Clássicos revisitados: uma série em plena continuidade - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

 Clássicos revisitados: uma série em plena continuidade 

 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida, diplomata, professor.

Nota sobre os clássicos revisitados já feitos e uma em preparação. 

 

        Leitor compulsivo da boa literatura nas ciências sociais e nas humanidades, adquiri o hábito, desde as comemorações dos 150 anos do Manifesto Comunista, em 1998, de proceder a uma releitura dos grandes clássicos nessas áreas, revisitando os argumentos originais, mas adaptando-os ao ambiente contemporâneo. Assim, a primeira produção da minha série de “clássicos revisitados” foi exatamente a obra fundadora do “socialismo científico”, reescrevendo o panfleto do Marx e Engels sob o título de “Manifesto do Partido Comunista (atualizado para o século XXI)”, texto publicado no periódico então dirigido por Murillo de Aragão, Política Comparada, Revista Brasiliense de Políticas Comparadas (ano II, vol. II, nº 1, janeiro-junho 1998, p. 43-78). Nesse primeiro experimento de releituras atualizadas de grandes obras do passado eu retomava integralmente a estrutura e o estilo do texto original, operando uma transcriação-recriação do Manifesto de Marx e Engels, de 1848, adaptando-o às circunstâncias daquele final de século XX, já num ambiente de globalização triunfante. 

        A recepção parece ter sido satisfatória, pois que recebi o convite para republicar o texto, numa versão ampliada, em formato de livro, o que foi feito desde o ano seguinte: Velhos e novos manifestos: o socialismo na era da globalização (São Paulo: Editora Juarez de Oliveira, 1999), incorporando ainda um “Elogio da Exploração”, mais uma releitura de um discurso de Marx sobre as virtudes do livre comércio no caminho ao socialismo e, por último, um ensaio sobre a parábola do marxismo no século XX, compulsando toda a literatura a esse respeito. Esse livro, ao lado de vários outros esgotados ou fora do mercado de editoras comerciais, passou a estar disponível na plataforma acadêmica Academia.edu (link: https://www.academia.edu/41037349/Velhos_e_Novos_Manifestos_o_socialismo_na_era_da_globalizacao_1999_).

        Tomei gosto pela trouvaille de revisitar obras do passado, engajando em seguida numa longa reescritura do clássico de Maquiavel, daí resultando O Moderno Príncipe (Maquiavel revisitado), publicado em duas edições: uma digital (Rio de Janeiro: Freitas Bastos, 2009, 191 p.), outra impressa (Brasília: Senado Federal, 2010, 195 p.; disponível: https://www.academia.edu/5547004/16_O_Moderno_Pr%C3%ADncipe_Maquiavel_revisitado_2010_).

        O divertissement continuou, por meio de uma adaptação de um outro clássico do passado, Tocqueville, mas fazendo-o “trabalhar”, hipoteticamente, para uma nova missão de prospecção, a serviço do Banco Mundial, revisitando nosso desempenho político na atualidade: “De la Démocratie au Brésil: Tocqueville de novo em missão” (Brasília, 10 agosto 2009, 10 p.). O resumo desse trabalho, publicado numa revista tipicamente universitária, pode ser aqui reproduzido: 

        O francês Alexis de Tocqueville vem ao Brasil, a serviço do Banco Mundial, para examinar a situação do país do ponto de vista do funcionamento das instituições democráticas e da economia de mercado. Tendo chegado bem-intencionado, ele constata irregularidades e aspectos disfuncionais em praticamente todas as instituições que visitou e nos mecanismos políticos e econômicos que examinou. Constata a deterioração da democracia e os avanços do estatismo, aliás apreciado e valorizado no Brasil. Parte de volta a Washington frustrado. (Espaço Acadêmico (9, 103, 2009, link: http://periodicos.uem.br/ojs/index.php/EspacoAcademico/article/view/8822/4947; acesso em 13 mar 2025).

