1743) Soviet penetration of Brazil (é o caso de se dizer...)

Na verdade, se trata do trabalho de inteligência dos serviços de espionagem soviéticos envolvendo o Brasil, tal como pode ser lido neste livro, que revela apenas uma parte, pequena provavelmente, desse mundo obscuro.
Limito-me a transcrever a informação pertinene ao Brasil contida no livro, sem comentários no momento.

ANDREW, CHRISTOPHER & MITROKHIN, VASILI:
The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World
New York: Basic Books, 2005.

Brazil: 89, 96, 104-107; 477
Brasilia KGB Residence: 105-106

p. 96: (1976):
“Among the DGI operations in Angola carried out to assist the KGB was a penetration of the Brazilian Embassy to obtain intelligence on its cipher system. A technical specialist from the Sixteenth (SIGINT, intelligence derived from interception and analysis of signals) Directorate flew out from Moscow with equipment which enabled a DGI agent to photograph the wiring of the embassy’s Swiss-made TS-803 cipher machine.”(33)
(Note 33, p. 519: “k-22, 150. The DGI carried out a similar operation , at the request of the KGB, aginast the Venezuelan Embassy in Havana.”)
[k stands for “k series: handwritten notebooks containing notes on individual KGB files”, p. 595, on Bibliography, 1. Mitrokhin Archive]

p. 105:
“For most of its existence, the military regime which held power from 1964 to 1985 made Brazil a relatively hostile environment for KGB operations. There was little prospect during the 1970s either of acquiring confidential contacts within government, as in Argentina and Peru, or of finding contacts with direct access to the President, as in Mexico. The KGB’s best intelligence on Brazil probably came from its increasing ability to intercept Brazil’s diplomatic traffic. By 1979 the radio-intercept post (codenamed KLEN) in the Brasilia residency was able to intercept 19,000 coded cables sent and received by the Foreign Ministry as well as approximately 2,000 other classified official communications”(67)
(Note 67, p. 520: “k-22, 128. “Since Mitrokhin had no access to the KGB Sixteenth (SIGINT) Directorate, he was unable to note the contents of any decrypts.”)

“SIGINT enabled the Center to monitor some of the activities of probably its most important Brazilian agent, codenamed IZOT, who was recruited while serving as Brazilian ambassador in the Soviet bloc.(68)
(Note 68, p. 521: “IZOT is the highest-ranking Brazilian agent identified in the files noted by Mitrokhin. He provided recruitment leads on three fellow diplomats, including the ambassador of a NATO country in Prague. IZOT had himself been talent-spotted for the KGB by another Brazilian ambassador, an agent codenamed ALEKS; k-22, 235-7”)

“As well as providing intelligence and recruitment leads to three other diplomats, IZOT also on occasion included in his reports information (probably disinformation) provided by the KGB. Assessed by the KGB as ‘adhering to na Anti-American line and liberal views concerning the development of a bourgeois society’, IZOT was a paid agent. His remuneration, however, took a variety of forms, including in 1976 a silver service valued by the Centre at 513 rubles. The Centre has increasing doubts about IZOT’s reliability. On one occasion it believed that he was guilty of ‘outright deception’, claiming to have passed on information provided by the KGB to his Fioreign Ministry when his decrypted cables showed that he had not done so.” (69)”
(Note 69, p. 521: “k-22, 235-7; k-8, 551.)
(...)

p. 106:
“Despite hard-line opposition, Figueiredo issued an amnesty for most of Brazil’s remaining political exiles, including Prestes and other leading Communists.”(72)
(Note 72, p. 521: "In May 1980 Prestes was succeded as a leader of the Brazilian Communist Party by Giocondo Dias. In December Dias sent his thanks to Moscow, via the Brasilia residency, for allowing him, likek his predecessor, to nominate Party members for free visits to Soviet sanatoria and holiday homes; k-26, 339”)

p. 106:
“In the spring of 1980 a Soviet parliamentary delegation headed by Edwrd Shevardnadze, then a candidate (non-voting) member of the Politburo, visited Brasilia. Unknown to their hosts, the plane (Special Flight L-62) carried new radio interception equipment to improve the performance of the residency’s SIGINT station, and took the old equipment with it when it left. (...) (74)
(Note 74, p. 521: “k-22, 1, 3”)

[End of transcriptions related to Brazil]

ANDREW, CHRISTOPHER & MITROKHIN, VASILI. The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World (New York: Basic Books, 2005).

