O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.

Mostrando postagens com marcador China. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador China. Mostrar todas as postagens

domingo, 5 de fevereiro de 2017

A China, quem diria?, combate a corrupcao em tom mais vigoroso

Em 2001, o eterno candidato à presidência da República, chefe também eterno do PT, que ele trata como seu feudo particular, visitou a China, sendo recebido quase como chefe de Estado.
Na ocasião, o PT e o PCC (Partido Comunista da China), que domina o governo, o Estado, o país, a nação, toda a sociedade naquele imenso território asiático, assinaram um protocolo de cooperação, que sempre envolve a troca de informações e de experiências práticas em todos os terrenos da vida partidária, da administração pública, da governança.
Parece que o PT faltou às aulas de combate à corrupção, como evidenciado por esta matéria do Observatório da Política China sobre o endurecimento das penalidades contra delitos econômicos:
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Fiscalía suprema china anuncia castigos más duros contra delitos económicos

05/02/2017
BEIJING, 5 feb (Xinhua) -- La Fiscalía Popular Suprema (FPS) de China se ha comprometido a imponer castigos más severos a los responsables de delitos económicos que afecten los intereses de grandes comunidades, entre ellos la absorción ilegal de depósitos públicos y la recolección fraudulenta de fondos.
BEIJING, 5 feb (Xinhua) -- La Fiscalía Popular Suprema (FPS) de China se ha comprometido a imponer castigos más severos a los responsables de delitos económicos que afecten los intereses de grandes comunidades, entre ellos la absorción ilegal de depósitos públicos y la recolección fraudulenta de fondos.
El ente acusador también urgió a las fiscalías locales a dar más prioridad a la prevención de los riesgos financieros, luchando contra delitos como el blanqueo de dinero y la banca clandestina, así como a tomar parte activa en el manejo de los riesgos financieros en Internet, de acuerdo con un comunicado de la FPS.
Igualmente, la fiscalía se comprometió a fortalecer la labor contra la manipulación y el tráfico de información privilegiada en los mercados de títulos y futuros, y también en la supervisión de los mercados inmobiliarios.
En los últimos años se han registrado en China varios casos de delitos financieros con amplio despliegue mediático, entre ellos las actividades ilegales de recolección de fondos de Ezubao y el caso de Xu Xiang, gerente general de una compañía de inversiones con sede en Shanghai, quien fue acusado por presuntamente haber manipulado el mercado de valores.

terça-feira, 31 de janeiro de 2017

A "nova" anti-politica comercial de Trump e as oportunidades para a China - Alasdair Macleod

What Trump Means for Brexit, China, and the EU
by Alasdair Macleod
Mises Daily, January 31, 2017

The easy pattern of prolonged trade negotiations has been rudely interrupted by President Trump. Even before he had become president, his anticipated presence in the White House changed global attitudes and expectations. In Europe, EU officials are wrong-footed, while British trade officials cannot believe their luck.

EU officials were prepared to punish the UK knowing they could prevaricate for ever, because the EU should never, in its view, be challenged by a member state. The UK has been a disruptive member, and other members must be discouraged from following Britain’s exit at a time when there are increasing signs of rebellion by Europe’s "deplorables." Britain, having shocked its own establishment by voting for Brexit, faced the prospect of protracted negotiations with the EU that could, in the words of one British official who has since resigned, take a decade or more.

President Trump has dramatically changed the balance of power in Britain’s trade negotiations with the EU. It is probably no accident that the British approach was finally declared after Trump won the presidential election, and his attitude to trade with Britain was more friendly than Obama’s. The British negotiating strategy is remarkably sensible from a government that hasn’t until now believed in free markets, at least to the extent that it is prepared to back genuine free trade as a policy. Effectively, the EU has been told by Prime Minister Theresa May that Britain will propose, and they can take it or leave it, because Britain’s focus is now to trade relatively freely with the rest of the world. And if they don’t agree, Britain will cut corporation taxes to compensate British-based businesses from EU intransigence.

The threats from members of the European political establishment sound increasingly desperate, signaling they are waking up to the weakness of their position. They claim Britain will be cut out from the EU’s existing trade agreements. But when you look at them, you see there are only two of them with other G20 members — South Korea and Mexico. The rest are with small states, damning evidence of the failure of the EU to interact with the rest of the world. Big businesses in Europe are now switching sides, having unsuccessfully argued against a hard Brexit. They are now lobbying European governments instead for tariff-free trade with the UK.

Trump and Trade

Donald Trump apparently sees himself as bringing business priorities to government. He intends to run America in the manner of a nineteenth century mercantilist, where the priority is that America Inc. must become great again, with every able-bodied person regarded as potential contributors to the national enterprise. With respect to trade agreements, he will tear up the rules agreed between long-winded diplomats in favor of more effective business-driven resolutions, favoring America. Business negotiating strategies will be implemented, as we can see with the early signs of public negotiations between mercantilist Trump and China’s mercantilist Xi.

