Depois de Trump, Biden abre nova guerra comercial contra a China: isso não vai acabar bem - Jordan Schneider, Lily Ottinger (China Talk)

EMERGENCY POD: Sester on Biden's Electric Curtain

The IRA was the carrot. Here comes the stick. 

JORDAN SCHNEIDER AND LILY OTTINGER China Talk, MAY 15 The Biden administration has announced a slew of tariffs against China, including a 100% tariff on Chinese EVs. What took so long? How did regulators decide what to tariff, and how much the tariffs would be? To discuss, ChinaTalk interviewed economist Brad Setser, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and a former economist in Biden’s USTR. We discuss: Whether the national security justification for tariffs on EVs makes sense; Why the Biden admin waited so long before imposing these tariffs; Whether the tariffs will unjustly protect low-quality American carmakers from healthy competition; How the policy response to today’s Chinese EV manufacturers differs from the response to Japanese automakers in the 1980s; How the different tariff percentages were chosen;  … and more! What is being tariffed and why? Jordan Schneider: Let’s start with a brief history of how we got here. What is the process that ended up concluding on May 14, 2024? Brad Setser: The process started with the imposition of Section 301 tariffs in the Trump administration. 301 is sort of like the US unilateral judge-and-jury tariff law. It states that if there's an undue burden on US commerce, then the US can impose tariffs that are meant to offset that undue burden.  The original 301 case was centered around technology transfer and IP theft, which led to a series of negotiations with China. China responded to the initial $50 billion of tariffs with their own $50 billion of tariffs, and then Trump responded with an ever-escalating and expanding set of tariffs. $50 billion became $250 billion, and then another $110 billion was added by the Trump administration. Trump granted some exclusions to these tariffs, and the Biden administration inherited an open question of what to do with these tariffs. There is also a statutory review of 301 tariffs after a four-year period.  Today, Biden announced the conclusion that some of the tariffs needed to be increased to better serve the goals of the original 301 case. Those goals include holding China to its commitments, which it didn't meet under the phase one agreement. Thus, what the Biden administration eventually concluded was that this review should change the structure of tariffs around a set of products that the Biden administration judged to be of strategic importance to America's future industrial development. Those areas also happen to generally be areas where China itself has had an active industrial policy. The net effect is, to a significant degree, fighting to fire with fire.  China has a pretty restrictive policy towards imports of electric vehicles and batteries. It doesn't need to be that restrictive because companies have become competitive. But when China’s EV and battery industry was getting started, China didn't let foreign producers’ imports qualify for its subsidies. China’s always had actually pretty high tariffs around the auto sector and solar ships. China built the first deep-sea floating solar plant off the coast of Shandong province in 2022. Source. China has clearly had industrial policies. These tariffs took on an aspect of responding to China's industrial policies in support of the Inflation Reduction Act and the CHIPS Act. Biden’s goal is to make sure that an indigenous American electric vehicle and battery industry doesn't get overwhelmed by Chinese supply.  Jordan Schneider: I did a show way back in 2019 with Doug Irwin, who has a fascinating book about the political economy of tariffs. Tarriffs, taxes, and trade: Doug Irwin on ChinaEconTalk Jordan Schneider Episode Clearly, some of these industries have real political salience. The Detroit automakers in 2008 were prominent enough to get a bailout. But this also includes tariffs on some novel things –  such as lagging edge semiconductors, shipped-ashore cranes, syringes, and needles – which don’t appear to be motivated by a protectionist impulse to save unproductive jobs.  Instead, the Biden administration has decided that dependence on China is a national security issue that needs rectifying, and his solution is to use trade barriers as well as subsidies and industrial policy.  Brad Setser: That's right. In manufacturing, China is now a superpower. 30% to 33% of global manufacturing is in China, which is 15% to 20% of the global economy. China is a superpower. The US has gone through three phases in its response to the challenge created by China's emergence as the world's greatest manufacturing power. The first phase was a dominant sense that China's emergence as a manufacturer was complementary to the US economy. This was the idea that US companies could get cheap inputs and make certain consumer goods at a lower cost, which would be good for the US economy. This idea assumed that over time, a wealthier China would be a growing market for things like solar cells, aircraft, semiconductors, and patent-protected pharmaceuticals, which the US economy stood to benefit from also. The second phase was a recognition that the organic development of China's economy and its manufacturing power wasn't simply complimentary, and that in some specific sectors, telecommunications equipment being the obvious one, Chinese firms were emerging as potent competitors and they were doing so with a certain element of state backing. Huawei wasn't state-owned, but Huawei got plenty of support through contracts inside China from the state, telcos, a lot of support when it's going out and exporting, and a lot of subsidies for the development of its chip business. There was a hope that through negotiation you could convince China to change its ways, to back away from certain industrial policy practices, to liberalize, to go back to reform and opening up. Upgrade to paid Now we're in a third phase where no one expects China to reform and open up. We are now responding with our own industrial policies. We're not going to abandon sectors just because China has used state resources to prioritize them and built up capacity. We're trying to develop those sectors ourselves, and we're using both money and border restrictions to achieve that goal. Jordan Schneider: This gets at one of the things that is a sort of pet peeve for me. When Biden talks about trade policy, he says things such as, “American workers and businesses can out-compete anyone as long as they have fair competition.” Well, I'm sorry, but “fair” doesn't have a lot to do with it. China's actually really good at making stuff now. The concern I have is that this mindset doesn't internalize the fact that America is can lose because of domestic political decisions.  