Um possível próximo livro sobre a política externa e a diplomacia brasileira - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

 Ainda em revisão, capa a escolher: 

Relações internacionais do Brasil: 

história e historiografia da diplomacia brasileira

 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

 

Índice

Prefácio

 

1.    Relações internacionais e política externa do Brasil: visão geral, 7

       A era do Barão, 1902-1912

       A República dos bacharéis, 1912-1930

       Crise e fechamento internacional, 1930-1945

Uma política exterior tradicional, 1945-1960

A política externa independente, 1961-1964

A volta ao alinhamento, 1964-1967

Revisão ideológica e busca de autonomia tecnológica, 1967-1985

Redefinição das prioridades e afirmação da vocação regional, 1985-2000

 

2.    Evolução histórica da política externa brasileira, 20

       Diferentes abordagens em torno da política externa brasileira

       Uma periodização em contínuos ajustes

       Grandes etapas da diplomacia brasileira em sua trajetória independente

A diplomacia brasileira e a política externa partidária do lulopetismo

As instituições republicanas e a ferramenta diplomática

As grandes etapas da política externa desde 1945 (listagem esquemática)

 

3.    Historiografia da independência: síntese bibliográfica, 37

       Seleção dos trabalhos para a construção da história da independência

       Qual historiografia, qual independência?

       A historiografia da independência: seus principais historiadores

       As fontes, os fatos e a historiografia da Independência

       Alguns historiadores estrangeiros dos “sucessos” da independência

       O patrono da historiografia, Varnhagen, e seu crítico, Oliveira Lima

4.    A diplomacia brasileira da independência: heranças e permanências, 55

A diplomacia e a política externa na independência do Brasil

O primeiro registro da autonomia: o Arquivo Diplomático da Independência

A outra independência: uma história alternativa da construção do Estado

A Bacia do Prata e a Cisplatina: a primeira guerra (herdada de Portugal)

A lamentável diplomacia do tráfico escravo: defendendo o indefensável

A diplomacia brasileira na construção do Estado

 

5.    A diplomacia econômica do Brasil em perspectiva histórica, 81

Aspectos metodológicos da análise da diplomacia econômica brasileira

Estrutura e contexto da diplomacia econômica no Brasil

A diplomacia econômica brasileira no século XIX

Uma diplomacia “fora do lugar”?

A diplomacia econômica brasileira no século XX

Velhas questões, novos desafios: a diplomacia econômica ao início do século XXI

 

6.    A emergência do Brasil para a diplomacia multilateral: da Haia a Paris, 98

Os conceitos de diplomacia mundial, internacional, global ou multilateral

Como o Brasil emergiu para a diplomacia multilateral?

A passagem do Brasil da política regional para a política internacional

O Brasil na conferência da paz da Haia (1907)

Rui Barbosa defende a neutralidade da Bélgica na Grande Guerra (1916)

O Brasil nas negociações de paz de Paris (1919)

 

7.    Relações econômicas internacionais desde 1944, 116

O Brasil no sistema econômico multilateral do pós-guerra

A ordem econômica internacional do pós-guerra e a economia brasileira

O multilateralismo econômico do pós-guerra e o Brasil

Brasil: cronologia sumária do multilateralismo econômico, 1944-2022

Vetores das relações econômicas internacionais do Brasil, 1944-2022

 

8.    Finanças internacionais do Brasil: perspectiva de meio século, 132

Meio século de história financeira do Brasil

Multiplicidade cambial e estrangulamento financeiro, 1954-1964

Estabilização econômica, indexação e abertura financeira, 1964-1973

A desordem monetária internacional e o desequilíbrio financeiro, 1973-1982

Crise e castigo numa era de transformações financeiras, 1982-1987

Ensaios de estabilização na era da globalização financeira, 1987-1994

De novo no turbilhão financeiro internacional, 1994-2004

A inserção financeira internacional do Brasil: perspectiva de meio século

 

9.    As relações internacionais do Brasil na era militar, 1964-1985, 181

       Visão geral da diplomacia e das políticas externas do regime militar

       A diplomacia dos círculos concêntricos: governo Castello Branco, 1964-1967

       A diplomacia da prosperidade: governo Costa e Silva, 1967-1969

       A diplomacia do interesse nacional: governo Garrastazu Médici, 1969-1974

       A diplomacia do pragmatismo responsável: dupla Geisel-Silveira, 1974-1979

       A diplomacia do universalismo: governo Figueiredo, 1979-1985

       Balanço global das diplomacias do regime militar, 1964-1985

 