Britain’s free traders are likely to be at odds with Trump. He is signaling he is not interested in free trade. His attitude to the EU also marks a major change in American geopolitical thinking. Europe is now regarded as a leach, sucking America’s blood, not paying its way in NATO. Its socialism is alien to Trump. That’s the new world, as proposed by Trump, but the reality can be expected to turn out somewhat differently.

Trade Fallacies

All this would be fine, if President Trump based his understanding on the economics of trade imbalances. Like most people, he appears to think a trade deficit is the result of unfair foreign competition. It is not. It is the result of monetary expansion. In a sound money environment, everything is paid for out of real money. If I buy a foreign good, it must be matched by a fellow citizen’s export. If people change their preferences for real money, there will be a temporary surplus or deficit, but prices will rapidly adjust to find a new balance, the flows stop, and trade balances again.

In a sound-money environment, permanent or semi-permanent trade surpluses and deficits cannot exist. With unsound money, in other words if extra money is conjured up out of thin air and spent into the economy, excess demand is created, which either drives up prices domestically, or it is spent on imported goods. And given a country’s total production usually matches its total consumption, that extra money is certain to lead to an increase in imports.

It’s the cheat factor of fiat currency that’s responsible for trade imbalances, not unfair competition from foreigners. And because all countries cheat with their own fiat currencies, untangling the trade surpluses and deficits becomes a fruitless task.

We can conclude that however Trump’s trade policies turn out, America’s trade deficits will not go away. He will need to take a firm grasp of the budget deficit, and the Fed must take tighter control over the expansion of bank credit and money, both of which are unlikely.

Unintended Consequences

The Trump administration appears to be set to discourage imports by the introduction of a border tax, or discriminatory corporate income taxes. We know this will not achieve its objective, unless bank credit fails to grow. And if bank credit fails to grow despite the Fed’s desire for it to do so, a reduction in the trade deficit would be part and parcel of a contracting economy. America would then risk triggering a rerun of the depression of the 1930s, which was given an extra spin from the Smoot-Hawley tariff signed into law by President Hoover. In those days, both the dollar and sterling, as the two leading currencies, started the decade on the gold standard, which continued for the dollar after sterling abandoned it in 1931. This meant that commodity prices priced in both gold and dollars collapsed, impoverishing miners and agricultural producers worldwide. If the same thing happened today, the dollar would go down with commodity prices, because we know the Fed would expand money supply to avoid a slump. But measured in gold, commodity prices would still fall.

For now, this outcome is regarded by markets as a low risk, but given Trump’s contradictory statements on trade, it would be wrong to dismiss a Smoot-Hawley rerun. Trump’s rhetoric is indeed frighteningly similar.

China would be justified in taking the view that Trump’s intentions are protectionist, and therefore represent an escalation of the financial war between the two countries. That will depend on the outcome of negotiations between Presidents Trump and Xi. China could equally console herself with the knowledge that the dollar will become less important if gross American trade (as opposed to the net balance) diminishes because of protectionist measures. For the moment, the dollar is riding high, partly due to the declining use of the euro. But a higher dollar could be regarded as an opportunity for China to sell more Treasuries to invest in commodity stockpiles, before the dollar declines. And when the dollar declines, the yuan is likely to stabilize and become more attractive as a global trade settlement currency.

If, and it is an if, the Chinese take this view, they will not worry too much about Trump and his aggressive stance. He might be surprised that the Chinese give in on very little in the trade negotiations due to take place later this year. Their view could be that Trump is fighting yesterday’s trade war. Instead, China will be content with free trade agreements between the Pacific nations cut out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. South-East Asia will manufacture the cheap goods China used to make, because China is already upscaling her economy into services and technology, redeploying capital from the manufacture of cheap goods.

Where are Europe and Britain likely to end up in all this? The will for a rapid resolution of an Anglo-American trade agreement is there at both the White House and Downing Street. However, under the terms of Brexit, a deal cannot be signed before March 2019, which is a long time in politics. The threat of a US/UK agreement is more important as a lever to pull the EU into line, than its eventual reality. Additionally, Britain can easily sign agreements with Commonwealth members, comprised of 52 countries and a third of the world’s population. Importantly, these are the growing economies of the future. South Korea, Mexico, and the minor nations that have existing agreements with the EU should also be ready signatories, assuming the EU does not successfully pressure them not to enter agreements with the UK. The ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries and China total another two billion, again growing more rapidly than the advanced nations, taking the potential total to well over half the world’s population.

The opportunity for Britain presented by Brexit, and facilitated by Trump’s election, is truly extraordinary, but that’s not reckoning with the politics. Politicians do not define free trade in the way that free trade should be. To politicians, free trade is a complex agreement, regulating every provision of goods and services. Free trade without politicians is simple: we can all get on with buying and selling with each other what we truly desire.

The greatest threat to world trade comes not from the break-up of the EU, nor from China. It appears to be Trump’s lack of understanding of why trade imbalances exist, and his wrongheaded policy of American protectionism.

