Brazil's Global Ambitions
Harold Trinkunas
Brookings, 6 Feb 2015
Harold Trinkunas is the Charles W. Robinson Chair and
senior fellow and director of the Latin America Initiative in the Foreign
Policy program. His research focuses on Latin American politics, particularly
on issues related to democratization and security. He has also written on
terrorism financing, borders and ungoverned spaces.
The world's seventh-largest economy needs a foreign
policy that matches rhetoric with capabilities.
When President Dilma
Rousseff first took office in
2010, Brazil’s future looked exceptionally bright. For nearly a decade, the
country had benefited from Asia’s enormous appetite for its commodities. This
allowed Brazil to reduce poverty and expand the middle class while at the same
time sustaining a remarkable growth rate, becoming the seventh largest economy
in the world in 2014.
But by the time Rousseff was sworn in for a second term on January 1, 2015, she
faced serious decisions about Brazil’s future. Brazil’s development model based
on domestic consumption and commodity exports has reached its limits and the
real is significantly overvalued, thus undercutting the competitiveness of its
non-commodity-based export sectors. Moreover, the Southern Common Market, Mercosur,
which had once showcased Brazil’s leadership in regional integration, now ties
Brazil’s flagging economy to two of the most troubled economies in South
America—Argentina and Venezuela. At the same time, the two most significant
global trade negotiations in a decade, the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the
Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, are nearing completion without
Brazil.
Brazil has sought to play the role of a major power on
the global stage since the beginning of the twentieth century, but it will not
earn this status just by virtue of its size, burgeoning population and
impressive economic achievements. Historically, rising powers acquired
dreadnoughts or sizeable armies to achieve influence. Today, they also seek to
become a permanent member on the United Nations Security Council or lead the
World Trade Organization.[1] Brazil under Dilma stands at a crossroads: it can try to parlay its rising
economic might and soft power into global influence, or it can remain a
regional power, albeit a significant one, with limited influence on the course
of world events. To turn its aspirations into reality, Brazil will have
to deploy its national capabilities more effectively to shape the rules
governing the international order.
Hard and Soft Powers
Unlike other global powers, which employ economic and
military hard power to play a role in shaping the international order, Brazil
has primarily relied on its soft power and exhibited a notable reluctance to
compel other states to follow its lead. Brazil’s largely peaceful history and
secure geostrategic position meant that it never felt the need to project power
abroad through military strength.
Unlike other rising powers, such as India and China,
Brazil’s regional security environment is enviably peaceful, at least at the
interstate level. This has not only allowed Brazil to escape the costs of
creating a formidable military machine, but encouraged Brasília’s policymakers
to believe that shrewd diplomacy was sufficient to propel them onto the world
stage. In 2012, Brazil was 68th in the world in terms of military expenditure
as a percentage of GDP, and 11th in the world in terms of total amount
spent.[2] Although Brazil has steadily increased defense spending over the past
two decades—and although its defense budget accounts for over half of Latin
America’s total defense expenditures—this has not yet translated into concrete
capabilities that would enable its armed forces to conduct significant combat
operations beyond its borders.[3]
At the same time, Brazil has been reluctant to
leverage its hard economic power, either in the form of rewards or sanctions,
to make other countries follow its lead. Brazil has made large strides in
reducing poverty and growing its middle class.[4] Its national development
bank, BNDES, is a significant player in both internal and regional development,
with a total lending volume three times that of the World Bank in 2011.[5]
However, Brazil has shied away from committing economic resources beyond South
America. And its official international development assistance remains quite
modest.[6]
In contrast to these historical and self-imposed
limits on the use of its hard power, Brazil wields significant soft power
relative to many states. It ranks 17th in the world, according to the
Monocle/Institute for Government’s 2012 ranking of soft power, ahead of
developing countries and many of the rising powers.[7] The emphasis of its
foreign policy on equity, inclusion and universal institutions appeals to many
states, especially small and middle powers. Brazilian diplomats are widely
respected for their professionalism and effectiveness, and Brazilians consider
themselves to be particularly adroit at bringing together parties with opposing
points of view.[8] Domestically, Brazil provides an attractive narrative of
economic growth with a strong state and a growing degree of social inclusion.