10. Da normalidade à esquizofrenia na diplomacia brasileira, 202

Diplomacia e política externa de Estados soberanos, em condições normais

Padrões tradicionais da diplomacia brasileira, em tempos normais

Tempos anormais: sem padrões e sem qualquer programa

Como a anormalidade se transformou em esquizofrenia diplomática 

A esquizofrenia se transforma em isolamento internacional

A restauração da política externa e da diplomacia segundo ex-chanceleres

 

11.  A política externa do governo Bolsonaro, 2019-2022, 232

       No começo era o globalismo, o pavor da nova direita

       Trump, o salvador do Ocidente, guia e ídolo de Bolsonaro

       China ou o tecnototalitarismo, estimado destruir a democracia no Brasil

       A União Europeia e o seu insistente incômodo na questão do meio ambiente

       O Mercosul e a América do Sul: as oportunidades perdidas

       De repente, a pandemia revela o negacionismo do presidente

       O isolamento internacional do Brasil: uma novidade desde a ditadura militar

       A Ucrânia e a disjunção entre a política presidencial e o Itamaraty

       Nunca antes visto na história da diplomacia brasileira: um primeiro balanço

 

12. O pensamento brasileiro sobre as relações internacionais do Brasil, 245

Existe um “pensamento brasileiro” em relações internacionais?

Panorama do pensamento internacional no Brasil até o regime militar

Desenvolvimento do pensamento brasileiro na redemocratização

Os grandes eixos da pesquisa e das atividades docentes no final do século XX

A diplomacia do Sul Global e sua influência na produção acadêmica

Ruptura política a partir de 2016-2018: desaparecimento do pensamento?

Tendências atuais e perspectivas para o pensamento internacional do Brasil

 

13.  Rupturas e continuidades na política externa brasileira, 276

A construção de uma política externa autônoma sob o regime militar

Poucas descontinuidades na Nova República

Pequena ruptura da era Lula: engajamento no combate à fome e à pobreza

A caminho da grande ruptura: desafeição ao PT e ascensão da extrema-direita

Uma nova “ruptura diplomática” em 2023?

 

Indicações bibliográficas, 286

Nota sobre o autor, 291

Livros publicados por Paulo Roberto de Almeida, 292

 

Então, minha gente, como andamos de Guerra Fria? - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

 Então, minha gente, como andamos de Guerra Fria?

Vamos fazer um retrospecto rápido.

