Como torrar o dinheiro do contribuinte com esses caros brinquedos militares: USS Gerald R. Ford - Courtney Mabeus (Popular Mechanics)

How the World’s Greatest Aircraft Carrier Became a $13 Billion Fiasco

Can the military save the USS Gerald R. Ford?

Courtney Mabeus

Popular Mechanics,  February 8, 2022

https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/a38941815/how-the-uss-gerald-r-ford-became-a-dollar13-billion-fiasco/

The USS Gerald R. Ford conducts high-speed turns in the Atlantic Ocean in October 2019.

U.S. Navy

The late 20th century was a time of supreme American confidence and rapid innovation. The Cold War was drawing to a close, the digital age was around the corner, and the Pentagon saw an opportunity to capitalize on peacetime and begin preparing for future conflict. With few diplomatic or military distractions, the United States ushered in a revolution in military technology.

Out of that boom period came ambitions for a new class of aircraft carrier headlined by the transformational USS Gerald R. Ford, a ship featuring an expanded flight deck, a boosted power plant, and support for almost two dozen emergent technologies. Expectations were high. The Ford’s nuclear reactor and propulsion system would triple the electrical power of the preceding Nimitz-class aircraft carriers. Its state-of-the-art weapons elevators would move 20,000 pounds of munitions at speeds of 150 feet per minute compared with the Nimitz's speed of 100 feet per minute. Its new launch-and-recovery system would be able to handle 270 planes in a single day. From bow to stern, the ship’s innovations—designed to save time, costs, and crew—would revolutionize the way the U.S. military built and used carriers. The Ford would be a symbol of American superiority, one that would project power to American adversaries for five decades of dependable service. 

“There was this thinking of, ‘We are so far ahead of everyone else that we can afford to take a strategic pause and take risks on our acquisition and try new and untested technology,’” says Eric Wertheim, a defense analyst and expert with the U.S. Naval Institute, of the nation’s mindset after the Cold War. “And there was this feeling that the rest of the world is at least 20 years behind us.”

But after two decades of development and delays, the audacity that conceived the Ford seemed to usher its doom. Expected to save the military $4 billion during its life span, the Ford has actually cost billions more than initial estimates. First expected to deploy in 2018, it has been projected to deploy as far out as 2024. When the ship reached the Navy after construction, it was already two years behind schedule, with work outstanding on thousands of items. In 2015, Sen. John McCain, chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee and a former Navy aviator, called packing all that tech onto the Ford “the original sin” that damaged the program.

Even the Navy’s top officer acknowledged the problems that have plagued the carrier. “We had 23 new technologies on [the USS Gerald R. Ford] which, quite frankly, increased the risk of delivery on time and cost right from the get-go,” said Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike Gilday at a virtual talk before the Navy League’s 2021 Sea Air Space exposition. “And I think industry’s in full agreement with this: We really shouldn’t introduce more than maybe one or two new technologies on any complex platform like that, in order to keep risk at a manageable level.” 

“Warships are the only weapon where the prototype goes out to sea."

Meanwhile, naval advances by U.S. adversaries have added urgency to the Ford’s troubleshooting. The ship's critics point to its expanding budget and timetable as evidence that the U.S. military should reconsider developing massive nuclear carriers as a foundational element of its naval program. Military advisor Norman Polmar points out that America’s most recent conflicts in the Middle East didn’t even use the Nimitz class to full capacity. “Look what we did in Iraq,” he says. “We launched [just] 20 or 30 strikes a day from a carrier that has 70 airplanes.” And Rep. Adam Smith, chair of the House Armed Services Committee, has questioned whether the Ford’s price tag justifies its utility. During a 2021 Brookings Institution discussion, Smith asked if there are other ways “to get unmanned systems closer to the fight that don’t cost $12 billion.” 

Today, despite years of setbacks and backlash, the Ford is showing signs that it can complete its mission. Its critical technologies are coming to life, and the Navy is accelerating the carrier’s deployment timetable. But as the Fordapproaches its maiden deployment, its successes and failures are still on public display. Talbot Manvel, a retired Navy captain who led the initial concept development of the Ford carrier class from 1996 to 2001, points out that for this multi-billion dollar floating airport to prove its capability and necessity, it has to become battle-ready under scrutiny. “Warships are the only weapon where the prototype goes out to sea,” he says.

In 1993, a Navy working group began investigating new technologies for a new class of carrier. Technologies on the Nimitz class, already a quarter of a century old, had evolved beyond their means, and the carriers were beginning to sag under their own weight, unable to support all that capability.

In 1998, the Navy launched the CVN(X) program to replace the Nimitz class with another large nuclear-powered carrier class. Technologies under development for this new class would apply to the USS George H.W. Bush—the 10th and final Nimitz carrier—and evolve across the upcoming class. But in 2002, the U.S. Secretary of Defense at the time, Donald Rumsfeld, changed course. Seeking a bolder shift toward the future, he ordered technology development, ship design, and construction for what he called a “transformational” carrier, and the Navy launched the CVN 21 program, later christened the Ford class. This research and development would cost nearly $5 billion (separate from Ford’s eventual $13 billion construction cost), the result being a carrier class that currently comprises four ships—three in addition to the flagship Ford. Prefab construction on the class' frontrunner, the USS Gerald R. Ford, began in 2005.

The Navy designs each carrier with an assembly sequence in mind. Each block of the ship contains a particular arrangement of structural and technological components, and when workers at Huntington Ingalls Industries’ Newport News Shipbuilding division in Virginia—the country’s only builder of nuclear carriers—finish adjacent blocks, they weld them together into a complete section of the ship, called a “lift,” sometimes weighing hundreds of tons. With the help of cranes, the builders hoist the lifts into place to form the ship’s hull. Ford’s construction was elaborate; it required 496 lifts.

“This was transformation run amok.” 

Designing a ship in this fashion means material and technological delays can have a cascading effect on the construction timeline. Signs of trouble emerged as early as 2007; the electromagnetic launch system, one of the signature technologies on Ford, was already more than a year behind schedule. “The warning signs were there,” says Shelby Oakley, a director in the Government Accountability Office’s contracting and national security acquisitions team. Even before construction began, the GAO had flagged the Ford to the Navy as a poor business case, noting its risky cost estimates and shipbuilding schedules. 