As Brazil has substantially consolidated its democracy over the past three
decades, its political success story contributes to its prestige in international
and regional forums.[9]
Constraints in Cooperation
Brazil’s renewed attempts to rise to major power
status benefit from two unique opportunities. The first is Brazil’s ascendancy
in South America. For most of the twentieth century, Argentina was a regional
rival to Brazil in economic and military terms. The Argentine-Brazilian rivalry
is now history, marked not only by diminished military competition, but also a
mutual agreement on nuclear non-proliferation that consolidated Latin America’s
status as a nuclear-free zone. The likelihood of interstate war in South
America involving Brazil has become very low, further reducing Brazil’s need
for military capabilities.
During the past decade, Brazil has also worked
steadily to constrain challengers within South America, principally through
regional integration and multilateral diplomacy.[10] The reduction in security
tensions was complemented by the negotiation of Mercosur, a new common market
arrangement initially formed with Argentina in 1988 and ratified by Paraguay
and Uruguay in 1991. This set of negotiations and agreements transformed
Brazil’s main rival in South America into a partner.[11] Brazil also laid the
groundwork for securing its regional ascendancy through new multilateral
institutions that excluded the United States. These institutions evolved under
President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to become the Union of South American
Nations (UNASUR) in 2008. UNASUR excludes not only the U.S., but also Canada,
Mexico and Central America, which are considered too politically and
economically tied to Washington.[12] Most recently, Brazil has worked to create
the Comunidad de Estados de Latinoamérica y el Caribe (CELAC), which includes
South, Central American and Caribbean states—but pointedly, neither the U.S.
nor Canada.
The second new opportunity arises from the fading of
post-Cold War U.S. hegemony and the subsequent rise of global multipolarity.
This geopolitical opening offers rising powers the opportunity to influence the
international order more actively as their own capabilities improve relative to
those of established powers. Moreover, the increasing number of powers critical
in varying degrees of the existing liberal international order—Brazil is joined
in this respect by Russia, China, India, South Africa, Turkey, and Iran—offers
Brazilian policymakers a range of potential collaborators with common interests
in revising the international system. Brazil hopes that the sum of the rising
powers will have a greater impact than each acting alone.[13]
Since Brazil is not a regional rival to any of these
nations, it can help facilitate multilateral networks among the rising powers.
The BRICS summits, bringing together the leaders of Brazil, Russia, India,
China, and South Africa, formally launched in 2009, are one example of new
initiatives that exclude the traditional major powers and provide opportunities
to craft alternative global governance institutions. In August 2014, for
instance, the BRICS nations announced they were forming an international development
bank with over $50 billion in starting capital. Brazil shares with its new
international partners an interest in defending their sovereignty and autonomy
of action, as well as in opening room for their participation in global “rule
shaping.”
Brazil also claims to represent the concerns of a
growing number of small and middle powers in the international system about
global inequality.[14] Why would smaller nations accept Brazil’s leadership?
Brazil’s attraction for smaller states has an economic and cultural dimension,
but it is based, more importantly, on its promised commitment to more
democratic, equitable and universal international institutions once it becomes
a major power.