US failure on EVs isn’t simply a downstream consequence of the fact that BYD got some undermarket loans back in 2015. There are clear firm dynamics and regulatory dynamics that have made the EV rollout in the US a lot less successful. Both Western and East Asian carmakers are less capable of producing vehicles at the quality and price that China is offering.  I worry that there is actually a skill issue, and tariffs will just get us into the same position we’re in with US steel. Is the Biden administration just buying time for GM to make poor-quality cars? Could there be potential benefits to forcing US automakers to out-compete BYD in the US?  Brad Setser: Competition can strengthen you because you have to emerge as the best form of yourself. College basketball coaches want to have tough games to prepare themselves for the tournament for a reason. But competition can also wipe out your industry.  If competition risks killing the US EV industry, making us totally reliant on China, then that competition isn't a helpful strategy for making a strong, competitive domestic industry either. There was, to a degree, a risk that Chinese supply would come to dominate the US market. This isn’t just about BYD – Tesla's economic dynamics made them decide to produce cars in China for sale in the US market. GM and GM's partners could produce EVs in China for sale to the US. Same with Ford. That would not strengthen our own capacity to make our own EVs. It might help GM and Ford survive as brands, but it wouldn't bring that technology nor that expertise into the US.  I share the Biden administration's judgment that there was a real risk that the end result of open competition would have been the transfer of the whole industry to China, not a stronger US industry.  Next, I don't think it is quite right to either say “China's industry has only emerged because of the subsidies,” or to conversely make the argument that “China's industry just reflects the strategic and technological prowess of a few Chinese firms, which is why we should welcome them into our markets so that we can learn from them.”  The history is much more complex. Some of China's early EVs were not great. They clearly were benefiting from subsidies. There were a lot of subsidies thrown into the development of both batteries and the supply chain for minerals that eventually become batteries.  This was a conscious, strategic decision to shift to EVs, in part because China wanted to shake up the industry because Chinese brands weren't succeeding at building conventional combustion vehicles. There are cases where failed EV manufacturers in China are resurrected with investments from Three Gorges, which is a power company in the local province, which is hardly this story of great innovation leading to winning the market.  All that said, the EV industry drew on China’s existing manufacturing skill set – making an EV is analogous to producing high-quality electric machinery or appliances. EVs and cell phones are both powered by the same underlying battery technology.  But I also don't think it is fair to say that the Chinese government played no role in this. The reality is that it was a government policy that was very successful at nurturing these very efficient and innovative firms that we are now seeing today.  Jordan Schneider: For a deep dive on that specific topic, check out our show with John Helvaston, who wrote a number of papers exploring the interaction between the Chinese EV and the state sector in great detail.  Why Chinese EVs Will Take Over the World Jordan Schneider Episode Are these tariffs unprecedented, or just a repeat of the 1980s?  Jordan Schneider: Let's talk about the potential resolution of this. We're up to 100% tariffs if you are importing directly from China, which basically means that there are not going to be cars imported directly from China. Interestingly, the US hit the same roadblock in the 1980s with Japanese and Korean automakers. The compromise that American policymakers landed on was to accept foreign car brands as long as they were manufactured in Mississippi, for example. Now we have a lot of Hyundai and Toyota factories in the US. It seems like that is not necessarily going to happen with BYD.  What's your take on whether such a resolution might be applicable in today’s EV market? Brad Setser: Well, just as an observation, I think the history of the eighties is actually not very helpful. There are obvious differences. One difference is that Korea, Japan, and Europe are allies. Second, the incentives didn't just come from tariffs, they came from a big adjustment in the dollar. Toyota, BMW, and Mercedes set up shop here because they actually had an economic incentive to invest and build out their US supply chain.  