O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida;

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Mostrando postagens com marcador Grã-Bretanha. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador Grã-Bretanha. Mostrar todas as postagens

sábado, 19 de agosto de 2017

Produtividade nao e' tudo, mas e' quase tudo: o caso da GB - Robert Colvile (CapX)

O artigo trata unicamente da queda de produtividade, em última instância da fragilidade do capitalismo inglês, na Grã-Bretanha, mas se a economia tem "leis" mais ou menos universais, ele poderia igualmente ser aplicado ao Brasil, e sobretudo ao investimento estrangeiro.
Como diz o artigo, "foreign ownership makes each UK firm 50 per cent more productive. Such firms employ only 15 per cent of the UK workforce, but account for 30 per cent of the country's productivity growth - and 50 per cent of R&D spending, which is a staggering five times higher under foreign ownership."
Certas coisas são tão eloquentes, tão evidentes, que não existem contra-argumentos econômicos.
Não só a Grã-Bretanha -- que estava doente antes de Margaret Thatcher -- está doente novamente.
O Brasil também padece da mesma doença.
Quando é que vamos nos curar?
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Can we cure the British disease?

When Theresa May became Prime Minister, one of her first promises was (as the Daily Mail put it) to protect our “City icons” from “foreign vultures”.
It’s a widely shared complaint. From our rail companies to our energy companies, from London property to Cadbury’s chocolate, we’ve let asset-stripping foreigners make off with the family silver. And with the plunge in the pound due to Brexit, the problem is only going to get worse.
But there’s another way of looking at it - which is that the simplest way to make this country more prosperous would be to gift-wrap those City icons and flog the lot.
That is the implication of a new blog from two Bank of England economists. It points out that, controlling for everything else, foreign ownership makes each UK firm 50 per cent more productive. Such firms employ only 15 per cent of the UK workforce, but account for 30 per cent of the country's productivity growth - and 50 per cent of R&D spending, which is a staggering five times higher under foreign ownership.
Productivity isn’t everything. But as Paul Krugman says, in the long run, it’s almost everything. It is higher productivity that drives improvements in wages, living standards and prosperity. Andrew Haldane, also of the Bank of England, points out that if productivity had remained flat since 1850, we would be only twice as rich as the Victorians. Instead, we are 20 times better off.
And this is the single biggest problem with Britain’s economy. Since the financial crisis, the UK has created jobs at an enviable rate. But the flipside is that productivity has flatlined. Between 1950 and 2008, it grew at an average of 1.7 per cent a year. Since then, it has fallen by 0.36 per cent a year. The latest figures, released this week, only confirm the trend.
These are statistics that should set not alarm bells ringing, but whacking great air raid klaxons. Because the global economy is polarising, as Haldane points out, between the productive and the unproductive – between “frontier” firms and countries, which make full use of the latest technological and managerial innovations, and laggards.
As Britain slips towards the back of the productivity pack, it becomes a place that relies not on the dynamism of its workers, but the fact they are dirt cheap - which is not a comfortable or sustainable position to be in.
So how do we fix this - apart from inviting in those foreign “vultures” to teach us how to be proper capitalists?
One solution suggested by Sir Charlie Mayfield’s official Productivity Review is to make firms aware of the problem. Just as each of us thinks we are an above-average driver, every firm tends to think of itself as well run. Confront executives with the figures, and they will sharpen up their act.
We also need to expose firms to the global market. Companies that export tend to be more productive than those who don’t. That's why some Brexiteers saw a Leave vote as a form of shock therapy - a way to force complacent British firms to shape up.
But this is a policy challenge that stretches beyond company management. We need better education and training. We need greater investment in IT. And above all, we need workers to be in the right places.
One of the most interesting laws of population is that productivity, like many other things, scales up with community size. Huddersfield will never be as productive as London, simply because it is smaller.
So one reason Britain's housing crisis has inflicted such devastating economic harm is that low housebuilding and high house prices have pushed workers away from the most productive parts of the country, trapping them in towns and jobs where they cannot reach their economic potential.
A new Resolution Foundation study confirms that the young are decreasingly likely to move for work - which means the British economy is getting even worse at marrying people to the most productive jobs, and giving them the highest possible salaries.
Britain was once known as the sick man of Europe. Today, we are still sick. And low productivity is our crippling disease.
Robert Colvile
Editor, CapX
 

sexta-feira, 18 de agosto de 2017

O "milagre" de Hong-Kong e o seu autor - livro biografia sobre John Cowperthwaite