Brazil has not been able to fully exploit these
opportunities. It has had limited success in persuading other states in South
America to adhere to the new order it purports to have created or to support it
in global forums. For example, Brazil’s leadership was challenged by Venezuelan
President Hugo Chávez, who used oil diplomacy and relations with leftist and
progressive movements around the globe in a bid for global influence. Brazil
defused Venezuela’s aspirations for regional leadership, but only by
incorporating some of Chávez’s ideological proposals into UNASUR and CELAC.[15]
While Venezuela’s regional challenge has faded, other
sub-regional institutions have emerged as would-be alternatives to UNASUR and
Mercosur, particularly the Pacific Alliance between Colombia, Peru, Chile, and
Mexico. The free-market foundation of these new groupings undermines the more
political logic for integration that Brazil has promoted within UNASUR. In
addition, Mexico’s re-engagement with South America has undermined Brazil’s
claim to uncontested regional leadership. Mexico and Argentina have also
quietly networked neighboring states to undermine Brazil’s campaign to win a
permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC).[16]
Perhaps most tellingly, Brazil’s historical reluctance
to place limits on its sovereignty through adherence to rules-based
international regimes has diminished the utility of Mercosur, UNASUR and CELAC
as platforms for its leadership. These institutions all have limited budgets,
small cadres of personnel and inconsistent leadership. In the absence of
capacity and commitment, these new multilateral institutions have essentially
devolved into opportunities for presidential summitry in the region rather than
institutions that can govern interstate relations or bind the actions of member
states. Their weakness highlights a central problem in Brazil’s
multilateralism: a willingness to evade the rules of the institutions it
creates. For example, Venezuela’s domestic legislation did not meet many
regulatory requirements for admission to Mercosur, nor did it fully adhere to
the institution’s democracy standard. Nevertheless, with consistent backing
from Brazil, Venezuela was admitted over the objection of other Mercosur member
states, such as Paraguay.
Brazil has also been unable to attract support for its
aspirations from the U.S. and other established powers, a major problem when
Brazil’s strategy relies on soft power. Its frequent criticism of the present
international order limits the chances that such powers will support Brazil’s
efforts to play the role in world affairs that it believes it deserves.
Consider Brazil’s quest for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council,
spearheaded by former President Lula da Silva. The lack of U.S. support for its
campaign has been a particular source of tension between Brasília and Washington,
even though Brazilian diplomats recognize that Russia and China also oppose
Brazilian permanent membership. Here, the contrast with Washington’s support
for India’s bid for a permanent seat has been particularly galling for
Brazilians.
Changing the Rules or Just Criticizing Them?
Brazil’s ability to act as a major power will depend
on its contributions to shaping and enforcing the rules that govern the
international order. Two recent episodes highlight the dilemmas Brazil faces:
the global financial crisis and international responses to imminent threats to
human security. Brazil has consistently privileged the use of diplomacy over
all other state capabilities, but its reluctance to assume economic and
military costs to contribute to global order prevents it from participating
effectively. Moreover, its desire to minimize the role of military power in
settling major conflicts, such as those in Iraq, Libya, and Syria, sometimes
leads it to propose solutions that are discarded as unrealistic by the established
powers.
Brazil had an unprecedented opportunity to insert
itself into the heart of international economic and financial governance during
the 2008 global financial crisis. The rising powers, which by and large were
much less affected by the crisis, garnered even more importance once reform and
recapitalization of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) became necessary. The
incumbent major powers turned to Brazil, India and China for support after
experiencing great economic turmoil, and Brazil was able to negotiate a
redistribution of IMF voting weights to better reflect the actual economic
power of the member states. Brazil’s role as a key member in the G-20, the
small group of states that coordinate international economic policy, indicates
that it has joined an exclusive group of major powers at least in the financial
domain. This is quite a contrast to Brazil’s stance during the 1980s Latin
American debt crisis, when it went along—often grudgingly—with IMF-recommended
austerity packages.[17] Brazil’s challenge will be to translate its new
institutional weight in the IMF—which has been delayed because of U.S.
congressional inaction on altering member country voting rights—into
meaningful, positive changes in how the IMF views the developing world and conducts
its business.
Since its reluctance to use hard power diminishes its
influence over policy outcomes, Brazil has been less successful as a global
actor in responding to international security crises. Brazil is frequently
critical of the selectivity with which international law is applied by the
major powers, especially in cases where the international community intervenes
in the internal affairs of states. Brazil’s stance runs counter to the
prevailing liberal international order, which is premised on the belief that
violations of popular sovereignty and humanitarian crises can at times trump
national sovereignty and permit the use of force to pursue humanitarian goals
or contain rogue states—and was codified in the concept of Responsibility to
Protect.
