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Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.

Mostrando postagens com marcador colonialismo. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador colonialismo. Mostrar todas as postagens

quarta-feira, 17 de agosto de 2022

O fantasma de Patrice Lumumba volta a atormentar os colonialistas belgas - Bruna Gonçalves (EJIL)

European Journal of International Law, August 17, 2022

June 2022 was marked by a critical event in South-North relations: Belgium returning a tooth to Congo. As trivial as it may sound, the return of the gold-crowned tooth ends a quarrel of 62 years between the former colonial and colonized peoples regarding the murder of the anti-colonial leader Patrice Lumumba. More than that, the declaration that accompanied the act was the first satisfactory Belgian apology acknowledging unlawful conduct, ending a cycle of over 20 years of insufficient declarations about Lumumba’s death. It characterizes the circumstances of Lumumba’s killing as a human rights violation, signaling a potential new trend for future apologetic declarations.

Apologies and International Law

Apologetic declarations became popular after the end of the Cold War, mainly addressing injustices perpetrated in the course of the Second World War. Their emergence is attributed to the incorporation of human rights language in transnational relations, described by Baxi (2008) as ‘grammar of governance’ and by Barkan (2000) as the ‘moralization’ of international relations. The phenomenon is characterized by the standardization of human rights as the moral guidance for States’ behavior or, in practice, rhetoric. States are constantly monitored by their peers on the matter, creating relations based on performative activism and guilt over violations (Barkan 2000). In legal terms, the numerical growth of declarations led to the establishment of criteria for identifying their remedial value, differentiating legal apologies from moral apologies (see Salvioli 2021; IAtHR, Escher, §243El Mozote, §357; Guerrilha do Araguaia, §277). According to these sources, satisfactory legal apologies are endowed with (i) publicity, (ii) acknowledgment of the harm, (iii) recognition of legal responsibility for the facts, and (iv) an expression of remorse. The measure promotes symbolic redress, acknowledgment of the harm, and most importantly, the public recognition of victims’ narrative and its penetration into the intersubjectively constructed history (UN Special Rapporteur 2019; see also Halbwachs 1980). Further, they fulfill the collective dimensions of the substantial right to truth (Van Boven 1993).

When not satisfying the criteria, apologetic declarations may assume three other forms – non-apologies, expressions of regret, and moral apologies. Non-apologies merely acknowledge events not addressed in the past, recognizing their occurrence, for example, Queen Elizabeth’s declaration concerning the Amritsar massacre. Expressions of regret convey remorse but exclude the recognition of liability and do not include an acknowledgment of harm, for example, the British declaration in the Mau Mau case. On this occasion, the UK demonstrated remorse for the event and acknowledged the harm, but expressly denied liability, and did not adopt any idioms pleading for forgiveness (e.g. ‘we apologize’, ‘we are sorry for our past actions’). If it had included the latter, the statement could be considered a moral apology. Like legal apologies, moral apologies encompass remorse, liability, publicity, and acknowledgment of harm. However, rather than accepting legal liability, the interlocutor restricts their responsibility to the moral realm, rejecting the existence of binding substantive norms and reparatory duties.

Due to their semantic vagueness, expressions of regret and moral apologies have been widely adopted by States addressing colonialism, allowing States to benefit from the performative guilt while excepting themselves from the consequences of legal apologies. The choice is enabled by the power imbalance existing between the Global North and South, which allows for the limitation of declarations to performative activism. Out of the declarations related to colonialism issued after Britain first approached the matter in 1995, only six complied with all criteria of legal apologies: the maiden British apologies to the Maoris, the Dutch 20112013, and 2022 apologies for the Indonesian War, and the Belgian 2019 and apologies to ‘Métis’ children and 2022 for Lumumba’s death. Both the Dutch and the latest Belgian apologies were motivated by Court decisions resulting from victim activism.

Belgian apologies in context

In total, Belgium has addressed its colonial past in the Congo in five different statements: in 2002, in 2019, in 2020, and twice in 2022. Its first-ever apologetic statement, as with its latest, was directed toward Patrice Lumumba’s family, after 40 years of systematically denying responsibility for his death.  Patrice Lumumba was the first prime minister of independent Congo. His mandate, however, lasted only ten turbulent weeks. In 1961, he was brutally murdered by Belgian law enforcement. In the 2002 declaration, the State’s late admission of the facts, instead of apologizing for the conduct, merely expressed condolences for the victim’s feelings (see Goffman 1971), as an expression of regret and, hence, exempted Belgium from responsibility over the result. Its underwhelming nature was further aggravated by the adoption of a ‘bad apple’ argument when attributing the injustice to some Belgian actors at the time’, rather than the colonial regime or State machinery as a whole.

