O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida;

Meu Twitter: https://twitter.com/PauloAlmeida53

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domingo, 8 de janeiro de 2017

Mercados são racionais, agentes economicos sao racionais? Uma conferencia em Antuerpia

Recebo, da Sociedade de Historiadores da Economia à qual subscrevo, um "call for papers" para uma conferência em Antuérpia (cidade onde morei e fiz o meu mestrado) sobre a "Racionalidade na Economia", cuja explicação transcrevo mais abaixo.
Trata-se de um encontro entre acadêmicos, para acadêmicos, o que não impede que algumas das propostas de acadêmicos acabem convencendo políticos, ou conselheiros do Príncipe, e se convertendo em propostas de políticas concretas, de Estados ou organizações internacionais.
A OCDE, por exemplo, é supostamente um "templo" da racionalidade econômica, com seu exército de economistas e funcionários ministeriais dos governos dos países membros, todos eles motivados por diagnósticos realistas -- ou seja, racionais -- capazes de se traduzirem em políticas públicas "racionais". O mesmo deveria ocorrer, supostamente, com a Comissão de Bruxelas, supostamente (é preciso insistir no termo) aconselhando os governos a adotarem as políticas mais racionais, para a felicidade geral dos povos.
Trata-se de uma arrogância intelectual enorme, na qual tecnocratas supostamente (sempre) mais instruídos do que a média da população propõem políticas "racionais" para construir o bem estar e a felicidade dos povos. E quando os povos rejeitam suas soluções "racionais" os políticos ignoram isso e os tecnocratas tentam outra vez, até conseguirem implantar suas propostas "racionais" de algum jeito.
Esse é um dilema eterno, o conflito entre os "instintos primitivos" de simples cidadãos, agentes primários de mercados difusos, e a suposta expertise de "iluminados" burocratas, que assessoram aqueles que realmente fazem o casamento entre as partes: as vontades dos cidadãos (com todas as mentiras e a demagogia que isso implica por parte dos políticos) e a assessoria "esclarecida" dos tecnocratas que servem a esses "representantes" do povo.
Termino por aqui, apenas transcrevendo a parte central, que deve ter algum valor intelectual, do "call for papers" da European Society for the History of Economic Thought (mais informações aqui: http://www.eshet-antwerp.eu).

Rationality in Economics
Rationality is one of the defining concepts of economics. Standard economic theory routinely assumes that people behave rationally. Consumption decisions are taken to be made by utility maximising economic agents, and production decisions by profit maximising firms. Economists have also eagerly applied the rationality assumption to situations outside the traditional realm of economics. The economic analysis of crime and marriage are just two examples.
Throughout the history of economic thought debates have raged about the nature of rational behaviour. A case in point is the debate about rationality in situations of risk and uncertainty, set in motion by Maurice Allais’s experiments and the discovery of the Allais paradox. Game theory has been a fertile ground for the exploration of different puzzles and anomalies concerning rational behaviour. The prisoners’ dilemma, for instance, highlights the tension between individual and collective rationality.
A more radical departure can be seen in the development of new branches of economics, such as behavioural finance and behavioural macroeconomics. Scholars in these fields openly question the assumption that people behave rationally, and adopt behavioural assumptions which are perceived as more realistic. Recent work on ‘irrational exuberance’ (Robert J. Shiller) and ‘predictably irrational’ behaviour (Dan Ariely) illustrates this type of research. Going further back in history, John Maynard Keynes’s use of the phrase ‘animal spirits’ points in the same direction.
Clearly, there is a role for historians of economic thought to illuminate the central but changing place of the concept of rationality in the history of economics. Since the debates on rationality are far from over and continue to influence the way economics and related disciplines evolve today, the topic is of interest to more than just historians of thought. The theme of the 2017 conference therefore confirms ESHET’s belief that the study of the history of economic thought should in no way be disconnected from current issues in economics and beyond, and could in fact help provide historical perspectives on standard views about the subject.
Special attention will be granted to proposals which enrich our views on the role of rationality in the history of economic thought, from the origins up to today. Examples include:
·       Rationality and self-interest
·       Individual and social rationality
·       Rationality and uncertainty
·       Rationality and satisficing
·       Rationality in macroeconomics

David Fleischer: the good American informer (who else would do that?) - corruption

David Fleischer sent
Odebrecht -- In reaction to the lengthy report by the US Dept. of Justice on the “activities” of Odebrecht regarding BNDES loans/contracts in Latin America, several nations have now banned Odebrecht from bidding on any new contracts in their countries ➔ Peru, Ecuador and Panama.

    The list of bribes paid by Odebrecht is as follows (in US$ millions):

        Angola:      50         Brasil :    599  

        Argentina:  35        Colombia:     11

        Ecuador:    33.5     Dominican Repb.:    92

        Panama:   59        Guatemala:   18

        Peru :     29          Mozambique:     0.9

        Mexico :   10.5        Venezuela:  98

      PERU ➔ On 5th January, Odebrecht Peru signed a “Term of Cooperation” with the Peruvian federal prosecutors in support of the ongoing investigations.  Odebrecht agreed to offer a “guarantee” of 30 million Soles (R$ 28 million = US$ 9 million) in order to be allowed to operate in Peru.  This is not part of an eventual fine still under deliberation in Peru.  
 
Petrobras has requested that Brazilian courts block/freeze/confiscate R$12.5 billion held by firms and individuals involved in the corruption/bribe scheme that nearly destroyed Brazil’s large Petrol state enterprise – awaiting final court decisions that would return these funds to Petrobras.  Reportedly, R$ 1.35 billion have already been returned to Petrobras.

Guardamoria: "clausulas sociais" em navios negreiros - Paulo Werneck

Transcrevo, do meu amigo Paulo Werneck, re-descobridor de coisas velhas, como eu, esta postagem interessante:

Medidas para Regular os Negreiros
Paulo Werneck: Guardamoria
Posted: 07 Jan 2017 05:34 PM PST
 

Rugendas: Navio Negreiro
Fonte: Wikipedia

Charles Ralph Boxer (1904—2000), na página 6 de The Golden Age of Brazil faz referência a uma lei de 1664 que tentou limitar a carga dos navios que transportavam escravos negros de Angola para o Estado do Brasil.Esses navios também eram chamados tumbeiros, em inglês undertakers, em face da alta mortalidade dos negros durante a travessia, decorrente das condições insalubres e alimentação parca.

Encontrei a norma referida numa compilação publicada em 1857. Trata-se do Alvará de 23 de Setembro de 1664:

EU EL-REI faço saber aos que esta minha Provisão virem, que, tendo respeito ao que me representaram os moradores da Cidade de S. Paulo da Assumpção do Reino de Angola. em razão de se ter introduzido nelle, depois de sua restauração, despacharem os navios que sahem do porto da mesma Cidade dobradas peças de escravos do que requerem suas capacidades; e que, posto que se faça arqueação de seus portes, é feita por pessoas nomeadas pelos mestres, sem se fazer vestoria da aguada que levam; de que resultam consideraveis damnos, com o morte e perda de tantos escravos, em que a tem muito grande os homens de negocio, e os moradores d'aquelle Reino, attenuando-se com isso muito o Commercio. em diminuição dos direitos de minha Fazenda. - E respeitando ao que allegam, e informação que sofre a materia mandei tomar - hei por bem, e mando ao meu Governador do Reino de Angola. e ao Provedor de minha Fazenda delle, façam ter particular cuidado e vigilancia no despacho dos ditos navios, para que nenhum possa sahir do porto do Cidade de S. Paulo, sem levar, para cada cem peças, vinte e cinco pipas de agua, bem acondicionadas e arqueadas, e que nenhum leve mais peças do que seu porte podér levar, para que os ditos escravos possam ir à sua vontade, e não haver tanta mortandade nelles. E esta minha Provisão se cumprirá muito inteiramente como nella se contem, etc.

Anlonio Serrão a fez, em Lisboa, a 23 de Setembro de 1664. O Secretario Manoel Barreto de Sampayo a fez escrever. = REI.
Liv. XXV da Chancellaria. fol. 442.

