Da novela Brasil-Bolivia para o entrevero Itamaraty-Senado - David Fleischer

Da newsletter semanal de David Fleischer, 6/06/2014:

Senate versus Itamaraty

           A nasty impasse has developed between the Brazilian Senate and the MRE (Ministry of Foreign Relations) Itamaraty.  As in other presidential systems, all ambassador appointments must be confirmed by the Upper House (Senate).  Usually, in Brazil, it is quite rare that the Senate refuses to confirm these appointments.  But in June 2014, the Senate CRE (Foreign Relations Committee) has indicated that it will not confirm any appointee to the Brazilian Embassy in Bolivia until the MRE honors the committee’s request to supply all the documents related to the August 2013 episode when the number two Brazilian diplomat in La Paz, Eduardo Saboia, decided to drive Bolivian Senator Roger Pinto Molina to Corumbá, MS – to extract him from his exile within the Brazilian Embassy, fearing his declining mental health – after 453 days of “confinement” at the Embassy. 

Pinto had sought refuge in the Brazilian Embassy because of persecution and threats from the Evo Morales government and the MRE (Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota) had ordered “severe” treatment for Pinto within the embassy in an attempt to force him to leave a small cubicle room with no window, no walks outside to get some sun, no internet access, and no visitors.  As a result, Patriota was sacked by Pres. Dilma Rousseff and then “kicked upstairs” to become Brazil’s ambassador to the UN, and the then Brazilian Ambassador at the UN became Foreign Minister.

This case is typical of the actions of the “PT commissar” for Brazil’s foreign relations with Latin America – Professor Marco Aurélio Garcia – who has been the Foreign Affairs advisor to Pres. Lula and Pres. Dilma since 2003.  The “order” was not to offend “comrade” Evo Morales and keep Senator Roger Pinto Molina in “sub-human” confinement in the Brazilian Embassy in La Paz – in contrast to the “special confinement” dispensed to former Honduran President Manuel Zelaya when he sought refuge in the Brazilian Embassy in Tegucigalpa.  This tactic was implemented in an attempt to force Senator Pinto Molina to abandon his refuge at the Embassy

Escandalo Petrobras: resumo da opera - David Fleischer (Brazil Focus)

O resumo da ópera (bem, faltam os detalhes da negociata) Petrobras e seus companheiros administradores.
Nunca antes neste país se roubou tanto, com tanta facilidade.
E a vergonha vai continuar: o governo vai fazer tudo para abafar o caso...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Petrobras “on the rocks”

Brazil Focus – David Fleischer

Weekly Report  –  March 15-21 2014

            Petrobras is going through some “stormy waters”.  First, the late 2013 increase in diesel and gasoline prices has not eliminated Brazil’s largest state from continued FX deficits – the price of imported gasoline and diesel is higher than the pump price in Brazil.  Second, some Petrobras employees have been accused to receiving kickbacks from the Dutch firm SBM that was chosen to supply drilling platforms.  This case is now the object of an external investigating committee from the Chamber of Deputies that has allowed some deputies to “junket” to The Netherlands to meet with Dutch prosecutors who are investigating this case to obtain documents.  Third, this week yet another even worst case is mobilizing deputies to convoke a CPI to investigate the purchase of a refinery in Texas with a huge cost overrun (overpayment).

            2005 – A Belgian firm Astra Oil Trading NV purchased the Pasadena Refining System (PRSI) for US$42.5 million

            2006 (the year of Lula’s reelection) – The Administrative Council of Petrobras (presided over at that time by the Casa Civil Chief Dilma Rousseff authorized the firs to buy 50% of this Texas refinery for US$ 360 million. That meant that the “market price” of this refinery had increased from US$ 42.5 million to US$720 million in one year. 

            2007 – The Petrobras Adm. Council vetoes the acquisition of the remaining 50% of PRSI.

            2007 – Because of a “put option” in the 2006 sales contract, Astra Oil sues Petrobras in US federal court to oblige the Brazilian firm to acquire the remaining 50%.

           

            2008 – Petrobras hires a law firm (linked to some of its ex-executives) to defend it at the US Federal court in Texas – for a fee of US$ 7.9 million.           