Responding to the declaration, anti-colonial movements surfaced in Belgium and in its former colonies. In 2004, for example, the ‘Bold Ostenders’ caught the media’s attention by damaging a monument celebrating Leopold II, severing the hand from the statue of an enslaved Congolese man in a symbolic reference to a common practice of the colonial regime. The activists promised to return the hand if Belgium duly apologized for the Congo’s colonization. The promise was fulfilled only in 2019, after Belgium’s second apologetic declaration. Although apparently accepted by the Ostenders, nevertheless, the statement limited its object to the treatment of Métis children in colonial Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi. The overall Belgian posture continued to be the omission or, worse, praise of colonialism. In 2010, Louis Michel, former Belgian foreign minister and at the time member of the European Parliament, publicly commended Leopold II and denied the horrors of Congo’s colonization, portraying the conduct as development assistance to an ‘uncivilized’ people.

From 2020 onwards, the number of protests against Belgium’s silence grew, influenced by the anti-racist wave triggered by the Black Lives Matter movement. Soon after, in the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s independence, King Filip addressed the demands in an expression of regret towards Leopold II’s colonization of the Congo between 1885 and 1908. Nevertheless, continuing in some respects the Belgian State’s previous posture, his letter also affirmed that Belgium and the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s common history is ‘made up of common achievements’, reinforcing a positive and hence misleading reading of colonialism. A few months later, Lumumba’s daughter wrote him a letter requesting her father’s remains, endorsed by a national juge d’instruction. After this decision, the State’s declarations changed significantly, including elements capable of strengthening their reconciliatory and reparatory efficiency, e.g. concomitant measures and wider assumptions of liability.

The return of the tooth

In 2022, Belgium issued two declarations on its colonial injustices: the first as an expression of regret for the Congo’s colonization in its entirety, and the second, a legal apology for Belgian colonialism and Lumumba’s death, marking a radical shift in Belgium’s approach towards its past. The latter was accompanied by measures like the return of the tooth – the only remaining body part – to the family. This followed the common practice of enforced disappearance cases, redressing the violent character of the part’s apprehension as a prize. Further, these actions were accompanied by a funeral ceremony in the presence of the victim’s family, and the parliamentary approval of a bilateral treaty on the restitution of cultural propriety.

The latter statement’s text, detrimentally and echoing most past declarations, purposedly pointed out the ‘moral’ character of Belgium’s responsibility. Nonetheless, it paradoxically adopted a significantly more condemnatory language in describing the colonial past, becoming the first-ever apologetic declaration to acknowledge colonial injustices as human rights violations. Resembling qualifications, such as ‘crimes against humanity’, appeared four times in prior statements: in the British 2006 statement on the transatlantic slave trade, the 2004 and 2021 German declarations on the Namo and Herrero case, and the 2011 Dutch declaration regarding the Indonesian war. Nevertheless, ‘human rights’ have been traditionally avoided as a classification as a form of evading the assumption of contemporary legal responsibility and, thus, the emergence of reparatory duties. The resistance is reinforced by the legal uncertainty on the application of the international legal system to the colonial past, commonly supported by the intertemporal principle (see Von Arnauld 2020).

Both in its legal and social aspects, such measures go some way toward reversing traditional policies of ‘colonial amnesia’ (Fletcher 2012Stahn 2020). The phenomenon is described by Fletcher (2012) as the systemic forgetfulness and omission of the colonial atrocities in narrations of the past, i.e. the oblivion or diminishing of colonial injustices in celebrations of Northern countries’ ‘development’. By recognizing the illegality of colonial injustices, Belgium’s statement rejects the Eurocentric reading of human rights law according to which colonialism is legitimized by the law applicable at the time of the facts and, hence, cannot be condemned nor given redress. Politically, it factually acknowledges the Northern violence towards the South, subverting the colonial amnesia pattern. The precedent raises hope over a reversal of the trend of merely rhetorical apologetic declarations regarding colonial injustice.

