Dealing With Assange and the WikiLeaks Secrets
By BILL KELLER
The New York Times Magazine, January 26, 2011
Bill Keller is the executive editor of The New York Times. This essay is adapted from his introduction to “Open Secrets: WikiLeaks, War and American Diplomacy: Complete and Expanded Coverage from The New York Times,” an ebook available for purchase at nytimes.com/opensecrets.
E-Book: “Open Secrets”
Purchase an e-book of complete and expanded WikiLeaks coverage from:
nytimes.com/opensecrets
This past June, Alan Rusbridger, the editor of The Guardian, phoned me and asked, mysteriously, whether I had any idea how to arrange a secure communication. Not really, I confessed. The Times doesn’t have encrypted phone lines, or a Cone of Silence. Well then, he said, he would try to speak circumspectly. In a roundabout way, he laid out an unusual proposition: an organization called WikiLeaks, a secretive cadre of antisecrecy vigilantes, had come into possession of a substantial amount of classified United States government communications. WikiLeaks’s leader, Julian Assange, an eccentric former computer hacker of Australian birth and no fixed residence, offered The Guardian half a million military dispatches from the battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq. There might be more after that, including an immense bundle of confidential diplomatic cables. The Guardian suggested — to increase the impact as well as to share the labor of handling such a trove — that The New York Times be invited to share this exclusive bounty. The source agreed. Was I interested?
I was interested.
The adventure that ensued over the next six months combined the cloak-and-dagger intrigue of handling a vast secret archive with the more mundane feat of sorting, searching and understanding a mountain of data. As if that were not complicated enough, the project also entailed a source who was elusive, manipulative and volatile (and ultimately openly hostile to The Times and The Guardian); an international cast of journalists; company lawyers committed to keeping us within the bounds of the law; and an array of government officials who sometimes seemed as if they couldn’t decide whether they wanted to engage us or arrest us. By the end of the year, the story of this wholesale security breach had outgrown the story of the actual contents of the secret documents and generated much breathless speculation that something — journalism, diplomacy, life as we know it — had profoundly changed forever.
Soon after Rusbridger’s call, we sent Eric Schmitt, from our Washington bureau, to London. Schmitt has covered military affairs expertly for years, has read his share of classified military dispatches and has excellent judgment and an unflappable demeanor. His main assignment was to get a sense of the material. Was it genuine? Was it of public interest? He would also report back on the proposed mechanics of our collaboration with The Guardian and the German magazine Der Spiegel, which Assange invited as a third guest to his secret smorgasbord. Schmitt would also meet the WikiLeaks leader, who was known to a few Guardian journalists but not to us.
Schmitt’s first call back to The Times was encouraging. There was no question in his mind that the Afghanistan dispatches were genuine. They were fascinating — a diary of a troubled war from the ground up. And there were intimations of more to come, especially classified cables from the entire constellation of American diplomatic outposts. WikiLeaks was holding those back for now, presumably to see how this venture with the establishment media worked out. Over the next few days, Schmitt huddled in a discreet office at The Guardian, sampling the trove of war dispatches and discussing the complexities of this project: how to organize and study such a voluminous cache of information; how to securely transport, store and share it; how journalists from three very different publications would work together without compromising their independence; and how we would all assure an appropriate distance from Julian Assange. We regarded Assange throughout as a source, not as a partner or collaborator, but he was a man who clearly had his own agenda.
By the time of the meetings in London, WikiLeaks had already acquired a measure of international fame or, depending on your point of view, notoriety. Shortly before I got the call from The Guardian, The New Yorker published a rich and colorful profile of Assange, by Raffi Khatchadourian, who had embedded with the group. WikiLeaks’s biggest coup to that point was the release, last April, of video footage taken from one of two U.S. helicopters involved in firing down on a crowd and a building in Baghdad in 2007, killing at least 18 people. While some of the people in the video were armed, others gave no indication of menace; two were in fact journalists for the news agency Reuters. The video, with its soundtrack of callous banter, was horrifying to watch and was an embarrassment to the U.S. military. But in its zeal to make the video a work of antiwar propaganda, WikiLeaks also released a version that didn’t call attention to an Iraqi who was toting a rocket-propelled grenade and packaged the manipulated version under the tendentious rubric “Collateral Murder.” (See the edited and non-edited videos here.)
Throughout our dealings, Assange was coy about where he obtained his secret cache. But the suspected source of the video, as well as the military dispatches and the diplomatic cables to come, was a disillusioned U.S. Army private first class named Bradley Manning, who had been arrested and was being kept in solitary confinement.
On the fourth day of the London meeting, Assange slouched into The Guardian office, a day late. Schmitt took his first measure of the man who would be a large presence in our lives. “He’s tall — probably 6-foot-2 or 6-3 — and lanky, with pale skin, gray eyes and a shock of white hair that seizes your attention,” Schmitt wrote to me later. “He was alert but disheveled, like a bag lady walking in off the street, wearing a dingy, light-colored sport coat and cargo pants, dirty white shirt, beat-up sneakers and filthy white socks that collapsed around his ankles. He smelled as if he hadn’t bathed in days.”
Assange shrugged a huge backpack off his shoulders and pulled out a stockpile of laptops, cords, cellphones, thumb drives and memory sticks that held the WikiLeaks secrets.
The reporters had begun preliminary work on the Afghanistan field reports, using a large Excel spreadsheet to organize the material, then plugging in search terms and combing the documents for newsworthy content. They had run into a puzzling incongruity: Assange said the data included dispatches from the beginning of 2004 through the end of 2009, but the material on the spreadsheet ended abruptly in April 2009. A considerable amount of material was missing. Assange, slipping naturally into the role of office geek, explained that they had hit the limits of Excel. Open a second spreadsheet, he instructed. They did, and the rest of the data materialized — a total of 92,000 reports from the battlefields of Afghanistan.
The reporters came to think of Assange as smart and well educated, extremely adept technologically but arrogant, thin-skinned, conspiratorial and oddly credulous. At lunch one day in The Guardian’s cafeteria, Assange recounted with an air of great conviction a story about the archive in Germany that contains the files of the former Communist secret police, the Stasi. This office, Assange asserted, was thoroughly infiltrated by former Stasi agents who were quietly destroying the documents they were entrusted with protecting. The Der Spiegel reporter in the group, John Goetz, who has reported extensively on the Stasi, listened in amazement. That’s utter nonsense, he said. Some former Stasi personnel were hired as security guards in the office, but the records were well protected.
Assange was openly contemptuous of the American government and certain that he was a hunted man. He told the reporters that he had prepared a kind of doomsday option. He had, he said, distributed highly encrypted copies of his entire secret archive to a multitude of supporters, and if WikiLeaks was shut down, or if he was arrested, he would disseminate the key to make the information public.
Schmitt told me that for all Assange’s bombast and dark conspiracy theories, he had a bit of Peter Pan in him. One night, when they were all walking down the street after dinner, Assange suddenly started skipping ahead of the group. Schmitt and Goetz stared, speechless. Then, just as suddenly, Assange stopped, got back in step with them and returned to the conversation he had interrupted.
For the rest of the week Schmitt worked with David Leigh, The Guardian’s investigations editor; Nick Davies, an investigative reporter for the paper; and Goetz, of Der Spiegel, to organize and sort the material. With help from two of The Times’s best computer minds — Andrew Lehren and Aron Pilhofer — they figured out how to assemble the material into a conveniently searchable and secure database.
Journalists are characteristically competitive, but the group worked well together. They brainstormed topics to explore and exchanged search results. Der Spiegel offered to check the logs against incident reports submitted by the German Army to its Parliament — partly as story research, partly as an additional check on authenticity.
Assange provided us the data on the condition that we not write about it before specific dates that WikiLeaks planned on posting the documents on a publicly accessible Web site. The Afghanistan documents would go first, after we had a few weeks to search the material and write our articles. The larger cache of Iraq-related documents would go later. Such embargoes — agreements not to publish information before a set date — are commonplace in journalism. Everything from studies in medical journals to the annual United States budget is released with embargoes. They are a constraint with benefits, the principal one being the chance to actually read and reflect on the material before publishing it into public view. As Assange surely knew, embargoes also tend to build suspense and amplify a story, especially when multiple news outlets broadcast it at once. The embargo was the only condition WikiLeaks would try to impose on us; what we wrote about the material was entirely up to us. Much later, some American news outlets reported that they were offered last-minute access to WikiLeaks documents if they signed contracts with financial penalties for early disclosure. The Times was never asked to sign anything or to pay anything. For WikiLeaks, at least in this first big venture, exposure was its own reward.
Back in New York we assembled a team of reporters, data experts and editors and quartered them in an out-of-the-way office. Andrew Lehren, of our computer-assisted-reporting unit, did the first cut, searching terms on his own or those suggested by other reporters, compiling batches of relevant documents and summarizing the contents. We assigned reporters to specific areas in which they had expertise and gave them password access to rummage in the data. This became the routine we would follow with subsequent archives.
An air of intrigue verging on paranoia permeated the project, perhaps understandably, given that we were dealing with a mass of classified material and a source who acted like a fugitive, changing crash pads, e-mail addresses and cellphones frequently. We used encrypted Web sites. Reporters exchanged notes via Skype, believing it to be somewhat less vulnerable to eavesdropping. On conference calls, we spoke in amateurish code. Assange was always “the source.” The latest data drop was “the package.” When I left New York for two weeks to visit bureaus in Pakistan and Afghanistan, where we assume that communications may be monitored, I was not to be copied on message traffic about the project. I never imagined that any of this would defeat a curious snoop from the National Security Agency or Pakistani intelligence. And I was never entirely sure whether that prospect made me more nervous than the cyberwiles of WikiLeaks itself. At a point when relations between the news organizations and WikiLeaks were rocky, at least three people associated with this project had inexplicable activity in their e-mail that suggested someone was hacking into their accounts.