            2010 – The US federal judge orders Petrobras America Inc. to pay US$ 639 million to Astra Oil for the additional 50% share of PRSI. 

            2012 – Petrobras finally “settles” this dispute and ends up paying US$ 820.5 million for the remaining 50% of PRSI (including lawyers’ honorariums and other fees).

            The TOTAL outlay by Petrobras for this refinery comes to US$ 1.1805 billion for a refinery that was worth US$ 42.5 million in 2005.  The Belgian owner of Astra Oil, Baron Albert Frére (88), received a giant “windfall” profit from this “deal”.  Frére is one of the richest Belgians with a fortune estimated at US$ 4.9 billion and is 295^th rank among the billionaires listed by Forbes. 

            2013 – The TCU investigates this case and “discovers” suspect, “irregularities” in this transaction.  Petrobras tries to sell (unload) this refinery but the only offer was US$180 million and decides not to sell.

            2014 – The Federal Police and the PGR open investigations on this case that is the object of “heated” debate in Congress.

            Tuesday, 18^th March – Pres.  Dilma issues a note affirming that the Petrobras Adm. Council made its decision in 2006 based on “incomplete & faulty” information contained in a summary presented by the head of Petrobras’ international sector.

            Wednesday, 19^th March – The “technical area” of Petrobras and the then director of the international sector, Nestor Ceveró affirmed that in 2006 the Adm. Council had full copies of the contract including the “put option” when the acquisition was authorized. Detail: On 19^th March, Nestor Ceveró went on vacation and traveled to Europe.  

            Some comments by other Petrobras Adm. Council members who attended that meeting back in 2006: 

            Claudio Haddad – Citibank [technical support] filed a favorable opinion; the council members received a summary statement.

            Jorge Gerdau – Council members were not aware of the clauses cited by Pres. Dilma; they decided based on “consultants’ technical evaluations”.

             

The Opposition (PSDB, DEM, PPS, PSoL, etc.) hypothesis is that the original overprice in 2006 was incorporated as caixa dois campaign finance for Lula’s reelection.

            

Want more? On 20^th March, the Federal Police got a judicial arrest warrant and “search & seize” order and arrested former Petrobras director Paulo Roberto da Costa.  He was Petrobras Director for Refining and Supply between 2004 and 2012 and is accused of “participating (or “perpetrating”) the Pasadena refinery operation.  More recently, he is accused of participation in a money laundering dubbed Operation Lava a Jato by the Federal Police.  The police found the equivalent of R$ 1.2 million in Real, US dollars and Euros in his house.    

            Want even more? Paulo Roberto da Costa organized a firm called REF that constructed some mini-refineries in Sergipe, Alagoas, Ceará and Espírito Santo – with a total investment of R$ 1 billion.  Costa is closely linked to the Sarney Family and Senate President Renan Calheiros (PMDB-AL). 

Popolo mobile: pesquisa de opiniao politica: to the brink, inesperadamente

Brazil Focus – David Fleischer

Special Report-29-06-13 

New Datafolha Poll – Dilma down 27 points

​Datafolha conducted a new poll on 27-28 June - two weeks after the massive street demonstrations began that reached over 100 cities in Brazil, complaining that “we don’t feel represented by the political class” – meaning the three powers of the federal government as well as the state and municipal governments.

​This poll interviewed 4,717 voters in 196 municípios with a two-point margin of error.  The previous poll was conducted on 6-7 June – where the approval rating of Pres. Dilma declined by eight points (65%→57%).  The Folha de São Paulo published this poll on Saturday, 29th June and the results should have a very heavy impact on the strategies of the Dilma government as of 1stJuly.

​In this latest poll, her approval rating fell by yet another 27 points to just 30%, while the “Bad/Terrible” rating jumped up 9%→25%.  This is the most dramatic change ever detected byDatafolha in such a short (three-week) period – since March 1990, when Pres. Collor imposed his economic plan that confiscated Brazilians’ savings (71%→36%)!!!

​In December 2005, after the explosion of the mensalãoscandal, Lula’s approval rating dropped to 30%.  The worst approval rating for Pres. Cardoso was 13% in September 1999.  

