domingo, 22 de dezembro de 2013

Guerra do Paraguai: uma historia sem fim - The Economist



Paraguay's awful history

The never-ending war

How a terrible but little-known conflict continues to shape and blight a nation

He died with his homeland


THE fall of the “father of all Paraguayans” was even more abrupt than his rise. In 2008 Fernando Lugo, a Catholic bishop and liberation theologian who called himself a champion of the poor, won his country’s presidential election and broke the Colorado Party’s chokehold on power. Shortly after his inauguration, however, four women said that he had fathered their children while under a vow of celibacy; Mr Lugo recognised two of them. The Liberal party, whose support had propelled him to the presidency, repudiated him. In June 2012 Congress summarily removed him from office, after he was accused of mishandling a clash between police and landless peasants.
In the eyes of the leftist leaders of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, Paraguay’s partners in the Mercosur trade block, the lightning-fast impeachment was a coup. They suspended the country from Mercosur and encouraged the Organisation of American States (OAS) to do the same. On June 26th Hugo Saguier, Paraguay’s ambassador to the OAS, took the floor and lashed out. “If you want to form a new Triple Alliance,” he said, “go ahead.”



Many in the room were puzzled. But Brazil’s representative angrily replied that the comment was “unnecessary and gratuitous”. Mr Saguier had invoked one of the deepest scars in Latin America’s history: the War of the Triple Alliance, a conflict between Paraguay and a coalition of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay that began in 1865 (just as the American civil war was drawing to a close), and ended in 1870. “I wanted [the speech] to hurt,” Mr Saguier says.
The war, known in Paraguay as the “War of ’70” or the “Great War”, was among the worst military defeats ever inflicted on a modern nation state. According to Thomas Whigham of the University of Georgia, as much as 60% of the population and 90% of Paraguayan men died from combat or, more often, from disease and starvation. Other researchers put the figure considerably lower—but still atrociously high. Federico Franco, Mr Lugo’s successor, recently called the war a “holocaust”. Yet it is little known outside the region. Even in Paraguay its moral ambiguities have caused generations of leaders to shroud it in myth.
But the diplomatic backlash against the impeachment has revived debate about this national trauma. After 142 years Paraguay is grappling with the mixture of hubris and heroism that plunged it into self-immolation, a tragedy that still defines the country.
Modern Paraguay—flat, landlocked and steamy—is a geopolitical pipsqueak. Its foreign influence is limited to two giant dams on its borders, soyabean exports that feed Chinese livestock and the free-for-all bazaar of Ciudad del Este, a border town where vendors of cut-rate electronics and clothes operate in public, and arms dealers and Hizbullah fund-raisers do so in private.
In the mid-1800s, however, Paraguay was a middling regional power. It began a breakneck industrialisation during the presidency of Carlos Antonio López, who imported European experts to build a shipyard, a foundry and one of South America’s first railways. He also beefed up the army to deter Paraguay’s twitchy neighbours: Argentina considered the country a rebel province until 1852, while Pedro II, the Brazilian emperor, claimed lands that Spain and Portugal had disputed.
He died with his homeland
In 1862 López died, and was succeeded by his son Francisco Solano. The younger López demanded absolute deference—he banned people from turning their backs to him, or sitting while he stood—and was eager to make a name for himself as a statesman. In 1864 he saw his chance. To protect its commercial interests, Brazil threatened to intervene in a civil war in Uruguay, a small buffer state between it and Argentina. López feared this would upset the regional balance of power, and announced that Paraguay could not tolerate the presence of Brazilian troops on Uruguayan soil.
Pedro shrugged him off and invaded Uruguay. Soon afterwards López declared war on Brazil and attacked its interior province of Mato Grosso. He later dispatched a force to Uruguay as well. When Argentina refused to let him march troops through its territory, López sent them anyway. Once the Brazilian-backed side won the war in Uruguay, the three governments signed a secret pact. They agreed to annex half of Paraguay’s territory, collect reparations and forbid it from keeping an army—and to fight until López was ousted.
The odds were stacked against Paraguay. The allies’ combined population was 25 times bigger. Paraguay relied on Napoleonic-era kit—muskets, 17th-century cannon and wooden boats—and, being landlocked, could not import modern armaments. Many of its horses were crippled by a spinal ailment. The allies ultimately mustered long-range rifles, artillery and ironclad warships.
Victory or death. It was death
The Paraguayan invaders were soon beaten back from Uruguay and Brazil, and López proposed peace. But Pedro’s honour would not let him quit until his rival was toppled (the Brazilian troops did most of the fighting). Honour similarly prevented López from abdicating, though perhaps no alternative, self-respecting Paraguayan leader could have surrendered on the secret pact’s terms. What began as a capricious escapade became a total war, and a struggle for national survival.
For three years the outgunned, undermanned Paraguayans battled their enemies to a stalemate in the country’s southern marshes. Water mines and obstacles at the fort of Humaitá blocked the Brazilians’ advance by river. But in 1868 heavy rains raised the water level, and their boats quickly reached Asunción, the capital. Paraguay’s army surrendered the next year.
López, however, would not give up. He moved his capital from one town to another, taking the entire state archives in tow. He imagined a vast conspiracy against him, and jailed and tortured thousands of his most loyal backers, including his own mother and sister. His brother was among the 700-800 people he had executed—often by lance to save ammunition.
Because López had drafted every man in Paraguay, there was no labour to work the fields, and starvation set in. Many who subsisted on bitter wild oranges succumbed to cholera, malaria and dysentery. As able-bodied men died, López recruited a new army of wounded and child soldiers. He armed them with sticks painted to look like guns, disguising the youngsters with fake beards. The army’s original red uniforms had dwindled to rags; rain seeped through ponchos made of shredded carpets. Eventually they fought naked. (Today, Paraguay celebrates Children’s Day on the anniversary of a battle in which 2,000 children perished.)
López continued to retreat. In 1870 the Brazilian army cornered him at last at Cerro Corá, in the remote north-east. His ring bore a slogan, “victory or death”, which he honoured by refusing to surrender. “I die with my homeland,” he proclaimed before being shot—though his partisans insist he said “for my homeland”. Elisa Lynch, his Irish consort, buried him next to their son.
My day will come
According to a rough-and-ready post-war census, just 29,000 males over the age of 15 were left in Paraguay. One observer called the survivors “living skeletons…shockingly mutilated with bullet and sabre wounds”. Jaguars roamed freely and feasted on human flesh. Women wandered the streets naked.
The war wiped out Paraguay’s elite. After an eight-year occupation the country was run by Argentine carpetbaggers and exiles who had backed the allies. They branded López a butcher and a tyrant, and excised him from history. He had foreseen what would become of his reputation. “I will be buried beneath the weight of mountains of ignominy,” he said on the day before his death. “But my day will come, and I will rise from the abyss of slander to…take my rightful place in history.”
Time would prove him right. By the 1920s tensions were rising with Bolivia over the Chaco region, wrongly thought to be rich in oil. Eager to whip up nationalist sentiment, the government recast López as a symbol of the country’s bellicose spirit.
From 1932-35 the two countries went to war. This time Paraguay won. The indigenous Bolivian soldiers did not want to fight for their white commanders, and could not understand Paraguayan radio signals in the Guaraní language. Their wool uniforms left them dehydrated in the arid Chaco.