The Ford’s construction contract reached Newport News Shipbuilding in 2008; building the ship was a muddled, disarranged process. The shipyard began construction while some of the Ford’s technologies still lingered in development and faced design revisions. Modifications to accommodate the space, weight, and utilities for these components contributed to a total of 19,000 eventual design changes. The Navy had planned for many of these changes in anticipation of technological evolution, but other changes were unexpected. 

One standout feature of the Ford—albeit a troublesome one—is its state-of-the-art Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG). Prior to Ford, American carriers used a hydraulic arresting system to slow and stop landing aircraft, but the AAG uses an electric engine and a water twister to accommodate a broader range of aircraft—including unmanned aerial vehicles. Engineering and manufacturing of the AAG began in 2005, with 2009 the targeted end date. But a 2016 Pentagon Inspector General report noted that developmental testing for the AAG would continue through 2018; the system still hadn’t proved capable or safe enough to test on the Ford. Between 2009 and 2012, the AAG’s power conditioning system failed across multiple tests, and both its inverter system and cable shock absorber required redesigns. The setbacks ballooned the AAG’s development cost from $143 million to more than $1 billion, according to a report from Sen. McCain’s office. 

Manvel says he resisted AAG on the Ford as early as 1998, wanting to push it onto the subsequent ships in the class after its design had matured. He had his way until Rumsfeld stepped in with his transformational vision. “This was transformation run amok,” Manvel says.

As technologies fell behind on the Ford, the structural shipbuilding continued, and that disparity would require corrections. The Ford’s Dual Band Radar (DBR), a combination of both volume search radar and multifunction radar meant to handle long-range surveillance, air traffic control, and missile communications, was originally developed for use on the Zumwalt class of guided missile cruisers. But due to the cruisers’ own construction delays, the Navy dropped volume search for Zumwalt’s DBR, leaving that particular feature untested and incomplete before its implementation on Ford.

“That [brought] a major change to the Ford development and test program,” says Rear Adm. James Downey, the Navy’s program executive officer for carriers, whose assignments have also included chief engineer on the CVN(X) program and program manager for the Zumwalt class.

Land-based tests of the volume search radar that would have proceeded under Zumwalt were suspended, and contracting and additional testing delays hampered its development for Ford.

Those tests continued even after the radar’s installation on Ford, ultimately finishing nearly five years later than planned. The tests themselves unearthed issues with the DBR’s power regulating system, and the resulting modifications required the shipbuilder to cut into Ford’s island—its command and control tower—to make the repairs. 

But Manvel says Rumsfeld deemed Ford too important to fail, and goes as far as to say the former defense secretary was right. No matter how much time or money it took, America would make sure the Ford delivered, because as Marvel says: “America always wants the best.” In 2013, after construction overruns and inflation, the Ford’s cost cap ballooned from $10.5 billion to $12.9 billion under order of Congress. As it bumped against that ceiling, the Navy accelerated the Ford to fleet by deferring work on more than 9,000 items.

It took Downey's new leadership—he took over the carrier program office in summer 2019— for the cycle of deference to stop. He was central to the redemption of the Ford’s 11 Advanced Weapons Elevators (AWEs), meant to reduce bomb movement within the ship by up to 75 percent compared to the Nimitz class. Less handling of munitions means increased safety and maneuverability for sailors and aircraft on the flattop. Faster movement plays into increased mission launches (a.k.a. sorties), a key measure of the Ford's success.

When the Navy commissioned the Ford in July 2017, none of the elevators were fully operational. When the Ford began its period of post-delivery testing and trials in 2019, just four elevators were operational. While the GAO has cited premature corrosion of electrical components and faulty parts as problems with the AWEs in earlier years, Downey says the major hindrance appears to have been software-related.

With renewed urgency on having operable elevators, industrial workers began making fixes while the Ford was at sea, rather than waiting until it was pierside. Downey also established offices at the shipyard in Newport News, and also at the Ford’s home port at the nearby Norfolk Naval Station. He goes over daily reviews of work items with project supervisors. “To this day, we do daily closeouts of the work, with me included,” Downey says. "My view is it’s critical to keeping these large projects on track, and you can’t do that monthly or quarterly." His procedural adjustments seem to have worked. The last of the weapons elevators were turned over to the Ford's crew on December 22, 2021, according to the Navy.

Launching and recovering aircraft was another trouble area. The Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System, or EMALS, is supposed to average 4,166 launches between failures. A Pentagon report from early 2021 noted that the Ford was averaging just 181 launches between failures. AAG, meanwhile, is meant to average 16,500 recoveries before a failure. It averaged 48. Downey doesn’t dispute those numbers, but he points out that the Pentagon report covered the carrier’s delivery and initial trials period, and largely missed its post-delivery tests and trials, a period when a carrier’s crew learns how to operate the ship. By that time, Ford had completed fewer than 800 aircraft launches and recoveries total. It has now surpassed 8,000 launches and recoveries.

The Ford has corrected its wayward trajectory in large part through finding optimal ways to marry its crew with its new technologies. While at sea, the Ford became the Navy’s East Coast platform for more than 400 pilots to earn or maintain their flight certifications. During that time, sailors gained proficiency on the ship’s systems and made their own recommendations on how to operate them. During eight and a half hours of daytime flight operations in December 2020, the Ford achieved 175 arrested landings, which was more than the 160 expected of it during a 12-hour fly day. EMALS has become a morale boost for the sailors working on that system, says Navy Capt. Paul Lanzilotta, who took command of Ford in early 2021. At the end of a flight day, aviation boatswain mates push a button to put EMALS into standby, saving them the hours of pre- and post-flight maintenance required on the Nimitz class. 

“It is a different mindset and environment in which they work,” Lanzilotta says. “[The crew are] a lot smarter about things like electronics and electronic systems.”

Ford completed 18 months of post-delivery tests and trials in spring 2021. As the ship's crew gained proficiency, the Navy did something unheard of: It moved the Ford’s projected first deployment date up, from 2024 to 2022. Here, a military decision to run things concurrently paid off. While the Ford was working through its post-delivery tests, the Navy put the ship through live fire combat system tests and carrier-strike group operations. The Ford cleared all its benchmarks despite the crunch.

It was a decision born out of weariness and practicality: If there were any more weaknesses aboard the Ford, the Navy wanted to expose them as soon as possible, Downey says.