​On the other hand, 68% of those interviewed favored the convocation of a national plebiscite.

=======
Comments by Tim Power: 

DataFolha: the way they present the numbers is never easy to digest. It's best to subtract ruim/péssimo from ótimo/bom (and leave out the regulares) to get the net approval (positives minus negatives). It would look like this overall:

in March: net +55 points of popularity

on June 6-7: net +46

and now June 27-28: net +5 (the largest recorded drop since Plano Collor)

Doing the same by region with the newest numbers:

Southeast:  +4

South:  -1

Northeast:  +24

North/Center-West: +4 (always distorted by DF)

Overall:  +5

And then the same with MW income brackets:

less than 2 MW: +12

from 2-5 MW: +3

from 5-10 MW: -6

over 10 MW: -12

Overall: +5

These numbers are very interesting: they are like peeling an onion. When things go wrong and you strip away the "soft" support for a popular president, you see the "hard core" of the loyal base. The hard core for Dilma looks an awful lot like the hard core for Lula.

Lula underwent his only popularity meltdown in 2005 because of the mensalão. Here is his "bad year" from May 2005 to the point at which he recovers previous levels of net popularity in mid-2006 (the scandal broke on June 6, 2005):

LULA NET POPULARITY

May-05    21.00

Jun-05    21.00

Jul-05    20.30

Aug-05    16.05

Sep-05    11.80

Oct-05    7.05

Nov-05    2.30

Dec-05    6.90

Jan-06    11.50

Feb-06    16.10

Mar-06    14.80

Apr-06    13.50

May-06    16.23

Jun-06    18.97

So it took Lula about 5 months of twisting in the wind with the mensalão scandal to get to his lowest point, which was +2. Dilma is more or less there already, and it took her 3 weeks, not 5 months. So the Dilma collapse is much more spectacular than Lula's: it's like the difference between running out of gas versus running into a telephone pole.

A few quick thoughts:

1. In terms of distance from the onset of crisis (June 2005 and June 2013) to the next presidential election, the electoral calendar is identical: each president had/has a time horizon of 15 months before facing reelection.

2. It took Lula about 7 months to recover the popularity he enjoyed before the onset of mensalão: a long time, but still with time to spare before the campaign heated up.

3. BUT: Lula needed 7 months at the very height of the commodity boom. The economy was then growing at around 4% with inflation also around 4%: rising expectations. Dilma will probably have equivalent numbers of 2% and 7% over the next year: not as easy to claw her way back in the current economic scenario.

4. On the positive side for Dilma, the numbers for the poor and for the Northeast show a very similar firewall for both presidents. Lula had an obvious base onto which he could retreat and then rebuild from there; that's what he did in 2006. He got beat up badly in the South but it didn't matter much in the end. The numbers show pretty much a similar scenario for Dilma. She remains in a comfortable position among the poor and very secure indeed (+24 points) in the Northeast.

5. If these trends hold for a while, they might (a) make it difficult for a challenger to emerge from the Northeast (like Eduardo Campos), and (b) encourage a future opposition candidate, predictably, to start building off the "old" middle class and the South/Southeast. That's a losing strategy, as Geraldo Alckmin showed us in 2006.

6. But: you can't beat somebody with nobody. So far the wave of protests has not advantaged any single party or candidate in a meaningful way, and that is good news for Dilma. There is still a path to reelection by default.

7. Never underestimate the capacity of the Brazilian political system to absorb dissent!

Warning: in the current scenario, these comments have a short shelf life. I am only certain about the last one :-)

Tim

=======

Calor do asfalto ‘derrete’ Dilma e reabre 2014

Josias de Souza

29/06/2013 08:28

Digamos que há três semanas Dilma Rousseff tinha fama de gerentona, 57% de popularidade, uma coligação gigantesca, uma reeleição garantida e um padrinho chamado Lula. A situação dela agora é a seguinte: precisa verificar, urgentemente, o que Lula vai fazer quando voltar de sua viagem à África. Ele pode ser a única coisa que lhe resta.

