Short summary to Brazil elections in 2026 - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Short summary to Brazil elections in 2026

 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida, diplomat, professor

About the 2026 elections in Brazil.

  

Before the creation of the Electoral Justice system in Brazil—established just after the 1930 Revolution, which replaced the "Old Republic" and launched a 15-year process of top-down (von oben), Bismarckian-style modernization under the sway of Getúlio Vargas—elections in our thoroughly oligarchic country were complete shams. It was the "Verification Commission" that vetted the list of potential candidates in advance and decided unilaterally who deserved to be elected and who could be cast aside without a second thought. A political figure from the Old Republic who transitioned into the "new" order used to say that while the elections were rigged, the representation was genuine, since those chosen were all upstanding citizens—magistrates, capitalists, large landowners; in short, wealthy and educated people.

After several decades of genuine modernization—spanning the 1946 Republic (following the fall of the dictator Vargas, who had spoken of a "brief 15-year period"), the crises of the 1950s and 60s, and a subsequent 21-year dictatorship that was strictly military in nature—and following the democratization process begun in 1985 and two presidential impeachments (in 1992 and 2016), we can finally say that elections have become fully legitimate, yet representation has become a complete sham. "Sham" in this context means that the political system and the parties represent nothing and no one; instead, the candidates themselves are entirely free to utilize public facilities and resources without having to answer to anyone.

During the early years of democratization, elections were defined by a contest between parties—notably the social-democratic PSDB (associated with Fernando Henrique Cardoso, architect of the Real Plan for macroeconomic stabilization and president from 1995 to 2002) and the Workers' Party (PT). The latter has been led since its inception (1980) by Lula—president for two terms (2003–2010), succeeded by one of his ministers, Dilma Rousseff (2011–2016, who was impeached), and returning to power in 2023. In fact, the president-elect’s direct mandate from the popular vote rarely translates into control over Parliament; parliamentary representation—derived from proportional elections or shaped by regional political bosses—usually remains dominated by conservative parties and leaders hailing from the oligarchies that have led Brazil since the 16th century. This disparity between majorities is often the source of political crises.

The Republic introduced direct and ostensibly secret voting, yet the illiterate—who constituted nearly half the population until World War II—were excluded from the process until 1987. The democratic era appeared to consolidate a steady progression toward broader party recruitment and the strengthening of the major parties that had fought against the military dictatorship for years. While the political landscape of the 1980s and 1990s resembled that of other presidential democracies—featuring competing parties—the nature of representation and the functioning of the parties themselves have changed significantly over the last quarter-century. The loosening of electoral laws, followed by parliamentary maneuvering, resulted in a chaotic party landscape—with parties becoming instruments of political and economic corruption—while a revolution in the tax treatment of the new "churches" belonging to various "evangelical" sects transformed them into veritable "money pumps" benefiting thousands of "pastors" who had become "educators" in the poorest municipalities.

The extraordinary growth of evangelical sects is a direct result of the complete tax exemption granted to their places of worship, which today outnumber official administrative localities several times over. Brazil has around 5,570 municipalities—a number that has surged since the 1988 Constitution granted them certain financial advantages—and over 150,000 evangelical churches and temples; this amounts to dozens for every municipality, all entirely tax-exempt. Their numbers continue to multiply. Meanwhile, fewer than half of these municipalities generate enough revenue of their own to cover normal operations; instead, they rely on various federal transfers, as well as social welfare programs (such as Bolsa Família), retiree pensions, and assorted subsidies (for gas, electricity, food vouchers, transport, etc.).

However, the most extraordinary developments concern the political parties themselves. They already benefit from two separate funds: one allocated to every party with congressional representation—and there were nearly 25 such parties a few years ago, out of more than 38 registered with the Superior Electoral Court—and another fund dedicated specifically to elections, making millions available for campaign advertising every two years. The most remarkable "coup" occurred during the PT's third term in office (2011–2014, under Dilma Rousseff), when parties succeeded in making mandatory the budget allocations that lawmakers can propose via amendments to the General Budget. These amendments have since proliferated in various forms—originating from individuals, parties, legislative committees, or political group leaders—and now represent a major source of widespread corruption. The situation has reached the point where federal elected officials—deputies and senators—have effectively become "federal aldermen," as these funds flow directly to small municipalities with minimal oversight from state audit courts or the federal government itself.

This massive windfall, flowing from the federal budget to the country’s most remote corners, has fundamentally altered how parties engage with the normal governance expected of a true democracy: it has virtually put an end to the horse-trading that was once standard practice between the executive and legislative branches during every parliamentary term. Parties—controlled by regional political bosses—and elected officials alike no longer need to fight for projects included in the federal government’s budget planning; a simple amendment earmarking funds for "healthcare" or "infrastructure works" in their home districts is enough to channel money into dubious undertakings (with half the funds being siphoned off, naturally). For the 2026 elections, several parties did not even bother fielding presidential candidates—either alone or in coalitions—to secure access to the Electoral Fund; they simply do not need it, as the money is already there. Alongside "evangelical temples"—many owned by local or national politicians—a "fourth" or "fifth" power has emerged in Brazil. It is as corrupt as the mafia-style militias that have proliferated in various capitals and major cities, siphoning off as much money as the drug trade, arms trafficking, or the criminal tax evasion facilitated by an incredibly complex and excessively heavy tax code (Brazil’s tax-to-GDP ratio rivals the OECD average, despite a per capita income five times lower—and is, in fact, ten percentage points higher than that of other developing nations).

Regarding Brazil’s October elections, the issue goes beyond the "polarization" between Right and Left; the entire Brazilian political system has been in a sorry state for years. This constitutes a distinct, purely domestic problem, running parallel to Trump’s maneuvers to bring Latin America under his imperial sway. Brazil, along with Mexico, is the last leftist bastion on a continent already reduced to the sphere of influence of the new emperor.

Up next: The Brazilian elections—between the first and second rounds 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 5423, August 7, 2026, 3 p.; rev.: 2; Diplomatizzando