 

        Depois de Maquiavel e Tocqueville, dois gigantes da sociologia política, decidi fazer percursos por dois pensadores, um da antiguidade chinesa, outro da modernidade francesa, com conexões para a política brasileira: “Formação de uma estratégia diplomática: relendo Sun Tzu para fins menos belicosos” (Espaço Acadêmico, 10, 118, mar. 2011, 155-161; link: http://www.periodicos.uem.br/ojs/index.php/EspacoAcademico/article/view/12696/6714); “Da diplomacia dos antigos comparada à dos modernos”, a partir do modelo de Benjamin Constant, “De la liberté des anciens comparée à celle des modernes”. Academia.edu (link: http://www.academia.edu/12507205/2822_Da_diplomacia_dos_antigos_comparada_%C3%A0_dos_modernos_2015_; blog Diplomatizzando (link: http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2015/10/da-diplomacia-dos-antigos-comparada-dos.html).

        Ao considerar novos pensadores, como “vítimas” dessas releituras atualizadas (e George Orwell, com o seu Animal Farm, estava certamente na primeira fila, muitos anos atrás), eu já tinha imaginado, retomar as lições básicas de Milton Friedman em seu famoso livro de 1962, e aplicar os seus argumentos ao caso brasileiro, com as devidas adaptações e considerações específicas ao nosso itinerário histórico e econômico. O fato é que, em 2006, imediatamente após sua morte, em 16 de novembro desse ano, imaginei um diálogo possível, em algum lugar do céu ou do limbo, dele com sua alma gêmea Roberto Campos, num artigo intitulado “Milton Friedman meets Bob Fields: o reencontro de dois grandes economistas”; ele foi publicado no dia 26 pelo Instituto Millenium (hoje apenas disponível em meu blog: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2024/01/milton-friedman-meets-bob-fields-o.html). 

        Roberto Campos tinha imensas afinidades eletivas com Milton Friedman, e sobre ele e seu pensamento já escrevi muitos artigos, incluindo dois livros. O primeiro, organizado e em grande parte escrito por mim: O Homem Que Pensou o Brasil: trajetória intelectual de Roberto Campos (Curitiba: Appris, 2017; do qual está disponível uma apresentação em meu blog: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2017/04/o-homem-que-pensou-o-brasil-roberto.html) constituiu uma homenagem no centenário do seu nascimento. O outro coletou todos os textos “constitucionais” de Roberto Campos, sua participação na Constituinte e as análises que ele fez sobre os impactos da Carta de 1988 sobre a economia e a política do Brasil: A Constituição Contra o Brasil: ensaios de Roberto Campos sobre a Constituinte e a Constituição de 1988 (São Paulo: LVM, 2018; apresentação disponível neste link: https://www.academia.edu/37324704/A_Constituicao_Contra_o_Brasil_Ensaios_de_Roberto_Campos_sobre_a_Constituinte_e_a_Constituicao_de_1988). Ambos tinham uma inequívoca convicção de que a condição essencial da liberdade política era a liberdade econômica, e é por essa questão que podemos dar início à nossa releitura da obra clássica de Friedman. 

        Efetuei há dois anos um esquema, unicamente focado na “versão brasileira” dessa obra interessante, conceitualmente ainda válida, mas datada em seus capítulos operacionais. Reproduzo esse esquema, mas precedido pelos títulos dos treze capítulos da obra original, para que se possa pelo menos ter uma ideia de quais questões Friedman tratou, aqui com a indicação sobre os problemas correlatos que caberia tratar no caso do Brasil. Já escrevi metade da obra, mas ainda vou demorar mais algumas semanas, com diversos outros trabalhos no pipeline, para terminar o conjunto dos capítulos, e depois preparar prefácio e apresentação, antes de publicar a obra, que é, como as precedentes da série, uma homenagem ao autor do clássico escolhido. Tenho vários outros na minha “lista de desejos”, mas não pretendo revelar agora as próximas “vítimas” dessas minhas intrusões no passado. Pelo menos, não tenho nada a temer dos autores, pois geralmente são autores do passado (o que é o requerimento para se tornar um clássico, embora alguns já o sejam em carne e osso).