O Datafolha informa que a popularidade de Dilma desabou 27 pontos percentuais em três semanas –de uma altura de 57%, despencou para 30%. E pensar que em março ela colecionava 65%! O último presidente a viver a experiência de um mergulho tão radical foi Fernando Collor. Entre março e junho de 1990, a popularidade dele ruiu 35 pontos –de 71% para 36%.

No caso de Collor, a explicação estava na cara: o confisco da poupança. No caso de Dilma, não há explicações peremptórias. Há no máximo duas probabilidades: o asfalto e a inflação. Se as ruas ensinaram alguma coisa na última quinzena foi que a irritação e a cobrança já não admitem ficar trancadas no Facebook.

Quanto à economia, relatório divulgado nesta semana pelo BC rebaixou a previsão do PIB anual e e elevou a da inflação. E o eleitor, agora tomado de rigores insuspeitados até bem pouco, grita nas esquinas. De acordo com o Datafolha, caiu de 49% para 27% a avaliação positiva da gestão econômica de Dilma.

Assim, a não ser que ocorra o milagre da combinação de um PIBão com uma carestia mixuruca, a vida de Dilma dificilmente voltará a ser como antes. Hoje, se dependesse da vontade da maioria do PT, o candidato do partido à Presidência da República se chamaria Lula.

Antes do tsunami de protestos, a especulação sobre uma eventual derrota de Dilma em 2014 era um desafio à lógica. Era algo equivalente a uma previsão de que o Brasil, jogando no Maracanã, perderia para a seleção do Taiti um jogo em que o juiz seria o Felipão.

O despertar das ruas –na verdade um bocejo de gigante que levou a felicidade do petismo junto com o ar— teve um quê de punição antecipada. Mostrou a Dilma e Lula que a arrogância não é boa conselheira. E informou ao PT que o meio-fio não tem dono.

A elevação da temperatura das ruas produziu em Dilma uma espécie de meltdown –termo incorporado pelo economês na década de 90 para simbolizar a situação de uma economia que desanda e começa a derreter. Mal comparando, pode-se dizer que Dilma está derretendo. O que faz de 2014 uma janela de oportunidades.

- Atualização feita às 17h06 deste sábado (29): medido em intenções de voto, o tombo de Dilma Rousseff mede 21 pontos percentuais, informa o Datafolha. Em três semanas, a ex-favorita despencou de 51% para 30%. Principal beneficiária da erosão, Marina Silva ganhou sete pontos. Foi de 16% para 23%. Aécio Neves beliscou três pontos. De 14%, foi a 17%. Eduardo Campos oscilou um ponto. Tinha 6% e foi a 7%. Se a eleição fosse hoje, haveria um segundo turno, disputado entre Dilma e Marina. Mas a disputa só ocorrerá daqui a um ano e meio. E as ruas informaram que, no Brasil, hoje parece anteontem. Quer dizer: pode acontecer tudo. Ou o contrário.

Em boca fechada nao entra mosquito; e o que mais fica de fora?

Muita coisa, certamente. Cada um imagine como, por que, em que condições, pessoas e instituições escolhem aplicar um auto-zipper...
[Received from David V. Fleischer:]

Violence in Syria Increases While Brazil Takes a Policy of Silence

Stacey Berger

Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs

– Posted on August 24, 2012

On July 20, 2012, Brazil’s Foreign Minister, Antonio Patriota, announced the withdrawal of all Brazilian diplomats from Syria due to the intensified fighting and violence throughout the country. Though, for Brasilia, this was a note-worthy step, it should not be regarded as a clear political move intended to condemn the Bashar al-Assad regime.[1] While the situation in Syria worsens with each passing day, Brazil has yet to apply any sort of pressure on Damascus. Brazil certainly is a rising economic superpower, but the foreign policy dictated by Brasilia disappointingly indicates it has yet to achieve a similar status in the diplomatic arena.