Depois da gloriosa revolução proletária de 1917 – na verdade, um mero putsch bolchevique que fechou o parlamento e a constituinte que tentavam criar um regime democrático no recém finado absolutismo czarista –, houve uma guerra quente: a dos revolucionários brancos – apoiados por potências ocidentais – contra o Exército Vermelho: este ganhou, e implantou uma ditadura ainda mais cruel do que a do czarismo.
Não houve nenhuma conciliação da URSS com o Ocidente; ao contrário, fomentou golpes e revoluções em diversos países, inclusive na China (1927) e no Brasil (1935), ambos fracassados.
Uma aproximação, mas por necessidade, se deu em 1941, após a invasão da URSS por Hitler, com quem Stalin tinha feito um "pacto de colaboração" em 1939, para decepar a Polônia.
Se não fosse pela ajuda americana e inglesa, a URSS teria sido vencida pela Wehrmacht, e a União Soviética, a Europa e boa parte do mundo teriam sido submetidos pelo totalitarismo nazista talvez por 30 anos.
Os líderes aliados – Roosevelt, Churchill e Stalin – se encontraram várias vezes durante a guerra, depois não mais, e a Guerra Fria começa de fato em Berlim a partir de 1947.
Apenas com a crise dos mísseis soviéticos em Cuba, em 1962, eles começam novamente a se falar, nessa fase de Détente na Guerra Fria, mas esta continuou, mesmo com negociações seguidas de "controle" de armas estratégicas pelos 20 anos seguintes. O socialismo continuou a bater pinos e a caminhar inconscientemente para o declínio e o desaparecimento.
Antes disso, o último líder soviético, ou da URSS, amenizou o clime da Guerra Fria, que só terminou mesmo com a implosão do socialismo e o fim da União Soviética.
A Otan criou um programa para a Rússia e o G7 incorporou a Rússia e a considerou uma economia de mercado, em 2002, mesmo com dúvidas sobre a conversão real do país à democracia e à economia de mercado.
O ex-KGB e saudosista do império soviético que conquistou o poder em 2000, e nunca mais largou, criou a maior cleptocracia do mundo, e investiu zilhões em rearmamento.
Enquanto isso, a China, aceita no Gatt-OMC, deu continuidade à sua fulgurante ascensão na economia e no comércio mundial, ultrapassando todo o G7 (menos EUA) e deixando a Rússia na sua rabeira (candidata a uma possível colonização econômica num futuro de médio prazo).
Enquanto a Rússia perdia importância – salvo para fornecimento de energia à Europa –, os dirigentes chineses pós Deng se encontravam com seus parceiros ocidentais, aperfeiçoando a incorporação da China à economia mundial. 
Os EUA se comportaram muito mal no momento unipolar pós-Guerra Fria, tratando com soberba tanto a Rússia quanto a China, e se submeteram à paranoia dos chefes do Pentágono, que passaram a considerar a China a sua inimiga estratégica (quando esta considerava os EUA seus aliados naturais, contra uma Rússia ainda perigosa.
Este foi o momento decisivo, de volta a uma Guerra Fria econômica, que não deveria existir se os EUA aceitassem a ideia da Chimerica, a complementaridade natural entre as duas maiores economias mundiais, em benefício da paz e da segurança internacionais, sobretudo em favor dos países em desenvolvimento. Perdeu-se a maior oportunidade do pós-Guerra Fria e criou-se uma fissura entre os dois gigantes.
O que era apenas uma Guerra Fria Econômica ameaçou converter-se em guerra quente por causa de uma pequena ilha que NUNCA pertenceu à jurisdição soberana da RPC, mas que era parte do antigo Império do Meio, que o novo Imperador (rompendo com o bom sistema de alternância criado por Deng) quer recolocar na sua esfera de domínio imperial.

O encontro Biden-Xi em Bali promete inaugurar uma nova Détente, sem que os fatores da nova Guerra Fria estejam desativados, pois eles são alimentados pela hubris imperial dos dois grandes contendores.
Conclusão: teremos mais alguns anos, talvez décadas, de gastos inúteis com armamentos sofisticados (que nunca serão usados), em lugar de uma cooperação em prol da paz mundial e do desenvolvimento internacional.
Os impérios por vezes são seguros, para dentro, mas quando suas placas tectônicas se tocam, desastres podem ocorrer.
Esta é a minha visão do cenário atual.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Brasília, 15/11/2022

Territórios liberados pelas forças ucranianas contra os invasores russos - Financial Times

Uma cartografia dos avanços e recuos na guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia, pelo Financial Times:  

 
https://www.ft.com/content/4351d5b0-0888-4b47-9368-6bc4dfbccbf5?desktop=true&segmentId=7c8f09b9-9b61-4fbb-9430-9208a9e233c8#myft:notification:daily-email:content

Since the start of the Russian invasion on February 24, Ukraine has liberated a total of 74,443 sq km of territory from Russian forces, according to data from the Institute for the Study of War think-tank. 

Ukrainian forces advanced into Kherson on Friday after Russia said its forces had completed their withdrawal from the southern city, sealing one of the biggest setbacks to president Vladimir Putin’s invasion. 

Kyiv’s progress and Moscow’s chaotic retreat across the Dnipro river, conducted under Ukrainian artillery fire, means Russia has now surrendered the only provincial capital it had captured in the war, as well as ceding key strategic positions. 

At the end of August, Ukraine launched its first big counter-attack since Russia’s full assault on the country began in February, even as Kyiv complained that its forces lacked sufficient heavy western weaponry to make a decisive strike. 

The advance liberated 3,000 sq km of territory in just six days — Ukraine’s biggest victory since it pushed Russian troops back from the capital in March. 