By the way, in the US we still import a meaningful number of cars from Japan, Korea, and Germany. We are still the biggest market in the world for imported cars by far. We shouldn't forget that. But the third thing is that, in the 1980s we weren't in a world of smart cars and the internet of things. A self-driving car is a surveillance camera on steroids connected to the global ether. There's massive computing power processing all the images and telling that computer how to process all the information it is receiving. There's a surveillance angle that didn't exist in the 1980s. I don't think we are so far behind the Chinese carmakers. I wouldn't go so far as to say we need to import all the technical know-how from China. Tesla’s leadership has maybe spent too much time pursuing extracurriculars, but Tesla knows how to make competitive electric cars, no question about it. I actually don't think GM is that far behind either. They just went a different route. They went for costly builds because they wanted to build electric substitutes for their money-making models, which are their heavier pickups and SUVs. Hyundai, which is going to produce in the US, has already built a pretty significant business with a broader range of electric vehicles.  China’s vehicles are available at a much lower price point — that’s what makes them competitive. But they are cheap because the yuan is weak and because there hasn't been much upward pressure on wages in China. And in some cases Chinese manufacturers, because the domestic market has been very competitive, have just abandoned performance and went for a luxury vehicle experience where you're driven around in a home entertainment system. We could probably do the same thing. The question is whether there's a market for it. I'm not as pessimistic as some. I do think we are going to import some of China's battery technology through licensing arrangements, and I think that's fine. The harder questions will arise when we confront the technology for self-driving and AI-powered cars. You can get some pretty scary national security scenarios when all those cars are connected to computers run out of Beijing.  Jordan Schneider: Well, in any industry you can come up with a national security rationale for wanting to have domestic production. The question is — how important is it and how much are you willing to pay? The cost for now is that we're basically going to have a bifurcated car industry for the foreseeable future. Brad Setser: I guess I agree it's a big decision, but just for the record — we've already had a bifurcated car industry. Cars for the US market were made in the US, Korea, and Japan. Cars for the Chinese market were made in China. The Chinese market has a very low import penetration and used to have almost no exports. It was self contained in part because of the joint venture requirements of that industry.  The question was whether we were going to have an integrated market that included China. We have not in the past. But the decision not to integrate our auto markets at this point when China's auto sector is genuinely innovative and genuinely competitive is a consequential one. Jordan Schneider: One industry where the trade is not going to be zeroed out by these new tariffs is batteries. There’s a 25% increase for lithium-ion EV batteries and a 25% increase in 2026 for non-EV lithium-ion batteries. What's going on here, Brad?  Brad Setser: Well, weirdly, the Trump battery tariffs were inconsistent. There was a 25% tariff on EV battery cells for cars and a 7.5% tariff on EV battery packs, which led to some pretty significant imports of EV battery packs. If you look at dollar figures, the tariff on EV batteries is the biggest one because a large unnamed American electric vehicle producer is relying more and more on Chinese battery packs.  Source. If you want an independent battery industry and an independent battery supply chain, these restrictions are necessary because there is so much potential capacity coming out of China. We want a battery industry. Simple. We're spending a lot of money on it with the IRA, and we wanted to make sure there was a demand for all the capacity that the US is trying to build.  What’s the difference between a 100% tariff and a 200% tariff? Are the percentages just darts at a wall? Jordan Schneider: It strikes me that all of these are round numbers – hopefully there was some sophisticated analysis that went into picking these percentages — is that the case? Brad Setser: It's not a secret that the 301 tariff lists were initially created to hit a dollar amount that Trump wanted.  For the 301 tariffs, which are basically punitive, you can't calculate the tariff level based on an estimate of damages. Hence, why make anyone's life more complicated with something that is not a simple round number? The general rule of thumb is that for every percentage point you increase, the tariff trade falls by 2%. A 25% tariff should lead to a 50% fall on your imports. A 50% tariff should be prohibitive. If it's not, that tells you something. And then when you go from 50% to 100%, you're making a point. The point is — we don't want to be dependent on China for electric vehicles. All these calculations end up being arbitrary, but with an anti-dumping duty or a CVD counter-subsidy duty, there is pressure to be overly precise in calculating the offset in damages. In reality, no model is clear enough to recommend an 8.9% tariff. Conversely, in the 301 space, because the structure is tied to an undue burden on US commerce, it's an offset to Chinese retaliation, and it’s been modified over time – there's no point in trying to have a decimal point estimate because that is not the basis for this kind of tariff action. Do we really need 100%, or is that just a political statement? 50% should be prohibitive. For some sectors, 50% may not be prohibitive because Chinese battery producers are really quite competitive, but they also don't qualify for IRA incentives.  Then, for some other sectors, like legacy chips, the tariff actually doesn't matter that much, because most legacy chips aren't imported as chips, they're imported as part of a final product. Solar is also performative because the US imports a lot of Chinese solar content through Southeast Asia. We import wafers and cells that are put into panels in Southeast Asia.  It doesn't really matter what the tariff is if the product is already tariffed out the wazoo. Jordan Schneider: Fair enough. You know, Trump said today that his plan is to make the tariff 200%.  Brad Setser: Ha, Biden should have countered with 400%. Why not, right?