Note-se que a norma não tem como base preocupações humanísticas, mas antes com os interesses da Coroa com a tributação - os negros eram mercadorias que seriam tributadas ao chegar ao Brasil - e com os interesses dos comerciantes, que perdiam as suas mercadorias frente à ganância dos transportadores.

A Cidade de S. Paulo da Assumpção do Reino de Angola refere-se à cidade de São Paulo da Assunção de Loanda, fundada em 25 de janeiro de 1576 pelo fidalgo e explorador português Paulo Dias de Novais, hoje conhecida como Luanda.

Restauração refere-se ao episódio da reconquista de Angola em 1648, após a expulsão dos holandeses, pelos portugueses (da península, do Estado do Brasil, até índios) comandados por Salvador Correia de Sá e Benevides.

Arqueação é um processo de medida do capacidade de carga de um navio, o que permitia definir quantos escravos poderiam ser transportados com relativa segurança quanto à integridade física deles, tendo em conta a ventilação, comida e água.

Aguada é o carregamento de água potável, para ser bebida, usada na cocção dos alimentos e higiene.

Peça é a quantidade de escravos. Um negro ou uma negra entre 15 e 25 anos de idade correspondia a uma peça; entre 8 e 14 e entre 26 a 35, tres contavam como duas peças; com menos de 8 anos ou entre 36 a 45, dois contavam como uma; de 46 em diante, ou doentes, eram avaliados por árbitros. Bebês não contavam e eram despachados com as mães e não eram valorados.

Boxer assevera que essa lei não pegou. Seja como for, outra foi baixada em 1684 e será oportunamente divulgada.

Um agradecimento especial aos responsáveis pelos sites www.iuslusitaniae.fcsh.unl.pt, donde foi extraída a norma, e www.newocr.com, que disponibilizou a ferramenta OCR para o trabalho pesado de conversão da imagem para texto.

Fontes:

BOXER, C. R. The Golden Age of Brazil • 1695-1750. Growing Pains of a Colonial Society. Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964.

PORTUGAL. Alvará de 23 de Setembro de 1664. Providências sobre despacho dos navios de escravos em Angola, para evitar a mortandade deles in SILVA, José Justino de Andrade. Collecção Chronologica da Legislação Portugueza. Segunda série (conclusão) 1675-1683. Suplemento à Segunda Série 1641-1685. Lisboa: Imprensa de F. X. de Sousa, 1857.

Desafios da politica externa brasileira na proxima decada: propostas de Oliver Stuenkel - comentarios PRAlmeida

Sob esse título pretendo organizar no IPRI, em Brasília (anunciarei oportunamente), um seminário-debate com boa parte dos autores da publicação 10 Desafios da Política Externa Brasileira (disponível neste link), organizada por Matias Spektor e editada recentemente pelo CEBRI e pela Fundação Konrad Adenauer.

Um dos autores, Oliver Stuenkel, possui livro e site próprios, sob o signo do Post Western World (sobre os quais também já efetuei apresentação com o próprio autor no IPRI em dezembro último (ver aqui).
Oliver apresentou numa de suas últimas postagens os dez desafios que ele acha que a diplomacia brasileira precisa enfrentar no futuro imediato e de médio prazo. Eles estão expressos aqui, e não vou debatê-los todos, em detalhe, neste momento, mas apenas referir-me a eles e fazer um rápido comentário sobre cada um genericamente.
Ao final desta postagem transcrevo a síntese de Daniel Buarque, do blog do Brasilianismo, sobre um desses desafios, o de explicar o Brasil ao mundo.

Quais são os dez desafios de política externa identificados por Oliver Stuenkel?

1. Help accelerate Brazil's economic recovery
2. Develop a regional long-term strategy vis-à-vis Venezuela
3. Manage the global corruption fallout
4. Explain Brazil's unique moment to the world 
5. Prepare for a more Asia-centric world
6. Design a strategy to address domestic violence
7. Recover Brazil's voice in global security matters — by starting at home
8. Tackle growing challenges in cyberspace
9. Strengthen BRICS, revive IBSA
10. Continue to work towards reforming international institutions        

Eu (PRA) diria, rapidamente o seguinte: 
Concordo, basicamente com quase todos esses "objetivos", ou desafios, mas descarto completamente o de número 9 -- por razões objetivas e de ordem subjetiva, minhas, de acordo com concepções de política externa que mantenho pessoalmente, mas que não vou explicar agora -- e diria que TODOS esses desafios não são exatamente de política externa, e sim de política doméstica, de interesse nacional brasileiro, desafios que temos como nação para o nosso próprio povo.
1) Acelerar o crescimento econômico é o básico de qualquer governança responsável num país atrasado relativa e absolutamente, e portanto a recuperação da GRANDE DESTRUIÇÃO causada pelos lulopetistas é absolutamente essencial para nossa própria sobrevivência. Talvez a política externa (ou mais exatamente a diplomacia) possa ajudar nessa tarefa, mas creio que existem limitações estruturais a isso, que têm a ver com as próprias concepções da diplomacia profissional. Vou me estender sobre isso mais adiante.
2) A Venezuela é certamente um problema para o Brasil, mas nenhuma solução pode ser externa e acho que o Brasil dos lulopetistas foi em grande medida responsável pelo que aconteceu naquele país. Mas não creio que precisamos ter uma estratégia de longo prazo para aquele país exclusivamente, e sim uma estratégia para a região como um todo, e ela passa pela formação, totalmente unilateral, de um espaço econômico aberto na região, bastando ao Brasil abrir-se aos demais, sem nenhuma negociação, apenas dando as regras pelas quais podemos favorecer a criação de uma zona de livre comércio regional.
3) e 4) A corrupção é coisa nossa, e eu não gastaria um centavo sequer tentando explicar o Brasil ao mundo: eu simplesmente faria um ENORME processo de reformas internas, abrindo o país, acabando com monopólios (estatais e privados), rebaixando o Estado ao mínimo indispensável, liberando as forças produtivas do país, da nação, ou seja, criando uma economia baseada nas liberdades e privatização geral de atividades econômicas e mesmo na prestação de serviços públicos. Ou seja, eu investiria TUDO num processo interno de reformas, e deixaria que isso produzisse efeitos primeiro para nós, que depois o mundo vai se dar conta de que, finalmente, ficamos grandes e responsáveis.
5), 7) e 8) Que o mundo esteja se tornando mais "Ásia-cêntrico" (o que é possível), não depende do Brasil, nem da política externa; são dinâmicas econômicas que escapam inclusive do controle dos próprios asiáticos em seus conjunto: apenas ocorre que esses países, por políticas domésticas e esquemas de interdependência regional e global, se tornaram propulsores da economia mundial e isso é bom para todos, para os que lideram o processo e mesmo para os atrasados como nós. Questões de segurança internacional e desafios do ciberespaço também dependem de reformas internas, que nos habilitem a participar da cooperação internacional nessas áreas de maneira útil, não de forma passiva como hoje. Continuo achando que são questões dependentes de reformas internas.
6) Violência doméstica é um assunto de foro íntimo, digamos assim, ou seja, uma tarefa absolutamente interna, que tem pouco a ver com a política externa. Um assunto de polícia e de políticas domésticas de segurança, e basicamente de revolução educacional, o que infelizmente não vai ocorrer tão cedo.
9) Como já disse, não dou nenhuma importância a isso, e apenas lamento que se perca tempo e dinheiro com coisas absolutamente inúteis para nossos grandes objetivos de desenvolvimento.
10) Não ligo tanto para as instituições internacionais, pois acho que elas têm muito pouco a contribuir para as reformas internas -- que são as que reputo mais relevantes -- e podem até influenciar negativamente na consecução de várias delas. O Brasil continua, infelizmente, a disputar os primeiros lugares dentre os "coitadinhos do mundo", e não acho que seja uma boa atitude para ajudar nas reformas internas.