Bruna Gonçalves is an Incoming Special Doctoral Fellow at the Law Department of the European University Institute (EUI), in Florence. In 2022, she graduated Cum Laude from Leiden University’s Advanced LLM in European and International Human Rights Law, which she attended as a Leiden Excellence Scholar (LExS) Awardee. Her LLM thesis addressed the technical aspects of redress for colonial injustice, a topic also approached in her pending thesis at her Alma Mater, Universidade de São Paulo (USP) LLM in Legal Philosophy and Legal Theory. She obtained Summa Cum Laude honors for her LLB degree from USP in 2020 and has received an honorable mention for her thesis. She is proficient in Portuguese, English, French, and Spanish.

segunda-feira, 13 de julho de 2015

Grecia: quase 200 anos depois da independencia, voltou a ser colonia (por seus proprios erros)

Não são exatamente 200 anos de independência completa, pois no século 19 a Grécia já enfrentou problemas semelhantes, ao se endividar demasiadamente, e ao ter de colocar suas finanças sob a supervisão de representantes de governos estrangeiros, que atuavam a pedido dos banqueiros financiadores.
Portanto, não deve ser nenhuma tragédia, viver uma velha experiência outra vez, mas eu não quero tripudiar sobre os pobres gregos, que não tem culpa por terem as elites que tiveram e têm (nós também, por sinal, temos elites ineptas, corruptas e basicamente autocentradas nos seus próprios negócios pessoais).
Mas, uma coisa que venho reparando nos comentários e matérias de jornalistas é essa constante referência à Grécia antiga, a pátria da democracia, da filosofia, da história, e outras coisas mais. Tudo isso é bobagem. Os gregos antigos (comedores de azeitonas, ordenhadores de cabras e bons de conversa) têm pouca coisa diretamente legada aos gregos modernos, que só herdaram dos antigos essa mania de conversar, ao que parece. O resto, não tem absolutamente nada a ver com antigas tradições e relatos heróicos. Mal comparando, eles são os baianos da Europa, aquela coisa de viver de sol, de turistas, de música, e de dinheiro público... Enfim, cada um se vira como pode.
Abaixo, os detalhes da colonização contemporânea. Eles conseguiram que o fundo de privatização não os humilhe sendo sediado em Luxemburgo; será na Grécia, mas terá supervisores estrangeiros...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Conheça os detalhes do novo acordo de resgate da Grécia
Veja.com, 13/07/2015 às 19:25

O primeiro-ministro grego Alexis Tsipras e a chanceler alemã, Angela Merkel se reúnem na sede da União Europeia em Bruxelas, na Bélgica - 07/07/2015 (Foto: Philippe Wojazer/AFP)
O primeiro-ministro grego Alexis Tsipras e a chanceler alemã, Angela Merkel se reúnem com os demais líderes do continente na sede da União Europeia em Bruxelas, na Bélgica - 07/07/2015
Yanis Varousfakis chega para uma conferência em Atenas. O ex-ministro das finanças da Grécia renunciou ao cargo após a vitória do "Não" às propostas dos credores
 Voltar ao início