From consultations with our lawyers, we were confident that reporting on the secret documents could be done within the law, but we speculated about what the government — or some other government — might do to impede our work or exact recriminations. And, the law aside, we felt an enormous moral and ethical obligation to use the material responsibly. While we assumed we had little or no ability to influence what WikiLeaks did, let alone what would happen once this material was loosed in the echo chamber of the blogosphere, that did not free us from the need to exercise care in our own journalism. From the beginning, we agreed that in our articles and in any documents we published from the secret archive, we would excise material that could put lives at risk.
Guided by reporters with extensive experience in the field, we redacted the names of ordinary citizens, local officials, activists, academics and others who had spoken to American soldiers or diplomats. We edited out any details that might reveal ongoing intelligence-gathering operations, military tactics or locations of material that could be used to fashion terrorist weapons. Three reporters with considerable experience of handling military secrets — Eric Schmitt, Michael Gordon and C. J. Chivers — went over the documents we considered posting. Chivers, an ex-Marine who has reported for us from several battlefields, brought a practiced eye and cautious judgment to the business of redaction. If a dispatch noted that Aircraft A left Location B at a certain time and arrived at Location C at a certain time, Chivers edited it out on the off chance that this could teach enemy forces something useful about the capabilities of that aircraft.
The first articles in the project, which we called the War Logs, were scheduled to go up on the Web sites of The Times, The Guardian and Der Spiegel on Sunday, July 25. We approached the White House days before that to get its reaction to the huge breach of secrecy as well as to specific articles we planned to write — including a major one about Pakistan’s ambiguous role as an American ally. On July 24, the day before the War Logs went live, I attended a farewell party for Roger Cohen, a columnist for The Times and The International Herald Tribune, that was given by Richard Holbrooke, the Obama administration’s special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan. A voracious consumer of inside information, Holbrooke had a decent idea of what was coming, and he pulled me away from the crowd to show me the fusillade of cabinet-level e-mail ricocheting through his BlackBerry, thus demonstrating both the frantic anxiety in the administration and, not incidentally, the fact that he was very much in the loop. The Pakistan article, in particular, would complicate his life. But one of Holbrooke’s many gifts was his ability to make pretty good lemonade out of the bitterest lemons; he was already spinning the reports of Pakistani duplicity as leverage he could use to pull the Pakistanis back into closer alignment with American interests. Five months later, when Holbrooke — just 69, and seemingly indestructible — died of a torn aorta, I remembered that evening. And what I remembered best was that he was as excited to be on the cusp of a big story as I was.
We posted the articles on NYTimes.com the next day at 5 p.m. — a time picked to reconcile the different publishing schedules of the three publications. I was proud of what a crew of great journalists had done to fashion coherent and instructive reporting from a jumble of raw field reports, mostly composed in a clunky patois of military jargon and acronyms. The reporters supplied context, nuance and skepticism. There was much in that first round of articles worth reading, but my favorite single piece was one of the simplest. Chivers gathered all of the dispatches related to a single, remote, beleaguered American military outpost and stitched them together into a heartbreaking narrative. The dispatches from this outpost represent in miniature the audacious ambitions, gradual disillusionment and ultimate disappointment that Afghanistan has dealt to occupiers over the centuries.
If anyone doubted that the three publications operated independently, the articles we posted that day made it clear that we followed our separate muses. The Guardian, which is an openly left-leaning newspaper, used the first War Logs to emphasize civilian casualties in Afghanistan, claiming the documents disclosed that coalition forces killed “hundreds of civilians in unreported incidents,” underscoring the cost of what the paper called a “failing war.” Our reporters studied the same material but determined that all the major episodes of civilian deaths we found in the War Logs had been reported in The Times, many of them on the front page. (In fact, two of our journalists, Stephen Farrell and Sultan Munadi, were kidnapped by the Taliban while investigating one major episode near Kunduz. Munadi was killed during an ensuing rescue by British paratroopers.) The civilian deaths that had not been previously reported came in ones and twos and did not add up to anywhere near “hundreds.” Moreover, since several were either duplicated or missing from the reports, we concluded that an overall tally would be little better than a guess.
Another example: The Times gave prominence to the dispatches reflecting American suspicions that Pakistani intelligence was playing a double game in Afghanistan — nodding to American interests while abetting the Taliban. We buttressed the interesting anecdotal material of Pakistani double-dealing with additional reporting. The Guardian was unimpressed by those dispatches and treated them more dismissively.
Three months later, with the French daily Le Monde added to the group, we published Round 2, the Iraq War Logs, including articles on how the United States turned a blind eye to the torture of prisoners by Iraqi forces working with the U.S., how Iraq spawned an extraordinary American military reliance on private contractors and how extensively Iran had meddled in the conflict.
By this time, The Times’s relationship with our source had gone from wary to hostile. I talked to Assange by phone a few times and heard out his complaints. He was angry that we declined to link our online coverage of the War Logs to the WikiLeaks Web site, a decision we made because we feared — rightly, as it turned out — that its trove would contain the names of low-level informants and make them Taliban targets. “Where’s the respect?” he demanded. “Where’s the respect?” Another time he called to tell me how much he disliked our profile of Bradley Manning, the Army private suspected of being the source of WikiLeaks’s most startling revelations. The article traced Manning’s childhood as an outsider and his distress as a gay man in the military. Assange complained that we “psychologicalized” Manning and gave short shrift to his “political awakening.”
The final straw was a front-page profile of Assange by John Burns and Ravi Somaiya, published Oct. 24, that revealed fractures within WikiLeaks, attributed by Assange’s critics to his imperious management style. Assange denounced the article to me, and in various public forums, as “a smear.”
Assange was transformed by his outlaw celebrity. The derelict with the backpack and the sagging socks now wore his hair dyed and styled, and he favored fashionably skinny suits and ties. He became a kind of cult figure for the European young and leftish and was evidently a magnet for women. Two Swedish women filed police complaints claiming that Assange insisted on having sex without a condom; Sweden’s strict laws on nonconsensual sex categorize such behavior as rape, and a prosecutor issued a warrant to question Assange, who initially described it as a plot concocted to silence or discredit WikiLeaks.
I came to think of Julian Assange as a character from a Stieg Larsson thriller — a man who could figure either as hero or villain in one of the megaselling Swedish novels that mix hacker counterculture, high-level conspiracy and sex as both recreation and violation.
In October, WikiLeaks gave The Guardian its third archive, a quarter of a million communications between the U.S. State Department and its outposts around the globe. This time, Assange imposed a new condition: The Guardian was not to share the material with The New York Times. Indeed, he told Guardian journalists that he opened discussions with two other American news organizations — The Washington Post and the McClatchy chain — and intended to invite them in as replacements for The Times. He also enlarged his recipient list to include El País, the leading Spanish-language newspaper.
The Guardian was uncomfortable with Assange’s condition. By now the journalists from The Times and The Guardian had a good working relationship. The Times provided a large American audience for the revelations, as well as access to the U.S. government for comment and context. And given the potential legal issues and public reaction, it was good to have company in the trenches. Besides, we had come to believe that Assange was losing control of his stockpile of secrets. An independent journalist, Heather Brooke, had obtained material from a WikiLeaks dissident and joined in a loose alliance with The Guardian. Over the coming weeks, batches of cables would pop up in newspapers in Lebanon, Australia and Norway. David Leigh, The Guardian’s investigations editor, concluded that these rogue leaks released The Guardian from any pledge, and he gave us the cables.
On Nov. 1, Assange and two of his lawyers burst into Alan Rusbridger’s office, furious that The Guardian was asserting greater independence and suspicious that The Times might be in possession of the embassy cables. Over the course of an eight-hour meeting, Assange intermittently raged against The Times — especially over our front-page profile — while The Guardian journalists tried to calm him. In midstorm, Rusbridger called me to report on Assange’s grievances and relay his demand for a front-page apology in The Times. Rusbridger knew that this was a nonstarter, but he was buying time for the tantrum to subside. In the end, both he and Georg Mascolo, editor in chief of Der Spiegel, made clear that they intended to continue their collaboration with The Times; Assange could take it or leave it. Given that we already had all of the documents, Assange had little choice. Over the next two days, the news organizations agreed on a timetable for publication.
The following week, we sent Ian Fisher, a deputy foreign editor who was a principal coordinator on our processing of the embassy cables, to London to work out final details. The meeting went smoothly, even after Assange arrived. “Freakishly good behavior,” Fisher e-mailed me afterward. “No yelling or crazy mood swings.” But after dinner, as Fisher was leaving, Assange smirked and offered a parting threat: “Tell me, are you in contact with your legal counsel?” Fisher replied that he was. “You had better be,” Assange said.
Fisher left London with an understanding that we would continue to have access to the material. But just in case, we took out a competitive insurance policy. We had Scott Shane, a Washington correspondent, pull together a long, just-in-case article summing up highlights of the cables, which we could quickly post on our Web site. If WikiLeaks sprang another leak, we would be ready.
Because of the range of the material and the very nature of diplomacy, the embassy cables were bound to be more explosive than the War Logs. Dean Baquet, our Washington bureau chief, gave the White House an early warning on Nov. 19. The following Tuesday, two days before Thanksgiving, Baquet and two colleagues were invited to a windowless room at the State Department, where they encountered an unsmiling crowd. Representatives from the White House, the State Department, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the C.I.A., the Defense Intelligence Agency, the F.B.I. and the Pentagon gathered around a conference table. Others, who never identified themselves, lined the walls. A solitary note-taker tapped away on a computer.
