Crescimento do PIB e PIB per capita no Brasil, de 1964 a 2018 - Ricardo Bergamini

Taxa Média/Ano de Crescimento Econômico Real Relativo

ao Período de 1964 a 2018 em Percentuais do PIB - Fonte de Consulta IBGE.

Períodos	1964/84	1985/89	1990/94	1995/02	2003/10	2011/2018
Média/Ano	6,29	4,38	1,40	2,37	4,09	0,60

1 – Nos 21 anos dos governos militares, o Brasil teve um crescimento econômico real médio de 6,29% ao ano.

2 – Nos 5 anos do governo Sarney, com moratória internacional e hiperinflação, o Brasil teve um crescimento econômico real médio de 4,38% ao ano.

3 – Nos 5 anos dos governos Collor/Itamar, o Brasil teve um crescimento econômico real médio de 1,40% ao ano.

4 – Nos 8 anos do governo FHC, o Brasil teve um crescimento econômico real médio de 2,37% ao ano.

5 – Nos 8 anos do governo Lula, o Brasil teve um crescimento econômico real médio de 4,09% ao ano.

6 – Nos 8 anos dos governos Dilma/Temer (2011/2018) o Brasil teve um crescimento econômico real médio de 0,60% ao ano. 

Arquivos oficiais do governo estão disponíveis aos leitores.

Taxa Média/Ano de Crescimento Econômico Real Per Capita Relativo

Período de 1964 a 2018 em Percentuais do PIB - Fonte de Consulta IBGE.

Períodos	1964/84	1985/89	1990/94	1995/02	2003/10	2011/2018
Média/Ano	3,64	2,44	(0,18)	0,87	2,90	(0,25)

1 – Nos 21 anos dos governos militares, o Brasil teve um crescimento econômico real per capita médio de 3,64% ao ano.

2 – Nos 5 anos do governo Sarney, com moratória internacional e hiperinflação, o Brasil teve um crescimento econômico real per capita médio de 2,44% ao ano.

3 – Nos 5 anos dos governos Collor/Itamar, o Brasil teve um crescimento econômico real per capita médio negativo de (0,18%) ao ano.

4 – Nos 8 anos do governo FHC, o Brasil teve um crescimento econômico real per capita médio de 0,87% ao ano.

5 – Nos 8 anos do governo Lula, o Brasil teve um crescimento econômico real per capita médio de 2,90% ao ano.

6 – Nos 8 anos dos governos Dilma/Temer (2011/2018) o Brasil teve um crescimento econômico real per capita médio negativo de (0,25) % ao ano. 

Arquivos oficiais do governo estão disponíveis aos leitores.

Ricardo Bergamini

Debate na City University of New York : Bolsonaro, for beginners...

Colloquium on Brazilian Democracy Opening Roundtable Brazil under Bolsonaro

Monday, Sept. 16, 2 PM Room 9206 The Graduate Center, CUNY

Robert Kaufman (Ph.D., Harvard University) is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University. He has written widely on authoritarianism and democratic transitions and on the political economy of economic reform. His current research is on the relation between inequality, distributive conflict, and democratization during the “Third Wave.” His most recent book is Dictators and Democrats: Elites, Masses, and Regime Change, co-authored with Stephan Haggard (Princeton University Press, 2016). Other books co-authored with Stephan Haggard include Development, Democracy, and Welfare States: Latin America, East Asia, and Eastern Europe(Princeton University Press, 2008) and The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton University Press, 1995), winner of the 1995 Luebbert Prize for the best book in comparative politics, awarded by the Comparative Politics Section of the American Political Science Association; Kaufman is co-editor (with Joan M. Nelson) of Crucial Needs, Weak Incentives: Social Sector Reform, Globalization and Democratization in Latin America (Cambridge University Press, 2004).

Roberto Simon is the senior director for policy at Americas Society/Council of the Americas and the politics editor for Americas Quarterly. Previously, Simon served as the lead Latin America analyst at FTI Consulting’s Geopolitical Intelligence practice. He also worked for almost 10 years as a journalist at O Estado de S. Paulo, covering political crises, elections, natural disasters, and conflicts throughout Latin America and in the Middle East. He was a public policy fellow at the Wilson Center in Washington, DC and is currently working on a book about Brazil’s involvement in Chile’s 1973 coup. Simon has a master’s in public policy from Harvard Kennedy School of Government, where he was a Jorge Paulo Lemann fellow, and a master’s in international relations from the University of the State of São Paulo (UNESP).