LegendasTodas as mídiasSlideshow
Depois de uma série de reuniões realizadas nas últimas semanas, a Grécia finalmente chegou a um acordo com os seus credores para contornar a crise financeira do país. Os detalhes do acordo, que foram longamente debatidos por líderes de 19 países da zona do euro entre a noite de domingo e a manhã desta segunda-feira, tratam da necessidade de implantação de diversas medidas de austeridade, como privatizações, aumento de impostos e reformas no mercado de trabalho e no sistema previdenciário.
Algumas das medidas, inclusive, foram refutadas pelo povo grego no referendo realizado no dia 5 de julho. Apesar de ter alardeado que sairia fortalecido com a vitória do "não" no plebiscito, o primeiro-ministro, Alexis Tsipras, se viu obrigado a arredar o pé e aceitar as duras condições propostas pelos credores para liberação de um pacote de socorro que pode chegar a 86 bilhões de euros.
LEIA TAMBÉM:
Os números da crise grega
Com uma dívida de mais de 170% do PIB, o governo grego corre o risco de não ter recursos para bancar o funcionamento do Estado sem o auxílio financeiro. Os bancos já estão fechados há duas semanas e devem continuar nos próximos dias até que o dinheiro do Banco Central Europeu seja injetado no sistema bancário grego. As medidas, que ainda devem ser apreciadas pelo Legislativo grego até esta quarta-feira, devem deprimir ainda mais a economia do país, que recuou quase 25% nos últimos 5 anos e cuja taxa de desemprego chega a 26%.
Eleito com o slogan anti-austeridade no início do ano, Tsipras já encontra resistência do próprio partido, o Syriza, para conseguir aprovar o plano. Ministros de seu governo e correligionários chegaram a dizer que o acordo firmado "humilha" a Grécia e a coloca como uma "colônia da dívida de uma Europa supervisionada pela Alemanha".
Os detalhes do acordo foram divulgados no início da tarde. Confira os principais pontos do documento:
FMI - O Eurogrupo condiciona a concessão de um empréstimo via MEE (Mecanismo Europeu de Estabilidade) a um acordo prévio com o Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI). Em moratória com o fundo desde a semana retrasada, o governo grego havia insistido que não queria o FMI como parceiro no novo plano. "Portanto, a Grécia solicitará apoio continuado do FMI (monitoração e financiamento), a partir de março de 2016", diz o texto.
Previdência - Fazer uma reforma ampla no sistema de aposentadorias e pensões, visando torná-los viáveis. O texto ainda define que essas medidas devem ser aprovadas até esta quarta-feira.
Aumento de tributos - Implementar mecanismos de "alargamento da base tributária" a fim de expandir a receita. O texto também fala em desburocratizar alguns sistemas tributários, como o IVA (imposto sobre o valor agregado).
Privatizações - Segundo o documento, o governo deverá desenvolver um programa de privatizações, que consiga levantar 50 bilhões de euros com a venda de ativos. Esse montante deverá ser transferido para um fundo independente. Do valor, 25 bilhões de euros serão usados para recapitalizar os bancos; 13,2 bilhões de euros, para reduzir a dívida do país; e os outros 13,2 bilhões de euros serão repassados para investimentos. O fundo será sediado na Grécia e não em Luxemburgo, como havia proposto a Alemanha. Apesar disso, ele contará com a supervisão de "instuições europeias relevantes".
A operadora da rede nacional de transmissão de energia também deve ser privatizada, "a menos que medidas de substituição possam ser identificadas que tenham efeito semelhante sobre a concorrência", conforme o texto.
Mercado de trabalho - O acordo destaca a necessidade de "revisões rigorosas e uma modernização" das relações de trabalho. O objetivo é que, com as mudanças, as políticas trabalhistas se alinhem às "melhores práticas europeias e profissionais" e se distanciem do formato anterior que "não são compatíveis com as metas de promoção de crescimento sustentável e inclusivo".
Independência - O Eurogrupo exige medidas para melhorar a governança do Fundo de Estabilidade Financeira da Grécia e a eliminação de "qualquer possibilidade de interferência política" sobre os bancos.
Transparência - O texto exige uma reforma do escritório de estatísticas (Elstat), sob suspeita de manipulação de dados do país. A entidade se assemelha ao que é o Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística no Brasil (IBGE) no Brasil.
Recuperar a confiança - Os países da zona do euro reforçam a "necessidade crucial de reconstruir a confiança com as autoridades gregas como pré-requisito" para a Grécia conseguir ajuda financeira. "A Comissão Europeia recebe positivamente os compromissos das autoridades gregas de propor ao Parlamento, sem delongas, um primeiro conjunto de medidas", informa o documento.
Reduzir a máquina pública - De acordo com o texto, o governo grego assumiu o compromisso de reduzir "ainda mais" os custos de administração do país. A primeira proposta nesse sentido deve ser apresentada até o dia 20 de julho.
Revisar leis - O texto prevê que o governo reavalie as leis aprovadas antes de fevereiro deste ano que resultaram "em abandono de compromissos anteriores" quanto ao controle fiscal. Além disso, os credores pedem a "modernização e a despolitização" da administração grega.
Consideração - No texto, o governo grego é apontado como o culpado pela insolvência da dívida grega. "Isso se deve ao relaxamento de políticas nos últimos 12 meses, que resultou na recente deterioração do ambiente financeiro e macroeconômica grego", explica o documento. Por fim, os países da zona do euro ainda fizeram uma constatação de que, se o acordo não sair do papel, a responsabilidade será toda da Grécia.
LEIA MAIS:
Mesmo com acordo, bancos gregos continuarão fechados
Bolsas europeias fecham em alta influenciadas por acordo entre Grécia e credores
(Da redação)

quarta-feira, 21 de maio de 2014

O fim do acordo Sykes-Picot na Siria, e no Oriente Medio em geral - Gregory Gause (Foreign Policy)

Is this the end of Sykes-Picot?