The Ford class is likely to deploy in a different climate from the ones military leaders anticipated two decades ago. While the U.S. military focused on counterinsurgency efforts in the Middle East, Russia became active in the Arctic, and China began aggressively expanding its naval capabilities. China’s DF-21D “carrier killer” missile has a range of up to 2,485 miles, enough to put U.S. military bases on Guam within striking distance from mainland China.

“If we’re not moving the threshold forward on carrier capabilities, what happens if China continues to incrementally catch up?” asks Matthew Funaiole, a senior fellow with the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. China is now building a third carrier of its own, called the Type 003. Though it’s unlikely to rival a Nimitz-class carrier, it might include an electromagnetic launch system that could bypass today's more common steam-powered launch systems, Funaiole says. Even if the launch system doesn’t appear on the Type 003, Funaiole expects it on the follow-up ship.

The context for the Ford’s deployment is becoming higher pressure, but many see the ship, as well as the three others in its class, to be the pinnacle of carrier technology. “I’m confident that we’re going to get the Ford class, and it’s going to be a great ship,” says the Naval Institute’s Wertheim. “It’s taking longer and it’s more expensive, and it maybe didn’t have to be this way, but we will iron those things out. We shouldn't look at the Ford class as some massive failure. It’s more of a ‘What can we do better next time?’” 

That “next time” is already here. The Ford’s three successors—the USS John F. Kennedy, USS Enterprise, and USS Doris Miller—are taking shape at Newport News Shipbuilding. The Kennedy is expected to reach the Navy first, in 2024, and the Miller last, in 2032. In the meantime, the Ford is finally proving its sea legs, but its saga demonstrates the complexities of building a modern aircraft carrier, designing a ship around both an assessment of modern adversaries and a prediction of future military contexts. The lessons of Ford’s construction will inform the larger debate over staking the sea service on a massive nuclear flagship, but the next decade is set—and the Navy expects the world’s newest, most advanced warship to operate for half a century. For now, the Ford is the future.

Mister Bozo goes to Moscow: what a wonderful world - Eliane Oliveira, Jussara Soares e Janaína Figueiredo (O Globo)

 Uma pequena parte do que eu declarei na entrevista, da qual pinçaram uma única frase, em torrentes de história e direito internacional.

Política externa vira saia justa para Lula e Bolsonaro na disputa eleitoral

Com acenos ao centro nacionalmente, o petista tem postura condescendente com regimes autoritários de esquerda no cenário internacional; presidente enfrenta cenário de desgaste por sua postura e pelo legado do ex-ministro Ernesto Araújo

Eliane Oliveira, Jussara Soares e Janaína Figueiredo
O Globo, 16/02/2022 - 03:30

BRASÍLIA e RIO — Normalmente relegada a segundo plano em época de eleição, a política externa tem se convertido este ano em um telhado de vidro e servido de alvo na pré-campanha para ataques recíprocos entre os dois principais candidatos à Presidência, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (PT) e Jair Bolsonaro (PL).

Internamente, o petista tenta ampliar sua candidatura para o centro, mas, no plano internacional, é condescendente com regimes autoritários de esquerda como Nicarágua, Cuba e Venezuela, historicamente alinhados ao PT. Já Bolsonaro, que ontem iniciou a controvertida viagem à Rússia em meio à crise da Ucrânia, tirou do comando do Ministério das Relações Exteriores um dos expoentes da ala ideológica do governo, Ernesto Araújo, e o substituiu por Carlos França, que tenta desfazer o legado negativo do antecessor, cujos ataques à China, ao meio ambiente, e o discurso negacionista afetaram, por exemplo, relações comerciais e a compra de insumos para vacinas contra a Covid-19.

O novo chanceler, no entanto, enfrenta limitações, como a interferência de um dos filhos do presidente, o deputado Eduardo Bolsonaro (PSL-SP), e a própria postura do titular do Planalto.

No fim do ano passado, Lula chegou a minimizar, em entrevista, a ditadura de Daniel Ortega na Nicarágua, comparando seu tempo no poder com o da ex-chanceler alemã Angela Merkel. Ele também minimizou a violência policial contra manifestações em Cuba.

— O apoio às ditaduras de Cuba, da Venezuela e da Nicarágua, para satisfazer as alas mais extremistas, abre o flanco para acusações de que transformaria o Brasil numa Cuba ou Venezuela — afirmou o consultor internacional Nelson Franco Jobim, em referência a um discurso recorrente de bolsonaristas.

Já Bolsonaro tem uma agenda estreita, que inclui nomes da extrema-direita, como o primeiro-ministro da Hungria, Viktor Órban, e está praticamente alijado dos grandes debates da agenda mundial. Além da Hungria, ele visita esta semana a Rússia, onde chegou ontem, em meio às tensões daquele país com a Ucrânia.

—A visita de Bolsonaro à Rússia é altamente inoportuna e não desejável —disse o embaixador Paulo Roberto Almeida.

Único embaixador na ativa que critica abertamente a política externa de Bolsonaro, Almeida lembrou que o convite do líder russo Vladimir Putin foi feito bem antes, mas somente agora foi aceito:

— O Brasil está isolado, o presidente não tem grandes aliados e ninguém o convida na Europa e nas Américas. Sobraram líderes de direita. Putin não é direita, nem esquerda, mas vê na visita do Bolsonaro uma oportunidade para mostrar que ele não estaria isolado no mundo. Seria irônico, se não fosse trágico.

Apesar da troca de chanceler, sepultando a estridência do discurso no Itamaraty, Eduardo Bolsonaro continua exercendo um papel importante na política externa, com conexões com a direita internacional.

— Eduardo tem um papel importante. Há lugares em que o presidente Bolsonaro não tem tempo de ir e ele acaba virando uma espécie de embaixador mesmo e traz resultados— disse o senador Flávio Bolsonaro (PL-RJ).

Cooperação Sul-Sul
Caso Lula seja eleito, estão previstos o fortalecimento do Mercosul, da União das Nações Sul-americanas (Unasul) e da Comunidade de Estados Latino-Americanos e Caribenhos (Celac). Essas duas perderam o Brasil como membro no governo Bolsonaro.

O ex-presidente, que realizou uma bem-sucedida visita a líderes europeus no ano passado, já manifestou a intenção de reforçar os laços com a União Europeia (UE), praticamente rompidos com Bolsonaro. Um dos desafios é restaurar o acordo comercial UE-Mercosul.

