Crise grega: uma opiniao pessimista sobre o pacote de ajuda

Abaixo o ensaio, feito ainda antes de ser aprovado o GIGANTESCO plano de ajuda à Grécia pela UE, FMI e consórcio de países (inclusive, o Brasil), por um economista do Institute of International Economics.
Devo dizer que concordo inteiramente com ele e vou além: a Grécia NÃO devia ser ajudada. Deveria quebrar, ser obrigada a renegociar a sua dívida (com perdas para os financiadores e não para os contribuintes) e assim aprender a viver com seus próprios meios, não com dinheiro emprestado irresponsavelmente.
O povo grego é ingrato: deveria simplesmente ser deixado de lado, e aprender a eleger gente mais responsável...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Greek Deal Lets Banks Profit from "Immoral Hazard"
by Arvind Subramanian
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Op-ed in the Financial Times
May 6, 2010

The economic adjustment program agreed last weekend between Europe, the International Monetary Fund, and Greece will be considered, and approved, by the IMF's executive board soon. Early satisfaction with the program has given way to serious market doubts about it. These doubts are rational because the fiscal arithmetic simply does not work. For the IMF, this program represents a squandered opportunity because it could have been ahead of events and designed a much better program, specifically by facilitating orderly debt restructuring. Instead, we could end up with a program that is inequitable, perverse, and unsuccessful with much greater costs all around.

When the Greece saga began, the mantra of the German government and many purists in Europe, including the European Central Bank, was: "no default, no bailout, no exit." European private sector holders of Greek debt would be spared any pain (no default). The European taxpayer would be protected (no bailout). And European companies would be shielded because Greece could not devalue its currency (no exit). That left one and only one policy measure that could be brought to bear on the problem, namely a fiscal austerity program, with the average Greek citizen bearing all the burden of adjustment. Europe, in short, had defined this to be an exclusively Greek problem.
Insisting on contributions from all parties—not just the Greek citizen and international taxpayer—would have led to a program that was fair, avoided 'immoral hazard' and the perverse incentives associated with rewarding reckless financial sector behavior, and would have maximized chances of success.

The recently negotiated IMF program changed that situation in one important way: the burden of adjustment is now being spread to include European ($105 billion) and international ($40 billion) taxpayers. China, India, and Brazil, among many others will contribute—which is as it should be—given their growing economic status and the cooperative nature of the endeavor. But there will still be no contribution from European banks that hold large amounts of Greek debt. That taxpayers in much poorer countries should contribute so that rich financial institutions can get away with reckless lending seems unfair and perverse. One might call this "immoral hazard": heads the banks win, tails much poorer taxpayers thousands of miles away pick up the tab.

What is worse is that this bailout of European financial institutions increases the already high odds of failure of the IMF program. Greece's fiscal predicament requires not just adjustment and financing but devaluation and debt restructuring. And with devaluation being achieved through painful deflation, the case for restructuring looks only stronger. Substantial debt write-offs are necessary and will probably remain so even if Greece exits the eurozone.

Consider the prerequisites for a successful program. First, Greeks must acquiesce in the sharp decline in living standards over the next three years. Second, after three years of the program, Greek debt will be much greater than today's 115 percent of GDP. At that point, markets will have to think it plausible that Greece is on a path toward reasonable debt levels because it is able to grow fast enough and maintain the fiscal belt-tightening for some considerable time. Doubts on the part of markets on any of these scores will lead to higher costs of borrowing for Greece and put it back into the viciously self-sustaining fiscal debt dynamic in which it has found itself recently, except that the starting point in terms of debt levels will only be worse. This might well prove to be the (unlucky) 13th labor of Hercules.

Why then has the IMF gone along with this arrangement? A generous reading is that the IMF has to work with governments, and if Greece and Europe have strong preferences, then those must be respected. A less charitable reading is that the IMF is a Euro-Atlantic Monetary Fund, where its management does the bidding of its richer shareholders. It is true that, in this instance, the IMF has imposed tough conditions on the borrower, but it has done so because Germany would have it no other way. It has gone along?with?a?bailout of the?banks because the major players, including the European Central Bank, wanted it that way.

All this is a pity because Greece could have been a real opportunity for the IMF to regain durable legitimacy. Insisting on contributions from all parties—not just the Greek citizen and international taxpayer—would have led to a program that was fair, avoided "immoral hazard" and the perverse incentives associated with rewarding reckless financial sector behavior, and would have maximized chances of success. The IMF could have set a precedent for orderly debt resolution programs. Debt restructuring will happen, but it will be disorderly and messy with all the actors reacting to rather than shaping events. So, for now, we must continue to watch this unfolding Greek tragedy whose essence is not just sadness and pain but their inevitability.

============

Addendum: no mesmo sentido vai esta entrevista publicada pelo Le Monde:

"On ne peut pas résoudre une crise de dette par plus d'endettement"
LE MONDE, 11.05.10

Thorsten Polleit est chef économiste de Barclays Capital en Allemagne. Il porte un regard très critique sur le gigantesque paquet de sauvetage monté par les Etats de la zone euro.

Comment jugez-vous le plan de secours de 750 milliards d'euros pour la zone euro ?
On ne peut pas résoudre le problème par de l'endettement supplémentaire. Pour soutenir certains pays pris dans une crise de dette, les gouvernements vont devoir emprunter encore. Ce n'est pas une solution. L'urgence aujourd'hui, pour la zone euro, c'est d'annoncer une stratégie crédible de réduction des déficits. Si la pression des marchés est devenue si forte, si les investisseurs perdent confiance, c'est précisément parce qu'un tel concept n'existe pas. Il est temps de le formuler.

Que faut-il faire ?
Les décisions sont du ressort de chaque gouvernement, au niveau national. Il faut voir comment couper dans les dépenses, réduire les déficits le plus rapidement possible, graver ces objectifs dans le marbre comme nous l'avons fait en Allemagne en inscrivant un mécanisme de "frein à la dette" dans notre Constitution… On doit se rappeler qu'à l'origine, si le pacte de stabilité avait été respecté à la lettre, on n'en serait pas là.

Grâce à ce plan, n'a-t-on pas néanmoins écarté le risque de contagion de la crise grecque ?
Oui en ce qui concerne les pays menacés dans l'immédiat. Mais c'est la qualité de crédit des Etats bien notés qui en subira les conséquences. Les conditions d'emprunt des pays prêteurs vont sans doute se dégrader. En fait, le problème ne fait que se déplacer et risque, à terme, de s'aggraver.

La décision de la Banque centrale européenne (BCE) d'acheter de la dette publique porte-t-elle un coup à sa crédibilité ?
Il est clair que si la BCE agit ainsi, c'est parce que les gouvernements européens le souhaitent. On a là un instrument de politique monétaire qui semble n'avoir pas été décidé en toute indépendance. Cette décision est très problématique: dans la durée, un tel programme risque de créer de l'inflation et d'entraîner une perte de confiance des investisseurs.

Qu'en est-il de la stabilité de l'euro à long terme ?
Si les Etats ne trouvent pas le moyen de réduire leur endettement qui atteint souvent des niveaux insoutenables, l'euro est sérieusement menacé. La création de la monnaie unique a été une vaste expérimentation dont l'issue est aujourd'hui très incertaine. Surtout si les choses continuent ainsi, avec certains pays condamnés à payer encore et encore des sommes toujours plus importantes.

Croyez-vous que l'Allemagne récupérera l'argent des prêts faits à la Grèce ?
Non, je crois au contraire que les sommes ne seront jamais remboursées.

Propos recueillis par Marie de Vergès
Article paru dans l'édition du 12.05.10