Enfim, essas são considerações muito rápidas que faço sobre essas "teses" de política externa, que terei oportunidade de discutir mais extensamente com o próprio autor.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Agora:

Explicar o Brasil ao mundo é um dos 10 desafios de política externa do país
Daniel Buarque
Blog Brasilianismo, 6/01/2017

Explicar o Brasil ao mundo é um dos desafios de política externa do país, diz analista

O momento histórico vivido pelo Brasil em meio às crises política e econômica que assolam o país é único, muda a realidade dos objetivos da diplomacia nacional e precisa ser traduzido para o mundo. Fazer com que estrangeiros entendam o que se passa no país é um dos maiores desafios da política externa brasileira em 2017, segundo o cientista político Oliver Stuenkel, professor de Relações Internacionais da FGV e membro não residente do Instituto Global de Política Pública (GPPi), em Berlim.

Em um artigo publicado no seu site ''Post Western World'', Stuenkel listou os 10 principais desafios da diplomacia brasileira neste momento de crise, em que evitar o declínio do país se tornou prioridade. Ele inclui esta questão da imagem do país como 4º ponto da lista.

Segundo ele, a Lava Jato alterou a forma como a política e os negócios funcionam no Brasil, ''possivelmente mudando para sempre a tolerância com a corrupção''. Apesar de ser algo importante, isso ''paralisou temporariamente alguns atores-chave, que precisam aprender como se envolver de forma apropriada, com consequências de curto prazo negativas'', avalia.

''A política externa brasileira precisa mostrar a observadores internacionais que isso é, acima de tudo, um desenvolvimento positivo, já que vai fazer com que o Brasil se torne mais moderno, transparente e democrático. Apenas se isso for comunicado de forma bem-sucedida, investidores de todo o mundo vão ajudar o Brasil a se recuperar da sua pior recessão na história'', explica.

Além de explicar o Brasil atual aos estrangeiros, Stuenkel diz que a diplomacia brasileira tem como desafios: Ajudar a acelerar a recuperação econômica do Brasil; desenvolver uma estratégia regional de longo prazo em relação à Venezuela; administrar as consequências da corrupção em escala global; preparar o país para um mundo mais centrado na Ásia; desenvolver uma estratégia para lidar com a violência doméstica; recuperar a voz do Brasil em questões globais de segurança; lidar com desafios crescentes no ciberespaço; fortalecer os Bric; e continuar trabalhando para reformar as instituições internacionais.

''A política externa do Brasil sob seus três presidentes anteriores — Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva e Dilma Rousseff — foi formada, apesar de alguns passos atrás e acima de tudo, por desafios na administração da ascensão do Brasil e sua transformação em um ator moderno e visível globalmente. O governo interino de Michel Temer, ao contrário, busca impedir o declínio do Brasil enquanto a maior economia da América Latina entra o que pode se tornar o quarto ano seguido com crescimento negativo ou próximo de zero", explica.

sábado, 7 de janeiro de 2017

Protecionismo a la Trump: destruindo empregos e diminuindo a criacao de riqueza nos EUA


UP FRONT

Trump’s trade policy: protecting American workers at the expense of American consumers

Dany Bahar
    When markets closed on January 3, 2017, Ford Motor Co. stock had strengthened by 3.79 percent. That same day, the company announced it would be canceling plans to build a $1.6 billion plant in Mexico and, instead, expand one of its factories in Michigan to produce more cars on American soil. How is it possible that this change of course—which would result in higher costs of production—was so welcomed by markets? The answer: President-elect Donald Trump.
    Ford’s investors probably expected that such a move would get the company a sweet deal in the form of tax cuts or other perks, following the precedent set by Mr. Trump when he offered $7 million in state tax credits to Carrier to keep them from relocating production facilities abroad. Certainly, this precedent creates incentives for any large firm to announce relocation in the morning and then retracting in the afternoon. Will the new “dealmaker-in-chief” go firm by firm in negotiations to keep them from relocating? That remains to be seen. However, in parallel, President-elect Trump plans to impose a tariff of 35 percent on imports from any firm, American or not, based outside of the U.S. Trump strongly believes that protectionism is what will protect the American workers. He is wrong.
    According to the World Trade Organization (WTO) website, based on 2014 data, the U.S. has an average applied tariff of 3.51 percent for all products being imported from other WTO members (known as the most-favored nation, or MFN, tariff). This is the maximum tariff that the U.S. promises to impose on imports from other WTO members, averaged across all industries. For other nations that the U.S. has a free-trade agreement, such as Canada and Mexico through NAFTA, tariffs are typically lower and in some cases, zero. Mr. Trump is basically advocating for a tenfold increase in the average import tariffs that are already in place. Is any WTO member imposing import tariffs that are anything near 35 percent? Not at all.
    When looking at non-agricultural goods, the average MFN import tariff on the US is 3.24 percent. The Bahamas is the only country in the world that has an average tariff for non-agricultural goods above 35 percent, and it is not a fully-fledged member of the WTO. For goods in the manufacturing sector, such as the electrical machinery industry—the category that Carrier would classify in—the average MNF tariff on U.S. products is only 1.66 percent. Some of the WTO members with the highest average tariffs for products in this category are Chad (16.82 percent), Pakistan (14.43 percent), Brazil (14.07 percent), Argentina (14.81 percent), and Zimbabwe (13 percent). For transport equipment, such as cars, the U.S. average MFN tariff is 3.06 percent, whereas some examples of the most protectionist WTO members in that category are Pakistan (24.38 percent), India (21.7 percent), and Thailand (20.68 percent). In short, charging a 35 percent import tariffs to other WTO members is the exception, not the rule. Imposing higher tariffs is, in fact, common only in developing and poor countries.
    Beyond making comparisons, it is important to raise a few points on why dramatically raising import tariffs is a bad idea. Not only will it not protect the American worker, it will strongly hurt the American consumer. This is simply because if imports turn out to be more expensive than before, it is the American consumers, and no one else, who will have to pay for that extra 35 percent that will be added to goods’ price tags. Alternatively, one may think, Americans can start consuming more local goods, and therefore their price tags won’t be affected. However, not everything “Made in USA” is cheaper in the U.S.: If these goods were being imported before, it is because American producers were not competitive enough to begin with; therefore, the American version of these goods are more expensive. Also, in the absence of foreign competition, American producers could raise prices, therefore reducing the purchasing power of consumers.
    In addition, imposing tariffs do not unequivocally protect American workers. By increasing import tariffs to other WTO members, the U.S. will be more prone to retaliations by its trade partners. Other countries could decide to retaliate by increasing their own import tariffs, putting American jobs in jeopardy, as these exporter firms could harshly suffer from the lower global demand for their products. This is highly critical to consider, as most of the countries that export to the U.S. also import from the U.S. ( China, Canada, and Mexico being the top three).
    Of course, the notion that trade has winners and losers isn’t wrong. David Autor, a professor of economics at MIT together with David Dorn from the University of Zurich and Gordon Hanson from the University of California, San Diego, have shown that higher Chinese import penetration in U.S. localities resulted in less manufacturing jobs. But, imports—let alone Chinese imports—cannot account for all U.S. job losses in manufacturing during the last decade. As Harvard Professor Ricardo Hausmann explains in a Project Syndicate piece, a look at the numbers suggests that the manufacturing jobs lost in the US since 1993 (before NAFTA came into effect) until 2014 did not end up in Mexico. Many of these jobs , in fact, went missing due to higher labor productivity and advances in technology and automation, which have little to do with low trade tariffs.
    Therefore, the right course of action to protect American workers is not to protect the U.S. from foreign competition but rather to put proper safety nets in place to assist affected workers in their transition to new jobs in advanced manufacturing or the service sector, or even to retirement. Trade protectionism is the wrong policy, not only because it aims to protect the American workers at the expense of the consumers, but also because it will harm the most important determinant of economic growth: productivity. Competition, which foreign trade is a crucial part of, is one of the most important sources of wealth, productivity, and economic growth. If the president-elect ignores this, he will fail in his mission of bringing greatness to America.

    sexta-feira, 6 de janeiro de 2017

    William Perry: o profeta do apocalipse nuclear ataca outra vez - Politico.com

    Bill Perry is Terrified. Why Aren't You?
    By John F. Harris and Bryan Bender
    Politico magazine, 01/06/2017 05:08 AM EDT

    At this naked moment in the American experiment, when many people perceive civilization on the verge of blowing up in some metaphorical sense, there is an elderly man in California hoping to seize your attention about another possibility.