Os próximos meses devem ser de disputas por protagonismo internacional entre Lula e Bolsonaro. O petista tem uma viagem prevista para o México, em março. Bolsonaro, por sua vez, tenta se destacar nas viagens para a Rússia e Hungria. Na sua última grande apresentação multilateral, na Assembleia da ONU, chocou seus pares ao defender tratamentos ineficazes contra a Covid-19.

Um tema que ganhou relevância nas últimas semanas foi o início das negociações para a adesão do Brasil à OCDE, o “clube dos países ricos”. Pré-candidato à Presidência pelo PDT, Ciro Gomes tem postura crítica em relação a isso. Um dos motivos é que o Brasil terá que abrir mão do status de nação em desenvolvimento na Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC).

Já a política externa desenhada pelo presidenciável Sergio Moro (Podemos) tem como linhas gerais “manter boas relações com todos os países, sem preconceitos, e voltar a ter protagonismo em temas de direitos humanos, acordos comerciais, desenvolvimento sustentável e combate à corrupção”.

Coordenador do programa de governo de João Doria (PSDB), Rodrigo Maia destacou dois pontos para que o Brasil retorne às mesas de negociações internacionais: a defesa da democracia no Brasil e proteção ambiental.

https://oglobo.globo.com/politica/politica-externa-vira-saia-justa-para-lula-bolsonaro-na-disputa-eleitoral-25396262

Economist: relações do Brasil com a China nunca foram fáceis, mas com Bolsonaro, elas estão no nível mais baixo...

 Economist: Apesar das relações comerciais prósperas, relação entre China e Brasil está enfraquecendo

Relações entre os dois países nunca foram fáceis, mas sob Bolsonaro, nunca foram piores
   
The Economist, 14 de fevereiro de 2022 | 10h08

Em uma viagem à China em 2004, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, então presidente do Brasil, levou consigo uma comitiva digna de uma estrela do rock: sete ministros, seis governadores e mais de 450 empresários. Relações foram criadas e acordos foram debatidos. Nos cinco anos seguintes, a China se tornou o parceiro econômico mais importante do Brasil. Em 2019, as negociações anuais entre os países eram de US$ 100 bilhões.

A primeira visita oficial à China de Jair Bolsonaro, atual presidente do Brasil, foi bem mais discreta. Bolsonaro passou boa parte de sua campanha eleitoral em 2018 se posicionando contra o país, que ele acusava de querer “comprar o Brasil”. Quando visitou a China em 2019, levou com ele quatro ministros, mas nenhum assessor econômico sênior. Embora tenha falado de como os países estavam “completamente alinhados”, a viagem foi ofuscada pelo debate se ele iria permitir ou não que a Huawei, uma empresa chinesa de telecomunicações, construísse sua rede de 5G no Brasil.

As relações entre Brasil e China nunca foram fáceis, mas sob Bolsonaro, elas nunca foram piores. Apesar de sua conversa de alinhamento em 2019, ele continuou a criticar a China, assim como integrantes de sua família, muitos deles também envolvidos na política. No início da pandemia, seu filho, Eduardo, falava do “vírus chinês”. No ano passado, sem mencionar o nome da China, o presidente brasileiro ponderou se a covid-19 poderia ser uma “guerra química”. A China, por sua vez, talvez esteja interessada em negociar com o Brasil, mas está cada vez mais cautelosa em investir no País – e no restante da América Latina.

O antagonismo de Bolsonaro não passou despercebido pelas autoridades chinesas. Em 2020, Li Yang, cônsul-geral da China no Rio de Janeiro, escreveu um artigo de opinião para o jornal O Globo, no qual respondeu aos comentários de Eduardo com uma ferocidade incomum. O chefe da Sinovac Biotech, empresa chinesa que fornece vacinas contra a covid-19 para o Brasil, foi citado pela Reuters como tendo dito a diplomatas que os comentários do presidente brasileiro estavam impedindo uma relação “fluida e positiva” entre os dois países.

Às vezes, a China gosta de lembrar seu poder ao Brasil. No final do ano passado, as exportações brasileiras de carne bovina foram prejudicadas quando a China impôs uma proibição de três meses depois de dois registros de casos suspeitos da doença conhecida como “vaca-louca” em dois estados diferentes. O valor das exportações de carne bovina despencou e a proibição custou cerca de US$ 2 bilhões em vendas. Muitos consideraram o embargo estranhamente longo.

Apesar da discussão quanto à carne bovina, o comércio entre Brasil e China tem prosperado, mesmo durante a pandemia. Em 2021, a China comprou mais de 30% das exportações físicas do Brasil, ante menos de 20% nos cinco anos anteriores. A maior parte foi de soja, petróleo bruto e minério de ferro, mas os envios de carne e outros bens de maior valor também cresceram nos últimos anos, principalmente desde que a guerra comercial entre os Estados Unidos e a China começou em 2017.

Mas outros laços econômicos entre Brasil e China parecem estar se enfraquecendo. O investimento da China no Brasil atingiu o pico em 2010, segundo o Conselho Empresarial China-Brasil (CEBC). Naquele ano, a China investiu US$ 13 bilhões em 12 projetos.  O CEBC estima que, no ano passado, a China tenha investido apenas cerca de US$ 4 bilhões.

Isso sugere uma tendência mais ampla. Embora os presidentes da Argentina e do Equador tenham ido recentemente a Pequim com o intuito de melhorar os laços econômicos com a China, os acordos econômicos entre a China e a América Latina diminuíram nos últimos anos. Em um discurso à Comunidade de Estados Latino-Americanos e Caribenhos (CELAC), uma organização internacional da região, em 2015, Xi Jinping, presidente da China, prometeu US$ 250 bilhões em investimentos na América Latina até 2025. Mas entre 2015 e 2020 as empresas chinesas investiram apenas US$ 76 bilhões na região, de acordo com pesquisadores da Universidade Boston. Em dezembro, em outra reunião com a CELAC, Xi não prometeu quaisquer outros investimentos. (O Brasil não compareceu à reunião, pois Bolsonaro suspendeu a participação do País na CELAC em 2020.)

