Francis Fukuyama's The End of History? 30 years later - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Hoje, no curso de uma defesa de dissertação, o nome de Fukuyama e sua famosa tese sobre o Fim da História vieram à baila, o que me lembrou de um artigo que escrevi 20 depois de sua publicação original. Agora já são 30 anos, e eu talvez considere retomar o tema, para uma nova leitura e uma nova avaliação de como se apresenta o mundo com uma Rússia ressurgente e uma China decididamente assumida a desempenhar um papel mais assertivo não só em sua região mas no mundo.
Enquanto isso, aquela coisa que responde pelo título de presidente americano, manda parar o ônibus da globalização, retira os EUA dentro da geringonça caótica, e deixa o campo livre para chineses, russos, gregos e goianos se divertirem como crianças no salão. Mas o adulto não é exatamente aquele, e sim talvez os europeus. Pena que eles tenham tão pouco poder, mesmo tendo construído uma catedral gótica em Bruxelas, atualmente com problemas de manutenção e adesão (Brexit, populismos de direita, contestações nacionalistas, etc.).
Em todo caso, eis o que eu escrevi vinte anos atrás em torno do trabalho de Fukuyama:

O “Fim da História”, de Fukuyama, vinte anos depois: o que ficou?, por Paulo Roberto de Almeida

21/01/2010  Política Internacional 4

1. O que restou, vinte anos depois, da tese controversa de Fukuyama?

No verão de 1989, a revista americana National Interest publicava um ensaio teórico – mais exatamente de filosofia da História – do intelectual nipo-americano Francis Fukuyama sobre os sinais – até então simplesmente anunciadores – do fim da Guerra Fria, cujo título estava destinado a deslanchar um debate ainda hoje controverso: “The End of History?”.[1] Vinte anos depois, em vista das muitas críticas feitas naquela conjuntura – e ainda hoje –  às principais teses do autor, vale a pena retomar seus principais argumentos e verificar se eles ainda conservam alguma validade para nossos tempos, que poderiam ser considerados como de pós-Guerra Fria, mas que alguns interpretam, ou consideram efetivamente, como de volta à Guerra Fria, ainda que sob novas modalidades (com uma Rússia singularmente diminuída e uma China hesitante em se posicionar como contendor estratégico dos Estados Unidos).

Antes, contudo, de ingressar numa descrição linear desses argumentos, qualquer que seja sua validade relativa ou absoluta para o tema que nos interessa – qual seja, o da natureza das opções abertas aos países em termos de reforma e desenvolvimento paralelos do sistema econômico e do  regime político, que Fukuyama identificava com a redução dessas opções à democracia de mercado – cabe chamar a atenção para uma peculiaridade geralmente descurada no debate anterior (e talvez atual) sobre a validade das teses de Fukuyama, sobretudo por aqueles que recusavam, in limine, a essência mesma do argumento do autor. Esta peculiaridade tem a ver, basicamente, com um simples sinal diacrítico: o ponto de interrogação ao final do título, geralmente ignorado pelos críticos das teses de Fukuyama, e provavelmente também por aqueles que apóiam, em grande medida, o sentido dos seus argumentos. Ou seja, Fukuyama não fazia uma afirmação peremptória, mas levantava uma hipótese, a do final presumido da história, numa análise de corte essencialmente conceitual, ainda que fortemente embasada nos fatos históricos, e nunca pretendeu formular uma sentença de caráter terminativo, indicando um “congelamento” das formas possíveis de organização social, econômica e política. O interrogante básico de seu argumento tem a ver com a possibilidade de alternativas credíveis às democracias liberais de mercado, ponto.

O ponto de interrogação, por si só, tem o poder de desmantelar boa parte das críticas superficiais, embora ele não elimine uma discussão responsável sobre a essência de sua tese, que caberia discutir, após o resumo inicial de seus argumentos. A tese – vale a pena resumir desde o início – tem a ver com o caráter incontornável da democracia de mercado como sendo uma espécie de ‘horizonte insuperável de nossa época’, como poderia argumentar – mas a propósito do marxismo – Jean Paul Sartre, um dos estudantes, junto com Raymond Aron, da tese original de Hegel, através de Alexandre Kojève.