The Gulf/2000 Project and United Nations ReliefWeb
The Gulf/2000 Project and United Nations ReliefWeb
The intensity of the civil war in Syria, combined with the continued upheavals in Iraq and the endemic instability of Lebanese politics, has naturally led to speculation that the famously “artificial” borders in the eastern Arab world, drawn by Britain and France in the aftermath of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, are on their last legs. Are the state entities created by European colonialism in the 1920s about to collapse? Are we about to see a grand redrawing of the borders in the Middle East? The short answer to this question is no. While none of these three states will be able to claim effective governance within their borders anytime soon, the borders themselves are not going to change. They are devolving into what the political scientist Robert Jackson perceptively referred to as “quasi-states,” internationally recognized de jureas sovereign even though they cannot implement de facto the functional requisites that sovereignty assumes – control of territory and borders. Real governance in the eastern Arab world is certainly up for grabs, but the borders themselves will be the last things to change, because almost none of the actors, either regionally or internationally, really want them to change.
“The end of Sykes-Picot” is the tagline used by those who argue that the borders themselves are on the verge of substantial change. This is something of a misnomer. The Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 made a preliminary division of the Arab (and some Turkish and Kurdish) territories of the Ottoman Empire between Britain and France, but the final borders were determined by the two powers at the San Remo conference in 1920. Sykes-Picot, for example, gave what is now northern Iraq to France and foresaw an international regime for the Holy Land. San Remo gave League of Nations approval to the borders that France and Britain subsequently worked out – Lebanon carved from the French mandate of Syria, Transjordan separated from the British mandate of Palestine, and the British mandate of Iraq created from the three Ottoman provinces of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra. It would be more accurate historically to refer to the prospective collapse of the regional order in the Fertile Crescent as “the end of San Remo,” but that is not a semantic fight worth fighting.
Google returns 14,700 results when queried on “the end of Sykes-Picot.” Formerdiplomats, respected journalists and academics have all recently used the phrase to express their doubts that the territorial state status quo can be sustained. But we should be leery about jumping to the conclusion that the geopolitical dispensation created by France and Britain nearly a hundred years ago is not much longer for this world. These “artificial” entities have had remarkable staying power. Their borders are basically unchanged from their post-World War I creation. Transjordan is now Jordan, and the old mandate of Palestine is now completely under Israeli control (with Gaza a partial exception and the West Bank in an uncertain limbo regarding sovereignty). Iraq, Lebanon and Syria (with the exception of the cession of Alexandretta/Hatay by France to Turkey in 1939) remain as they were created.
The prospects that the map will continue to look as it does now remain strong. First, no one questions the longevity of either Israel or Jordan. Palestinian statehood, which would have been a major shift in the map, looked closer to realization in 1999 than it does now. If anything, the British-drawn border between “Palestine” and “Transjordan” seems more stable now than it has been for years. Second, the deconstruction of the Iraqi state began not recently, but back in 1991 with the establishment of the Western-protected (under a United Nations Security Council resolution) Kurdish region in the north and northeast of the country. That soft partition of Iraq became a constitutional element of the post-Saddam Iraqi state, with the establishment of the Kurdish Regional Government. The KRG has had most of the attributes of statehood – effective control of territory, its own military and an ability to conduct foreign relations – for more than 20 years, yet the map of the Iraqi state remains unchanged.
The anomalous status of the KRG, effectively sovereign but lacking international recognition, leads to the third and most serious weakness of the “end of Sykes-Picot” argument. The international powers constructed the post-Ottoman eastern Arab world. They created territorial shells in which colonial authorities, local elites in league with the colonialists and then independent state rulers, tried, with varying degrees of success, to build real states. But the success or failure of those efforts has not determined whether outsiders grant diplomatic recognition to those entities or not. The Lebanese government has not been able to claim effective control over all its territory since the civil war began in 1975. Yet not a single state granted diplomatic recognition to any sub-state Lebanese entity during the civil war, nor did a single state withdraw diplomatic recognition from Lebanon as a state. The KRG effectively governs a good chunk of Iraq, but no foreign government has recognized it as a state or limited its recognition of the Iraqi state to the territory that Baghdad effectively controls. Knowing that it is unlikely to receive international recognition, the KRG will very likely continue to maintain the fiction that it is a part of Iraq, despite the fact that most Kurds would rather have an independent state. Syria might end up, like Lebanon in its civil war, in a state of de facto partition, but it does not look like any foreign power would be willing to recognize the independence of any of those Syrian statelets. Nor is it clear that the Syrian leaders of such statelets would claim formal independence.
This is the ultimate analytical flaw of the “end of Sykes-Picot” argument. Outsiders drew those borders. No outsiders seem to have any interest in redrawing them, or recognizing the redrawing of them, at this time. The United States certainly does not. It has patronized the KRG for nearly 25 years while never encouraging the Kurds to declare independence. No Russian, Chinese or European leader has suggested an international conference to remake the Middle Eastern map. The states themselves might fragment internally. De facto governing authorities might emerge. But the international borders themselves do not look like they are going to change. All the action in the Middle East is bottom-up, as various domestic and regional groups fight for control of these states and regional powers aid their allies in these fights. But these fights look to remain, at least formally and in terms of international law, within the borders that the French and the British drew nearly a hundred years ago. “Sykes-Picot” lives, as fragile as governance within those borders is.
F. Gregory Gause III is a professor of political science at the University of Vermont and non-resident senior fellow at the Brookings Doha Center. He is the author of “The International Relations of the Persian Gulf.”