 

Book: Conceptualizing the History of the Present Time - María Inés Mudrovcic (Cambridge University Press, free up to May 30)

Conceptualizing the History of the Present Time

María Inés Mudrovcic

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 May 2024

Available: 

https://cup.org/3Qzl4xj

https://www.cambridge.org/core/elements/conceptualizing-the-history-of-the-present-time/6DE5F1356F86C274574E3EEB913E2592

María Inés Mudrovcic

National University of Comahue IPEHCS-Patagonian Institute of Studies on

Humanities and Social Sciences

---

Summary

In this work, I explore four meanings of 'contemporary,' emphasizing its designation as a historical field. I argue that disagreements about when the presento or the contemporary era begins stem from historians assuming a linear, chronological, and absolute conception of time. Following scholars like L. Descombes, L. Hölscher, B. Latour, D. J. Wilcox and S. Tanaka, I propose conceiving relational historical time without chronology, emphasizing the original sense of “sharing the same time” that 'contemporary' acquired for the first time. This perspective mitigates issues concerning the 'beginnings' or 'meaning' of the present. Emphasizing relationships within a relational time framework aids in overcoming ontological challenges like 'so many presents' or 'distance in time,' along with the corresponding epistemological issue of 'objectivity.' This exploration aims to reevaluate and enrich our understanding of the multifaceted concept of the 'present' in the context of history.

 

Element contents

• Summary
• 1 The Present, the Contemporary and the Order of Time
• 1.1 Introduction
• 2 Present As “Sharing the Same Time”
• 3 Contemporary As an Epoch
• 3.1 Contemporary As an Epochal Experience of Time
• 3.2 Contemporary As an Epoch or a Period
• 4 When Contemporary Conflates with Present
• 4.1 Memory and History
• 4.2 When Memory Bursts into History
• 4.3 Limits of Historical Representation
• 5 History of the Present Time
• 5.1 History “in Crisis”
• 5.2 Presentism and the History of Present Time
• 5.3 History of the Present Time and Institutions
• 5.4 Many Names for the Same Historiographical Field?
• 5.5 Criticism and Controversies
• 6 Absolute Time, Chronology, and History
• 6.1 The Present within the Framework of Linear and Chronological Time: Some Problems

·           6.2 “Living Together”: A Relational Approach of Understanding the Present

·   Historical Theory and Practice

·   Footnotes

·   References

 

Information

Series: Elements in Historical Theory and Practice

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009047739[Opens in a new window]

Online ISBN: 9781009047739

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Print publication: 30 May 2024

 

Disponível neste link: 

https://www.cambridge.org/core/elements/conceptualizing-the-history-of-the-present-time/6DE5F1356F86C274574E3EEB913E2592

Livro: Debates Em Torno da Proposta de Uma Nova Constituição do Prof. Modesto Carvalhosa (Fecomercio, SP)

Sou um dos colaboradores ao livro, com este trabalho: 

“Brasil, um país de ponta-cabeça? As propostas constitucionais de Modesto Carvalhosa"

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Reiteramos o nosso convite para o lançamento da obra 

Debates Em Torno da Proposta de Uma Nova Constituição do Prof. Modesto Carvalhosa 

Ed. Quartier Latin, 

a ser realizado no dia 22/05/2024, das 14 às 19hs, na nova Sede da Fecomercio, na Av. Rebouças, nº 3377 (esquina Av. Faria Lima) – Pinheiros. Serviço de Vallet no local.

 

Haverá debates sobre as principais propostas conforme programação abaixo.

 

Realização: Conselho Superior de Direito da Fecomercio.

 

Apoio: Fecomercio, Instituto Atlântico, Instituto Ives Gandra, Instituto Liberal,

University of Iowa, Univerdidad de Salamanca

 

Apresentação: Beyla Esther Fellous.

 

Abertura: Ives Gandra da Silva Martins.

 

14h30 – 1.º Painel: Uma Nova Constituição

Apresentação da proposta: Modesto Carvalhosa

Participantes:

a. Professor Luciano de Castro

b. Professor Paulo Rabello de Castro

c. Doutor Ingo Plöger

 

15h30 – 2.º Painel: Sistema Político e Partidário

Apresentação da proposta: Modesto Carvalhosa

Participantes:

a. Professor Bolívar Lamounier

b. Jornalista Fernão Lara Mesquita

c. Professora Renata Rodrigues Ramos

 

16h30 – 3.º Painel: Reforma do STF e dos Tribunais Superiores

Apresentação da proposta: Modesto Carvalhosa

Participantes:

a. Jornalista Carlos Alberto Di Franco

b. Professor Ives Gandra da Silva Martins

c. Doutor Ricardo Peake Braga

 

Contamos com sua honrosa presença e participação no evento.

 

 

Cordial abraço.