 

(segue o esquema)

 

Capitalismo e Liberdade: uma releitura de Friedman ajustada ao Brasil

 

Capitalism and Freedom (1962)

Capitalismo e democracia no Brasil: releitura de um clássico

Prefácio (com referências aos prefácios das edições de 1982, 2002 e 2020)

 

Introduction

Introdução

1. The relation between economic freedom and political freedom

A difícil conexão entre liberdade política e liberdade econômica no Brasil

 

2. The role of government in a free society

O peso do Estado em uma sociedade parcialmente livre

 

3. The control of money

Moeda e finanças num ambiente altamente volátil

 

4. International financial and trade arrangements

Acordos financeiros e comerciais internacionais: a longa dependência

 

5. Fiscal policy

As contas públicas: raramente em equilíbrio

 

6. The role of government in education

O papel insuficiente do Estado na educação

 

7. Capitalism and discrimination

A persistência do escravismo e do corporativismo 

 

8. Monopoly and the social responsibility of business and labor

Monopólios, carteis e o sindicalismo tutelado pelo Estado

 

9. Occupational licensure

O cartorialismo regulatório ultra exacerbado 

 

10. The distribution of income

A não distribuição de renda: uma tendência persistente ao longo da história

 

11. Social welfare measures

Políticas de bem-estar social: entre o foco e a abrangência

 

12. Alleviation of poverty

Redução da pobreza: uma tarefa nunca completada

 

13. Conclusion

Conclusão: o que nos separa de uma sociedade desenvolvida?

 

 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 4881, 26 março 2025, 4 p.

Book Review, Thomas Larkin on China: na origem da dominação ocidental: guerras do ópio e colônia britânica de Hong Kong, by Richard J. Grace

 Book Review: 

H-Diplo Review Essay 622

Thomas M. Larkin. The China Firm: American Elites and the Making of British Colonial Society. Columbia University Press, 2024. ISBN: 9780231210676 (paperback).

25 March 2025 | PDF: https://hdiplo.org/to/E622 | X: @HDiplo | BlueSky: @h-diplo.bsky.social

Editor: Diane Labrosse 
Commissioning Editor: Kevin Grimm 
Production Editor: Christopher Ball
Pre-Production Copy Editor: Masami Kimura 

Review by Richard J. Grace, Providence College

At the conclusion the First Opium War, in 1842, the Celestial Empire ceded the island of Hong Kong to Great Britain. Prior to the war, British merchants at Canton (Guangzhou) had complained vociferously to their home government that the Chinese authorities had declined diplomatic relations with Britain but imposed regulations that affected the business of foreign merchants. To escape from that uncomfortable situation, British merchants sought an entrepot of their own, separate from Chinese interdictions as in the case of the opium trade. When Commissioner Lin Zexu seized the foreign opium stocks in 1839, the Scottish merchant William Jardine sent a “paper of hints” to Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston, suggesting that the British naval squadron then in Chinese waters seize a suitable island and initiate a negotiation on such terms as: “You take my opium—I take your islands in return—we are therefore Quits, — & thenceforth if you please let us live in friendly Communion and good fellowship.”[1]

When the Treaty of Nanking was agreed to in 1842, Hong Kong was the island that was ceded to Britain; by that time, it was already in British possession, as British naval forces had taken control of the island in 1841. Almost immediately, British firms had begun setting up their operations there and much of the foreign trade of Canton relocated to the new British colony. The Hong merchants, who had been the required conduit of foreign trade at Canton, quickly recognized that “the island-entrepot meant the end of Canton as they knew it.”[2] American firms followed the initial British establishments at Hong Kong, and they became participants in an evolving China trade that took shape differently from the pre-war commerce. The most prominent American firms in the China trade at Canton prior to the Opium War were Russell & Co., Wetmore & Co., Olyphant & Co., and Augustine Heard & Co.

Thomas Larkin’s monograph is the story of Augustine Heard & Co., which was established by Massachusetts people in 1840 and which was declared bankrupt by 1878. The book concentrates much of its attention on four nephews of Augustine Heard, Sr., the founding father of the company. John Heard, Augustine Heard, Jr., Albert Farley Heard, and George Farley Heard were the directors of the Heard business in its heyday.

For most of its life, Augustine Heard & Co. was at home in Hong Kong, though it had offices in some of the treaty ports, most prominently Shanghai. Accordingly, Larkin’s book devotes much of its attention to the way in which the American firm adapted to the circumstances of commerce and society as established by British firms on the island. The book takes in business history, cultural history, personal biographies, and transnational commercial developments. It is a valuable addition to the growing stock of studies of the mercantile history of East Asia during a period when China was in decline. It is written more for scholars than for general readership, in part because of its style of composition, with a vocabulary that employs terms which are more commonly used in other disciplines. In short, the text is sometimes thick, requiring multiple readings for some sentences. However, that does not subvert the value of the author’s research and organization.