With Paraguay’s pride restored, López’s remains were moved to a domed shrine in central Asunción. Today, el mariscal (“the marshal”) is the country’s improbable icon. A portrait of him atop a stallion hangs in the president’s office in the López Palace, which he built. His sword sits in a display case.
Yet despite this clumsy hagiography, Paraguay has done little to tell the real story of the war. Asunción has no history museum; the main battlefields have been neglected. Humaitá is now a fishing village, accessible only by a dirt road that is often blocked by cattle. The river moves a few feet east every year, taking the border with Argentina with it. It now threatens to flood the ruins of a church destroyed by the invaders. “What they didn’t take in the war, they’re getting from the river,” says Vicenta Mirando, a local schoolteacher.
The war’s worst atrocity occurred in Piribebuy, 80km (50 miles) east of Asunción by road. There Brazilian troops cut the throats of everyone they could find, and locked the doors to a crowded hospital before setting it alight. A gruesome concrete relief, illustrating the horror, has been built on the site; the town has funded a one-room museum, which includes a single tuft of braided hair removed from the mass grave below its 18th-century church. In the church itself, however, there is no sign of the history buried below the red-tiled floor. Speakers blare Christian rock between services.
It isn’t even past
Paraguay’s suspension from Mercosur set off a surge of nationalism. Asunción is plastered with posters trumpeting the country’s sovereignty. “We won’t accept foreign tutelage,” says President Franco. “This is a poor but dignified country. It’s poor as a consequence of an unjust war.” He demands that Brazil return Paraguay’s “Christian Cannon,” cast from melted church bells.
The episode has also increased sympathy for López in some quarters. “I’ve had my re-evaluation of el mariscal,” says Esteban Burt, a lawyer. “The Triple Alliance went out of its way to say [the impeachment] was a disgrace, that Paraguayans should be punished. We haven’t heard that sort of language since 1870.” Mr Burt thinks that Brazil’s wartime archives, the last of which were declassified this year, will reveal that the allies had conspired to destroy Paraguay years before the war began.
But Mr Lugo’s career highlights other aspects of the war’s legacy. His election was widely celebrated because it ended 61 years of unbroken rule by the Colorado Party, 35 of them under Alfredo Stroessner. It was under Stroessner that the cult of López reached its apex. “The emphasis on glory, self-sacrifice, authoritarian models and internal enemies felt very congenial to the stronistas,” says Mr Whigham, the historian. Stroessner’s state “legitimised itself by drawing a straight line between Big Al and the Marshall.”
Wartime depopulation also influenced Stroessner’s policies. Post-war governments distributed brochures offering immigrants a free trip to Paraguay and land. A series of Utopian colonies sprung up, including a “New Australia” and an Aryan-supremacist “Nueva Germania”, co-founded by Friedrich Nietzsche’s sister, where a German flag still flies. In 1931 descendants of that group set up the first Nazi party outside Germany. (At the start of the second world war, Paraguay’s government openly sympathised with Hitler. The national police director named his son Adolfo Hirohito; police cadets wore swastikas on their uniforms.)
Another German who came to Paraguay after the war was Stroessner’s father, a Bavarian. Stroessner himself had no direct ties to the Paraguayan Nazis, but he shared many of their instincts: in 1974 he was accused by the UN of committing genocide against the native Aché people. He also harboured numerous Nazi war criminals, including Josef Mengele.
This autocratic tradition may have influenced Mr Lugo’s dismissive attitude to other politicians—a crucial factor in his downfall. The Liberals abandoned him in part because they felt their support had not been adequately rewarded in policies and jobs. Instead Mr Lugo had packed his cabinet with leftist allies. “You get in with one group and govern with another,” he reportedly said.
“Piribebuy has funded a one- room museum, which includes a single tuft of braided hair removed from the mass grave below its 18th-century church”
But alienating the Liberals cost him his presidency, because the Paraguayan left was far too weak to protect him. That too has roots in the war. “Our economy never overcame the deficiencies the war imposed on us,” says Jorge Rubiani, an architect and author, “so there was never an industrial structure to generate class consciousness.” Brazilian troops destroyed the foundry at Ybycuí, Paraguay’s main industrial asset, so it could never be reused.
The pretext for the impeachment also stems from the conflict. Before 1865 most Paraguayan land was state-owned. To pay reparations, post-war governments sold off huge plots to Argentine landowners. The broad subdivisions of Paraguay in 1880s maps refer to individual possessions, not provinces. Those concentrated holdings still bedevil the country: they include the ranch where police fired on peasant squatters in June.
Even Mr Lugo’s first misstep, his paternity scandal, can arguably be traced to the war. Sexual relations in Paraguay have always been open: in 1545 a Spanish priest called the country “Muhammad’s paradise” after witnessing his compatriots sleeping with numerous native women, behaviour he associated with Muslims. In the mid-1800s most Paraguayan households were led by señoras, often depicted chomping cigars, carrying food on their heads and sporting white cotton dresses. They paired off with a rotating cast of itinerant men.
But even that tradition did not prepare society for the post-war free-for-all. “Men without modesty”, wrote one newspaper, “may be found even in the corridors of the Church and the cemetery, atrociously scandalising even during the day to satiate their brutal passions.” No one knows whether the intercourse in “plazas, streets and meeting places” was rape, prostitution or a result of the privileges men enjoyed because of the distorted sex ratio. Mr Lugo might not have realised quite how far sexual mores had changed. “Lugo was the cultural extension of the idea that we have to populate the country,” says Benjamín Fernández Bogado of 5 Días, a newspaper. “Having children in huge quantities wasn’t a problem. Even priests could have children.”
Sexual violence during the war itself poisoned attitudes to race. In its own way, Paraguay is a melting pot: the countryside is full of blond-haired, blue-eyed peasants who speak fluent Guaraní and halting Spanish. Yet López’s propagandists tried to drum up prejudice against the Brazilian army, which was mostly black, since Pedro promised to free slaves who fought. They called the emperor the “chief of the monkey tribe”. The resentment lingers. “The kambá raped our women,” says Miguel Ángel of the Piribebuy museum, using the Guaraní word for blacks. Legend has it that the resulting black babies were killed.
The would-have-been country
Perhaps the final tragedy of the war is that it is so little known abroad. Mr Fernández Bogado thinks this is no coincidence. “The world isn’t a comfortable place for us,” he says of his country’s insularity. “It’s a scene of danger, conspiracy and death.” For Paraguayans, he explains, success is a prelude to danger: when the national football team scores, “It makes us nervous and we panic.”
Guaraní—still spoken by 80% of the population—renders time differently from Western tongues. The future is uncertain: the word for “tomorrow” means “if the sun rises”. The past is divided between what happened, and what was supposed to but did not. If you quit a seminary, you are a “would-have-been priest”; a broken engagement yields a “would-have-been spouse”. This grammar is “like a backpack you can never take off,” says Alejandra Peña, a former national museum director.
Paraguayans still die in falls and accidents while digging for treasure supposedly buried by their forefathers during the war. Perhaps they can only truly understand the conflict in their mother tongue. They know full well the woes of the country they live in, but never forget the one that might have been.
A blog post addressing some readers' responses to this article is available here.