segunda-feira, 5 de maio de 2014

Vietnam 1954: a guerra quase virou nuclear (BBC)

French soldiers during the battle for Dien Bien PhuCould Vietnam have been nuked in 1954?

BBC, May 4, 2014, 20:35 GMT-3

Sixty years ago this week, French troops were defeated by Vietnamese forces at Dien Bien Phu. As historian Julian Jackson explains, it was a turning point in the history of both nations, and in the Cold War - and a battle where some in the US appear to have contemplated the use of nuclear weapons."Would you like two atomic bombs?" These are the words that a senior French diplomat remembered US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles asking the French Foreign Minister, Georges Bidault, in April 1954. The context of this extraordinary offer was the critical plight of the French army fighting the nationalist forces of Ho Chi Minh at Dien Bien Phu in the highlands of north-west Vietnam.
The battle of Dien Bien Phu is today overshadowed by the later involvement of the Americans in Vietnam in the 1960s. But for eight years between 1946 and 1954 the French had fought their own bloody war to hold on to their Empire in the Far East. After the seizure of power by the Communists in China in 1949, this colonial conflict had become a key battleground of the Cold War. The Chinese provided the Vietnamese with arms and supplies while most of the costs of the French war effort were borne by America. But it was French soldiers who were fighting and dying. By 1954, French forces in Indochina totalled over 55,000.
At the end of 1953, French commander in chief Gen Navarre had decided to set up a fortified garrison in the valley of Dien Bien Phu, in the highlands about 280 miles from the northern capital of Hanoi. The valley was surrounded by rings of forested hills and mountains. The position was defensible providing the French could hold on to the inner hills and keep their position supplied through the airstrip. What they underestimated was the capacity of the Vietnamese to amass artillery behind the hills. This equipment was transported by tens of thousands of labourers - many of them women and children - carrying material hundreds of miles through the jungle day and night. On 13 March the Vietnamese unleashed a massive barrage of artillery and within two days two of the surrounding hills had been taken, and the airstrip was no longer usable. The French defenders were now cut off and the noose tightened around them.
French soldiers during the battle for Dien Bien PhuIt was this critical situation which led the French to appeal in desperation for US help. The most hawkish on the American aide were Vice-President Richard Nixon, who had no political power, and Admiral Radford, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also quite hawkish was the US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who was obsessed by the crusade against Communism. More reserved was President Eisenhower who nonetheless gave a press conference in early April where he proclaimed the infamous "domino theory" about the possible spread of Communism from one country to another.
Red Cross helicopter flies to French positions at Dien Bien Phu
"You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly," he said. "So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences."
Saturday 3 April 1954 has gone down in American history as "the day we didn't go to war". On that day Dulles met Congressional leaders who were adamant they would not support any military intervention unless Britain was also involved. Eisenhower sent a letter to the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill warning of the consequences for the West if Dien Bien Phu fell. It was around this time, at a meeting in Paris, that Dulles supposedly made his astonishing offer to the French of tactical nuclear weapons.
In fact, Dulles was never authorised to make such an offer and there is no hard evidence that he did so. It seems possible that in the febrile atmosphere of those days the panic-stricken French may simply have misunderstood him. Or his words may have got lost in translation.