Alasdair Macleod is the head of research at GoldMoney.

sexta-feira, 20 de janeiro de 2017

O efeito China sobre a industria de manufaturados do Brasil - Estudo do IEDI

Aqui abaixo figura apenas o sumário deste importante estudo.
Para ler por inteiro, os interessados precisam acessar este link: http://www.iedi.org.br/cartas/carta_iedi_n_769.html

Exportação de manufaturados: Concorrência China x BrasilIEDI,  20/01/2017

Sumário
Esta Carta IEDI atualiza nosso estudo de 2013 (Carta IEDI n. 590) sobre a concorrência entre Brasil e China na exportação de manufaturados nos três principais mercados regionais para as empresas brasileiras – Mercosul (Argentina, Uruguai, Paraguai), Aladi (Bolívia, Chile, Colômbia, Equador, Peru, Venezuela) e Nafta (EUA, Canadá e México). Na edição anterior fizemos uma comparação entre os anos de 2008 e 2012, isto é, após o aprofundamento da crise global; agora, tratamos do quadro em 2015, ano de forte crise da indústria e da economia brasileiras, comparando-o com 2012.

O desempenho da balança comercial brasileira, desde 2003, tornou-se estreitamente vinculado ao crescimento econômico e da demanda externa da China mediante dois efeitos antagônicos. Por um lado, o “efeito complementaridade”, que beneficiou (sobretudo, antes da crise financeira global) as exportações brasileiras tanto de forma direta (impulsionando as vendas externas de commodities), como indireta (aumentando as exportações de bens manufaturados para países latino-americanos exportadores de commodities). Por outro lado, o “efeito concorrência”, associado à consolidação da China como produtora e exportadora de produtos manufaturados, afetou negativamente a indústria brasileira por dois canais: a invasão de importados no Brasil e o crescimento das exportações chinesas para mercados tradicionalmente atendidos pela indústria brasileira.

Após 2008, o “efeito concorrência” ganhou intensidade devido à estratégia da China de aumentar sua presença na periferia para compensar a perda de dinamismo das economias centrais, atingidas pela crise global. No âmbito dessa estratégia, aumentaram as exportações chinesas para as principais regiões de destino das vendas externas brasileiras de bens manufaturados – Mercosul, Aladi e Nafta – a ponto de superarem o valor registrado pelo Brasil em 2012.

Para 2015, entre outros indicadores que são analisados nesta Carta, calculamos o nível de ameaça das exportações chinesas às exportações brasileiras. Foram criadas quatro categorias: Ameaça Direta quando, para um produto, há aumento de market-share da China nas regiões selecionadas, ao mesmo tempo em que o Brasil reduz seu market-share; e Ameaça Indireta quando o aumento do market-share da China for maior do que o aumento do market-share do Brasil. Os produtos que não estão sendo ameaçados pelas exportações chinesas foram classificados como Sem Ameaça.

Ainda que nos dois períodos analisados (2008-2012 e 2012-2015) o desempenho, em valor, das exportações chinesas e brasileiras para as regiões selecionadas tenha sido bastante diferente, como mostram os itens abaixo, do ponto de vista do dinamismo e do grau de ameaça, várias tendências negativas identificadas em 2012, que eram motivo de preocupação para o Brasil, não se intensificaram ou mudaram de direção e tendências positivas se intensificaram.

     •  Exportações brasileiras: crescimento de +1,9% entre 2008 e 2012 e -21,8% entre 2012 e 2015

     •  Exportações chinesas: crescimento de +47,6% e +8,3%, respectivamente

No que se refere ao grau de ameaça das exportações chinesas, em 2015 elas representavam uma ameaça direta principalmente nos produtos em que o Brasil perdeu oportunidades de mercado, isto é, nos produtos cuja participação na pauta das regiões consideradas neste estudo cresce, mas cuja participação do Brasil cai. Porém, essa ameaça direta da China recuou de 76%, em 2012, para 68,7%, em 2015.

Outro motivo de preocupação em 2012 era a ameaça indireta das exportações da China (de 36,4%) nas exportações de produtos cuja participação na pauta das três regiões estudas crescia assim como a participação do Brasil em tais produtos. Contudo, em 2015, o grau de ameaça indireta das vendas externas chinesas nesses produtos recuou para menos de 5%.

Em termos de região de destino das exportações, no caso dos produtos exportados pelo Brasil que sofriam Ameaça Direta das exportações chinesas e tinham como destino o Nafta, a participação aumentou de 39,5% em 2012 para 45,2% em 2015. Esse resultado é desfavorável, já que no âmbito das três regiões consideradas, o Nafta foi o mercado mais dinâmico no período analisado devido ao desempenho dos Estados Unidos. Em contrapartida, a redução da participação da Aladi neste grupo sob ameaça direta (de 23,4% para 17,3%) é positiva, pois essa região é o principal destino de produtos manufaturados brasileiros.