The chapters deal with many interesting facets of the firm’s headquarters in Hong Kong, including, for example, the racial dimension of the relationship between these American businessmen and their Chinese personnel who had a great deal to do with the smooth operations of the business and the domicile (under one roof). As the household served commercial affairs and personal accommodation, the operation of the company headquarters had to satisfy a great number of functions, including transactions and entertaining.

One of the most important elements of the book, one which Larkin handles deftly, is the rapport (or lack thereof) between American merchants in China and their English counterparts. The business practices and social practices were established by the British firms there, and the Americans largely conformed and took advantage of the British model. There was some tension or jealousy evident in the way that Americans regarded the more firmly established British firms and the “elite society” that Larkin describes in his presentation of the merchants from different homelands and their ways of life. 

The book gives some attention to women on the scene in China and in Boston, but mostly the four Heard brothers are the primary figures in this history (with the exception of Mary Livingston, wife of Albert Heard). The social code of the China trade opposed marriages between American or British businessmen and Chinese women, but there were many instances where Western traders held long-lasting relationships with “protected women” and, upon leaving China, set up funds to provide for these women and their Eurasian children, as in the case of John Heard’s son, Richard Howard Heard (178-85).

Although the title of the book refers to the Heard “firm,” the text is as much about the lives of the company’s administrators as it is about business operations. Close observation of company management (cargoes, bills of trade, banking transactions, taxes, bankruptcy settlements, consignment sources, pay for employees, etc.) would have been welcome, at the risk of nitty-gritty, but important, detail. 

The man who gave his name to the firm, Augustine Heard, Sr., a sea captain from Ipswich, Massachusetts, does not occupy a prominent role in Larkin’s account of the firm. The founders who were active in China were Joseph Coolidge (formerly of Russell & Co.) and George Dixwell. They assisted British firms in carrying on a clandestine trade during the period of the Opium War. After the Thirteen Factories (where foreign trade was conducted at Canton) were razed to the ground during the British and French assault on the city at the start of the Second Opium War in December 1856, the operations of Heard & Co. were re-established at Hong Kong, which became the headquarters of the firm for the remainder of its existence. The four brothers (John, Augustine Jr., Albert, and George) ran the firm by turns, but not with even management strategies. Accordingly, Augustine Heard & Co. was not a model of business stability. Larkin’s primary documentary collection is the Heard Family Business Records at the Baker Library, Harvard Business School.

One theme that runs through the book examines the relationship between American merchants in China and the British firms which were on home ground in the new colony. The business practices and social practices were established by British firms there, and the Americans largely conformed and took advantage of the British dominance. To some degree, the neutral status of American trade during the Opium War allowed British firms to keep their businesses alive by trans-shipping their cargoes into China on American ships. But there was a quiet tension between the two national groups after the war that was intensified by the sympathies of some British citizens (in China and in England) for the Confederate side in the American Civil War. Larkin handles this tension smoothly, acknowledging it, but not exaggerating it. Sometimes the fusion of local Chinese ways and British practices, as in the emergence of the “tiffin” as a substitute for the English afternoon tea, reduced such tensions between the English and the Americans. Moreover, the author describes a “sense of white cohesion” by which “the Americans and British found unity by identifying that which they both were not: Chinese” (75).

Larkin’s chapters have varying weight. For example, chapter 2, which deals with the properties that served as domicile and business headquarters, offers a great deal of insight into the somewhat confusing social circumstances of the American merchants. Chapter 3, which describes the roles of women in the colony, and the situations in which American and British merchants and families got together in social rounds, at clubs, and at the horse races, explains the odd functioning of social occasions and practices. Larkin’s work is very good in this field of social history. In contrast, the chapter which describes the Heard brothers’ fortunes after China is somewhat less effective because of the awkwardness of the text bouncing from one brother to another repeatedly.

Jacques Downs’s The Golden Ghetto is a good starting point for readers interested in American commerce in China in the first half of the nineteenth century.[3] The field of the old China trade and the post-1842 burgeoning of Western firms is a hot market these days, and those scholars who are interested in this province of East Asian History would do well to keep attention on the work of Paul van Dyke, John Carroll, Alain LePichon, Elizabeth Sinn, Phyllis Forbes Kerr, and Stacilee Ford.[4]

In his introduction, Larkin states that he has used this case study of Augustine Heard & Co. “to establish a more complete understanding of how Americans abroad interacted with nineteenth-century British colonialism and shaped Sino-foreign contact” (9). In that endeavor, he has been successful.