2. O que Fukuyama de fato escreveu?

(...)

Para ler este longo ensaio, veja este link: 

http://www.mundorama.net/?article=o-fim-da-historia-de-fukuyama-vinte-anos-depois-o-que-ficou-por-paulo-roberto-de-almeida

(Confirmo que vai ser longo...)

Posturas distintas no tema da Venezuela: militares e chanceler - Bruno Boghossian (FSP)

Brincadeira ideológica atrapalha a cautela dos militares com a Venezuela

Generais delimitam envolvimento brasileiro, mas chanceler faz jogo político perigoso

Bruno Boghossian

FSP, 24.fev.2019 às 2h00
https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/bruno-boghossian/2019/02/brincadeira-ideologica-atrapalha-a-cautela-dos-militares-com-a-venezuela.shtml

Quando a crise na Venezuela começava a transbordar, o general Hamilton Mourão se apressou para empurrar as inquietações para outras fronteiras. “Do lado mais complicado, que é o lado colombiano, acho que vai ficar nessa situação de impasse”, afirmou o vice à BBC.

Enquanto isso, do lado mais complicado, o chanceler Ernesto Araújo resolveu posar sorridente com o autoproclamado presidente interino, Juan Guaidó. O ministro decidiu confraternizar com o opositor de Nicolás Maduro justamente na hora em que os venezuelanos chegavam a uma encruzilhada.

O núcleo militar do governo tem reagido com cautela à escalada de tensões na região, mas a ala ideológica do bolsonarismo insiste num jogo político perigoso.

Generais do Planalto trabalharam nos últimos dias para delimitar claramente o envolvimento brasileiro na crise venezuelana. Embora não tenha se recusado a enviar ajuda humanitária ao país, o grupo conseguiu reduzir a marcha dessa ação.

Além de circunscrever a participação de tropas brasileiras, os militares também barraram a presença de soldados americanos em território nacional —ideia que havia sido alimentada pelo Itamaraty em conversas com autoridades dos EUA.

Araújo mergulhou numa guerra de provocações que, agora, interessa somente a Maduro, aos colombianos e a Donald Trump. Enquanto os militares tentavam baixar a temperatura para evitar uma matança, o chanceler brincava de fazer diplomacia.

China: o modelo capitalista autoritario e os limites da autocracia meritocratica - The Economist

‘Claws of the Panda’: China model going backwards?

Democracy Digest, February 25, 2019

Chen Tianyong, a Chinese real estate developer in Shanghai, boarded a flight to Malta last month with no plans to return anytime soon. After landing, Mr. Chen, a former judge and lawyer, shared on social media a 28-page article explaining himself. “Why I Left China,” read the headline, “An Entrepreneur’s Farewell Admonition,” the New York Times reports:

Many members of the business elite are unhappy that the leadership’s economic policies favor state-owned enterprises even though the private sector drives growth. They are angry that the party is trying to put a Mao-era ideological straitjacket on an economy driven by private enterprises and young consumers. They are upset that the party eliminated term limits last year, raising the prospect that Mr. Xi could become president for life.

“The most important cause of their pessimism is bad policy and bad leadership,” said Minxin Pei, a professor at Claremont McKenna College [and contributor to the NED’s Journal of Democracy]  who is in frequent contact with business figures. “It’s clear to the private businesspeople that the moment the government doesn’t need them, it’ll slaughter them like pigs. This is not a government that respects the law. It can change on a dime,” he told the Times.

Since Mr Xi took power in 2013, China has in some ways gone backwards, the Economist observes:

As our essay this week explains, two decades ago it was possible, even sensible, to imagine that China would gradually free markets and entrepreneurs to play a bigger role. Instead, since 2013 the state has tightened its grip. Government-owned firms’ share of new bank loans has risen from 30% to 70%. The exuberant private sector has been stifled; its share of output has stagnated, and firms must establish party cells which then may have a say over vital hiring and investment decisions.

There is mounting concern generally about China’s influence campaigns in countries like Canada, much of it executed through the United Front Work Department, a secretive offshoot of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) known to work with ethnic Chinese organizations overseas, the Calgary Herald adds:

According to its website, the Vancouver-based United Association of Women and Children has 1,500 members, branches in several provinces and a focus on equal treatment and work opportunities for women — but it lists no contact information. Two B.C. leaders of the non-profit sector dedicated to helping women in business — Laurel Douglas of the Women’s Enterprise Centre and Lisa Niemetscheck of WebAlliance — told the National Post they had never heard of it.