No que se refere aos produtos que sofreram Ameaça Indireta, o Mercosul foi o principal destino em 2015 (42,2%), assim como nos dois anos anteriores (em 2012 o percentual era um pouco maior, enquanto em 2008 menor). Já as posições do Nafta e da Aladi se inverteram entre 2012 e 2015. A Aladi tornou-se a segunda principal região de destino dessa categoria de produtos em 2015 (29,8%), seguida pelo Nafta (27,9%).

Em suma, considerando os resultados em termos de dinamismo e grau de ameaça, a trajetória de aumento do “efeito-concorrência” das exportações chinesas entre 2008 e 2012 nas principais regiões de destino das exportações brasileiras de produtos manufaturados não persistiu no triênio subsequente. Esta Carta IEDI também traz informações que contribuem para a compreensão das mudanças no perfil do comércio exterior brasileiro em 2015 mencionadas acima, sobretudo o melhor desempenho das exportações da indústria de transformação.

Embora estudos adicionais sejam necessários para identificar de forma mais precisa os determinantes da interrupção da tendência de perda de dinamismo e de market-share das exportações brasileiras nas regiões selecionadas entre 2012 e 2015, é possível identificar alguns fatores externos e internos que contribuíram para este resultado.

Do lado externo, o contexto internacional foi desfavorável tanto do ponto de vista do crescimento da demanda externa como dos preços das commodities, mas a apreciação do dólar no biênio 2014-2015 favoreceu as exportações brasileiras já que significou, igualmente, apreciação da moeda chinesa (a paridade fixa com o dólar foi abandonada em 2010, mas o regime cambial vigente desde então procura manter a cotação do Renminbi relativamente estável em relação à moeda americana).

Do lado interno, dois fatores atuaram positivamente: a desaceleração da atividade econômica, que culminou na recessão em 2015; e, sobretudo, a desvalorização da moeda brasileira em termos reais. Assim, para que as exportações brasileiras de bens manufaturados não retomem aquela tendência, seria fundamental a manutenção da taxa de câmbio em patamares competitivos. A dependência do câmbio pode diminuir ao longo do tempo, desde que fatores relacionados à produtividade/custo de natureza sistêmica (infraestrutura, tributação, custo financeiro) tenham evolução e que a indústria amplie sua produtividade.

Finalmente, é importante mencionar que as exportações brasileiras de bens manufaturados para os países latino-americanos das regiões analisadas também foram negativamente afetadas pelos múltiplos acordos comerciais que têm sido assinados com países externos à região, que acabam beneficiando produtos provenientes de países com vantagens competitivas, como a China. Assim, o governo brasileiro também deve adotar uma estratégia de política que busque um modelo favorável para a penetração de nossas exportações e estimule a integração da indústria brasileira nas cadeias regionais e globais de valor mediante a diversificação da base industrial e investimentos no mercado regional.

Leia o estudo completo neste link: http://www.iedi.org.br/cartas/carta_iedi_n_769.html

segunda-feira, 12 de dezembro de 2016

A politica da China para a America Latina - visao positivo do documento

Documento de China para América Latina servirá para fortalecer relaciones, enfatizan analistas argentinas
Observatorio da Politica China, 07/12/2016
 