See also, by the same authors: The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB.

1742) Works by P.R. Almeida, in English, French and Spanish

A selection of works in English, in French, and Spanish
by Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Up to date: March 3rd, 2010

2060. “Brasil y su Política Exterior: una intervista periodistica”
Brasilia, 12 novembro 2009, 2 p. Respostas a questões da jornalista Carolina Pezoa Ascuí, La Nación, Chile - Sección Internacional. Postado no blog Diplomatizzando (03.03.2010).

2043. “Entretien sur le président Lula”
Brasília, 9 setembro 2009, 8 p. Respostas a questionário da revista de negócios francesa Décideurs. Versão completa colocada no Blog Textos PRA (17.09.2009; link: http://textospra.blogspot.com/2009/09/518-entrevista-revistda-francesa-sobre.html). Versão resumida publicada na revista Décideurs, reproduzida no Blog Diplomatizzando(17.09.2009). Entrevista publicada sob o título “Lula: orateur par excellence”, Décideurs: Stratégie Finance Droit (Paris: n. 109, octobre 2009, p. 13; ISSN: 1764-6774). Relação de Publicados n. 930.

2028. “The question of Ossetia and Russian intervention: a personal Brazilian view”
Brasília, July 23, 2009, 8 p. Answers to questions submitted by Yulia Netesova, European Bureau Chief of the Russian Journal. Divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (22.11.2009).

2023. “Non-Intervention: a political concept, in a legal wrap: a historical and juridical appraisal of the Brazilian doctrine and practice”
Brasília, 8 Julho 2009, 17 p. (7.090 palavras). Ensaio sobre o conceito em causa, para informar escritório britânico de advocacia. Blog Textos PRA (03.03.2010).

2020. “Le Brésil à deux moments de la globalisation capitaliste et à un siècle de distance (1909-2009)”
Brasília, 30 junho 2009, 25 p. Trabalho apresentado para o International Symposium “Inequalities in the World System: Political Science, Philosophy, Law”; São Paulo, 3-6 de setembro de 2009; Cebrap. Blog Textos PRA (03.03.2010).

2008. “Financial Architecture of the Post-Crisis World: Efficiency of Solutions”
Brasília, 22 maio 2009, 7 p. Answers to questions presented by researcher from the Post-Crisis World Institute Foundation, Moscou (Michael Mizhinski). Blog Diplomatizzando (03.03.2010).

1999. “The share of the United States and Brazil in the modern civilization: A centennial homage to Joaquim Nabuco’s commencement speech of 1909”
Urbana, 23 abril 2009, 15 p. Paper presented at the Symposium: Nabuco and Madison: A Centennial Celebration (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin, April 24-25, 2009); Available at link.

1996. “Brazil’s role in South America and in the global arena”
Urbana, Illinois, 13 abril 2009, 7 p. Answers to questions presented by a M.A. Candidate 2010 of the Latin American & Hemispheric Studies Elliott School of International Affairs - George Washington University. Blog Diplomatizzando (13.04.2009).

1983. “Mercosur-European Union Cooperation: A case study on the effects of EU activities and cooperation with Mercosur on regional democracy building”
Brasília, 2 fevereiro 2009, 26 p. Paper prepared for a Project of International IDEA to map out and analyze the perceptions on the European Union as an actor in democracy building, as seen from the EU's partner regions. Blog Textos PRA (03.03.2010).

1950. “Les Brics et l’économie brésilienne : Interview pour la Chaire des Amériques – Université Paris I”
Brasília, 11 novembro 2008, 6 p. Respostas a questionário colocado por Vincent Paes, assistente da Chaire Amériques-Université de Paris I, para divulgação online. Divulgado em 25.11.2008, nos seguintes links: (a) Brics; (b) Brésil.

1942. “La puissance américaine vue d'Amérique Latine”
Brasília, 21 outubro 2008, 2 p. Interview à Radio France Culture, journaliste Thierry Garcin (Paris: émission le 29.10.2008, à 7h15, 10 minutes).

1902. “Brazil in the world context, at the first decade of the 21th century: regional leadership and strategies for its integration into the world economy”
Rio de Janeiro, 26 junho 2008, 22 p. Essay for the volume edited by Joám Evans Pim (president IGESIP, Corunha; www.igesip.org; Editor Strategic Evaluation), on Brazilian Defense Policy: Current Trends and Regional Implications. In: Joam Evans (org.), Brazilian Defence Policies: Current Trends and Regional Implications (London: Dunkling Books, 2009, 251 p.; ISBN: 978-0-9563478-0-0; link to book), p. 11-26. Relação de Publicados n. 935.