The meeting was off the record, but it is fair to say the mood was tense. Scott Shane, one reporter who participated in the meeting, described “an undertone of suppressed outrage and frustration.”
Subsequent meetings, which soon gave way to daily conference calls, were more businesslike. Before each discussion, our Washington bureau sent over a batch of specific cables that we intended to use in the coming days. They were circulated to regional specialists, who funneled their reactions to a small group at State, who came to our daily conversations with a list of priorities and arguments to back them up. We relayed the government’s concerns, and our own decisions regarding them, to the other news outlets.
The administration’s concerns generally fell into three categories. First was the importance of protecting individuals who had spoken candidly to American diplomats in oppressive countries. We almost always agreed on those and were grateful to the government for pointing out some we overlooked.
“We were all aware of dire stakes for some of the people named in the cables if we failed to obscure their identities,” Shane wrote to me later, recalling the nature of the meetings. Like many of us, Shane has worked in countries where dissent can mean prison or worse. “That sometimes meant not just removing the name but also references to institutions that might give a clue to an identity and sometimes even the dates of conversations, which might be compared with surveillance tapes of an American Embassy to reveal who was visiting the diplomats that day.”
The second category included sensitive American programs, usually related to intelligence. We agreed to withhold some of this information, like a cable describing an intelligence-sharing program that took years to arrange and might be lost if exposed. In other cases, we went away convinced that publication would cause some embarrassment but no real harm.
The third category consisted of cables that disclosed candid comments by and about foreign officials, including heads of state. The State Department feared publication would strain relations with those countries. We were mostly unconvinced.
The embassy cables were a different kind of treasure from the War Logs. For one thing, they covered the entire globe — virtually every embassy, consulate and interest section that the United States maintains. They contained the makings of many dozens of stories: candid American appraisals of foreign leaders, narratives of complicated negotiations, allegations of corruption and duplicity, countless behind-the-scenes insights. Some of the material was of narrow local interest; some of it had global implications. Some provided authoritative versions of events not previously fully understood. Some consisted of rumor and flimsy speculation.
Unlike most of the military dispatches, the embassy cables were written in clear English, sometimes with wit, color and an ear for dialogue. (“Who knew,” one of our English colleagues marveled, “that American diplomats could write?”)
Even more than the military logs, the diplomatic cables called for context and analysis. It was important to know, for example, that cables sent from an embassy are routinely dispatched over the signature of the ambassador and those from the State Department are signed by the secretary of state, regardless of whether the ambassador or secretary had actually seen the material. It was important to know that much of the communication between Washington and its outposts is given even more restrictive classification — top secret or higher — and was thus missing from this trove. We searched in vain, for example, for military or diplomatic reports on the fate of Pat Tillman, the former football star and Army Ranger who was killed by friendly fire in Afghanistan. We found no reports on how Osama bin Laden eluded American forces in the mountains of Tora Bora. (In fact, we found nothing but second- and thirdhand rumors about bin Laden.) If such cables exist, they were presumably classified top secret or higher.
And it was important to remember that diplomatic cables are versions of events. They can be speculative. They can be ambiguous. They can be wrong.
One of our first articles drawn from the diplomatic cables, for example, reported on a secret intelligence assessment that Iran had obtained a supply of advanced missiles from North Korea, missiles that could reach European capitals. Outside experts long suspected that Iran obtained missile parts but not the entire weapons, so this glimpse of the official view was revealing. The Washington Post fired back with a different take, casting doubt on whether the missile in question had been transferred to Iran or whether it was even a workable weapon. We went back to the cables — and the experts — and concluded in a subsequent article that the evidence presented “a murkier picture.”
The tension between a newspaper’s obligation to inform and the government’s responsibility to protect is hardly new. At least until this year, nothing The Times did on my watch caused nearly so much agitation as two articles we published about tactics employed by the Bush administration after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. The first, which was published in 2005 and won a Pulitzer Prize, revealed that the National Security Agency was eavesdropping on domestic phone conversations and e-mail without the legal courtesy of a warrant. The other, published in 2006, described a vast Treasury Department program to screen international banking records.
I have vivid memories of sitting in the Oval Office as President George W. Bush tried to persuade me and the paper’s publisher to withhold the eavesdropping story, saying that if we published it, we should share the blame for the next terrorist attack. We were unconvinced by his argument and published the story, and the reaction from the government — and conservative commentators in particular — was vociferous.
This time around, the Obama administration’s reaction was different. It was, for the most part, sober and professional. The Obama White House, while strongly condemning WikiLeaks for making the documents public, did not seek an injunction to halt publication. There was no Oval Office lecture. On the contrary, in our discussions before publication of our articles, White House officials, while challenging some of the conclusions we drew from the material, thanked us for handling the documents with care. The secretaries of state and defense and the attorney general resisted the opportunity for a crowd-pleasing orgy of press bashing. There has been no serious official talk — unless you count an ambiguous hint by Senator Joseph Lieberman — of pursuing news organizations in the courts. Though the release of these documents was certainly embarrassing, the relevant government agencies actually engaged with us in an attempt to prevent the release of material genuinely damaging to innocent individuals or to the national interest.
The broader public reaction was mixed — more critical in the first days; more sympathetic as readers absorbed the articles and the sky did not fall; and more hostile to WikiLeaks in the U.S. than in Europe, where there is often a certain pleasure in seeing the last superpower taken down a peg.
In the days after we began our respective series based on the embassy cables, Alan Rusbridger and I went online to answer questions from readers. The Guardian, whose readership is more sympathetic to the guerrilla sensibilities of WikiLeaks, was attacked for being too fastidious about redacting the documents: How dare you censor this material? What are you hiding? Post everything now! The mail sent to The Times, at least in the first day or two, came from the opposite field. Many readers were indignant and alarmed: Who needs this? How dare you? What gives you the right?
Much of the concern reflected a genuine conviction that in perilous times the president needs extraordinary powers, unfettered by Congressional oversight, court meddling or the strictures of international law and certainly safe from nosy reporters. That is compounded by a popular sense that the elite media have become too big for their britches and by the fact that our national conversation has become more polarized and strident.
Although it is our aim to be impartial in our presentation of the news, our attitude toward these issues is far from indifferent. The journalists at The Times have a large and personal stake in the country’s security. We live and work in a city that has been tragically marked as a favorite terrorist target, and in the wake of 9/11 our journalists plunged into the ruins to tell the story of what happened here. Moreover, The Times has nine staff correspondents assigned to the two wars still being waged in the wake of that attack, plus a rotating cast of photographers, visiting writers and scores of local stringers and support staff. They work in this high-risk environment because, while there are many places you can go for opinions about the war, there are few places — and fewer by the day — where you can go to find honest, on-the-scene reporting about what is happening. We take extraordinary precautions to keep them safe, but we have had two of our Iraqi journalists murdered for doing their jobs. We have had four journalists held hostage by the Taliban — two of them for seven months. We had one Afghan journalist killed in a rescue attempt. Last October, while I was in Kabul, we got word that a photographer embedded for us with troops near Kandahar stepped on an improvised mine and lost both his legs.
We are invested in the struggle against murderous extremism in another sense. The virulent hatred espoused by terrorists, judging by their literature, is directed not just against our people and our buildings but also at our values and at our faith in the self-government of an informed electorate. If the freedom of the press makes some Americans uneasy, it is anathema to the ideologists of terror.
So we have no doubts about where our sympathies lie in this clash of values. And yet we cannot let those sympathies transform us into propagandists, even for a system we respect.
I’m the first to admit that news organizations, including this one, sometimes get things wrong. We can be overly credulous (as in some of the prewar reporting about Iraq’s supposed weapons of mass destruction) or overly cynical about official claims and motives. We may err on the side of keeping secrets (President Kennedy reportedly wished, after the fact, that The Times had published what it knew about the planned Bay of Pigs invasion, which possibly would have helped avert a bloody debacle) or on the side of exposing them. We make the best judgments we can. When we get things wrong, we try to correct the record. A free press in a democracy can be messy. But the alternative is to give the government a veto over what its citizens are allowed to know. Anyone who has worked in countries where the news diet is controlled by the government can sympathize with Thomas Jefferson’s oft-quoted remark that he would rather have newspapers without government than government without newspapers.
The intentions of our founders have rarely been as well articulated as they were by Justice Hugo Black 40 years ago, concurring with the Supreme Court ruling that stopped the government from suppressing the secret Vietnam War history called the Pentagon Papers: “The government’s power to censor the press was abolished so that the press would remain forever free to censure the government. The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people.”
There is no neat formula for maintaining this balance. In practice, the tension between our obligation to inform and the government’s obligation to protect plays out in a set of rituals. As one of my predecessors, Max Frankel, then the Washington bureau chief, wrote in a wise affidavit filed during the Pentagon Papers case: “For the vast majority of ‘secrets,’ there has developed between the government and the press (and Congress) a rather simple rule of thumb: The government hides what it can, pleading necessity as long as it can, and the press pries out what it can, pleading a need and a right to know. Each side in this ‘game’ regularly ‘wins’ and ‘loses’ a round or two. Each fights with the weapons at its command. When the government loses a secret or two, it simply adjusts to a new reality.”
In fact, leaks of classified material — sometimes authorized — are part of the way business is conducted in Washington, as one wing of the bureaucracy tries to one-up another or officials try to shift blame or claim credit or advance or confound a particular policy. For further evidence that our government is highly selective in its approach to secrets, look no further than Bob Woodward’s all-but-authorized accounts of the innermost deliberations of our government.
