DDB: Documentos Diplomáticos Brasileiros? - Uma possibilidade longinqua, ao que parece... Documentos Diplomáticos Suíços

DDB: Documentos Diplomáticos Brasileiros? - Uma possibilidade longinqua, ao que parece... Documentos Diplomáticos Suíços 

A diplomacia brasileira dispõe de um um Consultor Jurídico – o primeiro foi instituído pelo pai do Barão, o Visconde do Rio Branco –, mas nunca "sentiu necessidade" de dispor de um historiador oficial, ou seja, alguém encarregado de selecionar os documentos diplomáticos mais interessantes e de divulgá-los em prazos regulares.

Não temos, por exemplo, o equivalente do U.S. Foreign Relations series, volumes temáticos com documentos cronologicamente agrupados, mesmo confidenciais (depois de liberados), que servem ao público em geral, mas mais precisamente aos historiadores, como guias documentais em seu trabalho analítico e interpretativo. Sempre propus a criação de um cargo de Historiador Diplomático no Itamaraty, mas nunca fui ouvido.

Até o Reino do Marrocos possui um quadro estratégico das relações internacionais do país, preparado pelo seu instituto de pesquisas da área diplomática, que pode ser visto neste link: https://www.ires.ma/fr/publications/rapports-generaux/tableau-de-bord-strategique-evolution-du-positionnement-international-du-maroc-douzieme-edition

Abaixo, um exemplo interessante: a série da Suíça, liberada a cada 30 anos, ou seja, na desclassificação.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

H-Diplo: New posted content

• H-Diplo Roundtable XXVI-11 on Zala et al., _Documents Diplomatiques Suisses, 1992_

H-Diplo: New posted content

H-Diplo Roundtable XXVI-11 on Zala et al., _Documents Diplomatiques Suisses, 1992_

christopher ball

H-Diplo Roundtable XXVI-11

Sacha Zala et al., Documents Diplomatiques Suisses, 1992. Bern: Dodis, 2023. ISBN 978-3-907261-10-1.

28 November 2024 | PDF: https://hdiplo.org/to/RT26-11 | X: @HDiplo | BlueSky: @h-diplo.bsky.social

Editor: Diane Labrosse | Commissioning Editor: Liliane Stadler | Production Editor: Christopher Ball

Contents

Introduction by Georg Kreis, University of Basel 2

Review by Stéphanie Ginalski, Université de Lausanne.. 6

Review by Marianne von Grünigen, formerly of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (EDA). 11

Response by Thomas Bürgisser and Sacha Zala, Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland.. 18

 

Introduction by Georg Kreis, University of Basel

The scholarly discussion revolving around the Dodis Research Centre’s volume on Swiss diplomatic documents from 1992 gives us the opportunity to reflect on the importance of this type of scientific endeavor in a recapitulatory way. The volumes of the Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland (DDS), which have been published since 1979, occupy a key position in the landscape of Switzerland’s diplomatic history and historiography.

Since 2021, the Dodis Research Centre annually selects and publishes approximately 1,800 of the most important documents on Swiss foreign policy at the exact expiry date of the 30-year protection and embargo period—just like a proverbial Swiss clock, so to speak. At the beginning of each year, Dodis uploads these documents via its website and publishes a small, carefully selected sub-set of approximately 62 documents both digitally and in print. The print volume of documents from 1992 was presented to the public at a well-attended book launch on 3 January 2023.[1]

In fact, the annual book launches of the DDS series have become somewhat of an institution in and of themselves and enjoy great popularity among scholars, students, journalists, as well as Swiss and foreign diplomats. They also receive considerable press coverage in Switzerland on the day they are held. Media professionals pour over the compiled documentation and convey a “selection of the selection” from the always rich and meaningful collections of documents, which continue to a wider public debate on the continued relevance of Swiss diplomatic history for the present day.[2] We know that documents that were previously classified as secret are of particular interest.

What is special about the way in which Dodis makes Swiss diplomatic documents accessible to the public is that they are primarily intended to allow interested citizens to encounter historical primary-source material with a sound balance of proximity and distance. The aim is to stimulate curiosity and inquiry. Thanks to the interactive format of both the print and digital versions of the DDS volumes, the index, and the table of contents, interested readers can find out more with little effort, about what was thought and done on their behalf in the arena of foreign affairs thirty years ago. The Dodis volumes also draw interest from the many bilateral and multilateral diplomatic missions based in Switzerland. Of course, current-day policymakers at the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs are interested too in what their predecessors have left behind in written reflections. 

Yet what significance do these editions have for historical research and for the ongoing academic debates surrounding Swiss foreign policy? They are important intermediate products in a continuous process of academic debate on the history of Swiss foreign relations. These can be used to gauge what has already been—as always—provisionally worked out in the existing literature. In the case of the present volume, Swiss reactions to the possibility of becoming part of the European Economic Area (EEA) have received considerable attention.[3] On the basis of the documentation now available, it is possible to guess what is still waiting to be recorded in an in-depth investigation. 

