Why China wants to expand BRICS - Antara Ghosal Singh

 Why China wants to expand BRICS

• Antara Ghosal Singh
• Raisina Debates
• Jul 21 2022
• https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/why-china-wants-to-expand-brics/

China’s purpose to expand BRICS is to promote its agenda and grand strategy more forcefully through the BRICS mechanism and stage and diplomatically ease the containment of the US.

The recently concluded 14^th BRICS Leaders’ Meeting in Beijing has once again brought the issue of BRICS expansion into the limelight. This is the second time since the 2017 Xiamen Summit that China has expressed its interest in expanding the group of emerging economies. There have been reports that Iran and Argentina have also announced their interest in formally joining the group. At a time when China and India are locked in a deadly stalemate at the Line of Actual Control, the Chinese proposal to expand BRICS has raised concern in New Delhi. As India determines its stance on this contentious issue, it is important to look into the factors driving China’s BRICS strategy.

Chinese analysts are of the opinion that the economic distress in these countries has been causing domestic political changes, which, in turn, is weakening the BRICS countries’ common identity, position, and enthusiasm to continue promoting the cooperation mechanism.

The growing chorus in China is that of late, BRICS has started showing signs of weakness, has been in retreat, and is lacking coherence in actions. Therefore, by replenishing fresh blood—attracting new members—China plans to inject new impetus into its development. As per the Chinese assessment, the economic performance of BRICS including China, in the past seven or eight years, has deteriorated. In other words, “golden BRICS” has turned into “stone BRICS” (金砖变成石砖). The era of rapid growth of BRICS seems to have passed, most strikingly for member countries like Brazil, South Africa, and Russia. While Brazil’s economy grew at an average annual rate of 1 percent in 2017, South Africa’s average annual GDP growth has been around 1.2 percent during the same time. Meanwhile, Russia’s GDP grew 0.7 percent in 2014, -2 percent in 2015, 0.2 percent in 2016, and 1.8 percent in 2017.

Chinese analysts are of the opinion that the economic distress in these countries has been causing domestic political changes, which, in turn, is weakening the BRICS countries’ common identity, position, and enthusiasm to continue promoting the cooperation mechanism. For example, Brazil and South Africa, which have poor economic performance and unstable domestic political situations, are unwilling to prioritise the BRICS agenda, which they believe will weaken their foreign policy flexibility, and thereby, jeopardise their national interests.^[1]

Now, with the pandemic and the Russia–Ukraine war, the situation has turned grimmer with the original international competitiveness of the BRICS countries clearly losing traction. On the contrary, the economies of developed countries, represented by the United States (US) and the West, are gradually showing signs of recovery. Still occupying a leading position in a new round of technological revolution and industrial transformation, the US has begun to try and regain its leadership of the global economy.^[2] At a time when the overall strength of the BRICS countries has been declining and facing heightened competition from traditional developed country-led cooperation mechanisms, China feels that limiting the BRICS mechanism to its original five members will further reduce its overall global influence and right to speak at global platforms. Hence, China’s interest in further expanding BRICS members.

Still occupying a leading position in a new round of technological revolution and industrial transformation, the US has begun to try and regain its leadership of the global economy.

The second reason is the intensifying China–US competition. Chinese observers note how in the Obama era, the G2 proposition had weakened the significance of BRICS for Chinese foreign policy. However, under the Trump presidency, as the meaning of G2 quickly turned from high-level cooperation to high-decibel confrontation, a larger, better coordinated BRICS became China’s priority. It was also in 2017 when China, for the first time, proposed the concept of an expanded BRICS. Now, with Biden in power, Chinese observers believe that the ‘new Cold War’—initiated during the Trump era—has been taken to a higher level.

For instance, in the backdrop of the Russia–Ukraine war, Europe has been dragged into a new Cold War environment, wherein a cohesive western bloc has been formed, comprising the US and Europe, like the old Cold War era. The Russian–Ukrainian war, they note, has become an excellent glue between the US and Europe. On the other hand, it is argued that in Asia, the US is driving more and more countries—Japan, Australia, India, New Zealand, and South Korea—into ‘smaller circles’ like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, AUKUS, and even into North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Of particular concern to China is how amidst heightened geopolitics, trade conflicts, the impact of the epidemic, and industrial upgrading, the global industrial chain is being restructured at an accelerated pace and efforts are being made to replace the existing ‘US+West+China’ industrial model by newer models, particularly a ‘US+West+India’ model. This, they argue, is aimed at isolating China and delivering a blow to China’s power and position in the upcoming fourth wave of industrialisation. It is against this background that China wants to expand BRICS, promote “ a community of supply chains interests,” and get more and more emerging economies from all over the world to join the BRICS (read China’s) supply chain. By deeply embedding these countries in a China-led supply chain, potential competitors like India can be neutralised, and any effort of excluding or replacing China in the current round of reorganisation of supply chains can be thwarted.