Ukraine’s forces have continued to push east, capturing the crucial transport hub of Lyman, near the north-eastern edge of the Donetsk province, which it wrestled from Russian control on October 1. The hard-fought victory came after nearly three weeks of battle and set the stage for a Ukrainian advance towards Svatove, a logistics centre for Russia after its troops lost the Kharkiv region in the lightning Ukrainian counter-offensive. Map animation showing Ukrainian counter-offensive in the north east of the country since September 1 

Other key maps and charts from the war The shift in the conflict’s focus towards the Donbas region follows Russia’s failure to capture Kyiv during the first phase of the war. Before Ukraine’s rapid counter-offensive, marginal Russian gains in the east suggested the war was entering a period of stalemate. 

An animated map showing areas of Ukraine under Russian control through six months of war. Russia’s focus has shifted east, with the invasion reaching a stalemate in recent weeks The Russians were thwarted in Kyiv by a combination of factors, including geography, the attackers’ blundering and modern arms — as well as Ukraine’s ingenuity with smartphones and pieces of foam mat. Map showing Ukrainian counter-offensive area around Kyiv 

The number of Ukrainians fleeing the conflict makes it one of the largest refugee crises in modern history. Map showing Ukrainian refugees seeking safety in multiple countries – estimated refugees recorded, source UNHCR In mid-March, an attack on a Ukrainian military base, which had been used by US troops to train Ukrainian soldiers, added to Russia’s increasingly direct threats that Nato’s continued support of Ukraine risked making it an enemy combatant in the war. 

On March 24, Nato agreed to establish four new multinational battle groups in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia to add to troops in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. 

Map of Europe showing Nato member countries with locations of different military presences (multinational troops, air and sea forces, and other military) 

Sources: Institute for the Study of War, Rochan Consulting, FT research Cartography and development by Steve Bernard, Chris Campbell, Caitlin Gilbert, Emma Lewis, Joanna S Kao, Sam Learner, Ændra Rininsland, Niko Kommenda, Alan Smith, Martin Stabe, Neggeen Sadid and Liz Faunce. 

Based on reporting by Roman Olearchyk and John Reed in Kyiv, Guy Chazan in Lviv, Henry Foy in Brussels and Neggeen Sadid in London.

Solidariedade com as mulheres, e todos os homens do Irã, dominado por uma teocracia impiedosa (Signal, GZERO Media)

 Centenas de mulheres e homens já morreram, pela repressão do regime teocrático do Irã, inclusive um primeiro condenado à morte "por ofender Deus".

Is the West doing enough to help Iranians?Signal, GZERO Media, November 15, 2022

   

The actions of Iranian protesters over the past two months – particularly women – have been awe-inspiring. Despite the prospect of incarceration, and worse, they’ve refused to kowtow to the bushy-eyebrowed mullahs calling the shots in the Islamic Republic. Fear of execution looms large, but Iranian women continue to abandon their headscarves and chant in the streets for regime change.

Things are only getting more dangerous after Iran’s parliament recently voted in favor of the death penalty for protesters. The first such sentences were handed down in recent days. Indeed, the stakes could not be higher, and yet hopeful Iranians continue to risk their lives.

As the government crackdown intensifies – there have been 300 deaths and 15,000 arrests to date – is the West doing enough to support the protesters in their bid for freedom?

Defying the despots. Iranians took to the streets in September in the aftermath of the in-custody death of Mahsa Amini, 22, who was arrested and reportedly beaten by Iran’s “morality police” for improperly donning her hijab. 

Many young Iranians have died in custody over the past decade, but Amini’s story has galvanized a generation of millennial and Gen-Z women who have no recollection of the 1979 Islamic Revolution that brought down a corrupt Shah and have zero affinity for the mullahs who rule their lives.

As the human rights situation in Iran deteriorates, what’s the West doing about it?

Suit-clad politicians in Brussels and Washington have imparted all the right platitudes expressing support for Iran’s women-led movement. 

More substantially, the US and EU, the UK, and Canada have expanded on Western sanctions in recent weeks – in place for the better part of a decade – aimed at stopping Iran from further developing its nuclear program. The Western alliance has sanctioned a host of officials from the Islamic Republican Guard Corps, a key unit of Iran's armed forces, as well as high-ranking government officials and regime loyalists.

These new measures come on top of long-term sanctions that have sought to cut Tehran off from the global financial system in hopes of strangling Iran’s most lucrative export – oil – and bringing the regime to its knees. 

