quarta-feira, 8 de agosto de 2012

Auto-governanca: o exemplo de uma pequena comuna europeia


Mises Daily, August 8, 2012



Anarchy in the Aachen
by Peter C. Earle on August 8, 2012
Can a community without a central government avoid descending into chaos and rampant criminality? Can its economy grow and thrive without the intervening regulatory hand of the state? Can its disputes be settled without a monopoly on legal judgments? If the strange and little-known case of the condominum of Moresnet — a wedge of disputed territory in northwestern Europe, and arguably Europe's counterpart to America's so-called Wild West — acts as our guide, we must conclude that statelessness is not only possible but beneficial to progress, carrying profound advantages over coercive bureaucracies.
The remarkable experiment that was Moresenet was an indirect consequence of the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815), which, like all wars, empowered the governments of participating states at the expense of their populations: nationalism grew more fervent; many nations suspended specie payments indefinitely; and a new crop of destitute amputees appeared in streets all across Europe.
In the Congress of Vienna, which concluded the war, borders were redrawn according to the "balance-of-power" theory: no state should be in a position to dominate others militarily. There were some disagreements, one in particular between Prussia and the Netherlands regarding the miniscule, mineral-rich map spot known as the "old mountain" — Altenberg in German, Vieille Montagne in French — which held a large zinc mine that profitably extricated tons of ore from the ground. With a major war recently concluded, and the next nearest zinc source of any significance in England, it behooved the two powers to jointly control the operation.
They settled on an accommodation; the mountain mine would be a region of shared sovereignty. So from its inception in 1816, the zone would fall under the aegis of several states: Prussia and the Netherlands initially, and Belgium taking the place of the Netherlands after gaining its independence in 1830. Designated "Neutral Moresnet," the small land occupied a triangular spot between these three states, its area largely covered by the quarry, some company buildings, a bank, schools, several stores, a hospital, and the roughly 50 cottages housing 256 miners and support personnel.[1]
The territory "originate[ed] in mistake … perpetuated by [the] jealousy [and] inability of … two governments to concur in partition," and initially, little changed within the district.[2] But over the next few decades, Moresnet's small size and ambiguous oversight by several national powers came together to create an inadvertent experiment deep in the Aachen forests of northwestern Europe.
The first factor is that, although nominally monitored by several nations, by virtue of its small size, Moresnet was loosely supervised at best. Not only was it so small that a crumb would blot out its existence on most maps; neither was there much reason for its overseers to direct attention to it: it sat quietly, reliably excavating 8,500 tons of zinc each year. Occasionally a patrolling Prussian, Dutch, or Belgian soldier would wander close to the border — as a demilitarized zone, Moresnet territory was explicitly off limits for military forces — but for the most part the mining community was left alone.
And it wasn't just administrators who lost track of the of the anomalous territory; it was secluded enough that one traveler recalled inquiring
at [a nearby] hotel, at some neighboring shops, and at both of the railway stations … [but still couldn't be told] how to reach Neutral Moresnet; they had no idea at all, or guessed at random at various impossible stations.[3]
Within the triangle, there was a minimal government in the form of a burgomaster, assisted by a "Committee of Ten." Despite its somewhat ominous name, the committee "wield[ed] no real power" and the burgomaster was "far from being a … despot."[4]
Moresnet also employed a police force of one, referred to with local good humor — and perhaps mocking nearby Prussia with its General Staff and large social class of military officers — as Moresnet's "Secretary of War."[5] The lone police officer was usually "to be seen in full uniform enjoying a game of chess or billiards with the burgomaster at the beer garden on the shores of the lake."[6]
Through the rest of the 19th century, Moresnet's course ran distinct from that of surrounding European states. In 1848, for example, violent revolutions broke out in Italy, France, Germany, Denmark, Hungary, Switzerland, Poland, Ireland, Wallachia, the Ukraine, and throughout the Habsburg Empire. For Moresnettians, life in 1848 proceeded unperturbed, and the year was noteworthy only for the first minting of sovereign coins, which local merchants accepted for use alongside other currencies.[7]
Despite its isolation, word slowly spread that within Moresnet — if one could find it — "imports from surrounding countries were toll free, the taxes were very low, prices were lower and wages higher than in [other European] countries."[8]
Over the following decades the population of the tiny region grew correspondingly: by 1850, the population had doubled, and in addition to the zinc mine, new businesses and even some small farms began to spring up.
Alongside the negligible tax burden, a unique legal climate favored the expansion of economic activity within the tiny district. On inception, the Congress of Vienna, which created Neutral Moresnet, held that its laws would be construed in accordance with the Code Napoleon, known for
its stress on clearly written and accessible law, [which] was a major step in replacing the previous patchwork of feudal laws.… Laws could be applied only if they had been duly promulgated, and only if they had been published officially (including provisions for publishing delays, given the means of communication available at the time); thus no secret laws were authorized. It [also] prohibited ex post factor laws.[9]
And most importantly of all, the code placed a primary importance on "property rights … [which] were made absolute," naturally generating a favorable climate for commercial enterprise.[10] One periodical noted that a "thief tried … [nearby] gets … a few months, while the Code Napoleon specifies five years."[11]
This contrasted sharply with the Allgemeines Landrecht legal system of neighboring Prussia, which "used an incredibly casuistic and imprecise language, making it hard to properly understand and use in practice," but which for some legal purposes may have held advantages over the Code Napoleon.[12] Alternately, disputes could be directed to the burgomaster's "petty tribunal" for quick decisions on smaller issues and disputes.[13] His
head-quarters were … "under his hat." He went about town and held court wherever he happened to be when his service as justice was required, which, happily, was not often. When complaint was made to him, he would listen patiently and attentively … [then] whistle some favorite air, and thus take time to resolve the matter in his mind.… His judgments were always intelligible and fair, insomuch that they were never excepted to or appealed from during all his term of thirty-five years.[14]
Moresnet inhabitants, therefore, had access to several different systems for resolution of disputes — a rudimentary market for justice — and were therefore empowered to take their issues to the venue they felt afforded the best chances of satisfactory resolution.
Further, residents of Neutral Moresnet were not required to fulfill the compulsory military requirements of their nations of origin.[15] This no doubt motivated many of the new arrivals, in particular those from Prussia, which fought half a dozen wars during the 19th century.[16]