More broadly speaking, the selection of files contained in DDS 1992 provides a condensed overview of the most important foreign policy challenges—big and small—which occurred that year. With its layout, based primarily on archival holdings from the Swiss Federal Archives in Berne, it can provide a glimpse into issues and topics that have received little attention to date. The detailed note of a conversation that took place in Geneva in May 1992 between the president of the African National Congress (ANC), Nelson Mandela, and Swiss State Secretary Franz Blankart, is particularly significant and catalogued as Document Number 19 in DDS 1992 (115-118). In this document, Mandela comments that Switzerland had a “most negative image” in South Africa because of its non-participation in international sanctions and because of the behavior of several Swiss companies. Nevertheless, he added, “Let bygone be bygone, let us now normalize the perception,” referring primarily to financial support for the ANC (118).[4]

On the whole and in the spirit of “blue skies research,” DDS 1992 leaves open which research questions could or should be developed on the basis of the materials provided. Most Dodis volumes are products of what is called Grundlagenforschung in German—research that forms a solid basis for further investigations. They are intended as entry points into specific topics for those interested in historical research on Swiss foreign policy. The substantial introduction that precedes the documents provides both context and overview for the selection of documents that essentially mark the beginning of a new year in the declassification calendar at the Swiss Federal Archives (XXXI-LI). It is now also accompanied by a detailed review in the Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte, an academic journal dedicated to new research on Swiss history.[5]

I do want to stress, however, that while this roundtable primarily revolves around the edited volume of 1992, the publication of these documents in an edited volume—as much as they form the material core of the edition—is only half of the achievement. The other half—which cannot be valued highly enough, especially for further research—is the digital enrichment of the document corpus with metadata and its breakdown according to relevant core themes and key words, which makes targeted research much easier. The editors aptly state soberly in their contribution to our roundtable that, “this is the primary work we do on sources.” In her contribution, Stéphanie Ginalski correspondingly highlights the diversity of diplomatic activities and emphasizes, among other things, the negotiations on climate issues that were conducted in 1992—more than 30 years ago. She also reflects on the reorientation of the conventional understanding of Swiss neutrality that occurred that year, stressing Switzerland’s participation in international sanctions “without inciting a revolution.” 

Marianne von Grünigen, meanwhile, dwells on the strengthening of the CSCE and its successor organization over time, as well as on the “soft” institutionalization of its involvement in various conflicts leading up to and including 1992. She emphasizes that the year 1992 was significant in terms of enhanced cooperation among the existing international organizations in Europe. The year 1992 was a turning point after two decades of growing optimism for a more peaceful, secure and democratic Europe. Finally, Thomas Bürgisser and Sacha Zala, the two editors of the volume, respond to the two preceding contributions. They confirm Ginalski’s observation concerning the “glaring absence of women” in diplomacy at the time. Women remained heavily underrepresented in the diplomatic corps throughout the 1990s. Von Grünigen herself is a notable exception in the Swiss diplomatic corps and thankfully, the gender balance has since improved considerably. 

(...)

Ler a íntegra neste link: 

https://networks.h-net.org/group/discussions/20051318/h-diplo-roundtable-xxvi-11-zala-et-al-documents-diplomatiques-suisses

Biblioteca Digital da Funag: mais de mil livros disponíveis gratuitamente

A Biblioteca Digital da Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão tem, em seu estoque de livros disponíveis, 1033 obras, um volume continuamente alimentado por novos acréscimos:

 https://funag.gov.br/biblioteca-nova/todos/0

A Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão (FUNAG) coloca à disposição do público obras relativas ao estudo dos grandes temas de interesse da política externa brasileira e das relações internacionais. As obras encontram-se em formato digital para download gratuito na biblioteca digital.

Bolsonaro nu - Editorial O Estado de S. Paulo

Bolsonaro nu

Editorial O Estado de S. Paulo, 28/11/2024

Ninguém precisava da PF para saber que Bolsonaro é golpista. Mas as investigações são úteis porque o despem de vez dos trapos retóricos com os quais ele tentou se travestir de democrata

O relatório final da Polícia Federal (PF) sobre a tentativa de golpe de Estado que teria sido urdida no seio do governo de Jair Bolsonaro para aferrá-lo ao poder decerto não surpreendeu quem acompanhou minimamente a vida pública do ex-presidente. Desde quando saiu do Exército em desonra, passando por uma frívola carreira parlamentar – que, se prestou para alguma coisa, foi para enriquecê-lo, além de sua família – até chegar à Presidência da República, Bolsonaro jamais traiu seu espírito golpista. De mau militar e mau deputado a mau presidente, foram quase 40 anos de exploração da insurreição e da infâmia como ativos políticos.

Este jornal, seguramente, não está surpreso com o que veio a público após o ministro Alexandre de Moraes, do Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF), levantar o sigilo sobre o referido relatório. Afinal, faz quase 25 anos que já sublinhávamos nesta página o vezo parasitário de Bolsonaro no Brasil pós-redemocratização, chamando-o pelo que é: um desqualificado que se serve das mesmas liberdades democráticas que sempre quis obliterar (ver o editorial Dejetos da democracia, 8/1/2000).