 

 

Modesto Carvalhosa

www.mkradvogados.com

 

Novo acordo de Itaipu, prejudicial ao Brasil - Tomas Esposito Neto (IDESF)

 

Cenas de um “fiasco” anunciado: o caso de Itaipu

14 de maio de 2024

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Por: Tomaz Espósito Neto (Professor Associado da Universidade Federal da Grande Dourados (UFGD)).

No dia 07 de maio de 2024, o Ministro de Minas e Energia, Alexandre da Silveira, anunciou, durante uma viagem surpresa Assunção no Paraguai, o acordo brasileiro-paraguaio sobre a renegociação dos termos financeiros da energia produzida por Itaipu Binacional, em especial do Anexo C do Tratado de Itaipu (1973).
Passados alguns dias, as primeiras análises sugerem que o acordo é “terrível” e os termos “indecentes” para o Brasil. O presente artigo objetiva apresentar uma breve síntese das principais críticas ao acordo.
O sigilo das negociações e o timing do acordo. Itaipu é uma enorme represa binacional que gera uma enorme quantidade de energia limpa e renovável. Em 2023, produziu 83.879 GWh, o que corresponde à 8,6% do mercado elétrico brasileiro e 86,4% da energia consumida pela sociedade paraguaia. Ademais, essa barragem é uma obra complexa de engenharia e de arquitetura político-econômica feitas por Brasil e Paraguai. Ambos sócios equânimes da hidroelétrica, em que pese as suas assimetrias de poder.
A despeito de sua importância e de seus reflexos socioeconômicos para o Brasil e para a região, as negociações em torno desse acordo quase passaram incólume pelos noticiários brasileiros. Aliás, o anúncio fora feito em meio a comoção pela terrível tragédia das enchentes no Rio Grande do Sul. Impediu, assim, uma análise dos termos do acordo e um necessário debate democrático dos stakeholders do mercado elétrico brasileiro.
Atores e as dinâmicas das negociações. Desde o início dos debates em torno de repactuação do Anexo C, o Itamaraty estava à frente das negociações. Ao Ministério de Minas e Energia (MME), à Assessoria para Assuntos Internacionais do Palácio do Planalto, ao Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria, Comércio e Serviços e à Itaipu Margem Esquerda (margem administrada pelo Brasil), caberia o papel de fornecer elementos e dados para os diplomatas brasileiros e, em última instância para o Presidente Lula, acertarem os termos da negociação.
No entanto, diversos grupos políticos, como Partido dos Trabalhadores, capitaneada pela Deputada Gleisi Hoffmann, e parte da base aliada do atual governo defendem um acordo com tarifas mais altas e flexível. Com isso, Itaipu poderia realizar investimentos fora da sua área de influência, como o investimento de R$ 1,3 bilhões em obras de infraestrutura em Belém no Pará. Ademais, os gastos de Itaipu possuem regras mais “flexíveis”. Os investimentos não passam pelas agências de controle estatal, como o Tribunal de Contas da União (TCU) e a Controladoria Geral da União (CGU), em virtude da sua natureza jurídica internacional. As discussões bilaterais sobre os padrões de governança corporativa da entidade binacional estão “paradas” em alguma gaveta em Brasília-DF e em Assunção. Aparentemente, não há vontade política de se fazê-lo.
Assim, a visita de surpresa do Ministro Alexandre da Silveira e a forma midiática do anúncio do acordo indicam duas coisas. O Ministro de Minas Energia, em busca de um protagonismo político individual, atropelou as instituições de Estado. Escancarou a fragilidade do Ministério de Relações Exteriores, o qual foi “atropelado” nas negociações. Teria o Presidente Lula dado anuência à essa ação espetaculosa à margem da Casa de Rio Branco? Não se sabe a resposta, mas é improvável o Palácio do Planalto não soubesse de tal ação.
Termos do Acordo. Outra consequência indesejável da ação espalhafatosa do Ministro Alexandre da Silveira é a perda da posição dominante que o Brasil possuía nas negociações. Afinal, o Anexo C de 1973 previa a comercialização pelo preço de custo da energia gerada por Itaipu. Segundo estudiosos, esse valor seria algo entre US$ 10 – 12 /kW mês (quilowatt-mês). Qualquer tribunal arbitral internacional daria razão ao pleito brasileiro.
Como sinal de boa vontade, o governo Lula aceitou pagar uma tarifa provisória de US$ 17,66/kW mês (quilowatt-mês), isto é, acima dos custos previstos no Tratado e dos valores do mercado livre de energia. Assim não é verdade que a tarifa acordada de US$ 19,28 até 2026 seja benéfica ao consumidor brasileiro.
Ademais, o Ministro de Minas e Energia anunciou que o governo federal subsidiará a eletricidade e não repassará o aumento para os clientes finais. Esse subsídio fere, de maneira evidente, as normas internacionais de comércio da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC). Com isso, todo o setor industrial brasileiro poderá ser questionado no Órgão de Solução de Controvérsias (OSC) da OMC. Com isso, o país poderá ser alvo sanções econômico-comerciais e de medidas protecionistas.
Na ocasião, o Ministro Alexandre da Silveira anunciou a promessa paraguaia de que , a partir de 2027, a tarifa será de até US$ 12,00/kW mês (quilowatt-mês). Essa energia seria vendida, diretamente, ao mercado livre de energia do Brasil.
Contudo, existem alguns problemas. A energia fornecida por Itaipu está acima do valor médio praticado pelo mercado livre de energia. Ao permitir a venda, a operação será uma importação de energia, a qual incidem tributos como Imposto de Importação (II) e o Imposto sobre Circulação de Mercadorias e Prestação de Serviços (ICMS). Portanto, a energia chegará ao mercado livre muito acima dos valores prometidos. Ademais, a história demonstrou que o Paraguai nunca cumpriu as promessas relativas às tarifas. Ao se acompanhar os debates na imprensa paraguaia, representantes das mais diversas matizes ideológicos defendem a não ratificação do acordo do valor da energia em torno US$ 12,00/kW mês (quilowatt-mês). Não foram aparentadas as garantias paraguaias do cumprimento do acordado. As autoridades brasileiras continuaram a crer na “La Garantia Soy Yo”. A questão certamente voltará a baila em 2027. Não obstante, o Paraguai estará na posição privilegiada nos debates.
Obras complementares. Em paralelo às discussões de Itaipu, ganhou força o debate da construção de um gasoduto de Vaca Muerta na Argentina até o Mato Grosso do Sul, o qual passaria por território paraguaio. Esse projeto possui algumas questões a serem clarificadas.
Essa opção visa privilegiar o Paraguai, o qual seria intermediário da venda do gás da Argentina ao Brasil. O Estado brasileiro daria todas as garantias de mercado e o financiamento do empreendimento.
No entanto, existem opções mercadológicas mais viáveis, tais como a interconexão do gasoduto de Vaca Muerta no Rio Grande do Sul, sem passar pelo território paraguaio. Outra opção é a utilização comercial do gás da Bacia de Santos em São Paulo Por fim, fazer cumprir o acordo do gasoduto Brasil – Bolívia. O governo boliviano, a despeito de receber o valor integral da venda do gás, não entrega o acordado. Ademais, estudos da Empresa de Pesquisa Energética (EPE) do MME indicam a possibilidade de ampliação da produção de Itaipu pelo uso de novas tecnologias e materiais, as quais ampliariam a eficácia energética, aumentariam a oferta e reduziriam os valores da energia da represa binacional.
Não se resolveu também a questão de obras previstas no Tratado de 1973, tais como as eclusas em Itaipu, as quais permitiram a interconexão entre a hidrovia Tiête-Paraná com o restante da Bacia do Rio da Prata. Esse tema certamente voltará à baila futuramente.
O que fazer então? Cabe ao Parlamento, em especial ao Senado brasileiro, e ao Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) colocarem freios aos arroubos do Executivo, em especial do Ministro Alexandre da Silveira. Os impactos de um mal acordo terá efeitos negativos duradouros para toda sociedade brasileira. É necessário não ratificar e rediscutir os termos do pacto. Ademais, deve-se construir uma agenda bilateral positiva. Afinal, o Acordo de Itaipu deve ser benéfico para ambas as partes, e não apenas ao Paraguai.