Na verdade, não tem nenhum milagre. Apenas Adam Smith aplicado na prática, e constantemente.
Muito tempos antes que o World Economic Forum ou o Insead, ou a Heritage Foundation e o Fraser Institute, começassem a fazer os seus rankings e classificações de liberdade econômica, de competitividade, de bom ambiente para negócios, Milton Friedman já tinha detectado o sucesso que era e estava se tornando Hong Kong, um monte de pedras, algumas ilhas, que não tinham absolutamente nada em cima, a não ser uma boa localização no sul da China, perto do enclave português, bem mais antigo, que era Macau.
Pois bem: depois que a colônia inglesa (que tinha sido atribuída à Grã Bretanha por cem anos, de acordo com os tratados desiguais do século XIX) foi libertada da dominação japonesa ao final da Segunda Guerra -- um dos que ficaram presos ali foi o militar Charles Boxer, futuro historiador do império marítimo português -- sua renda per capita era menos da metade da renda per capita da metrópole. Bem antes da colônia ser devolvida à China, a renda já tinha ultrapassado a da metrópole, e atualmente é mais de 30% superior, e isso a despeito, desde os anos 1950 (pós-revolução comunista no continente), de um afluxo constante de refugiados e emigrados de várias partes da Ásia, buscando simplesmente liberdade para empreender, pessoas miseráveis, chegando sem qualquer pertence, muitas delas dormindo em cortiços na cidade (que ainda existem) ou em sampans no rio ou na sua embocadura. São essas pessoas miseráveis que criaram a riqueza de Hong Kong, como aliás dizia Adam Smith, seguida pelo administrador inglês da colônia, o homem que criou a sua prosperidade, e que é objeto desta biografia resenhada nesta matéria.
O que dizia Adam Smith, além da sua famosa frase sobre a "mão invisível", que muitos equivocadamente elevam à condição de teoria, quando é uma simpes imagem. Adam Smith disse o seguinte:

Little else is requisite to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice; all the rest being brought about by the natural course of things. All governments which thwart this natural course, which force things into another channel, or which endeavor to arrest the progress of society at a particular point, are unnatural, and to support themselves are obliged to be oppressive and tyrannical.

E não venham me dizer que esses princípios só se aplicam em situações especiais, em países pequenos, em cidades-Estado, como Cingapura e Hong-Kong, justamente.
Não: princípios de governo se aplicam em quaisquer circunstâncias, qualquer que seja o tamanho do país, por mais pobre que ele seja. O Brasil podia aprender com isso.
Elementar, não é?

Paulo Roberto de Almeida​
Brasília, 18 de agosto de 2017


The man behind the Hong Kong miracle



I have just finished reading Neil Monnery’s new book, Architect of Prosperity: Sir John Cowperthwaite and the Making of Hong Kong. This fascinating account of the rise of Hong Kong as a global economic powerhouse is well written and, as such, easy to read and understand. I’m happy to recommend it wholeheartedly to CapX’s discerning readership.
I first became interested in the story of Hong Kong in the late 1990s. The emotional handover of the colony from the United Kingdom to China, for example, is deeply impressed on my memory. But also, as part of my doctoral research at the University of St Andrews, I read a number of essays about the rise of Hong Kong written by the Nobel Prize-winning economist Milton Friedman. Friedman, an advocate of the free market and small government, believed that individuals, when left unmolested, will strive to improve their lives and those of their families. Prosperity will follow.
His was similar to Adam Smith’s insight:
“Little else is requisite to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice; all the rest being brought about by the natural course of things. All governments which thwart this natural course, which force things into another channel, or which endeavor to arrest the progress of society at a particular point, are unnatural, and to support themselves are obliged to be oppressive and tyrannical.”
No country in modern history has come as close to Smith’s ideal as Hong Kong. The territory that the British Foreign Secretary Viscount Palmerston described as “a barren island with hardly a house upon it” was once very poor. In the immediate aftermath of World War II and Japanese occupation, its per capita income was about a third of that in the United Kingdom.
By the time British colonial rule ended, Hong Kong was 10 per cent richer than the mother country. Last year, the former colony was 37 per cent richer than the UK. It is, therefore, apposite that the man credited with Hong Kong’s success should be a Scottish civil servant, a University of St Andrews alumnus, and a devotee of Adam Smith: Sir John Cowperthwaite.
As Monnery explains, Cowperthwaite was not the first small government advocate to oversee the colony’s economy and finances. A succession of colonial governors and their financial secretaries ran a shoe string government. But, they did so out of financial necessity, rather than deep ideological commitment to small government.
As Financial Secretaries, Geoffrey Fellows (1945-1951) and Arthur Clarke (1951-1961) established a regime of low taxes and budgetary surpluses, and free flow of good and capital. To those foundations, Cowperthwaite (1961-1971) added not only the vigour of his convictions, but also a handpicked successor, Philip Haddon-Cave (1971-1981). By the time Haddon-Cave departed, the success of Hong Kong’s experiment with small government was undeniable not only to the British, but also to the Chinese. Margaret Thatcher embarked on her journey to dismantle British socialism in 1979, while Deng Xiaoping started undoing the damage caused by Chinese communism in 1978.