A rigor, ninguém precisava de um relatório policial de mais de 800 páginas para saber que Bolsonaro é um golpista inveterado. Quem já votou nele ao longo da vida pode alegar tudo, menos desconhecimento de sua índole destrutiva. Mas, para quem quiser, aí está o portentoso material reunido pela PF a encadear fatos e personagens com notável robustez, além de desnudar o espírito insurreto que jamais deixou de guiar o ex-presidente ao longo de sua trajetória.

Segundo a PF, Bolsonaro “planejou, atuou e teve domínio de forma direta e efetiva” das tramoias para impedir a posse do presidente Lula da Silva, o que teria incluído até um suposto plano para assassiná-lo, entre outras autoridades. E não só entre novembro e dezembro de 2022, mas durante todo o mandato – que, recorde-se, começou com a disseminação de mentiras sobre a suposta “fragilidade” das urnas eletrônicas. Ainda de acordo com a PF, essa desabrida campanha de desqualificação do sistema eleitoral já era parte do plano golpista de Bolsonaro para se insurgir contra um resultado nas urnas que não fosse a sua reeleição, contando que a desconfiança que semeou entre milhões de brasileiros poderia lhe ser útil no futuro.

É fundamental frisar que ainda se está em fase de inquérito policial. De modo que o contraditório e a ampla defesa só estarão plenamente garantidos aos 37 indiciados, como é próprio do Estado Democrático de Direito, mais à frente, vale dizer, se e quando a Procuradoria-Geral da República (i) oferecer denúncia contra eles, (ii) as acusações forem aceitas pelo STF e (iii) o caso, então, entrar na fase judicial propriamente dita. Entretanto, as eventuais provas que poderão ser apresentadas à Justiça pelo parquet, obviamente, serão decisivas apenas, por assim dizer, para o destino penal de Bolsonaro. Já sobre seu golpismo não há prova mais cabal de que se trata de um inimigo figadal da democracia do que seu próprio passado.

Nesse sentido, é estarrecedor ainda haver no seio de uma sociedade que se pretende livre e democrática quem admita a presença de alguém como Bolsonaro na vida política. Ou pior, que enxergue como “democrata”, “patriota”, “vítima do sistema” ou baboseira que o valha um sujeito de quinta categoria que já defendeu o fechamento do Congresso, lamentou o “baixo número” de concidadãos torturados e mortos nos porões da ditadura militar, pregou o fuzilamento do presidente Fernando Henrique Cardoso e trata adversários políticos como inimigos a serem eliminados, inclusive fisicamente. Ademais, Bolsonaro jamais desestimulou as manifestações de teor golpista realizadas em seu nome, como os acampamentos na frente de quartéis País afora. Tudo indica que não o fez para falsear um “clamor popular” pelo golpe e, assim, pressionar as Forças Armadas a apoiálo na intentona – o que, para o bem do Brasil, não ocorreu.

A Justiça, primeiro, e a História, depois, hão de ser implacáveis com Bolsonaro e todos os que flertaram com a destruição da democracia no Brasil.

How the Global Distribution of Wealth Has Changed (2000-2023) - Visual Capitalist

 How the Global Distribution of Wealth Has Changed (2000-2023)

This was originally posted on our Voronoi app. Download the app for free on iOS or Android and discover incredible data-driven charts from a variety of trusted sources.

People worldwide are becoming increasingly wealthier—and not just those who already own great wealth.

Over recent decades, the share of the global population with wealth between $10,000 and $100,000 has more than doubled, while the group in the lowest wealth segment (less than $10,000) has been nearly cut in half.

This graphic illustrates the shifts in global wealth distribution between 2000 and 2023, based on data from Art Basel and UBS.

Key Takeaways

The percentage of adults in the lowest wealth segment (under $10,000) decreased from 75% in 2000 to 40% in 2023. Most of these individuals reside in poorer countries, predominantly in Africa.

Meanwhile, the group with wealth between $10,000 and $100,000 has seen the most significant growth over the last two decades.

Year	< $10k	$10k-$100k	$100k-$1m	> $1m
2000	75%	17%	8%	1%
2010	56%	32%	12%	1%
2019	57%	33%	10%	1%
2022	53%	34%	12%	1%
2023	40%	43%	16%	2%

While the share of millionaires has doubled since 2000, they still account for only 2% of the global population. North America and the Middle East have experienced the largest percentage increase in the number of millionaires since 2016, with +52% and +50% growth, respectively.

Individuals with assets worth $100,000–$1 million have grown from 8% to 16% of the population.

According to UBS, the data shows that in every wealth band and over any time horizon, it’s consistently likelier for people to climb up the wealth ladder than slip down it, at least on a global level.

Learn More on the Voronoi App 

To learn more about this topic, check out this graphic that shows the global wealth distribution by region in 2023.