Marx, Lenin e o totalitarismo moderno - Maurício Rojas

Como ocorre frequentenente, surripio, do blog de meu amigo Orlando Tambosi, un texto essencial para o aprendizado dos mais jovens.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 
Marx, Lênin e o totalitarismo moderno
Reproduzo abaixo parte de um dos capítulos do livro La libertad y sus enemigos, do escritor e economista chileno Maurício Rojas, ex-membro do Parlamento sueco e defensor das ideias liberais. Ex-marxista, ele faz uma análise impiedosa do terrível legado de Marx, esse espectro que ainda ronda a América Latina. No final, um link para o texto completo.

O idealismo genocida
En los círculos en que transcurrió mi juventud revolucionaria no había calificativo más honroso que el de "bolche". Era sinónimo de entrega total a la causa de la revolución y a la organización que la encarnaba. Eso ocurría en ese Chile de fines de los años 60 que se hundía en una lucha fratricida que terminaría desquiciando su pueblo y destruyendo su antigua democracia. Por ese entonces estudiábamos a Lenin con pasión. El ¿Qué hacer? El Estado y la revolución eran lecturas obligatorias para todo buen bolche. Conocíamos los entretelones del Segundo Congreso de la socialdemocracia rusa, en el que se fundó el bolchevismo, y defendíamos, con absoluta convicción, el derecho de la revolución a instaurar lo que Marx llamó "dictadura revolucionaria del proletariado" y ejercer el terror con el objetivo de alcanzar sus fines. Al mismo tiempo, criticábamos al estalinismo, pero no por su uso ilimitado de la violencia sino por ser una supuesta "degeneración burocrática" del ideal marxista-leninista. Circunstancias adversas habrían llevado a la perversión del impulso revolucionario, hasta convertirlo en un monstruoso Estado en manos de una nueva clase privilegiada. No era el ideal de Marx y Lenin el que había fracasado, sino su aplicación bajo circunstancias extraordinariamente difíciles, que habían forzado su corrupción. Por ello, el sueño revolucionario seguía vigente, y nada había en él que lo ensombreciese.
Sólo con el paso del tiempo y ya en el exilio fui entendiendo la profunda relación que existía entre nuestros ideales tan deslumbrantes y la penosa realidad de las sociedades edificadas en nombre de esos ideales. La dificultad fundamental estribaba en comprender cómo del idealismo podía surgir tanta maldad. Lo más fácil era atribuirlo a causas exteriores, a accidentes de la historia o a la perversidad de ciertos líderes, y quedarse así con los ideales impolutos y la conciencia tranquila. Pero esto fue lo que terminé poniendo en cuestión, y ello implicó, además, un serio cuestionamiento personal que me obligó a entender que también en ese joven idealista y romántico que yo había sido anidaba la semilla del mal.
Finalmente llegué a la conclusión de que en la misma meta que nos proponíamos estaba la raíz de un accionar político despiadado y sin límites morales. Lo que supuestamente estaba en juego era tan grandioso que todo debía ser subordinado a su consecución. Por ello es que la bondad extrema del fin puede convertirse en la maldad extrema de los medios; la supuesta salvación de la humanidad puede hacerse al precio de sacrificar la vida de incontables seres humanos; se puede amar al género humano y despreciar a los hombres realmente existentes.
El esfuerzo por comprender la asombrosa metamorfosis en verdugos de idealistas entregados plenamente a la causa de crear un mundo nuevo me llevó, hace ya unas tres décadas, a estudiar con cierta profundidad a los creadores del primer Estado totalitario moderno: aquellos revolucionarios rusos liderados por el noble hereditario Vladímir Ilich Uliánov, alias Lenin, que quisieron abolir la explotación y la opresión del hombre por el hombre y terminaron creando una maquinaria de explotación y opresión nunca vista en la historia de la humanidad.
El triste destino de esa primera revolución comunista exitosa se fue repitiendo luego en cada país donde se intentó llevar a cabo un cambio semejante: el intento de recreación total del mundo y el hombre acabó siempre en el totalitarismo. Hoy, todo aquello puede parecer historia: un pasado que ya no guarda relación alguna con nuestro tiempo. Y así puede ser si solo nos atenemos a las formas concretas que asumieron esos intentos mesiánicos. Sin embargo, mirando el fondo de las cosas podemos ver que hay una lección universal que aprender en el clamoroso fracaso del marxismo revolucionario. Se trata de la perversión fatídica del idealismo revolucionario por su propia soberbia, por aquella intención de partir de cero, de hacer tabla rasa de quienes realmente somos, o, para decirlo con las palabras de Platón en La República, de tratar al ser humano como si fuese "un lienzo que es preciso ante todo limpiar" para sobre él plasmar nuestras utopías.
Esta "voluntad de crear la humanidad de nuevo", por usar las palabras de Hitler para definir el núcleo del nazismo,[1] esta tentación mesiánica fue lo que hizo de Lenin y sus bolcheviques unos verdaderos genocidas, pero no fueron los primeros ni serían los últimos que se dejaron llevar por el delirio de la bondad extrema. En el futuro los veremos sin duda reaparecer blandiendo nuevas promesas de cambio total y redención plena, como hacen los islamistas radicales o los antisistema, con su comparsa de izquierdistas nostálgicos de la revolución.