And that brings me to the most important reason why Cowperthwaite, rather than Fellows and Clarke, deserve to be credited with the rise of Hong Kong. Basically, he was the right man at the right place in the right time – the 1960s. It was all well and good to run a small government when the colony was still poor. By the 1960s, however, the colony was prospering and demands for higher government spending (as a proportion of GDP) were increasing. As an aside, the government’s nominal spending increased each year in tandem with economic growth. To make matters much worse, socialism, be it in its Soviet form (i.e., central planning) or in its more benign British form (state ownership of the commanding heights of the economy) was ascendant.
In fact, just before departing from Hong Kong, Clarke appears to have had a sudden crisis of confidence in the colony’s economic model, noting:
“We have, I think, come to a turning point in our financial history … There seem to be two courses we can follow. We can carry on as we are doing … Or we can do something to plan our economy … Which course should we adopt?”
Mercifully, Cowperthwaite was able to articulate the reasons for staying the course. In his early budget debates, he noted:
“I now come to the more general and far-reaching suggestion made by Mr Barton and Mr Knowles, that is, the need to plan our economic future and in particular, the desirability of a five-year plan. I would like to say a few words about some of the principles involved in the question of planning the overall economic development of the colony.
“I must, I am afraid, begin by expressing my deep-seated dislike and distrust of anything of this sort in Hong Kong. Official opposition to overall economic planning and planning controls has been characterised in a recent editorial as ‘Papa knows best.’ But it is precisely because Papa does not know best that I believe that Government should not presume to tell any businessman or industrialist what he should or should not do, far less what he may or may not do; and no matter how it may be dressed up that is what planning is.”
And:
“An economy can be planned, I will not say how effectively, when there unused resources and a finite, captive, domestic market, that is, when there is a possibility of control of both production and consumption, of both supply and demand. These are not our circumstances; control of these factors lies outside our borders. For us a multiplicity of individual decisions by businessmen and industrialists will still, I am convinced, produce a better and wiser result than a single decision by a Government or by a board with its inevitably limited knowledge of the myriad factors involved, and its inflexibility.


“Over a wide field of our economy it is still the better course to rely on the nineteenth century’s ‘hidden hand’ than to thrust clumsy bureaucratic fingers into its sensitive mechanism. In particular, we cannot afford to damage its mainspring, freedom of competitive enterprise.”
It is not clear whether Cowperthwaite ever read Friedrich Hayek’s 1945 essay, “The Use of Knowledge in Society”, which posits that allocation “of scarce resources requires knowledge dispersed among many people, with no individual or group of experts capable of acquiring it all”, or whether he came to the same conclusions as the Austrian Nobel Prize-winning economist on his own. But, even if he were consciously or sub-consciously influenced by Hayek, it speaks much of Cowperthwaite “the thinker” that he took Hayek’s insights to heart, unlike so many decision-makers around the world, who succumbed to the Siren calls of socialism.
And so it was with considerable amazement that, towards the end of my first year at St Andrews, I discovered Cowperthwaite and I were neighbours. His house on 25 South Street was a few hundred feet away from Deans Court, the University’s post-graduate student residence. I immediately wrote to him and he responded, asking me to come for tea. I spent a wonderful afternoon in his presence and kept in touch with him during my remaining time at St Andrews.
Last time I saw him, he came to the launch of the libertarian student magazine Catallaxy, which my friend, Alex Singleton, and I wrote together. As he took his leave, I saw him walk down Market Street and got a distinct feeling that it would be for the last time. Shortly after I graduated and moved to Washington. A new life and new job took precedence and St Andrews slowly receded down memory lane.
Neil Monnery’s book made those wonderful memories come alive again. His work has immortalised a man to whom so many owe so much. Architect of Prosperity is an economic and intellectual history. Above all, it is a tribute to a principled, self-effacing, consequential and deeply moral man. Monnery deserves our gratitude for writing it.
Marian Tupy is Editor of HumanProgress.org and a senior policy analyst at the Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity

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segunda-feira, 27 de junho de 2016

Brasil vs Brexit - artigo do ministro das Relacoes Exteriores Jose Serra

Brasil x Brexit. Bola prá Frente
José Serra, ministro de Estado das Relações Exteriores
Folha de S.Paulo, 27/06/2016, p. A-3

O mundo assistiu apreensivo à decisão do povo britânico, em plebiscito, pela saída da União Europeia. O Brasil respeita, mas não comemora a notícia. O projeto da União Europeia é o mais avançado processo de integração econômica e política existente. Construído sobre as cinzas da Segunda Guerra Mundial, a integração econômica que levou à formação da União Europeia trouxe paz e prosperidade à Europa Ocidental por 60 anos e tornou menos traumática a transição dos países da antiga Europa Oriental para o mundo que sucedeu à Guerra Fria.

A saída do Reino Unido abala o relativo consenso pró integração que predominou na Europa há décadas e alenta as forças desagregadoras no continente. Amplia a incerteza e terá efeito negativo sobre o crescimento no Reino Unido, na União Europeia e na economia mundial, em momento no qual os países europeus, ainda fragilizados pela crise iniciada em 2008, buscavam retomar o crescimento.