Jorge Antonio Alves (Ph.D., Brown University) is Associate Professor of Political Science at Queens College, CUNY. His research focuses on subnational politics, political party behavior, intergovernmental relations, and the implementation of public health and social policy in Brazil and Latin America more broadly. His work has been published in journals such as Comparative Politics, Latin American Politics and Society, and the Journal of Politics in Latin America.

Paulo Vieira da Cunha is a Partner and Head of Research at Tandem Global Markets’ Emerging Markets Fund. In 2008, he completed a two-year appointment as Deputy Governor at the Central Bank of Brazil, where he was also a member of the Bank’s Policy Committee. Earlier he held senior positions in the government of the State of São Paulo. He was a researcher at IPEA in Rio de Janeiro where he edited Pesquisa e Planejamento Econômico, and at CEBRAP in São Paulo, in addition to holding the post of Associate Professor of Economics at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. In addition to his writings for the market, he has over 50 publications in areas of labour economics, the economics of inflation and macroeconomics in general.

TO REGISTER, send e-mail bildner@gc.cuny.edu

Quando o Japão parecia superar os EUA: anos 1980-90

A Brief History of Doom by Richard Vague.

In the 1980s and early 1990s, many Americans thought Japan was going to surpass the United States to become the world's largest economy, and some even arranged Japanese language lessons for their children to prepare them for a new world order: "In 2016, as I was beginning to think concertedly about this book, my wife, Laura, and I found ourselves in Hawaii. I had with me The Bubble Economy, Christopher Wood's excellent book on Japan's 1990s financial crisis, and was reading it as I looked out over the ocean. I came to a passage about the Japanese luxury hotel craze of that period and realized that a neighboring hotel, the just-opened Four Seasons Resort at Ko Olina, had been part of that building frenzy. Japanese developers had built the building as a high-end luxury hotel and ambitiously created its artificial ocean peninsulas -- but the hotel had been shuttered or used for less than its original high-end purpose for almost twenty-five years. Nothing close to the demand for luxury hotels projected by the Japanese had materialized. The hotel was built because banks were making loans hand over fist and not basing their decisions on realistic projections of use. "Vestiges of Japan's 1980s lending frenzy remain in other places: in old American magazine cover stories, such as the February 2, 1987, issue of Newsweek, which intoned, 'Your next boss may be Japanese'; or with adults who grew up in the 1980s and can still remember bits of Japanese because their ambitious parents enrolled them in Japanese-language courses as children to prepare them for the new economic world order. America seemed in the grips of a Japanese corporate takeover. As the Japanese bought more and more high-profile U.S. properties, outraged old-school columnist Paul Harvey warned that Japan's growing financial presence in the United States was 'an economic Pearl Harbor,'

Click to watch the video

"The hotel in Hawaii, like empty skyscrapers in New York and Chicago in the late 1920s, was a relic of an explosion in private lending that was all but unprecedented in the twentieth century. From 1985 to 1990, Japan's pri­vate debt-business and household loans-catapulted from 143 percent to 182 percent, an increase of ¥343 trillion, or $2.4 trillion. That percentage increase was far higher than in the years leading up to the Great Depression or Great Recession. "Japan's runaway lending was concentrated in commercial real estate, the profligate construction of office buildings, hotels, and apartments and the de­velopment of tracts of land both in Japan and abroad. From 1985 to 1990, commercial real estate (CRE) loans more than doubled from ¥75 trillion to ¥187 trillion. Japan's loans of this era created building after building that would not be sold or filled for years and even decades. But Japan's use of real estate as collateral went far beyond CRE and conventional household mort­gages. It extended to trillions of total yen in household nonmortgage loans and small- and medium-sized business loans.' Even bank loans for finance and leasing companies were largely tied to activity in the real estate industry. "Further, Japanese banks were eager, often naive participants in the financ­ing of U.S. leveraged buyout transactions. Japan's lending frenzy drove up real estate prices by an astonishing 300 percent in that compressed period and created a short-term economic surge that Japan and the rest of the world misconstrued as an economic miracle. Its banks, businesses, and households became overleveraged, and the country was fully overbuilt by 1990, as were other markets, such as California and Hawaii, targets of Japan'shyperactive lending. "By the late 1980s, five of the world's ten largest commercial banks by total assets were Japanese. In the 1990s, Japan's economy reached 18 percent of world GDP, yet by 2007, it was a mere 7.9 percent. Japan followed the well-trodden boom trajectory in the 1980s but then distinguished itself by delay, denial, and delusion in the bust in the 1990s. Japan's struggles with its crisis and efforts at bank recapitalization took as long as fifteen years -- a distinct inflection from the Great Depression. Japan's financial crisis is a parable of when, and how, policy decisions matter in the postboom phases of financial crisis."