Por ello, para que no olvidemos la terrible lección de la historia, es que he decido actualizar mis estudios sobre los revolucionarios rusos y reunirlos en un libro que he titulado Lenin y el totalitarismo, que recientemente ha publicado la editorial Sepha (Málaga).
Marx y el pensamiento totalitario
En el libro se analiza no solo la historia de Lenin y sus revolucionarios genocidas, sino que se hace una serie de reflexiones más generales acerca de la naturaleza del totalitarismo, su relación con el pensamiento de Marx y la pertinencia de usar este término para conceptualizar el régimen de la Rusia soviética. Sobre ello merece la pena detenerse un poco.
La visión revolucionaria de Marx fue definida muy tempranamente[2] en torno a la idea de la transformación total no solo del mundo existente sino del ser humano mismo. La naturaleza humana debía ser rehecha mediante la violencia apocalíptica de la revolución comunista; surgiría entonces un hombre nuevo, capaz de forjar una sociedad radicalmente distinta a todas las anteriormente conocidas. Sus célebres palabras en La ideología alemana de 1845 no dejan lugar a dudas al respecto:
Tanto para engendrar en masa esta conciencia comunista como para llevar adelante la cosa misma, es necesario una transformación masiva del hombre [eine massenhafte Veränderung der Menschen nötig ist], que sólo podrá conseguirse mediante un movimiento práctico, mediante una revolución, y, por consiguiente, la revolución no sólo es necesaria porque la clase dominante no puede ser derrocada de otro modo, también porque únicamente por medio de una revolución logrará la clase que derriba [el sistema] salir del cieno en que está hundida y volverse capaz de fundar la sociedad sobre nuevas bases[3].
Este ser humano masivamente transformado fundaría una sociedad cuya característica esencial seríala unidad inmediata y absoluta del hombre con su especie o, para decirlo con el vocabulario de Hegel, el fin de toda separación entre las partes (los individuos) y el todo (la sociedad o comunidad). Se propone, pues, el surgimiento de una sociedad total, totalizante y totalitaria en el sentido estricto de la palabra. Esta idea de una sociedad en la que desaparece el individuo como tal, es decir, el individuo con derecho a una esfera propia de libertad separada de lo colectivo y lo político, fue elaborada extensamente por Marx en sus escritos de 1843-44. Un ejemplo notable es su crítica a la existencia misma de unos derechos humanos distintos de los derechos políticos o del ciudadano, tal como establecían las célebres declaraciones estadounidense y francesa. Estos derechos son criticados por ser la expresión del "hombre egoísta", la quintaesencia del derecho superior del individuo frente al colectivo o la sociedad. Las palabras de Marx en Sobre la cuestión judía (Zur Judenfrage, escrita a fines de 1843) a este respecto merecen ser citadas con cierta extensión, ya que estamos ante la esencia antiliberal del paradigma que, radicalizando la búsqueda hegeliana de la armonía o reconciliación entre el todo y las partes, formará el núcleo mismo de la ideología marxista:
Constatemos ante todo el hecho de que, a diferencia de los droits du citoyen, los llamados derechos humanos, los droits de l’homme, no son otra cosa que los derechos del miembro de la sociedad civil, es decir del hombre egoísta, separado del hombre y de la comunidad (...) Ninguno de los llamados derechos humanos va por tanto más allá del hombre egoísta, del hombre como miembro de la sociedad civil, es decir del individuo replegado sobre sí mismo, su interés privado y su arbitrio privado, y disociado de la comunidad. Lejos de concebir al hombre incardinado en su especie [Gattungswesen], los derechos humanos presentan la misma sociedad y la vida de la especie [Gattungsleben] como un marco externo a los individuos, como una restricción de su independencia originaria [4].
Para Marx, los únicos derechos importantes son los derechos políticos. En su visión, y al igual que en la de Hegel, el hombre deja de existir en sí para quedar reducido a su calidad de miembro del Estado(o de la comunidad políticamente organizada), con sólo los derechos que éste le reconozca como ciudadano. Es por ello que Marx no puede entender cómo los franceses pudieron crear un tipo de derechos del hombre que funcionan como obstáculos frente a la voluntad política colectiva, derechos que crean una esfera que está más allá de la política o del colectivo:
Es bastante incomprensible que un pueblo que, precisamente, comienza a liberarse, a derribar todas las barreras que separan a sus diferentes miembros, a fundar una comunidad política, que un pueblo así proclame solemnemente (Declaración de 1791) la legitimidad del hombre egoísta, separado de su prójimo y de su comunidad[5].
Marx quiere la sociedad total, que todo lo abarca, sin barreras –es decir, sin derechos individuales que le pongan límites– entre el hombre y el colectivo social representado por el Estado. Esta es, exactamente, la esencia de la definición original de los conceptos de Estado totalitario y totalitarismo, tal como Mussolini los usó ya en los años veinte del siglo pasado: "Todo dentro del Estado, nada fuera del Estado, nada contra el Estado"[6].