1900. “Brazil: Mileposts to Responsible Stakeholdership”
Brasília-Tóquio, 24 junho 2008, 53 p. Joint text, written with Miguel Diaz, for the project “Mileposts to Responsible Stakeholdership” of the Stanley Foundation; presented by Miguel Diaz in a Washington meeting (July 8, 2008) and published at the website of the Project “Powers and Principles: International Leadership in a Shrinking World” (November 3rd, 2008), under the title: “Brazil's Candidacy for Major Power Status”, by Miguel Diaz and Paulo Roberto Almeida, with a reaction by Georges D. Landau (Muscatine, IA: The Stanley Foundation, Working Paper, November 2008, 24 p.; link). Published in book form as: “Brazil's Candidacy for Major Power Status”, with Miguel Diaz. In: Michael Schiffer and David Shorr (Eds.). Powers and Principles: International Leadership in a Shrinking World (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009, 328p.; Co-published with: The Stanley Foundation; ISBN Cloth: 978-0-7391-3543-3; $85.00; ISBN Paper: 978-0-7391-3544-0; $32.95; p. 225-250). Link. Relação de Publicados n. 897.

1890. “Brazil and the G8 Heiligendamm Process”
Brasília-Rio de Janeiro, 18 maio 2008, 31 p. Paper preparado em colaboração com Denise Gregory, Diretora Executiva do CEBRI para publicação do Centre for International Governance Innovation - CIGI, do Canadá. Publicado in Andrew F. Cooper and Agata Antkiewicz, Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process. Waterloo, Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, Studies in International Governance Series, October 2008, p. 137-161; ISBN: 978-1-55458–057-6. © 2008 The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) and Wilfrid Laurier University Press; Available).

1871. “Convergence and divergence in historical perspective: Regions and countries and their differing paths and rhythms towards sustainable integration into the world economy”
Brasília, 15 março 2008, 15 p. Opening Lecture at the 8th World Congress of RSAI: Regional Science Association International. Feita na FEA-USP (São Paulo, 17 março 2008). Preparado PowerPoint com imagens.

1868. “Brazil’s Integration into Global Governance: The rise of the Outreach-5 countries to a G-8 (plus) status”
Brasília, 9 março 2008, 29 p. Versão em inglês, ampliada, em colaboração com Denise Gregory, Diretora Executiva do Cebri. Draft paper prepared for the project Dialogue on Global Governance with the “Outreach” countries - Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, para apresentação em seminário no Cebri, Rio de Janeiro, em 4 de abril. Publicado, como “Brazil”, no volume: Growth and Responsibility: The positioning of emerging powers in the global governance system (Berlin: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2009, 126 p.; ISBN: 978-3-940955-45-6; p. 11-30; link). Trabalhos publicados n. 887.

1859. “Questionnaire on the G8 Summit Reform Process”
Brasília, 12 fevereiro 2008, 3 p. Answers and comments to a questionnaire on the Heiligendam Process (expansion of G-8 countries to the outreach 5) and global governance reform, presented by Prof. Colin I. Bradford, Jr. (Brookings Institution, Washington, and Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), Waterloo, Canada).

1856. “Brazil and Global Governance”
Brasília, 30 janeiro 2008, 17 p. Colaboração a trabalho a ser apresentado pelo CEBRI para centro de estudos do Canadá (Centre for International Governance Innovation - CIGI).

1811. “The Foreign Policy of Brazil under Lula: Regional and global diplomatic strategies”
Brasília, 30 setembro 2007, 25 p. Published as “Lula’s Foreign Policy: Regional and Global Strategies”, chap. 9, In Werner Baer and Joseph Love (eds.), Brazil under Lula (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2009, 326 p.; ISBN: 970-0-230-60816-0; p. 167-183; link). Publicados n. 811.

1748. “Brazil as a regional player and as an emerging global power: Foreign policy strategies and the impact on the new international order”
Versão reduzida em inglês para publicação pela FES-SWP, dia 7.07.07; publicado sob a forma de Briefing Paper, series Dialogue on Globalization (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, July 2007; link). Publicados n. 780bis.

(not complete...)