The group seems to have “all the hallmarks” of a front organization to further Beijing’s interests, says Jonathan Manthorpe, whose just-published book, Claws of the Panda, documents China’s influence campaigns.

“Establishing fake civil society NGOs is an established modus operandi” of the United Front, said Charles Burton, a Brock University professor and former Canadian diplomat in Beijing.

Thanks to blockchain, internet users have achieved some victories in the fight against China’s strict internet censorship, notes Nir Kshetri, Professor of Management at the University of North Carolina – Greensboro. A historic moment occurred when Peking University‘s former student, Yue Xin, penned a letter detailing the university’s attempts to hide sexual misconduct. The case involved a student, Gao Yan, who committed suicide in 1998 after a professor sexually assaulted and then harassed her, he writes for the Conversation:

The letter was blocked by Chinese social networking websites, but an anonymous user posted it on the Ethereum blockchain. In another case, in July, Chinese citizens used blockchain to preserve an investigative story which condemned inferior vaccines being given to Chinese babies. …A blockchain is a secure database that’s stored in a distributed set of computers. Every addition to the database must be digitally signed, making clear who’s changing what and when.

Increasing Chinese leadership in the Middle East is served by a growing interest among the region’s states to pursue the “China Model” at the expense of the “Washington Consensus” that has traditionally defined foreign economic presence in the region, analyst Nicholas Lyall writes for the Diplomat:

The China Model – characterized by a strictly controlled political arena, as well as state control of the economy’s commanding heights, accompanying market capitalism – resonates significantly with Middle Eastern governments. Despite the fact that Middle Eastern regimes have largely proven incapable of achieving the state capacity, industrialization, and institutional structures imperative to the success of the China Model, the appeal of Beijing’s economic alternative is likely to remain a source of Chinese soft power that consolidates its economic influence vis-à-vis the US in the Middle East.

American Default (1934), Sebastian Edwards - book record, Amazon

Estou lendo este livro, e gostando. Leiam este artigo que postei anteriormente: 
https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2019/02/roosevelt-e-o-abandono-da-clausula-ouro.html

American Default: The Untold Story of FDR, the Supreme Court, and the Battle over Gold

Sebastian Edwards

Amazon.com: Books

As an economic history nerd I can only applaud the work of my UCLA colleague Sebastian Edwards in his vibrant telling the story of the long forgotten Supreme Court showdown over the United States’ abrogation of contracts written with the gold clause. Remembering the inflation of the Civil War greenback era, most creditors demanded gold clauses in debt contracts in which they would be repaid in in either gold or its paper money equivalent value.

This system worked fine until the onset of the Great Depression. It is here where Edwards begins his story as President Roosevelt adopts an inflationist policy by first abandoning the gold standard by requiring all citizens to turn in their physical gold at the then $20.67/ounce price. Then in June 1933 Congress adopts a joint resolution authorizing Roosevelt to increase the price of gold which he ultimately does to $35/ounce and the legislation abrogates the gold clause in all contracts. Indeed, most economists credit the early recovery from the depression directly to the monetary easing associated with Roosevelt’s gold policies.

If Congress hadn’t abrogated the gold clause all debts would have been written up to reflect the devaluation by 69%. Thus it would require a payment of approximately $1700 to repay a nominal debt of $1,000. Needless to say a host of bankruptcies would have ensued.

Of course several creditors sued and Edwards skillfully moves the action from Roosevelt and Congress to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ruled that it was in Congress’ power to alter private contracts, but it was not in its power to alter U.S. government debt. However, the court ruled that as of the date of the Joint Resolution gold was still trading at $20.67/ounce and Americans were not allowed to possess physical gold at that time. Hence there would be no damages. A brilliant 5-4 ruling by Chief Justice Hughes.