The government surely cheapens secrecy by deploying it so promiscuously. According to the Pentagon, about 500,000 people have clearance to use the database from which the secret cables were pilfered. Weighing in on the WikiLeaks controversy in The Guardian, Max Frankel remarked that secrets shared with such a legion of “cleared” officials, including low-level army clerks, “are not secret.” Governments, he wrote, “must decide that the random rubber-stamping of millions of papers and computer files each year does not a security system make.”
Beyond the basic question of whether the press should publish secrets, criticism of the WikiLeaks documents generally fell into three themes: 1. That the documents were of dubious value, because they told us nothing we didn’t already know. 2. That the disclosures put lives at risk — either directly, by identifying confidential informants, or indirectly, by complicating our ability to build alliances against terror. 3. That by doing business with an organization like WikiLeaks, The Times and other news organizations compromised their impartiality and independence.
I’m a little puzzled by the complaint that most of the embassy traffic we disclosed did not profoundly change our understanding of how the world works. Ninety-nine percent of what we read or hear on the news does not profoundly change our understanding of how the world works. News mostly advances by inches and feet, not in great leaps. The value of these documents — and I believe they have immense value — is not that they expose some deep, unsuspected perfidy in high places or that they upend your whole view of the world. For those who pay close attention to foreign policy, these documents provide texture, nuance and drama. They deepen and correct your understanding of how things unfold; they raise or lower your estimation of world leaders. For those who do not follow these subjects as closely, the stories are an opportunity to learn more. If a project like this makes readers pay attention, think harder, understand more clearly what is being done in their name, then we have performed a public service. And that does not count the impact of these revelations on the people most touched by them. WikiLeaks cables in which American diplomats recount the extravagant corruption of Tunisia’s rulers helped fuel a popular uprising that has overthrown the government.
As for the risks posed by these releases, they are real. WikiLeaks’s first data dump, the publication of the Afghanistan War Logs, included the names of scores of Afghans that The Times and other news organizations had carefully purged from our own coverage. Several news organizations, including ours, reported this dangerous lapse, and months later a Taliban spokesman claimed that Afghan insurgents had been perusing the WikiLeaks site and making a list. I anticipate, with dread, the day we learn that someone identified in those documents has been killed.
WikiLeaks was roundly criticized for its seeming indifference to the safety of those informants, and in its subsequent postings it has largely followed the example of the news organizations and redacted material that could get people jailed or killed. Assange described it as a “harm minimization” policy. In the case of the Iraq war documents, WikiLeaks applied a kind of robo-redaction software that stripped away names (and rendered the documents almost illegible). With the embassy cables, WikiLeaks posted mostly documents that had already been redacted by The Times and its fellow news organizations. And there were instances in which WikiLeaks volunteers suggested measures to enhance the protection of innocents. For example, someone at WikiLeaks noticed that if the redaction of a phrase revealed the exact length of the words, an alert foreign security service might match the number of letters to a name and affiliation and thus identify the source. WikiLeaks advised everyone to substitute a dozen uppercase X’s for each redacted passage, no matter how long or short.
Whether WikiLeaks’s “harm minimization” is adequate, and whether it will continue, is beyond my power to predict or influence. WikiLeaks does not take guidance from The New York Times. In the end, I can answer only for what my own paper has done, and I believe we have behaved responsibly.
The idea that the mere publication of such a wholesale collection of secrets will make other countries less willing to do business with our diplomats seems to me questionable. Even Defense Secretary Robert Gates called this concern “overwrought.” Foreign governments cooperate with us, he pointed out, not because they necessarily love us, not because they trust us to keep their secrets, but because they need us. It may be that for a time diplomats will choose their words more carefully or circulate their views more narrowly, but WikiLeaks has not repealed the laws of self-interest. A few weeks after we began publishing articles about the embassy cables, David Sanger, our chief Washington correspondent, told me: “At least so far, the evidence that foreign leaders are no longer talking to American diplomats is scarce. I’ve heard about nervous jokes at the beginning of meetings, along the lines of ‘When will I be reading about this conversation?’ But the conversations are happening. . . . American diplomacy has hardly screeched to a halt.”
As for our relationship with WikiLeaks, Julian Assange has been heard to boast that he served as a kind of puppet master, recruiting several news organizations, forcing them to work in concert and choreographing their work. This is characteristic braggadocio — or, as my Guardian colleagues would say, bollocks. Throughout this experience we have treated Assange as a source. I will not say “a source, pure and simple,” because as any reporter or editor can attest, sources are rarely pure or simple, and Assange was no exception. But the relationship with sources is straightforward: you don’t necessarily endorse their agenda, echo their rhetoric, take anything they say at face value, applaud their methods or, most important, allow them to shape or censor your journalism. Your obligation, as an independent news organization, is to verify the material, to supply context, to exercise responsible judgment about what to publish and what not to publish and to make sense of it. That is what we did.
But while I do not regard Assange as a partner, and I would hesitate to describe what WikiLeaks does as journalism, it is chilling to contemplate the possible government prosecution of WikiLeaks for making secrets public, let alone the passage of new laws to punish the dissemination of classified information, as some have advocated. Taking legal recourse against a government official who violates his trust by divulging secrets he is sworn to protect is one thing. But criminalizing the publication of such secrets by someone who has no official obligation seems to me to run up against the First Amendment and the best traditions of this country. As one of my colleagues asks: If Assange were an understated professorial type rather than a character from a missing Stieg Larsson novel, and if WikiLeaks were not suffused with such glib antipathy toward the United States, would the reaction to the leaks be quite so ferocious? And would more Americans be speaking up against the threat of reprisals?
Whether the arrival of WikiLeaks has fundamentally changed the way journalism is made, I will leave to others and to history. Frankly, I think the impact of WikiLeaks on the culture has probably been overblown. Long before WikiLeaks was born, the Internet transformed the landscape of journalism, creating a wide-open and global market with easier access to audiences and sources, a quicker metabolism, a new infrastructure for sharing and vetting information and a diminished respect for notions of privacy and secrecy. Assange has claimed credit on several occasions for creating something he calls “scientific journalism,” meaning that readers are given the raw material to judge for themselves whether the journalistic write-ups are trustworthy. But newspapers have been publishing texts of documents almost as long as newspapers have existed — and ever since the Internet eliminated space restrictions, we have done so copiously.
Nor is it clear to me that WikiLeaks represents some kind of cosmic triumph of transparency. If the official allegations are to be believed, most of WikiLeaks’s great revelations came from a single anguished Army private — anguished enough to risk many years in prison. It’s possible that the creation of online information brokers like WikiLeaks and OpenLeaks, a breakaway site announced in December by a former Assange colleague named Daniel Domscheit-Berg, will be a lure for whistle-blowers and malcontents who fear being caught consorting directly with a news organization like mine. But I suspect we have not reached a state of information anarchy. At least not yet.
As 2010 wound down, The Times and its news partners held a conference call to discuss where we go from here. The initial surge of articles drawn from the secret cables was over. More would trickle out but without a fixed schedule. We agreed to continue the redaction process, and we agreed we would all urge WikiLeaks to do the same. But this period of intense collaboration, and of regular contact with our source, was coming to a close.
Just before Christmas, Ian Katz, The Guardian’s deputy editor, went to see Assange, who had been arrested in London on the Swedish warrant, briefly jailed and bailed out by wealthy admirers and was living under house arrest in a country manor in East Anglia while he fought Sweden’s attempt to extradite him. The flow of donations to WikiLeaks, which he claimed hit 100,000 euros a day at its peak, was curtailed when Visa, MasterCard and PayPal refused to be conduits for contributors — prompting a concerted assault on the Web sites of those companies by Assange’s hacker sympathizers. He would soon sign a lucrative book deal to finance his legal struggles.
The Guardian seemed to have joined The Times on Assange’s enemies list, first for sharing the diplomatic cables with us, then for obtaining and reporting on the unredacted record of the Swedish police complaints against Assange. (Live by the leak. . . .) In his fury at this perceived betrayal, Assange granted an interview to The Times of London, in which he vented his displeasure with our little media consortium. If he thought this would ingratiate him with The Guardian rival, he was naïve. The paper happily splashed its exclusive interview, then followed it with an editorial calling Assange a fool and a hypocrite.
At the mansion in East Anglia, Assange seated Katz before a roaring fire in the drawing room and ruminated for four hours about the Swedish case, his financial troubles and his plan for a next phase of releases. He talked vaguely about secrets still in his quiver, including what he regards as a damning cache of e-mail from inside an American bank.
He spun out an elaborate version of a U.S. Justice Department effort to exact punishment for his assault on American secrecy. If he was somehow extradited to the United States, he said, “I would still have a high chance of being killed in the U.S. prison system, Jack Ruby style, given the continual calls for my murder by senior and influential U.S. politicians.”
While Assange mused darkly in his exile, one of his lawyers sent out a mock Christmas card that suggested at least someone on the WikiLeaks team was not lacking a sense of the absurd.
The message:
“Dear kids,
Santa is Mum & Dad.
Love,
WikiLeaks.”
A version of this article appeared in print on January 30, 2011, on page MM32 of the Sunday Magazine
Purchase "Open Secrets" a new e-book from The New York Times today.
http://www.nytimes.com/opensecrets/
sexta-feira, 28 de janeiro de 2011
Bolivia a caminho do leninismo-maoista, por uma voz autorizada...
O que vai em primeiro lugar pode ser considerado opinião pessoal, externa, mas o último parágrafo é, ao que parece, uma opinião autorizada, por um dos líderes, talvez O líder atual da Bolívia.
ÁLVARO GARCIA LINERA GOVERNA A BOLÍVIA: EVO MORALES É APENAS O SÍMBOLO QUE ELE USA!
