Wikileaks: sobre a adesão da Ucrânia à OTAN - embaixador Burns (2008)

 Telegrama de 2008 expedido pelo então embaixador em Moscou, William Burns. Hoje o diretor da CIA.

https://t.co/wAucIDgGTN

Wikileaks sobre a Ucrânia.

NYET MEANS NYET: RUSSIA'S NATO ENLARGEMENT REDLINES
Date: 2008 February 1, 14:25 (Friday)	Canonical ID: 08MOSCOW265_a
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL	Current Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Handling Restrictions -- Not Assigned --	Character Count: 9713
Executive Order: -- Not Assigned --	Locator: TEXT ONLINE
TAGS: NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization | PREL - Political Affairs--External Political Relations | RS - Russia | UP - Ukraine	Concepts: -- Not Assigned --
Enclosure: -- Not Assigned --	Type: TE - Telegram (cable)
Office Origin: -- N/A or Blank -- Office Action: -- N/A or Blank --	Archive Status: -- Not Assigned --
From: Russia Moscow	Markings: -- Not Assigned --
To: Joint Chiefs of Staff | NATO - European Union Cooperative | National Security Council | Russia Moscow Political Collective | Secretary of Defense | Secretary of State	Linked documents or other documents with the same ID: 08MOSCOW2653_a 08MOSCOW2655_a 08MOSCOW2656_a