O Tesouro britânico estima que pode haver queda no PIB de longo prazo de cerca de 6% em seu país. Segundo o FMI, o PIB do Reino Unido poderia crescer a menos, até 2019, entre 1,4%, se mantiver o acesso pleno ao mercado europeu, e 5,6%, se tiver que pagar as tarifas de importação sem descontos. Afinal, o comércio exterior corresponde a 59% do PIB britânico, e 45% de suas exportações vão para a Europa. Parte do setor financeiro, tão crucial à economia de Londres e do Reino Unido, poderia migrar para outras praças europeias e, com menos investimentos entrando no país, as taxas de juros poderão elevar-se, pressionando a desvalorização da libra, pois o déficit em conta corrente é de 5% do PIB.

Sucessivos estudos mostraram que a imigração é benéfica para a economia do Reino Unido, mas o temor aos estrangeiros foi uma das principais motivações dos que votaram pela saída. Os britânicos pensam que o percentual de estrangeiros na população é muitas vezes superior aos dados reais. Ou seja, uma das principais razões que teriam motivado a saída da UE não tem fundamento na realidade.

O fato de que percepções equivocadas tenham influenciado o voto majoritário no plebiscito não diminui sua importância. É preciso perguntar de onde nascem e como combatê-las. Na década de 1940, Karl Mannheim, um dos pais do Estado de bem estar social instalado no Reino Unido no pós-guerra, argumentava que uma das razões que havia levado à derrocada da democracia liberal e aos totalitarismos pré-guerra foi o enfraquecimento dos vínculos de solidariedade social. Hoje, é preciso fazer acompanhar o avanço da integração econômica global de mecanismos de inclusão social e redução das desigualdades, assim como recusar inequivocamente as soluções isolacionistas. Confiamos que a União Europeia e o Reino Unido saberão trilhar esse caminho enquanto ajustam com serenidade seu relacionamento. Afinal, as dificuldades que a Europa enfrenta com migrantes e refugiados não se resolverão com a redução de sua presença no mundo. Requerem, na verdade, atuação cada vez mais solidária com as nações e os povos de origem dos fluxos humanos de nossa era.

O efeito econômico na União Europeia tende a ser comparativamente menor, mas o impacto político é preocupante. Visões excessivamente nacionalistas e xenófobas poderiam ganhar força, levando a um maior fechamento europeu ao resto do mundo. Não é provável que aconteça, mas o mundo sairá perdendo se a Europa apostar mais no isolamento do que na cooperação.

O Brasil não será muito afetado diretamente. É pequena a participação (1,52%) do mercado britânico nas nossas exportações. Mantém-se também a expectativa de que os investimentos britânicos continuem a buscar as oportunidades por aqui. A situação externa da economia brasileira, com reservas elevadas e superávit comercial, reduz os riscos para o Brasil. Sofremos um pouco mais com a instabilidade de curto prazo dos mercados financeiro e cambial e com o impacto negativo de médio prazo para o crescimento no Reino Unido e na União Europeia. De nossa parte, redobraremos os esforços para concluir o acordo de associação Mercosul-UE e nos empenharemos em buscar acordos de comércio e investimentos com o Reino Unido.

quinta-feira, 16 de janeiro de 2014

A nova guerra franco-britanica: socialismo contra economia liberal - Le Monde

La riposte de l'ambassade de France à un article de « french-bashing » fait des remous à Londres

Le Monde.fr, 

La réponse de l'ambassade de France à Londres à un article de presse dénonçant« la tragédie » de « l'échec de l'expérience socialiste » française a suscité des remous dans les rangs conservateurs britanniques.