BUENOS AIRES, 6 dic (Xinhua) -- El documento que China presentó en noviembre sobre sus vínculos con América Latina y el Caribe (ALC) es "un instrumento para la mejora, profundización y generación de una estrategia para las relaciones conjuntas", enfatizaron hoy, martes, las expertas argentinas Nadia Radulovich y Cecilia Peralta.
BUENOS AIRES, 6 dic (Xinhua) -- El documento que China presentó en noviembre sobre sus vínculos con América Latina y el Caribe (ALC) es "un instrumento para la mejora, profundización y generación de una estrategia para las relaciones conjuntas", enfatizaron hoy, martes, las expertas argentinas Nadia Radulovich y Cecilia Peralta.
"Este nuevo documento busca un mayor compromiso a través de la 'persistencia' y 'cooperación' en varias áreas y sectores económicos, productivos, científico-tecnológico, informático, de inversiones, de comercio exterior, para llevar a una 'nueva altura' la asociación de cooperación integral China-ALC", dijeron en entrevista con Xinhua.
A su juicio, "las posibilidades de intercambios y cooperación entre las partes son muchísimas, al igual que las oportunidades de esta asociación de cooperación integral pueden significar para la región latinoamericana y el Caribe".
Las analistas, titulares del grupo de especialistas Asia Viewers e integrantes del Grupo China del Consejo Argentino para las Relaciones Internacionales (CARI), se referían así al texto que Beijing dio a conocer el 24 de noviembre.
El texto resalta que "pese a la distancia geográfica entre China y ALC, la amistad entre sus pueblos data de tiempos remotos. A raíz de la fundación de la Nueva China en 1949, y gracias a los esfuerzos mancomunados de varias generaciones, las relaciones chino-latinoamericanas y caribeñas han venido avanzando a pasos firmes por una trayectoria extraordinaria".
"En 2008 China tuvo la incitativa de publicar su Libro Blanco hacia ALC cuyo objetivo era establecer la asociación China-ALC. Desde el año 2013 los dirigentes chinos han planteado una serie de iniciativas y medidas de importancia con miras a robustecer las relaciones y la cooperación en diversas áreas", ponderaron.
En 2015, el volumen comercial entre China y América Latina alcanzó 236.500 millones de dólares, multiplicándose por 20 en la pasada década, según estadísticas oficiales de China.
En 2016, las relaciones entre China y América Latina han avanzado con el establecimiento de las nuevas plataformas tales como el Año de Intercambio Cultural China-América Latina y el foro de cooperación China-América Latina entre los gobiernos locales.
China ha firmado tratados de libre comercio (TLC) con varios países latinoamericanos. Con Chile, en noviembre de 2005, con Perú, en abril de 2009, y con Costa Rica, en 2010.
En la actualidad, China es el segundo mayor socio comercial y la tercera fuente de inversión de América Latina, mientras que América Latina es el séptimo mayor socio comercial de China, e importante destino de su inversión extranjera.
"Las áreas de cooperación en el ámbito de gobierno, cultura y educación son vastas y dejan en relieve temas como el intercambio de conocimiento así como también temas de medidas conjuntas en un tema tan complejo como la reducción de la pobreza", sostuvieron las observadoras.
También, añadieron, "desarrolla una sección muy detallada acerca de la coordinación internacional en temas como asuntos internacionales políticos, gobernanza económica global, implementación de la Agenda 2030 para el Desarrollo Sostenible y el cambio climático".
"La cooperación financiera en el desarrollo de infraestructura, en temas energéticos y temas de comercio, sobre todo en temas agrícolas, para fomentar conjuntamente la seguridad alimentaria son y serán los ejes de las relaciones entre China y América Latina para los próximos años", consideraron.
Subrayaron "la importancia de estudiar y analizar el documento con el fin de que nuestra región pueda también unirse al muevo compromiso chino y aprovechar de las posibilidades que puedan generarse de esta nueva fase de relacionamiento".

terça-feira, 6 de dezembro de 2016

Rumo ao mundo sinocentrico? - palestra de Oliver Stuenkel no IPRI (Brasilia, 13/12/2016)


O presidente da Funag, embaixador Sérgio Eduardo Moreira Lima, e o Diretor do Instituto de Pesquisa de Relações Internacionais (IPRI), Paulo Roberto de Almeida, convidam para a palestra-debate com o professor de Relações Internacionais da FGV-SP Oliver Stuenkel, no auditório Paulo Nogueira Batista, no próximo dia 13/12, às 16:00hs
Stuenkel, colaborador regular de diversas publicações na área de relações internacionais e autor de vários livros – entre eles The Brics and the Future of Global Order (2015) e do recentemente publicado Post-Western World (2016) – falará sobre “Rumo ao mundo sinocêntrico? - As transformações globais e suas implicações para o Brasil”.


Nota curricular: 
Oliver Stuenkel é Professor de Relações Internacionais da Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) em São Paulo, onde coordena a Escola de Ciências Sociais e o MBA em Relações Internacionais. Tem graduação pela Universidade de Valência, na Espanha, Mestrado em Políticas Públicas pela Kennedy School of Government de Harvard University, e Doutorado em Ciência Política pela Universidade de Duisburg-Essen, na Alemanha. É autor de três livros, entre eles Post-Western World: How Emerging Power Are Remaking Global Order (2016, Polity) e colunista da revista Americas Quarterly.   

Mister Trump parece facilitar as coisas para a China na America Latina - Oliver Stuenkel

Oliver Stuenkel deve fazer uma palestra no IPRI (Funag, Brasília), que estou dirigindo, no próximo dia 13/12, quando deve falar, justamente sobre a possível "sinização" do Brasil, da América Latina, do mundo (o que vier antes...).
Vou informar mais detalhadamente.
Este artigo parece preparar o terreno para o debate.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Web Exclusive

How Trump Benefits China in Latin America

Growing Chinese engagement in the region will test Latin America's ability to adapt.
Xi jinping
Anderson Riedel (flickr - Michel Temer) November 7, 2013 CC by 2.0