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B. MOSCOW 182 Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. (C) Summary. Following a muted first reaction to Ukraine's intent to seek a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the Bucharest summit (ref A), Foreign Minister Lavrov and other senior officials have reiterated strong opposition, stressing that Russia would view further eastward expansion as a potential military threat. NATO enlargement, particularly to Ukraine, remains "an emotional and neuralgic" issue for Russia, but strategic policy considerations also underlie strong opposition to NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia. In Ukraine, these include fears that the issue could potentially split the country in two, leading to violence or even, some claim, civil war, which would force Russia to decide whether to intervene. Additionally, the GOR and experts continue to claim that Ukrainian NATO membership would have a major impact on Russia's defense industry, Russian-Ukrainian family connections, and bilateral relations generally. In Georgia, the GOR fears continued instability and "provocative acts" in the separatist regions. End summary. MFA: NATO Enlargement "Potential Military Threat to Russia" --------------------------------------------- -------------- 2. (U) During his annual review of Russia's foreign policy January 22-23 (ref B), Foreign Minister Lavrov stressed that Russia had to view continued eastward expansion of NATO, particularly to Ukraine and Georgia, as a potential military threat. While Russia might believe statements from the West that NATO was not directed against Russia, when one looked at recent military activities in NATO countries (establishment of U.S. forward operating locations, etc. they had to be evaluated not by stated intentions but by potential. Lavrov stressed that maintaining Russia's "sphere of influence" in the neighborhood was anachronistic, and acknowledged that the U.S. and Europe had "legitimate interests" in the region. But, he argued, while countries were free to make their own decisions about their security and which political-military structures to join, they needed to keep in mind the impact on their neighbors. 3. (U) Lavrov emphasized that Russia was convinced that enlargement was not based on security reasons, but was a legacy of the Cold War. He disputed arguments that NATO was an appropriate mechanism for helping to strengthen democratic governments. He said that Russia understood that NATO was in search of a new mission, but there was a growing tendency for new members to do and say whatever they wanted simply because they were under the NATO umbrella (e.g. attempts of some new member countries to "rewrite history and glorify fascists"). 4. (U) During a press briefing January 22 in response to a question about Ukraine's request for a MAP, the MFA said "a radical new expansion of NATO may bring about a serious political-military shift that will inevitably affect the security interests of Russia." The spokesman went on to stress that Russia was bound with Ukraine by bilateral obligations set forth in the 1997 Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership in which both parties undertook to "refrain from participation in or support of any actions capable of prejudicing the security of the other Side." The spokesman noted that Ukraine's "likely integration into NATO would seriously complicate the many-sided Russian-Ukrainian relations," and that Russia would "have to take appropriate measures." The spokesman added that "one has the impression that the present Ukrainian leadership regards rapprochement with NATO largely as an alternative to good-neighborly ties with the Russian Federation." Russian Opposition Neuralgic and Concrete ----------------------------------------- 5. (C) Ukraine and Georgia's NATO aspirations not only touch a raw nerve in Russia, they engender serious concerns about the consequences for stability in the region. Not only does Russia perceive encirclement, and efforts to undermine Russia's influence in the region, but it also fears unpredictable and uncontrolled consequences which would seriously affect Russian security interests. Experts tell us that Russia is particularly worried that the strong divisions in Ukraine over NATO membership, with much of the ethnic-Russian community against membership, could lead to a major split, involving violence or at worst, civil war. In that eventuality, Russia would have to decide whether to intervene; a decision Russia does not want to have to face. 6. (C) Dmitriy Trenin, Deputy Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, expressed concern that Ukraine was, in the long-term, the most potentially destabilizing factor in U.S.-Russian relations, given the level of emotion and neuralgia triggered by its quest for NATO membership. The letter requesting MAP consideration had come as a "bad surprise" to Russian officials, who calculated that Ukraine's NATO aspirations were safely on the backburner. With its public letter, the issue had been "sharpened." Because membership remained divisive in Ukrainian domestic politics, it created an opening for Russian intervention. Trenin expressed concern that elements within the Russian establishment would be encouraged to meddle, stimulating U.S. overt encouragement of opposing political forces, and leaving the U.S. and Russia in a classic confrontational posture. The irony, Trenin professed, was that Ukraine's membership would defang NATO, but neither the Russian public nor elite opinion was ready for that argument. Ukraine's gradual shift towards the West was one thing, its preemptive status as a de jure U.S. military ally another. Trenin cautioned strongly against letting an internal Ukrainian fight for power, where MAP was merely a lever in domestic politics, further complicate U.S.-Russian relations now. 7. (C) Another issue driving Russian opposition to Ukrainian membership is the significant defense industry cooperation the two countries share, including a number of plants where Russian weapons are made. While efforts are underway to shut down or move most of these plants to Russia, and to move the Black Sea fleet from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk earlier than the 2017 deadline, the GOR has made clear that Ukraine's joining NATO would require Russia to make major (costly) changes to its defense industrial cooperation. 8. (C) Similarly, the GOR and experts note that there would also be a significant impact on Russian-Ukrainian economic and labor relations, including the effect on thousands of Ukrainians living and working in Russia and vice versa, due to the necessity of imposing a new visa regime. This, Aleksandr Konovalov, Director of the Institute for Strategic Assessment, argued, would become a boiling cauldron of anger and resentment among the local population. 9. (C) With respect to Georgia, most experts said that while not as neuralgic to Russia as Ukraine, the GOR viewed the situation there as too unstable to withstand the divisiveness NATO membership could cause. Aleksey Arbatov, Deputy Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, argued that Georgia's NATO aspirations were simply a way to solve its problems in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and warned that Russia would be put in a difficult situation were that to ensue. Russia's Response ----------------- 10. (C) The GOR has made it clear that it would have to "seriously review" its entire relationship with Ukraine and Georgia in the event of NATO inviting them to join. This could include major impacts on energy, economic, and political-military engagement, with possible repercussions throughout the region and into Central and Western Europe. Russia would also likely revisit its own relationship with the Alliance and activities in the NATO-Russia Council, and consider further actions in the arms control arena, including the possibility of complete withdrawal from the CFE and INF Treaties, and more direct threats against U.S. missile defense plans. 11. (C) Isabelle Francois, Director of the NATO Information Office in Moscow (protect), said she believed that Russia had accepted that Ukraine and Georgia would eventually join NATO and was engaged in long-term planning to reconfigure its relations with both countries, and with the Alliance. However, Russia was not yet ready to deal with the consequences of further NATO enlargement to its south. She added that while Russia liked the cooperation with NATO in the NATO-Russia Council, Russia would feel it necessary to insist on recasting the NATO-Russia relationship, if not withdraw completely from the NRC, in the event of Ukraine and Georgia joining NATO. Comment ------- 12. (C) Russia's opposition to NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia is both emotional and based on perceived strategic concerns about the impact on Russia's interests in the region. It is also politically popular to paint the U.S. and NATO as Russia's adversaries and to use NATO's outreach to Ukraine and Georgia as a means of generating support from Russian nationalists. While Russian opposition to the first round of NATO enlargement in the mid-1990's was strong, Russia now feels itself able to respond more forcefully to what it perceives as actions contrary to its national interests. BURNS