The population of the hamlet quadrupled between 1850 and 1860, topping 2,000 residents. One newcomer was particularly significant. Dr. Wilhelm Molly arrived in 1863 to become the general practitioner of the mining company, and soon won celebrity by thwarting a local cholera epidemic in Moresnet. Like many physicians of his era, Dr. Molly had numerous interests, some of which would play a role in Moresnet's development over the next half-century.[17]
From the beginning of the designation of Neutral Moresnet, it was known that the Vieille Montagne zinc mine could not, and would not, produce indefinitely. In 1885, the zinc mine finally wound down and ceased operation, but this wasn't especially worrisome economically: numerous businesses were now flourishing, including "60–70 bars and cafes [along] the main street," a number of breweries, small farms, and at least one dairy operation.[18] Taxes hadn't changed since the designation of the neutral zone in 1816, and visitors noted that Moresnet was "without the beggars who are [a] sadly familiar sight" across the rest of Europe.[19]
To Dr. Molly, the closing of the zinc mine hardly presented reason for the culmination of Neutral Moresnet as a community, much less its end. On the contrary, he became the foremost advocate of pursuing a path of complete independence and severing the few ties that Moresnet had with Prussia and Belgium. Within a year after the zinc mine closed down, he spearheaded the founding of a local, private postal service — but it was quickly shut down by Prussian and Belgian authorities.
Undeterred, he explored numerous other initiatives. In 1903, a group of entrepreneurs proposed developing a casino there to rival those in Monte Carlo, offering to build electric trolleys to nearby towns and "share the profit with every citizen."[20] In fact, a small casino opened briefly, but like the postal service was short-lived; on hearing of it, the king of Belgium threatened Moresnet's always-tenuous independence.
But Belgium proved the least of Moresnet's worries. In 1900 the Prussian state — now itself consolidated into the greater German Empire — began to undertake "aggressive" tactics towards pressuring the residents of the zone to consent to absorption.[21] None too subtle and true to its martial heritage, Prussian efforts included "outright sabotage," such as cutting off Moresnet's electricity and telephone connections at times.[22]When citizens attempted to run new electrical and telephone lines, Prussia attempted to thwart them, as well as "prevent[ing] the appointment of new … officials" known to support Moresnettian independence.[23]
But "these people, small though their territory, w[ould] not be cabined, cribbed, confined."[24] In fact, despite being harassed by a state thousands of times larger and armed to the teeth, by 1907 the population of the hamlet had increased to almost 3,800, only 460 of whom were descendents of the original Moresnettians.[25] The rest came from varied and far-flung locations: not only Germans, Belgians and Dutch, but also former residents of Italy, Switzerland, and Russia — and eventually two Americans and even one Chinese resident. A large cathedral had come to occupy the center of the community, which had expanded to over 800 homes.[26] Even though Belgian Aix-la-Chapelle was nearby and offered a more cosmopolitan experience, in general, the Moresnettians chose "not [to] leave the Triangle, but variedly find the spice of life within its slender borders."[27]
Dr. Molly — now living in the "thoroughly autonomous" Neutral Moresnet for half a century — began to view the independence and prosperity of Moresnet as a place compatible with the Weltanschauung of another of his intellectual pursuits: the universal language and culture of Esperanto.[28] While a detailed discussion of Esperanto is beyond the scope of this writing, the synthetic language was founded in 1887 by L.L. Zamenhof to eliminate the "hate and prejudice" that he theorized arose between ethnic groups owing to language differences and often leading to war; and it should come as little surprise that Esperanto's founder additionally expressed his
profound [conviction] that every nationalism offers humanity only the greatest unhappiness.… It is true that the nationalism of oppressed peoples — as a natural self-defensive reaction — is much more excusable than the nationalism of peoples who oppress; but, if the nationalism of the strong is ignoble, the nationalism of the weak is imprudent; both give birth to and support each other.[29]
Embracing this thinly veiled antistate philosophy and having corresponded for years with prominent Esperantists around the world, in 1906, Dr. Molly met with several colleagues to discuss designating Neutral Moresnet as a self-determining global haven for Esperantists; a territory that would "embrace aims and ideals affecting the brotherhood of man … civilized life … emancipating ourselves from all that is absurd and unworthy in convention, all that the ignorant centuries have imposed upon us."[30] Core to that initiative, he proposed that the name of the enclave be changed to Amikejo — Esperanto for "place of friendship" — not only espousing their explicitly peaceful nature, but undoubtedly a propagandist thumb in the eye of ever-marauding Prussia.[31]
Two years later, in 1908, a large celebration was held commemorating the launch of the renamed Amikejo, complete with festivities and the airing of a new national anthem.[32] Unsurprisingly, the occasion went unnoted (and Amikejo unrecognized) by nearby states, although numerous newspapers reported the event.
By 1914, Amikejo's population topped 4,600 people, peacefully cohabitating in an economically prosperous political limbo characterized by an "absence of definite rule."[33] Signs and notifications were printed in German, French, and Esperanto, and residents had developed one of the "queerest and most unintelligible dialects in the world."[34] Indeed, an American — an American of the turn of the century, no less — described the establishment as having "a sort of al fresco freedom of life, an untrammelledness which comes naturally from long-continued absence of centralized restraint."[35]
Indeed; for a century, residents and settlers in the diminutive wedge of land had found governments — internally and foreign — superfluous to and iniquitous toward the attainment of individual liberty. In one sense the Moresnet/Amikejo experiment might be viewed as Europe's analog to the American West, covering a greater length of time but on a much smaller scale. Summarizing, one reporter described it as
one of the smallest and strangest territories in the world … an encircling ridge of high mountains veritably buries it from neighboring civilization and culture and leaves it in a little world of its own.… [And] for nearly a century, the inhabitants have never experienced the feeling of being under the rule of an emperor, king or president. They are independent, governed by no one, at liberty to do as they please.[36]
More to the point, another visitor described Amikejo in simple terms: "a legal anarchy."[37]
Despite a vibrant, small-scale economy, the existence of the district remained enormously fragile in the tempestuous political environment of early 20th-century Continental Europe. Amikejans perennially worried over the "impermanency of their pleasing status," and this concern was realized in 1914 when war broke out between France and Germany.[38]Although Amikejo escaped destruction as invading German forces bypassed it — it was, fortuitously, "an oasis in a desert of destruction" — the War proved a ready excuse, confirming the suspicion that "Prussia … always had the intention to appropriate the territory" when Germany statutorily annexed the district in 1915.[39]
Two inconceivably bloody years later, with the end of the war in sight, only the Contemporary Review, a British journal of politics and social reform, considered the plight of Amikejo née Moresnet:


The fate of Moresnet has been forgotten in this immense catastrophe. We must bear it in mind. After the victory the plenipotentiaries who draw up the conditions of peace must not neglect this poor little piece of independence which has been victimized.[40]
The cost of the Great War was unimaginably staggering, dwarfing those of previous conflicts in virtually every category: 37 million casualties, the influenza pandemic, widespread hunger, civil dislocation, economic wreckage, and more. But another, seldom-considered consequence of the war — of all wars — was, and is, the uncountable heaps of unfulfilled promises and discarded goals left in the wake of the conflagration. And with article 32 of the Treaty of Versailles — "Germany recognizes the full sovereignty of Belgium over the whole of the contested territory of Moresnet"[41] — these were joined by yet another: Dr. Molly's vision.
Comment on this article.
Peter C. Earle is the founder of FINAGEM, LLC. Follow him on Twitter. Send him mail. See Peter C. Earle's article archives.
You can subscribe to future articles by Peter C. Earle via this RSS feed.
Copyright © 2012 by the Ludwig von Mises Institute.

Brazil e Africa: novos horizontes - New York Times


Brazil Gains Business and Influence as It Offers Aid and Loans in Africa

Issouf Sanogo/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
In Luanda, Angola, construction workers for the Brazilian company Odebrecht, which is among Angola’s largest employers.
  • FACEBOOK
  • TWITTER
  • GOOGLE+
  • E-MAIL
  • SHARE
  • PRINT
  • REPRINTS
RIO DE JANEIRO — In Mozambique, Brazil’s government is opening a plant making antiretroviral drugs to fight the AIDS epidemic. Brazil islending $150 million to Kenya to build roads and ease congestion in the capital, Nairobi. And in Angola, West Africa’s rising oil power, a new security agreement seeks to expand the training of Angolan military personnel in Brazil.
Multimedia
World Twitter Logo.