The timing was perfect, and the symbolism could not have been stronger. A mere week after Donald Trump’s upset victory stunned the world, Xi Jinping traveled to Lima for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit and projected China as a bastion of stability, predictability and openness. With the U.S. increasingly skeptical of globalization, Xi promised that China would stand up for free trade. Faced with an emerging global leadership vacuum, Beijing was quick to recognize a window of opportunity. Compared with the abrasive U.S. president-elect, the Chinese president, with his avuncular charm, seemed to have a soothing effect on the gathering in the Peruvian capital.
No region in the world will remain unaffected by the unprecedented combination of the United States as a source of uncertainty and China as a potential stabilizer. The consequences for Latin America, however, are particularly important, as the recent political shift in the region has led to a growing consensus that greater openness to trade is a prerequisite to economic recovery. While trade negotiators in Brasília and Buenos Aires may have hoped for a deal with Europe or the United States, Beijing increasingly looks like the only partner offering a meaningful opportunity, building on already existing free-trade agreements with Costa Rica, Peru and Chile. Similarly, when it comes to attracting investors to modernize the region’s rotten infrastructure, no country offers as much as the Middle Kingdom. China, free to promote alternative trade deals now that Trump promised he would pull out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), faces a world of opportunities in Latin America.
This trend may be accelerated if U.S. policy toward the region resembles that of former President George W. Bush. During his presidency, more pressing short-term priorities elsewhere (such as the “war on terror”) caused Washington to largely turn away from Latin America, allowing China to boost its influence. Much suggests a similar scenario will materialize again over the next four years. Chinese trade with Latin America has grown more than 20-fold over the past fifteen years. Xi announced that Chinese companies will invest a quarter of a trillion dollars in the region over the next decade, diversifying from traditional industries such as mining, oil and gas to areas like finance, agriculture and infrastructure (energy, airports, ports and roads).
Yet for Latin America, Beijing’s growing engagement is a mixed blessing. As China increasingly focuses on value-added goods, it now purchases fewer commodities from Latin America but sells more to the region, causing Latin America’s trade deficit with China to increase. Countries like Brazil face a risk of deindustrialization and face direct competition as they seek to export to its neighborhood. Chinese imports are affecting, among others, industrial machinery, textiles, footwear and clothing, while copper, iron, oil and soybeans account for the greatest share of the region’s exports to China. Many new projects that China may finance (such as the Trans-Amazonian Railway from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean) would help integrate the region, but also enhance Latin America’s dependence on China, in addition to posing threats to the environment and creating relatively few jobs.
Lack of preparedness
China’s growing influence is remarkable, but it should not come as a surprise. Brazil's former Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira argued as early as 1974 that China "had consolidated itself as an emerging power," urging then-President Ernesto Geisel to normalize diplomatic relations with the country. And yet, particularly in Brazil, the lack of preparedness and knowledge about China on most policy-making levels is remarkable. During debates in Brasília, comments often reveal a worrying degree of ignorance of Chinese affairs. Yet governments are not the only ones to blame. Thinkers both left and right of the ideological spectrum are often stuck in a 20th century Western-centric worldview, still regarding the United States as the source of most good and evil. The left still regards U.S. meddling in the region as the most urgent concern at a time when Chinese clout in capitals like Caracas now exceeds Washington’s influence even in countries that are seen as pro-U.S., such as Colombia. Mostly through the China Development Bank, Beijing now lends far more to the region than the World Bank.
Oblivious to these trends, it is not uncommon to witness dinner party debates among left-of-center Brazilian intellectuals about whether the Lava Jato corruption investigation and former President Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment are actually schemes by the FBI to destroy Petrobras (as a professor at USP, a leading university, recently argued in a newspaper interview).
All the while, Brazil’s Foreign Minister José Serra is said to have only a vague understanding of Asia, and was recently unable to name the members of the BRICS grouping during an interview. Add to that the absence of sinologists and Brazilian foreign correspondents based in China, the result is a disturbing unpreparedness for an increasingly Asia-centric world.
Designing a regional strategy
What is to be done? For starters, while Peru, Chile and others have already begun to adapt to new realities, foreign ministries in the region should coordinate their positions regarding China better to avoid competing for Chinese largesse, which will lead to a race to the bottom. That involves discussing and possibly aligning legislation regarding Chinese investments, transnational environmental rules for Chinese-financed projects that cross borders, and cohesive policies regarding bigger questions such as China’s role in the World Trade Organization.
This discussion should also include a broad debate, all ideological passions aside, about how the emerging global competition between Washington and Beijing can be used to the region’s advantage. That requires being as knowledgeable about domestic affairs in Beijing as in Washington, which, given the opacity of China, requires a far greater diplomatic presence than most countries possess today.
Considering the influence China already has on Latin American economics and politics (for example, the current situation in Venezuela is impossible to understand without making sense of China’s role as a lender), the lack of a regional debate over how to grapple with the implications of multipolarity is remarkable. The longer policy makers in the region wait, the smaller their capacity to learn to operate in the new environment.
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Stuenkel is a contributing columnist for Americas Quarterly and teaches International Relations at the Getulio Vargas Foundation in São Paulo. He is the author of The BRICS and the Future of Global Order (2015) and the Post-Western World (2016).
Any opinions expressed in this piece do not necessarily reflect those of Americas Quarterly or its publishers.

domingo, 2 de outubro de 2016

China: internacionalizacao da moeda e inserção nos Direitos Especiais de Saque do FMI

Banco de compensación en RMB en EEUU, paso clave en globalización de moneda china