Negotiations With Iran. Trump’s Approach Isn’t Working - William J. Burns, Jake Sullivan

IDEAS

We Led Successful Negotiations With Iran. Trump’s Approach Isn’t Working

Coercive diplomacy has worked before, but coercion without diplomacy will not.

William J. Burns

President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Jake Sullivan

 

Senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

The Atlantic, May 16, 2019

A year after abandoning the Iran nuclear agreement, President Donald Trump is doubling down on a risky and an ill-fated “maximum pressure” campaign. He’s tried to brand this strategy as a kind of coercive diplomacy, purportedly aimed at an elusive “better deal.” But so far, his strategy is all coercion and no diplomacy. His aggressive escalation of sanctions, the blustery rhetoric of his senior officials, and his administration’s lack of direct engagement with Tehran betray a fundamentally different goal: the capitulation or implosion of the Iranian regime.

Painful experience has shown that neither of those objectives is realistic. In the meantime, two sets of risks loom large.

The first is the risk of a violent collision, whether intended or unintended. In the past week, we’ve seen the U.S. announce the dispatch of an aircraft carrier and B-52 bombers in response to perceived Iranian threats against American personnel in the region. We’ve also seen reported attacks on shipping and oil infrastructure around the Persian Gulf. With American forces and Iranian proxies in tight quarters across Iraq, Syria, and the Gulf, and no direct communications between Washington and Tehran, either side could misjudge or misinterpret the other’s moves.

Trump’s hawkish advisers and the hard-liners in Tehran could easily become mutual enablers in pushing a crisis up the escalatory ladder. The idea that the conflict is inevitable can produce momentum of its own, as can the sort of hubris that led to a disastrous war in Iraq in 2003. And should Iran abandon the deal altogether, the odds of conflict will grow larger still.

An escalating conflict brings with it an increased risk of significant collateral damage. Fissures between the U.S. and our European allies are widening as a result of our withdrawal from the nuclear deal with Iran, our subsequent pressure campaign, and our erratic saber-rattling. We’re also eroding the long-term utility of economic sanctions with our reckless unilateralism. Even our closest partners have begun to talk publicly about reducing exposure to the American financial system as a hedge against U.S. economic pressure.

We’ve seen coercive diplomacy succeed with Iran—this is not how it works.

We’re the two negotiators who led the secret bilateral talks with the Iranians that paved the way for the interim and comprehensive nuclear deals between Iran and the so-called P5+1, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany. The United States built broad international pressure to bring Tehran to the table—the political leverage of an international community united in its determination to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon; the military leverage of a credible threat of force; and the economic leverage of sanctions that ultimately produced a 50 percent drop in Iran’s oil exports and in the value of its currency.

That pressure was necessary but not sufficient, because pressure is not an end in itself. It was coupled with a realistic aim—a sharply constrained, tightly limited, and closely monitored civilian nuclear program—and a willingness to engage directly with the Iranians, not through empty summitry but over many months of arduous negotiations.

Now, after more than a year of coercion, with no capitulation or implosion in sight, and no shortage of risks on the horizon, it’s time to take diplomacy seriously again. That means going beyond the repetition of terms the other side won’t ever accept. The best way forward for the Trump administration is to signal privately that its maximalist demands are not carved in stone and pursue a more realistic agenda on nuclear issues. That starts with working to extend the nuclear deal’s timelines, and recognizing that further sanctions relief will be necessary to encourage Iranian acceptance; it means talking quietly about securing the release of Americans detained in brutal Iranian prisons; it means probing for possible understandings on Iran’s ballistic-missile programs; and it means encouraging dialogue on the wars in Afghanistan and Yemen, where Iran will be a player in any eventual settlement.