Connect With Us on Twitter

Follow@nytimesworldfor international breaking news and headlines.
Brazil, which has more people of African descent than any other country outside of Africa itself, is assertively raising its profile again on the continent, building on historical ties from the time of the Portuguese empire.
The array of aid projects and loans recently extended to African countries points both to Brazil’s ambitions of projecting greater influence in the developing world and to the expanding business allure of Africa, where some economies are rapidly growingeven as parts of the continent still grapple with wars and famine. The charm offensive is paying off in surging trade flows between Brazil and Africa, growing to $27.6 billion in 2011 from $4.3 billion in 2002.
“There’s the growing sense that Africa is Brazil’s frontier,” said Jerry Dávila, a historian at the University of Illinois who has written extensively about Brazil’s inroads across the South Atlantic Ocean. “Brazil is in the privileged position of finally reaching the institutional capacity to do this.”
Brazil’s forays into Africa are similar to the ambitions of other rising powers, like Turkey, which has established its sway in the Arab world, and India’s promotion of its culture across Asia.
The prominence given to Africa also reflects Brazil’s shift from aid recipient to provider. Big development challenges persist in Brazil, including woeful public schools and a sharp economic slowdown this year. But Brazil is a major agricultural exporter that recently surpassed Britain as the world’s sixth-largest economy, and it now boasts more embassies in Africa than Britain does — a notable change from when Brazil relied on foreign aid in the 1960s, largely from the United States, to alleviate hunger in the country’s impoverished northeast.
Africa now accounts for about 55 percent of the disbursements by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency, which oversees aid projects abroad, according to Marco Farani, the agency’s director. Altogether, including educational exchanges and an expanding loan portfolio, Brazil’s foreign aid exceeds $1 billion, he said. Big portions of Brazilian aid also go to countries in Latin America, and there is a smaller focus on East Timor, the former Portuguese colony in Southeast Asia.
“We still have a smaller foreign aid profile than other some countries, but we’re learning how to do cooperation,” Mr. Farani said.
Brazil still trails other nations, notably China and the United States, which have far more expansive aid programs and trade in Africa. Elsewhere in Latin America, Venezuela and Cuba have offered different ways of enhancing African ties. Venezuela organized a 2009 summit meeting of African and South American leaders, in which President Hugo Chávez tightened an alliance with Libya’s leader at the time, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi.
During the cold war, Cuban troops supported Communist governments in Africa. In Angola, this mission included the seemingly paradoxical task of protecting a Chevron oil complex at the same time the United States was supporting an insurgency against Angola’s leaders. More recently, Cuba has sent thousands of doctors to Africa.
But while the Cuban and Venezuelan efforts have largely prioritized developing-world solidarity with some African nations, Brazil’s growing foothold in Africa is more complex, involving ambitions to forge Brazil into a diplomatic and economic powerhouse.
After a surge of openings of diplomatic missions over the past decade, Brazil now has 36 embassies across Africa, and hopes to open its 37th in Malawi this year. Brazil is already using this presence to bolster its actions on the world stage, sending jets to fly delegations from Sierra Leone, Liberia and Cape Verde to the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, which was held here in June.
Other projects are intended to lure Africans to study in Brazil. A new university began offering classes last year for students from Portuguese-speaking countries, including Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Principe.
Since Brazil does not need to import large amounts of oil or food, its plans in Africa differ somewhat from other countries seeking greater influence there. Outreach projects tie largely into efforts to increase opportunities for Brazilian companies, which sometimes work with Brazil’s government in offering aid.
Some of Brazil’s biggest inroads, predictably, are in Portuguese-speaking countries like Angola, where the Brazilian construction company Odebrecht ranks among the largest employers, and Mozambique, where the mining giant Vale has begun a $6 billion coal expansion project.
But Brazilian companies are also scouring other parts of Africa for opportunities, putting down stakes in Guinea and Nigeria. A leading Brazilian investment bank, BTG Pactual, started a $1 billion fund in May focused on investing in Africa. New links are also emerging, including Brazilian farming ventures in Sudan; a flight from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’s capital, to São Paulo; and a fiber optic cable connecting northeast Brazil to West Africa.
Some of Brazil’s forays in Africa have come with complications, including criticism of warming ties with leaders connected to human rights abuses, like Equatorial Guinea’s president, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo. A freedom-of-information measure has enabled journalists to delve into African arms deals by Brazilian companies, including the sale of cluster bombs to Zimbabwe.
African students studying in Brazil have filed numerous complaints describing slurs and aggression, complicating the myth of “racial democracy” that once prevailed here, in which scholars contended that Brazil had largely escaped the discrimination common in other societies.
In one episode here in Rio, Eleutério Nhantumbo, a Mozambican police officer with a scholarship to study public security at a Brazilian university, said he was stopped by police officers on one occasion. They ordered him to raise his shirt upon exiting a store on the suspicion that he had stolen something.
When he questioned why they had singled him out, he said the officers responded with a racial slur and warned him of addressing them without respect; hearing his accent in Portuguese, they queried him about his origins. “The police asked, ‘Where’s Mozambique?’ ” said Mr. Nhantumbo, 33. “They didn’t know that there existed a country with this name.”
Brazil, closely linked for centuries to Africa through shipping routes and the slave trade, is thought to have imported 10 times as many slaves as the United States did before slavery was abolished here in 1888. For a stretch in the 19th century, Brazil was the seat of the Portuguese empire, making the capital then, Rio de Janeiro, a nerve center for trade with Africa.
Those ties withered until civilian leaders sought to establish relations with newly independent governments in Africa in the early 1960s. That process cooled after Brazil’s military rulers seized power in a 1964 coup supported by the United States.
Then economic necessity and a quest to build autonomy from the United States laid the foundations in the 1970s for today’s diplomatic buildup in Africa. Seeking to offset spending on oil imports, including cargoes from Nigeria, military rulers set about opening new markets in Africa for Brazilian companies. They found some success, notably in newly independent Angola.
Brazil’s former president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, built on those inroads in trips to Africa from 2003 to 2010, referring to the “historic debt” Brazil had to Africa in its formation as nation.
Taylor Barnes contributed reporting.