1741) Financial Architecture of the Post-Crisis World: PRAlmeida

Financial Architecture of the Post-Crisis World: Efficiency of Solutions
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Post-Crisis World Institute Foundation
(http://eng.postcrisisworld.org/)
Research Director - Tatyana Overina
Coordinator - Michael Mizhinski

QUESTIONS TO EXPERT

Personal Information:
Full Name
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Country
Brazil
Organization
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and University Center of Brasilia (UniCeub)
Position
Diplomat and Professor


1. How would you assess the results of the G-20 Summit that took place in London on April 1-2?
1.1. Were there any decisions made at G-20 Summit that can get the world economy out of crisis? Please specify if any.

The Global Plan for Recovery and Reform, signed by the G20 (financial) leaders in London, April 2nd, 2009, offers no recovery, and no reform at all. It’s just a political piece of rhetoric and wishful thinking.
The only and sole measure with practical effects was the raise in IMF’s resources to tackle emergency financial needs from some countries, which is, in fact, a post-crisis remedy, not a recovery structured plan. So much for the photo op.

1.2. What decisions taken at G-20 Summit can serve the interests of the new developing economies?

The most needed decision was not taken: resume multilateral trade negotiations and finish the Doha Round with real market access, and effective trade liberalization. Instead, we just had a vague promise of not increasing the already growing protectionism.
IMF extended resources do not serve developing countries interests: it’s just a support for moral hazard.

1.3. Would the decisions taken at G-20 Summit make the world financial system more transparent?

Not exactly: the promise to work on financial re-regulation has to be achieved through technical discussion at the appropriate forum or level: Financial Stability Forum and proper work by BIS committees.
Transparency is surely needed, but most probable is the creation of new bureaucratic regulations that will constrain the financial industry, diminishing opportunities for ‘good speculation’, so reducing prospects for growth and investment.

1.4 Would the decisions taken at G-20 Summit give the financial system a common clear set of rules?

No yet. Perhaps, this would come as a result from work in the appropriate fora, as stated above, but it’s unlikely that multilateral financial rules should emerge from that. Most probably, there will be only recommendations at international level, and implementation at national level by willing countries. In short, there will be no real progress on that chapter.

1.5. Are there any other results of the London Summit you would like to comment on?

The communiqué, in itself, is what the French would call a “voeux pieux”, that is, an ineffective wishful thinking. The tangible reality is the process of de-concentration of the world economy, with a consequent redistribution of power from the center towards emerging economies, but that is a reality that was already gaining ground without any crisis in perspective. Perhaps, the crisis will accelerate the trend, moving more financial muscles in the direction of the new actors. Already, among the top ten banks, are four big Chinese banks, which is new in the scenario.


2. How effective are the existing world institutions?
2.1. Today the world institutions evaluate various approaches in order to get the economy out of crisis. How would you assess the effectiveness of international institutions and discussion platforms where it concerns developing new approaches and ideas that may help to overcome the crisis and form a new world financial architecture (on the scale from 1 to 5):
UN 1
Davos Forum 2
G8 3
G20 3
EU 2
Other: OECD 2

2.2 How would you assess the possible contributions to overcoming the crisis and designing the future world system by some of the following institutions (on the scale from 1 to 5):

IMF 3
World Bank 2
Financial Stability Forum (FSF) 4
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 4
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 4
Other: Independent economic thin tanks in US and Europe 2

2.3. Can the IMF effectively dispose of the resources made available by G-20 (around USD 750 billions)?

Yes, she can, but that is a unwanted contribution to moral hazard. Even if she can’t, the central question is not availability of resources, but correction of unbalances and disequilibria, which should be assessed and tackled on market basis.

3. Please describe the current decision-making mechanism in the world financial system?
3.1. What [sic] countries have real means to promote their initiatives to change the global financial system?

Of course, the biggest economies, but the question, nowadays, is that small economies – let us say, like Belgium or Netherlands – have disproportionate decision making powers in IMF and World bank, and larger economies, emerging countries, have little. It is of course difficult to devise a new, more balanced approach to this matter, as world economy is a very dynamic system, with rapid changes in a five years time.


3.2. Please make a rating of three countries that have come up with interesting financial solutions? Are there any post Soviet countries that offer such solutions?

More flexible systems are desirable, and even if the USA has caused all this mess, I think that the American and British financial systems are most adapted to a modern economy. Crises are inevitable, and banks should be allowed to go bankrupt sometimes, to clear the mess and prepare the way for new entrants, more dynamic and innovative.
I don’t know enough about post Soviet countries to express an opinion on that.


3.3. Do you think that it is possible to come to breakthrough decisions in the world economy within G-20 format or such decisions will be developed and taken in some other formats?