Contacts with the Iranians are not a reward for bad behavior, and we should have no illusions that they will engage productively on all our concerns. But diplomacy is the best way to test intentions and define the realm of the possible, repair the damage our unilateral turn has inflicted on our international partnerships, and invest in more effective coercion if and when it’s needed to focus minds in Tehran.

Coercive diplomacy—when both elements of the approach are carefully synchronized—can deliver. On the other hand, coercion without diplomacy can lead to huge blunders in the Middle East. We’ve seen that before. A lot is at stake over the coming months. Given the impulses and track record of this administration, it’s hard to be optimistic, and easy to see more trouble ahead.

We want to hear what you think about this article. Submit a letter to the editor or write to letters@theatlantic.com.

Ambassador WILLIAM J. BURNS is President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, former Deputy Secretary of State, and author of The Back Channel: A Memoir of American Diplomacy and the Case for its Renewal. 

JAKE SULLIVAN is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He was the national-security adviser for Vice President Joe Biden, the director of policy planning at the U.S. Department of State, and the deputy chief of staff for Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

Diplomacia americana: seu longo declínio, no livro de William Burns - Jeremi Suri

O autor da resenha, Jeremi Suri, refere-se às memórias de Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, para sinalizar que, depois de sua longa e segura ascensão, a diplomacia americana empreendeu um longo declínio, provavelmente concomitante à militarização da presença americana no mundo.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

The Long Rise and Sudden Fall of American Diplomacy

One of Washington's most accomplished diplomats has traced how U.S. foreign policy went astray over decades—and how it can get back on track.

Jeremi Suri

Foreign Policy, April 17, 2019, 3:10 PM

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad shakes hands with U.S. under secretary for political affairs William Burns ahead of their meeting in Damascus on Feb 17, 2010. (Louai Beshara/AFP/Getty Images) 

On the afternoon of Sept. 11, 2001, one of America’s most experienced diplomats, William Burns, sat in the deserted U.S. State Department compound, five blocks from the evacuated White House, contemplating the future of American foreign policy. The department’s computer systems were down, so he reverted to writing longhand. Burns, the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, composed four pages that he later handed to Secretary of State Colin Powell, outlining ideas for the “imaginative and hard-nosed diplomacy” necessary to drain the Middle East of the terrorism that had now reached the United States. Burns’s advice was prescient; its rejection by the White House, Congress, and much of the American public reveals the debilitating “militarization of diplomacy”—the subject of Burns’s compelling memoir, The Back Channel.

“What was unfolding,” Burns writes, “was less a clash of civilizations than a clash within a civilization, a deeply battered Islamic world in the midst of a desperate ideological struggle. There were limits to what we could do directly to shape that debate. What we could do, however, was to help create a sense of geopolitical order that would deprive extremists of the oxygen they needed to fan the flames of chaos, and give moderate forces the sustained support they needed to demonstrate that they could deliver for their people.”

These were the insights of a former ambassador to Jordan who had served in high-ranking positions on the National Security Council (NSC) and in the State Department. In his memoir, Burns explains why his emphasis on diplomacy was so important as the United States embarked on a new global war against terrorism. Washington could never master the deeply complex histories, motivations, and factions within and around the region. The United States would have to rely on local relationships, which would require compromise, negotiation, and some humility. U.S. military power could not replace the necessary deference to regional sensibilities. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak captured this well when he warned Burns, “You must not underestimate how much trouble those Iraqis can be. They spend their whole lives plotting against each other.”

If Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s classic memoir, Present at the Creation, narrates the growth of U.S. diplomacy during the early Cold War, Burns’s memoir captures the apex of U.S. diplomacy and its rapid decline 50 years later. Acheson’s generation of political leaders valued and supported the nation’s diplomats; Burns’s political masters, particularly after 9/11, did not. Burns offers a cogent argument for why that must change, soon.