Le texte, publié le 7 janvier dans le quotidien économique gratuit City AM, s'apparente à une description catastrophiste de la santé économique de la France et à une critique de la politique menée à Paris. L'auteur, Allister Heath, y dénonce notamment « un Etat prédominant, des niveaux d'imposition affreusement élevés (...) et une haine généralisée du commerce, du capitalisme, du succès et de l'effort ».
Interprété comme un nouvel exemple de « french-bashing » (dénigrement de la France), l'article a fait réagir l'ambassade de France, qui a publié trois jours plus tard une réponse, en anglais et en dix points détaillés, pour démentir ou corriger les affirmations de son auteur. Ce qui n'a pas empêché le journaliste de rester « dubitatif » sur ce sujet.
L'ambassade dénonce un contenu « idéologique, mélange de préjugés et d'erreurs », en précisant que la dépense publique en France, dont City AM critique l'inefficacité et le niveau élevé, sert à financer notamment un service public de santé de qualité reconnu. Elle établit une comparaison avec le système britannique, le NHS, jugé « défaillant ».
« LE VIN ET LE FROMAGE », MAIS PAS LE NHS
La critique n'a pas été du goût du ministre de la santé britannique, Jeremy Hunt, qui a riposté mardi dans un article du Daily TelegraphCelui-ci dénonce le « langage très peu diplomatique » de l'ambassadeur français, et défend le NHS, dont les dysfonctionnements font régulièrement les gros titres de la presse, mais qui reste une institution chère aux Britanniques.
« On est peut-être confrontés à une rude concurrence des Français pour le vin et le fromage, mais ce n'est pas sans raisons que le NHS nous rend fiers d'êtreBritanniques, plus que tout autre institution », dit-il. « Le NHS ne devrait pas êtreattaqué pour être ouvert et transparent sur ses difficultés, et surtout pas par un pays qui ne publie pas autant de données sur la sécurité des patients », estime-t-il aussi.
Le même article cite aussi un député conservateur, Dominique Raab, qui voit dans la réaction de l'ambassadeur français la preuve par excellence du « sentiment d'insécurité gaulois », et assène que « ce n'est pas pour rien que Londres est désormais la sixième ville française : c'est parce qu'un nombre grandissant de travailleurs français reconnaissent que l'expérience socialiste à échoué ».
« ÉMEUTES » ET « ETAT DÉMESURÉ »
La riposte diplomatique a aussi piqué au vif le député conservateur Jacob Rees-Mogg, qui a dénoncé mercredi dans le Times une « hyper-sensibilité inappropriée »de l'ambassade. Le Huffington Post britannique a rapporté de son côté de nombreuses réactions outre-Manche, critiquant ici l'ambassadeur et sa réaction « excentrique et indigne », attaquant là le président François Hollande, sous l'angle de ces dernières frasques amoureuses. Ainsi, le conservateur Brooks Newmark, membre du conseil du Trésor, ironise sur un chef de l'Etat qui « semble gérer lesfinances de son pays aussi bien que ses affaires personnelles ».
Du côté des arguments socio-économiques, un autre député conservateur membre du conseil du Trésor, Mark Garnier, juge que les « émeutes, les activités syndicales criminelles, une économie stagnante, des résultats douteux et tout l'agenda socialiste ne dépeignent pas vraiment un pays qui serait à l'aube d'un cycle économique vertueux ». Tandis qu'un conseiller ministériel, David Rutley, estime que Paris ferait mieux de mettre en œuvre en priorité la réforme européenne et la libre entreprise.
Même l'économiste en chef de l'Institut des directeurs, une organisation de chefs d'entreprises, a donné son avis : « Quelles que soient les opinions suffisantes de l'ambassade de France, beaucoup de chefs d'entreprises français se sentent beaucoup plus préoccupés par le poids d'un Etat démesuré, une régulation excessive et les entraves à la compétitivité de la part d'un membre de la zone Euro. »
Le 3 janvier, le magazine américain Newsweek avait publié un article controversé sur La chute de la France, déclenchant une cascade de réactions dans l'Hexagone, en raison notamment de nombreuses erreurs factuelles, pointées dans un article du Monde.fr. Le ministre de l'économie Pierre Moscovici avait critiqué un « pamphlet »qui suscite « une certaine hilarité ». L'hebdomadaire américain avait récidivé quelques jours plus tard avec l'article Comment la nation du coq est devenue la nation de l'autruche, également truffé d'imprécisions :
Lire aussi : Huit raisons de ne pas désespérer de la France

E para terminar:



En 2013, ce sont 4 880 entreprises ayant un chiffre d'affaires de plus de 1 million d'euros qui ont fait défaut, soit 63 % de plus qu'à la fin 2007, avant la crise financière de l'automne 2008.

domingo, 29 de dezembro de 2013

As guerras delongadas do colonialismo na logica da Guerra Fria e da teoria do domino - book review

Bullet Diplomacy

‘Small Wars, Faraway Places,’ by Michael Burleigh

Photographs, from left: Haywood Magee/Picture Post—Getty Images; Rolls Press/Popperfoto—Getty Images
Soldiers of the Scots Guards patrol in Malaya, 1950; American Marines north of Da Nang, 1965.
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In “Small Wars, Faraway Places,” Michael Burleigh recounts the violent end of the British and French empires in Africa and Asia, and their partial replacement by the United States in its often ill-informed and costly efforts to combat Communism during the early stages of the Cold War. Burleigh surveys many of the major international wars and anticolonial insurgencies between 1945 and 1965, but opts to focus most on those involving America, Britain and France, and how they related to the rivalry with the Soviet Union. The result is a well-researched and readable account of two tumultuous decades. Burleigh judges most of these wars, both small and large, to have been futile and destructive. But while he clearly has no interest in defending or rehabilitating such conflicts, he nonetheless offers a fair, thoughtful assessment of the motives and interests behind them. He also takes care to understand and explain the grievances of the insurgents.