Not really. Of course, G20 countries made up 80 per cent, or more, of the world economy, but it is unlikely that event those 20 countries could agree on a common platform to reform the current state of affairs, as this endeavor involves redistribution of power, and none of the leading countries would agree to their own rabaissement. Most probable, facts themselves should force the changes upon them.


3.4. Is there any need (by analogy with Breton-Wood where 45 countries have participated) to convene a new multi-state international conference that will have the authority to make key decisions?

No. Big conferences like Bretton Woods are only possible in moments of real and grave crises, with total disruption of existing mechanisms, like the depression of the 1930s and the WWII. There are no such events today, as the system continues to perform almost ‘normally’, with only a bigger crisis than the ‘usual’ crises of the system.


3.5. Please suggest some formats for designing a new financial architecture?

An ‘architecture’ is only possible if all players live and work under the same rules and patterns of financial activity, which is unlikely today. Multilateral financial institutions should only propose common standards for voluntary and gradual adherence by participants, like freedom for capital flows, absence of aggressive devaluations, fiscal responsibility and sound monetary policies. That will only be possible with growing integration of national economies. So the most reasonable recommendation should be an active promotion of globalization, in every sector of the world economy, but that is of course impossible, due to the huge unbalances and differing income levels among countries.
So, again, most developed partner should contribute to the elevation of standards of life of poor countries, not through development assistance as usual, but by trade liberalization, technical cooperation for educational investments, and some sanitation and health improvements in those countries. Of course, good governance is needed, and dictatorships and corrupt governments should be isolated and punished.


4. How do you see the world financial architecture of the future?
4.1. Is there a chance for the rise of the new financial centers in the world? What would be their scale? What are their regional, country and other niche specifics?

Of course, new financial center will emerge, of all kinds and geographical scopes. Some would be huge, as for instance in Sao Paulo, Brazil, in the future, some others will remain small in scope and trade, as in most African countries, but with the integration of the world economy, new centers will emerge to serve new peripheries, as the lore about the concentration in only a few markets is not tenable and realistic.


4.2. In your opinion, can the Russian Federation become one of those new financial centers? What is the potential for the Ruble’s international influence?

Perhaps, but it depends on the development of capitalism in Russia, as Lenin would say sometime ago. Nowadays, there is only a restricted and corrupted form of capitalism, with a strong, dirigiste, State, tending to autocratic or cesaristic leadership, which is of course a return to very old times. Russia has still to develop real capitalism and a proper functioning democratic system, not a façade of them. Ruble depends on a sound financial system, which is still wanting.

4.3. What other post soviet countries along with the Russian Federation can aspire to the financial center of the future status?

I’m not able to respond this question.


4.4. Please make a rating of three developing non-BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) countries that will have a bigger role in the world financial system. Are there any post soviet countries among them?

Perhaps Ukraine, but that will depend on its further integration into Europe and the world economy. Most probable Mexico, if it reforms itself, South Africa, and Indonesia, again with huge reforms in its financial and monetary policies. Among small countries, with limited impact on world economy, some of them already developed, I would count on Chile, Singapore, Taiwan and Abu Dabhi. South Korea is already a developed country.


5. Will there be any cardinal changes in the world currency system?
5.1. What are the perspectives of USD as the world reserve currency?

USD should continue to have an important role in the foreseeable future, but will have to share some role whit euro, yuan (already pound and yen), and perhaps the real, from Brazil. But that will take decades to unfold, more than fifty years…


5.2. What do you think would be the consequences of Yuan currency expansion in the world trade as China makes a move towards it?

Yuan will surely grow in strength and value itself vis-à-vis the USD, euro and other currencies. It will probably gain more value than the ruble, the rupie and the real, many times more. That is inevitable. With more power come more responsibilities: it should be made convertible, and China will be a lender to other countries, which it is already in a moderate way.


5.3. Kazakhstan, China, Russia and South Korea have called for the establishment of the new world currency. What do you think about such an idea?