The reason why these cases have been forgotten is that if they went the other way all hell would have broken loose. Instead of rallying as the stock market did after the ruling, stocks likely would have crashed. It would have triggered a constitutional crisis with Court versus the other two branches of government. Indeed the lead up to the ruling was a precursor to the 1937 court fight that Roosevelt would have.
As an aside Edwards notes that the United States had a treaty with Panama concerning the lease payments for the Panama Canal. That treaty had a gold clause in it. After a long negotiation in 1939 the lease payment was increased retroactive to 1934 thereby reflecting the dollar devaluation. Thus, the U.S. made good on its international treaty obligations.

“American Default” is a worthy addition to the economics literature of the Great Depression. It should be read with the works of Friedman & Schwartz, Bernanke, Irwin, Eichengreen and Sumner. And because it is more a history book than an economics book the lay reader should find it very readable. Further given the rising debt/GDP ratio in the U.S. when coupled with even larger unfunded liabilities, the idea of a 21st century American default is not totally improbable.

Reviews: 

"Sebastian Edwards' American Default is just such a superb history of the US exit from gold in 1933-34, satisfyingly detailed and highly accessible on both the relevant economics & law."---David Frum, 

"Edwards analyses the default that followed President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s 1933 decision to devalue the dollar against gold. . . . The story is fascinating and the lessons eternal."---Martin Wolf, Financial Times

"[American Default] is the history of that mighty legal, moral, political and monetary controversy, the effects of which are with us still. . . . [Sebastian Edwards] knowledgably compares the 20th-century American default to Argentina’s 2002 abrogation of its dollar denominated debt."---James Grant, Wall Street Journal

"Brilliantly told."---Steve Hanke, Forbes

"Edwards ends his admirably accessible and illuminating book with some careful thoughts on recent financial crises around the world, such as those in Argentina and Greece, and shows why US gold cases from 1933 to 1935 are a useful precedent to understand how future such crises may be successfully resolved by hewing carefully to the rule of law. He believes that the cases may even be invoked by lawyers in other national, or international, arenas. If so, those involved will, no doubt, turn to this book for inspiration and guidance."---Benn Steil, Financial World

"Excellent. . . . A fascinating narrative of FDR's decision to devalue the dollar in 1933-34."---Scott Sumner, EconLog

"[Sebastian Edwards] skillfully narrates a pivotal episode in American political and economic history he considers too little remembered. . . . Edwards writes equally knowledgeably about economics and politics: . . . At a time of economic uncertainty at home and abroad, this comprehensive study of an important event in U.S. fiscal history has significant implications for today." (Publishers Weekly)

"Edwards’ book is fascinating, well written and enjoyable."---Geoffrey Wood, Central Banking

"Great book by UCLA economist Sebastian Edwards about a key moment in American economic history. Many economists believe that the most important thing FDR did to help the economy recover from the Great Depression was to go off the gold standard. As part of that policy, he pursued laws that rewrote many bond contracts, annulling gold clauses. It was controversial then (and surely would be again if such an issue were ever to arise). Edwards does a wonderful job telling the story."---Greg Mankiw, Greg Mankiw's Blog

"Fascinating. . . . I couldn't put this book down."---Brenda Jubin, Seeking Alpha

From the Back Cover: 

"American Default provides an in-depth look at one of the most important, but often neglected, events in U.S. economic history, the abrogation of bond’s gold clauses during the New Deal. Not only does the book provide an excellent discussion of the economics of this event, but it is a really good read because it delves into the personalities and the politics behind this effective default. I highly recommend it."--Frederic S. Mishkin, Columbia University

"I thought we knew about American abandonment of gold during the Great Depression. But American Default is an eye-opener. It is astonishing how chaotic were the circumstances and how woefully inadequate was understanding. Everyone interested in the history of gold, the Great Depression, the Greek or the Argentine crises, and in the crises to come should read this book."--Anne Krueger, Johns Hopkins University

"American Default is a fascinating and well-written book about the momentous decision to leave the gold standard in 1933. Sebastian Edwards skillfully weaves together the political, economic, and legal aspects of this important episode, with lessons for today. Highly recommended!"--Douglas A. Irwin, Dartmouth College, author of Clashing over Commerce: A History of US Trade Policy

"A really excellent book. Edwards provides a dramatic and readable account of monumental decisions that changed the course of history. American Default is sure to be a hit."--Michael D. Bordo, Rutgers University

Product details Hardcover: 288 pages Publisher: Princeton University Press (May 22, 2018) Language: English ISBN-10: 9780691161884 ISBN-13: 978-0691161884 ASIN: 0691161887

Founding fathers of the Fed, by Richard A. Naclerio - Book review by Mary Tone Rodgers

Richard A. Naclerio, The Federal Reserve and its Founders: Money, Politics and Power, Newcastle upon Tyne: Agenda Publishing, 2018. vii + 226 pp. $22.50 (paperback), ISBN: 978-1-78821-078-2.