A Brief History of Doom Author: Richard Vague Publisher: University of Pennsylvania Press Copyright 2019 University of Pennsylvania Press Pages: 71-72

Otaviano Canuto on US-China trade war and its impact on Latin America

Latin America Is Not Benefiting from the U.S.-China Trade War

Otaviano Canuto

Center for Macroeconomics and Development, September 16, 2019

https://www.cmacrodev.com/latin-america-is-not-benefiting-from-the-u-s-china-trade-war/

Has the U.S. trade war with China been good for Latin America?

An increase in Chinese demand for primary products from the region, as well as recent news of production transfers from China to Mexico, might give the impression that it has.

But any positive short-term effects of the confrontation should also take into account its negative medium- and long-term impacts on the region and on global growth. And the fact is that the overall trade and GDP destruction effects of trade wars tend to outweigh gains from shifts in trade activity.

That’s why Latin America should hope that the exchange of goodwill acts between the U.S. and China in recent weeks will be a harbinger of a more peaceful phase in international trade.

On Sept. 12, Donald Trump announced a postponement from Oct. 1 to Oct. 15 of planned U.S. tariff increases on $250 billion of Chinese goods. Beijing had previously released a list of 16 product types that would be left out of retaliatory tariffs on U.S. imports. A new round of high-level trade negotiations is scheduled to happen early next month, when China is expected to offer increases of purchases of U.S. agricultural products.

In a sign of how fickle the movement of agricultural trade from one country can be, unwinding trade diversion that has been a boon to parts of Latin America will certainly be part of any package offered by China in its negotiations with the U.S.

Some of that movement has indeed been significant. On Sept. 13, Argentina’s agriculture minister said that China had opened the way for value-added soy meal from his country, instead of selling only raw soy beans. Brazil, in part thanks to trade deviation, is poised to overcome the U.S. as the world’s largest soy producer this year.

There have also the trade diversion gains by Mexico through the partial replacement of Chinese manufacturing supplies, as well as recent announcements from multiple companies of plans to shift factories from China, Japan and Korea to Mexico. While China’s share of U.S. imports fell from 21% to 17.7% in the first quarters of 2019 and 2018, respectively, Mexico captured part of China’s sales in products subject to U.S. tariff retaliation and moved up from 13.5% to 14.5%.

Still, the U.S. attitude with respect to trade and its connection to other aspects of its policy agenda – including recent threats to Mexico demanding actions on immigration – should curb the enthusiasm with which this type of movement is received.

One must also consider the overall trade and GDP destruction effects of the trade war. Both the Chinese and U.S. economies are hurting.

In China, where trade between the two countries corresponds to a larger share of the economy than in the U.S., growth deceleration is mainly due to domestic issues of rebalancing and debt. But these have been aggravated by primary impacts of export losses and trade/production transfer abroad.

On the U.S. side, farmers and ranchers have been hit by plummeting sales to China, particularly because China’s retaliatory tariffs have targeted areas where Trump obtained many votes in the 2016 election. Additionally, consumers and domestic producers have suffered the burden of tariffs in the form of higher prices of final goods and inputs. Not by chance, signs of growth deceleration in the U.S. economy have been clearest among tradable sectors.

Both the U.S. and China’s partners have felt the consequences. Asian and European economies – especially industry-intensive Germany – have felt the impact of the global trade slowdown and of disruptions in value chains. In Latin America, the downward effects of China’s deceleration on demand has hit prices of copper in Chile and minerals in Peru. In fact, as recently explained in the World Bank’s Commodity Markets Outlook, the imposition of both commodity-specific and broad-based tariffs tend to negatively affect regions with large resource wealth, such as Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa.

Indirect effects of the trade war, via higher caution in capital spending decisions and through financial markets, can also be expected to hurt the region. Weakening global trade and heightened trade uncertainty have been major factors behind recent downward revisions to global growth by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. A newly released report by economists of the U.S. Federal Reserve suggests trade policy uncertainty as potentially leading to a haircut of 1% in U.S. GDP growth through the beginning of next year.

Financial markets have viewed the twists and shouts on trade policies as an important component of their activity. This is less because of the size of the direct economic effects of tariff increases than because of fears that the confrontation could extend beyond trade in agriculture and manufactured goods. Finally, an ongoing loosening of monetary policies in advanced economies could lead to currency pressures and, ultimately, a run to the safety of U.S. treasury bonds that would lead to capital outflows and currency depreciation in Latin America and elsewhere.