O Brasil, em particular, dificulta o investimento estrangeiro. As normas e regulamentos do País são enormes e estão em constante mudança. Sua moeda, o Real, é volátil; suas leis trabalhistas são complicadas e seu sistema tributário precisa seriamente de uma reforma. A corrupção e a incerteza sobre a política econômica não ajudam. “Se uma empresa chinesa pode sobreviver no Brasil, ela pode fazer isso em qualquer lugar”, diz Qu Yuhui, diplomata chinês que estava trabalhando no Brasil até bem pouco tempo.

Os investidores chineses focam no que eles percebem como apostas seguras. Aproximadamente metade do dinheiro que eles investiram no Brasil antes de 2020 foi para a geração de eletricidade, que tem o benefício de contratos de longo prazo. Várias empresas de energia chinesas têm se estabelecido no País. O Brasil se beneficia da experiência chinesa: ambos os países têm linhas de transmissão de ultra-alta tensão que se estendem por milhares de quilômetros.

O setor de energia, entretanto, também gera desafios. No ano passado, o CEO da State Grid Brazil, subsidiária de uma das maiores empresas estatais chinesas de eletricidade, descreveu a dificuldade de aquisição de terrenos para uma enorme linha de transmissão entre a Usina de Belo Monte, no Pará, na região norte, e os consumidores do sudeste do Brasil. O esforço envolveu negociar individualmente com “3.337 proprietários de terras” e conseguir “204 licenças inter-regionais, incluindo [para] rios, linhas de transmissão, rodovias, ferrovias, oleodutos, pequenos aeroportos, etc”.

O Brasil deveria estar fazendo mais para atrair investimentos estrangeiros, mas seus esforços tendem a ser esporádicos, impulsionados mais por políticos estaduais do que pelo governo federal. O estado de São Paulo, por exemplo, montou um escritório comercial em Xangai em 2019. João Doria, governador de São Paulo, acredita que isso o ajudou a fechar um acordo com a Sinovac para vacinas contra a covid-19. Mas poucas empresas brasileiras abriram escritórios na China, ou inclusive se aventuraram a visitar o país, diz Tatiana Lacerda Prazeres, consultora comercial na China e ex-secretária de Comércio Exterior do Brasil. “Há uma percepção entre algumas das principais autoridades brasileiras, e até mesmo algumas empresas, de que a China é mais dependente do Brasil do que o contrário”, diz ela.

O grande apetite da China por commodities brasileiras reforça esse comportamento. Mas a visão da China é bem diferente. Em comparação com outras regiões, a América Latina sempre foi a “menor prioridade” da China em termos de diplomacia e investimento, diz Margaret Myers, do Inter-American Dialogue, um think tank americano. A Ásia e a África continuam sendo mais importantes.

Além disso, o apetite da China talvez esteja mudando. Sua movimentação em direção à “autossuficiência básica” em grãos, conforme explicado em seu último plano quinquenal, inclui um esforço para aumentar a produção de soja. O ceticismo em relação ao seu plano é abundante. Mas até mesmo uma pequena queda nas compras da China prejudicaria o Brasil, que envia 70% de suas exportações de soja para o país. Se a demanda por novas moradias nas cidades chinesas caísse, como alguns preveem, isso diminuiria a demanda por minério de ferro brasileiro e outros insumos. (Embora uma desaceleração no setor da construção de imóveis residenciais talvez também leve as empresas chinesas de infraestrutura a procurar por oportunidades no exterior.)

A eleição presidencial do Brasil em outubro ajudará a determinar o futuro das relações. Lula está pensando concorrer ao cargo. Ele supera Bolsonaro por uma ampla margem na maioria das pesquisas. Se ele se tornar presidente outra vez, há poucas dúvidas de que ele tentaria restabelecer os laços. Conquistar investidores chineses, no entanto, talvez seja mais difícil na segunda tentativa.

https://economia.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,economist-china-brasil,70003978614

Pedro e Bonifácio, às vésperas dos 200 anos - Luiz Henrique de F. Carneiro (Diário do Poder)

Pedro e Bonifácio, às vésperas dos 200 anos

Luiz Henrique de F. Carneiro

Diário do Poder, 15/02/2022 23:09

 

Numa noite dessas, José Bonifácio desceu de seu pedestal de estátua, no Largo de São Francisco de Paula, e foi visitar o imperial e real Pedro I, na Praça Tiradentes.  Este desceu do cavalo, olhou ao redor com muita saudade, e foi logo perguntando ao seu antigo ministro notícias sobre as festas que tanto admiravam. 

– Qual o que, Majestade! Nem o Barão do Rio Branco, o Juca, consegue!  Atualmente só temos notícias da tal pandemia e da confusão instalada no país e tem mais, coisa alguma encontro em que se fale de nós, da Independência ou do Projeto de Nação. 

Pedro I retrucou: 

– Bonifácio, este país nasceu envolto em complicações diplomáticas. A esta nossa terra privilegiada da natureza pode ser aplicado o conto onde a despeito de não haver sido convidada para o batizado de uma criança, uma Fada raivosa propõe-se frustar todos os mimos que lhe fizeram as boas fadas. Terás grandeza, formosura opulência, glória mesmo –  exclamaria ela – mas não terás descanso, porque serás alvo de constantes ambições territoriais e o pasto de contínuos conflitos militares, roubos, fraudes, maracutaias e gigantescas trapalhadas políticas. 

A esta altura, Bonifácio interrompeu Pedro I e falou: 

– Majestade, peço perdão, olha quem vem por ali na Rua 7 de setembro.  É o Lima Barreto e o Machado, vou chamá-los. 

– E aí Lima, quais são as novidades? E você Machado, qual a pressa?, perguntou Pedro I. 

– Pedrinho, o Maneco perdeu o vapor Hermes para Campos e vai nos encontrar para um papo com paraty na Ouvidor, vamos?, falou Lima. 

– Qual o quê Lima, Sua Majestade Imperial e o Ministro Bonifácio têm mais o que fazer! De mais, vou contar a aventura para chegar aqui vindo do Cosme Velho,  poderou Machado. 

– O progresso, Majestade, o progresso, a tecnologia! 

Bem, subi no bonde puxado por dois burros, um à esquerda e outro à direita do condutor.  Notei que os burros conversavam, mas ora o da direita ora o da esquerda levantava o tom de voz.   E eu ali, sentado, cabreiro, aborrecido, mas prestando muita atenção e tentando a todo custo entender o que os burros falavam.  Sim, a primeira coisa foi identificar que a língua comum era o Houyhnhnm. 