02/10/2016
NUEVA YORK, 1 oct (Xinhua) -- Gracias a la reciente instauración de un banco de compensación en renminbi (RMB) en Estados Unidos, los negocios con las empresas chinas se han vuelto mucho más fáciles para la Bolsa Mercantil de Chicago (CME, siglas en inglés).
NUEVA YORK, 1 oct (Xinhua) -- Gracias a la reciente instauración de un banco de compensación en renminbi (RMB) en Estados Unidos, los negocios con las empresas chinas se han vuelto mucho más fáciles para la Bolsa Mercantil de Chicago (CME, siglas en inglés).
En agosto pasado, el volumen diario medio de intercambio con China del CME, uno de las mercados de valores más antiguos y distinguidos de América, alcanzó las 70.000 unidades, pero todos estos negocios se vieron obligados a pasar por el proceso de convertir el RMB en otras formas de garantía.
"Esto añadía tiempo y coste adicional al proceso de compensación", dijo Suzanne Sprague, directora ejecutiva de gestión de riesgos del CME.
Sin embargo, las cosas han cambiado desde el 21 de septiembre, cuando el banco central chino anunció la designación de la sucursal del Banco de China en Nueva York como banco de compensación y liquidación en RMB.
PROMOCION DEL COMERCIO Y LAS INVERSIONES
"Es un hito", dijo Xu Chen, presidente y director general del Banco de China en Estados Unidos, en una entrevista con Xinhua el día después del anuncio. "Ahora tenemos servicio en renminbi en el extranjero en Asia y el Pacífico, en Europa y en Estados Unidos, es decir, 24 horas los siete días de la semana".
Según puntualizaron varios analistas, la medida era muy esperada ya que llena un gran vacío en la red de instituciones extraterritoriales designadas para promover un mayor uso del RMB en el mercado global.
En la primera mitad de este año, la liquidación de la moneda china en Estados Unidos está valorada en unos 100 billones de yuanes (14,99 billones de dólares), lo que supone el quinto puesto en el mercado exterior global.
La designación es si cabe más significativa ya que el comercio en RMB en Estados Unidos tiende a ser impulsado por el mercado, y no por el gobierno o las instituciones monetarias como en otros países.
"La necesidad es más real y urgente", explicó Xu, añadiendo que el establecimiento de un banco de compensación beneficia no solo el comercio, sino también las inversiones en Estados Unidos.
En este sentido, apuntó, "estamos viendo un crecimiento de las inversiones chinas en Estados Unidos en los últimos años". "En 2015, el volumen fue de 15.700 millones de dólares, mientras que sólo en la primera mitad de 2016, la cifra fue de 18.400 millones de dólares".
"Es muy posible que las inversiones individuales o institucionales de China sobrepasen en gran medida las de otros países o regiones", dijo Xu.
MAYOR USO INTERNACIONAL
En sintonía con el aumento de la utilización del RMB como moneda global, el Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI) lo añadió el viernes a su cesta de derechos especiales de giro (DEG), haciéndose la medida efectiva el 1 de octubre.
La inclusión convierte el RMB en una de las cinco monedas de reserva totalmente avalada por los 189 miembros del FMI junto al dólar, el euro, el yen y la libra esterlina.
"Se lanzarán nuevos productos financieros valorados en RMB", anotó Xu, quien añadió que la moneda china "va a ser utilizada de forma más amplia en Estados Unidos dado que su mercado está más abierto que otros".
No obstante, también existen riesgos. Algunos observadores han advertido de que el acceso al mercado financiero estadounidense, más libre y desarrollado, podría, al mismo tiempo, aumentar los desafíos del RMB. La diferencia horaria entre Nueva York y Beijing, por ejemplo, podría dificultar el seguimiento de los impactos.
En cualquier caso, se trata de un paso necesario en el camino y un paso crucial. Xu consideró que, a largo plazo, el establecimiento de un banco de compensación en Nueva York es significativo para promover un mayor uso internacional del RMB y una mejor expansión de su influencia.
"Creo que, a lo largo de los próximos años, podremos responder al desafío", aseveró Xu.

