Iran: programa nuclear continua, a despeito de todo o otimismo ocidental - entrevista Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani

Rafsanjani says final Iran deal could come within a year

By Najmeh Bozorgmehr, Lionel Barber and Roula Khalaf in Tehran

Financial Times, November 25, 2013

Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, one of Iran’s most influential political leaders, has raised hopes of a comprehensive nuclear deal with world powers within a year.

In a rare interview with the Financial Times in Tehran, Mr Rafsanjani, 79, declared that Sunday’s interim deal was the hardest step because it meant overcoming decades of diplomatic estrangement with the US going back to the 1979 Islamic revolution.

“It was breaking the ice, the second stage will be more routine,” said the former two-term Iranian president, sitting serenely in his book-lined office in an elegant Tehran palace that once belonged to the late Shah, who was ousted in the revolution.

Many analysts in Tehran and Washington warn that the next phase of negotiations will be very difficult, partly because Israel continues to believe that Iran is covertly on course to develop a nuclear bomb and partly because of differing expectations in Tehran and western capitals about how much further ground Iran is prepared to give.

But Mr Rafsanjani was determinedly optimistic. “Part of it [the breakthrough] was because talking to the US was a taboo. That taboo could not be easily broken and nuclear talks could not move ahead without the US.”

He said Iran had no interest in developing nuclear weapons and dismissed Israeli threats of a military strike to curb its nuclear programme. “Israel is so small; no small fish can eat big fish.”

Mr Rafsanjani is leader of the so-called conservative pragmatists who have long argued against Iran’s international isolation, and were alarmed by the confrontational policies of the former hardline president, Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad.

Western officials view Mr Rafsanjani as a barometer of the fractious Islamic regime’s willingness to adopt more pragmatic policies abroad.

In the interview, the top cleric, who heads the Expediency Council, which drafts policy, and wields considerable influence behind the scenes, referred to the ruinous damage to the economy wrought by sanctions and the populist policies adopted by Mr Ahmadi-Nejad.

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Iran’s nuclear sites

As Iran agrees a historic deal to limit its nuclear programme in exchange for an easing of tough international sanctions, this guide profiles seven key nuclear sites around the country

He expressed hope of a turnround in the economy in the next two years, especially if foreign investors come in and support sectors such as aviation, the oil and gas sectors, petrochemicals, shipping and railroads.

Despite being barred from running in the June presidential election (“ill-wishers did not let me run,” he says), Mr Rafsanjani struck an alliance with reformers that helped to catapult his ally Hassan Rouhani to the presidency.

But the more rational approach of Mr Rafsanjani, who has now seen many of his fellow “Rafsanjani-ites” appointed to Mr Rouhani’s administration, was vindicated. “The people recognised the way the country was run would not benefit them.”

He made clear that Iran has no intention of abandoning its nuclear programme, but rather intended to bring it in line with the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty that allows for the peaceful development of nuclear power.

This mirrors the view of the Iranian government, which would like to preserve its low-level uranium enrichment programme while providing sufficient assurances, through inspections and other forms of compliance, that it will not divert nuclear material for more sinister use.

“The limitations set by international laws are acceptable to us. The Non-Proliferation Treaty is acceptable to us. Anything more than that would be considered imposed on us.”

“The [Iranian] people recognised the way the country was run would not benefit them

”

- Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, head of Iran’s Expediency Council

Mr Rafsanjani and his allies have been worried about growing tensions with Saudi Arabia, not just over the nuclear programme but also over Iran’s interference in various crises in the Arab world, particularly Syria.

Tehran has actively backed President Bashar al-Assad’s regime financially and militarily, while Saudi Arabia has supplied funds and weapons to the rebels. The stand-off between Shia Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia has exacerbated sectarian strains across the region.

Mr Rafsanjani is one of the few Iranian political figures who has enjoyed good relations with Saudi leaders. In the interview, he said he was ready to travel to Riyadh and had been invited by King Abdullah to perform last month’s hajj, the Muslim pilgrimage. His intention would be “to reassure them [the Saudis] that friendship with Iran benefits the region and both countries.”

But he hinted that Iran’s leaders first needed to agree on policies of de-escalation. A future trip needed preparation and a decision within Iran on “how we are going to deal with [Saudi Arabia] in a win-win situation.”

Mr Rafsanjani acknowledged that Iran “can play a better role” in Syria than it is doing now, but said the fate of Mr Assad would ultimately be decided by Syrians.

“If the Syrian people accept it, it seems to be no problem [for Assad to step down]  . . .,” he said. “We have no right to interfere,” he added.

More

ON THIS STORY

• Gideon Rachman Obama v the Israel lobby
• Global Insight Deal wrongfoots Netanyahu
• Iran deal has its roots in secret US talks
• Gulf states cautiously welcome deal
• Interactive map Iran’s nuclear sites

ON THIS TOPIC

• Iran nuclear deal pushes oil prices lower
• Relief sweeps Tehran on nuclear deal
• Rouhani hails deal as a turning point
• Nick Butler Iran – the sanctions door opens

IN MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA

• Assad buoyed by Iran’s nuclear deal
• Hizbollah tightens grip in Syria
• US woos Russian support at Syrian talks
• Time for Obama to deploy his cunning

RELATED TOPICS

• Iran under Rouhani,
• United States of America,
• Hassan Rouhani

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Acordo sobre o programa nuclear iraniano - texto da agencia de noticias iraniana

Full text of Iran-5+1 agreement in Geneva

Tehran, Nov 24, IRNA - The Iranian nuclear negotiating team and members of the G5+1 reached a first step agreement in Geneva Sunday morning on Iran’s peaceful nuclear program.

Following is the full text of Iran-5+1 nuclear deal:
Joint Plan of Action

Preamble

The goal for these negotiations is to reach a mutually-agreed long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure Iranˈs nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek or develop any nuclear weapons. This comprehensive solution would build on these initial measures and result in a final step for a period to be agreed upon and the resolution of concerns. This comprehensive solution would enable Iran to fully enjoy its right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the NPT in conformity with its obligations therein. This comprehensive solution would involve a mutually defined enrichment program with practical limits and transparency measures to ensure the peaceful nature of the program. This comprehensive solution would constitute an integrated whole where nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. This comprehensive solution would involve a reciprocal, step-by step process, and would produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions, as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iranˈs nuclear program.