Not easy, or simpler said than done. A new world currency has to respond to the traditional roles of a national currency – measure of value, exchange and reserve functions – and enjoy trust and credibility. That is not easy for any national currency to perform, it depends on the success of a responsible economy, and none of current players are capable of that nowadays, not even the US (well, we act on the basis of the USD more for custom and inexistence of an alternative, than for the fact that US policies are responsible, which they are not).
A world currency – let us say, a SDR reformed – depends on the credibility of its issuer. The IMF has no real power to enforce a real currency, so the bigger countries should act with converging policies and objectives, which is very difficult to attain. Even the current financial G20 is not appropriate: it has to many countries, and some of them are not really monetary responsible. Perhaps a new G10 or G12 (at maximum) should embark on the future issuance of a new liquidity, but the precondition of this is total financial liberalization among them, convergent macroeconomic policies, and total trade liberalization (short of people free flows) among them and towards third countries. That is really difficult to attain, but it should a desirable outcome of a new financial architecture.


5.4. You forecast which course of development the world currency system will embark on:
• USD dominance;
• Emergence of regional currencies on the base of euro, Yuan and others;
• Emergence of a new type world reserve currency;
• Other scenarios (which ones)

A diminishing USD dominance (in the long run), a growing role for alternate reserve currencies (and Yuan is not yet of the club, but should embark in this adventure), a reformed SDR but with very limited functions (in redressing imbalances, for instance) and, of course, greater financial globalization, with free flow of capitals, and absence of restrictions in current transactions. As regards total freedom for capital flows, this will depend on the correction of the huge disparities in the world economy, and that will take some decades, if not more than a century to be achieved. Gradually, bigger economies should move towards greater macroeconomic convergence, but this, also, will take long to be attained (perhaps a half a century more).


6. Do you think that there is a need for renewal of the elites in the light of the world crisis?

Surely, current leaders are very mediocre, to say the least, with some notable exceptions.

Will there be any new names with the serious potential to become the world elite? Please name some candidates in the field of:
6.1. Economics

Some innovative economists, but I cannot name a single one, not the old Keynesians for sure. Perhaps some new ‘Austrian’ economists, who should combine humanities and philosophy with theoretical economics.


6.2. Politics (Prime-Ministers and Ministers level)

I cannot think about one single distinguished politician, who should combine a brilliant mind and a good technical preparation: perhaps Mr Obama grows in the role, but he has to learn a lot yet. As for the Europeans, we are in a real short supply. The Chinese are a special bunch of apparatchik technocrats, disposing of the Communist monopoly of power, and they cannot count as examples, even some are very capable on technical grounds. But China is a world in itself, and cannot offer any viable solution for the lack of leadership at world level nowadays. Some small countries could have very capable people, but they have no clout to play a bigger role on world stage. In Latin America, for instance, perhaps Chile could offer some positive examples on how running a country in a responsible manner, but for the rest of Latin America the scenario is very poor in capabilities and human resources, at least at political level. In fact, this continent is reversing course, going towards populist leaders who are destroying the possibility of having modern economies in the region: think about Bolivarian leaders, who area dismantling a market system in their own countries…

6.3. Other

Scientists, working on health and environmental issues, with political sensibilities, could offer new possibilities, but it is difficult to name some.
(...)

1740) Politica Exterior de Brasil: respuestas a periodista de La Nacion (Chile

Brasil y su Política Exterior: una entrevista periodística
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

1) No son pocos los países que le exigen a Brasil que tome, de una vez por todas, el liderazgo que le corresponde en Latinoamérica. ¿Es el mejor tiempo para hacerlo, teniendo en cuenta que se acercan las elecciones y Lula debe dejar el poder?
PRA: Uno no se presenta como líder con base en su propia voluntad. Hay que ser reconocido como líder por los demás países sobre la base de ciertos elementos objectivos y otro conjunto de percepciones externas. La primera condición es tener suficiente peso económico, ser abierto comercialmente para atraer otros países a sus mercados, prestar ayuda y cooperación unilateralmente, sin que sea necesario a otros pedir que se lo haga, y también asumir ciertos encargos multilaterales o regionales (incluso en materia de seguridad). O sea, hay que tener dos cosas muy sencillas: plata y soldados. Brasil tiene muy poco de los dos.
Pero las percepciones son muy importantes, en varios sentidos. Es necesario que los otros lo perciban como líder para que un país sea así reconocido. En la región, Argentina dificilmente acceptaría a Brasil como líder, igual que Colombia o Venezuela, o sea, los mas grandes, pero sobretodo Argentina (que ha sido por gran parte del siglo 20 mucho mas desarrollada que Brasil). Un líder también tiene que ser neutral, objectivo frente a los problemas de los otros países: Brasil actual ha tenido una política externa muy marcadamente partidaria, hecha de simpatias por los gobiernos progresistas o izquierdistas, con base a su partido (PT) de carácter socialista y antiimperialista. La actitud dura con respecto al gobierno de Colombia y el interino de Honduras es un ejemplo, frente a la actitud complaciente con respecto a Chávez, que representa una seria menaza a la democracia y a la estabilidad en la región.
Por ultimo, el Itamaraty, o sea, el cuerpo profesional de diplomáticos, no ha jamás proclamado una actitud de liderazgo, pues tiene consciencia que nuestros vecinos hispanos lo aceptarían. La voluntad de ser líder emana no mas que del presidente y de su partido y consejeros, no de los diplomáticos.