SMALL WARS, FARAWAY PLACES

Global Insurrection and the Making of the Modern World, 1945-1965
By Michael Burleigh
Illustrated. 587 pp. Viking. $36.
Burleigh, the author of “The Third Reich: A New History” and several other books, begins with the collapse of Japanese rule at the end of World War II. Japanese conquest had briefly swept away the European colonial powers, which made it impossible for those governments to reimpose their authority over their former colonies for very long once hostilities ended. Burleigh proceeds episodically, jumping from one conflict to the next with each new chapter. Though this has the potential to be disorienting, he keeps the narrative moving along. He capably introduces each new subject without assuming too much prior knowledge, and uses brief biographical sketches of the key political and military actors to illustrate the experiences that informed their decisions. By the end of the book, the United States has begun its escalation in Vietnam, and is assuming much the same role that France had just abandoned.
Some conflicts from this period are inevitably left out or mentioned only in passing. For example, even though they began during the period covered by the book, the anticolonial wars against Portuguese rule in Angola and Mozambique are omitted. This is a deliberate choice on Burleigh’s part, which he explains as “favoring depth of field rather than a wide-angled focus,” and for the most part it succeeds. There is one short chapter on India and Pakistan that doesn’t seem to fit Burleigh’s subject all that well, but it doesn’t detract from the book as a whole, much of which is usefully concerned with the reconstruction of lesser-known conflicts in the postwar Philippines, Algeria and Malaya. All in all, Burleigh has synthesized a wide range of material to create a valuable introduction to the political and military events of the early Cold War.
Introducing a contemporary note, Burleigh makes several criticisms of current efforts to imitate the tactics of previous counterinsurgency campaigns, suggesting that “this may only involve selectively raiding the past to justify the prescriptions of the present.” For every limited and atypical “success” of counterinsurgency in Malaya, there were several extremely costly total failures. As he notes in his chapter on Vietnam, “there were actually few meaningful lessons to be drawn from Malaya, where the Communist insurgents were ethnic Chinese and the majority population Malay.” If there is a lesson to be drawn from these experiences, it is that no single conflict from the past can serve as a reliable model for struggles in the present. The particular circumstances of each country are far more important in determining the outcomes of wars.
Anti-Communist “domino” theories also come in for repeated criticism, since they were based almost entirely on an irrational alarmism rather than informed political analysis. Colonial governments had an incentive to stoke American fears of Communism among the insurgents, and American policy makers were inclined to imagine a monolithic global Communism that never existed. Because of this, the United States backed doomed efforts to shore up empires, and then ignored national differences that could, and later did, split the Communist powers. In a subtle nod to George Kennan’s criticisms of the time, Burleigh emphasizes that a belief in monolithic Communism was one of the main errors of American policy makers during this period.
His recounting of John F. Kennedy’s time in office, when the notion of monolithic Communism dominated strategic thinking, is notable for being quite negative. He is even more unsparing in expressing a low opinion of Anthony Eden and his handling of the Suez crisis of 1956. One of Burleigh’s recurring themes is how often postwar leaders blundered because they made misguided comparisons with appeasement at Munich. In the confrontation over Suez, Burleigh notes, “men with little or no knowledge of modern Egyptian history accommodated every assertive move by Nasser to a misleading Hitlerian template.” As it has done many times since then, a visceral fear of appeasement has led to entirely avoidable disasters. For Burleigh, the key to Britain’s role at Suez was that Eden failed to recognize global political realities had changed, and that Britain was no longer the great power it once had been.
While all of the relevant governments and leaders come in for their share of deserved rebukes throughout the book, Burleigh doesn’t seek to demonize any of the figures he describes. As he explains in the introduction, his is “not a work of advocacy history.” He consistently condemns both official and insurgent atrocities in no uncertain terms. Among the strengths of Burleigh’s account is that he has no interest in, and no patience with, romanticizing or whitewashing either side.
There is one curious remark in Burleigh’s discussion, however, that stands out as uncharacteristically inaccurate. It concerns the 1952 presidential campaign, when Dwight Eisenhower wrested the Republican nomination from Senator Robert Taft. Burleigh writes that Taft “was the last serious anti-interventionist presidential candidate in U.S. history, at least,” he adds, “until George W. Bush, who started out with such views.” This would surely be news to Bush, as well as to Taft’s admirers, since Bush would have rejected what Taft represented even before he became president.
The final chapters of “Small Wars, Faraway Places” inevitably focus on the increasing American involvement in Vietnam under Presidents Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. In light of contemporary debates about Washington’s “credibility” in the Middle East, it is worth remembering that American officials issued the same warnings about Southeast Asia, insisting that a failure to act in Vietnam would undermine American credibility in Europe and elsewhere around the world. Burleigh wholly rejects this argument. It “was a lie. Britain and France opposed escalating the war, and de Gaulle was a firm advocate of Vietnam’s neutralization.” Appealing to credibility is often the last refuge of a policy maker who knows his argument lacks merit.
Burleigh concludes that the United States “profited little and lost much from its misconceived adoption of liberal imperialism.” But his book does a great deal to explain why Washington’s policy makers then — and perhaps now — couldn’t resist blundering into unnecessary small wars in faraway places.
Daniel Larison is a senior editor at The American Conservative.

segunda-feira, 30 de setembro de 2013

Num 30 de Setembro, de 1938, o dia da vergonha: a particao da Tchecoslovaquia

Dia da vergonha, de fato, quando duas grandes potências (Grã-Bretanha e França) entregaram a Tchecoslováquia para um ditador que não estava brincando de paz, mas que ainda podia ser detido. Como disse Churchill, da rendição vergonha: não queriam a guerra, mas terão a guerra e a desonra...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

ON THIS DAY

On This Day: September 30, 1938

The New York Times, September 29, 2013, 2:28 PM
On Sept. 30, 1938, British, French, German and Italian leaders agreed at a meeting in Munich that Nazi Germany would be allowed to annex Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland.