Still, while these established measures remain in place, the Biden administration has so far been unwilling to up the ante by implementing a cohesive strategy for further inflicting pain on the Iranian energy sector. Consider that in the fiscal year leading up to March 2023, Iran is expected to export 1.4 billion barrels per day, compared to around 500,000 bpd or less when former President Donald Trump was in the White House and enforced a “maximum pressure” campaign on Iran. 

This suggests, analysts say, that the West, long trying to keep the dialogue open with Tehran in hopes of reviving the now-defunct nuclear deal, has overseen a lax enforcement system. 

Many observers point to the latest developments in Ukraine as a case in point. Despite Western sanctions intended to stop Iran from developing its military-industrial complex, Iran has succeeded in building one of the world’s biggest drone fleets – and is supplying the Russians with thousands of sophisticated “killer drones” that the Kremlin is using to pummel Ukraine. 

What’s more, debris from the battlefield suggests that Iranians have been able to rely on Chinese copies of Western parts to build their drone stockpile, while they’ve also acquired Western-made parts to power their drones. Clearly, Western sanctions haven’t had the intended effect of cutting Iran off and making it squirm. (To be sure, the EU has recently imposed sanctions on Iran drone makers, while the US sanctioned Iranian flight companies for helping transfer drones to Russia. Still, it comes after Iran had already developed one of the best arms games in the business.)

Moreover, that countries including China and the United Arab Emirates have had no qualms about flouting Western sanctions on Iranian energy exports suggests that the perceived cost of buying and selling Iranian oil has waned. 

What more could be done? The US could sanction Iran’s drone program and increase the pace of its ad-hoc sanctions regime. What’s more, while hundreds of Russian diplomats have been expelled from Europe and the US, many Iranian dignitaries continue to get the royal treatment in global forums.

Looking ahead. The UN Human Rights Council says it will hold a special session to discuss Iran on Nov. 24. Meanwhile, the world's largest and most influential economies are currently gathering at the G-20 summit to talk about all things geopolitics. Will their response to Iran be united and stern? Don’t hold your breath.

Brazil's "Moderated" Liberty - Leonidas Zelmanovitz (Liberty Fund)

Essay: Liberty Fund 

Pedro Américo: Independência ou Morte

Brazil's "Moderated" Liberty

Leonidas Zelmanovitz

Liberty Fund, November 15, 2022

On September 7, 1822, the son of the Portuguese king, the prince regent of Brazil, declared Brazilian independence and became Brazilian Emperor, taking the name of Dom Pedro I. The occasion may not have been as glamorous as later depicted in the canvas “Independence or Death,” but it was the formal birth of the nation. Since then, Brazil has achieved significant, but limited, constitutional liberty.

Independence or Death

The roots of Brazilian national identity and political independence may or may not be traced deep into colonial times. Certainly, however, the events of the early nineteenth century decisively shaped the idea of Brazil as a distinct political entity. In 1808, the Portuguese court arrived in Rio de Janeiro, escaping from Napoleon’s invasion. King Joao VI (at that time still prince regent) abolished the colonial condition by opening Brazil to direct trade with all “friendly nations,” and later, in 1815, Brazil was made an integral part of the “United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil, and Algarve.”

The end of colonial status of Brazil implied that the commercial interests in Portugal, which had benefited from a draconian monopoly of Brazilian trade before 1808, lost their monopolistic rents. At the same time, the Portuguese bureaucrats also lost the rents that used to come along with political power over Brazil when Joao VI decided to remain in Rio de Janeiro instead of returning to Lisbon upon Napoleon’s defeat. Brazil was by then already a bigger, wealthier, and more populated territory than Portugal proper. The reaction of Portuguese elites was the “Porto Revolution of 1820,” a botched attempt to reinstate the colonial statute, which inadvertently triggered Brazilian independence.

The situation in Brazil was dire at that time. Of about 4.5 million inhabitants, 1 million were white Portuguese, 800,000 were Native Americans, 1.2 million were slaves brought from Africa, and about 1.5 million were free decedents of white, black, and native people. Slavery was at the same time the cornerstone of the economy and the major impediment to economic growth.

Though local governance, the Portuguese language, and the Catholic religion had been well established in colonial times, almost every other major institution was introduced in the country after 1808, including the first institution of higher education, the first press, the first bank, a rudimentary centralized bureaucracy, and a national army.