 

Richard J. Grace is an emeritus Professor of History at Providence College in Rhode Island. He holds a PhD in History from Fordham University and has twice been a visiting fellow at St. Edmund’s College, University of Cambridge. His fields of special interest are British and American history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. His study of nineteenth-century China traders, Opium and Empire: The Lives and Careers of William Jardine and James Matheson, was published in 2014 by McGill-Queens University Press. He is currently completing an analysis of the various types of costs of World War II for Great Britain. He is the author of articles and reviews in numerous academic journals.

 

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[1] Memorandum from William Jardine to Lord Palmerston, 5 December 1839, Palmerston Papers, University of Southampton, MS 62 PP/ MM/ CH /5.

[2] Jacques Downs, The Golden Ghetto: The American Commercial Community at Canton and the Shaping of American China Policy, 1784–1844 (Lehigh University Press, 1997), 325.

[3] Downs, The Golden Ghetto.

[4] Regarding Chinese migration via Hong Kong, see Elizabeth Sinn, “In-between Place: A New Paradigm for Hong Kong Studies,” in Elizabeth Sinn, Siulun Wong, and Wing-hoi Chan, eds.,Rethinking Hong Kong: New Paradigms, New Perspectives (University of Hong Kong Centre of Asian Studies, 2009). Regarding the field, see Paul Van Dyke, Americans and Macao: Trade, Smuggling, and Diplomacy on the South China Coast (Hong Kong University Press, 2012); John Carroll, Canton Days: British Life and Death in China (Rowman & Littlefield, 2020); Alain Le Pichon, Aux origins de Hong Kong: Aspects de la civilisation commerciale a Canton – Le fonds de commerce de Jardine, Matheson & Co., 1827–1839 (L’Harmattan, 1998); Elizabeth Sinn and Christopher Muss, eds., Meeting Place: Encounters across Cultures in Hong Kong, 1841–1984 (Hong Kong University Press, 2017).

Consolidating Europe’s Eastern Frontiers: the Options for Ukraine and the Continent - Andriy Zagorodnyuk, Alina Frolova and Oleksandr Khara (RUSI)

Um relatório sobre a segurança das fronteiras europeias e que também tem a ver com a paz e a segurança internacional, num momento em que o suposto líder do Ocidente abandona seus aliados europeus e da OTAN e se torna grande amigo do maior autocrata mundial e promotor de violações em série do Direito Internacional.
A questão não interessa apenas à Europa centra e oriental, e sim ao mundo inteiro, assim como ao futuro do multilateralismo, atualmente em perigo de desaparecer.

Consolidating Europe’s Eastern Frontiers: the Options for Ukraine and the Continent

Andriy Zagorodnyuk, Alina Frolova and Oleksandr Khara

RUSI, 24 March 2025

(Royal United Services Institute)

https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/consolidating-europes-eastern-frontiers-options-ukraine-and-continent

Come a ceasefire in Ukraine, the border to Europe’s East will remain a line of tension with no end in sight, necessitating new concepts for collective defence.

Almost two months into President Trump’s tenure in the White House, his promised and highly publicised quick resolution of Russia’s war in Ukraine remains as unclear and confusing as ever. Following a controversial Oval Office meeting with President Zelensky, Ukraine took steps to mend relations with the US administration, first proposing a staged ceasefire, later accepting a US proposal for a 30-day ceasefire and most recently a ceasefire on energy infrastructure.

Moscow’s position – that it seeks a comprehensive agreement rather than interim measures – is a familiar tactic. Russia wants to signal that it is in no hurry, while continuing to use violence as leverage against Ukraine and, more importantly, against a US administration eager for a quick resolution. It remains highly uncertain whether any ceasefire will actually take hold and be upheld – and, crucially, whether the US will press for more concessions from Russia or from Ukraine.

For Ukraine, the prospect of a sustainable end to the war is undoubtedly a commendable goal. There is no doubt that the country is suffering gravely from the violence, and peace remains its greatest aspiration. However, the credibility and reliability of any peace arrangements are absolutely critical to ensure – peace will only be as robust as the means by which it is protected.