Venezuela: a maneira dura de Trump tratar com a ditadura não vai funcionar, como não funcionou com Cuba ou Nicarágua - Francisco Rodriguez (Foreign Affairs)

 The Case for Engagement With Venezuela

Maximum Pressure Will Only Strengthen Maduro

By Francisco Rodríguez

Foreign Affairs, November 28, 2024

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/venezuela/case-engagement-venezuela?utm_medium=newsletters&utm_source=fatoday&utm_campaign=The%20Case%20for%20Engagement%20With%20Venezuela&utm_content=20241128&utm_term=EDZZZ003ZX#author-info

 

Among the most complex foreign policy challenges facing the new U.S. administration is the situation in Venezuela. Over the past 12 years, Venezuela has transitioned from a fragile democracy to an entrenched authoritarian regime, experiencing one of the most severe economic collapses and migration crises in modern history outside wartime. And in recent years, these problems have increasingly affected the United States. During the past five years, U.S. authorities have apprehended more than 900,000 Venezuelans attempting to cross the southern border.

[Lea la versión de este artículo en español aquí.]

Many expect that Donald Trump’s presidency will mean the return of the maximum-pressure approach to Venezuela that defined his first term, when Washington imposed sweeping oil and financial sanctions, backed efforts at an armed uprising, and even floated the possibility of direct military action. At a rally in Florida just three days before the election, Senator Marco Rubio, Trump’s nominee for secretary of state, asserted that under the new administration, “we will have a very different position, much tougher and much clearer, not only in Venezuela, but also in Cuba and Nicaragua.” Rubio has cosponsored legislation to codify sanctions on Venezuela, conditioning any sanctions relief and diplomatic recognition on Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro relinquishing power and an opposition-led transition.

But a return to the failed strategy of maximum pressure by the new administration would be a grave mistake. Sanctions are rarely effective in achieving regime change, and Venezuela is no exception. Far from destabilizing Maduro, U.S. sanctions have helped him consolidate control, increasing the asymmetry of power between the state’s apparatus and an impoverished and weakened civil society. More than seven million Venezuelans have fled the country since 2014, and doubling down on pressure could further worsen the living conditions of those remaining. Maximum pressure will, therefore, cut against Washington’s effort to reduce irregular migration and ensure a stable energy supply.

The United States should continue to condemn Maduro’s authoritarian government for its human rights violations and dismantling of democratic institutions. But Trump and his administration should adopt a strategy of targeted engagement with Venezuela’s authorities. Such a strategy would prioritize maintaining or strengthening economic and diplomatic linkages between the United States and Venezuela—the types of connections that can empower stakeholders committed to fostering a democratic transition. The first priority of U.S. policy should be to alleviate the suffering of Venezuelans, recognizing that broad economic sanctions have exacerbated that suffering. Where possible, Washington should leverage engagement—including the gradual easing of sanctions—to encourage improvements in human rights and political freedoms. This strategy of targeted engagement offers a path to immediately improve conditions in Venezuela while enhancing the prospects for a democratic transition in the medium to long term.

SANCTIONING CATASTROPHE

From 2017 to 2022, the United States imposed some of the harshest sanctions on Venezuela that it has levied on any country. The Trump administration halted all trade with Venezuela’s state-owned oil, gold, and banking sectors (transactions with private banks were still allowed) and blocked the national government and the oil industry from borrowing, restructuring debt, or receiving dividends from its offshore subsidiaries (like Citgo). In 2019, Washington handed control over Venezuela’s overseas assets to the U.S.-recognized opposition, led by Juan Guaidó, and blocked the country’s access to international reserve holdings, including special drawing rights in the International Monetary Fund.

The first Trump administration also imposed secondary sanctions, barring Venezuela from selling oil abroad by targeting foreign companies and vessels involved in its oil trade. Between 2019 and 2021, 47 vessels and 12 companies were sanctioned for assisting in Venezuelan oil exports. (In contrast, despite similar U.S. sanctions on Russian oil today, non-U.S. tankers can still sell Russian oil at $60 per barrel without being sanctioned themselves.)

This pressure has compounded Venezuela’s economic crisis. The country’s contraction in per capita incomes began in 2013 because of severe macroeconomic imbalances created by years of populist policies. Yet starting in 2017, sanctions significantly worsened the economy by severing Venezuela’s access to vital oil and financial markets, which led to a sharp decline in oil production. Sanctions contributed substantially to falling oil output, imports, and productivity; without them, Venezuela’s economy would have started to recover when oil prices rose in 2017. Sanctions accounted for around 52 percent of Venezuela’s economic contraction between 2012 and 2020. Without sanctions, Venezuela would have still faced a severe crisis, with per capita incomes dropping by 34 percent. With sanctions, however, GDP per capita declined by an extraordinary 71 percent—equivalent to almost three successive Great Depressions.