Map showing details of Dien Bien Phu
"He didn't really offer. He made a suggestion and asked a question. He uttered the two fatal words 'nuclear bomb'," Maurice Schumann, a former foreign minister, said before his death in 1998. "Bidault immediately reacted as if he didn't take this offer seriously."
According to Professor Fred Logevall of Cornell University, Dulles "at least talked in very general terms about the possibility, what did the French think about potentially using two or three tactical nuclear weapons against these enemy positions".
Bidault declined, he says, "because he knew… that if this killed a lot of Viet Minh troops then it would also basically destroy the garrison itself".
In the end, there was no American intervention of any kind, as the British refused to go along with it.
The last weeks of the battle of Dien Bien Phu were atrociously gruelling. The ground turned to mud once the monsoon began, and men clung to craters and ditches in conditions reminiscent of the battle of Verdun in 1916. On 7 May 1954, after a 56-day siege, the French army surrendered. Overall on the French side there were 1,142 dead, 1,606 disappeared, 4,500 more or les badly wounded. Vietnamese casualties ran to 22,000.
In this year marked by two other major anniversaries - the centenary of the outbreak of World War One and the 70th anniversary of D-Day - we should not forget this other battle that took place 60 years ago. In the history of decolonisation it was the only time a professional European army was decisively defeated in a pitched battle. It marked the end of the French Empire in the Far East, and provided an inspiration to other anti-colonial fighters. It was no coincidence also that a few weeks later a violent rebellion broke out in French Algeria - the beginning of another bloody and traumatic war that was to last eight years. The French army held so desperately on to Algeria partly to redeem the honour it felt had been lost at Dien Bien Phu. So obsessed did the army become by this idea that in 1958 it backed a putsch against the government, which it believed was preparing what the generals condemned as a "diplomatic Dien Bien Phu". This putsch brought back to power Gen de Gaulle who set up the new presidential regime that exists in France today. So the ripples of Dien Bien Phu are still being felt.
Dien Bien Phu memorial to French soldiers who died in battle there
A memorial in Dien Bien Phu commemorates the French soldiers who died there
It was also in 1954 that France began working on its own independent nuclear deterrent.
For the Vietnamese, however, Dien Bien Phu, was only the first round. The Americans, who had refused to become directly involved in 1954, were gradually sucked into war - the second Vietnam War - during the 1960s.
Listen to The Siege of Dien Bien Phu written and presented by Julian Jackson on the BBC iPlayer
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segunda-feira, 7 de junho de 2010

A pedidos, a volta das Falacias Acadêmicas (aguardem novas...)

Tinha recebido "reclamações" por causa da interrupção da minha série sobre as Falácias Acadêmicas (elas são tantas, que se pode ter aquela sensação que os franceses chamam de "embarras du choix").
Bem, como naquela canção do Roberto Carlos, eu voltei (tem também a de Nelson Gonçalves, para os mais velhos, mas esta se refere aos boêmios), desta vez tratando do colonialismo.
Acaba de ser publicada:

2140. “Falácias Acadêmicas 14: o mito do colonialismo como causador de subdesenvolvimento
Shanghai, 9 maio 2010, 19 p. Continuidade da série, abordando o fenômeno do colonialismo como indutor de progresso e avanços materiais (e até sociais) nas sociedades dominadas.
Publicado em Espaço Acadêmico (vol. 10, n. 109, junho 2010, p. 12-26;
link: http://www.periodicos.uem.br/ojs/index.php/EspacoAcademico/article/view/10231/5689).
Relação de Publicados n. 972.