U.S. leaders had excelled in the diplomacy surrounding the end of the Cold War. President George H.W. Bush and Secretary of State James Baker built enduring relationships with diverse leaders across the Soviet bloc and the Middle East. They negotiated compromises that gave other leaders what they needed in return for endorsement of key U.S. aims: nuclear arms control, reunification of Germany, and the reversal of Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait. Bush and Baker were less successful in negotiating a peace agreement between Israel and its neighbors, but they made progress there, too. Baker was the great U.S. diplomat of the late 20th century, as seen by Burns, who served on the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff and frequently traveled with the secretary: “His skills, weight within the administration, relationships with all the key players in the region, and proven ability to deliver could not be easily replicated. He seemed like the right peacemaker at the right time.”

Bush and Baker’s international achievements left a void as their successors undervalued the diplomacy they had carefully crafted to reach those results. A unipolar post-Cold War hegemon, the United States possessed unmatched military and economic power, and its ideological righteousness seemed unassailable. Who needed difficult, slow diplomatic compromises when U.S. leaders could get what they wanted largely through pressure and force?

The militarization of U.S. diplomacy began, according to Burns’s account, when President Bill Clinton pushed for rapid NATO expansion into the former Soviet bloc, despite prior U.S. commitments to the contrary (as confirmed by Burns in his memoir) and strong Russian objections. Although Clinton offered strong personal support to Russian President Boris Yeltsin, he failed to address the growing sense of insecurity and grievance within Russia. It appeared that the United States was muscling into Russian geopolitical space, brandishing guns and dollars. Washington offered little to assure concerned Russians, other than continued aid to a drunk, pro-American figure in the Kremlin.

The former Soviet bloc states had good reason to seek NATO membership, but the United States needed to do more to accommodate Russian fears. Diplomacy of this kind received little attention among Clinton’s impatient advisors. Burns, then the U.S. minister-counselor for political affairs in Russia, recounts: “Sitting at the embassy in Moscow in the mid-1990s, it seemed to me that NATO expansion was premature at best, and needlessly provocative at worst. … It was wishful thinking, however, to believe that we could open the door to NATO membership without incurring some lasting cost with a Russia coping with its own historic insecurities.”

The destructive cocktail of U.S. wishful thinking, military power, and ideological self-righteousness reached maximum potency with the Iraq War. Burns calls it America’s “original sin” of the post-Cold War order, “born of hubris, as well as failures of imagination and process.” Burns commends President George W. Bush’s personal sincerity, but he describes him as “reckless” in his commitment to overthrow Saddam Hussein militarily and ignore all advice to the contrary. Burns recounts what he and others at State, and within the Western alliance, told the White House: “There was ‘no evidence of an Iraqi role’ in 9/11, ‘no [regional or international] support for military action,’ and ‘no triggering event.’ There was a ‘relatively weak internal opposition [in Iraq],’ and little clarity on what might happen on the day after.”

These observations—repeated and confirmed by virtually all experienced diplomats at the time—were not an argument for doing nothing. Burns fills many pages with elaborations on the options, short of U.S. invasion, that would have addressed terrorism and other threats in the Middle East. These options included tightened international sanctions, increased support for alternative groups and power centers in the region, and, most important, closer cooperation among U.S. allies—most of whom were eager to show their support for the United States after 9/11.

Washington ran roughshod over all of these diplomatic options. The United States isolated itself, antagonized allies and adversaries, and diverted its resources to a lengthy military occupation that further destabilized the region. The winner of the war was Iran, which saw a regional rival defeated and found new influence in Iraq. The United States was a clear loser, as the “war in Iraq sucked the oxygen out of the administration’s foreign policy agenda.” Mired in Iraq, facing opposition around the globe, Washington found its diplomatic leverage diminished in almost every region. Burns recounts how Russian President Vladimir Putin took advantage of this situation by throwing his weight around in Central Asia, the Middle East, and Southeastern Europe. The United States had cornered itself.