terça-feira, 7 de agosto de 2012

Mark Twain: ator de cinema? - filme de Thomas A. Edison


CULTURA

Veja filme gravado por Thomas Edison do escritor Mark Twain

Filme mudo capturado em 1909 mostra autor em cenas cotidianas

Teoria "Marquissista" I e II - concurso para "profeçor" da Unesp

Bem, o concurso para professor da Unesp-Marília é teoricamente para a disciplina "Teoria Política I e II".
Em princípio, deveria exigir conhecimentos amplos sobre essa área,  desde os primeiros pensadores da política (isto é, os gregos), passando por Santo Agostinho, Maquiavel, Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, e chegando até os clássicos contemporâneos, ou seja Tocqueville, Marx, Weber, e todos os pensadores da teoria política no século XX, entre liberais, conservadores, socialistas, a exemplo de Raymond Aron e vários outros.
Esta a chamada: 

Período de Inscrição: de 02/08/2012 até 31/08/2012

Acham-se abertas, nos termos do Despacho nº 627/2012-RUNESP, de 28/06/2012, publicado no Diário Oficial do Estado – DOE – Poder Executivo – Seção I de 29/06/2012, com base no Estatuto e Regimento Geral da Universidade Estadual Paulista “Julio de Mesquita Filho” – UNESP, bem como na legislação em vigor, as inscrições para o concurso público de provas e títulos para provimento de  01 (um) cargo de PROFESSOR ASSISTENTE, com titulação mínima de Doutor, em Regime de Dedicação Integral à Docência e à Pesquisa – RDIDP, junto ao  Departamento de Ciências Políticas e Econômicas, da Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências, do  Campus de Marília, nas disciplinas  “Teoria Política I e II”


Mas vejam o programa:
Programa
1- Marx e a crítica da política  
2- Marx e as revoluções de 1848  
3- Marx e a Internacional  
4- Marx e o movimento operário alemão  
5- Engels e a social democracia  
6- As vertentes teóricas da social democracia  
7- A teoria do partido revolucionário  
8 - A teoria da revolução democrática  
9 - A teoria da transição socialista  
10 - A teoria dos conselhos  
11 - Estado e sociedade civil  
12 - Luta de classes e hegemonia 

Ou seja, a "teoria política" da Unesp se resume, em tudo e por tudo (e não é pouco, reconheçamos), a uma suposta teoria da revolução segundo os cânones do marxismo-leninismo. Edificante, não é mesmo?
Inclusive uma tal de "transição socialista" que, como todos sabemos, está na ordem do dia.

E eis a Bibliografia recomendada (aliás obrigatória, do contrário, o pobre do candidato não conseguiria passar em tão complicada prova de conhecimentos revolucionários aplicados à realidade do mundo atual).