There would be additional steps in between the initial measures and the final step, including, among other things, addressing the UN Security Council resolutions, with a view toward bringing to a satisfactory conclusion the UN Security Councilˈs consideration of this matter. The E3+3 and Iran will be responsible for conclusion and implementation of mutual near-term measures and the comprehensive solution in good faith. A Joint Commission of E3/EU+3 and Iran will be established to monitor the implementation of the near-term measures and address issues that may arise, with the IAEA responsible for verification of nuclear-related measures. The Joint Commission will work with the IAEA to facilitate resolution of past and present issues of concern.

Full text: http://www.irna.ir/en/News/80918859/Politic/Full_text_of_Iran-5_1_agreement_in_Geneva

Programa nuclear iraniano: o coracao da materia -- Mark Hibbs entrevistado por Max Fisher

WorldViews

A nuclear expert explains, in very basic language, the science at the heart of Iranian nuclear talks

BY MAX FISHER 

The Washington Post Blog, November 12 at 7:00 am

Iran's ongoing negotiations with world powers over its nuclear program, most recently this weekend in Geneva, have not yet resulted in a deal. This weekend's talks fell through, according to some reports, because French representatives worried about how the agreement would have dealt with Iran's nuclear facility at Arak.

The details of the facility, how it works and why it's so controversial can be confusing. To get a better understanding of it and the other scientific issues at the heart of this very political process, I talked to Mark Hibbs. As a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's nuclear policy program, Hibbs understands both the science of the Iranian program and the politics around those scientific issues. A lightly edited and compressed transcript of our phone conversation follows.

Can you explain to me, very simply, what are the main technical issues in these negotiations with Iran? In other words, what are they negotiating over?

The two main parts that are of concern are the uranium enrichment program and the heavy-water reactor [in the city of Arak].

Can you explain the dispute over uranium enrichment first?

The question is, how much enrichment should an agreement with Iran permit Iran to do? What would be the enrichment level? Where would Iran be permitted to do the enrichment, and, finally, what happens to the enriched uranium when it comes out of the enrichment plant?

Iran has been building up an inventory of enriched uranium. Most of it is 3 percent enriched or 5 percent enriched. It's "low enriched" uranium fuel, at the level of enrichment that normally is used for normal nuclear power reactors, like the reactor Iran has at Bushehr. There is a small nuclear inventory that Iran is enriching at [its nuclear facility at] Fordow, at a second enrichment plant, and that's enriched to 20 percent. And the problem is that 20 percent enriched uranium. The amount of work that's necessary, the amount of processing of the uranium to enrich it to 20 percent, that gets you most of the way there to enrich it further to 90 percent, which is what you would want for a nuclear weapon. The concern is that there has been, in recent years, a small but growing amount of 20 percent enriched uranium, which is the focus of a great deal of tension in this negotiation, because that would be the inventory that's closest to bomb grade.

They have slowed down the accumulation of this 20 percent enriched uranium. They've slowed it down to a crawl, and they haven't crossed that line. That is an indication that Iran is aware that this is a sensitive matter. That being said, in a negotiation to try to solve the Iranian crisis, the powers negotiating with Iran want to eliminate this threat. They want all of the 20 percent enriched uranium removed, converted to other nuclear materials that can't be readily accessible. And there hasn't been a discussion on it on how best to do that.

Most of the time, since about 2006, the countries negotiating with Iran have been preoccupied primarily with schemes to get that 20 percent uranium out of the country, and more recently there has been a discussion about an alternative approach which is to take the 20 percent enriched-uranium inventory and convert it into an oxide form, which would be less accessible in the sense that Iran would have to take a number of processing steps to convert that back again into metal.

The French are involved in that; the Americans are involved in that. Politically, ultimately it has to do with what you believe to be Iran's intentions. Technically, it has to do with what your assessment is about Iran's capabilities, the question of would Iran be able to reconvert the uranium, how quickly would Iran be able to do that and would they be able to do it fast enough that they wouldn't be detected.

What about Iran's heavy-water reactor in the city of Arak? Some reporting suggests that the negotiations in Geneva fell apart because the French didn't think the agreement was tough enough on this reactor. What does a heavy-water reactor do, and why is this one so controversial?

Okay, I am going to walk you through some basic science. [Laughs] The uranium fuel in the reactor core is surrounded by what's called a "moderator." The moderator in most reactors is water. For example, in a power reactor that makes electricity, there is enriched light-enriched uranium surrounded by a water moderator, which permits the nuclear reaction to happen. In the case of this Iranian reactor, the moderator is not normal water, it's heavy water. Heavy water is water for which the hydrogen isotope has a proton and a neutron, instead of just a proton, making it denser. You can make it through several chemical processes.

Heavy water moderates the reactor less efficiently than the normal, light water does. What that means for the reaction is that the deuterium, the heavy isotope of hydrogen, absorbs fewer neutrons, which are released spontaneously by the fuel in the system. It means that there's going to be a lot more neutrons in that nuclear system, in the core of that reactor. That means that the natural uranium fuel, which is to a large extent over 70 percent of the uranium in that fuel, is isotope U-238.

The excess neutrons in that system get absorbed by that natural uranium. They absorb the neutrons and it transmutes the uranium into plutonium-239, so you're creating plutonium by doing that. That's what you're doing in your reactor. The heavy water permits the reactor in Iran, or will permit the reactor in Iran, to be very efficient at producing plutonium.

Which is used for making nuclear weapons.

Correct. The design of the reactor is considered a red flag for nonproliferators. They see the heavy water, together with the use of the natural uranium fuel, the U-238 in the fuel, as a red flag. It's a reactor that can be very efficiently used to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons.

This gets to the heart of the problem. The United States has a very firm position about this. It has taken the view that the reactor in Iran is a bomb factory. The Iranian narrative says the reactor is supposed to be used for medical isotope production and for general research.

Who's right?

In a sense the problem that the negotiators have about this project is that both of them are right. The reactor can be used to make bombs, but it's also perfectly suitable for a large number of peaceful-use applications.

What this problem reveals is a disconnect between the nonproliferation community, which sees the heavy water reactor and its neutrons as a threat because they can be used to make bombs, and then you have the nuclear research community, academic people mostly, who use heavy water reactors in many countries to produce neutrons that they need for new nuclear research. So nuclear researchers will tell you that the most valuable reactors in the world are those that create the most neutrons, and in fact these heavy water reactors do that.

But if you take the position as the U.S. government has taken, that there is no justification for this reactor in Iran other than making bombs, then there's no way that you could justify a solution that would permit Iran at the end of the day to have this reactor.

But Iran says it doesn't want a nuclear weapon, so presumably its position is that it should be allowed to keep the reactor.