    It is that civilization is on the verge of blowing up in a non-metaphorical sense.

    William J. Perry is 89 now, at the tail end of one of his generation's most illustrious careers in national security. By all rights, the former U.S. secretary of Defense, a trained mathematician who served or advised nearly every administration since Eisenhower, should be filling out the remainder of his years in quiet reflection on his achievements. Instead, he has set out on an urgent pilgrimage.

    Bill Perry has become, he says with a rueful smile, "a prophet of doom."

    His life's work, most of it highly classified, was nuclear weapons-how to maximize the fearsome deterrent power of the U.S. arsenal, how to minimize the possibility that the old Soviet arsenal would obliterate the United States and much of the planet along the way. Perry played a supporting role in the Cuban Missile Crisis, during which he went back to his Washington hotel room each night, fearing he had only hours left to live. He later founded his own successful defense firm, helped revolutionize the American way of high-tech war, and honed his diplomatic skills seeking common ground on security issues with the Soviets and Chinese-all culminating as head of the Pentagon in the early years after the end of the Cold War.

    Nuclear bombs are an area of expertise Perry had assumed would be largely obsolete by now, seven decades after Hiroshima, a quarter-century after the fall of the Soviet Union, and in the flickering light of his own life. Instead, nukes are suddenly-insanely , by Perry's estimate-once again a contemporary nightmare, and an emphatically ascendant one. At the dawn of 2017, there is a Russian president making bellicose boasts about his modernized arsenal. There is an American president-elect who breezily free-associates on Twitter about starting a new nuclear arms race. Decades of cooperation between the two nations on arms control is nearly at a standstill. And, unlike the original Cold War, this time there is a world of busy fanatics excited by the prospect of a planet with more bombs-people who have already demonstrated the desire to slaughter many thousands of people in an instant, and are zealously pursuing ever more deadly means to do so.

    And there's one other difference from the Cold War: Americans no longer think about the threat every day.

    Nuclear war isn't the subtext of popular movies, or novels; disarmament has fallen far from the top of the policy priority list. The largest upcoming generation, the millennials, were raised in a time when the problem felt largely solved, and it's easy for them to imagine it's still quietly fading into history. The problem is, it's no longer fading. "Today, the danger of some sort of a nuclear catastrophe is greater than it was during the Cold War," Perry said in an interview in his Stanford office, "and most people are blissfully unaware of this danger."

    It is a turn of events that has an old man newly obsessed with a question: Why isn't everyone as terrified as he is?

    Perry's hypothesis for the disconnect is that much of the population, especially that rising portion with no clear memories of the first Cold War, is suffering from a deficit of comprehension. Even a single nuclear explosion in a major city would represent an abrupt and possibly irreversible turn in modern life, upending the global economy, forcing every open society to suspend traditional liberties and remake itself into a security state. "The political, economic and social consequences are beyond what people understand," Perry says. And yet many people place this scenario in roughly the same category as the meteor strike that supposedly wiped out the dinosaurs-frightening, to be sure, but something of an abstraction.

    So Perry regards his last great contribution of a 65-year career as a crusade to stimulate the public imagination-to share the vivid details of his own nightmares. He is doing so in a recent memoir, in a busy public speaking schedule, in half-empty hearing rooms on Capitol Hill, and increasingly with an online presence aimed especially at young people. He has enlisted the help of his 28-year-old granddaughter to figure out how to engage a new generation, including through a series of virtual lectures known as a MOOC, or massive open online course.

    He is eagerly signing up for "Ask Me Anything" chats on Reddit, in which some people still confuse him with William "The Refrigerator" Perry of NFL fame. He posts his ruminations on YouTube, where they give Katy Perry no run for her money, even as the most popular are closing in on 100,000 views.

    One of the nightmare scenarios Perry invokes most often is designed to roust policymakers who live and work in the nation's capital. The terrorists would need enriched uranium. Due to the elaborate and highly industrial nature of production, hard to conceal from surveillance, fissile material is still hard to come by-but, alas, far from impossible. Once it is procured, with help from conspirators in a poorly secured overseas commercial power centrifuge facility, the rest of the plot as Perry imagines it is no great technological or logistical feat. The mechanics of building a crude nuclear device are easily within the reach of well-educated and well-funded militants. The crate would arrive at Dulles International Airport, disguised as agricultural freight. The truck bomb that detonates on Pennsylvania Avenue between the White House and Capitol instantly kills the president, vice president, House speaker, and 80,000 others.

    Where exactly is your office? Your house? And then, as Perry spins it forward, how credible would you find the warnings, soon delivered to news networks, that five more bombs are set to explode in unnamed U.S. cities, once a week for the next month, unless all U.S. military personnel overseas are withdrawn immediately?

    If this particular scenario does not resonate with you, Perry can easily rattle off a long roster of others-a regional war that escalates into a nuclear exchange, a miscalculation between Moscow and Washington, a computer glitch at the exact wrong moment. They are all ilks of the same theme-the dimly understood threat that the science of the 20th century is set to collide with the destructive passions of the 21st.

    "We're going back to the kind of dangers we had during the Cold War," Perry said. "I really thought in 1990, 1991, 1992, that we left those behind us. We're starting to re-invent them. We and the Russians and others don't understand that what we're doing is re-creating those dangers-or maybe they don't remember the dangers. For younger people, they didn't live through those dangers. But when you live through a Cuban Missile Crisis up close and you live through a false alarm up close, you do understand how dangerous it is, and you believe you should do everything you could possibly do to [avoid] going back."

    ***

    For people who follow the national security priesthood, the dire scenarios are all the more alarming for who is delivering them. Through his long years in government Perry invariably impressed colleagues as the calmest person in the room, relentlessly rational, such that people who did not know him well-his love of music and literature and travel-regarded his as a purely analytical mind, emotion subordinated to logic and duty.

    Starting in the 1950s as a technology executive and entrepreneur in some of the most secretive precincts of the defense industry, he gradually took on a series of high-level government assignments that gave him one of the most quietly influential careers of the Cold War and its aftermath.

    Fifteen years before serving as Bill Clinton's secretary of defense, Perry was the Pentagon official in charge of weapons research during the Carter administration. It was from this perch that he may have had his most far-reaching impact, and left him in some circles as a legendary figure. He used his office to give an essential push to two ideas that transformed warfare over the next generation decisively to American advantage. One idea was stealth technology, which allowed U.S. warplanes to fly over enemy territory undetected. The other was precision-guided munitions, which allowed U.S. bombs to land with near-perfect accuracy.

    During the Clinton years, Perry so prized his privacy that he initially turned down the job of Defense secretary-changing his mind only after Clinton and Al Gore pleaded with him that the news media scrutiny wouldn't be so bad.

    The reputation he built over a life in the public sphere is starkly at odds with this latest highly impassioned chapter of Perry's career. Harold Brown, whoalso is 89, first recruited Perry into government, and was Perry's boss while serving as Defense secretary in the Carter years. "No one would have thought of Bill Perry as a crusader," he says. "But he is on a crusade."

    Lee Perry, his wife of nearly 70 years, is living in an elder care facility, her once buoyant presence now lost to dementia. Perry himself, lucid as ever, has seen his physical frame become frail and stooped. Rather than slowing his schedule, he has accelerated his travels to plead with people to awaken to the danger. A trip to Washington includes a dinner with national security reporters and testimony on Capitol Hill. Back home in California, he's at the Google campus to prod engineers to contemplate that their world may not last long enough for their dreams of technology riches to come true. He's created an advocacy group, the William J. Perry project, devoted to public education about nuclear weapons. He's enlisted both his granddaughter and his 64-year-old daughter, Robin Perry in the cause.