China promete más reformas financieras tras inclusión de RMB en DEG

02/10/2016
El banco central de China aseguró hoy sábado que el país continuará impulsando la reforma financiera y la apertura del mercado después de la inclusión de su moneda, el renminbi (RMB) o yuan, en la cesta de monedas de los Derechos Especiales de Giro (DEG) del Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI).
El banco central de China aseguró hoy sábado que el país continuará impulsando la reforma financiera y la apertura del mercado después de la inclusión de su moneda, el renminbi (RMB) o yuan, en la cesta de monedas de los Derechos Especiales de Giro (DEG) del Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI).
El FMI anunció el viernes la entrada en vigor a partir de este sábado de la nueva cesta de DEG, que incluye al yuan, cambio que calificó de "hito histórico" para China, el FMI y el sistema monetario internacional.
China da la bienvenida al nuevo sistema, que reforzará la representatividad, la estabilidad y el atractivo de los DEG mientras se avanza en la reforma del sistema monetario internacional, indicó el Banco Popular de China en un comunicado publicado en su página web.
La inclusión del renminbi en los DEG representa un hito en la internacionalización del yuan y un reconocimiento del progreso del desarrollo económico de China, así como de las reformas financieras y la apertura que ha emprendido, sostuvo el banco central.
Los DEG son un activo de reserva internacional creado por el FMI en 1969 para complementar las reservas oficiales de los países miembros. Se puede intercambiar entre los gobiernos por monedas de uso libre en tiempos de necesidad.
En noviembre pasado, el FMI decidió incluir el yuan como quinta moneda de la cesta de los DEG a partir del 1 de octubre de 2016.
La junta de gobierno del FMI también decidió el viernes qué peso tendrá cada moneda en la nueva cesta de DEG, que será del 10,92 por ciento en el caso del yuan, del 41,73 por ciento para el dólar, del 30,93 por ciento para el euro, del 8,33 por ciento para el yen japonés y del 8,09 por ciento en la libra esterlina.
El porcentaje se mantendrá fijo durante los próximos cinco años, hasta la próxima revisión de la cesta.

sexta-feira, 30 de setembro de 2016

Como a India se tornou mais competitiva do que a China: Global Competitiveness Report (WEF)

Here’s how India became more competitive than China

Image: REUTERS/Jitendra Prakash
Attilio Di Battista, Economist, World Economic Forum

India’s GDP per capita (in terms of purchasing power parity) almost doubled between 2007 and 2016, from $3,587 to $6,599. Growth slowed after the 2008 crisis, hitting a decade low in 2012–2013. But if anything, this provided the country with the opportunity to rethink its policies and engage more firmly in the reforms necessary to improve its competitiveness. Growth rebounded in 2014, and last year surpassed that of China.
India’s overall competitiveness score was rather stagnant between 2007 and 2014, and the country slipped down the rankings in the Global Competitiveness Report as others made improvements. However, improvements since 2014 have seen it climb to 39th in this year’s edition of the report — up from 48th in 2007–2008. Its overall score improved by 0.19 points in that time.
What makes India so competitive?
Improvements in health, primary education and infrastructure contributed most to this improvement — although this is partly explained by the relatively large weight these “basic requirements” components have until now been given in factor-driven economies, each accounting for 15% of the final score.
On health and basic education, India almost halved its rate of infant mortality (from 62 to 37.9 per 1,000), increased life expectancy (from 62 to 68) and primary education enrolment (from 88.8% to 93.1%).
Improvements in infrastructure were small and faltering until 2014, when the government increased public investment and accelerated approval procedures to attract private resources. Macroeconomic conditions — the third-biggest positive contributor — followed a similar path: the recent slump in commodity prices has helped India to keep inflation below its target of 5%, while rebalancing its current account and decreasing its public deficit.
Another improvement over the past decade has been increased market size (the adoption of new PPP estimates by the IMF in 2014 also contributed to the upward increase in the measure of market size used in the GCI). Institutions deteriorated until 2014, as mounting scandals and seemingly unmanageable inefficiencies caused businesses to lose trust in the public administration — but this trend was also reversed after 2014, and the institutions score has returned to its 2007 level.
Have you read?
In other areas, India has not yet recovered to 2007 levels, with the biggest shortfall coming in financial market development — this pillar taking 0.03 points off India’s 2016 score in comparison to 2007 (a reduced pillar score of 0.52 points, multiplied by a pillar weight of 6%). The Reserve Bank of India has helped increase financial market transparency, shedding light on the large amounts of non-performing loans previously not reported on the balance sheets of Indian banks. However, the banks have not yet found a way to sell these assets, and in some cases need large recapitalizations.
The efficiency of the goods market has also deteriorated, as India failed to address long-running problems such as different local sales and value added taxes (this is set to finally change as of 2017 if the Central GST and Integrated GST bills currently in parliament are fully implemented). Another area of concern is India’s stagnating performance in technological readiness, a pillar on which it scores one full point lower than any other. These three pillars will be key for India to prosper in its next stage of development, when it will no longer be possible to base its competitiveness on low-cost, abundant labour. Higher education and training has also shown no improvement.
What areas should India prioritize today? India has made significant progress on infrastructure, one of the pillars where it ranked worst. As the country closes the infrastructure gap, new priorities emerge. The country’s biggest relative weakness today is in technological readiness, where initiatives such as Digital India could lead to significant improvements in the next years. India outperforms countries in the same stage of development, mostly those in sub-Saharan Africa, in all pillars except labor market efficiency.
Even on indicators where India has made progress, comparisons with other countries can be sobering: although life expectancy has increased, for example, it is still low by global standards, with India ranking only 106th in the world; and while India almost halved infant mortality, other countries did even better, so it drops nine places this year to 115th. Huge challenges still lie ahead on India’s path to prosperity.
The Global Competitiveness Report 2016–2017 is available here. You can explore the results of the report using the heatmap below.

Originally published at www.weforum.org.