Source: The Economist

When Brazil originally served on the 15-member United Nations Security Council in 2011, it abstained from voting on the first draft resolution condemning Syria, while 9 of 15 members of the council members voted in favor.[2] Brazilian officials have provided various reasons as to why the government abstained from voting, one of which involves the concept of “Responsibility while Protecting.” Brazilian President, Dilma Rousseff, developed this notion to express concerns within the framework of the associated but substantially different “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine. This concept espouses that Brasilia understands its responsibility to protect civilians in armed battle abroad, but must think of its own civilians first and foremost.[3]

Although it is a priority for Brasilia to protect the highest interest of its populace, Brazil sees itself as rising into a role of global leadership, and therefore must face up to conflicts such as the one encountered in the Syrian uprising. And if Brasilia truly wishes to see itself gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council—a desire frequently heard in Brasilia—it will have to take a hard stance on Syria, especially because President Assad has committed a deplorable level of UN human right violations, “from arrests of political activists to torture and killings on a massive scale.”[4]

The ability to strike a severe posture toward the Assad regime should come easily enough for President Rousseff, due to her history as a leading political adversary against Brazil’s military dictatorship. In 1970, the government jailed Rousseff for three years where interrogators tortured her on numerous occasions. Despite her harsh personal experiences, Rousseff still claims to be unashamed of her past as a guerrilla.[5][6] Therefore, Rousseff, due to this evolutionary background, does not seem like the leader that would readily shirk from conflict, particularly when a possible outcome could relate directly to Brazil’s strategic interests. Yet, Rousseff first introduced the “Responsibility while Protecting” concept, and then has adhered to the policy of silence.[7]

Alongside the notion of “Responsibility while Protecting,” some Latin American experts have justified Brazil’s abstention on the Syrian vote by claiming the draft resolution will lead to foreign intervention. Regarding Syria, this type of direct action has been off the negotiating table, as many worry that the vote can be seen as just another instance of imperialist motivation that might generate anti-Western sentiments and conjure up a negative backlash from Russia and China, both important trading partners for Brazil.[8] But the Brazilian concept to preserve westernization in a noble light as well as to maintain strategic alliances pays the price of countless lives lost.

Source: The Washington Post

In August of 2011, the India-Brazil-South Africa dialogue forum (IBSA), composed of the nations with non-permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council in 2011, sent a delegation to speak with the Syrian foreign minister and president. This discussion proved to be unfruitful and Nadim Houry, Deputy Middle East Director of Human Rights Watch, observed, “Their efforts at private dialogue have achieved nothing, and hundreds more Syrians have died in the meantime.”[9] Shortly after the Security Council vetoed the draft resolution, IBSA engaged in a Heads of State and Government Dialogue Forum on October 17, 2011, but failed to even mention Syria.[10]

As of now, Brazil has only reduced trade with Syria; the Brazil-Syria trade volume decreased by $178 million USD from 2010 to 2011. But this figure does not include the indirect trade Brazil has been able to maintain with Syria. The president of the Arab-Brazilian Chamber of Commerce reported, “from experience, some Brazilian companies have sold to Lebanon, and from there, follow the goods to Syria.”[11] The Brazilian government has condemned the violence in Syria, but actions speak louder than words. In that sense, the most bold action Brazil has taken has been voting in favor on the most recent resolution passed by the United Nations General Assembly, A/RES/66/253 B, which demands an end to violence in Syria, a completely unenforceable initiative.[12]

It is clear by now that Brazil has maintained nothing but a passive position toward the Syrian regime, but it still has a chance to prove itself as a rising global leader, obtain a spot on the U.N. Security Council, and help mend the desperately tangled situation in Syria.  In October of this year, the third ASPA summit, composed of the heads of state and government from South America and Arab nations, will be in Lima, a forum where a discussion on the catastrophic Syrian situation is scheduled to take place.[13] Brazil should lead by example by cutting off all diplomatic and trade relations with the Syrian government, and urge other countries to do the same. This would be a great chance to send the Syrian government a strong message about their human rights violations as well as positively influence Brazil’s reputation as a serious rising power.

Please accept this article as a free contribution from COHA, but if re-posting, please afford authorial and institutional attribution.

Exclusive rights can be negotiated.