Es justamente esta forma totalitaria de ver las cosas lo que hace que Marx manifieste un particular desagrado por la idea de la libertad individual, expresada en la Constitución francesa de 1793, en que se dice (artículo 6, que no es sino una repetición de la famosa declaración de 1791) que la libertad es "el poder que tiene el hombre de hacer todo lo que no perjudique los derechos de otro". Ante esto Marx comenta desdeñosamente:
O sea, que la libertad es el derecho de hacer y deshacer lo que no perjudique a otro. Los límites en los que cada uno puede moverse sin perjudicar a otro se hallan determinados por la ley, lo mismo que la linde entre dos campos por una cerca. Se trata de la libertad del hombre en cuanto mónada aislada y replegada sobre sí misma[7].
Por esta libertad tan clásica, que es la esencia del liberalismo, ni Marx ni los marxistas del futuro profesarán la menor simpatía. Tampoco la profesarán otros totalitarios, como los fascistas italianos, los nazis alemanes o los fundamentalistas islámicos.
¿Qué es el totalitarismo?
De esta manera, Marx reformuló aquella vieja utopía de corte mesiánico que planteaba el advenimiento de un reino celestial sobre la Tierra, con sus hombres nuevos surgidos de una hecatombe depuradora.
La visión mesiánica de Marx encontraría con el tiempo miríadas de seguidores entusiastas. Entre ellos, los revolucionarios rusos encabezados por Lenin serían los primeros en disponer del poder necesario para intentar la realización práctica de ese "asalto al cielo", que diera paso a un hombre y una sociedad absolutamente renovados. El resultado fue, en parte, plenamente congruente con la utopía de Marx: efectivamente, se creó la primera sociedad total o totalitaria. Al mismo tiempo, ni de cerca se cumplieron las promesas de armonía, reconciliación y felicidad, sino que del sueño del reino celestial sobre la Tierra surgió un régimen de una brutalidad sin precedentes. Esta discrepancia entre ideal y realidad es lo que ha llevado a muchos a decir que entre la utopía comunista de Marx y la realidad del totalitarismo soviético no existiría vínculo alguno. En mi libro sostengo una opinión diametralmente opuesta a este intento de desvincular a Marx de la obra totalitaria de sus seguidores revolucionarios.
Para probar el vínculo entre el pensamiento totalitario de Marx y el sistema totalitario creado por Lenin, consolidado por Stalin y luego reproducido en todos los demás regímenes comunistas, hay una distancia que es necesario recorrer, si uno de verdad quiere probar, y no sólo creer, que entre el uno y el otro hay una relación de causalidad. Con relación de causalidad quiero decir que las ideas de Marx –condensadas en su visión de una futura sociedad total que alcanzaría la armonía aboliendo toda separación entre individuo y colectivo– fueron no sólo una condición sine qua non para la creación del sistema social totalitario soviético, también un componente esencial del mismo. Con ello no se quiere desconocer la multiplicidad de condiciones e influencias que debieron concurrir para que se diese el hecho histórico de la creación del primer sistema totalitario moderno, es decir, uno dondese intenta la destrucción sistemática de toda vida social independiente del colectivo representado por el Partido-Estado. Esa multiplicidad de factores existe, pero no puede explicar el resultado alcanzado, es decir, la formación de la Unión Soviética, sin incluir de manera esencial y determinante el componente ideológico, el credo marxista.
La tesis fundamental del libro es por ello que el totalitarismo como sistema social no es más que el intento de llevar a la práctica la idea de una sociedad-comunidad sin divisiones ni conflictos internos, en la cual el hombre se convierta en lo que Marx llamó el "individuo total" (totalen Individuen) o "ser-especie" (Gattungswesen), sin derechos personales, propiedad o intereses que lo separen del colectivo[8]. Esto hace que el concepto totalitarismo sea más amplio que el propio totalitarismo de raigambre marxista, que es sólo una de las propuestas ideológicas que buscan esta fusión del individuo en el colectivo y, por ello, la destrucción sistemática de toda individualidad y toda sociedad civil independiente. El nacionalsocialismo es otra variante de lo mismo, tal como lo es el fundamentalismo islámico.
Lo anterior no quiere decir que el sistema totalitario –ya sea el soviético u otro– haya de hecho logrado la destrucción de toda vida social independiente y, con ello, el control absoluto del individuo. Esto es algo que debe ser empíricamente estudiado en cada caso. Lo central en mi definición del totalitarismo reside en el intento sistemático de lograrlo, es decir, en la construcción de un sistema social que se estructura en torno a ese objetivo de control total del individuo. Un sistema así fue el que se erigió en la Unión Soviética, y todo indica que llegó a grados asombrosos de control sobre las personas y de destrucción de la vida social. (Continua).