Imagine the United States becoming independent with King’s College being the only institution of higher education and less than 15 years old, without a press, without industries, and without state governments.

Considering the circumstances, the constitution given to Brazil by Dom Pedro I was remarkably liberal, its virtues evidenced by the fact that it lasted from 1824 to 1891, the longest of any other constitutions of the country since.

Yet that constitution arguably planted the seeds of some of the most intractable problems haunting Brazil to this day. Most importantly, it did not recognize a single source of legitimate political power. Both the Emperor and the People were recognized as sources of sovereignty. That was not an arcane and inconsequential feature, as I hope to demonstrate.

The Moderating Power

The traditional division of power, since Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws, has been one of three branches of power, the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary, all of them having popular sovereignty as the sole source of their legitimacy.

Benjamin Constant later proposed a different separation of power. It was based on the recognition that in England, the quintessential constitutional monarchy at his time, in the words of Adolphe Thiers: “the king rules but does not govern.” Based on that observation, Constant proposed that the king had a “moderating” power, with the executive power vested in the cabinet of ministers, and the king acting as an impartial “judge” of the political game. Constant is mostly understood as describing, in more detail, a liberal conception of constitutional monarchy with popular sovereignty exercised by a parliament, and not as challenging such conception.

However, that was not what was institutionalized in Brazil.   

The charter Dom Pedro I gave the country concentrated power in his hands to intervene in the political process whenever he deemed it necessary. To that end, he institutionalized a power of “tutelage” of the exercise of popular sovereignty for himself. The emperor at his sole discretion could fire the cabinet, dissolve the parliament, call new elections, command the armed forces, and enjoy legal immunities, among other prerogatives. Soon he abused that power. A crisis ensued and, for all practical purposes, he was forced to resign in 1831. His son, Dom Pedro II, exercised that power more prudently, if not more sparingly, until the monarchy was abolished by a military coup in 1889.

Although Brazil, once it became a republic, has never again explicitly acknowledged the right of someone to exercise “tutelage” over the political process in its formal constitutions, first the army and more recently the Supreme Court have claimed such powers time and again.

Aside from other minor and not-so-minor incidents, Brazil had military coups in 1889, 1930, 1945, and 1964. More recently, the Supreme Court has claimed to have powers not considered by most legal scholars to be authorized by the current Brazilian constitution of 1988.

With more or less acknowledgment, all those instances of tutelage over the political process are manifestations of the “moderating power.” It is part of the real, unwritten Brazilian Constitution.

If the Army yesterday or the Supreme Court today may decide that the institutions of limited and representative government in the country are not sufficient . . . then the real sovereign is not the people.

The problem is that the principle of legality, a cornerstone of the rule of law, means not only that private individuals are free to do whatever is not forbidden by law, but also that public agents are authorized to do only what is mandated by law.  If the political constitution recognizes that the sole source of legitimacy is the sovereignty of the people and determines how the different branches of government will exercise such sovereignty on behalf of the people, then any infringement of the constitution is an infringement on popular sovereignty, and therefore, illegitimate—period.

Throughout Brazilian history, defenders of such arrangements have argued that extreme circumstances require extreme measures, and therefore, the exercise of such “tutelage” is warranted every time that the integrity of the country is at risk. However, other societies have institutionalized emergency powers subject to popular sovereignty rather than above it.

If the Army yesterday or the Supreme Court today may decide that the institutions of limited and representative government in the country are not sufficient, for example, to check the power of a political maverick and therefore they are entitled to intervene “for the good of the country,” then the real sovereign is not the people but whoever exercises the ultimate power in emergency cases. That is the Hobbesian lesson of Carl Schmitt, like it or not.

In other words, the rule of law in the country is conditioned to the goodwill of whoever is perceived as having such “moderating power.”

Another argument presented by the supporters of such usurpation of popular sovereignty is that Dom Pedro II used it with prudence. That seems to me a non-sequitur. Because that man happened to be a prudent man, it does not follow that any other man or group of men will act similarly.

“Jabuticaba” is a fruit that grows only in Brazil. Everything that exists only in Brazil such as the acceptance of a “moderating power” limiting popular sovereignty is also called a “jabuticaba.” Very well, what are the consequences of this particular “jabuticaba”?