[1] Jordan, Lucy. “Brazil Removes Diplomats from Syria.” The Rio Times, June 24, 2012. Accessed August 16, 2012 http://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/front-page/brazil-removes-diplomats-from-syria/#

[2] Charbonneau, Louis. “Russia, China veto U.N. resolution condemning Syria.” Reuters, October 4, 2011. Accessed August 16, 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/05/us-syria-un-idUSTRE7937M220111005

[3] Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti. “Responsibility while Protecting: Elements for the Development and Promotion of a Concept.” Paper presented to the U.N Security Council, November 11, 2011.

[4] Mohamed, Saira. “The U.N. Security Council and the Crisis in Syria.” Insights 16.11 (2012) Accessed August 16, 2012. http://www.asil.org/pdfs/insights/insight120326.pdf

[5] O’Shaugnessy, Hugh. “Former Guerrilla Dilma Rousseff Set to be the World’s Most Powerful Woman.” The Independent, September 26, 2010. Accessed August 16, 2012 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/former-guerrilla-dilma-rousseff-set-to-be-the-worlds-most-powerful-woman-2089916.html

[6] Romero, Simon. “Leaders Torture in the ‘70s Stirs Ghosts in Brazil.” The New York Times, August 4, 2012. Accessed August 16, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/05/world/americas/president-rousseffs-decades-old-torture-detailed.html?ref=world

[7] Foley, Conor. “Welcome to Brazil’s Version of ‘Responsibility to Protect.’” The Guardian, April 10, 2012. Accessed August 16, 2012. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2012/apr/10/diplomacy-brazilian-style

[8] Spektor, Matias. “The Arab Spring, Seen From Brazil.” The New Y.ork Times, December 23, 2011. Accessed August 16, 2012. http://latitude.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/23/the-arab-spring-seen-from-brazil/

[9] “IBSA: Push Syria to End Bloodshed.” Human Rights Watch, October 16, 2011. Accessed August 16, 2012 http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/10/16/ibsa-push-syria-end-bloodshed

[10] “Africa: India-Brazil-S.A (IBSA) Dialogue Forum Fifth Summit of Heads of State and Government Tshwane Declaration.” All Africa, October 18, 2011. Accessed August 16, 2012. http://allafrica.com/stories/201110190947.html

[11] “Brazilian Trade with Syria Declines.” Nuqudy, February 2, 2012. Accessed August 16, 2012. http://english.nuqudy.com/Levant/Brazilian_Trade_wit-1065

[12] “Brazil Slowly Moves Towards Condemning Syria Violence.” Ya Libnan, February 10, 2012. Accessed August 16, 2012. http://www.yalibnan.com/2012/02/10/brazil-slowly-moves-towards-condemning-syria-violence/; “General Assembly, In Resolution, Demands All in Syria ‘Immediately and Visibly’ Commit to Ending Violence That Secretary-General Says is Ripping Country Apart.” Resolution Presented to the U.N. General Assembly, NY, New York, August 3, 2012.

[13] “Peru Will Host Leaders’ Summit of Arab and South America Countries in October.” Mecro Press, August 11, 2012. Accessed 16, 2012. http://en.mercopress.com/2012/08/11/peru-will-host-leaders-summit-of-arab-and-south-america-countries-in-october

Brazil and Argentina: a book by Werner Baer and David Fleischer

The Economies of Argentina and Brazil: 

A Comparative Perspective

Werner Baer(ed.) ; David V. Fleischer (ed.)

€ 30.21 (+ VAT)

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Edward Elgar Publishing; December 2011
512 pages; ISBN 9781849809979
Read online, or download in secure PDF format

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This book compares the successes and failures of the development and growth processes of Argentina and Brazil. It provides important insights into the different performances of these economies through a series of comparative essays written by Argentinian and Brazilian economists. In the last 60 years Argentina and Brazil have both undergone a dramatic process of urbanization and industrialization. While there are similarities between the two, each country has dealt with the side effects in a different manner. In this insightful book, Argentinean and Brazilian economists expertly analyze their country's experiences with processes of industrialization, the performance of the agricultural and service sectors, the impact of foreign investments, the distribution of income, the roles of the state and the privatization experience, and inflationary and stabilization experiences. The contrast of the two emerging countries addressing these challenges will offer students, economists and other social scientists significant new insights into the economic development process.Many of the articles will also appeal to individuals in multinational corporations and banks that have to deal with emerging market economies.