Bibliografia 
BARATTA, G. I quaderni e le rose. Roma: Gamberetti, 1999. 
BARATTA, G.; CATONE, A. Tempi moderni: Gramsci e la critica dell´americanismo. Roma: Edizione Associate, 1989. 
BERTELLI, A. R. Capitalismo de estado e socialismo. São Paulo: IAP: IPSO, 1999. 
BUKHARIN, N. Le vie della rivoluzione. Roma: Riuniti, 1980. 
BURGIO, A.; SANTUCCI, A. Gramsci e la rivoluzione in occidente. Roma: Riuniti, 1999. 
DEL ROIO, M. O império universal e seus antípodas: a ocidentalização do mundo. São Paulo: Ícone, 1998. 
______. Os prismas de Gramsci: a fórmula política da frente única. São Paulo: Xamã: IAP, 2005. 
______. Marxismo e oriente: quando as periferias se tornam o centro. São Paulo: Ícone; Marília: Oficina Universitária Unesp, 2008. 
ENGELS, F. Anti-Duhring. São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 1977.  
______. Revolução e contra-revolução na Alemanha. Lisboa: Avante, 1981. 
FEUERBACH, L. A essência do cristianismo. Campinas: Papirus, 1997. 
FREDERICO, C. O jovem Marx: as origens da ontologia do ser social. São Paulo: Cortez, 1995. 
FREDERICO, C.; SAMPAIO, B. A. Dialética e materialismo: Marx entre Hegel e Feurebach. Rio de Janeiro: Ed. UFRJ, 2006.   
GRAMSCI, A. Cadernos do cárcere. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2004. 6 v.  
GRUPPI, L. Il pensiero de Lenin. Roma: Riuniti, 1970. 
______. O conceito de hegemonia em Gramsci. Rio de Janeiro: Graal, 1980.  
HEGEL, G. W. F. Princípios da filosofia do direito. São Paulo: Ícone, 1997. 
HOBSBAWN, E. (Org.). Storia del marxismo. Torino: Einaudi, 1978-1982. 4 t. 
LENIN, V. Duas táticas da social democracia na revolução democrática. Rio de Janeiro: Vitória, 1945. 
______. Que fazer? Lisboa: Estampa, 1973.  
______ . Obras escogidas. Moscú: Progreso, 1975. 12 t. 
______. O estado e a revolução. São Paulo: Hucitec, 1979. 
______. O desenvolvimento do capitalismo na Rússia: o processo de formação do mercado 
interno para a grande indústria. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1982.  
LOSURDO, D. Antonio Gramsci dall liberalismo al comunismo crítico. Roma: Gamberetti, 1997. 
LOWY, M. A teoria da revolução no jovem Marx. Petrópolis: Vozes, 2002. 
LUKACS, G. Ontologia do ser social: a falsa e a verdadeira ontologia de Hegel. São Paulo: Ciências Humanas, 1979. 
_____. Ontologia do ser social: os princípios ontológicos fundamentais de Marx. São Paulo: Ciências Humanas, 1979. 
_____. História e consciência de classe. Lisboa: Martins Fontes, 2003. 
LUXEMBURG, R. Scritti politici. Roma: Riuniti, 1976. 
MARTORANO, L. C. A burocracia e os desafios da transição socialista. São Paulo: Xamã, 2002. 
______. Conselhos e democracia. São Paulo: Expressão Popular, 2011. 
MARX, K.  Luta de classes na França. Introdução e organização de Friedrich Engels. Rio de Janeiro: Vitória, 1956. 
______. El capital. México: FCE, 1976. 3 v.  
______. A questão judaica. São Paulo: Centauro, 2000. 
______. Introdução a crítica da filosofia do direito de Hegel. São Paulo: Boitempo, 2002.  
______. Manuscritos econômico-filosóficos. São Paulo: Boitempo, 2004. 
MARX, K.; ENGELS, F. Obras escolhidas. Rio de Janeiro: Vitória, 1956. 3v.  
______. Manifesto comunista. São Paulo: Boitempo, 1998. 
______. A sagrada família. São Paulo: Boitempo, 2002. 
______. A ideologia alemã. São Paulo: Boitempo, 2007. 
______. Luta de classes na Alemanha. São Paulo: Boitempo, 2010.  
MCLELLAN, D. Karl Marx: vida e pensamento. Petrópolis: Vozes, 1990. 
MESZAROS, I. Para além do capital. São Paulo: Boitempo, 2003. 
______. A teoria da alienação em Marx. São Paulo: Boitempo, 2007. 
NETTO, J. P. Capitalismo e reificação. São Paulo: LECH, 1981. 
SANTOS, A. Marx, Engels e a luta de partido na Primeira Internacional (1864-1874). Londrina: Ed. UEL, 2002. 
TEXIER, J. Revolução e democracia em Marx e Engels. Rio de Janeiro: Ed. UFRJ, 2005. 
TROTSKY, L. A revolução permanente. São Paulo: LECH, 1979

O redator do edital e responsável pelo programa é, indiscutivelmente, um adepto da bibliografia italiana, sendo, sem sombra de dúvida, um remanescente do exílio italiano, do qual ele ainda não conseguiu se liberar. Tanto é assim, que cita a obra dirigida pelo Hobsbawm na sua edição italiana -- Storia del marxismo -- quando existe uma edição em Português desde muitos anos. O autor do edital espera, entretanto, que os candidatos não apenas leiam a edição italiana, mas que eles leiam, como "teoria política", exclusivamente essa bibliografia sectária.

É ou não é um concurso destinado apenas a um companheiro desempregado?
Edificante como se notam progressos fantásticos no que se converteu em lixo das humanidades nas universidades públicas brasileiras.
Eu poderia passar no concurso, pois conheço toda essa bibliografia marxista, mas suponho que na prova didática os companheiros só vão selecionar aqueles plenamente identificados com o seu "marquissismo" altamente idiota.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 
==================

Addendum em 9/08/2012:
Um comentário que merece promoção de nota de rodapé a corpo de texto:


paulo araújo deixou um novo comentário sobre a sua postagem "Teoria "Marquissista" I e II - concurso para "prof...": 

Paulo

Boa sua resposta ao Anônimo horrorizado.