Bem, os assuntos eram burrices o tempo todo e nada fazia sentido.  Já na altura da Lapa, consegui me libertar deste suplício burrificante e, ao olhar para a frente, vi um bonde, já bem distante, com tração elétrica, mas este já ia bem mais  acelerado e o perdi de vista.   O condutor do bonde, falando uma língua que nem eu nem os burros entendíamos, balbuciou algo, mas como já estava na Carioca, nem perdi meu tempo e saltei do bonde. 

A esta altura e já faminto, Lima exclamou: 

– Pedrinho e Zé Bonifácio, me deêm licença porque uma bela mesa e prosa nos aguardam; vamos Machado que o Maneco, o Oliveira Lima, a Júlia Lopes e a Maria Laura nos esperam. Até outro dia, Pedrinho e Zé! 

– Feliz o Lima com sua leveza e coitado do Machado que perde tempo e o bonde da história, do progresso, da tecnologia e da mais importante reforma que é a abertura econômica enquanto tem que aturar burros da esquerda e da direita falando a mesma língua Houyhanhnm e um condutor do bonde ininteligível. Bonifácio, sabe de uma coisa?  Não faço mais “independências”, fui! 

E José Bonifácio e D. Pedro I, às vésperas do aniversário de 200 anos da Independência do Brasil, voltaram para suas estátuas no Largo de São Francisco de Paula e na Praça Tiradentes. 

(Texto ficcional adaptado de obras dos geniais Lima Barreto, Machado de Assis e Manoel de Oliveira Lima)

Luiz Henrique de F. Carneiro, empresário e economista, é formado na FEA/UFRJ,  PUC/RJ e Universidade de Chicago. Seu e-mail:  luiz.henrique@lvcinvestimentos.com

 

Rússia diz que ajuda militar à Venezuela não será usada para atacar Colômbia - Luis Jaime Acosta (Reuters)

 Rússia diz que ajuda militar à Venezuela não será usada para atacar Colômbia

Colômbia acusa Nicolás Maduro de abrigar dissidentes das FARC que rejeitam um acordo de paz de 2016, o que é negado pelo presidente venezuelano.

 

Luis Jaime Acosta

Reuters, 08/02/2022

 

A Rússia prometeu que o equipamento militar dado à Venezuela não será usado para atacar a Colômbia, desestabilizar a América Latina ou que vai acabar nas mãos de grupos armados ilegais, disse a ministra das Relações Exteriores e vice-presidente da Colômbia, Marta Lucia Ramirez.

 

“Precisamos que não haja o menor risco de que a cooperação militar que existe entre a Rússia e a Venezuela, há muito tempo, possa eventualmente, por descuido ou qualquer motivo, levar qualquer equipamento militar russo às mãos de grupos armados ilegais que estão presentes na fronteira”, disse Ramirez a jornalistas na noite de segunda-feira (8), após uma reunião com o embaixador russo Nikolay Tavdumadze e outras autoridades.

 

“O embaixador russo nos expressou que nenhuma cooperação militar da Rússia com a Venezuela jamais será usada para qualquer ação militar contra a Colômbia, nem qualquer país da América Latina, nem para afetar a estabilidade da região”, acrescentou.

 

O ministro da Defesa da Colômbia, Diego Molano, disse na semana passada que a Venezuela estava movendo tropas para a fronteira dos países com assistência técnica da Rússia e do Irã, chamando o possível deslocamento de “interferência estrangeira”.

 

Molano, citando fontes de inteligência, disse que houve movimentos de tropas em frente à província colombiana de Arauca, que tem presenciado combates ferozes entre guerrilheiros do Exército de Libertação Nacional (ELN) e ex-rebeldes das FARC pelo controle do tráfico de drogas.

 

Autoridades colombianas na reunião entre Ramirez e Tavdumadze, incluindo Molano, pediram à Rússia que garanta que os acordos de uso final de armas sejam cumpridos, para que não possam ser usados ​​por terceiros, disse o Ministério das Relações Exteriores da Colômbia em comunicado.

 

Tavdumadze, também falando após a reunião, disse que a situação foi resolvida e as conversas continuarão pelos canais diplomáticos.

 

O governo colombiano acusa o presidente venezuelano, Nicolás Maduro, de abrigar dissidentes das FARC que rejeitam um acordo de paz de 2016, bem como o ELN, algo que ele negou repetidamente.

 

A província de Arauca está enfrentando uma onda de violência crescente, com pelo menos 24 pessoas mortas recentemente em confrontos e um carro-bomba.

100 anos da Semana de Arte Moderna: chamada para artigos na Revista de História (DH-FFLCH-USP)

 Chamada - Dossiê 1922/2022: O Século da Semana (balanços e perspectivas)

Revista de História - USP

A Semana de Arte Moderna, no Brasil de 1922, foi uma atividade patrocinada por homens endinheirados (Paulo Prado, René Thiolier e outros), realizada num ambiente de pessoas endinheiradas (Teatro Municipal de São Paulo) e assistida por um público de homens e mulheres endinheirados (ingressos pagos, trajes pomposos). Seu alcance ultrapassou esse universo social e estadual, astúcia das Artes, fez-se História também criticamente, às vezes sem o querer.

Vanguardas europeias se interessaram por linguagens de povos de fora da Europa. Para o Brasil, “fora da Europa” era aqui mesmo: indígenas, africanos, múltiplos imigrantes repaginados, “contribuição milionária de todos os erros”, de acordo com Oswald de Andrade no Manifesto Antropófago. Conforme os Modernistas o demonstraram, ao resolverem essa auto-redefinição nacional, tais “erros” podiam ser acertos...

Embora Modernistas não se confundissem com Regionalismos, o contato dos primeiros com artistas e intelectuais de diferentes estados brasileiros foi cultivado, especialmente por Mario de Andrade, que tanto se dedicou à Epistolografia. Essas relações são importantes para a compreensão de que nem tudo, na Modernidade brasileira, se reduziu a São Paulo, Minas Gerais e Rio de Janeiro; havia uma produção intelectual e artística em diferentes partes do Brasil que também começava a refletir sobre Cultura e Sociedade em novas bases, inclusive a contatar Cultura e Artes de múltiplos países. Isso não diminui o peso da produção modernista naqueles três primeiros núcleos, apenas realça que não vale a pena manter o adjetivo “regional” para os demais nem os considerar meros seguidores de paulistas, mineiros e cariocas.