2) ¿Por qué el Presidente Lula habría decidido involucrarse en el conflicto de Medio Oriente y qué ha llevado a Israel a pedir su participación, independientemente de que el Mandatario iraní viaje próximamente a Brasil? ¿Se trata de mero formalismo o en verdad Lula tiene algo que podría ayudar a calmar la situación, aún cuando líderes internacionales con más renombre y poder no han podido?
PRA: No creo, personalmente, que Brasil tenga atributos capaces de influenciar decisivamente la resolución de los conflictos en Oriente Medio, basicamente la cuestión palestina, y la del Irán. Falta conocimiento preciso de las condiciones locales -- que se adquiere con extensa presencia diplomática, think tanks, centros universitarios dedicados a la región, etc., que Brasil no tiene -- y faltan los elementos "brutos" del poder: recursos financieros, presencia militar, capacidad real de influencia o presión. Brasil tiene al máximo la retórica del entendimiento, su ejemplo de sociedad integrada con base en muchos pueblos diferentes, sin conflictos internos de naturaleza étnica o religiosa. Todo esto puede ser motivo de orgullo nacional, pero no resuelve los problemas concretos del Medio Oriente. Así, su tentativa representa esta voluntad protagónica del presidente de se presentar como un gran líder mundial, de una manera mas bien voluntarista.

3) ¿Qué continuidad hay en la política exterior del Presidente Lula con los anteriores gobiernos brasileño?
La continuidad esta en el multilateralismo, la integración regional, el énfasis en el Mercosur, y varias otras tradiciones de nuestra diplomacia profesional. Las rupturas están en el excesivo tercer-mundismo, la partidarización de la política externa.
También es continuidad afirmar la voluntad de integrar el Consejo de Seguridad de las NU, pero ahora con verdadero ardor militante en esta causa. La conformación de un espacio económico integrado en America del Sur representa una otra continuidad, pero antes esto era visto como medio para alcanzar otros objetivos relevantes -- como el desarrollo material y la influencia regional e internacional -- ahora quizás sea un objectivo en si mismo.

Brasilia, 12.11.2009

1739) Jose Mindlin: minha homenagem

Conheci o Dr. José Mindlin em Washington, quando eu era ministro-conselheiro na Embaixada e ele foi fazer uma palestra na Library of Congress.
Eu já conhecia, então o livro dele, Entre Livros, e presenteei-o com o meu livro, editado em Paris, Vivendo com Livros, uma coletânea de escritos meus falando de livros e contendo diversas resenhas minhas.
Eu estava naquele momento engajado na tarefa de identificar, catalogar e se possível copiar os arquivos americanos sobre o Brasil: o Itamaraty nunca se manifestou, sequer respondeu aos meus telegramas pedindo alguma verba para pesquisas em arquivos dos EUA, sobretudo National Archives.
Foi Mindlin quem me concedeu, um subsídio de 20 mil dólares, atraves da Fundação Vitae, com o qual pude mobilizar algum auxilio, comprar um pequeno computador, e preparar o "Guia dos Arquivos Americanos sobre o Brasil".
Esse Guia aguarda até hoje edição pela Funag-MRE.

Mindlin era simplesmente cativante, de muito bom humor, como todos já disseram.
Sem duvida um grande homem.
Um amigo dos livros, e isso diz tudo.

1738) Ditaduras passam, mas o sofrimento de quem perde um ente querido é eterno

El costo del asesinato de Zapata Tamayo
por Carlos Alberto Montaner
1 de marzo de 2010

Carlos Alberto Montaner es periodista cubano residenciado en Madrid.

