Pressões dos ultranacionalistas russos para o aumento da repressão aos dissidentes, e adoção de práticas stalinistas do passado totalitário, são os assuntos tratados nesta matéria, que também se detém sobre eventual doença do tirano de Moscou e do presidente atual da Turquia. Ou seja, mais instabilidade não apenas no Kremlin, mas na região como um todo.
Kremlin Instability
Medium, Apr 26
This one crossed this morning from the Institute for the Study of War. They have also noticed the same thing I have. There are signals that instability in the Kremlin is increasing. I will quote them directly instead of the noise via Ukrainian channels because it’s significant. It also matches my observations:
Russian ultranationalists are continuing to advocate for the Kremlin to adopt Stalinist repression measures. Russian State Duma Parliamentarian Andrey Gurulyov — a prominent Russian ultranationalist figure within the ruling United Russia Party — stated that Russia needs to reintroduce the concept of the “enemy of the people.”[10] This concept designated all the late Soviet leader Joseph Stalin’s opposition figures as the enemies of society. Gurulyov frequently shares extreme opinions on Russian state television but the rhetoric among the ultranationalists is increasingly emphasizing the need for the targeting and elimination of Russia’s internal enemies. Former Russian officer Igor Girkin and Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin often echo similar calls to prosecute Russian officials who are hoping to end the war via negotiations with the West. Such attitudes indicate that the ultranationalist communities are expecting Russian President Vladimir Putin to expand repression and fully commit to the war.
The Kremlin continues to avoid adopting overtly repressive measures likely out of concern for the stability of Putin’s regime. The Russian government withdrew a bill from the Russian State Duma that would have increased taxes from 13 to 30 percent for Russians who have fled the country.[11] Russian ultranationalists have repeatedly called on the Kremlin to nationalize property belonging to Russians who had “betrayed” the country by fleeing, but the Kremlin appears to remain hesitant to introduce such unpopular measures. Unnamed sources told Russian independent outlet Verska that the Russian presidential administration does not support the return of capital punishments in Russia — another issue that recently reemerged in Russian policy discussions.[12] The Kremlin could use the threat of the death penalty to scare Russians into supporting the war effort (or remaining passively resistant to it), but Putin likely remains hesitant to destroy his image as a diplomatic and tolerant tsar. ISW previously assessed that Putin relies on controlling the information space to safeguard his regime much more than the kind of massive oppression apparatus of the Soviet Union and that Putin has never rebuilt an internal repression apparatus equivalent to the KGB, Interior Ministry forces, and the Red Army.[13]
Realize we are all watching the same channels, I suspect. So we see the same demands for SMERSH and other repressive techniques. This also points to the next point. We seem to be shaping operations before the offensive begins. We have explosions inside Crimea and Russia, near the border regions.
One of our Z Channels is nice to tell us this…and no, there is no precise confirmation of this, except the explosions at this point, for example, on Rostov-on-Don, and Nikolaev on the Ukrainian side.
There is an unprecedented movement on the border in Belgorod and Kursk regions. Drones fly swarms in both directions. The equipment is here, they drag everything and everything. Both ours and the enemy. The Nazis pulled technical means to the border. Our air reconnaissance is being tinguished. We lost a few Maviks this week. But we also do not lag behind, today not without a catch — the Khokhla has minus two drones. Active movement and arrival of new equipment were noticed in Zolochev.
We are seeing those over other channels.
Now on a larger piece, apparently, Vladimir Putin was driven to the Kremlin overnight. There is a lot of speculation as to why. So here are two versions. I will add a third; the front is starting to heat up with shaping operations:
Putin’s cortege raced unscheduledly in the evening towards the Kremlin. The media are building versions of the president’s emergency visit to the workplace: from Erdogan’s disease to confiscation of assets in Poland.
There were rumors that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had a heart attack. This is now getting disputed. But what is true is that meetings were indeed canceled.
And a change at the top of the leadership in Turkey will prove democracy works. This is dangerous for Russia. While many have given up on Turkish democracy, perhaps this is too early.
Now, this brings me to General SVR. This is why I suspect they are putting out code for somebody. No, nobody survives pancreatic cancer this long. So if this is what ails Putin, he must donate his body to science.
But I digress.
Every time things go badly for the regime, his cancer issues…this week colon, last week pancreas…whatever, it’s oncology, get worse. His case gets nearly out of control, and boy doubles start to become a thing. The medicine starts to work…being a former medic, hardly a specialist; this smells of creative writing.
Are there doubles? Probably. It’s not unusual for authoritarian leaders to have some. But the story that he is dying from a fast-killing cancer is back again. At this point, I tend to interpret that part of the story as code to the regime's stability. This is one reason I read the channel.
And occasionally, they put out something that does turn out to be right. Should you rely on them, for Putin will die tomorrow? Nope. And if you do, the British Press adds nice embellishments to these stories. Assume there is no cancer. Hell, there is not a cold. What there is, well, paranoia. And as we start to get closer to the end of this, if the Ukrainian offensive goes well, here is why this started, according to MO:
Last drops for Putin. Six personal motives of the dictator that led to the war with Ukraine
Vladimir Putin decided to start a war a year before the invasion, in February-March 2021, Nyurstka found out after talking with sources in the Russian and Ukrainian authorities. Moreover, he was guided, among other things, by personal motives — resentment and the desire to take revenge. Sources told what exactly overwhelmed his “cup of patience”:
💧2004 Orange Revolution
Putin’s attitude towards Ukraine deteriorated along with relations with the West. A major blow to Putin was the 2004 Orange Revolution, which he sees as the work of the United States.
💧Dangerous Philosophy
In 2012, Putin began to spend a lot of time reading ultra-conservative books. His “mentor” was the White Guard philosopher Ivan Ilyin. Modern nationalists also began to influence Putin more.
💧Maidan and the flight of Yanukovych
“Putin said: guys, this is our last chance, there won’t be another chance like this, I take responsibility,” said a close acquaintance of the decision of the owner of the Kremlin to seize Crimea.
💧The impracticability of the Minsk agreements
Putin seriously hoped to outwit the Ukrainian authorities with the help of the Minsk agreements and personally participated in their writing. But he failed in the end to push through either Poroshenko or Zelensky.
💧The closure of Medvedchuk’s media assets
The fact that the Ukrainian authorities began to “nightmare” Putin’s godfather Medvedchuk was the last straw in Putin’s decision to prepare for a military operation.
💧Quarantine in the bunker
During a long isolation, Yuriy Kovalchuk gained a particularly strong influence on his friend, convincing the president that power in Kyiv could be changed quickly and painlessly.Putin is a typical psychopath, and losing control of himself, says American neuroscientist, professor at the University of California James Fallon. “Putin’s facial expressions also speak of Putin’s failures,” the American professor notes. He became more like a wild animal in a cage. But that only made him more dangerous.”
Some we have heard before, which brings me back to Turkey. If Erdogan loses, this will not be received well by Moscow. It will be another Orange revolution of sorts. I see the influence of the ultranationalist right as well. It is evident in how Putin speaks.
This war is making the regime unstable. A defeat could bring the country to the conditions of the early 1990s. The vertical of power, which also relies on patronage networks, will suffer. It could also go away. The pressure towards disolución is increasing.