A Modernidade popular, no Brasil, não dependeu apenas daquela produção artística e intelectual nascida em 1922, em São Paulo & Cia. Movimentos sociais, desde meados do século XIX, evidenciavam lutas por novos direitos, nascidas entre escravos, libertos e imigrantes pobres, a falar sobre Greves, Educação, Mulheres, Moradia, Estado Laico, Divórcio e outros tópicos. E nomes como Machado de Assis, Cruz e Sousa e Lima Barreto foram modernos bem antes de 1922. O Brasil se fez moderno a partir de diferentes sujeitos, artistas ou não. As Artes não apenas falam de pobres e ricos, existem num mundo de ricos e pobres, tema e destino de seus produtos. O poder das Artes vai além da fala dos que já são, política, econômica e socialmente, dominantes.

PRAZO PARA ENVIO DOS ARTIGOS - 31/03/2022 (somente pelo Portal de Periódicos USP)

como submeter o artigo

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https://www.revistas.usp.br/revhistoria/announcement/view/1298

Why the West’s Diplomacy With Russia Keeps Failing - Anne Applebaum (The Atlantic)

 Putin trouxe a Europa de volta a 1938-39, como Hitler, pois ele pensa que a OTAN vai fazer como Hitler em junho de 1941, e tudo isso porque ele não é um czar normal, mas um autocrata desvairado, como o próprio Hitler e também Stalin. Infelizmente, o "Ocidente" – um conceito dotado de escasso significado no terreno econômico, mas que ainda tem certo peso no terreno político e dos valores – não vai fazer o que sugere Anne Appebaum em seu artigo: confrontar os autocratas russos e expor sua prepotência, suas mentiras, sua lavagem de dinheiro no Ocidente, suas tentações totalitárias. Nem mesmo Bolsonaro vai fazer qualquer coisa a esse respeito: está muito satisfeito de ter sido recebido pelo autocrata, mesmo confinado em seu hotel até o momento. A Rússia é um Terceiro Reich em projeto, mas não vai conseguir, embora tenha recebido agora o respaldo do grande Império do Meio, que ainda vai colonizar a Rússia economicamente.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Ideas

Why the West’s Diplomacy With Russia Keeps Failing

American and European leaders’ profound lack of imagination has brought the world to the brink of war.

By Anne Applebaum

The Atlantic, February 12, 2022

About the author: Anne Applebaum is a staff writer at The Atlantic, a fellow at the SNF Agora Institute at Johns Hopkins University, and the author of Twilight of Democracy: The Seductive Lure of Authoritarianism.

Oh, how I envy Liz Truss her opportunity! Oh, how I regret her utter failure to make use of it! For those who have never heard of her, Truss is the lightweight British foreign secretary who went to Moscow this week to tell her Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, that his country should not invade Ukraine. This trip was not a success. At a glacial press conference he likened their conversation to “the mute” speaking with “the deaf”; later, he leaked the fact that she had confused some Russian regions with Ukrainian regions, to add a little insult to the general injury.

Lavrov has done this many times before. He was vile to the European Union’s foreign-policy chief, Josep Borrell, last year. He has been unpleasant at international conferences and rude to journalists. His behavior is not an accident. Lavrov, like Russian President Vladimir Putin, uses aggression and sarcasm as tools to demonstrate his scorn for his interlocutor, to frame negotiations as useless even before they begin, to create dread and apathy. The point is to put other diplomats on the defensive, or else to cause them to give up in disgust.

But the fact that Lavrov is disrespectful and disagreeable is old news. So is the fact that Putin lectures foreign leaders for hours and hours on his personal and political grievances. He did that the first time he met President Barack Obama, more than a decade ago; he did exactly the same thing last week to French President Emmanuel Macron. Truss should have known all of this. Instead of offering empty language about rules and values, she could have started the press conference like this:

Good evening, ladies and gentlemen of the press. I am delighted to join you after meeting my Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov. This time, we have not bothered to discuss treaties he won’t respect and promises he won’t keep. We have told him, instead, that an invasion of Ukraine will carry very, very high costs—higher than he has ever imagined. We are now planning to cut off Russian gas exports completely—Europe will find its energy supplies somewhere else. We are now preparing to assist the Ukrainian resistance, for a decade if need be. We are quadrupling our support for the Russian opposition, and for Russian media too. We want to make sure that Russians will start hearing the truth about this invasion, and as loudly as possible. And if you want to do regime change in Ukraine, we’ll get to work on regime change in Russia. 

Truss, or Borrell before her, could have added just a touch of personal insult, in the style of Lavrov himself, and wondered out loud just how it is that Lavrov’s official salary pays for the lavish properties that his family makes use of in London. She could have listed the names of the many other Russian public servants who send their children to schools in Paris or Lugano. She could have announced that these children are now, all of them, on their way home, along with their parents: No more American School in Switzerland! No more pied-à-terres in Knightsbridge! No more Mediterranean yachts!

Of course Truss—like Borrell, like Macron, like the German chancellor who is headed for Moscow this week—would never say anything like this, not even in private. Tragically, the Western leaders and diplomats who are right now trying to stave off a Russian invasion of Ukraine still think they live in a world where rules matter, where diplomatic protocol is useful, where polite speech is valued. All of them think that when they go to Russia, they are talking to people whose minds can be changed by argument or debate. They think the Russian elite cares about things like its “reputation.” It does not.

Read: The reason Putin would risk war

In fact, when talking to the new breed of autocrats, whether in Russia, China, Venezuela, or Iran, we are now dealing with something very different: people who aren’t interested in treaties and documents, people who only respect hard power. Russia is in violation of the Budapest Memorandum, signed in 1994, guaranteeing Ukrainian security. Do you ever hear Putin talk about that? Of course not. He isn’t concerned about his untrustworthy reputation either: Lying keeps opponents on their toes. Nor does Lavrov mind if he is hated, because hatred gives him an aura of power.