Iran will make the argument that it should have the reactor, because the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA, the United Nations' nuclear watchdog] is inspecting everything in Iran. And Iran has agreed to implement a so-called Additional Protocol, which is an agreement that provides a far greater level of IAEA intrusiveness into the program. So the Iranians will argue, "If we're demonstrating our nonproliferation bona fides to you, to the IAEA, then you should let us have the reactor."

So what was the big disagreement over Arak? Some reports say that the deal at Geneva this weekend fell through because the French diplomats had some concerns about how it would deal with the Arak reactor.

The French were not satisfied that this agreement really addressed the future of this reactor. The French were saying, "What we want to see happen is for the Iranians to agree not to do any more work on this reactor for six months or more. And during this period of time, we will sit down with Iran and we'll discuss how to go forward about the long-term future of this project."

What we have heard is that the preliminary agreement that had been discussed was that Iran had agreed not to start up the reactor for six months. And if that's the case, that wouldn't suffice. That reactor probably cannot be started up anyway during the next six months, because the Iranians are having trouble finishing the project. They're under sanctions and there's things that are missing. So they can't finish it.

In other words, if Iran had agreed not to start up the reactor for six months, that would have been pretty meaningless since they probably weren't going to be able to do that anyway.

That's why I think that in the longer term, when we look at this in a week or so, maybe in a couple of weeks, we'll look back and we'll see the French intervention is something which was constructive and positive. And it's not something that happened because a few people in a negotiating team weren't happy for one reason or another. I think there are issues here that have to be addressed.

Max Fisher is the Post's foreign affairs blogger. He has a master's degree in security studies from Johns Hopkins University. Sign up for his daily newsletter here. Also, follow him on Twitter or Facebook.

Programa nuclear iraniano: sem acordo, ate o momento - Le Monde

Quem sabe o guia genial dos povos não consegue desbloquear a situação?

Nucléaire iranien : le rôle de la France en question après l'échec des négociations

Le Monde.fr avec AFP | 10.11.2013 à 05h43 • Mis à jour le 10.11.2013 à 10h33

Alors que les négociations sur l'avenir du programme nucléaire iranien se sont achevées sans accord dans la nuit du samedi 9 au dimanche 10 novembre, le rôle de la France dans cet échec est pointé du doigt par plusieurs observateurs. Ces derniers soulignaient notamment les multiples prises de parole de la délégation française pour insister sur les points de blocage.

A lire : Les négociations sur le nucléaire iranien échouent à Genève

Le chef de la diplomatie française a d'ailleurs été le premier à annoncer l'absence d'accord, soulignant qu'il restait beaucoup de chemin à faire. Selon Paris, des clarifications sont nécessaires sur trois points principaux : la centrale d'Arak, ledevenir du stock d'uranium enrichi à 20 % et, plus généralement, la question de l'enrichissement.

FABIUS TROP EXPOSÉ ?

Cette détermination a fini par irriter certains diplomates qui, sous couvert d'anonymat, n'ont pas caché leur agacement aux journalistes. "Les Américains, l'Union européenne et les Iraniens travaillent intensivement depuis des mois sur ce processus et il ne s'agit rien de plus que d'une tentative de Fabius de se donner une importance tardivement", avait-il dit, en évoquant les multiples interventions publiques du ministre mettant en garde contre un éventuel accord au rabais.

Lire aussi les réactions des observateurs américains : Nucléaire iranien : les néoconservateurs remercient la France, les autres l’assassinent

La propension de Laurent Fabius à s'exprimer devant les médias a peut-être joué un rôle dans cette suspicion à l'encontre de la France. Le fait qu'il soit sorti samedi soir le premier de la salle de réunion, grillant la politesse à la porte-parole du groupe des six, Catherine Ashton, a pu aussi jouer en sa défaveur.

"NOUS SOMMES D'ACCORD AVEC LES FRANÇAIS"

Mais Paris s'est défendu d'avoir été le grain de sable qui a empêché la conclusion d'un accord et, de fait, aucun des ministres qui se sont exprimés à l'issue de la réunion n'a incriminé publiquement la France, comme l'ont fait en Iran des députés et des médias.

A sa sortie de la salle de négociations, interrogé sur les critiques touchant Paris, le chef de la diplomatie allemande Guido Westerwelle a affirmé qu'il y avait eu "un excellent travail d'équipe, en particulier entre les Européens". Pressés de questions, son homologue américain John Kerry et la chef de la diplomatie de l'Union européenne Catherine Ashton se sont aussi abstenus de dénoncer la position française.

Le groupe des six puissances chargées du dossier iranien "est absolument uni", a dit le secrétaire d'Etat. "Nous travaillons très étroitement avec les Français, nous sommes d'accord avec les Français sur le fait qu'il y a certaines questions sur lesquelles il faut travailler", a-t-il insisté.

Mohammad Javad Zarif, le ministre iranien, très investi dans la négociation, a affirmé de son côté ne "pas [être] déçu", en dépit de l'absence d'accord. "Nous travaillons ensemble et heureusement nous allons être capables de parvenir à un accord quand nous nous rencontrerons à nouveau", a-t-il dit, avec un sourire un peu forcé.

Lire : La presse iranienne divisée sur les négociations de Genève

Les Français gardent en tête l'échec de 2003-2004, lorsqu'un accord internationalprévoyant la suspension de l'enrichissement d'uranium par l'Iran avait volé en éclats faute d'avoir été suffisamment sécurisé. Ils n'ont eu de cesse pour les négociations en cours d'"élever le niveau de l'accord" envisagé, même si ce dernier doit êtrerepoussé dans le temps.

Programa nuclear iraniano: alguma semelhanca com o acordoturco-brasileiro de 2010?

Não, nenhuma, o que desmente totalmente a afirmação do professor brasileiro neste artigo de opinião que é mais impressionista do que lógico.

Com efeito, o título do artigo, talvez dado pelo jornal, pretende que o acordo atual seria parecido com o que o Brasil e a Turquia "costuraram" há três anos. Ora, por enquanto não existe acordo nenhum, apenas intenção de retomar negociações. E um dos responsáveis iranianos afirma expressamente que aquele acordo não serve de base para os contatos e conversações atuais.

O resto do artigo é pura especulação acadêmica.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Acordo negociado agora é parecido com o costurado pelo Brasil há três anos

Análise / Dawisson Belém Lopes

Folha de S.Paulo, 10/10/2013

DAWISSON BELÉM LOPES é professor de Política Internacional e Comparada na UFMG e autor de "Política Externa e Democracia no Brasil" (Ed. Unesp, 2013) / ESPECIAL PARA A FOLHA

Há pouco mais de três anos, Brasil e Turquia chegaram a um surpreendente acordo diplomático com o Irã.