Russia’s Approach to Negotiations

Amidst the uncertainty and contradictions surrounding the US-led peace efforts, as well as Washington’s shift to deprioritise European security, Russia’s fundamental objectives remain unchanged. Intelligence specialists and analysts widely agree that Russia continues to pursue its original strategy of undermining Ukraine and Europe’s security architecture. Every action Moscow takes is ultimately geared towards achieving these enduring goals.

Feeling relatively secure in its current position and ready to exploit the US administration’s stated commitment to ending the war through diplomacy, Russia has two options. Either continue hostilities or attempt to gain an advantage through diplomatic manoeuvres. Any diplomatic breakthrough that Russia achieves will, however, be incorporated into its broader grand strategy. There is a high probability that the Kremlin will then use any cessation or reduction of hostilities to prepare for the next phase of its military campaign. If the US manages to broker a comprehensive ceasefire, Russia will likely treat it as an operational or strategic pause, a window of opportunity to strengthen its position before launching a decisive strike.

If Moscow manages to negotiate the lifting of sanctions in exchange for a ceasefire, its militarised economy will quickly regain strength, and in a very short time Russia could once again emerge as a formidable military force

Should this plan succeed, a renewed Russian offensive could deal a devastating blow both to Ukraine and to Europe’s security. Moscow views the current situation as a historic opportunity, where a convergence of favourable conditions creates the perfect storm. The US administration no longer considers the Russian regime an outright adversary and has repeatedly failed to condemn its numerous war crimes and genocidal policies. It refuses to identify Russia as the aggressor and openly discusses "enormous economic opportunities" and the prospect of normalisation – something that, until now, would have been unthinkable.

The United States Risks Facilitating Further Russian Aggression

As the cornerstone of NATO and European security, the United States’ ambiguous position creates deep uncertainty about its response should Russian aggression expand into other European countries. If Moscow manages to negotiate the lifting of sanctions in exchange for a ceasefire, its militarised economy will quickly regain strength, and in a very short time Russia could once again emerge as a formidable military force.

Today, Russia is exhausted and severely weakened by its military failures in Ukraine. It lacks the ability to amass the necessary mass of equipment, and it is visibly running out of personnel. Equally significant is the fact that its warfighting methods are no longer effective – even the brutal human-wave assaults that proved successful in 2023 and 2024 are now failing to deliver decisive results.

A ceasefire would provide Russia with the time it needs to reassess its approach and rebuild a military force based on new operational concepts. The Russian war economy is too deeply entrenched to be quickly dismantled or converted back to a civilian model, but it is unlikely that de-escalation is even a strategic objective. Instead, Moscow is likely to be motivated by a drive to compensate for past underperformance coupled with a sense of strategic opportunity created by US policy shifts. A ceasefire is, therefore, likely to lead to a dramatic new phase of Russian militarisation.

Historical precedents support this possibility. Iraq’s military re-emerged in 1991 after enduring the hardships of the Iran-Iraq War, while revanchist ambitions fuelled Nazi Germany’s military expansion following early setbacks. Russia may well follow a similar trajectory, using the lessons of this war to rebuild an even stronger force and emerge from its war of attrition in Ukraine with a revamped military – its own version of a new ‘Grande Armée’.

The mere presence of such a revitalised Russian force along Europe’s borders would constitute an existential threat to its neighbours, granting Moscow immense leverage over the region. Beyond direct military pressure, Russia would certainly employ a full spectrum of hybrid warfare tactics, including political coercion, cyber operations, and economic manipulation. It could also destabilise multiple regions, including the Arctic, the Baltic, Balkans, Poland, the Black Sea, and the Mediterranean. Ukraine, of course, would remain at the highest risk, with a renewed Russian offensive highly probable.

If the Black Sea Straits are reopened, it would enable Moscow to rebuild its Black Sea Fleet, once again posing a threat to freedom of navigation, endangering Ukrainian ports, and extending the threat to Moldova from the maritime domain.

The Imperative of Building European Deterrence

The only way to prevent this scenario is to recognise the severity of the threat and build a force capable of making Russian aggression futile. Given Russia’s demonstrated willingness to absorb significant losses, deterrence by punishment is unlikely to be effective. Instead, only deterrence by denial – ensuring that any future attack would be impossible or overwhelmingly costly – can secure lasting peace in the region.