Reviewed for EH.Net by Mary Tone Rodgers, Department of Finance, State University of New York at Oswego.

Scholars have been keenly interested in the Federal Reserve system since its inception, and the subject has motivated many books. Authors’ tones, viewpoints and theses about the Fed are understandably shaded by the political discourse of the period in which they write. Richard Naclerio writes The Federal Reserve and its Founders: Money Politics and Power in 2018, a time of rising populist sentiment and, while not explicitly identifying himself as a populist, Naclerio argues the populist viewpoint. The book’s thesis is that the Federal Reserve was formed by elites to preserve their informational advantages over the “little guy,” primarily by preserving a monopolistic structure of the banking industry. He supports his argument by providing biographical evidence that six men who suggested critical features of the Federal Reserve Act disdained the common man, perceived themselves to be elite and were interested in extracting profits for the central bank from elevated interest rates charged on loans to the “little guy.”

This book is permeated with the rhetoric of economic populism providing an “us versus them” framework for the author’s writing style. The approach is not the traditional one taken by economic historians; it does not test theories of political economy, industry structure, formation of efficient financial systems, or financial panics by examining past quantitative data. Instead, it uses qualitative archival evidence from personal writings, contemporary critiques and newspaper stories for thesis support. Its primary contributions are for the reader to understand, first, how the populist viewpoint may be informed by biographical evidence, and second, what the implications of populism for the future of Federal Reserve might be. Naclerio argues that from the “American people’s” viewpoint a central bank that does not bail out banks, does not profit from high interest rates charged to the “little guy,” and that has oversight by non-elites appears to be the type of institution a populist might prefer.

Naclerio devotes one chapter to each of the six men who attended a private conference at Jekyll Island in 1910 to draft policy proposals to create an American central bank. He also writes a chapter about J. Pierpont Morgan who did not attend the conference but who Naclerio considers a central historical figure epitomizing the elite who formed the central bank. After examining the seven men’s attitudes toward the “little guy,” Naclerio then argues that those attitudes were institutionalized in the legislation that formed the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. A chapter devoted to a post-2008 interview with one journalist at Bloomberg News is used as evidence that elitist attitudes continue to drive Fed policy in the present period. The interview explores how Bloomberg News found it difficult to obtain information from the Fed about loans the Fed made during the 2008 crisis.

The seven chapters about the Jekyll Island attendees and Morgan comprise about two-thirds of the book. Each chapter presents biographical evidence that each man embodied the populist lament that the “little guy” is disadvantaged by elite who create opacity and monopoly for self-aggrandizement. Nelson Aldrich eliminated small sugar producers and refiners by changing the tariff structure for sugar imports, benefitting his family’s wholesale grocery business. Felix Warburg’s proposal to allow the central bank to discount commercial paper disadvantaged small bankers and gave preference to large banks. Benjamin Strong’s efforts to coordinate Europe’s post-World War I reconstruction created a Western monopoly of central banks in defiance of each government’s citizenry and was achieved using loopholes in the Charter of the League of Nations. Strong’s venom toward small bankers is supported by his characterization of them as an “unorganized mob.” Henry Davison persuaded Woodrow Wilson to break his promise to the average American to stay out of World War I – so that loans to France and Britain organized by Davison at J. P. Morgan & Co. could be paid off. Davison’s efforts to preserve Morgan’s profits would be at the expense of the “European working class” whose taxes would pay the interest and principal on war loans. A. Piatt Andrew’s suggestion that the central bank would support itself by charging rates to banks on loans it provided meant that small businessmen’s and farmers’ rates would be higher, benefitting the elites in money center banks. Frank Vanderlip’s assessment that borrowers must sign loan contracts but small depositors earned no such reciprocal contract from the banker was evidence that elite bankers supported the inequity and imbalance of power inherent in the banking business model. J. P. Morgan’s takeovers of weak trust companies and corporations after the Panic of 1907 is evidence of an unscrupulous act of self-dealing. (Morgan is referred to as a “pirate” in the chapter title.)