O Brasil e o G7: postura favorável aos opositores do G7, isto é, as duas grandes autocracias

 Não cabem muitas explicações: a matéria do UOL é bastante explícita. O Brasil de Lula 3 se coloca do lado do Estado agressor da Ucrânia, a Rússia de Putin.

Exigir que sua participação seja condicionada à presença do Estado agressor, quando este já declinou do convite, já é uma tomada de posição em favor do Estado agressor.

A diplomacia do Brasil foi reduzida a força auxiliar do Estado violador da Carta da ONU e do Direito Internacional?

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Do UOL, 15/05/2024:

“ Em 2023, em sua volta à reunião, Lula criticou abertamente a atitude das potências Ocidentais na guerra na Ucrânia, alertou sobre a desigualdade global e convocou os governos a pensar em uma reforma da ONU e dos organismos financeiros internacionais.

Para 2024, os conflitos armados em Gaza e na Ucrânia estariam no centro do debate, temas em Lula e alguns dos líderes Ocidentais discordam abertamente. Mas, com o objetivo de ver aprovados os seus projetos no G20, negociadores acreditam que a presença de Lula seria importante.

Em 2025, o Brasil será sede da Conferência do Clima da ONU (COP30) e o diálogo com as principais potências será fundamental para o êxito do encontro.