Of particular concern to China is how amidst heightened geopolitics, trade conflicts, the impact of the epidemic, and industrial upgrading, the global industrial chain is being restructured at an accelerated pace and efforts are being made to replace the existing ‘US+West+China’ industrial model by newer models, particularly a ‘US+West+India’ model.

To sum up, for China, the purpose of the new round of BRICS expansion is to diplomatically ease the containment of the US and promote China’s agenda and grand strategy more forcefully through the BRICS mechanism and stage, while preventing existing BRICS members, particularly India, from drifting too far into the US/western camp.^[3]

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^[1] Li Yiping and Fu Yuheng , “国际合作中的领导权竞争:以“一带一路”倡议与金砖国家合作的战略对接为例”, Southeast Academic Research, 2019, (03), 118-129+248

^[2] Zhao Chunzhe, “China’s thinking and path design for improving BRICs cooperation platform”, 全球化 2018, (11),81-93+134-135

^[3] Wang Zhuo, “Study on Sino-Indian Relation from the Perspective of BRICS”, Journal of Changsha University of Science and Technology (Social Science Edition), 2022,37(03):98-107

Nossos aliados no Brics, e no IBAS: Africa do Sul

Just quoting; 

"South Africa is a social, political and economic disaster waiting to happen."

AUBREY MATSHIQI, a South African political analyst, on the growing tension in that country after the police killed 34 striking miners two weeks ago.

Do BRIC ao BRICS: o valor "agregado" de um S...

Parece que os observadores não estão avaliando muito positivamente o ingresso da África do Sul no grupo Bric.
Uma única observação, antes de alguma análise mais circunstanciada: se os quatro já tinham problemas de compatibilização de agendas e de harmonização de prioridades, a cinco os exercícios de convergência se tornarão ainda mais difíceis.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Creating more walls than Brics
Mills Soko; Dr Mzukisi Qobo
Mail & Guardian online, January 07, 2011

JOHANNESBURG, SOUTH AFRICA - South Africa has finally edged closer to becoming a member of the "elite" grouping of the Bric nations (Brazil, Russia, India and China), following the recent expression of support by China and Russia for Pretoria's bid. It is expected that South Africa will be accepted formally as a new Bric member at these emerging powers' next summit in April.

The Bric states wield significant diplomatic and economic clout and have become crucial powerbrokers in the evolving, albeit volatile, multi-polar world order.

They are the four biggest economies in the developing world and Goldman Sachs has predicted that, thanks to their rapid growth rates, the combined economies of the Brics could overtake those of the current wealthiest countries in the next four decades. They account for 40% of the world's total foreign exchange reserves. They represent more than 40% of the world's population and more than a quarter of the world's land area.

Unlike most Western countries, the Brics (with the exception of Russia) weathered the global economic recession relatively well. This was partly as a result of their pursuit of unorthodox economic policies, which have eschewed the neoliberal nostrums embodied in the now discredited so-called Washington Consensus. The Brics, notably China, have played a pivotal role in cushioning global growth during the recession and have actively championed the reform of the international financial system within the G20.

It is not surprising, therefore, that South Africa finds close association with the Brics alluring. Yet amid South Africa's apparent diplomatic triumph a number of questions remain unanswered about the purpose and benefit of positioning the country within the Bric grouping. It is not clear what South Africa's motivation for joining the group is and what it seeks to gain from its membership. It is not evident what South Africa's strategy to the Brics is and how this fits into the country's wider global strategy.

This is all the more important given that Brics are not a formal political club or economic bloc, with clearly defined and coherent objectives and programmes. It is a construct of Jim O'Neill, a former chief economist at Goldman Sachs, that is based on certain assumptions and projections, which may or may not materialise. In any case, the notion of Bric as an analytical category is problematic and has outlived its usefulness. How, for example, does one justify the inclusion of the failing Russian state in the group and the exclusion of Turkey, a resurgent geopolitical powerhouse and a fast-growing economy -- the sixth largest in Europe?