Ancara aceitava estocar o urânio levemente enriquecido de Teerã, que receberia, em troca, matéria-prima para um reator nuclear de uso civil. Brasil e Turquia serviriam como avalistas da boa vontade dos aiatolás.

À época, o entendimento foi rechaçado pelos membros permanentes do Conselho de Segurança da ONU. A então secretária de Estado dos EUA, Hillary Clinton, chegou a dizer que Brasil e Turquia estavam sendo enganados.

Agora, o atual secretário, John Kerry, defende o diálogo com Teerã.

Por que, afinal, a mudança de rumos?

Ora: é pouco crível que negociadores experientes como Celso Amorim (o chanceler brasileiro em 2010) e Ahmet Davutoglu (seu colega turco) pudessem costurar um arranjo com Teerã guiados pela ingenuidade --ainda mais sobre tema tão sensível.

Outro aspecto relevante é que, apesar de a representação internacional do Estado iraniano ter mudado recentemente --com a substituição de Ahmadinejad por Rowhani na Presidência--, o regime teocrático permanece.

A substituição de Clinton por Kerry também não significou ruptura com as linhas de política externa do governo Obama.

O novo posicionamento (não belicista) dos EUA em relação ao Irã, não muito distante daquela solução diplomática que Brasil e Turquia engendraram em 2010, pode sugerir algumas lições.

A mais importante: não se deve esperar tolerância das grandes potências com as ações políticas empreendidas por países intermediários (em termos militares e econômicos), como Brasil e Turquia.

A aquisição de credenciais para participar da gestão da ordem mundial não se dá de modo "natural". Emancipar-se e entrar para o "clube das potências" é um processo que envolve opções custosas --e não necessariamente pacíficas-- para o Estado.

Em regra, potências médias são recompensadas por se manterem coerentes com determinados compromissos previamente assumidos. Ou seja: a lógica da política internacional valoriza a acomodação ao status quo.

Assim, é razoável esperar por desencontros e divergências entre as políticas externas de uma nação já estabelecida --como os EUA-- e outra que, como o Brasil, busca ascender no "ranking" dos Estados soberanos.

Os atritos entre os dois países serão, presumivelmente, mais frequentes daqui por diante. E, em certo sentido, é até bom que isso aconteça.

O Estado de S. Paulo - 'Nenhum dos lados quer o Irã com a bomba' / Entrevista / Ali Larijani

Político próximo ao líder supremo diz que país mudou com Rohani no poder e esta é uma administração 'sensata'

JAMIL CHADE, CORRESPONDENTE / GENEBRA

"O Irã mudou" e sabe que a construção de uma bomba atômica levaria o país a um "caminho destrutivo". As afirmações são de um dos principais nomes da política iraniana, Ali Larijani, presidente do Parlamento e um dos mais próximos do aiatolá Khamenei, líder supremo do país.

A menos de uma semana da reunião em Genebra que marcará a volta das negociações sobre o dossiê nuclear iraniano entre Teerã e o Ocidente, Larijani falou por mais de uma hora com um grupo restrito de meios de comunicação, entre eles o Estado. Ele confirmou a mudança de tom de seu governo.

O político afirmou que o acordo nuclear que o Brasil negociou com o Irã em 2009 não poderá ser usado como base de um novo entendimento. Mas garantiu que não existe um problema nas relações entre Teerã e Brasília.

Larijani chegou a ser candidato a presidente, em 2005, contra Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, mas ficou com apenas 5,8% dos votos. Foi chefe da Guarda Revolucionária e negociador-chefe para os temas nucleares.

O que pode sair das negociações da semana que vem?

Um pequeno grupo de países que estava usando sanções e ameaças optou por uma solução política. Se a vontade coletiva é de se ter uma solução política, então a solução será relativamente fácil.

As bases do acordo que o ex-presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva propôs ainda podem servir de modelo para o processo?

A base de Lula era para ajudar a criar algo totalmente diferente. Naquele momento, precisávamos de combustível enriquecido em 20% para o reator. Essa necessidade foi atendida de outra maneira e o caso está encerrado. A Agência (Internacional de Energia Atômica) e certos países se recusaram a nos permitir abastecer de combustível e tivemos de abastecer a nós mesmos com o que produzimos. A negociação hoje é totalmente diferente.

Em que é tão diferente?

O Irã está demandando o reconhecimento de uso pacífico de energia nuclear. É parte de nossos direitos. O outro lado diz estar preocupado que o programa conduza a uma bomba. Concordamos que uma bomba será um caminho muito destrutivo. Portanto, as duas partes precisam chegar à fórmula para que as duas preocupações sejam atendidas. Não pode ser tão difícil.

O Brasil ainda teria espaço nas negociações?

O Irã daria as boas vindas a qualquer tipo de papel que o Brasil desempenhar.

Houve um distanciamento entre o Irã e o Brasil nos últimos anos?

Não de nossa parte. Temos muitos pontos em comum e nossas relações comerciais são importantes.

Como o sr. vê a posição dos EUA? Washington diz que quer negociar, mas insiste que respostas militares estão sobre a mesa.

Esses comentários são problemáticos para eles mesmos. Ninguém dá mais valor a essas ameaças dos EUA.

O governo americano já deu algum sinal para restabelecer a confiança?

Precisamos ser realistas. Por 50 anos, eles mantiveram uma política de opressão contra o Irã. Montaram golpes de estado e guerra. Não podem restabelecer confiança da noite para o dia.

O que o Irã exige dos EUA para restabelecer relações diplomáticas normais?

Que eles não sabotem as negociações. Mudanças ocorreram com os dois lados. Países que achavam que poderiam colocar pressão para que o Irã mudasse de posição entenderam que persistimos em nossos objetivos e temos hoje acesso maior à tecnologia nuclear para fins pacíficos. Uma nova administração chegou ao poder no Irã e, claro, tem seu próprio estilo de negociação. O Irã mudou.

Os ativos iranianos congelados por anos pelos americanos fariam parte dessas ações para criar confiança?

Não sei quanto há bloqueado pelo mundo. Mas é algo avaliado em mais de US$ 10 bilhões. Só peço aos americanos que não peguem uma parte do dinheiro.

Com a ligação entre os presidentes do Irã e dos EUA, parece haver uma chance real para um diálogo. Quais são as propostas concretas?

A retomada da negociação é de fato uma janela de oportunidades, mas as partes precisam usá-la. Se uma delas dormir no ponto, vamos perder. Precisamos ter um plano da direção a que vamos e eu garanto que esses planos existem. No encontro que teremos, não será uma noite para recitar poemas.