Brazil’s participation on the Security Council during
the 2011–2012 term brought it into direct conflict with this prevailing
order.[18] First, Brazil’s decision to caucus with BRICS in the UNSC was not
viewed positively by the three other permanent members of the Council. The
matter came to a head during the UN response to the conflict in Libya in 2011.
Brazil opposed the UN’s authorization of the use of force by NATO to justify an
expanded campaign against a broad range of government targets in Libya, leading
to the fall of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. The expansion of the intervening
powers’ objectives in Libya provoked criticism from the BRICS and developing
countries that Responsibility to Protect was being used as a cover for regime
change.
Brazil, instead, proposed the concept of
Responsibility While Protecting (RWP), advocating that before states deploy
military force to protect civilians in humanitarian and human rights crises,
they carefully consider collateral damage. The U.S. and many European states rejected
RWP as unrealistic, thus highlighting the ongoing disagreement between Brazil
and the West over norms governing the use of force in response to humanitarian
crises.[19] In the end, the initiative, while a major Brazilian diplomatic
effort, received scant support among the UNSC powers, demonstrating Brazil’s
inability to influence the core security debates among the major powers and
shape the rules governing the use of force in the international system.
Reconciling the Rise with Ambition
President Rousseff
has some difficult decisions ahead of her in 2015. Brazil needs to implement an
economic adjustment plan to address its overvalued currency, persistent
inflation, high levels of consumer debt, and slowing economic growth. Brazil’s
prospects in the energy sector, particularly the offshore oil field known as
the pré-sal, are not as bright as they once seemed. Finally, Rouseff’s thin
margin of victory in the 2014 presidential elections indicates that she will
preside over a divided country in which the Brazilian middle class will
continue to demand improved government effectiveness, efficiency and
accountability.
None of these issues present an insurmountable
obstacle to Brazil’s rise. Nor do they represent a long-term threat to its
success. Brazil has an unprecedented set of opportunities: a large economy,
considerable soft power, a lack of regional rivals, and a network of partners
among other rising powers and the developing world. But Brazil needs to do a
better job of using the hard power it does have—military or economic—while
still maintaining its commitment to the norms that have historically guided its
foreign policy.
Given that Brazil’s regional security environment is
likely to remain peaceful, its shortage of military hard power is likely to endure,
and the government is right not to emphasize this dimension. Rather, Brazil
should seek another avenue to shape the international order by extending the
scope and size of its contributions to international peacekeeping, focusing in
particular on developing the types of capabilities that are in short supply
among peacekeeping-contributing nations: intelligence, logistics, aviation,
communications, command, and control. By developing these capabilities, Brazil
would acquire greater influence on the terms under which its peacekeepers
deploy and the UN mandates under which they operate.
Brazil can also achieve
greater influence by extending the global reach of its humanitarian and
development assistance. Brazil currently ranks 23rd among international donors.20
Although Brazil’s overseas development assistance has risen in the past decade,
as the seventh largest economy in the world, Brazil should be able to increase
its humanitarian aid contributions above the 0.2 percent of gross national
income it donated in 2011.[20] Brazil has extensive domestic experience in
developing social programs to reduce poverty and foster social inclusion.
Through its Agência Brasileira de Cooperaçaõ, it is already using this
knowledge in its international assistance programs in the Americas and parts of
Africa. It could also expand the reach of its national development bank, BNDES,
to fund a broader range of projects overseas and work with the new BRICS bank
to ensure that its lending portfolio benefits from Brazil’s domestic experience.
Paulo Roberto de Almeidaé doutor em Ciências Sociais pela Universidade de Bruxelas (1984). Diplomata de carreira desde 1977, exerceu diversos cargos na Secretaria de Estado das Relações Exteriores e em embaixadas e delegações do Brasil no exterior. Trabalhou entre 2003 e 2007 como Assessor Especial no Núcleo de Assuntos Estratégicos da Presidência da República. Autor de vários trabalhos sobre relações internacionais e política externa do Brasil.