Além do Brasil, serão convidados para o G7 o governo indiano de Narendra Modi, que compartilha com a primeira-ministra ultraconservadora Giorgia Meloni uma certa afinidade em sua agenda ideológica. Países africanos também estão na lista.

Viagem para cúpula sobre Ucrânia também é incertaNa esperança de aproveitar a presença de líderes como Joe Biden, Emmanuel Macron ou Olaf Scholz, o governo da Suíça organizará para os dias seguintes ao G7 uma cúpula para lidar com a guerra na Ucrânia.

Lula também foi convidado. Mas o governo brasileiro insiste que um evento com chefes de estado e de governo apenas pode ocorrer se houver a inclusão de todos, inclusive de russos.

Sem a participação de Moscou, Lula dificilmente aceitará a proposta para fazer parte da iniciativa.

A meta do encontro é a de fechar uma espécie de acordo entre os líderes, na esperança de abrir um canal de negociação para que o conflito seja concluído.

Mas o temor do governo Lula é de que o encontro sirva apenas para chancelar as propostas de Volodymyr Zelensky, que exige a retirada russa do território ucraniano para que as conversas possam ocorrer.

O governo brasileiro vem afirmando ao longo dos meses que um processo de negociação apenas pode fazer sentido se envolver os russos. Mesmo em conversa com Zelensky, Lula alertou que não existe um acordo de paz "unilateral".

Ainda em 2023, o presidente russo Vladimir Putin justificou a interlocutores brasileiros que aceitar a proposta de Zelensky seria equivalente a uma capitulação.”

A Guerra Quente Econômica já começou (ou continua) - Foreign Policy, Paulo Roberto de Almeida

 Trump começou a insanidade. Mas Biden recrudesce com maior insanidade do que o esperado de um presidente aparentemente sensato. A China entra na guerra, prometendo retaliar na mesms proporção. Ou seja, consumidores e investidores dos dois lados vão perder, pois é o que acontece quando se restringe o intercâmbio por motivos puramente politicos, ou politiqueiros. 

Todo mundo vai ficar mais pobre, e não apenas americanos e chineses. Políticos costumavam ter assessores mais sensatos. Já não é mais o caso. Não escaparemos dessa fragmentação do multilateralismo comercial antes de muito tempo, e o Brasil também vai perder, pois que o jogo cruzado das complementaridades seletivas vai se tornar menos dinâmico.

Brasil vai ter escolhas mais restritas pela frente, pois que também sofrendo os efeitos secundários das retaliações e quebra de padrões nos tabuleiros eventualmente conectados a decisões governamentais. Pior ainda será a imposição de um determinado meio ou ferramenta de pagamento, feito por razões politicas, não determinadas pela racionalidade microeconômica. 

O mundo ficará mais miserável, sobretudo para os países mais pobres. 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Brasília, 15/05/2024

Foreign Policy, May 14, 2024

“U.S. President Joe Biden unveiled a new slew of U.S. tariffs on Chinese imports on Tuesday. The White House cited “unacceptable risks” posed by Beijing flooding the global market with cheap products. Around $18 billion of imported goods will be affected, including electric vehicles, semiconductors, steel and aluminum, critical minerals, medical products, and solar panels. Biden also said he would maintain tariffs, originally established under former U.S. President Donald Trump, on more than $300 billion of Chinese goods.

Among some of the key changes, the White House plans to quadruple electric vehicle duties to more than 100 percent, double taxes on solar cells and semiconductors, and place a 50 percent tariff rate on hospital syringes and needles. U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai said these tariffs were justified to combat Chinese efforts to steal U.S. intellectual property. The United States imported $427 billion in goods from China and exported $148 billion to Beijing last year, according to the U.S. Census Bureau.

“China is determined to dominate these industries. I’m determined to ensure America leads the world in them,” Biden posted on X on Tuesday.

Beijing immediately vowed retaliation. “This action will seriously impact the atmosphere of bilateral cooperation,” the Chinese Commerce Ministry said. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin urged the White House to cancel the measures, arguing that they go against consensus reached during Biden’s summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping in San Francisco last November. “We urge the U.S. to stop repairing and digging up the road at the same time, so to speak, and create enabling conditions for China-U.S. climate cooperation and global green transition,” Wang said.

Biden’s announcement signals the latest escalation in a trade war that began under Trump and has since become a key campaign issue ahead of the November U.S. presidential election. Trump routinely raised tariffs on Chinese goods during his tenure. He has since proposed a 10 percent tax on all imports from all countries as well as a tax of at least 60 percent on all Chinese goods, including a 200 percent tax on Chinese vehicles manufactured in Mexico.