Ibsa and Brics
How cohesive the Brics will be is another matter of concern, not least because its agenda runs the risk of being burdened by contentious issues, such as competition between China and India, China's historical alliance with Pakistan, Beijing's campaign against India's (and Japan's) bid for United Nation Security Council permanent membership and unresolved border disputes between Beijing and Delhi. Moreover, it bears stating that while India, Brazil and South Africa rank among the world's leading democracies, Russia and China are not known for their democratic practices.

What South African policymakers need to explain is how our country's imminent membership of the Brics will affect its role in the Ibsa (India, Brazil and South Africa) Dialogue Forum, which was set up in 2003 in terms of the Brasilia Declaration. The declaration set out a broad agenda for cooperation among the three countries, which included an ambition to alter the balance of power between rich and poor countries by democratising global decision-making bodies, such as the UN, and international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, developing alternatives to the current model of globalisation and giving shape to the ideal of promoting the economic and social interests of the South.

Does South Africa's elevation to Bric membership imply that this transformative policy agenda will now be promoted within the confines of the Brics and does it signal the beginning of the end of the Ibsa forum?

Given the extensive financial and human resources required to drive and maintain effective club diplomacy, our policymakers will have to accept that the Brics and Ibsa are essentially competing entities and that it will not be possible in the long run for South Africa to sustain both of them.

Membership of the Brics has been touted by some government officials and business commentators as providing a big opportunity for South Africa to leverage trade and investment relations with these countries. This is not a convincing argument. South Africa does not need to become a Bric member to maximise economic cooperation with these countries; it can do so at a bilateral level.

Since 1994 South Africa has developed strong bilateral economic relations with all the Brics and has signed strategic partnership frameworks with some of them. China, the bedrock of the group and the only credible contender for global superpower status, has become South Africa's single biggest trade partner.

But this steady economic progress has masked inescapable facts: despite the vast commercial opportunities the Brics offer, access to its markets has been constrained by a range of tariff barriers as well as complex and restrictive domestic regulations.

Brics relations
As World Bank studies have shown, it is far easier to do business in South Africa than it is in the Brics. Compounding these market access challenges has been the reality that the Brics are our competitors in sectors such as steel, clothing and textiles and the automotive industry. Also, despite sanguine public pronouncements, South Africa has yet to upgrade its limited trade pact with Brazil to a comprehensive agreement and its negotiations on a preferential trading arrangement with India has been proceeding at an excruciatingly slow pace.

As such, the Brics are barren ground for yielding significant trade and investment opportunities. Against this backdrop, it is not clear how Brics membership will make up for the failure to extract meaningful economic benefits at the bilateral level.

Cultivating strong relations with the Brics is not only important, it is also in South Africa's interest. The global financial crisis has underscored the importance of diversifying South Africa's export markets away from Europe -- which currently absorbs 40% of our exports -- and of exploring new markets, particularly those in the fast-growing developing economies. The Brics should be an integral part of this diversification strategy, but strengthening links with them should not be the country's all-consuming foreign economic policy goal. South Africa's evolving South-South strategy should include Africa, the Middle East and other Asian and Latin American countries.

South Africa's engagement with the Brics must be guided not by ideological whims, but by a strategic paradigm that is grounded in our country's domestic needs and fundamental interests.
South Africa has in the past earned international recognition on the basis of its own intellectual and normative weight. It has always championed multilateralism, offered innovative ideas on vital global governance issues and demonstrated leadership in conflict resolution, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction in several parts of Africa. Moreover, the country has over the years developed a fluent narrative of global development, especially on the imperative of bridging the North-South chasm. What happened to all that conceptual clarity, diplomatic finesse and self-assurance?

The carefully cultivated image of South Africa as an assertive regional power sits uneasily with that of a country begging for acceptance into the Brics' informal deliberations. The spectre of South Africa rejoicing at being invited to join an amorphous entity such as the Brics is plainly degrading and it is an affront to our national pride. South Africa needs to ponder its foreign policy identity and strategic posture in a changing and complex global environment.

Dr Mills Soko is an associate professor at the University of Cape Town's Graduate School of Business.
Dr Mzukisi Qobo is head: emerging powers and global challenges at the South African Institute of International Affairs.