Venezuela’s migration crisis stems from this collapse in economic opportunities. Although the country’s human rights violations are horrific, they are not on the scale of the ethnic cleansing, genocide, or armed conflict that typically drives mass displacement. Instead, millions of Venezuelans have left to escape an economic catastrophe. If the U.S. government resumes policies that target Venezuelans’ livelihoods, it should not be surprised when many of those affected end up at its doorstep.

GAINING FROM ENGAGEMENT

In 2022, the Biden administration reestablished contact with the Maduro government, pursuing a dual track that gradually eased sanctions and encouraged renewed negotiations with the opposition. In November of that year, the U.S. Treasury issued a license for Chevron—the only U.S. oil company with production capacity in Venezuela—to export Venezuelan oil to the United States, coinciding with the resumption of talks between the Maduro government and its opposition.

Critics claimed that the Biden administration was giving Maduro sanctions relief without gaining anything in return. Yet this critique overlooks a key achievement. In October 2023, Maduro publicly committed to holding free and fair presidential elections. Though the election ended up being minimally transparent, this concession ultimately allowed the opposition coalition to register Edmundo González as a candidate after María Corina Machado, who had won the opposition’s primary in October 2023, was barred from running. Washington also successfully encouraged the opposition to abandon its failed electoral boycotts and to engage in the election process despite facing an unlevel playing field.

These decisions helped pave the way for González to defeat Maduro in the July 28 presidential election by more than a two-to-one margin. The opposition documented its victory with tally sheets from the country’s electronic voting system, reenergizing the coalition and demonstrating its broad support among Venezuelans. Although this victory did not produce immediate change, with Maduro’s electoral council blatantly altering the election’s results to declare Maduro the winner, it marked the opposition’s strongest challenge yet to Maduro’s authoritarian rule.

Critics might argue that the opposition’s electoral victory was meaningless because Maduro ultimately retained power and intensified repression. But such a critique misses the broader significance of the outcome. The elections played a crucial role in revitalizing and legitimizing Venezuela’s opposition, demonstrating its broad popular support, and strengthening its internal cohesion. These developments are essential preconditions for any successful challenge to an entrenched regime. Whether these gains can translate into meaningful change will depend on how realistic the opposition’s objectives are and how well it leverages its newfound strength in future negotiations.

BEYOND ISOLATION

A realistic foreign policy toward Venezuela must begin with the recognition that Washington has limited influence over political dynamics in authoritarian countries. In a world where 71 percent of people live under autocratic regimes, it is not only futile but also dangerous to target select countries—such as Cuba, Iran, and Venezuela—for regime change. Singling out specific regimes risks alienating allies, undermining U.S. moral authority, and reinforcing authoritarians’ claims that Washington meddles in other countries’ domestic affairs. In Venezuela, a principled, pragmatic approach—focused on humanitarian relief and diplomatic engagement—would better serve the interests of both the United States and the Venezuelan people.

Trump’s administration should thus continue easing economic sanctions. It should do so, in part, simply because the restrictions have needlessly immiserated millions. But improving the country’s living conditions also serves a political purpose. The more tolerable life becomes for Venezuelans, the less likely they are to flee to the United States. Managing migration flows from Venezuela will also require sustained communication and coordination with Caracas. Reopening the U.S. embassy in Venezuela is therefore a critical step to safeguarding American interests in the country, as well.

A return to the failed strategy of maximum pressure would be a grave mistake.

Easing sanctions could afford the Trump administration an opportunity to secure concessions on human rights. Licenses for new oil projects, for example, could be conditioned on revenues being allocated to international organizations that can address Venezuela’s humanitarian crisis. Likewise, the Trump administration could use sanctions relief to induce political reforms. It should work to secure the release of political prisoners. It should negotiate for institutional changes that reduce the stakes of power and create space for coexistence between Venezuela’s political factions. It should push Venezuela to appoint new electoral authorities and commit to inviting in international observers for upcoming elections. All three of these steps would provide vital space for electoral competition. They remain the best path to fostering a democratic transition. (The United States should also work with regional partners, including Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, to forge a realistic political settlement.)

Should the Trump administration embrace a policy of limited engagement, it would be bowing to reality. Punitive policies may appeal to policymakers, but they often corner regimes, making behavioral change unlikely. A government whose leaders fear U.S. prosecution will do everything to remain in power, including stealing elections. Strategic engagement, on the other hand, can incentivize positive shifts and strengthen local actors who support a negotiated resolution. The political scientists Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way have shown that countries with economic, social, and institutional ties to the West are more likely to democratize than those subjected solely to punitive measures.

Likewise, Trump would be accepting that when people become poorer in an authoritarian country, the state becomes stronger, not weaker. At the height of the Venezuelan economy’s contraction, a large segment of the population depended on politically conditioned government handouts. In contrast, Venezuela’s economic recovery of the past four years, due in part to the easing of oil sanctions, has helped reduce low-income voters’ dependency on government programs, making them less susceptible to electoral blackmail.

No U.S. administration can overhaul Venezuela’s political system. But by setting achievable goals that address immediate needs, promote economic recovery, and support fundamental freedoms, the United States can help the Venezuelan people. A pragmatic approach that prioritizes economic recovery and gradual political progress will be far more effective in bringing Venezuela closer to change than a strategy of suffocation.