Países no Ocidente esperam obter do Irã um compromisso no que se refere ao máximo de atividades de enriquecimento de urânio. O sr. está preparado para aceitar isso?

Minha impressão é de que não estamos na posição zero nas negociações. Na questão de transparência, não há diferenças. Somos parte da AIEA. Até hoje há inspeções e câmeras em nossas instalações. Mas não podem ser feitas regras apenas para o Irã.

A situação econômica que vive o Irã pesou para que o país aceitasse voltar a negociar?

Os problemas enfrentados com a economia não tem qualquer relação com sanções. Tivemos problemas de gerência e isso já está sendo trabalhado.

Quais eram suas diferenças com o ex-presidente Ahmadinejad?

Não era uma competição. Mas tínhamos ideias diferentes. Acredito que a nova administração é sensata.

Como o sr. vê o que está ocorrendo no Egito?

Não estamos contentes. Uma grande revolução ocorreu no Egito. Mas algum tempo depois ela encontrou problemas. O exercício democrático começou e o experimento foi apoiado pelo Irã. Lamentavelmente, alguns partidos criaram problemas. Garanto que, no caso de Egito, Bahrein ou Síria, uma opção militar não é a resposta efetiva.

E a situação na Síria?

Não haverá solução da noite para o dia. O envolvimento de terroristas é algo preocupante. Eles entraram na Síria dos quatro cantos do mundo, mesmo da Europa. Criaram uma série de ilhas terroristas, trouxeram armas e cresceram. Se esse terrorismo continuar, vai ter repercussões globais. Se alguns países pararem de dar armas, então pode ser rapidamente solucionado. Os governos que ajudaram a radicalizar o conflito entenderam que uma solução militar não é possível.

Iran vs Mundo: decepcao com o discurso do presidente iraniano na AGNU - National Review

Agora, vamos tratar de coisas um pouco mais sérias do que alegações de espionagem americana, coisas que preocupam o mundo, como o programa nuclear iraniano. Parece que as esperanças de que o novo presidente fosse empreender um novo caminho, e responder, ainda que parcialmente, à abertura demonstrada pelo presidente Obama, se desvaneceram rapidamente, como revelado nesta matéria, que traz avaliações de diversos especialistas.
Grato a Regina Caldas pelo envio.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

First Impressions on Rouhani’s Speech 24th September 2013 - National Review Online Here’s how Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s U.N. speech struck five Foundation for Defense of Democracies scholars: Ali Alfoneh: While a world away from Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s primitive rhetoric, President Hassan Rouhani’s speech never managed to reach the American audience. Unlike Mohammad Khatami, Iranian president from 1997 to 2005, whose UN speeches engaged the American people and the US government, new Iranian President Hassan Rouhan alienated both by repeating perceived “crimes” of the United States while exonerating the Islamic Republic of any mistakes. This shows that Rouhani was not attempting to find common ground with Americans but that he rather aimed to please developing nations, rising powers, and hardliners at home in Tehran. This is how Rouhani reciprocated Obama’s invitation to positive engagement between the two countries.   On one point however, Khatami and Rouhani are similar: Both are insignificant when it comes to strategic decision-making in Iran. John Hannah: Obama came to the U.N. to preemptively concede that regime change is not our policy in Iran — punctuated by his conspicuous failure to utter one word of concern for the freedom and human rights of the Iranian people. Rouhani came to NY to lure the leader of the free world into the humiliating position of chasing after him for a meeting — only to summarily diss the offer when it was eagerly tendered. And then he gave a defiant speech to boot that surrendered not an inch to U.S. demands. Score it: Rouhani 1; Obama 0. Emanuele Ottolenghi: President Rouhani is a poster child of his clerical-fascist regime. For evidence, look no further than this speech. Short of the apocalyptic and often offensive rhetoric of his predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Rouhani offered no real novelty. Iran’s elected president remains beholden to the third-worldist rhetoric of his regime. He showed no propensity to bank on the good will that Western nations expressed toward him and he rebuffed President Obama for trying to be conciliatory. There will be no change in Iran’s posture, either on nuclear issues or on regional issues. President Rouhani’s speech should disabuse us of the notion that we can find an understanding with him on the strength of his supposed moderation. There is no moderation – and the sooner Western leaders acknowledge that, the better. Reuel Marc Gerecht: All in all, a typical — and for President Obama disappointing — speech from Hassan Rouhani.  Rouhani played to his third-world Islamic revolutionary roots while trying, only occasionally, to borrow the language of Mohammad Khatami, without any of the former president’s intellectual and emotional sincerity.  An easy victory awaited Rouhani in New York:  just a little confession about past nuclear deception, just a bit of give on Iran’s “industrial-scale” enrichment. But no give at all. Rouhani was with Rafsanjani when the latter established Iran’s nuclear-weapons program.  Iranian nuclear-science defectors gave the U.S. a good rundown on exactly what the regime intended. Rouhani — and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei behind him — have made it hard for President Obama to punt this down the road, to de facto surrender to the nuclearization of the Islamic Republic. Rouhani has refused Obama’s meeting because to an extend a hand to an American president, even one so forgiving as Barack Obama, was anathema. It would have most probably troubled him personally, and greatly troubled the Supreme Leader and his Revolutionary Guards. So, it will be difficult for President Obama to turn this performance into an opening and a long postponement of Judgment Day. All in all, I’d give Rowhani a C-. Mark Dubowitz: Rouhani is a master of nuclear deception and Iranian historical revisionism whose strategy is to get sanctions lifted while achieving the nuclear weapons goal to which he, Khamenei, and the rest of Iran’s Revolutionary elite have been committed to for decades. To do that, he will offer enough in the way of nuclear concessions to stretch out nuclear negotiations into next year while insisting on the right to enrichment. By mid 2014, Iran’s nuclear program will reach the point of critical capability where Tehran will have enough operational centrifuges to break out or sneak out to a bomb in an undetectable way. As Rouhani approaches that point, he will let it be known that Iran doesn’t want a nuclear weapon, the Supreme Leader has a fatwa against such a weapon, and Iran will only develop a weapon if it’s threatened with continued sanctions and backed into a corner. Rouhani will demand massive sanctions relief, which he will receive from an anxious administration desperate to keep Iran from a nuke. Then when the Iranian economy is stabilized and the oil starts flowing, Khamenei will give into his irresistible urge to break out to a weapon and test. At that point, Khamenei and Rouhani will have achieved their objective of a nuclear armed Iran with a stable economy and regional dominance. The key to this success of strategy is to insist on the right of enrichment as nonnegotiable. Of course it has to be nonnegotiable for Iran: They can’t build a nuclear weapon without it. Checkmate.