In order to answer that, let us consider in what way slavery was a deadweight preventing the country from developing. The answer is that about a fifth of the population of the country was denied basic individual rights. Slavery, aside from being a moral monstrosity, denied to the slaves the necessary conditions to engage in mutually beneficial exchanges, and to benefit from the use of whatever knowledge of particular circumstances they might have come across.

Think now about the fact that, for all practical purposes, the rule of law was and according to some still is conditional. Do you think your property is secure? It is better to think twice. Do you think you know what the rules are for whatever endeavor you have chosen for yourself? Again, it is better to think twice.

That capital formation and wealth accumulation are still happening in the country is a wonder of wonders. Considering that Brazil is one of the world’s biggest economies, defenders of Brazilian political practices may argue that Brazil did not fare so badly after all, and we cannot know what would have happened if the frequent infringements of constitutional order were not so easily tolerated. Even if it is impossible to measure, we may nevertheless affirm beyond doubt that ceteris paribus, whatever security of possession and personal autonomy does exist, it is less than what it could exist if encroachments on popular sovereignty were not tolerated as they are to this day in the country. By the same token, if we accept that the rule of law is the foundation of individual incentives for wealth creation, the country would be, by definition, potentially wealthier if the rule of law were stronger than it actually is.

American Brazilianization? 

Are we experiencing a process of “Brazilianization” of the United States? That question would require more detailed consideration. However, the lessons from two hundred years of Brazilian independence without being able to clearly establish the principle of popular sovereignty may serve as a cautionary note to whoever takes it for granted anywhere.

We might analyze events of American history using the framework of the “moderating” power we see in Brazil, one that “for the good of the country,” can infringe the principles of legality and put itself above the constitutional order, even if only in spirit: What were the instances in which such episodes could be identified; who are the ones most likely to believe that they are above the law?

Changing circumstances may require changes in the institutional setting for the very survival of the polity. This fact does not do away with the importance of constitutional procedures in making those changes.

When substantive institutional changes are made not by constitutionally acceptable methods, but by abusing forms and disregarding traditional interpretations, they amount to infringements on popular sovereignty, and the legitimacy of the entire political system is called into question.

What unites the American people is not a common ethnic origin, is not a common religion, is not a common history, is not a common language, but an acceptance of some ideas which informed the American founding documents. That has been proved by the number of people from different parts of the globe who dream to become Americans regardless of their religious beliefs or the color of their skin.

That the United States is no longer the kind of polity thought by the framers is obvious. Again stating the obvious, many institutional changes since the founding were for the better. Still, we may argue that everything good that changed in the United States since its founding was inspired and made possible by the ideals behind the political arrangements established at the founding.

Chief among those ideals is the ideal of popular sovereignty exercised through a limited and representative government as established by the American Constitution. That is the positive expression in the laws of the country of the somewhat metaphysical concept of the Rule of Law.

The United States became the most powerful political society in the world thanks to the allegiance that so many productive, innovative, brave individuals were and still are willing to give to its flag.

Weakening respect for the laws and political practices in the country also weakens the country as a political entity, even if there is a long way to go until “tutelage” by any self-proclaimed elite becomes an acceptable part of the actual political norms, as they still seem to be back in Brazil.

Gordon Brown, a former Prime minister of the UK, once humorously remarked that “in establishing the rule of law, the first five hundred years are always the hardest.” Perhaps, about three hundred years from now, we will all be laughing at that in Brazil and in the United States.

Leonidas Zelmanovitz, a fellow with the Liberty Fund, holds a law degree from the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul in Brazil and an economics doctorate from the Universidad Rey Juan Carlos in Spain.

More by this author

https://lawliberty.org/author/leonidas-zelmanovitz/

Essay

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Brazil’s Inflation Lessons

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LawMacro, as it is currently practiced, has unmeasured confidence in the ability of government to steer the economy. 

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In face of uncertainty, there is no wonder that some projects only move forward if the government is willing to subsidize them.

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Considering two Roman legal maxims may help us navigate the crisis which has resulted from the coronavirus pandemic.

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Proponents of the Green New Deal ask us for the sacrifices normally offered only in war.

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As currently configured, it is likely to be rejected by those in charge of exercising the monetary prerogatives of sovereign governments. 

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The Baleful Consequences of Robert Skidelsky’s Keynesianism

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Keynes’s famed biographer wants economic interventionism to make a comeback.

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Designing Capitalism

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