 

• FRANCISCO RODRÍGUEZ is Rice Family Professor of the Practice of International and Public Affairs at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of International Studies.

O Mercantilismo, o Marxismo e o Keynesianismo como "seitas econômicas" - Roberto Campos

 O Mercantilismo, o Marxismo e o Keynesianismo como "seitas econômicas"

Roberto Campos

Leio e copio da apresentação de Roberto Campos ao Quadro Econômico dos Fisiocratas, de François Quesnay: 

"Nos últimos três séculos de história ocidental, que assistiram ao nascimento da Economia como "ciência"no sentido schumpeteriano, isto é, um corpo de análise independente de proposições metafísicas  ou 'influências anticientíficas', apenas o mercantilismo, o marxismo, este em grau extremo, e, modernamente, o keynesianismo, partilharam com a Fisiocracia a honra, aliás, duvidosa, de poderem ser classificados como 'seitas' econômicas. Uma 'seita econômica' é mais que uma doutrina porque é também uma 'mensagem' e, no caso do marxismo, uma poderosa mensagem política." 

in: Petty, William. Obras Econômicas. Apresentação de Roberto Campos. Trad. Luiz Henrique Lopes dos Santos e Paulo Almeida. Quesnay, François. Quadro Econômico dos Fisiocratas. Apresentação de Roberto Campos. Trad. José Guilherme Vargas Netto. São Paulo: Nova Cultural, 1996, p. 207.

The End of the Liberal West - Joschka Fischer (Social Europe)

 Ex-chanceler alemão:

The End of the Liberal West

Joschka Fischer 

 Social Europe, 27th November 2024

Donald Trump’s reelection marks a critical moment for the global liberal order, forcing Europe to confront its vulnerabilities and redefine its future.

We all think, speak, and write within certain intellectual frameworks that we largely take for granted. But, eventually, the passage of time renders familiar categories and ideas obsolete. For example, who still talks about the “Soviet Union” today, apart from historians? 

In a similar vein, this year’s presidential election in the United States was the most significant political event of 2024, and it will almost certainly be remembered as a historical turning point. The outcome will shape global events for decades to come. 

The effects will be felt on two levels. The first is the more immediate, practical, operational level of day-to-day governance. With Donald Trump back in the White House, the US will withdraw from the Paris climate agreement, impose new tariffs on its trade partners, and launch a massive campaign to round up and expel millions of undocumented immigrants. Taken together, this all represents a fundamental shift in how the world’s most powerful country operates, and in what it represents. 

Then there is the global dimension, where many scenarios are possible – from major power shifts to the dissolution of long-standing alliances and the disintegration of the world’s governing institutions and norms. What will happen to transatlantic relations? What about Ukraine? Will the US develop closer ties to Russia and other authoritarian regimes at the expense of the European Union and other allies? 

Trump won decisively despite his contempt for democratic institutions, his efforts to overturn the 2020 election, and his subsequent 34-count felony conviction. Though voters know about his chaotic approach to governance, his habitual mendacity, and his sinister immigration policies, he won every swing state. Even with full knowledge of who Trump is, more Americans voted for him than for Kamala Harris. 

We must not mince words: liberal democracy in the US has suffered a lethal blow. It will be under increasing pressure on both sides of the Atlantic, and there is no guarantee that it will survive. After all, can there be any future for the liberal West without the US as its leader? I believe the answer is no. 

Trump will begin his second term with Republican control over both houses of Congress, and many observers expect the 6-to-3 conservative majority on the Supreme Court to back him unequivocally. In June, the Court ruled, in a case brought by Trump, that presidents enjoy broad immunity from criminal prosecution for “official” acts. Thus, he will be able to govern – indeed, to rule – unimpeded. There is nothing to stop him from reshaping American liberal democracy into an illiberal oligarchy. 

Obviously, the pressure on European democracies to contribute more to their own security will intensify. But Trump has no interest in strengthening the EU – quite the opposite, in fact – and the EU’s capability to advance independently without the tacit support of the US is doubtful. Doing so would require a fundamental shift in Europeans’ political mentality, and such a change is currently nowhere in sight. Moreover, the Franco-German engine that has always propelled the EU is no longer operational, and no one knows when, or if, it will be restarted. 

Another major issue is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Will the current Israeli government now rush to annex the West Bank? What will it do about Iran, which has been amassing near-weapons-grade uranium? All signs point to a major war in the region – to a violent restructuring that will bring anything but peace or even a lasting ceasefire. 

That brings us to the final, all-important question: What will the world look like without a liberal West? For decades, the transatlantic alliance projected power (both hard and soft) and modeled the values that underpinned a cohesive global order. But now the global order is in the midst of a chaotic transition. 