Sobre Israel e o Iran: quem nao conhece historia, costuma falar bobagens

Comentários recebidos de um ignorante sobre a questão do programa nuclear iraniano, sobre a postura da teocracia iraniana em relação a Israel, seguida de minha resposta ao comentarista:

[Fulano] deixou um novo comentário sobre a sua postagem "Iran: destruir Israel continua a ser politica de E...": 

Sim , eu entendo que o regime do Irã é uma puta de uma loucura opressiva , mas deixemos as consideraçoes sobre o regime iraniano de lado e partamos para analisar o interesses do Estado Iraniano . Sim , eles têm motivo valido para recorrer ao armamento nuclear por um motivo bem simples ...Israel é inimigo ...não do Brasil ou de qualquer outro pais ocidental , mas sim para o Irã ..Israel É UM INIMIGO , um inimigo bem armado e que POSSUI ARMAS NUCLEARES . Ai vale a velha logica humana , se seu inimigo tem pedaço de pau você tem de logo tratar de achar um pedaço de pau maior , não é uma logica bonita ..mas é a logica que impera entre os estados desde que o mundo é mundo. Além disso , o Irã é um grande produtor de petroleo ..e depois do Iraque ficou claro que os Estado Unidos da America não se importam de inventar qualquer desculpa para invandir um país ...sim , o Irã é um potencial alvo ...não sei se da administração Obama ...mas se dependesse da boa vontade republicana já estaria chovendo misséis em alguns lugares . Os ocidentais tendem a ver os iranianos como causadores de briga e os "vilões" ...porém não existe vilões quando se fala em países , o que existe são "interesses" . É por interesses que ocorrem guerras , não porque uma parte é "má" e outra é "boa" . O Irã nada mais esta fazendo do que ser esperto e se armar, duvido que quando ele estiver de posse de armas atomicas ..o discurso de Israel vai ser tão grosso e prepotente ...porém fica a grande duvida , o que o Irã vai fazer com essas bombas ? vai começar uma guerra de extinção mutua com Israel ???...

Deixo bem claro que não apoio nenhum tipo de exterminio contra o "povo de israel " que não tem nada a ver com a ação prepotente e genocida praticada pelo governo israelita contra os palestinos . Que a Israel foi o maior erro de todos que a ONU , eu da minha parte considero mais que provado . Criar um pais do nada num lugar que A BIBLIA ( oh !! a unica fonte de verdade ...) diz que é dos judeus , porém é fato que este mesmo territorio vem sendo habitado por dezenas de povos durante o tempo ...se formos seguir o mesmo raciocinio ..deveriamos dar a "terra historica do curdos " ....o Brasil deveria ser devolvido aos Indios e um monte de outros casos . Porém , isso é impraticavél e a prova maior disso é Israel . Um estado insustentavel que não acredito que vá sobreviver até o final deste seculo ( fala serio , eu nao sei nem se o mundo aguenta até o final deste seculo ) . Resumindo , Irã está fazendo o que ele tem de fazer , Israel defendera-se ...e podemos ter uma guerra .Uma guerra com G MAIUSCULO , pois Irã não é presa fácil e os Estado Unidos dificilmente fariam uso de força nuclear ...Israel , já nao sei ...seria uma guera dura com repercussões severas , e com a possibilidade perigosa de envolvimento tanto da China quanto da Russia , o que levaria a um clima propicio para a eclosão da nossa querida WWIII...serio meu , o mundo hoje esta tão ferrado que até um conflito num pais como o Irã, que não nenhum Grande pais ocidental ou mesmo uma potencia ...pode causar um provavel apocalipse para a raça humana ( não extinção ...muito dificil extinção ) . Parece piada , mas o mundo está tão desenvolvido que as guerras tornaram-se coisas que ja não se pode se dar ao luxo de fazer .

Minha resposta ao comentarista ignorante:

[Fulano,]
Lamento dizer, mas suas teses são, não apenas viciadas, mas viciosas, erradas, equivocadas, deformadas, deturpadas e absolutamente inaceitáveis.
Vc nao tem nenhum conhecimento histórico para dizer o que diz, e aliás, não tem nenhuma lógica no que você diz.
Lamento dizer, mas você sabe muito pouco, ou nada, das relações entre Israel e o Irã.
Os dois países eram amigos, aliados, cordiais companheiros na balança de poder do Oriente Medio aos tempos do Xa Rheza Pahlevi, e estavam em ótimas relações, com troca de informações, venda de armas e consultas de inteligência sobre os árabes.
Ou seja, Israel NUNCA foi inimigo do Irã.
Quem é inimigo de Israel é a teocracia iraniana.
Aprenda um pouco de história, rapaz, vai lhe fazer bem.
Quando não sabe uma coisa, evite falar bobagem.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Iran: uma nova Coreia do Norte? - Wall Street Journal

Com as sanções se aproximando, o Irã pode tornar-se um novo país recluso, introvertido, fechado no seu sistema rígido, tendo como únicas portas para o mundo a China e a Rússia.
A ver...
Sanctions for Iran as Talks Fail

By ALAN CULLISON

The Wall Street Journal, June 19, 2012

MOSCOW—Sanctions aimed at punishing Iran will begin in two weeks after another round of talks with world powers ended without an agreement by Tehran to curb its nuclear program.

The lead negotiators for both sides said the ball was in the other's court after the end of talks here. Catherine Ashton, the European Union's foreign policy chief, and Saeed Jalili, the lead Iranian negotiator, used similar words, saying that the other had "a choice" to make to get negotiations restarted.

Iran had hoped the talks might forestall the looming sanctions. With new penalties now a certainty, the long-running international dispute has entered an unpredictable new phase that will test past Iranian threats to retaliate, including a vow to choke off a key global oil channel, the Strait of Hormuz.

In the absence of talks, sanctions also may be the last barrier to a possible Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear facilities, a step U.S. officials fear could spark a wider conflict.

Enlarge Image

Associated Press

Iran's Jalili, center, said the talks were 'a test on whether the West is for or against Iran's scientific progress.'

Iran's economy already is suffering shocks because of a combination of government mismanagement and sanctions that have driven up the cost of staple goods by as much as 50%.

Upcoming penalties will up the ante by targeting Iranian oil exports, its main source of revenue. A European Union embargo on all Iranian oil sales takes effect July 1, a move that could endanger as much as a third of Iran's revenue.