The book’s populist argument is not completely convincing because it does not explore how concern about the “little guy” was indeed part of the policy formation process; it does not adequately describe how the grassroots debate had been ongoing since at least the Baltimore plan of 1894 and the Indianapolis Monetary Convention of 1896. Rather, Naclerio seems to attribute most of the policy formation process to the seven men showcased in the book.

Nor does the book describe how the “little guy” benefitted from the formation of the Fed. The book does not explore how achieving economies of scale in information production and liquidity coordination became overwhelming tasks for a fragmented banking system during the period of industrialization and urbanization that accompanied technological advancement that opened up opportunities for the “little guy” of the early twentieth century.

Furthermore, Naclerio does not suggest how populists of the day, such as William Jennings Bryan or Theodore Roosevelt. might have managed the problems of providing a lender of last resort in periods of exogenous economic shocks any differently than the “elitist” Wall Street bankers did. The difficulty in compelling collective action in the absence of a lender of last resort was not the purview of the federal government at the time, nor was it easily managed by private actors in an increasingly complex economy.

Naclerio interprets the Great Depression as evidence that the Fed reneged on its promise to shield the “little guy” from shocks to the economy and fluctuations in the business cycle from 1921 through the late 1930’s, without describing the remedial changes to the Fed’s policy formation process made during the subsequent Franklin Roosevelt administration that improved the institution’s future capabilities to become more responsive.

Naclerio pays scant attention to how the Federal Reserve Act was influenced by politicians to include a decentralized system of twelve regional banks that served twelve distinct regions of the country, an effort to give voice to the “little guy.”

The shortcomings of the book do not mar the usefulness of the references it provides to see the Federal Reserve system through the eyes of a twenty-first century populist. Giving voice to those who have felt alienated from or disillusioned by the system can support constructive institutional change going forward.

(Naclerio has worked extensively in business operations and real estate investment in New York City and Denver. While continuing to manage his own real estate companies and stock portfolios, he is pursuing a Ph.D. in history at the CUNY Graduate Center. He worked as an adjunct instructor and academic advisor at Sacred Heart University and Monroe College.)

Mary Tone Rodgers, DPS, CFA, is the Marcia Belmar Willock Professor of Finance and Director of the Gordon Lenz Center for Finance and Risk Management at the State University of New York at Oswego. She has published several articles in financial history, including “Monetary Policy and the Copper Price Bust: A Reassessment of the Causes of the Panic of 1907” with James E. Payne” in Review of Economic History. She is currently working on a book with Jon R. Moen (University of Mississippi) on J. Pierpont Morgan’s role as lender of last resort in the pre-Federal Reserve period.

Copyright (c) 2019 by EH.Net. All rights reserved. This work may be copied for non-profit educational uses if proper credit is given to the author and the list. For other permission, please contact the EH.Net Administrator (administrator@eh.net). Published by EH.Net (February 2019). All EH.Netreviews are archived at http://www.eh.net/BookReview.

Partidos politicos e financiamento eleitoral no Brasil - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Partidos políticos e financiamento eleitoral no Brasil

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

(www.pralmeida.org; http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com)

 [Objetivo: respostas a questionário; finalidade: participação em pesquisa]

  

Recebi, de [um pesquisador], pequeno questionário destinado a subsidiar pesquisa que ele conduz sobre sistemas de financiamento político e eleitoral. Eis minhas respostas.

1 . No contexto democrático, qual é o papel dos partidos políticos? 

Representar “partes” da opinião pública, ou frações de setores sociais e grupos determinados da sociedade, até talvez o conjunto da sociedade (embora seja difícil atender a interesses contraditórios), junto às instituições políticas de natureza governamental. Partidos são intermediários entre desejos, demandas, requerimentos da sociedade – mais frequentemente partes dela, daí o nome de “partidos”, ou seja, partes de um todo – e as instituições de governança, no legislativo, em primeiro lugar, no comando do executivo naturalmente, e eventualmente também junto a órgãos do judiciário, no caso de mecanismos de solução de controvérsias.