Their intentions are different from ours too. Putin’s goal is not a flourishing, peaceful, prosperous Russia, but a Russia where he remains in charge. Lavrov’s goal is to maintain his position in the murky world of the Russian elite and, of course, to keep his money. What we mean by “interests” and what they mean by “interests” are not the same. When they listen to our diplomats, they don’t hear anything that really threatens their position, their power, their personal fortunes.

Despite all of our talk, no one has ever seriously tried to end, rather than simply limit, Russian money laundering in the West, or Russian political or financial influence in the West. No one has taken seriously the idea that Germans should now make themselves independent of Russian gas, or that France should ban political parties that accept Russian money, or that the U.K. and the U.S. should stop Russian oligarchs from buying property in London or Miami. No one has suggested that the proper response to Putin’s information war on our political system would be an information war on his.

Read: The U.S. is naive about Russia. Ukraine can’t afford to be.

Now we are on the brink of what could be a catastrophic conflict. American, British, and European embassies in Ukraine are evacuating; citizens have been warned to leave. But this terrible moment represents not just a failure of diplomacy; it also reflects a failure of the Western imagination, a generation-long refusal, on the part of diplomats, politicians, journalists, and intellectuals, to understand what kind of state Russia was becoming and to prepare accordingly. We have refused to see the representatives of this state for what they are. We have refused to speak to them in a way that might have mattered. Now it might be too late.

Anne Applebaum is a staff writer at The Atlantic, a fellow at the SNF Agora Institute at Johns Hopkins University, and the author of Twilight of Democracy: The Seductive Lure of Authoritarianism.

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Oh, how I envy Liz Truss her opportunity! Oh, how I regret her utter failure to make use of it! For those who have never heard of her, Truss is the lightweight British foreign secretary who went to Moscow this week to tell her Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, that his country should not invade Ukraine. This trip was not a success. At a glacial press conference he likened their conversation to “the mute” speaking with “the deaf”; later, he leaked the fact that she had confused some Russian regions with Ukrainian regions, to add a little insult to the general injury.

Lavrov has done this many times before. He was vile to the European Union’s foreign-policy chief, Josep Borrell, last year. He has been unpleasant at international conferences and rude to journalists. His behavior is not an accident. Lavrov, like Russian President Vladimir Putin, uses aggression and sarcasm as tools to demonstrate his scorn for his interlocutor, to frame negotiations as useless even before they begin, to create dread and apathy. The point is to put other diplomats on the defensive, or else to cause them to give up in disgust.

But the fact that Lavrov is disrespectful and disagreeable is old news. So is the fact that Putin lectures foreign leaders for hours and hours on his personal and political grievances. He did that the first time he met President Barack Obama, more than a decade ago; he did exactly the same thing last week to French President Emmanuel Macron. Truss should have known all of this. Instead of offering empty language about rules and values, she could have started the press conference like this:

Good evening, ladies and gentlemen of the press. I am delighted to join you after meeting my Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov. This time, we have not bothered to discuss treaties he won’t respect and promises he won’t keep. We have told him, instead, that an invasion of Ukraine will carry very, very high costs—higher than he has ever imagined. We are now planning to cut off Russian gas exports completely—Europe will find its energy supplies somewhere else. We are now preparing to assist the Ukrainian resistance, for a decade if need be. We are quadrupling our support for the Russian opposition, and for Russian media too. We want to make sure that Russians will start hearing the truth about this invasion, and as loudly as possible. And if you want to do regime change in Ukraine, we’ll get to work on regime change in Russia. 

Truss, or Borrell before her, could have added just a touch of personal insult, in the style of Lavrov himself, and wondered out loud just how it is that Lavrov’s official salary pays for the lavish properties that his family makes use of in London. She could have listed the names of the many other Russian public servants who send their children to schools in Paris or Lugano. She could have announced that these children are now, all of them, on their way home, along with their parents: No more American School in Switzerland! No more pied-à-terres in Knightsbridge! No more Mediterranean yachts!

Of course Truss—like Borrell, like Macron, like the German chancellor who is headed for Moscow this week—would never say anything like this, not even in private. Tragically, the Western leaders and diplomats who are right now trying to stave off a Russian invasion of Ukraine still think they live in a world where rules matter, where diplomatic protocol is useful, where polite speech is valued. All of them think that when they go to Russia, they are talking to people whose minds can be changed by argument or debate. They think the Russian elite cares about things like its “reputation.” It does not.

Read: The reason Putin would risk war

In fact, when talking to the new breed of autocrats, whether in Russia, China, Venezuela, or Iran, we are now dealing with something very different: people who aren’t interested in treaties and documents, people who only respect hard power. Russia is in violation of the Budapest Memorandum, signed in 1994, guaranteeing Ukrainian security. Do you ever hear Putin talk about that? Of course not. He isn’t concerned about his untrustworthy reputation either: Lying keeps opponents on their toes. Nor does Lavrov mind if he is hated, because hatred gives him an aura of power.

Their intentions are different from ours too. Putin’s goal is not a flourishing, peaceful, prosperous Russia, but a Russia where he remains in charge. Lavrov’s goal is to maintain his position in the murky world of the Russian elite and, of course, to keep his money. What we mean by “interests” and what they mean by “interests” are not the same. When they listen to our diplomats, they don’t hear anything that really threatens their position, their power, their personal fortunes.

Despite all of our talk, no one has ever seriously tried to end, rather than simply limit, Russian money laundering in the West, or Russian political or financial influence in the West. No one has taken seriously the idea that Germans should now make themselves independent of Russian gas, or that France should ban political parties that accept Russian money, or that the U.K. and the U.S. should stop Russian oligarchs from buying property in London or Miami. No one has suggested that the proper response to Putin’s information war on our political system would be an information war on his.

Read: The U.S. is naive about Russia. Ukraine can’t afford to be.

Now we are on the brink of what could be a catastrophic conflict. American, British, and European embassies in Ukraine are evacuating; citizens have been warned to leave. But this terrible moment represents not just a failure of diplomacy; it also reflects a failure of the Western imagination, a generation-long refusal, on the part of diplomats, politicians, journalists, and intellectuals, to understand what kind of state Russia was becoming and to prepare accordingly. We have refused to see the representatives of this state for what they are. We have refused to speak to them in a way that might have mattered. Now it might be too late.

Anne Applebaum is a staff writer at The Atlantic, a fellow at the SNF Agora Institute at Johns Hopkins University, and the author of Twilight of Democracy: The Seductive Lure of Authoritarianism.