A maior fraude politica do Brasil: razoes do seu sucesso - Ruy Fabiano

POLÍTICA

Clone do PT

Ruy Fabiano
O Globo, 21.12.2013
“O Lula é um fenômeno. Não é uma coisa normal. O Lula é algo que, no futuro, os estudiosos, os sociólogos vão analisar como algo que jamais aconteceu neste país.”
“Eu não me coloco nesse patamar, porque o Lula representa a aspiração de ascensão social de qualquer brasileiro. As pessoas veem o Lula viajando pelo mundo, recebido por reis e rainhas, por grandes dirigentes internacionais, enfim, caminhando por aí, e de alguma forma veem naquilo a possibilidade de ascensão no seu campo profissional. É natural que ele tenha uma força política que nós respeitamos”.
O discurso acima não foi produzido por nenhum petista ou militante sindical. É, por incrível que pareça, do candidato tucano à Presidência da República, senador Aécio Neves.
O vídeo está no Youtube e em diversas redes sociais e, seguramente, será peça da campanha eleitoral do PT no ano que vem. Com uma oposição dessa, o PT não tem o que temer, a não ser seus próprios aloprados.
A Era PT, que completa 12 anos em 2014, podendo se estender por mais um quatriênio – quebrando, assim, o recorde varguista de 15 anos ininterruptos no poder (1930-1945) -, ficará marcada por um paradoxo: foi a que reuniu maior número de escândalos graúdos e, no entanto, a que menos foi atormentada pela ação oposicionista.
Se tais escândalos ocorressem com o PT na oposição, é certo que nova campanha pró-impeachment teria varrido o país. Basta ver o que aconteceu no período Collor, em que, comparado ao que há hoje, os réus não passavam de punguistas amadores.
No entanto, o candidato do principal partido de oposição não hesita em desfiar louvores àquele que é seu principal adversário. Este, no entanto, sempre que pode desanca a principal liderança tucana, Fernando Henrique Cardoso.
Quem está certo? Pelos resultados, não há o que discutir. Em plena desova do Mensalão, com três CPIs fazendo barulho no Congresso, Lula reelegeu-se. A oposição não conseguiu (na verdade, não quis) transmitir ao público a responsabilidade que o então presidente da República tinha naquele processo.
Deixou-o escapar. Hoje, tenta recapturá-lo, sem muita convicção, a julgar pelos elogios de Aécio.
Lênin falava da estratégia das tesouras, pela qual o partido hegemônico escolhia sua própria oposição. Intencionalmente ou não, o PT realizou esse ideal estratégico. Tem a oposição que pediu a Deus; uma oposição que não sabe catalisar as insatisfações populares (que não são poucas) e não sabe traduzir em linguagem corrente, assimilável pela população, suas propostas para consertar o país.
O que mantém o PSDB como maior força oposicionista é exatamente o sentimento antipetista de grande parte da sociedade brasileira. E esse sentimento é eminentemente conservador. Mas o PSDB tem medo (ou vergonha) de vocalizá-lo. Quer ser uma alternativa ao PT, mas com o mesmo programa progressista.
Daí os elogios a Lula, que Serra, na eleição passada, também fez (sem, claro, o mesmo entusiasmo de Aécio). Se é para oferecer mais do mesmo, fiquemos com o original. O PSDB é um PT paraguaio. Assim, não dá.