All in all, even from the standpoint of those Latin American economies accruing short-term gains from the trade war between U.S. and China, the negatives will likely outweigh the positives. A dispute between the two largest economies leads one to recall – as Ecuador’s President Lenín Moreno recently has – the old Swahili proverb:

“When elephants fight, the grass gets crushed; when elephants make love, the grass gets crushed!”

Canuto is principal at the Center for Macroeconomics and Development and a non-resident fellow at the Brookings Institute. He is a former vice president and executive director at the World Bank. Contact: ocanuto@cmacrodev.com

Austeridade fiscal: inimiga do crescimento econômico? - Rodrigo Constantino (Gazeta do Povo)

AINDA HÁ QUEM ACREDITE QUE AUSTERIDADE FISCAL SEJA O INIMIGO DO CRESCIMENTO ECONÔMICO?! 

Rodrigo Constantino

Gazeta do Povo, 16 de setembro de 2019

A Folha de SP trouxe neste domingo em destaque um texto de opinião com o título “Por que cortar gastos não é a solução para o Brasil ter crescimento vigoroso?”. Trata-se da velha e surrada “teoria” de que a austeridade fiscal é inimiga do crescimento, que o governo precisa investir e gastar mais para induzir o crescimento econômico por meio do “multiplicador fiscal”.

Seria a descoberta do moto perpétuo de crescimento: o governo gasta e investe o que não tem, sem se preocupar com o déficit, e isso vai gerar mais crescimento ainda na iniciativa privada. O crescimento maior fará a arrecadação subir, e por isso não precisamos nos preocupar com os rombos do orçamento.

Com base numa “tese” dessas, é realmente espantoso ainda existirem países pobres! E “paradoxalmente”, são justamente os que mais acreditam nessas trilhas para o sucesso. Por que será?

O que os autores heterodoxos não explicam é como justamente na fase expansionista irresponsável de Dilma o país mergulhou na maior recessão da história recente. É mais ou menos como os ladrões que acabaram de realizar o maior roubo a banco de todos os tempos tentarem explicar que investir mais em segurança não é a solução, e ainda culparem outros pelo roubo. Haja cara de pau!

Claro que, com tão pouca sustentação teórica ou empírica, os autores tinham que partir para teorias da conspiração: “a insistência em um diagnóstico e uma política equivocada reflete apenas uma fé cega ou estaria a serviço de determinados interesses econômicos e políticos?”. Quem levanta tal suspeita é justamente a turma que adota fé cega em ideologias e tem vários interesses econômicos e políticos na manutenção do modelo atual falido, que leva aos altos juros e ao rentismo. Eles condenam da boca pra fora o excessivo gasto com juros, como se este não tivesse ligação alguma com o elevado déficit fiscal e sua trajetória insustentável, se não houver reformas estruturais de cunho liberal.

Não adianta quantas vezes a experiência comprove a boa teoria econômica, de que aumento de gastos públicos costumam gerar menos, não mais crescimento sustentável a longo prazo. Sempre haverá quem venda a ilusão de que basta o governo gastar para nos tirar do buraco que o excesso de gastos públicos cavou. Ou acabamos de vez com as falácias da Unicamp, ou a Unicamp acaba com o Brasil. Quase conseguiram com a Dilma, mas não desistiram ainda…

Rodrigo Constantino

IHEAL-Sorbonne 3: appel a candidatures - Professeurs invités: 2020-2021

Appel à candidatures pour les Chaires de Professeurs Invités

APPEL À CANDIDATURES POUR LES CHAIRES DE PROFESSEURS INVITÉS DE L'INSTITUT DES HAUTES ETUDES DE L'AMÉRIQUE LATINE (UNIVERSITÉ SORBONNE NOUVELLE - PARIS 3)

ANNEE UNIVERSITAIRE 2020 - 2021

Cette page est disponible en Anglais, Espagnol et Portugais

Appel à candidature pour l'année 2020-2021: SESSION OUVERTE JUSQU’AU 10 NOVEMBRE 2019

Conditions d’accès

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■  Le candidat doit être âgé de moins de 65 ans lors de sa prise de fonction à l’IHEAL, être titulaire d’un doctorat depuis 5 ans au minimum lors de la prise de poste ; être enseignant en poste dans une université ou être chercheur titulaire d'un organisme de recherche étranger au moment de la candidature.

■  Les invitations sont valables pour des séjours longs d’un semestre (4 mois entre septembre et décembre 2020 pour le premier semestre; 3 mois entre janvier et mars 2021 pour le second semestre). Cela permet une véritable insertion des professeurs invités dans les activités d’enseignement et de recherche de l’Université.