Britain and Germany Make Anti-War Pact; Hitler Gets Less Than His Sudeten Demands; Polish Ultimatum Threatens Action Today



Peace Aid Pledged

Hitler and Chamberlain Voice Their Nations' Will Never to Fight

Demobilization Foreseen

Four Zones Reich Will Occupy Only Half of Sudeten Area--Chief Forts Not Included

RELATED HEADLINESDaladier Cheered by Joyful France: Vast Crowds Hail Premier on Return--Chamber Called to Meet Tuesday
'Peace With Honor,' Says Chamberlain: Prime Minister Wildly Cheered by Relieved Londoners--King Welcomes Him at Palace
5,000 British Soldiers Will Guard Czech Areas
Czech Rulers Bow, But Under Protest: Nation Must Be Preserved, the Premier Tells Country--He Calls Terms Dictated
Germans Begin Czech Occupation; Troops Cross Old Austrian Border: Infantry, Vanguard of 30,000 Men, Enter Krumau Zone an Hour After Midnight-- Commission Arranges Evacuation
OTHER HEADLINESLehman Is Drafted For Fourth Term; He Attacks Dewey: Poletti on Ticket: Yielding to Pleas to Run, Governor Insists on Justice as Aide: Calls Rival Unqualified: Rochester Platform Hits Republican's Crime Issue--Wagner, Mead Are Nominated
Democratic Ticket Nominated for State
'Bosses' Desperate, Dewey Declares: This Accounts for Nomination of Governor Lehman, He Says on Return Here
New Deal A Peril, Says Gen. Moseley; Sharply Rebuked: Retiring Atlanta Commander Declares We Face Danger of 'Decay Within': Sees Dictatorship in End: Secretary Woodring Calls It 'a Flagrantly Disloyal' Statement--Blames 'Pique'
Cotton Senators Wait Hours to See President But He Refers Their Loan Pleas to His Aides
Poles Ready To Act: Prepare to Take Over Teschen Silesia on Terms Reich Got: Hungary Drafts Claims: Will Demand Magyar Areas of Czechoslovakia--Balkan Capitals Hail Peace
Prime Minister Chamberlain and Chancellor Hitler, at a final conference at Munich yesterday, agreed that: "We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo- German naval agreement as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again." Terms imposed on Czechoslovakia were found to be milder than Hitler's Godesberg plan. They provided immediate occupation of about half of the Sudeten area, the rest to be allotted by the International Commission or to be subject to plebiscite.
Poland delivered an ultimatum to Prague demanding the cession of the Teschen district, setting 6 A.M. New York time, as the limit for reply. Hungary prepared to make a two- point demand for cessions.
Czechoslovakia accepted the Munich terms and Premier Syrovy, announcing "We have been abandoned," made a protest to the world. General Krejci told the army to obey orders.
The first of the German troops crossed the Czechoslovak border from Austria an hour after midnight, or 7 P.M. Friday New York time. Large concentrations were made for the further occupation. The International Commission began sessions in Berlin on the evacuation and allocation of territory.
Mr. Chamberlain met a great demonstration when he arrived in London, and a similar one was accorded to Premier Daladier when he reached Paris.

quinta-feira, 22 de novembro de 2012

Falklands-Malvinas: um imbroglio eterno?

Recebo, de um leitor deste blog, as seguintes perguntas:

On Nov 22, 2012, at 02:25 PM, [fulano] <fulano@gmail.com> wrote:

Boa tarde
Dr. Paulo, gostaria de tirar uma dúvida sobre as Malvinas.
Eu acredito que a situação política das Malvinas, está mais para uma posição geográfica estratégica militar em relação a América do Sul do que simplesmente uma situação isolada para benefícios para a Argentina.
No entanto, caso a Argentina obtenha direitos sobre as Malvinas, após análise da ONU, e a Inglaterra não concordar, esgotados todos os direitos legais, poderá a Argentina ter o direito de  expulsar a Inglaterra por uso da força?
Grato

 [Fulano]

Eis o que respondi, muito improvisadamente e de forma rápida:

Ilhas no meio do oceano sempre são interessantes, para países costeiros, ainda que um pouco longe da linha territorial: elas ampliam tanto o conceito e a realidade do mar territorial (12 milhas reconhecidas internacionalmente, 200 milhas requeridas por muitos países), como a da Zona Econômica Exclusiva, também de 200 milhas segnudo a Convenção do Direito do Mar. Estamos falando de recursos econômicos: petróleo e outros nódulos metálicos, além dos recursos pesqueiros.
Quando Grã-Bretanha se apossou do antigo território espanhol das Malvinas, reivindicado pela Argentina então nascente, se tratava apenas de uma etapa de apoio na longa viagem entre o Atlântico norte e o Pacífico, passando pelo canal de Magalhães para alcancar o Oriente, cujo outro acesso seria pelo Indico, antes da abertura dos canais do Panamá e de Suez.
No plano militar tinha pouca importãncia, mas a Royal Navy, como todo grande império, gostava de ter bases em todos os mares. Hoje sua importância é basicamente econômica.

Não sei como a ONU poderia conceder direito sobre as Malvinas à Argentina, pois isso dependeria, basicamente, de um laudo da Corte Internacional de Justiça, caso as duas partes aceitassem tal procedimento e se comprometessem a cumprir um veredito (que imagino não ocorrerá por objeção da GB), ou de uma resolução do CSNU, o que também não ocorrerá, uma vez que a GB também possui direito de veto, mesmo que todos os demais, e os quatro outros permanentes, assim o desejem.
Não haverá, portanto, mas se por acaso houvesse, a Argentina ainda assim não teria como conduzir sozinha uma operação de "desalojo", pois não estaria se defendendo de uma agressão contra si, e não teria nenhuma resolução do CSNU autorizando medidas retorsivas. A única operação desse tipo ocorrida foi a primeira guerra do Golfo, depois que o Iraque invadiu o Kwait.
Ou seja, o tema vai permanecer na agenda, mas não haverá solução política, diplomática ou militar, até que a GB decida, sozinha, unilateralmente, por vontade própria, retirar seus cidadãos das Malvinas e entregar o território à Argentina.
Isso, se ocorrer, deve demorar pelo menos mais 50 anos, até que estejam mortos todos os protagonistas da guerra de 1982.
 Paulo Roberto de Almeida

domingo, 30 de setembro de 2012

Dia da vergonha: 30 de Setembro de 1938

On This Day: September 30



Chamberlain pretendia ter feito uma "paz com honra", como afirmou. Winston Churchill imediatamente retrucou: "Britain and France had to choose between war and dishonour. They chose dishonour. They will have war".
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

On Sept. 30, 1938, British, French, German and Italian leaders agreed at a meeting in Munich that Nazi Germany would be allowed to annex Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland.
The New York Times, September 30, 1938

Britain and Germany Make Anti-War Pact; Hitler Gets Less Than His Sudeten Demands; Polish Ultimatum Threatens Action Today


Peace Aid Pledged
Hitler and Chamberlain Voice Their Nations' Will Never to Fight
Demobilization Foreseen
Four Zones Reich Will Occupy Only Half of Sudeten Area--Chief Forts Not Included
RELATED HEADLINES 
Daladier Cheered by Joyful France: Vast Crowds Hail Premier on Return--Chamber Called to Meet Tuesday
'Peace With Honor,' Says Chamberlain: Prime Minister Wildly Cheered by Relieved Londoners--King Welcomes Him at Palace
5,000 British Soldiers Will Guard Czech Areas
Czech Rulers Bow, But Under Protest: Nation Must Be Preserved, the Premier Tells Country--He Calls Terms Dictated
Germans Begin Czech Occupation; Troops Cross Old Austrian Border: Infantry, Vanguard of 30,000 Men, Enter Krumau Zone an Hour After Midnight-- Commission Arranges Evacuation 


Poles Ready To Act: Prepare to Take Over Teschen Silesia on Terms Reich Got: Hungary Drafts Claims: Will Demand Magyar Areas of Czechoslovakia--Balkan Capitals Hail Peace
Prime Minister Chamberlain and Chancellor Hitler, at a final conference at Munich yesterday, agreed that: "We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo- German naval agreement as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again." Terms imposed on Czechoslovakia were found to be milder than Hitler's Godesberg plan. They provided immediate occupation of about half of the Sudeten area, the rest to be allotted by the International Commission or to be subject to plebiscite.
Poland delivered an ultimatum to Prague demanding the cession of the Teschen district, setting 6 A.M. New York time, as the limit for reply. Hungary prepared to make a two- point demand for cessions.
Czechoslovakia accepted the Munich terms and Premier Syrovy, announcing "We have been abandoned," made a protest to the world. General Krejci told the army to obey orders.
The first of the German troops crossed the Czechoslovak border from Austria an hour after midnight, or 7 P.M. Friday New York time. Large concentrations were made for the further occupation. The International Commission began sessions in Berlin on the evacuation and allocation of territory.
Mr. Chamberlain met a great demonstration when he arrived in London, and a similar one was accorded to Premier Daladier when he reached Paris.