Senti falta na bibliografia do Dialética da Natureza, do Engels. hehe

Roberto Romano contou o que certa vez aconteceu há muitos anos em uma sala de aula:

"Permitam-me contar-lhes uma anedota verdadeira. Em certo campus paulista, uma aluna perguntou-me qual o conteúdo da disciplina a ser ministrada por mim. Respondi que iria analisar os escritos de Maquiavel. "Que bom!" disse ela. "Já estava cansada de Marx". Naqueles anos os professores freqüentavam muito Marx e pouco outros autores. A situação mudou. Hoje, os docentes evitam ensinar marxismo, fora de moda para os intelectos que medem os pensadores pelo metro do mercado financeiro ou político. Outra aluna, militante, protestou: "Num curso marxista, se estuda Marx". "Errado", retruquei: "num curso marxista se imitaria Marx. Nele, seriam vistos Aristóteles, Hegel, Smith, Ricardo etc." Numa universidade pública, arrematei, todos os sistemas e pensamentos devem ser discutidos. Se a estudante imaginava ser "marxista" é porque já havia estudado os autores antes de cursar as disciplinas ensinadas no campus: ninguém opta por esta ou aquela filosofia sem acurado exame prévio. Neste caso, o curriculum não seria essencial. Se desejava aprender marxismo, ela precisaria, antes, comunicar-se com os pensadores que definiram o campo teórico a partir do qual Marx refletiu. Para isso, bastaria conferir os subtítulos dos trabalhos de Marx: "crítica da economia política". "Crítica" é exame, seleção, partilha, análise."

E sendo o assunto do post o ensino de Marx (principalmente de segunda mão gramsciana), vale lembrar o ó timo trabalho de Orlando Tambosi, que, por óbvio, não está na bibliografia:

O declínio do marxismo e a herança hegeliana (Editora da Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina,1999). O livro, praticamente deconhecido nos meios acadêmicos brasileiros, foi bem recebido na Itália e ganhou tradução: Perché il marxismo ha fallito (Milano, Mondadori, 2001). Leitura mais que bem-vinda para quem quer arriscar-se no pensamento do passado de uma ilusão. 

Tambosi (tese de doutoramento na UNICAMP em 1991 que deu origem ao livro) produziu uma análise do ideário marxista a partir dos escritos de Lucio Colleti.

Uma rápida resenha:

O livro apresenta um panorama das doutrinas marxistas na Itália e seus vínculos com o hegeliano Croce. Gramsci, sabemos, era conhecedor e admirador de Croce. Posteriormente, Della Volpe produziu uma vigorosa crítica do idealismo hegeliano e das concepções historicistas que marcavam profundamente o comunismo italiano. Colletti entra no debate pela vertente dellavolpiana nos anos 40/50. Essa turma tentou contrapor ao historicismo uma visão do marxismo como ciência. Colletti, nesse percurso, faz-se profundo conhecedor de Hegel e Marx. No início dos anos 70 ele radicaliza suas análises e conclui que Marx era um epígono de Hegel. 

Ao afirmar a existência de contradições na realidade (sobretudo via Engels, na Dialética da Natureza) o marxismo apresentou-se como uma filosofia da história: a ideia da história como portadora de uma ontologia (finalidade) que nos conduziria para uma determinada e necessária meta (o comunismo, a sociedade sem classes e sem Estado eram o corolário da história).

Colletti concluiu que a dialética de Marx, que supunha ter invertido a dialética hegeliana em termos materialistas, não superou o idealismo alemão. Colletti concluiu que o marxismo é, sim, uma metafísica herdeira de Hegel. 

Com o mesmo rigor, honestidade e independência intelectual com que analisou a “conexão Marx-Hegel”, procurando nela esmiuçar os elementos científicos do marxismo, Colletii desmonta a concepção que durante 25 anos ele ajudou a construir (marxismo como ciência) e rompe (início dos anos 70) com o marxismo, aproximando-se cada vez mais de uma perspectiva liberal.

segunda-feira, 6 de agosto de 2012

A crise dos misseis sovieticos em Cuba (1962) - Harvard Kennedy School

Welcome to the Cuban Missile Crisis
Fifty Year Anniversary website. This website has been created by the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. Here you will find key facts about the events of the Crisis, explore the most important lessons drawn from it over the past 50 years, find materials to help teach new students about this critical confrontation, and learn more about the nuclear threats that the world faces today. You can also register here to receive advance notice of Belfer Center events being held to mark the anniversary, and news about other website developments. - Graham T. Allison, Director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Ver neste link: http://www.cubanmissilecrisis.org/



background

Background

What was the Cuban Missile Crisis? Background, chronologies, and FAQs
lessons

Lessons

What are the most important lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis? Read lessons drawn by presidents and statesmen, and submit your own.



for_educators

For Educators

Interested in teaching your students about the Cuban Missile Crisis? Click here for reading lists, case-studies and lesson plans.
nucleardangertoday

Nuclear Danger Today

Fifty years ago, the Cuban Missile Crisis brought the world to the brink of nuclear disaster. What are the greatest nuclear threats we face today?

MercoChavez enriquece o Brasil: que bom, nao e'?