Ex-Blog de Cesar Maia, 28/01/2011
1. Linera é vice-presidente da Bolívia e presidente do congresso boliviano. É marxista, teórico e militante, e ídolo dos nossos marxistas, como Emir Sader e Marco Aurélio Garcia. É Linera quem manda no governo. Tem todos os poderes e busca reviver a experiência dos governos comunistas da segunda metade do século passado. Está certamente à esquerda de Chávez e é muito mais ideológico que ele. Tem Cuba e Fidel Castro como referência e quer implantar seu modelo na Bolívia. Evo Morales assusta pouco os democratas na Bolívia. Linera assusta muito. A própria percepção que faz de governos como Venezuela, Equador e Nicarágua é extremamente crítica.
2. O uso de Evo Morales como símbolo é uma mistificação. Evo Morales não sabe falar quechua ou aymara. Era líder sindical dos cocaleiros e não líder indígena. Por sua imagem, assume a questão indígena instruído por Linera que, com isso, pretende realçar elementos de comunidades pré-colombianas proto-comunistas e romper com a cultura ocidental e a memória da colonização espanhola. Seguem trechos de sua entrevista ao jornal "El Deber!", de Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolívia, de domingo, 23 de janeiro de 2011.
3. Fomos vanguarda na reunião de Cancun e a história nos dará razão. Muito 'leninisticamente' falando, há que ir contra a corrente. Hoje Bolívia tem posturas coerentemente de vanguarda. Hoje está só, mas garanto que em algum tempo não estaremos. Como dizia Fidel Castro: A história nos absolverá. Não há refugiados políticos bolivianos: são delinquentes prófugos. A verdade triunfa; ninguém pode ir contra a verdade. O passo seguinte será eleição direta para juízes e ministério público. Sempre há oposição, seja externa, seja interna. Este não é o fim da história, é a dinâmica da dialética da história. Sempre tem que haver a luta de contrários, para que assim saia a linha correta, no sentido maoista. Agora estamos na etapa de triunfo do modelo, consolidação de sua hegemonia e início do descolamento. Querer bloqueá-lo é simplesmente ir contra a história: não se pode.
Dixit!
ÁLVARO GARCIA LINERA GOVERNA A BOLÍVIA: EVO MORALES É APENAS O SÍMBOLO QUE ELE USA!
Ex-Blog de Cesar Maia, 28/01/2011
1. Linera é vice-presidente da Bolívia e presidente do congresso boliviano. É marxista, teórico e militante, e ídolo dos nossos marxistas, como Emir Sader e Marco Aurélio Garcia. É Linera quem manda no governo. Tem todos os poderes e busca reviver a experiência dos governos comunistas da segunda metade do século passado. Está certamente à esquerda de Chávez e é muito mais ideológico que ele. Tem Cuba e Fidel Castro como referência e quer implantar seu modelo na Bolívia. Evo Morales assusta pouco os democratas na Bolívia. Linera assusta muito. A própria percepção que faz de governos como Venezuela, Equador e Nicarágua é extremamente crítica.
2. O uso de Evo Morales como símbolo é uma mistificação. Evo Morales não sabe falar quechua ou aymara. Era líder sindical dos cocaleiros e não líder indígena. Por sua imagem, assume a questão indígena instruído por Linera que, com isso, pretende realçar elementos de comunidades pré-colombianas proto-comunistas e romper com a cultura ocidental e a memória da colonização espanhola. Seguem trechos de sua entrevista ao jornal "El Deber!", de Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolívia, de domingo, 23 de janeiro de 2011.
3. Fomos vanguarda na reunião de Cancun e a história nos dará razão. Muito 'leninisticamente' falando, há que ir contra a corrente. Hoje Bolívia tem posturas coerentemente de vanguarda. Hoje está só, mas garanto que em algum tempo não estaremos. Como dizia Fidel Castro: A história nos absolverá. Não há refugiados políticos bolivianos: são delinquentes prófugos. A verdade triunfa; ninguém pode ir contra a verdade. O passo seguinte será eleição direta para juízes e ministério público. Sempre há oposição, seja externa, seja interna. Este não é o fim da história, é a dinâmica da dialética da história. Sempre tem que haver a luta de contrários, para que assim saia a linha correta, no sentido maoista. Agora estamos na etapa de triunfo do modelo, consolidação de sua hegemonia e início do descolamento. Querer bloqueá-lo é simplesmente ir contra a história: não se pode.
Dixit!
Livro: O conhecimento no seculo 20 (e em alguns outros mais)
Um livro simplesmente essencial, para quem quer ficar "inteligente" (bem, é apenas uma maneira de dizer). Recomendo a todos (a todas) as brasileiras e os brasileiros:
Samuel Simon (org.)
Um Século de Conhecimento - Arte, Filosofia, Ciência e Tecnologia no século XX
Prefácio de Roberto Salmeron
(Brasília: Editora da UnB, 2011, 1282 p.; ISBN: 978-85-230-1276-2)
Organizador de livro sobre avanço da ciência vê tema como "grande ausente"
Max Miliano Melo
Correio Braziliense, 26/01/2011
Entrevista com o organizador do livro "Um Século de Conhecimento - Arte, Filosofia, Ciência e Tecnologia no século XX", Samuel Simon
- Como surgiu o interesse de escrever um livro tratando das teorias produzidas pela ciência ao longo do século XX?
As razões são, basicamente, duas. A primeira, conforme explico na Apresentação do livro, nasceu de uma constatação: nos balanços realizados pela imprensa no final do milênio, o tema "teorias científicas" era o grande ausente. Falou-se sobre acontecimentos políticos, grandes catástrofes, tecnologia, etc. O conhecimento científico e seus fundamentos foi esquecido. A segunda, porque "o que é uma teoria científica" é um dos meus objetos de estudo, na medida em que trabalho com filosofia da ciência. "Um Século de Conhecimento" nos apresenta as teorias em inúmeras áreas do conhecimento e podemos, assim, compreender melhor o que fazem os pesquisadores nas universidades.
- Explique um pouco como foi o processo de produção do livro.
Tive a ideia de fazer esse livro em 2000. Comecei então o contato com os autores explicando o projeto: fazer esse balanço das teorias produzidas na sua área no século XX, mas sem esquecer século anterior e sem esquecer as origens da área. Solicitei também uma avaliação sobre os possíveis desenvolvimentos da área para o século seguinte, o atual (século XXI).
- Qual a importância das teorias na produção do conhecimento?
As teorias são fundamentais para o desenvolvimento do conhecimento, embora não sejam as únicas fontes para o conhecimento. Antes um rápido esclarecimento: quando falo em conhecimento, estou me referindo ao conhecimento científico, que tem seus métodos, controles, aferições, etc. Voltando à importância das teorias, pode-se dizer, também de maneira breve, que elas buscam exprimir as causas de um fenômeno, qualquer que seja ele: do movimento da Lua a um distúrbio comportamental. A relação entre os enunciados de uma teoria, os termos que a compõem e a experiência é extremamente complexo e é um dos principais assuntos tratados pela filosofia da ciência. Nesse campo, não somente os filósofos, mas também cientistas deram e tem dado grandes contribuições. Albert Einstein, Sigmund Freud, são exemplos de cientistas que contribuíram para esse debate. Entre os filósofos, temos, evidentemente Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, para citar apenas dois grandes nomes do século XX.
- Porque tão relevantes elas não chegam, muitas vezes ao conhecimento do grande público?
As razões podem ser várias. Vou arriscar algumas: talvez o interesse por assuntos mais imediatos do dia-a-dia ocupem bastante as pessoas. Uma outra razão é que, muitas vezes, confunde-se tecnologia e produtos de teorias, que evidentemente têm sua importância, com as próprias teorias científicas e supõe-se que isso basta. Finalmente, os elementos mais fundamentais que compõem as teorias científicas, as conexões causais e os fundamentos dessas conexões para explicar certos fenômenos ("explicar o visível pelo invisível", como dizia o biólogo Jacques Monod) se relacionam de maneira bastante intrincada e com termos técnicos de difícil compreensão para quem não trabalha com aquele assunto. Nesse sentido, a imprensa tem um papel bem relevante.
- Este século a ciência passou por um processo de especialização?
A especialização no conhecimento tem a idade da filosofia ocidental e das primeiras pesquisas científicas no período clássico. Quando Platão faz filosofia, Euclides formula sua geometria, Arquimes enuncia os primeiros princípios da física, temos uma especialização. Com o passar do tempo, o número de domínios aumentou e, portanto, também a especialização.
- E a interdisciplinaridade ela teve um papel importante na produção do conhecimento neste século?
Também a interdisciplinaridade tem origem no período clássico. Para citar dois exemplos: Ptolomeu precisava de geometria para seu sistema geocêntrico de mundo. O século XVII continuou essa tendência e aguçou essa relação, na medida que incorporou definitivamente a matemática à física. Hoje, com maior número de domínios essa relação é inevitável. Não vejo uma grande novidade aí, pois ela é antiga.
Samuel Simon (org.)
Um Século de Conhecimento - Arte, Filosofia, Ciência e Tecnologia no século XX
Prefácio de Roberto Salmeron
(Brasília: Editora da UnB, 2011, 1282 p.; ISBN: 978-85-230-1276-2)
Organizador de livro sobre avanço da ciência vê tema como "grande ausente"
Max Miliano Melo
Correio Braziliense, 26/01/2011
Entrevista com o organizador do livro "Um Século de Conhecimento - Arte, Filosofia, Ciência e Tecnologia no século XX", Samuel Simon
- Como surgiu o interesse de escrever um livro tratando das teorias produzidas pela ciência ao longo do século XX?