Primeira Guerra Mundial: um outro livro de Margaret MacMillan


Turning Points: Margaret MacMillan Talks About ‘The War That Ended Peace


Publishers this year got the jump on commemorating the centenary of World War I, offering many books about the period by leading historians. “The War That Ended Peace” by Margaret MacMillan examines the relations among European countries in the relatively calmer years leading up to 1914. In The New York Times Book Review, Richard Aldous wrote that Ms. MacMillan “neatly recounts the events that led to battle” and that her “portraits of the men who took Europe to war are superb.”
In a recent e-mail interview, Ms. MacMillan discussed the turning points that led to war, Germany’s role in the outbreak of armed conflict and more. Below are edited excerpts from the conversation:
Q.
Several times you emphasize the “growing importance of public opinion” in the politics of the early 20th century. What role did it play, and why was public opinion a different force than it had been previously?
A.
Public opinion pushed leaders in certain directions and limited their options. Until the 19th century, statesmen and politicians could make decisions without worrying about what others, apart from their own very small circles, thought. The spread of literacy and mass communications — the most popular newspaper in Moscow was selling more than 800,000 copies a day before 1914 — meant that a much larger public was well-informed and engaged.
Public opinion also became a factor because it was more organized and articulate. In addition to the spread of constitutional government, the extension of the franchise meant that governments, even in autocracies like Russia, had to worry about keeping support and winning the next elections.
Q.
Most refutations of the “great man theory” of history downplay individuals to focus on social forces. And while you certainly do that, there’s also a pattern in the book of leaders who make bad decisions. How much would you attribute the start of the war to poor leadership as opposed to larger trends?
A.
I would say it is both. You can’t understand the leaders without understanding their world and its ideas, values and prejudices. For example, Social Darwinist ideas, derived — wrongly, as we now know — from evolutionary biology, encouraged Europeans to assume that nations were separate species, just as in the natural world, engaged in an unending struggle for survival. If you think that, then you might well conclude, and many did, that war was both inevitable and salutary.
On the other hand, those leaders who had to make the great choices were human beings with their own characteristics and emotions. The German Chancellor had just lost his beloved wife in the summer of 1914. Did this make him more pessimistic and less likely to resist the calls for war? So I would say individuals are very important at particular moments.
Q.
You write in the introduction that your book “traces Europe’s path to 1914 and picks out those turning points when its options narrowed.” There were many of those turning points, but does one stand out to you as the most fateful?
A.
If I have to choose one decision in those fateful days after the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Sarajevo, I think the most dangerous was Austria-Hungary’s determining it would destroy Serbia once and for all, even at the risk of bringing Russia in to defend Serbia. In Vienna they blamed the Serbian government for the assassination of their heir to the throne. Beyond that, though, the Austrian elites saw the existence of the Serbian state as a magnet for Austria-Hungary’s own Serbs and the Croats and Slovenes as well, and therefore a threat to the very survival of what was an increasingly rickety empire.
Austria-Hungary might still have paused if Germany, as it had done before, had urged caution. This time, however, the German government decided it would support its ally, come what may. So if I am allowed a second turning point, it is the so-called blank check Germany issued to Austria-Hungary on July 5. A month later Europe was at war.
Q.
Are there any historical figures that surprised you in their influence and who ended up playing a larger role in the book than you thought they would?
A.
Franz Ferdinand’s death was the trigger for the war, but I had never thought about him as a human being and what it meant that he had disappeared from the scene. He was not a particularly nice man — reactionary and anti-Semitic — but he was sensible when it came to foreign affairs. In previous crises in the Balkans he had resisted the cries for war from the generals and warned that an attempt to destroy Serbia might well lead to a wider war, which would destroy Austria-Hungary. In July 1914, the lonely old emperor had no one close to him to help him stand up to the hawks.
Q.
How would you summarize the current conventional wisdom about Germany’s role in starting the war? And how does what you write in this book differ from the conventional wisdom?
Rob JudgesMargaret MacMillan
A.
There is no current conventional wisdom on Germany, which is why the debate remains so interesting and lively. Opinion has swung back and forth over the past century. At the end of the war, Allied opinion was that the war had been Germany’s fault, but doubts almost immediately began to creep in. The Germans themselves, most of whom felt the war was not their fault, selectively released documents and encouraged research which seemed to show that everyone was to blame, even that the war may have been an accident. In the late 1920s and 1930s that view came to be widely accepted as well in the English-speaking countries such as Britain and the United States.
Margaret MacMillan
After the Second World War, however, a younger generation of German historians led by Fritz Fischer went back into the archives and emerged with the conviction that the German leadership, including the military, had actively worked for a war of conquest. The pendulum has since swung back a bit with newer historians arguing that, while German policies were often reckless, those of the other powers had to be taken into account as well.
Today we are no closer to a consensus. Some recent studies have singled out Russia and France for forming a military alliance which threatened Germany, while others put blame on Britain for not making its position clearer when the crisis started. The arguments will go on and I don’t think they are going to end any time soon.
What I can say about my own contribution to the debate is that I ask a different sort of question: Why did the peace fail? Europe had enjoyed an unprecedented period of general peace between 1815 and 1914, and there were strong forces in favor of maintaining that. There was a big international peace movement and governments were getting increasingly used to the idea of settling disputes in peaceful ways. Of the more than 300 international arbitrations during the century, more than half occurred after 1890. I don’t think war was inevitable, even though we can look back and see many reasons why it eventually happened.
Q.
In “Paris 1919,” you wrote about the aftermath of the war, and here you’ve written about the lead-up to it. Do you have plans or a desire to write about the years of the war itself?
A.
I sometimes think about it, but my recent book is very long and took up a good deal of my life for the past few years. So at the moment my ambition is to write something very short.

Progressos economicos e sociais: um livro para os pessimistas - Angus Deaton


A Cockeyed Optimist

Angus Deaton’s ‘Great Escape’




Economic nostalgia can have a strong appeal, especially following more than five years of a financial crisis and its aftermath. In the United States, people talk longingly of the mid-20th century, when the middle class was growing and upward mobility was the norm. In Europe and Japan, many hark back to the 1980s, before the euro was born and the Japanese bubble burst. Even in China and India, two of the world’s more dynamic economies, some like to celebrate a time when life did not revolve around breakneck growth.
Matt Dorfman