Before that, the White House will impose sanctions on firms doing business with Iran's central bank beginning June 28, another tool to drain Tehran of its oil revenue.

The U.S. Congress is likewise poised to push for more sanctions after the failure of talks in the past two months in Istanbul, Baghdad and now Moscow.

U.S. officials underscored their determination to enforce sanctions with a warning to Venezuela on Tuesday over a plan to cooperate with Iran to develop surveillance drones.

"All countries, including Venezuela, have an obligation to comply with international sanctions against Iran," said State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland. "We're committed to ensuring that if we see violations of Iran sanctions, that we will call them out and that we will seek appropriate action."

Iran and the world powers agreed to extend the negotiations by planning some lower-level technical meetings on July 3 in Istanbul.

No higher-level meetings are yet scheduled.

Compounding the setback, Iran recently backed out of a tentative deal with the United Nations' nuclear watchdog to provide its inspectors with greater access to scientists, sites and documents believed to be tied to Tehran's nuclear work.

Underscoring the rising stakes, the U.S. House Armed Services Committee will hold a hearing Wednesday on military options for addressing Iran's nuclear program.

Under the new U.S. sanctions, any foreign state bank processing oil transactions through Iran's central bank, called Bank Markazi, could be punished. Non-state institutions doing business with Bank Markazi could also be hit.

The State Department has granted waivers in recent months from these sanctions to countries that have shown a willingness to reduce their Iran oil purchases.

But China and Singapore could still be targeted after June 28, U.S. officials said.

Additional U.S. sanctions could further target Iranian energy and financial sectors as well as its shipping and insurance businesses, said Sen. Mark Kirk (R., Ill.), who has advanced new sanctions legislation.

"After three rounds of meetings, Iran remains in violation of multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions ordering it to halt all its uranium enrichment activities," Mr. Kirk said.

Diplomats called the two days of talks in Moscow "intense and tough" but said that the two sides remained far apart on how to unwind Iran's uranium enrichment program, which Tehran again Tuesday called an "inalienable right" of the Iranian people.

Western officials had expressed hope that the talks Monday and Tuesday would bear fruit, in part because heightened pressure from the Kremlin, which has traditionally maintained a closer relationship with Iran than most of the other Security Council members that are pressuring Tehran to scale back its nuclear program.

Russian officials dined with the Iranian delegation, and met with members in an effort to push along negotiations.

But U.S. and European officials said the talks remained deadlocked over Iran's program.

As in previous talks in Baghdad last month and in Istanbul before that, Iran demanded a lifting of sanctions before it would back off on its enrichment of uranium to 20% purity, which Western officials call perilously close to weapons grade.

But world powers have insisted that Iran take the first conciliatory step and have been proposing a step-by-step program in which Iran will be rewarded for putting a halt to its high-grade nuclear enrichment, ship out the highly-enriched fuel that it has amassed, and shut down a nuclear facility situated deep in a mountain that is impervious to an airstrike.

Ms. Ashton, the lead negotiator for the six powers in talks, said at the end of two days of meeting Tuesday that "significant gaps" remain between the two sides.

U.S. officials insisted that neither they nor their partners changed their demands in Moscow, or offered any sanctions relief before Iran takes steps to start meeting the international community's demands. In fact, the timing of the July 3 meeting, two days after a ban on Iranian oil purchases goes into effect in Europe, is a sign that Iran hasn't won any easing or postponing of sanctions, they said.

In the weeks leading to the talks, Iran likewise took a tough stance, with Iranian officials reiterating the Islamic Republic's position that enriching uranium is an "absolute right" under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Mr. Jalili, the Iranian chief negotiator, told Iranian reporters before entering the talks on Monday that this round of talks was really " a test on whether the West is for or against Iran's scientific progress."

Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has the last word on all state matters, indirectly made a reference to the nuclear talks in a speech on Monday making it clear where Iran stands on compromise.

"Our enemies should know that arrogance and un-substantiated demands from Iran will lead to nowhere," Mr.Khamenei said, according to official media. He also said Iran's resistance and progress stands as an example of standing up to injustice in the world.

—Farnaz Fassihi and Jay Solomon contributed to this article.

Write to Alan Cullison at alan.cullison@wsj.com

A version of this article appeared June 20, 2012, on page A1 in the U.S. edition of The Wall Street Journal, with the headline: Sanctions for Iran as Talks Fail.

O espiao que veio da Persia: drone americano revela segredos do programa nuclear iraniano