■ Il est demandé aux bénéficiaires de la chaire de dispenser deux enseignements par semestre. Pour chacun de ces enseignements, la charge horaire totale est de 24 heures. Les cours correspondent aux thèmes de recherche et de compétences du professeur invité. Toutefois, les enseignements proposés peuvent subir des modifications en fonctions des besoins de l’IHEAL. Les cours des professeurs invités peuvent être dispensés en français, en espagnol ou en anglais.

 ■  L’IHEAL reçoit des candidatures dans les disciplines suivantes : histoire, géographie, anthropologie, sociologie, économie et science politique. Pour l'année universitaire 2020-2021, la commission de recrutement portera une attention particulière - mais non exclusive – aux propositions de cours relevant de la sociologie, des études de genre et des études urbaines, ainsi qu’à celles portant sur l’Amérique centrale, les Caraïbes et le Mexique. Les enseignants seront susceptibles de dispenser des cours dans le nouveau Master LAGLOBE (Latin America and Europe in a Global World) de l’IHEAL, qui bénéficie d’un soutien de l’Union Européenne.   

■ Les enseignants et chercheurs bénéficiant d’une chaire pourront réaliser des activités dans d’autres composantes de l’Université Sorbonne Nouvelle – Paris 3, ainsi que dans d’autres institutions universitaires françaises ou européennes avec lesquelles l’IHEAL entretient des collaborations.

■ A partir de la rentrée de l’année 2019-2020, dans le cadre du projet du Campus Condorcet, l’IHEAL intègre les locaux de la Cité des humanités et des sciences sociales situés au nord de Paris. L’ensemble des cours seront dispensés dans le nouveau campus.

Dossier de candidature

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Les candidatures se feront directement en ligne. Les candidats devront :

1/ Remplir le formulaire en ligne disponible à l’adresse suivante : formulaire de candidature

http://www.iheal.univ-paris3.fr/node/7692/ Envoyer, par e-mail uniquement, les documents suivants (en format Word, PDF ou image scannée) à l’adresse iheal-chaires@sorbonne-nouvelle.fr. Veuillez noter que seuls les documents demandés seront pris en compte. 

■  Une lettre de motivation. La commission de recrutement sera particulièrement attentive aux propositions de coopération scientifique et/ou institutionnelle proposés par les candidats.

■  Un certificat de rattachement en tant qu’employé d’une université ou centre de recherche correspondant à l’année 2019.

■  Un curriculum vitae synthétique (6 pages maximum) comportant l’information personnelle de base ; la formation universitaire (en excluant les séminaires ou les formations de moins d’un an) ; l’expérience professionnelle, les activités d’enseignement et de recherche ; les activités administratives et de valorisation de la recherche le cas échéant ; la participation à des colloques de portée nationale ou internationale ; et la liste des publications, classée par ouvrages, articles dans des revues à comité de lecture, nationales ou internationales, rapports de recherche, actes de colloques et compte-rendu d’ouvrages dans des revues à comité de lecture. Toutes les informations du CV doivent être présentées par ordre chronologique en partant des dates les plus récentes vers les plus anciennes.

■  Deux lettres de recommandation avec cachet de l’institution et signature.

■  Une copie du diplôme de doctorat.

■  Trois propositions de cours en vue d’un séjour d’un semestre, sous forme d’un résumé (abstract) de deux pages maximum par cours comprenant les thèmes et les objectifs visés, ainsi qu’une bibliographie sommaire. Les résumés doivent être proposés dans la langue dans laquelle sera dispensé chaque cours (français, anglais, espagnol).

■  Une copie du passeport en cours de validité.

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Le dossier complet (formulaire + email avec pièces jointes) devra nous parvenir au plus tard le 6 NOVEMBRE 2019 avant minuit (heure française). Un email de confirmation vous sera adressé dans les jours suivant la réception du dossier. Les dossiers incomplets ou parvenus au-delà de ce délai ne pourront être examinés par la commission de recrutement de l’Université. Nous ne recevrons aucun dossier sous forme papier. Seules les pièces transmises par e-mail seront prises en compte. Tous les dossiers feront l'objet d'une double évaluation dont l'une réalisée par un chercheur ou un enseignant-chercheur extérieur à l'IHEAL.

Pour tout renseignement complémentaire, s’adresser à:
Manuel Rodríguez Barriga (Responsable administratif des Chaires)
Courriel : iheal-chaires@sorbonne-nouvelle.fr