This deterrence strategy must no longer be viewed as simply assisting Ukraine in isolation from NATO Europe. Russia has long been recognised as a pan-European threat – while Ukraine remains Putin’s primary focus, it is not his only target. Therefore, deterrence must be pan-European, treating Ukraine’s security as an integral part of the broader European defence architecture. While the Europeans are trying to persuade US administration to provide them with a backstop, the probability, extent and reliability of such support are unclear.

The most effective way for coalition governments and militaries to engage fully is to launch a dedicated operation aimed at countering the risk of a renewed Russian attack

As the existing structures of NATO and the EU cannot serve as the foundation for this effort, the only viable solution is the formation of a coalition of the willing, committed to ensuring that Russia is permanently denied the ability to wage expansionist war. Security arrangements must incorporate all fundamental elements of effective deterrence: they must be credible, rooted in capabilities proportionate to the threat, and clearly communicated to both Russia and the wider international community.

Moreover, they must be built on concepts of future warfare rather than outdated strategies. Legacy methods will prove ineffective against a Russian force that has adapted its doctrine based on lessons learned and technological advancements.

One of the key lessons from three years of war is that the most effective way for coalition governments and militaries to engage fully is to launch a dedicated operation aimed at countering the risk of a renewed Russian attack. Such an operation should be coordinated through a joint headquarters, with each participating state undertaking the necessary organisational steps within their respective ministries of defence to ensure its implementation. Those familiar with military structures understand that only an active, ongoing operation enables proper resource allocation, rapid decision-making, and the deployment of dedicated personnel. Military actions must be governed by structured operational planning, integrated command structures, and strict operational timelines.

For the purposes of this article, such an operation will be referred to as the Eastern Frontier Operation.

Integrating Ukraine’s Defence into European Deterrence

The coalition participants must recognise that Russia will be vocally opposed to this initiative from the outset. Moscow has a well-established pattern of justifying its aggression through victim-blaming narratives, claiming that the ‘true causes’ of the war lie elsewhere. Every instance of international military cooperation with Ukraine has been framed by Russia as a provocation or justification for its own aggression.

Policymakers must be fully aware of these tactics, resist falling into Russia’s narrative traps, and remain firm in establishing robust security arrangements. Any form of self-deterrence in setting up these measures would weaken the region and increase the risk of renewed hostilities.

As of now, we can identify seven potential formats in which Western forces could participate in the operation

The Ukrainian component of the Eastern Frontier Operation must be designed to enable Ukraine to withstand and successfully repel a potential future full-scale Russian attack. This comprehensive defensive capability should integrate the Ukrainian defence forces, the country’s full mobilisation potential, and dedicated resources provided by allied nations.

The operational framework must be structured as a multi-domain effort, encompassing the generation, sustainment, and deployment of capabilities across land, air, maritime, cyber, and information domains. Implementing this strategy will be an extremely complex undertaking, requiring meticulous planning and substantial contributions from coalition participants. As of now, we can identify seven potential formats in which Western forces could participate in the operation.

The most committed form of participation would be the direct deployment of troops in Ukraine, with active engagement in the event of renewed Russian aggression. This scenario, often referred to as ‘boots on the ground’, has been widely debated. The presence of land forces may, however, be less effective compared to other strategic options. A more impactful approach could be ‘airmen boots’ – the deployment of aerial and air defence units to protect Ukrainian airspace from Russian strikes.

One of the most compelling alternative proposals is a ‘Sky Shield over Ukraine’, a concept involving the air policing of Ukrainian airspace, particularly over its western and central regions, to defend against Russian missile and air strikes. This initiative could establish a large safe zone, enabling social stability and economic recovery, while allowing the Ukrainian Air Force to concentrate its resources on defending the eastern front.

Past phases of the Russo-Ukrainian war have been marked by repeated ceasefire violations and mutual accusations, which the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission failed to address effectively due to its limited access and inadequate equipment

A third option for Western assistance could be monitoring the ceasefire. A dedicated monitoring mission, equipped with advanced technology and surveillance tools, would be essential to maintaining constant situational awareness. Past phases of the Russo-Ukrainian war have been marked by repeated ceasefire violations and mutual accusations, which the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission failed to address effectively due to its limited access and inadequate equipment.

A fourth option involves remote capability support, including the provision of real-time intelligence, training, technical advice, and maintenance. This could also extend to remote operations, such as defensive cyber operations and information warfare, which would strengthen Ukraine’s ability to counter Russian aggression without requiring a direct Western presence.