If Europe fails to come together at this moment of tumultuous change, it will not get a second chance. Its only option is to become a military power capable of protecting its interests and securing peace and order on the world stage. The alternative is fragmentation, impotence, and irrelevance. The challenge is compounded by a massive technological shift toward digitalization and AI, as well as by Europe’s demographic crisis. Though the continent has too many elderly people and too few young people, it is increasingly opposed to immigration. 

So, what now? Will Europe prepare itself, or will it revert to a structure resembling the one that followed the 1814-15 Congress of Vienna, in which Russia’s influence was dominant and pervasive? Europeans woke up on November 6 to a result that will affect them more profoundly than all their own elections combined. Trump will not only change America (for the worse); he will also shape European history – if we let him.

Copyright Project Syndicate

Joschka Fischer was Germany’s foreign minister and vice-chancellor from 1998 to 2005 and a leader in the German Green Party for almost 20 years.

Em 2023, a necessidade de financiamento líquida do governo geral foi de R$ 844,0 bilhões, apresentando um aumento de 111,2% em relação a 2022. (Dados do IBGE)

PRA: O "mercado" não tem nada a ver com o aumento de despesas do Estado. Essa foi uma decisão tomada de forma inteiramente autônoma pelo governo.

Ricardo Bergamini: "Em 2023, a necessidade de financiamento líquida do governo geral foi de R$ 844,0 bilhões, apresentando um aumento de 111,2% em relação a 2022. Essa variação é explicada pelo aumento nominal de 13,2% da despesa em relação ao ano anterior ante um aumento de 3,4% da receita no mesmo período. Os dados são das Estatísticas de Finanças Públicas e Conta Intermediária do Governo, elaboradas pelo IBGE em parceria com a Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional (STN) e o Banco Central do Brasil."

Estatísticas de Finanças Públicas e Conta Intermediária de Governo – Fonte IBGE

27/11/2024

Base: Ano de 2023

Finanças públicas: necessidade de financiamento do governo cresceu 111,2% em 2023

Em 2023, a necessidade de financiamento líquida do governo geral foi de R$ 844,0 bilhões, apresentando um aumento de 111,2% em relação a 2022. Essa variação é explicada pelo aumento nominal de 13,2% da despesa em relação ao ano anterior ante um aumento de 3,4% da receita no mesmo período. Os dados são das Estatísticas de Finanças Públicas e Conta Intermediária do Governo, elaboradas pelo IBGE em parceria com a Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional (STN) e o Banco Central do Brasil.

Na análise dos principais agregados da receita, a arrecadação de impostos cresceu 4,1% e as contribuições sociais 7,5% em 2023. Por outro lado, outras receitas caíram 3,4%.

Em relação à receita tributária, o destaque fica por conta da arrecadação de impostos sobre a propriedade, com aumento de 16,0%, influenciado pelo aumento de 24,7% na arrecadação de IPVA. Impostos sobre a folha de pagamento e mão de obra cresceram 12,6%. Por outro lado, impostos sobre o comércio e transações internacionais tiveram queda de 0,9%, influenciada pela redução em dólar das importações combinada com aumento da taxa média de câmbio no ano.

Impostos sobre bens e serviços, grupo de maior peso na arrecadação tributária, tiveram crescimento nominal de 3,3% em 2023 e os impostos sobre renda, lucro e ganhos de capital, crescimento nominal de apenas 3,4%.

Dentre as outras fontes de arrecadação, os destaques negativos ficam por conta da receita de dividendos, com queda de 39,4%, e da receita de concessões (especialmente as ligadas à exploração de petróleo), com queda de 30,1%. Já o destaque positivo fica por conta das outras transferências, com aumento de 120,2%, influenciado principalmente pela arrecadação de R$ 26 bilhões em recursos abandonados do PIS/Pasep e apropriados pelo Tesouro Nacional (Emenda Constitucional nº 126, de 2022).

Pela ótica da despesa, observa-se que todos os itens agregados tiveram crescimento em 2023, o que contribuiu para o aumento da Necessidade de Financiamento Líquida do período. Benefícios previdenciários e assistenciais e remuneração de empregados cresceram 14,3% e 10,6% respectivamente. O destaque, no entanto, ficou por conta dos outros gastos (especialmente os de capital, como o Minha Casa Minha Vida), com 39,7% de crescimento. Despesas com uso de bens e serviços, juros e subsídios também cresceram, com taxas de 12,23%, 9,8% e 7,7%, respectivamente.

Governo contribui com 13,6% do PIB

Em 2023, o valor adicionado do Governo Geral foi de R$ 1.473,9 bilhões e sua participação no PIB foi de 13,6%, o que representa um aumento de 0,2 ponto percentual em relação a 2022. Em termos absolutos, a variação foi positiva em todas as esferas: 10,1% na federal, 8,8% na estadual e 13,1% na municipal.

Municípios elevam participação no Valor Adicionado

A esfera municipal ampliou sua participação no valor adicionado do governo, passando de 35,9% em 2022 para 36,6% em 2023, o que representa um aumento de 0,7 ponto percentual. A esfera federal perdeu 0,1 ponto percentual, passando de 27,3% em 2022 para 27,2% em 2023, e a esfera estadual perdeu 0,6 ponto percentual, passando de 36,8% em 2022 para 36,2% em 2023.