As razões são, basicamente, duas. A primeira, conforme explico na Apresentação do livro, nasceu de uma constatação: nos balanços realizados pela imprensa no final do milênio, o tema "teorias científicas" era o grande ausente. Falou-se sobre acontecimentos políticos, grandes catástrofes, tecnologia, etc. O conhecimento científico e seus fundamentos foi esquecido. A segunda, porque "o que é uma teoria científica" é um dos meus objetos de estudo, na medida em que trabalho com filosofia da ciência. "Um Século de Conhecimento" nos apresenta as teorias em inúmeras áreas do conhecimento e podemos, assim, compreender melhor o que fazem os pesquisadores nas universidades.
- Explique um pouco como foi o processo de produção do livro.
Tive a ideia de fazer esse livro em 2000. Comecei então o contato com os autores explicando o projeto: fazer esse balanço das teorias produzidas na sua área no século XX, mas sem esquecer século anterior e sem esquecer as origens da área. Solicitei também uma avaliação sobre os possíveis desenvolvimentos da área para o século seguinte, o atual (século XXI).
- Qual a importância das teorias na produção do conhecimento?
As teorias são fundamentais para o desenvolvimento do conhecimento, embora não sejam as únicas fontes para o conhecimento. Antes um rápido esclarecimento: quando falo em conhecimento, estou me referindo ao conhecimento científico, que tem seus métodos, controles, aferições, etc. Voltando à importância das teorias, pode-se dizer, também de maneira breve, que elas buscam exprimir as causas de um fenômeno, qualquer que seja ele: do movimento da Lua a um distúrbio comportamental. A relação entre os enunciados de uma teoria, os termos que a compõem e a experiência é extremamente complexo e é um dos principais assuntos tratados pela filosofia da ciência. Nesse campo, não somente os filósofos, mas também cientistas deram e tem dado grandes contribuições. Albert Einstein, Sigmund Freud, são exemplos de cientistas que contribuíram para esse debate. Entre os filósofos, temos, evidentemente Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, para citar apenas dois grandes nomes do século XX.
- Porque tão relevantes elas não chegam, muitas vezes ao conhecimento do grande público?
As razões podem ser várias. Vou arriscar algumas: talvez o interesse por assuntos mais imediatos do dia-a-dia ocupem bastante as pessoas. Uma outra razão é que, muitas vezes, confunde-se tecnologia e produtos de teorias, que evidentemente têm sua importância, com as próprias teorias científicas e supõe-se que isso basta. Finalmente, os elementos mais fundamentais que compõem as teorias científicas, as conexões causais e os fundamentos dessas conexões para explicar certos fenômenos ("explicar o visível pelo invisível", como dizia o biólogo Jacques Monod) se relacionam de maneira bastante intrincada e com termos técnicos de difícil compreensão para quem não trabalha com aquele assunto. Nesse sentido, a imprensa tem um papel bem relevante.
- Este século a ciência passou por um processo de especialização?
A especialização no conhecimento tem a idade da filosofia ocidental e das primeiras pesquisas científicas no período clássico. Quando Platão faz filosofia, Euclides formula sua geometria, Arquimes enuncia os primeiros princípios da física, temos uma especialização. Com o passar do tempo, o número de domínios aumentou e, portanto, também a especialização.
- E a interdisciplinaridade ela teve um papel importante na produção do conhecimento neste século?
Também a interdisciplinaridade tem origem no período clássico. Para citar dois exemplos: Ptolomeu precisava de geometria para seu sistema geocêntrico de mundo. O século XVII continuou essa tendência e aguçou essa relação, na medida que incorporou definitivamente a matemática à física. Hoje, com maior número de domínios essa relação é inevitável. Não vejo uma grande novidade aí, pois ela é antiga.
quinta-feira, 27 de janeiro de 2011
Holocausto e os negacionistas: apenas mais algumas provas
Negacionistas são gente ou absolutamente odiosa -- pois que empenhada em negar o que sabem que ocorreu -- ou sumamente estúpidas -- que cultivam a ignorância ativamente.
Eles costumam dizer que os campos de concentração serviam para desinfecção de doentes (piolhos, tifo, etc.).
Os próprios alemães, como nesta matéria da revista Spiegel, podem testemunhar:
Tem uma galeria de fotos no link abaixo.
HISTORY OF THE HOLOCAUST
------------------------
Auschwitz Oven Factory Reopens as a Memorial
For years, the site was left to crumble and decay. But now, following
extensive renovation, the factory where the Auschwitz ovens were
designed and built has reopened as a memorial. It shows the intimate
involvement of German industry in the mass murder of the Holocaust.
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,742013,00.html#ref=nlint
History of the Holocaust
Auschwitz Oven Factory Reopens as a Memorial
Photo Gallery: 5 Photos
For years, the site was left to crumble and decay. But now, following extensive renovation, the factory where the Auschwitz ovens were designed and built has reopened as a memorial. It shows the intimate involvement of German industry in the mass murder of the Holocaust.
For years, the site was little more than a typical industrial ruin -- the kind of modernist decay that became synonymous with Eastern Europe after the collapse of communism. The crumbling buildings just outside the city center of Erfurt were fenced off and left to the squatters who made the complex their home.
But ever since the company which owned the plant went bankrupt in 1994, historians have had their eyes on the location. Its history, after all, is intimately tied with the darkest chapter of Germany's past. The factory once belonged to Topf & Söhne, the company which supplied the Nazis with the ovens used at Auschwitz and other death camps to cremate Holocaust victims.
And on Thursday, after years of planning, a memorial exhibit in the former administration building opened its doors -- just in time for Jan. 27, Holocaust Remembrance Day.
"Nowhere else in Europe is the involvement of industry in the Nazis' machinery of death as visible as it is in the company in Erfurt," Rikola-Gunnar Lüttgenau told the German news agency DPA on Tuesday.
Systematic Mass Murder
The exhibit describes how Topf & Söhne, which began life in 1878 as a specialist for industrial ovens, brewing equipment and chimneys, soon became a leading manufacturer of crematoriums. The SS first commissioned crematorium ovens from the company in 1939 for concentration camps in Dachau, Buchenwald and Flossenbürg.
Once the Nazis embarked on the systematic mass murder of Jews, Gypsies and others, however, the SS needed much greater capacity. Soon, Topf & Söhne engineers set to work calculating the most efficient method to burn thousands of dead bodies. In 1942, company engineer Fritz Sander applied for a patent for a "continually operating corpse incinerator for mass use."
The company also designed ventilation systems to pump poison gas out of the gas chambers once the killing was complete -- and Topf & Söhne employees visited Auschwitz and other camps to help install their products. Ultimately, the company equipped Auschwitz with ovens capable of incinerating 8,000 bodies each day.
"The company was not a place where people were tortured or murdered," memorial head Annegret Schüle told DPA. "Rather it is a place where people thought and calculated how to incinerate as quickly and effectively as possible."
'Always Glad to Serve You'
Topf & Söhne's complicity with the Holocaust was largely ignored and then forgotten following World War II. CEO Ludwig Topf committed suicide once the war ended and several employees, including Sander, were arrested by the Soviets and sentenced to 25 years of hard labor. It was only in the mid-1990s that interest in the company's World War II activities began to gain momentum. Ultimately the state government of Thuringia and the federal government in Berlin provided €600,000 for the creation of a memorial on the site.
Documents now on display in the newly refurbished factory administration building clearly illustrate the pride the company took in the services it provided to the Nazi killing machine. Original drawings are part of the exhibition as are drafting tables where the ovens were designed.
Hundreds of urns made by Topf & Söhne to hold the ashes of deceased Buchenwald inmates are also presented. The urns were found in 1997 during work on the roof of the crematorium at the Buchenwald concentration camp memorial. Early in the Nazis' reign of terror, ashes of deceased concentration camp prisoners were sent back to their home towns for burial. Later, the ashes were stored on site. Once the Holocaust got under way in earnest, however, the ashes were simply dispersed or buried.
Visitors to the new exhibition are greeted with the sentence: "Always glad to serve you." It was taken from a letter from Topf & Söhne to the management of the Auschwitz death camp.
cgh -- with wire reports
Eles costumam dizer que os campos de concentração serviam para desinfecção de doentes (piolhos, tifo, etc.).
Os próprios alemães, como nesta matéria da revista Spiegel, podem testemunhar:
Tem uma galeria de fotos no link abaixo.
HISTORY OF THE HOLOCAUST
------------------------
Auschwitz Oven Factory Reopens as a Memorial
For years, the site was left to crumble and decay. But now, following
extensive renovation, the factory where the Auschwitz ovens were
designed and built has reopened as a memorial. It shows the intimate
involvement of German industry in the mass murder of the Holocaust.
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,742013,00.html#ref=nlint
History of the Holocaust
Auschwitz Oven Factory Reopens as a Memorial
Photo Gallery: 5 Photos
For years, the site was left to crumble and decay. But now, following extensive renovation, the factory where the Auschwitz ovens were designed and built has reopened as a memorial. It shows the intimate involvement of German industry in the mass murder of the Holocaust.
For years, the site was little more than a typical industrial ruin -- the kind of modernist decay that became synonymous with Eastern Europe after the collapse of communism. The crumbling buildings just outside the city center of Erfurt were fenced off and left to the squatters who made the complex their home.
But ever since the company which owned the plant went bankrupt in 1994, historians have had their eyes on the location. Its history, after all, is intimately tied with the darkest chapter of Germany's past. The factory once belonged to Topf & Söhne, the company which supplied the Nazis with the ovens used at Auschwitz and other death camps to cremate Holocaust victims.
And on Thursday, after years of planning, a memorial exhibit in the former administration building opened its doors -- just in time for Jan. 27, Holocaust Remembrance Day.
"Nowhere else in Europe is the involvement of industry in the Nazis' machinery of death as visible as it is in the company in Erfurt," Rikola-Gunnar Lüttgenau told the German news agency DPA on Tuesday.