    But if his profile is rising, his style is essentially unchanged. He is a man known for self-effacement, trying to shape an era known for relentless self-promotion, a voice of quiet precision in a time of devil-take-the-hindmost bombast. The rational approach to problem-solving that propelled his career and won him adherents and friends in both political parties and even among some of America's erstwhile enemies remains his guide-in this case, by endeavoring to calculate the possibilities and probabilities of a terrorist attack, regional nuclear war, or horrible miscalculation with Russia.

    "I want to be very clear," he said. "I do not think it is a probability this year or next year or anytime in the foreseeable future. But the consequence is so great, we have to take it seriously. And there are things to greatly lower those possibilities that we're simply not doing."

    ***

    Perry really did not expect he would have to write this chapter of his public life. His official career closed with what seemed then an unambiguous sense of mission accomplished. By the time he arrived in the Pentagon's top job in 1994, the Cold War was over, and the main item on the nuclear agenda seemed to be cleaning up no-longer-needed arsenals. As defense secretary, Perry stood with his Russian counterpart, Pavel Grachev, as they jointly blew up missile silos in the former Soviet Union and tilled sunflower seeds in the dirt.

    "I finally thought by the end of the '80s we lived through this horrible experience and it's behind us," Perry said. "When I was secretary, I fully believed it was behind us."

    After leaving the Pentagon, he accepted an assignment from Clinton to negotiate an end to North Korea's nuclear development program-and seemed agonizingly close to a breakthrough as the last days of the president's term expired.

    Now, he sees his grandchildren inheriting a planet possibly more dangerous than it was during his public career. No one could doubt that the Sept. 11 terrorists would have gladly used nuclear bombs instead of airplanes if they had had them, and it seems only a matter of time until they try. Instead of a retreating threat in North Korea, that fanatical regime now possesses as many as eight nuclear bombs, and is just one member of a growing nuclear club. Far from a new partnership with Russia, Vladimir Putin has given old antagonisms a malevolent new face. American policymakers talk of spending up to $1 trillion to modernize the nuclear arsenal. And now comes Donald Trump with a long trail of statements effectively shrugging his shoulders about a world newly bristling with bombs and people with reasons to use them.

    Perry knew Hillary Clinton well professionally, and says he admired both her and Bill Clinton for their professional judgment though he was never a personal intimate of either. He was prescient before the election in expressing skepticism about how voters would respond to the dynastic premise of the Clinton campaign-a healthy democracy should grow new voices-but was as surprised as everyone else on Election Day. Donald Trump was not the voice he was looking for, to put it mildly, but he has responded to the Trump cyclone with modulated restraint. Perry said he assumes his most truculent rhetoric isn't serious, the utterances of a man who assumed his words were for political effect only and had no real consequences.

    Now that they do, Perry is hoping to serve as a kind of ambassador to rationality. He said he is hoping for audiences soon, with Trump if the incoming president will see him, and certainly Trump's national security team, which includes several people Perry knows, including Defense Secretary nominee James Mattis.

    There is little doubt the message if the meeting comes. "We are starting a new Cold War," he says. "We seem to be sleepwalking into this new nuclear arms race. ... We and the Russians and others don't understand what we are doing."

    "I am not suggesting that this Cold War and this arms race is identical to the old one," Perry added. "But in many ways, it is just as bad, just as dangerous. And totally unnecessary."

    ***

    Perry had been brooding over the question for a year. It was in the early 1950s, he was still in his 20s, and the subject was partial differential equations-the topic of his Ph.D. thesis. A particular problem had been absorbing him, day in and day out, hours and hours on end. Then, out of nowhere, a light came on.

    "I woke up in the middle of the night, and it was all there," Perry recalled. "It was all there, and I got out of bed and sat down. The next two or three hours, I wrote my thesis, and from the first word I wrote down, I never doubted what the last word was going to be: It was a magic moment.

    The story is a reminder of something definitional about Bill Perry. Before he became in recent years an apostle of disarmament, before he sat atop the nation's war-making apparatus in the 1990s, before he was the executive of a defense contractor specializing in the most complex arenas of Cold War surveillance in the 1960s, he was a young man in love with mathematics.

    In those days, Perry had planned on a career as a math professor. His attraction to math was not merely practical, in the way that engineers or architects rely on math. The appeal was just as much aesthetic, in ways that people who are not numbers people-political life tends to be dominated by word people-cannot easily comprehend. To Perry's mind, there was a purity to math, a beauty to the patterns and relationships, that was not unlike music. Math for Perry represented analytical discipline, a way of achieving mastery not only over numerical problems but any hard problem, by breaking it down into essential parts, distilling complexity into simplicity.

    This trait was why Pentagon reporters in the 1990s liked spending time around Perry. When most public officials are asked a question, one studies the transcript later to decipher a succession of starts and stalls, sentence fragments and ellipses, that cumulatively convey an impressionistic sense of mind but no clear fixed meaning. Perry's sentences, by contrast, always cut with surgical precision. It was one reason Clinton White House officials often held their breath when he gave interviews-Perry might make news by being clear on subjects, such as ethnic warfare in the Balkans or a nuclear showdown in North Korea, that the West Wing preferred to try to fog over.

    "I've never been able to attack a policy problem with a mathematical formula," he recalled, "but I have always believed that the rigorous way of thinking about a problem was good. It separated the fact from the bullshit, and that's very important sometimes, to separate what you can from what you would hope you can do."

    Perry wishes more people were familiar with the concept of "expected value." That is a statistical way of understanding events of very large magnitude that have a low probability. The large magnitude event could be something good, like winning a lottery ticket. Or it could be something bad, like a nuclear bomb exploding. Because the odds of winning the lottery are so low, the rational thing is to save your money and not buy the ticket. As for a nuclear explosion, by Perry's lights, the consequences are so grave that the rational thing would be for people in the United States and everywhere to be in a state of peak alarm about their vulnerability, and for political debate to be dominated by discussion of how to reduce the risk.

    And just how high is the risk? The answer of course is ultimately unknowable. Perry's point, though, is that it's a hell of a lot higher than you think.

    Perry invites his listeners to consider all the various scenarios that might lead to a nuclear event. "Mathematically speaking, you add those all together in one year it is still just a possibility, not a probability," he reckons. "But then you go out ten, twenty years and each time this possibility repeats itself, and then it starts to become a probability. How much time we have to get those possibility numbers lower, I don't know. But sooner or later the odds are going to get us, I am afraid."

    ***

    Almost uniquely among living Americans, Bill Perry has actually faced down the prospect of nuclear war before- twice.

    In the fall of 1962, Bill Perry was 35, father of five young children, living in the Bay Area and serving as director of Sylvania's Electronic Defense Laboratories-driving his station wagon to recitals in between studying missile trajectories and the radius of nuclear detonations.

    Where he resided was not then called Silicon Valley, but the exuberance and spirit of creative possibility we now associate with the region was already evident. The giants then were Bill Hewlett and David Packard, men Perry deeply admired and wished to emulate in his own business career. The innovation engine at that time, however, was not consumer technology; it was the government's appetite for advantage in a mortal struggle against a powerful Soviet foe. Perry was known as a star in the highly complex field of weapons surveillance and interpretation.

    So it was not a surprise, one bright October day, for Perry to get a call from Albert "Bud" Wheelon, a friend at the Central Intelligence Agency. Wheelon said he wanted Perry in Washington for a consultation. Perry said he'd juggle his schedule and be there the next week.

    "No," Wheelon responded. "I need to see you right away."

    Perry caught the red-eye from San Francisco, and went straight to the CIA, where he was handed photographs whose meaning was instantly clear to him. They were of Soviet missiles stationed in Cuba. For the next couple weeks, Perry would stay up past midnight each evening poring over the latest reconnaissance photos and help write the analysis that senior officials would present the next morning to President Kennedy.