Partidos são elementos essenciais nas democracias modernas, que são todas, ou quase todas, representativas. O jogo democrático legítimo prevê a organização de consultas eleitorais regulares, visando à alternância dos partidos no exercício do poder, segundo procedimentos acordados consensualmente pela sociedade, através de uma assembleia constituinte e seus ordenamentos constitucionais.

2. Você seria favorável a um sistema de financiamento (partidos e campanhas) totalmente privado (doações empresariais e de pessoas físicas)?

Não se trata de ser favorável: sou, em primeiro lugar, inteiramente contrário a qualquer outro sistema, e, portanto, a favor de uma proibição formal de financiamento público de campanhas e dos partidos. Partidos são entes de direito privado – pois que representando apenas partes da opinião pública –e devem, dessa forma, ser financiados exclusivamente por seus membros, militantes, simpatizantes, apoiadores. Sou, portanto, pela liberdade absoluta de financiamento privado das campanhas. Mas, como os partidos são entidades de direito privado exercendo missões públicas, de caráter cívico, sou a favor de total transparência nos mecanismos e dados reais sobre esse tipo de financiamento: tudo o que o partido receber deve estar à disposição de todas as autoridades de organização dos escrutínios eleitorais, assim como da sociedade em geral. Repito: total liberdade. Existe o risco de partidos serem capturados por grandes interesses econômicos? Claro que existe, mas isso vai se saber imediatamente, e a sociedade terá perfeita informação e consciência desse apoio. Fraudes, omissões e sub-declarações quanto ao financiamento obtido deveriam ser sancionados severamente, implicando, por exemplo, na vedação da participação dos candidatos do partido fraudador em um ou dois escrutínios eleitorais seguidos.

3. Como a prestação de contas do dinheiro público transferido para os partidos políticos pode ser aperfeiçoada?

Sou absolutamente contrário a qualquer forma de financiamento público. O financiamento privado deve ser registrado na página de cada partido, sem sequer a obrigação de remeter à autoridade eleitoral, que procederá eventualmente a conferência por amostragem das contas dos partidos, podendo inquirir por dados mais completos.

4. Você seria favorável a um sistema de financiamento 100% público de campanhas e partidos políticos?

De nenhuma forma, e não aceito o argumento de que esse financiamento público é o preço da democracia. Partidos investem os recursos de seus apoiadores em campanhas políticas, para eleger representantes que, eles sim, receberão um salário condigno para tal tarefa de representação, mas se qualquer tipo de mordomia.

5. Você é favorável ao teto de gastos de campanha? 

Não; como liberal, acredito que cada partido deve investir o que seus apoiadores desejarem na eleição de seus candidatos. Alguns serão eleitos com muito dinheiro, outros com um mínimo. E serão ambos exatamente iguais na representação congressual ou nos cargos executivos, devendo desempenhar seus mandatos de acordo a dispositivos constitucionais.

6. Qual é sua perspectiva acerca do atual paradigma de financiamento dos partidos políticos brasileiros?  

Sistema totalmente irresponsável, perdulário, inaceitável, escandaloso e vergonhoso, do ponto de vista dos eleitores (que não deveriam ser compulsórios, e sim voluntários) e dos contribuintes (também compulsórios) que já pagam os salários de seus representantes e dirigentes. Os fundos eleitoral – uma excrescência inaceitável – e partidário devem ser extintos completamente, imediatamente, por antidemocráticos. A questão é muito simples: como um eleitor liberal, ou conservador pode apoiar, sem o seu consentimento, um partido que prega o fim da propriedade privada? E como um eleitor esquerdista, igualitarista radical, pode sustentar candidatos conservadores e partidários de uma economia de mercado totalmente livre? Injusto para ambos.

7. Qual é o modelo mais adequado de financiamento dos partidos políticos brasileiros?

 Já explicitado acima: totalmente a cargo, exclusivamente sob responsabilidade de seus membros e simpatizantes. Qualquer outra forma é antidemocrática e autoritária.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 25 de fevereiro de 2019