U.S. intelligence gains in Iran seen as boost to confidence

By Joby Warrick and Greg Miller 

The Washington Post, April 8, 2012

More than three years ago, the CIA dispatched a stealth surveillance drone into the skies over Iran.
The bat-winged aircraft penetrated more than 600 miles inside the country, captured images of Iran’s secret nuclear facility at Qom and then flew home. All the while, analysts at the CIA and other agencies watched carefully for any sign that the craft, dubbed the RQ-170 Sentinel, had been detected by Tehran’s air defenses on its maiden voyage.
“There was never even a ripple,” said a former senior U.S. intelligence official involved in the previously undisclosed mission.
CIA stealth drones scoured dozens of sites throughout Iran, making hundreds of passes over suspicious facilities, before a version of the RQ-170 crashed inside Iran’s borders in December. The surveillance has been part of what current and former U.S. officials describe as an intelligence surge that is aimed at Iran’s nuclear program and that has been gaining momentum since the final years of George W. Bush’s administration.
The effort has included ramped-up eavesdropping by the National Security Agency, formation of an Iran task force among satellite-imagery analysts and an expanded network of spies, current and former U.S. officials said.
At a time of renewed debate over whether stopping Iran might require military strikes, the expanded intelligence collection has reinforced the view within the White House that it will have early warning of any move by Iran to assemble a nuclear bomb, officials said.
“There is confidence that we would see activity indicating that a decision had been made,” said a senior U.S. official involved in high-level discussions about Iran policy. “Across the board, our access has been significantly improved.”
The expanded intelligence effort has coincided with a covert campaign by the CIA and other agencies to sabotage Iran’s nuclear program and has enabled an escalation in the use of targeted economic sanctions by the United States and its allies to weaken Iran’s resolve.
The Obama administration has cited new intelligence reports in arguing against a preemptive military strike by Israel against Iranian nuclear facilities.
Israeli officials have pushed for a more aggressive response to Iran’s nuclear activities, arguing that Iran is nearing what some officials have called a “zone of immunity,” in which Iran can quickly complete the final steps toward becoming a nuclear power inside heavily fortified bunkers protected from Israeli airstrikes.
White House officials contend that Iran’s leaders have not decided to build a nuclear weapon, and they say it would take Iran at least a year to do so if it were to launch a crash program now.
“Even in the absolute worst case — six months — there is time for the president to have options,” said the senior U.S. official, one of seven current or former advisers on security policy who agreed to discuss U.S. options on Iran on the condition of anonymity.
The improved intelligence also strengthens the administration’s bargaining position ahead of nuclear talks with Iran, tentatively scheduled for Friday. The United States and five other countries — Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany — are expected to press Iran to accept curbs on its nuclear program that would make it far more difficult for the country to build a nuclear weapon. A key demand, Western diplomats say, is for Iran to halt production at its uranium enrichment plant at Qom, which was built in mountain tunnels beyond the reach of all but the most advanced bombs and missiles. In return for such a concession, Iran could be allowed to keep some semblance of a commercial nuclear power program under heavy international oversight, diplomats say. It is unclear, however, whether Iran would agree to restrictions on its program. In recent days, Iran has refused even to commit to a venue for the talks.
The CIA declined to comment on the nature of its operations against Iran. Officials familiar with the operations, however, acknowledged that there had been some setbacks and conceded that aspects of Iran’s nuclear decision-making remain opaque, including the calculations made by the Islamic republic’s senior political and clerical leadership.
Iranian officials insist publicly that the program is for peaceful energy production. But experts skeptical of that explanation warn that Iran may become more adept at hiding parts of its nuclear program, particularly if it succeeds in building more powerful centrifuges that can enrich uranium in smaller, dispersed facilities.
“They have been taken off-guard in the past, and now they do their best to conceal,” said Olli Heinonen, who formerly directed nuclear inspections inside Iran for the International Atomic Energy Agency. While Western spy agencies have been successful of late, he said, “they are shooting at a moving target.”
The still-fresh sting of Iraq
There is also the chastening experience of Iraq. A decade ago, analysts at the CIA and other agencies were confident that Iraq had stockpiles of banned weapons, including the components of a nuclear weapons program. A costly U.S. invasion and futile search for those stockpiles proved them wrong.
The sting of that intelligence failure was still fresh when U.S. spy agencies came under pressure to ramp up collection efforts against Iran. By 2006, U.S. intelligence officials and top Bush advisers had become alarmed by deep gaps in U.S. knowledge of Iran’s nuclear efforts and ambitions.
Michael V. Hayden, then the new CIA director, recalled a White House briefing in which Bush became visibly agitated.
At the time, Iran was rapidly expanding its stockpile of enriched uranium at its main Natanz facility while working on what was then a secret site at Qom. American officials feared that Iran might surprise the world with a nuclear weapons test that would leave U.S. leaders with two highly unpalatable options: Attack Iran or accept the emergence of a new nuclear power in the Middle East.
At one point, Bush turned to Hayden and said, “I don’t want any U.S. president to be faced with only two choices when it comes to Iran,” according to Hayden. Efforts to reach Bush for comment were not successful.
The meeting became the impetus for overhauling the CIA’s approach to a country considered one of its hardest targets. The agency’s Iran experts and operatives were moved from its Near East Division to a group focused exclusively on Iran, much as the CIA had formed its Counterterrorism Center 20 years earlier.
“We put the best people on the job and put the most talented people in charge,” Hayden said. “Then we said, ‘Tell us what you need to get the job done.’ ”
Known internally as “Persia House,” the Iran Operations Division was set up in the agency’s Old Headquarters Building. Over time, it swelled from several dozen analysts and officers to several hundred. The division is now headed by a veteran case officer who previously served as CIA station chief in Islamabad, Pakistan.
“It got a robust budget,” said a former senior CIA official who worked in the Near East Division at the time. The Iran division’s emphasis was “getting people overseas in front of people they needed to be in front of — there are a lot of places to meet Iranians outside Iran.”
The division began assembling an informant network that stretched from the Middle East to South America, where Iran’s security services have a long-standing presence. The CIA also exploited the massive U.S. military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq to mount espionage operations against the country sandwiched between those war zones.
Limited damage
One of those operations was exposed last year, when an RQ-170, flown from an airstrip in Afghanistan, crashed inside Iran. Officials in Tehran have triumphantly claimed credit for bringing the stealth drone down and have released pictures showing the drone apparently patched up after the crash. U.S. officials say a technical failure caused the crash.
The former intelligence official familiar with the beginnings of the stealth drone missions said that there had been pointed debate before deploying the first aircraft over whether it should be equipped with a so-called self-destruction package, which could blow an RQ-170 to bits if it flew off course.
The director of national intelligence at the time, Michael McConnell, was among the high-ranking officials who pushed to have the package installed. But the CIA’s engineering team balked, saying it would add too much weight to the delicately balanced frame.
Despite the setback, U.S. officials said that some surveillance flights continue and that the damage to American espionage capacity overall has been limited.
That is partly because the drone flights were only a small part of a broad espionage campaign involving the NSA, which intercepts ­e-mail and electronic communications, as well as the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, which scours satellite imagery and was the first to spot the uranium enrichment plant at Qom.
The CIA’s expanded efforts continued under director Leon E. Panetta, who built partnerships with allied intelligence services in the region capable of recruiting operatives for missions inside Iran, former intelligence officials said.
The agency has encountered problems. Shahram Amiri, an Iranian defector and scientist in the country’s nuclear program, had been given $5 million by the CIA and relocated to Tucson. But in 2010, he abandoned his American life and returned to Tehran — where he had a young son — giving Iranian officials not only a propaganda victory but probably information on what his CIA debriefers were most desperate to learn.
U.S. officials said Amiri had been handled by the CIA’s Counter­proliferation Division after he approached U.S. officials in Vienna and volunteered to spy. That division continues to handle scientists and technical experts connected to Iran’s program, while Persia House focuses on leadership figures and the nation’s sprawling military and security services, including the Republican Guard Corps.
“The real damage was image — we looked like the Keystone Kops,” said a former senior CIA official of Amiri’s return to Iran. “In terms of actual damage — no, we collected all kinds of great stuff.”
The expanded espionage effort has confirmed the consensus view expressed by the U.S. intelligence community in a controversial estimate released publicly in 2007. That estimate concluded that while Iran remains resolutely committed to assembling key building blocks for a nuclear weapons program, particularly enriched uranium, the nation’s leaders have opted for now against taking the crucial final step: designing a nuclear warhead.
“It isn’t the absence of evidence, it’s the evidence of an absence,” said one former intelligence official briefed on the findings. “Certain things are not being done.”


Staff writer Julie Tate contributed to this report.