    Perry experienced the crisis partly as ordinary citizen, hearing Kennedy on television draw an unambiguous line against Soviet missiles in this hemisphere and promising that any attack would be met with "a full retaliatory response." But he possessed context, about the capabilities of weapons and the daily state of play in the crisis, that gave him a vantage point superior to that of all but perhaps a few dozen people.

    "I was part of a small team-six or eight people," he recounted of those days 54 years earlier. "Half of them technical experts, half of them intelligence analysts, or photo interpreters. It was a minor role but I was seeing all the information coming in. I thought every day when I went back to the hotel it was the last day of my life because I knew exactly what nuclear weapons could do. I knew it was not just a lot of people getting killed. It was the end of civilization and I thought it was about to happen."

    It was years later that Perry, like other more senior participants in the crisis, learned how right that appraisal was. Nuclear bombs weren't only heading toward Cuba on Soviet ships, as Kennedy believed and announced to Americans at the time. Some of them were already there, and local commanders had been given authority to use them if Americans launched a preemptive raid on Cuba, as Kennedy was being urged, goaded even, by Air Force Gen. Curtis LeMay and other military commanders. At the same time, Soviet submarines were armed and one commander had been on the verge of launching them until other officers on the vessel talked him out of it. Either event would have in turn sent U.S. missiles flying.

    The Cuban Missile Crisis recounting is one of the dramatic peaks in "My Journey on the Nuclear Brink," the memoir Perry published last fall. It is a book laced with other close calls -- like November 9, 1979, when Perry was awakened in the middle of the night by a watch officer at the North American Aerospace and Defense Command (NORAD) reporting that his computers showed 200 Soviet missiles in flight toward the United States. For a frozen moment, Perry thought: This is it-This is how it ends.

    The watch officer soon set him at ease. It was a computer error, and he was calling to see whether Perry, the technology expert, had any explanation. It took a couple days to discover the low-tech answer: Someone had carelessly left a crisis-simulation training tape in the computer. All was well. But what if this blunder had happened in the middle of a real crisis, with leaders in Washington and Moscow already on high alert? The inescapable conclusion was the same as it was in 1962: The world skirting nuclear Armageddon as much by good luck as by skilled crisis management.

    Perry is part of a distinct cohort in American history, one that didn't come home with the large-living ethos of the World War II generation, but took responsibility for cleaning up the world that the war bequeathed. He was a 14-year-old in Butler, Pennsylvania when he heard the news of the Pearl Harbor attack in a friend's living room, and had the disappointed realization that the war might be over by the time he was old enough to fight in it. That turned out to be true-he was just shy of 18 at war's end--a fact that places Perry in what demographers have called the "Silent Generation," too young for one war but already middle-aged by the time college campuses erupted over Vietnam. Like many in his generation, Perry was not so much silent as deeply dutiful, with an understated style that served as a genial, dry-witted exterior to a life in which success was defined by how faithfully one met his responsibilities.

    Perry said he became aware, first gradually and over time profoundly, of the surreal contradictions of his professional life. His work-first at Sylvania and then at ESL, a highly successful defense contracting firm he co-founded in 1963-was relentlessly logical, analyzing Soviet threats and intentions and coming up with rational responses to deter them. But each rational move was part of a supremely irrational dynamic - "mutually assured destruction" - that placed the threat of massive casualties at the heart of America's basic strategic thinking. It was the kind of framework in which policymakers could accept that a mere 25 million people dead was good news. Also the kind that in one year alone led the United States to produce 8,000 nuclear bombs. By the end, the Cold War left the planet with about 70,000 bombs (a total that is now down to about 15,500).

    "I think probably everybody who was involved in nuclear weapons in those days would see the two sides of it," Perry recalls, "the logic of deterrence and the madness of deterrence, and there was no mistake, I think, that the acronym was MAD."

    ***

    Perry has been at the forefront of a movement that he considers the sane and only alternative, and he has joined forces with other leading Cold Warriors who in another era would likely have derided their vision as naïve. In January 2007, he was a co-author of a remarkable commentary that ran on the op-ed page of the Wall Street Journal. It was signed also by two former secretaries of state, George Schulz and Henry Kissinger and by Sam Nunn, a former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee - all leading military hawks and foreign policy realists who came together to argue for something radical: that the goal of U.S. policy should be not merely the reduction and control of atomic arms, it should be the ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons.

    This sounded like gauzy utopianism, especially bizarre coming from supremely pragmatic men. But Perry and the others always made clear they were describing a long-term ideal, one that would only be achieved through a series of more incremental steps. The vision was stirring enough that it was endorsed by President Obama in his opening weeks in office, in a March 2009 address in Prague.

    In retrospect, Obama's speech may have been the high point for the vision of abolition. "A huge amount of progress was made," recalled Shultz, now 93. "Now it is going in the other direction."

    "We have less danger of an all-out war with Russia," in Nunn's view. "But we have more danger of some type of accident, miscalculation, cyber interference, a terrorist group getting a nuclear weapon. It requires a lot more attention than world leaders are giving it." Perry's goal now is much more defensive than it was just a few years ago-halting what has become inexorable momentum toward reviving Cold War assumptions about the central role of nukes in national security.

    More recently he's added yet another recruit to his cause: California Governor Jerry Brown. Brown, now 78, met Perry a year ago, after deciding that he wanted to devote his remaining time in public service mainly to what he sees as civilization's two existential issues, climate change and nuclear weapons. Brown said he became fixated on spreading Perry's message after reading his memoir, which he reviewed for the New York Review of Books. He recently gave a copy to President Obama and is trying to bend the ear of others with influence in Washington.

    If Bill Perry has a gift for understatement, Brown has a gift for the theatrical. In an interview at the governor's mansion in Sacramento, he wonders why everyone is not paying attention to his new friend and his warnings for mankind.

    "He is at the brink! At the brink! Not WAS at the brink-IS at the brink," Brown exclaimed. "But no one else is."

    A California governor can have more influence, at least indirectly, than one might think, due to the state's outsized role in policy debates and the fact that the University of California's Board of Regents helps manage some of the nation's top weapons laboratories, which study and design nuclear weapons. Brown, who was a vocal critic in the 1980s of what he called America's "nuclear addiction, reviewed Perry's recent memoir in the New York Review of Books, and said he is determined to help his new friend spread his message.

    "Everybody is, 'we are not at the brink,' and we have this guy Perry who says we are. It is the thesis that is being ignored."

    Even if more influential people wake up to Perry's message-a nuclear event is more likely and will be more terrible than you realize-a hard questions remains: Now what?

    This is where Perry's pragmatism comes back into play. The smartest move, he thinks, is to eliminate the riskiest part of the system. If we can't eliminate all nukes, Perry argues, we could at least eliminate one leg of the so-called nuclear triad, intercontinental ballistic missiles. These are especially prone to an accidental nuclear war, if they are launched by accident or due to miscalculation by a leader operating with only minutes to spare. Nuclear weapons carried by submarines beneath the sea or aboard bomber planes, he argues, are logically more than enough to deter Russia.

    The problem, he knows, is that logic is not necessarily the prevailing force in political debates. Psychology is, and this seems to be dictating not merely that we deter a Russian military force that is modernizing its weapons but that we have a force that is self-evidently superior to them.

    It is an argument that strikes Perry as drearily familiar to the old days. Which leads him the conclusion that the only long-term way out is to persuade a younger generation to make a different choice.

    His granddaughter, Lisa Perry, is precisely in the cohort he needs to reach. At first she had some uncomfortable news for her grandfather: Not many in her generation thought much about the issue.

    "The more I learned from him about nuclear weapons the more concerned I was that my generation had this massive and dangerous blind spot in our understanding of the world," she said in an interview. "Nuclear weapons are the biggest public health issue I can think of."

    But she has not lost hope that their efforts can make a difference, and today she has put her graduate studies in public health on hold to work full time for the Perry Project as its social media and web manager. "It can be easy to get discouraged about being able to do anything to change our course," she said. "But the good news is that nuclear weapons are actually something that we as humans can control...but first we need to start the conversation."

    It was with her help that Perry went on Reddit to field questions ranging from how his PhD in mathematics prepared him to what young people need to understand.