Gastos com Bolsa Família aumentam 47,1% em 2023

Item de maior peso na composição dos gastos públicos da Conta Intermediária de Governo, os benefícios sociais aumentaram 3,6% graças às elevações das despesas com outros benefícios de seguro social (8,6%) e benefícios de assistência social em numerário (29,2%), item no qual está classificado o Bolsa Família, que substituiu o Auxílio Brasil e teve aumento de 47,1% em 2023.

Já a formação bruta de capital fixo, variável que mede a capacidade produtiva futura do Governo Geral, chegou a R$ 215,8 bilhões no ano de 2023, o que representa um aumento de 7,8% em relação a 2022. Governos federal e municipais, com taxas de 22,8% e 28,6%, compensaram a redução observada nos governos estaduais de 15,2% e impulsionaram o crescimento dos investimentos no ano de 2023.

Todos os processos e investigações envolvendo Bolsonaro e os bolsonaristas - Consultoria Dharma

 A Consultoria Dharma listou TODOS os processos envolvendo Bolsonaro e os bolsonaristas.

PRA: Parafraseando (mal) Winston Churchill: "Poucas vezes na História tantos crimes foram cometidos tantas vezes envolvendo uma única pessoa."

"No cerne da defesa do Estado Democrático de Direito no Brasil, o Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) e outras instituições têm enfrentado a intensa tarefa de investigar e julgar casos envolvendo Jair Bolsonaro e seu círculo político.

Esta edição da Dharma News traz um panorama dos principais processos judiciais relacionados ao bolsonarismo e suas implicações políticas:

1. Questionamento do Sistema Eleitoral
Processos: ARE 1431329 e ARE 1428927
Relator: Ministro Dias Toffoli
Resumo: Reunião com embaixadores (julho/2022) em que Jair Bolsonaro questionou a integridade do sistema eleitoral.
Implicação política: Bolsonaro inelegível por 8 anos (TSE).
Última movimentação: 16/04/2024

2. Fake News
Processo: INQ 4781
Relator: Ministro Alexandre de Moraes
Resumo: Notícias falsas e uso indevido da ABIN para rastrear opositores.
Implicação política: Inclusão de Bolsonaro na investigação (2021).
Última movimentação: 12/11/2024

3. Interferência na Polícia Federal
Processo: INQ 4831
Relator: Ministro Alexandre de Moraes
Resumo: Denúncia de Sérgio Moro sobre interferência em investigações envolvendo aliados de Bolsonaro.
Status: Decisão da PGR sobre arquivamento pendente.
Última movimentação: 20/05/2024

4. Milícias Digitais
Processos: INQ 4874 e PET 9842
Relator: Ministro Alexandre de Moraes
Resumo: Investigação sobre organização criminosa digital antidemocrática.
Implicação política: Bolsonaro investigado por ataques ao sistema eleitoral.
Última movimentação: 19/11/2024

5. Vazamento de Dados Sigilosos
Processo: INQ 4878
Relator: Ministro Alexandre de Moraes
Resumo: Divulgação indevida de material sigiloso do TSE.
Status: PGR recusa arquivamento solicitado.
Última movimentação: 05/11/2024

6. Atos Antidemocráticos
Processo: INQ 4879
Relator: Ministro Alexandre de Moraes
Resumo: Atos após as eleições de 2022 buscando abolir o Estado Democrático de Direito.
Última movimentação: 19/11/2024

7. CPI da Covid-19
Processo: INQ 4888
Relator: Ministro Alexandre de Moraes
Resumo: Crimes na gestão da pandemia, incluindo promoção de medicamentos sem eficácia.
Última movimentação: 15/02/2024

8. Incitação aos Atos de 08/01
Processo: INQ 4921
Relator: Ministro Alexandre de Moraes
Resumo: Investigação de incitação aos atos golpistas de janeiro/2023.
Última movimentação: 19/11/2024

9. Cartões de Vacina Falsificados
Processo: PET 10405
Relator: Ministro Alexandre de Moraes
Resumo: Manipulação de registros de vacinação contra COVID-19.
Última movimentação: 12/11/2024

10. Caso Joias Sauditas
Processo: PET 11645
Relator: Ministro Alexandre de Moraes
Resumo: Investigação sobre irregularidades envolvendo joias recebidas da Arábia Saudita.
Última movimentação: 08/11/2024

11. Golpe de Estado
Processo: PET 12100
Relator: Ministro Alexandre de Moraes
Resumo: Investigação de uma minuta golpista formulada no Palácio da Alvorada após as eleições de 2022.
Última movimentação: 19/11/2024

Os processos em andamento representam esforços das instituições brasileiras para apurar e responsabilizar possíveis irregularidades no contexto político recente. As investigações seguem em curso e buscam por respostas sobre os eventos que marcaram o país nos últimos anos.

Até a próxima Dharma News! Um abraço!"