“Hoy, 25 de febrero, lo enterramos''. Lo gritaba Reyna, la madre desesperada. La cadena SER de Cataluña la entrevistaba. Era como una fiera herida. “Fue un asesinato premeditado'', gemía y denunciaba. Ella era una mujer negra y humilde, como su hijo, un simple albañil que quería ser libre. Reyna quiso llevar a su hijo en brazos hasta el cementerio, acompañada por unos cuantos amigos consternados, todos demócratas de la oposición. No pudo. La policía política lo impidió. Siempre la policía política intimidando, castigando, escarmentando a la sociedad para que obedezca en silencio. Son los perros que cuidan al rebaño.

¡Pobres madres! Hace unas semanas había muerto en Cuba otra como ella, pero más vieja y blanca, Gloria Amaya. Tuvo tres hijos presos. A uno de ellos, Ariel Sigler Amaya, lo están matando por rebelde, como le sucedió a Orlando Zapata Tamayo. Entró en la cárcel pesando 90 kilos. Hoy pesa 50 y está en una silla de ruedas. Me dice su hermano que le queda poco. A doña Gloria, que era una ancianita frágil y diminuta, la policía política le rompió dos costillas de una patada en el pecho. Había protestado porque maltrataban a su hijo, preso político, y casi la matan a ella. Desde el suelo, retorcida de dolor, siguió pidiendo por su hijo. Y dice Raúl Castro que en Cuba no se tortura. ¡Mentiroso!

La muerte de Zapata Tamayo tiene tres consecuencias internas graves para la dictadura de los hermanos Castro. Para los demócratas de la oposición, dentro del país, ese sacrificio refuerza el compromiso de lucha. Tal vez es un rasgo de nuestra cultura: la lealtad a los que dieron la vida no se traiciona nunca. Pero la sangre de Orlando tiene otro efecto interno. Avergüenza a los comunistas. Los desmoraliza y debilita. Los coloca en el bando de los asesinos. Hace unos años, cuando la policía política exterminó, ahogándolas, a 32 personas que intentaban huir del país a bordo de un barco llamado "13 de marzo", la mayor parte mujeres y niños, hubo muchos militantes que abandonaron el Partido llenos de asco. Eso era demasiado.

Fuera del país, este nuevo crimen galvaniza a los exiliados tras una causa justa. El día en que murió Orlando, la noticia de mayor divulgación en Twitter fue esa. Una ola de cólera y solidaridad recorrió a una comunidad dispersa que, descendientes incluidos, se acerca a los tres millones. Los periódicos del mundo entero le dieron las primeras páginas a la triste información llegada de La Habana. Muchos telediarios comenzaron sus transmisiones contando, consternados, lo que había sucedido. La imagen de la dictadura cayó por los suelos estrepitosamente y ese estruendo, claro, tuvo una honda repercusión política: se espera que el canciller español Miguel Angel Moratinos le ponga fin a su absurda campaña dedicada a tratar de demoler la posición común de la Unión Europea frente a la dictadura cubana. Jamás se ha visto mayor terquedad en la defensa de una causa innoble que la de Moratinos por beneficiar a la tiranía de los Castro.

El aparato cubano de difamación, por supuesto, ya prepara su contraataque. Uno de sus peones menores comenzó por decir que quienes condenaban esta muerte horrenda vertían lágrimas de cocodrilo. Otros dirán que Zapata Tamayo era un delincuente o un terrorista al servicio de la CIA. Carecen del menor vestigio de decencia. Dicen cualquier cosa. Pero la verdad inocultable es otra: como gritó, llorando, su madre Reyna, a Orlando lo asesinaron premeditadamente por pedir libertad para él y para su pueblo. Su ejemplo gravitará mucho tiempo en la historia de Cuba.

Artículo de Firmas Press
© Todos los derechos reservados. Para mayor información dirigirse a: www.firmaspress.com

1737) Meus pesames antecipados: Cidade Administrativa Tancredo Neves, BH-MG

O governador de Minas, Aécio Neves está inaugurando, nesta quinta-feira, 4 de março, o novo centro administrativo do estado de Minas Gerais em Belo Horizonte, a chamada Cidade Administrativa Presidente Tancredo Neves, projeto concebido e desenhado pelo arquiteto Oscar Niemayer.

Bem, não querendo ser ave de mau agouro, mas sendo, desejo, desde já, formular meus votos de mais sentida condolência, profundos pêsames, a todos aqueles que terão o dissabor, eu diria até a desgraça, de serem obrigados a trabalhar, ou até a frequentar, uma obra que, sem ver, sem conhecer, eu já reputo como desumana, horrivel esteticamente e funcionalmente desastrosa.
Sinto muito, isso é azar demais...

Paulo Roberto de Almeida (2.03.2010)