A war of orders: Russia, Ukraine, and the future of Europe in three texts
Anton Gerashchenko (anton_gerashchenko_en)
[ Texts referred and discussed in the summary below:
1) Duncan Allan, "To be a great power: Russia’s quest to destroy the post-1991 order in Europe", New Eurasian Strategies Centre, November 28, 2025 (Download PDF)
2) Olena Snigyr: "War behind the talks: Europe in Russia's coercive strategy", Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, February 23, 2026 (link: https://loom.ly/HiVeWNo)
3) Céline Marangé, Susan Stewart: "The tipping point: An emerging model of European security with Ukraine and without Russia", Stiftung for Wissenchaft und Politique, IRSEM (Paris) (link: Download; PDF | 2,0 MB )
Anton Gerashchenko:
My attention was drawn to three recent texts that read like a single argument. Duncan Allan explains why Russia is destroying the European order built after 1991. Olena Snigyr shows what kind of order Russia is building in its place. The SWP study describes what is emerging in response: European security with Ukraine inside it and Russia outside it.
The shared conclusion is clear.
The war against Ukraine is not a war over territory. It is a war over how Europe is structured: who has the right to sovereignty, and who gets to write the rules of security.
Duncan Allan identifies the root cause.
Russia acts according to the logic of a great power - and this is not merely about strength or influence, but about special rights: to rule at home without outside criticism, to maintain a sphere of influence, to limit the choices of its neighbors, and to demand recognition as an equal. This leads to a conclusion that many avoid: the issue is not NATO. What Moscow cannot tolerate is the very idea that neighboring states can choose their own course independently.
That destroys the Russian hierarchy in which states are not equal.
Olena Snigyr shows what exactly Russia is building in place of what it has destroyed. The Russian international order is a system of unequal circles. At the center is Russia itself and the space of its direct control. Further out are neighbors held in place through force, dependency, intimidation, and bought elites. Further still are partners tied by benefit, anti-Western solidarity, and a shared interest in weakening the West.
The tools vary - violence, gas, debt, corruption, information campaigns. The principle is the same: the world is divided into zones of influence among several powers, and Russia is among those that decide for others.
Here, both authors converge: Russia’s foreign policy is the export of its domestic order. Allan describes the current system as wartime Putinism resting on three pillars: repression, anti-Western mobilization, and a militarized economy.
Snigyr shows that the same logic is projected outward. Russia does not simply want influence - it reproduces around itself its own model of power: coercion, control, dependency, and managed approval.
That is why not only tanks and gas contracts matter, but narratives as well. The Russian order rests on stories: the external enemy, “traditional values,” a special path, the cult of Victory, the “historical unity” of peoples.
These stories turn violence into “protection,” dependency into “brotherhood,” and the seizure of another country’s sovereignty into “historical justice.”
Ukraine and Belarus occupy a special place. Control over them is not a trophy, but part of the answer to the question of what Russia itself is. If Ukraine consolidates itself as a sovereign European state, it is not only Russia’s plan of influence that collapses - the very story through which the Kremlin justifies itself collapses as well.
That is why the war is not instrumental for the regime, but existential. At stake is Moscow’s right to decide the fate of its neighbors - and its demand that the West recognize this right.
SWP adds a third dimension: Europe’s response. The old model, in which Russia was treated as a partner or at least a necessary interlocutor, can no longer be restored.
The question is now different: how to build European security with Ukraine inside the system - and without Russia among those who write its rules. Russia is not going anywhere; it remains the main military threat. But from a co-creator of the order, it has turned into a state from which that order must be defended. Ukraine, meanwhile, is moving in the opposite direction - from a “security problem” into one of its supporting pillars.
The former buffer and object of other people’s agreements has become a condition of a stable European order: one guaranteed by the Ukrainian army, resilience, and political choice.
This is where the three texts come together. Allan explains why compromise with Russia is so difficult: its demands are not about concessions, but about the very principle of order. Snigyr explains why Russia will not back down: the project is embedded in the way the regime holds power and sees itself.
SWP explains why the response is becoming a restructuring of European security around Ukraine and against the Russian threat.
The same framework also exposes the weak point. From the outside, Russia looks invulnerable: it adapts to sanctions, shifts the economy onto a war footing, applies pressure through repression, and maintains support through fear and control of information. But endurance is not stability.
Snigyr shows where the limit lies: the system can absorb gradual pressure, but not simultaneous pressure. Economic collapse can be absorbed.
Military defeat can be rewritten by propaganda. Political crisis can be suppressed. But when the pillars weaken together, rather than one by one, the regime loses its ability to adapt.
Snigyr also points to the paradox: the regime’s greatest strength is also its point of fragility.
All the legitimacy of power is concentrated in one figure - this provides control, but it also makes the system hostage to one person. Once that center disappears, the regime begins to disintegrate from within until it finds a replacement.
The conclusion for Europe is direct. If the challenge is not only military, then the response cannot be only military either. Defense, support for Ukraine, sanctions, technological containment, and strategic clarity are necessary - but not sufficient.
Russia is fighting over how people see reality, history, and justice. Therefore, Europe must defend not only borders, but also the ability to call things by their names. Aggression is not a “conflict of interests.” A sphere of influence is not a “security guarantee.” Conquest is not “historical justice.” And peace is not a return to an order in which the aggressor dictates rules to the victim.
Together, these texts show one thing: Russia’s war against Ukraine is the front line of a wider war of orders. Russia is destroying a model in which states choose their own path. Ukraine is defending not only its territory, but that principle itself. And Europe is reaching the conclusion it avoided for a long time: its security cannot be built by appeasing Russia - only by including Ukraine, containing Russia, and defending the rules without which Europe ceases to be itself.