A fifth option is the creation of strategic reserves for Ukraine in the form of pre-positioned military assets and capabilities. These resources would be immediately available, stored in secure locations in Eastern Europe, and operated by the coalition headquarters. Such facilities could function as a network of depots, housing weapons, ammunition, and essential military equipment near Ukraine’s borders. In the event of renewed hostilities, these reserves would enable the rapid mobilisation and rearmament of Ukrainian forces, allowing them to counter a large-scale Russian offensive effectively. These warehouses would store additional armaments, spare parts, ammunition, expendables, communication systems, and other critical supplies.

Another crucial form of support would be the direct provision of modern Western equipment to Ukraine’s defence forces. The most pressing requirement is sufficient ground-based air defence systems and advanced tactical aviation to prevent Russia from establishing air superiority. If Ukraine achieves air dominance over its own territory, the likelihood of a renewed Russian offensive will be significantly reduced.

Ukraine must have long-range missile systems capable of striking deep into enemy territory, targeting command and control centres, logistics hubs, and supply lines

Additionally, Ukraine must have long-range missile systems capable of striking deep into enemy territory, targeting command and control centres, logistics hubs, and supply lines. Precision strikes on these key assets would significantly weaken Russia’s capacity to sustain large-scale military operations.

While warfare technologies continue to evolve, certain core military assets remain indispensable. Ukraine will continue to require artillery, MRAPs (mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles), and firearms, all of which are essential for sustained ground operations.

Finally, the allies can further strengthen Ukraine’s long-term defence capabilities by enhancing support for its domestic defence industry, particularly in areas where Ukraine is already technologically advanced. The development of Ukraine’s defence sector is well underway and should be expanded and accelerated. This includes investment in unmanned systems, electronic warfare technologies, and other critical defence innovations.

Building a force capable of credibly deterring and repelling Russian aggression will be a formidable challenge. However, the coalition’s collective technological, industrial, and economic resources far exceed those of Russia, making this goal fully achievable. Through joint efforts, a unified threat assessment, decisive action, and resilience against Russian intimidation, the coalition can forge a security framework that ensures long-term peace and stability across the region.

© Andriy Zogorodnyuk, Alina Frolova and Oleksandr Khara, 2025, published by RUSI with permission of the authors.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the authors’, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

 

Nuvens negras começam a amontoar no horizonte - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Nuvens negras começam a amontoar no horizonte

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

 Não gostaria de ser ave de mau agouro, mas ao analisar os dados e os debates da atualidade corrente, estou vendo no horizonte algumas nuvens negras para os próximos meses, no segundo semestre e no começo de 2026:

1) Os americanos vão despertar num país muito pior do que na atualidade, com mais inflação, mais recessão, mais conflitos externos e uma desafeição geral dos países europeus e parte considerável do assim chamado Sul Global em relação ao Trump e aos EUA, e portanto, uma aproximação com a China, que está se comportando de maneira a confirmar isso: um elefante na loja de cristais, enquanto a China só observa e retira benefícios desse retraimento do outrora grande líder do Ocidente (agora um vulgar amigo de um procurado pelo TPI, aliás dois, Putin, um assassino cleptocratra confirmado, e Netanyahu, um genocida também incluído no rol dos criminosos de guerra).
2) Os brasileiros vão descobrir que as políticas distributivistas e assistencialistas de Lula não vão conseguir baixar a inflação, e vão continuar tão endividados quanto são, atualmente. A política vai continuar polarizada, os partidos do Centrão (traidores como sempre foram) não vão garantir o apoio que o governo precisa para passar seus projetos, sobretudo os fiscais e tributários. As pesquisas de opinião vão continuar negativas, o que levará o governo a aprofundar o populismo, o que só vai servir, consequentemente, para deteriorar ainda mais o cenário econômico. Ou seja, uma corrida ladeira abaixo.

O duro está em suportar, mais do que a desfaçatez da aristocracia do Judiciário, com seus penduricalhos pornográficos e a esbórnia com o dinheiro público, a prepotência de Trump e seus aspones desqualificados. Eles conseguiram perturbar, com a ajuda de Putin, a segurança e a paz no mundo, e vão levar à aceleração da fragmentação do cenário internacional.

Sorry pelo pessimismo, again...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Brasília, 25 de março de 2025