THE GREAT ESCAPE

Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality
By Angus Deaton
Illustrated. 360 pp. Princeton University Press. $29.95.
The biggest accomplishment of Angus Deaton’s “Great Escape” is to bring perspective to all this wistfulness. Deaton, a respected professor of economics at Princeton, does not stint on describing the world’s problems, be they income inequality in rich countries, health problems in China and the United States or H.I.V. in Africa. Large sections of the book revolve around such troubles and potential solutions. Yet Deaton’s central message is deeply positive, almost gloriously so. By the most meaningful measures — how long we live, how healthy and happy we are, how much we know — life has never been better. Just as important, it is continuing to improve.
Deaton is surely aware that many readers will view these claims with skepticism, especially coming from someone whose discipline often seems to elevate money over basic human needs. He addresses this skepticism with both sweeping and granular descriptions of how life has improved. Life expectancy has risen a stunning 50 percent since 1900 and is still rising. Despite the resulting population explosion, the average quality of life has surged. The share of people living on less than $1 a day (in inflation-adjusted terms) has dropped to 14 percent, from 42 percent as recently as 1981. Even as inequality has surged within many countries, global inequality has very likely fallen, thanks largely to the rise of Asia. “Things are getting better,” he writes, “and hugely so.”
Much of the most rapid change, of course, occurred long ago or — for Deaton’s readers in the United States and Europe — is happening far away. In the industrialized world, it can be easy to focus on bad news (like slow-growing wages and rising obesity) and dismiss the latest innovations (say, the newest iPhone) as materialist distractions. But this, too, would be a mistake. The pace of progress may have slowed in the West. For selected groups, on selected measures, progress may even have stalled. For most people, however, it has not stopped.
The digital revolution has allowed people to remain in touch with friends and family who once would have grown distant. The democratization of air travel, for all its indignities, has helped, too. The greatest progress against cancer and heart disease has come in the last 20 to 30 years. And although Deaton does not emphasize it, nearly every form of discrimination has become less common. When people talk gauzily of life in postwar America, they presumably are not referring to the lives of women, African-Americans, gays, lesbians, Catholics, Jews, Mormons, Latinos, Asian-Americans or the disabled.
Most of us can find miniature versions of this tale in our families. Deaton’s grandfather returned from World War I to a Scottish mine and rose to become a supervisor. Deaton’s father, despite not graduating from high school, became a civil engineer and lived twice as long as his own father. My own grandfather escaped the Nazis, to New York, but succumbed to cancer as a fairly young man in 1950. Had modern medicine advanced only a few decades more rapidly, my father may well have grown up with a father. In the starkest terms, most of us today have at least one family member or friend who would not be alive absent the innovations of the last several decades.
Perhaps most impressive — and, at the same time, most worrisome — is that progress is by no means inevitable. Humanity has spent most of its history not making progress, with neither life spans nor incomes rising. “For thousands of years,” Deaton writes, “those who were lucky enough to escape death in childhood faced years of grinding poverty.”
“The Great Escape” of Deaton’s title refers to the process that began during the Enlightenment and made progress the norm. Scientists, doctors, businessmen and government officials began to seek truth, rather than obediently accept dogma, and they began to experiment. In Immanuel Kant’s definition of the Enlightenment: “Dare to know! Have the courage to use your own understanding!” The germ theory of disease, public sanitation, the Industrial Revolution and modern democracy soon followed.
Deaton’s writing is unfailingly accessible to the lay reader. At times, he repeats himself (he is definitely not a fan of foreign aid) or delves into technical subjects that will not interest everyone, like the calculation of exchange rates. But readers looking to learn some economics without picking up a textbook may enjoy these tangents. All in all, “The Great Escape” joins “Getting Better” — a 2011 book by Charles Kenny that concentrated on poor countries (and was more positive about foreign aid) — as one of the most succinct guides to conditions in today’s world.
The great, unanswered question is how rapidly the progress will continue. Deaton pronounces himself cautiously optimistic. But he also acknowledges rising threats, global warming being the most obvious of them. Beyond climate change, economic growth has slowed and inequality has risen in most rich countries, leaving the middle class and poor with only modest gains. The skew is so severe in the United States that a vast majority of Americans — the bottom 99 percent, he calculates — have done worse than a vast majority of French in recent decades, despite our reputation for economic dynamism. In China, meanwhile, a growth slowdown may just be beginning, and it could bring true political tumult, including war.
From a historical perspective, the most worrisome development may be the tendency not to heed the central lesson of the Enlightenment and, by extension, of Deaton’s Great Escape: Facts matter, especially when they conflict with dogma and preconceived notions. Pretending otherwise has consequences.
Knowledge — which is to say education — is humanity’s most important engine of improvement. Deaton concludes, based on the data, that rising education is the most powerful cause of the recent longevity boom in most poor countries, even more powerful than high incomes. A typical resident of India is only as rich as a typical Briton in 1860, for example, but has a life expectancy more typical of a European in the mid-20th century. The spread of knowledge, about public health, medicine and diet, explains the difference.
Unfortunately, knowledge and facts are often on the defensive today. Fundamentalists of various stripes keep many countries from completing their own great escape. In the West, science still sometimes yields to dogma, on climate change, on evolution and on economic policy. Elites on both the right and left question the value of education for the masses and oppose attempts to improve schools even as they spend countless hours and dollars pursuing the finest possible education for their own children.
It is true that many of today’s biggest problems, including economic growth, education and climate, defy easy solutions. But the same was true, and much more so, about escaping centuries of poverty and early death. It was hard, and it involved a lot of failure along the way. The story Deaton tells — the most inspiring human story of all — should give all of us reason for optimism, so long as we are willing to listen to its moral.
David Leonhardt, a former economics columnist and Washington bureau chief for The New York Times, is leading a new project for the paper that will focus on politics and policy.

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Livro Marxismo e Socialismo finalmente disponível - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Meu mais recente livro – que não tem nada a ver com o governo atual ou com sua diplomacia esquizofrênica, já vou logo avisando – ficou final...