Systematic Mass Murder
The exhibit describes how Topf & Söhne, which began life in 1878 as a specialist for industrial ovens, brewing equipment and chimneys, soon became a leading manufacturer of crematoriums. The SS first commissioned crematorium ovens from the company in 1939 for concentration camps in Dachau, Buchenwald and Flossenbürg.
Once the Nazis embarked on the systematic mass murder of Jews, Gypsies and others, however, the SS needed much greater capacity. Soon, Topf & Söhne engineers set to work calculating the most efficient method to burn thousands of dead bodies. In 1942, company engineer Fritz Sander applied for a patent for a "continually operating corpse incinerator for mass use."
The company also designed ventilation systems to pump poison gas out of the gas chambers once the killing was complete -- and Topf & Söhne employees visited Auschwitz and other camps to help install their products. Ultimately, the company equipped Auschwitz with ovens capable of incinerating 8,000 bodies each day.
"The company was not a place where people were tortured or murdered," memorial head Annegret Schüle told DPA. "Rather it is a place where people thought and calculated how to incinerate as quickly and effectively as possible."
'Always Glad to Serve You'
Topf & Söhne's complicity with the Holocaust was largely ignored and then forgotten following World War II. CEO Ludwig Topf committed suicide once the war ended and several employees, including Sander, were arrested by the Soviets and sentenced to 25 years of hard labor. It was only in the mid-1990s that interest in the company's World War II activities began to gain momentum. Ultimately the state government of Thuringia and the federal government in Berlin provided €600,000 for the creation of a memorial on the site.
Documents now on display in the newly refurbished factory administration building clearly illustrate the pride the company took in the services it provided to the Nazi killing machine. Original drawings are part of the exhibition as are drafting tables where the ovens were designed.
Hundreds of urns made by Topf & Söhne to hold the ashes of deceased Buchenwald inmates are also presented. The urns were found in 1997 during work on the roof of the crematorium at the Buchenwald concentration camp memorial. Early in the Nazis' reign of terror, ashes of deceased concentration camp prisoners were sent back to their home towns for burial. Later, the ashes were stored on site. Once the Holocaust got under way in earnest, however, the ashes were simply dispersed or buried.
Visitors to the new exhibition are greeted with the sentence: "Always glad to serve you." It was taken from a letter from Topf & Söhne to the management of the Auschwitz death camp.
cgh -- with wire reports
Five Myths About Davos - Moises Naim
Five Myths About Davos
Moisés Naím
THE WASHINGTON POST, JANUARY 25, 2011
Every year, thousands of the world's most influential people descend upon Switzerland in late January for five days of debating, networking, fine eating and a little skiing, too. The gathering, called the World Economic Forum, has grown enormously popular over the decades - and has gained a steady chorus of detractors as well. In truth, the meeting is neither as exclusive or conspiratorial as its critics claim, nor as world-transforming as its boosters imagine. The following myths are just a few of the misconceptions that have sprung up around the singular institution known the world over simply as "Davos."
1. Davos is a convention for the world's plutocrats.
Not really. While chief executives of the world's top companies are the largest single group attending the World Economic Forum, over the years they've been joined by religious leaders, scientists, politicians, artists, academics, social activists, journalists and heads of nongovernmental organizations from across the globe. These newer participants account for about half of those who go to Davos. You're just as likely to run into Umberto Eco, Bono or Nadine Gordimer as Bill Gates, George Soros or PepsiCo chief executive Indra Nooyi.
Such diversity was not always a Davos trait. Founded in 1971 by German business professor Klaus Schwab, the gathering was initially dubbed the European Management Forum and catered to European executives worried about U.S. competitors. But over time, Schwab broadened the scope and participation, and since the 1990s, panels on poverty, climate change and military conflict have been as common as ones on business and management.
Of course, the dirty little secret of Davos is that the sessions in the formal program - with grand names such as "Engineering a Cooler Planet" and "Constructing the Ephemeral: Light in the Public Realm" - are not the main draw. It's all about networking. Casual hallway conversations and informal coffees with international bigwigs account for much of the forum's continuing ability to attract extremely busy people to a cold, inconvenient spot in the Swiss Alps.
2. Big, world-changing decisions are made at Davos.
When billionaires and politicians huddle in a remote location surrounded by armed guards, it's hardly surprising that conspiracy theorists imagine that this small clique is running the world, protecting its privileges and concocting decisions that will transform all our lives. And the forum itself is keen to show that its meetings matter; its oft-stated mission, emblazoned on tote bags and brochures, is "committed to improving the state of the world."
So, what happens at Davos? Forum boosters point to significant moments, such as when Turkey and Greece signed a declaration in 1988 dispelling the risk of war; or the unprecedented meeting a year later of representatives from North and South Korea; or the encounter, also in 1989, between East German Prime Minister Hans Modrow and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl to discuss reunification. It was also in Davos in 1992 that Nelson Mandela and South African President F.W. de Klerk first appeared together at an international gathering.
But, however fun it is to speculate, it is hard to assess which critical political decisions or business deals emerge from Davos - or how often they would have happened elsewhere regardless. My impression, based on two decades worth of Davos meetings, is that heads of state don't attend to negotiate deals. Rather, they use Davos as a platform to burnish their internationalist credentials, to impress audiences back home - or simply to hang out with their friends.
3. Davos is the high temple of stateless, free-market capitalism.
The late Harvard professor Samuel Huntington coined the term "Davos Man" in 2004 to criticize members of a global elite who "have little need for national loyalty, view national boundaries as obstacles that thankfully are vanishing, and see national governments as residues from the past whose only useful function is to facilitate the elite's global operations."
Huntington (who often attended Davos) was correctly describing a strand of thought common among many business leaders, at Davos and elsewhere. But the "Davos Man" characterization feels dated today. Executives from India and China - countries where the state plays a more dominant role in economic affairs - have been going to Davos in increasing numbers in recent years and might frown on the idea that national loyalties and governments are losing importance. Similarly, non-business attendees take the stage at the forum to offer critiques of free markets that are as damning as they are eloquent. Economic nationalism is alive and well - even in Davos.
4. Davos tells us where the global economy is headed.
The experts convened at Davos did not see the coming collapse of the Soviet Union. They failed to predict the Latin American, Russian and Asian financial crises of the 1990s, or the bursting of the tech bubble at the end of that decade. They didn't forecast the Great Recession. In other words, as far as experts go, they are fairly normal.
Why would we assume that if credit-rating agencies, banks, governments, think tanks, academics, intelligence agencies, pundits and the entire economic forecasting profession failed to anticipate these crashes, the people meeting at Davos would do a better job of warning the world? After all, the Davos crowd includes most of these experts. The mood in Davos does not drive the elite consensus, but merely reflects it.
5. Davos is losing its appeal.
Davos has gotten too large. Too packed with celebrities. Too lacking in substance.
These frequent criticisms are one reason that other gatherings for world leaders have proliferated. For example, the Clinton Global Initiative, launched in 2005 by former president Bill Clinton, was reportedly born out of his frustration at conferences that were more talk than action. CGI participants are expected not just to discuss problems such as pandemics or Haiti's earthquake tragedy but to make concrete commitments to address them. The TED talks - a small conference started in 1984 to discuss technology, entertainment and design - have developed large international audiences that follow them live online. The Wall Street Journal, Atlantic Monthly and other publications have launched similar events. And a coalition of left-leaning activist organizations, political groups and NGOs from around the world have formed an annual World Social Forum, also scheduled early in the year and billing itself as the anti-Davos.
Yet, despite the critics and competitors, there is no evidence that Davos has lost its allure. Like every other year, in 2010 more than 30 heads of state showed up, as did more than 50 top officials of multilateral agencies, chiefs of the world's most significant nongovernmental organizations, editors and columnists for leading publications, hundreds of experts from academia and think tanks, many Nobel Prize winners, and leaders in other fields. Plus, of course, the chief executives of 1,400 of the planet's largest companies.
I imagine that this year, for better or worse, the numbers will be similar - as will the criticisms.
Moisés Naím
THE WASHINGTON POST, JANUARY 25, 2011
Every year, thousands of the world's most influential people descend upon Switzerland in late January for five days of debating, networking, fine eating and a little skiing, too. The gathering, called the World Economic Forum, has grown enormously popular over the decades - and has gained a steady chorus of detractors as well. In truth, the meeting is neither as exclusive or conspiratorial as its critics claim, nor as world-transforming as its boosters imagine. The following myths are just a few of the misconceptions that have sprung up around the singular institution known the world over simply as "Davos."
1. Davos is a convention for the world's plutocrats.
Not really. While chief executives of the world's top companies are the largest single group attending the World Economic Forum, over the years they've been joined by religious leaders, scientists, politicians, artists, academics, social activists, journalists and heads of nongovernmental organizations from across the globe. These newer participants account for about half of those who go to Davos. You're just as likely to run into Umberto Eco, Bono or Nadine Gordimer as Bill Gates, George Soros or PepsiCo chief executive Indra Nooyi.
Such diversity was not always a Davos trait. Founded in 1971 by German business professor Klaus Schwab, the gathering was initially dubbed the European Management Forum and catered to European executives worried about U.S. competitors. But over time, Schwab broadened the scope and participation, and since the 1990s, panels on poverty, climate change and military conflict have been as common as ones on business and management.
Of course, the dirty little secret of Davos is that the sessions in the formal program - with grand names such as "Engineering a Cooler Planet" and "Constructing the Ephemeral: Light in the Public Realm" - are not the main draw. It's all about networking. Casual hallway conversations and informal coffees with international bigwigs account for much of the forum's continuing ability to attract extremely busy people to a cold, inconvenient spot in the Swiss Alps.