Most damaging, the United States never recovered the diplomatic capital lost in Iraq. Burns recounts many skilled U.S. efforts to contain Russia and denuclearize Libya and Iran, but from military intervention to drone warfare Washington consistently “overrelied on American hard power to achieve policy aims and ambitions.” Even critics of the Iraq War presumed the United States had underused or misused military power; they did not address the diplomatic deficit. U.S. leaders failed to educate the public about the importance of forging compromise abroad, and they frequently encouraged more skepticism toward diplomacy. This was most evident during the Barack Obama administration’s negotiations with Iran, when members of Congress worked to undermine sensitive negotiations while they were still in process, calling recklessly for military intervention instead.

Before Donald Trump’s presidency, many Americans had adopted a dangerous “dismissiveness toward diplomacy.” This was a marked change from the last decades of the 20th century and the presidency of George H.W. Bush in particular. Allies, including much of Western Europe, now distanced themselves from Washington, both frustrated and concerned about U.S. callousness. Adversaries, especially Russia and China, swooped in to acquire new partners and isolate the United States. Ironically, post-Cold War U.S. militarization cracked open the liberal international order that U.S. diplomats had carefully and successfully nurtured for more than 50 years.

There are no easy solutions. The skilled U.S. diplomacy of the late Cold War was a historical aberration, reflecting the accumulated experience of the prior half-century and the leadership of a few distinctive personalities. The U.S. electoral system does not favor diplomats or the slow compromises they nurture in foreign policy. And the United States invests far more in military power than other less kinetic elements.

Nonetheless, Burns’s memoir reminds us of the continued importance of diplomacy, and it points to a number of things Americans can do to improve its practice for the national interest. First, it is high time Americans grapple with the failure of the war in Iraq. They need to hold their leaders historically accountable for their disastrous dismissal of diplomacy, rather than hunting for successful military roads not taken. Recognizing that military power cannot succeed without diplomacy, as evidenced in Iraq, is crucial for building the domestic support U.S. diplomats desperately need. They are the keys to winning future conflicts.

Second, the militarization of U.S. diplomacy is centered in the White House. Burns recounts how the NSC grew in size and influence during his 30 years in government. It frequently crowds out the diplomatic voices coming from the State Department, as happened during deliberations surrounding the expansion of NATO and the war in Iraq. The NSC has become a crisis-driven center for foreign policy, which has repeatedly privileged rapid military solutions for deep diplomatic problems. Reducing its influence, and empowering professional diplomats with area-specific experience, will create more space for creative, informed policymaking. Burns makes this point well: “Responsibility needs to be pushed downward in Washington, and ambassadors in the field need to be empowered to make more decisions locally.”

Third, and perhaps most important, Americans need to educate themselves about diplomacy. This is an old problem in a society that is skeptical about cosmopolitan elites and generally ignorant of its own history. In a very competitive world, managing global relationships will be more important than ever for business and policy. Investing in educating citizens about diplomacy—through language instruction, history, political science, and other related subjects—must become a priority. Educational leaders should take up this cause. The U.S. government should also invest in the issue, beginning with the education of its own diplomats. A recent study that I completed with my colleague, Ambassador Robert Hutchings, shows that the U.S. foreign service is behind many of its peers in the quality and quantity of diplomatic education that it offers to its own diplomats. The United States should at least begin to address the diplomatic deficit among its talented representatives.

Burns’s career captures an underutilized asset in U.S. foreign policy. America has the capacity to produce world-class diplomats, and it needs more of them than ever before. The “imaginative and hard-nosed diplomacy” that Burns describes amid the smoldering ruins of 9/11 should guide thinking about U.S. foreign policy as the country emerges from recent setbacks. Without renewed diplomacy, U.S. force will never be enough.

Jeremi Suri holds the Mack Brown Distinguished Chair for Leadership in Global Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin. He is a professor in the University's Department of History and the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs.

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