    "As a 90s baby I never lived in the Cold War era," wrote one participant, with the Reddit username BobinForApples. "What is one thing today's generations will never understand about life during the Cold War?"

    Perry's answered, as SecDef19: "Because you were born in the 1990s, you did not experience the daily terror of 'duck and cover' drills as my children did. Therefore the appropriate fear of nuclear weapons is not part of your heritage, but the danger is just as real now as it was then. It will be up to your generation to develop the policies to deal with the deadly nuclear legacy that is still very much with us."

    For the former defense secretary, the task now is to finally-belatedly-prove Einstein wrong. The physicist said in 1946: "The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophe."

    In Perry's view the only way to avoid it is by directly contemplating catastrophe - and doing so face to face with the world's largest nuclear power, Russia, as he recently did in a forum in Luxembourg with several like-minded Russians he says are brave enough to speak out about nuclear dangers in the era of Putin.

    "We could solve it," he said. "When you're a prophet of doom, what keeps you going is not just prophesizing doom but saying there are things we do to avoid that doom. That's where the optimism is."

    To view online:
    http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/01/william-perry-nuclear-weapons-proliferation-214604

    Ainda Roberto Campos, com Marx e Hayek, discutindo a politica companheira - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

    Este artigo é também sobre Roberto Campos, no terceiro ano de sua morte, batendo um papinho sobre as políticas econômicas companheiras com dois colegas economistas:


    1333. “O que Roberto Campos estaria pensando da política econômica?”, Brasília, 30 setembro 2004, 4 p. Ensaio colocando RC em conversa com Keynes, Hayek e Marx, no limbo, a propósito do terceiro ano de sua morte. Preparada versão reduzida, sob o título de “O que Roberto Campos pensaria da política econômica”, publicada no O Estado de São Paulo (sábado, 9/10/2004, caderno Econômico, p. B2). Reproduzido in totum no site do jornalista Diego Casagrande (Porto Alegre: 8/11/2004) e no site do Ministério do Planejamento. Relação de Publicados n. 498.


    O que Roberto Campos estaria pensando da política econômica?

    Paulo Roberto de Almeida
    Preparada versão reduzida, sob o título
    “O que Roberto Campos pensaria da política econômica”,
    publicada no caderno econômico d’O Estado de São Paulo
    (Sábado, 9 de outubro de 2004, p. B2;
    Relação de Publicados nº 471.

    No dia 9 de outubro se estará ultrapassando a marca dos três primeiros anos do falecimento, em 2001, do diplomata, economista, administrador público, político e pensador Roberto Campos, que foi também um comentarista cáustico e voluntariamente impiedoso de nossas (ir)realidades quotidianas e bizarrices institucionais. Infelizmente para nós (mas talvez felizmente para os seus adversários “filosóficos”), ele não viveu o suficiente para assistir, a partir de 2002, a uma das mais formidáveis revoluções intelectuais já registradas em toda a história do Brasil: nada mais, nada menos do que a incrível conversão da água em vinho, isto é, a transformação do antigo partido adepto das rupturas econômicas – e propenso a fazer passar as “prioridades sociais” antes do respeito aos contratos da dívida – em um grupo comprometido com a responsabilidade fiscal, com a boa gestão das contas públicas e, surpresa das surpresas, com a aceitação decidida e consentida, não só da renovação do acordo de assistência financeira com o FMI, como também das condicionalidades associadas ao seu “menu” de política econômica (mais parecido a um regime de emagrecimento do que a uma churrascaria rodízio).
    O que estaria pensando de tudo isso o iconoclasta, irônico e irreverente Roberto Campos? O que estaria escrevendo a respeito da atual política econômica o mais arguto dos polemistas brasileiros contemporâneos, o homem a quem seus inimigos políticos teimavam em chamar de “Bob Fields”, como se ele fosse menos patriota ou menos comprometido com o interesse nacional do que aqueles que o provocavam com slogans mal concebidos, mas que hesitavam em (ou simplesmente evitavam) enfrentá-lo num debate aberto e responsável sobre esses temas candentes da atualidade econômica?
    Onde quer que ele possa estar no presente momento – e eu o imagino no limbo econômico das soluções imperfeitas, como compete a todos os partidários da disciplina da escassez, esses adeptos realistas da “ciência lúgubre”, sentado confortavelmente à esquerda de Hayek e à direita de Keynes –, ele deve estar soltando gostosas gargalhadas, comentando com seus incrédulos parceiros essa verdadeira “reversão de expectativas” a que o Brasil assistiu nos últimos dois anos e meio. Vamos imaginar um possível diálogo entre os três, com algumas rápidas incursões por parte de Marx (também, e mais do que nunca, no limbo) e uma única e breve intervenção do seu discípulo russo, Vladimir Ulianov, em férias de paragens mais quentes.
    Roberto Campos, que nasceu no mesmo ano da revolução bolchevique, não teria perdido a oportunidade para, em primeiro lugar, espicaçar este último e provocar o filósofo alemão, cujas doutrinas serviram de inspiração para a mais desastrada tentativa de superar os limites estreitos da escassez econômica em nome de uma suposta gestão socialista das forças produtivas. “O que você está achando da ‘nova política econômica’ Vladimir?”, perguntaria ele, para ouvir o outro resmungar ressabiado: “Os companheiros assumiram numa situação de verdadeira guerra econômica, pois os especuladores de Wall Street e os sabotadores internos queriam a derrocada imediata do novo governo. Eles precisaram, temporariamente, compor com as forças do mercado e com os banqueiros gananciosos, mas ainda guardam munição para combater a exploração capitalista e a opressão burguesa. Espere para ver.”
    Sem esperar pelo resto, Roberto Campos dirigiu-se de maneira não menos provocadora ao autor do Capital,: “Você acha mesmo, Karl, que nossos amigos saberão construir a sociedade ideal, na qual cada um contribuirá na medida de suas capacidades e cuja distribuição se fará segundo as necessidades de cada um de seus membros?” “Mas isto não é para agora, seu capitalista utópico”, respondeu o filósofo da mais valia, “e sim para a etapa comunista da revolução brasileira, isto é, para a última e derradeira fase da construção socialista. Por enquanto, até eu recomendaria uma política de transição e uma acomodação com os mercadores do templo, isto é, os donos do capital. De toda forma, ainda estamos no começo: não se esqueça que no Manifesto de 1848 eu preconizava primeiro o aprofundamento da globalização capitalista. Estou satisfeito com o que estou vendo: o novo governo caminha a passos rápidos no processo de internacionalização das empresas brasileiras, contribuindo com a missão histórica da rápida universalização do modo capitalista de produção. O socialismo está ao alcance da mão.”
    Marx recebeu a surpreendente adesão do liberal Hayek, que também achava que o governo tinha tomado o caminho da servidão, construindo as bases da mesma economia coletivista que um dia tragou sua querida Áustria, sob a forma do dirigismo nazista, assim como a Rússia, sob a economia totalmente estatizada dos bolchevistas. “E o senhor, Herr Campos, não está preocupado ao ver a atual orientação do Brasilianische economik Regierung?”, indagou ele, com o semblante carregado. “De fato, meu caro Friedrich”, comentou Campos, “vários dos membros da nomenklatura tropical padecem de incurável nostalgia em relação aos antigos tempos revolucionários. Mas isso justamente não ocorre com das Finanz Ministerium de Herr Palocci: sua Realeconomik não causaria nenhum tipo de constrangimento ao seu amigo Friedman, de Chicago. Ele até agora se guiou pelo mais retos princípios do Ideal Liberalismus e estou certo de que ouviria com prazer algumas de suas receitas práticas sobre como escapar da servidão, hoje representada por um Estado economicamente opressor da liberdade de empreender, tão bem defendida em sua obra.”
    Enquanto Hayek se deleitava ao ouvir essas palavras, Keynes fazia tilintar de impaciência o gelo de seu legítimo scotch, atacando sem mais esperar: “Mas esse doutor em medicina poderia ter evitado o amargo purgante de uma tão inútil quanto cruel recessão, se tivesse seguido uma das receitas da Teoria Geral, que recomendava injeções fiscais anti-cíclicas para poupar os Brazilian workers do desemprego e da perda do poder de compra. Ele precisava ter assegurado a demanda agregada, bem como o nível das despesas públicas, e deveria ter reintroduzido os controles de capitais, evitando a todo custo cair nas mãos daqueles fundamentalistas do FMI”.
    “Você está mal informado, Maynard”, retrucou Campos, que tinha intimidade suficiente com o inglês para chamá-lo pelo seu nome do meio. “O Estado brasileiro não consegue sequer assegurar um dedal orçamentário para a recuperação das esburacadas estradas federais, quanto mais essa injeção fiscal que você recomenda para estimular a demanda agregada. O que ele faz, de um lado, é uma oferta desagregada de promessas insustentáveis de crescimento, ao mesmo tempo em que retira, por outro lado, as poucas poupanças da sociedade, pela mão de uma máquina de arrecadação mais ameaçadora do que um dreadnought britânico.” Antes que Keynes formulasse novas recomendações de política econômica a partir das idéias de algum economista morto, Campos completou, com a mais fina ironia britânica: “As conseqüências econômicas de mister Palocci são, em todo caso, menos perigosas do que as recomendações bizarras dos seus discípulos no Brasil, que pretendem dar cabo de algo que nunca existiu em meu país: o liberalismo econômico. Francamente, Maynard, eles estão completamente out of touch! Passe o gelo, por favor, e se puder a sua garrafa também.”
    Virando-se novamente para Hayek, Campos aduziu com um sorriso maroto: “Não aconteceu em minha vida, mas eu ainda vou assistir, no Brasil, aqui do alto, à mais incrível revolução capitalista que se poderia esperar de um antigo líder socialista radical.” Tendo Marx justificado que isso talvez representasse alguma necessidade histórica da fase de transição para o capitalismo globalizado – que, afinal de contas, tinha tido sua marcha interrompida por setenta anos de tropeços socialistas –, Campos concluiu, rendendo uma homenagem à prosa barroca do Manifesto: “Eu também acho Karl: os seus amigos ex-socialistas, hoje neocapitalistas, não têm mais nada a perder, senão os grilhões mentais que os prendem às velhas soluções estatizantes de um passado tão mítico quanto, hoje em dia, inexeqüível. Esses grilhões mentais precisam ser rompidos e eles serão rompidos”. E dirigindo-se a ambos: “Vamos brindar com um gole de Schnaps a esta revolução burguesa tropical?”