Bem, o ingresso da Venezuela de Chávez vem sendo cantada em prosa e verso, como capaz de retirar o Mercosul de seu modesta cantinho no Cone Sul e projetá-lo nas paragens mais calientes do Caribe e do Amazonas. Que bom! 
Vamos todos nos beneficiar com o manancial de petróleo inesgotável de Mister Chávez, suas fabulosas compras no Brasil e várias outras benesses mais, sobretudo no plano da democracia e dos direitos humanos (inclusive os desumanos e os dos animais).
O Mercosul nunca mais será como antes; aliás, nunca antes na história do Mercosul, tanto tinha sido feito para beneficiar tantos em tão pouco tempo. Logo veremos os resultados.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Lá vêm os bolivarianos

Editorial O Estado de S.Paulo, 6/08/2012

Aberta a porteira do Mercosul aos bolivarianos, com o ingresso da Venezuela, agora é a vez de Equador e Bolívia negociarem sua entrada plena no bloco que é cada vez mais ideológico e menos econômico. O timing do processo é perfeito: primeiro, como se sabe, Brasil e Argentina urdiram o isolamento do Paraguai, último obstáculo à adesão da Venezuela, e atropelaram as normas do Mercosul para receber Hugo Chávez de braços abertos, com direito a uma lépida subida do autocrata venezuelano na rampa do Planalto; ato contínuo, os outros dois mais importantes governos chavistas da América Latina iniciam tratativas para engrossar o Mercosul.
Como diz o diplomata José Botafogo Gonçalves em artigo no Estado (2/8), trata-se de um "novo Mercosul", isto é, não se pode mais falar de uma zona de livre comércio e de união aduaneira, que está no espírito da fundação do bloco, mas, sim, de "um novo clube com objetivos políticos e econômicos que não valoriza o mercado, a livre circulação de mercadorias e serviços, a internacionalização das economias e a competitividade".
Como a comprovar essa tendência, a Bolívia, seguindo a cartilha chavista de estatizar até o ar que se respira, nacionalizou nos últimos dois meses duas minas de prata e estanho exploradas por empresas estrangeiras, depois que grupos indígenas pressionaram o presidente Evo Morales. Segundo o governo, os investidores afetados serão indenizados de acordo com uma avaliação "independente", eufemismo para empurrar-lhes o prejuízo. O padrão de Morales não é novidade - basta lembrar a estrepitosa invasão de refinarias da Petrobrás em 2006 e a consequente indenização por valor inferior ao investido pela empresa brasileira. Essa constante ameaça ao investimento externo e aos contratos desautoriza mesmo os mais ingênuos entusiastas do "novo Mercosul" a supor que a Bolívia irá submeter-se alegremente aos princípios de livre mercado.
O mesmo acontece com o Equador, embora este país seja diferente de Venezuela e Bolívia por um importante aspecto: o país vai bem. Os venezuelanos enfrentam a maior inflação da América Latina, que ronda os 25% anuais, apesar do contínuo controle de preços exercido pelo governo - cuja política brucutu tem desidratado sistematicamente a produção interna. O PIB venezuelano depende cada vez mais, portanto, da vontade de Chávez de investir o dinheiro estatal. A Bolívia, por sua vez, segue sendo um dos países mais pobres do continente, e o desestímulo de Morales ao investimento externo, por conta das seguidas intervenções estatais, não prenuncia futuro melhor.
Já o Equador cresceu 8% em 2011 e tem uma das menores taxas de desemprego da região, por volta de 5%. Pode-se dizer que, ao menos por ora, o "capitalismo de Estado" está funcionando por lá, e o país tem reservas de gás e petróleo que interessam ao Mercosul. No entanto, seguindo o figurino chavista, o presidente Rafael Correa não gosta de jornalistas e de opositores, contrariando frontalmente as cláusulas democráticas do Mercosul - aquelas que foram invocadas para suspender o Paraguai.
Na última manifestação da truculência de Correa, autoridades do Estado apreenderam os computadores da revista Vanguardia, que é crítica ao presidente e noticiou vários casos de corrupção no governo. O motivo da ação oficial é de um cinismo exemplar: o Ministério do Trabalho local alega que a revista foi punida porque não cumpre a cota de funcionários com deficiência. O diretor da publicação, Juan Carlos Calderón, já havia sido condenado em fevereiro a pagar US$ 1 milhão de indenização a Correa por ter publicado um livro em que denunciava um caso de corrupção envolvendo um irmão do presidente. Mais tarde, o magnânimo Correa "perdoou" a dívida do jornalista.
No entanto, nada disso importa mais, porque os valores da democracia e do livre mercado já não fazem mais parte do Mercosul. Com seu novo DNA, e em nome da expansão de oportunidades para as indústrias brasileiras e argentinas, o bloco mandou às favas os escrúpulos, instrumentalizando-se cada vez mais como contraponto bolivariano ao "império" americano.

Postagem em destaque

Livro Marxismo e Socialismo finalmente disponível - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Meu mais recente livro – que não tem nada a ver com o governo atual ou com sua diplomacia esquizofrênica, já vou logo avisando – ficou final...