Biden has criticized Trump’s “across-the-board tariffs” while also toughening his own economic posturing on China in a bid to woo working-class voters in key swing states, including areas at the center of the United States’ auto industry. “We know China’s unfair practices have harmed communities in Michigan and Pennsylvania and around the country that are now having the opportunity to come back due to President Biden’s investment agenda,” said Lael Brainard, the director of the White House National Economic Council.“

Essas épocas delimitadas dos historiadores - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Essas épocas delimitadas dos historiadores

Paulo Roberto de Almeida  

Não gosto muito dessas delimitações cronologicamente rígidas. Mas elas se impõem pelas convenções forçadas de jornalistas e historiadores, nessa ordem. Vamos admitir um pouco esse velho hábito.

Não estamos mais no pós-Guerra Fria. Já entramos numa nova Guerra Quente, ainda não direta, mas já confrontacional e rude. 

Sairemos desta? Provavelmente, mas não antes da morte de Putin e da contenção de Xi, o que deve demorar. Não sei quanto, não sou vidente, nem profeta, embora já tenha praticado astrologia diplomática. Brincadeira!

EUA e UE vão certamente resistir ao avanço das  autocracias, sem contudo recorrer ao enfrentamento direto. 

O Brasil se manterá neutro? Sim, por uma espécie de vocação hesitante, outro tanto por preguiça, mas não por enquanto e não por determinação de sua diplomacia profissional. A diplomacia partidária e personalista já escolheu o seu campo.

Sabemos qual é esse campo: é, ou se espera que seja, o da tal “nova ordem global”, mais um desses delírios que costumam acometer mentes febris e ambições insanas. Não tem muito perigo. As forças dominantes do Brasil, que sempre foram as oligarquias — algumas até de esquerda — vão conter a afoiteza dos amadores. Ou seja, continuaremos nossa marcha lenta em direção a um futuro indefinível, com alguns tropeços pelo caminho. Nada de muito diferente do que sempre tivemos. Somos “excêntricos”, não por bizarrice, mas geograficamente. Melhor assim…

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Brasilia, 15 de maio de 2024

Atlas histórico-econômico do Brasil no século XIX tem lançamento com download gratuito - Luiz Fernando Saraiva, Wagner Nabarro, Pérola Goldfeder, matéria de Bruno Leal (Café História)

Um lançamento de alta qualidade:  

https://nephes.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/SARAIVA_NABARRO_GOLDFEDER_%282024%29_Atlas%20historico-economico%20-%20Livro%20Digital.pdf

Atlas histórico-econômico do Brasil no século XIX tem lançamento com download gratuito

Obra é importante contribuição para a compreensão geográfica e histórica de um século decisivo para a história brasileira.

Um aguardado projeto histórico está a partir de agora ao alcance de qualquer pessoa: o Atlas histórico-econômico do Brasil no século XIX, organizado pelos historiadores Luiz Fernando Saraiva, Wagner Nabarro, Pérola Goldfeder e publicado por uma parceria entre a editora do Senado Federal e da Universidade Federal Fluminense (Eduff). São 157 páginas com muitos mapas, fotos, textos e outras informações relevantes sobre a economia oitocentista brasileira. E o melhor de tudo: a versão digital é gratuita – clique aqui.  

O Senador Randolfe Rodrigues, Presidente do Conselho Editorial do Senado Federal, assina o prefácio da obra, que resume da seguinte forma:

“A relação entre história e geografia não é estranha ao ofício de historiador; o exercício de aproximação entre essas disciplinas é fundamental à compreensão da realidade e ao campo de conhecimento das humanidades. Nesse sentido, a contribuição deste Atlas Histórico-Econômico é inestimável, e traz elementos, dados e informações à historiografia do território brasileiro durante o “longo século XIX (1780 a 1920)”, incluindo uma abordagem crítica das estatísticas desse período. (…) As informações trazidas por Luiz Fernando Saraiva e os demais organizadores desta obra nos permitem falar a história em diferentes perspectivas, não importando se esses percursos foram pouco ou muito explorados pela historiografia brasileira. Em cada um dos mapas e estatísticas organizados pelos autores, podemos encontrar formas novas de compreender o nosso passado e de refletir sobre o Brasil contemporâneo.

O desenho cartográfico do livro foi realizado com utilização do software livre de código aberto QGIS versão 3.26.3, que permite a edição de dados georreferenciados. Para representação dos recortes provinciais, municipais e territoriais do Brasil, bem como a rede hidrográfica brasileira, foram utilizados os shapefile disponibilizados pelo Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE).

O material em sua versão impressa está disponível para a compra nos sites da Eduff e da Editora do Senado e no site do @Nephes_uff para download gratuito http://nephes.org.

Bruno Leal

Fundador e editor do Café História. É professor adjunto de História Contemporânea do Departamento de História da Universidade de Brasília (UnB). Doutor em História Social. Tem pós-doutorado em História Social pela Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ). Pesquisa História Pública, História Digital e Divulgação Científica. Também desenvolve pesquisas sobre crimes nazistas e justiça no pós-guerra.