    Paulo Roberto de Almeida é doutor em ciências sociais, mestre em planejamento econômico e professor universitário.
    (pralmeida@mac.com; www.pralmeida.org)


    Versão publicada:

    O Estado de São Paulo, Sábado, 9 de outubro de 2004
    O que Roberto Campos pensaria da política econômica?
    ENTRE HAYEK E KEYNES, HERR CAMPOS ESTARIA RINDO DA REVERSÃO DE EXPECTATIVAS VISTA NO BRASIL

    (Subtítulo da edição impressa do jornal: “Diálogo de mortos: de Marx, Keynes, Hayek e Campos sobre o Brasil de Lula)

    PAULO ROBERTO DE ALMEIDA


    No dia 9 de outubro se completam três anos do falecimento, em 2001, do diplomata, economista, administrador público, político e pensador Roberto Campos, que foi também um comentarista cáustico e impiedoso de nossas bizarrices institucionais. O que estaria pensando o iconoclasta, irônico e irreverente Roberto Campos a respeito da política econômica do atual governo?
    Onde estará ele no presente momento? Eu o imagino no limbo econômico das soluções imperfeitas, no purgatório da disciplina da escassez, na companhia de adeptos da "ciência lúgubre", sentado à esquerda de Hayek e à direita de Keynes, soltando gargalhadas a propósito da "reversão de expectativas" a que o Brasil assistiu nos últimos dois anos.
    Roberto Campos não perderia a oportunidade para provocar o filósofo alemão cujas doutrinas serviram de inspiração para os propositores de uma "nova política econômica": "Você acha, Karl, que nossos amigos saberão construir a sociedade ideal, na qual cada um contribuirá na medida de suas capacidades e cuja distribuição se fará segundo as necessidades de cada um de seus membros?" "Isto não é para agora, seu capitalista utópico", responde o filósofo da mais-valia, "e sim para a etapa comunista, para a última fase da construção socialista. Por enquanto, até eu recomendo uma política de transição e uma acomodação com os donos do capital. No Manifesto de 1848 eu preconizava primeiro o aprofundamento da globalização capitalista. Estou satisfeito com o novo governo: ele promove a internacionalização das empresas brasileiras, ajudando na missão histórica da rápida universalização do modo capitalista de produção. O socialismo está ao alcance da mão."
    Marx recebeu a surpreendente adesão do liberal Hayek, que também achava que o governo tinha tomado o caminho da servidão. "E o senhor, Herr Campos, não está preocupado com a orientação do Brasilianische economik Regierung?", indagou com o semblante carregado. "De fato, meu caro Friedrich", comentou Campos, "vários dos membros deste governo padecem de nostalgia em relação aos tempos revolucionários. Mas isso não ocorre com das Finanz Ministerium de Herr Palocci: sua Realeconomik não causaria nenhum constrangimento ao seu amigo Milton Friedman. Ele até agora se guiou pelos retos princípios do Ideal Liberalismus e estou certo de que ouviria com prazer suas receitas sobre como escapar da servidão, hoje representada por um Estado economicamente opressor da liberdade de empreender."
    Enquanto Hayek se deleitava ao ouvi-lo, Keynes fazia tilintar o gelo de seu scotch, atacando sem mais esperar: "Mas esse doutor em Medicina poderia ter evitado o purgante de uma cruel recessão, se tivesse seguido as receitas da Teoria Geral, que recomenda injeções fiscais anticíclicas para poupar os Brazilian workers do desemprego. Ele precisa assegurar a demanda agregada e o nível das despesas públicas, além de controlar os capitais, evitando cair nas mãos dos fundamentalistas do FMI."
    "Você está mal informado, Maynard", retrucou Campos, que tinha intimidade com o inglês para chamá-lo pelo nome do meio. "O Estado brasileiro não consegue sequer manter as estradas federais, quanto mais fazer essa injeção fiscal para estimular a demanda agregada. O que ele faz é uma oferta desagregada de promessas insustentáveis de crescimento, ao mesmo tempo em que retira a poupança da sociedade, usando uma máquina de arrecadação mais ameaçadora do que um dreadnought britânico." Antes que Keynes formulasse novas recomendações de política econômica a partir das idéias de algum economista morto, Campos completou, com a mais fina ironia britânica: "As conseqüências econômicas de mister Palocci são, em todo caso, menos perigosas do que as recomendações bizarras dos seus discípulos no Brasil, que pretendem dar cabo de algo que nunca existiu em meu país: o liberalismo econômico. Francamente, Maynard, eles estão completamente out of touch!
    Passe o gelo, por favor, e a garrafa também."
    Virando-se para Hayek, Campos aduziu com um sorriso maroto: "Não aconteceu em minha vida, mas ainda vou assistir, no Brasil, à mais incrível revolução capitalista que se poderia esperar de um antigo líder socialista." Tendo Marx justificado que isso era uma necessidade histórica da transição para o capitalismo globalizado - que tinha tido sua marcha interrompida por 70 anos de tropeços socialistas -, Campos concluiu, rendendo uma homenagem à prosa barroca do Manifesto: "Eu também acho Karl. Os seus amigos ex-socialistas, hoje neocapitalistas, não têm mais nada a perder, senão os grilhões mentais que os prendem às velhas soluções estatizantes de um passado tão mítico quanto, hoje em dia, inexeqüível. Esses grilhões mentais precisam ser rompidos e eles serão rompidos." E dirigindo-se a ambos: "Vamos brindar com um gole de Schnaps a esta revolução burguesa tropical?"