2. Big, world-changing decisions are made at Davos.
When billionaires and politicians huddle in a remote location surrounded by armed guards, it's hardly surprising that conspiracy theorists imagine that this small clique is running the world, protecting its privileges and concocting decisions that will transform all our lives. And the forum itself is keen to show that its meetings matter; its oft-stated mission, emblazoned on tote bags and brochures, is "committed to improving the state of the world."
So, what happens at Davos? Forum boosters point to significant moments, such as when Turkey and Greece signed a declaration in 1988 dispelling the risk of war; or the unprecedented meeting a year later of representatives from North and South Korea; or the encounter, also in 1989, between East German Prime Minister Hans Modrow and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl to discuss reunification. It was also in Davos in 1992 that Nelson Mandela and South African President F.W. de Klerk first appeared together at an international gathering.
But, however fun it is to speculate, it is hard to assess which critical political decisions or business deals emerge from Davos - or how often they would have happened elsewhere regardless. My impression, based on two decades worth of Davos meetings, is that heads of state don't attend to negotiate deals. Rather, they use Davos as a platform to burnish their internationalist credentials, to impress audiences back home - or simply to hang out with their friends.
3. Davos is the high temple of stateless, free-market capitalism.
The late Harvard professor Samuel Huntington coined the term "Davos Man" in 2004 to criticize members of a global elite who "have little need for national loyalty, view national boundaries as obstacles that thankfully are vanishing, and see national governments as residues from the past whose only useful function is to facilitate the elite's global operations."
Huntington (who often attended Davos) was correctly describing a strand of thought common among many business leaders, at Davos and elsewhere. But the "Davos Man" characterization feels dated today. Executives from India and China - countries where the state plays a more dominant role in economic affairs - have been going to Davos in increasing numbers in recent years and might frown on the idea that national loyalties and governments are losing importance. Similarly, non-business attendees take the stage at the forum to offer critiques of free markets that are as damning as they are eloquent. Economic nationalism is alive and well - even in Davos.
4. Davos tells us where the global economy is headed.
The experts convened at Davos did not see the coming collapse of the Soviet Union. They failed to predict the Latin American, Russian and Asian financial crises of the 1990s, or the bursting of the tech bubble at the end of that decade. They didn't forecast the Great Recession. In other words, as far as experts go, they are fairly normal.
Why would we assume that if credit-rating agencies, banks, governments, think tanks, academics, intelligence agencies, pundits and the entire economic forecasting profession failed to anticipate these crashes, the people meeting at Davos would do a better job of warning the world? After all, the Davos crowd includes most of these experts. The mood in Davos does not drive the elite consensus, but merely reflects it.
5. Davos is losing its appeal.
Davos has gotten too large. Too packed with celebrities. Too lacking in substance.
These frequent criticisms are one reason that other gatherings for world leaders have proliferated. For example, the Clinton Global Initiative, launched in 2005 by former president Bill Clinton, was reportedly born out of his frustration at conferences that were more talk than action. CGI participants are expected not just to discuss problems such as pandemics or Haiti's earthquake tragedy but to make concrete commitments to address them. The TED talks - a small conference started in 1984 to discuss technology, entertainment and design - have developed large international audiences that follow them live online. The Wall Street Journal, Atlantic Monthly and other publications have launched similar events. And a coalition of left-leaning activist organizations, political groups and NGOs from around the world have formed an annual World Social Forum, also scheduled early in the year and billing itself as the anti-Davos.
Yet, despite the critics and competitors, there is no evidence that Davos has lost its allure. Like every other year, in 2010 more than 30 heads of state showed up, as did more than 50 top officials of multilateral agencies, chiefs of the world's most significant nongovernmental organizations, editors and columnists for leading publications, hundreds of experts from academia and think tanks, many Nobel Prize winners, and leaders in other fields. Plus, of course, the chief executives of 1,400 of the planet's largest companies.
I imagine that this year, for better or worse, the numbers will be similar - as will the criticisms.
Um manifesto em favor de um criminoso: uma peticao "inassinavel"...
Recebi, de um correspondente de internet cuja identidade não vem ao caso, a petição abaixo transcrita, cujos termos repudio da maneira mais veemente.
Respondi, simplesmente, dizendo que não concordava em absoluto com os termos da petição, e que eu era a favor da extradição, imediata e legal, do referido criminoso.
Ainda assim, como sempre sou a favor de ideias, e de seu debate, mesmo as más -- como é manifestamente este caso -- transcrevo a petição, para rechaçar de modo formal seus termos e intenções, e logo exponho por que.
Devo dizer, em primeiro lugar, que considero a decisão do STF de autorizar a extradição do criminoso em questão lamentável, ao dar ao presidente da República a faculdade de se pronunciar, em última instância, sobre essa expulsão, cabendo-lhe então a palavra final num imbróglio jurídico que esses juízes, sempre decidindo politicamente, e não legalmente, meteram o país e nossa credibilidade internacional.
Ao STF é quem cabe a palavra final, em nosso sistema constitucional -- e suponho que em qualquer outro -- em matéria de legalidade e de constitucionalidade.
O STF, e o presidente então, confundem o Brasil com a figura do presidente, que nada mais é do que o representante temporário do Estado brasileiro.
Quem tem acordo de extradição com a Itália é o Brasil, não o STF, ou sequer o presidente da República, a quem cabe apenas cumprir a lei -- neste caso, um tratado bilateral -- e muito menos o STF, a quem cabe apenas e tão somente cumprir a lei, não ficar inventando filigranas jurídicas que só complicam o caso.
Volto a dizer: o comportamento do STF neste caso foi abaixo de lamentável, e o comportamento do ex-presidente, então, foi abaixo de reprovável, indigna de um país que pretende respeitar tratados internacionais.
Venho agora ao texto da petição em questão (quem desejar lê-la em primeiro lugar, vá mais abaixo).
Os peticionários são obviamente militantes de uma causa qualquer, neste caso a mais deplorável de todas, que é a de defender um criminoso, julgado e condenado, e refugiado ilegalmente no Brasil (para o que contribuiu também um simulacro de decisão política de um lamentável ex-ministro da (in)Justiça, que não se pejou de expulsar para uma ditadura dois legítimos refugiados comuns, não políticos.
Eles começam por dizer o seguinte:
"A situação atual constitui profundo desprezo a) à decisão do presidente da república pela não-extradição, b) ao estado democrático de direito e, sobretudo, c) à dignidade da pessoa humana."
Corrijo: (a) o presidente não tinha que decidir sobre extradição ou não-extradição; o caso pertencia à Justiça, que decidiu pela extradição, em cumprimento de um acordo; o presidente só tinha de aplicar a decisão da Justiça, ou seja, tomar as providências para cumprir a decisão do STF; este, de modo idiota, "decidiu" que cabia ao presidente ter a última palavra; ora, a decisão pertence a um tratado do qual o Brasil é signatário, não à pessoa do presidente;
(b) o que é, ou o que seja, um Estado democrático de direito não pode ser definido por um punhado de indivíduos, mas tem parâmetros claros, que são decididos em última instância pelo STF; este bando de tiranetes togados esqueceram-se disso e se auto-castraram;
(c) dignidade da pessoa humana não está em causa aqui, pois quem define isso é a lei e a Justiça, e os peticionários são unilaterais e enviesados em seu julgamento.
Continuam os peticionários politizados:
"No dia 31 de dezembro de 2010, o presidente da república decidiu negar o pedido de extradição de Cesare Battisti, formulado pela Itália. A legalidade e legitimidade dessa decisão são inatacáveis. O presidente exerceu as suas competências constitucionais como chefe de estado."
Errado, completamente. Não cabia ao PR negar ou autorizar o pedido de extradição; ele apenas tinha de cumprir o que determina a lei, que era responsabilidade do STF. Este atuou, repito, de maneira inaceitável, ao auto-eximir-se de cumprir um tratado, esquecendo as obrigações internacionais do Estado brasileiro e dando responsabilidade sobre o caso a um mero representante temporário do Estado, que por acaso (e para nossa vergonha) era o ex-presidente. A legalidade e a legitimidade dessa "decisão" são altamente questionáveis, aliás profundamente erradas, equivocadas no mais alto grau. O presidente não tinha nenhuma competência na interpretação da lei, de nenhuma lei, tampouco no caso da decisão em causa, apenas lhe cabia cumprir a lei. Luis Inácio pensou que era o Estado brasileiro... (aliás, ele pensa muito alto sobre si mesmo...).
Todo o resto da petição é de uma pobreza jurídica inacreditável, aliás inaceitável em qualquer fórum que se considere aliado do direito. Cesare Battisti nunca foi perseguido político; se trata de um criminoso que foi processado e condenado por um Estado democrático, que recorreu até as mais altas instâncias europeias e que perdeu em todas. Cabia ao Brasil apenas e tão somente extraditá-lo, inclusive porque entrou no Brasil ilegalmente, fraudulentamente.
O ex-ministro da (in)Justiça que concedeu-lhe o status de refugiado extravasou de suas competências e não tem autoridade moral para fazer o que fez, depois da expulsão de cubanos para uma ditadura totalitária.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Petição MANIFESTO PELO FIM IMEDIATO DA PRISÃO INSUSTENTÁVEL E INCONSTTITUCIONAL DE CESARE BATTISTI
Para: STF, Governo Federal
Os cidadãos abaixo assinados expressam total inconformidade com a decisão do ministro Cézar Peluso, presidente do Supremo Tribunal Federal, de manter preso o cidadão italiano Cesare Battisti e instam pela sua soltura imediata e inadiável, por ser de justiça. A situação atual constitui profundo desprezo a) à decisão do presidente da república pela não-extradição, b) ao estado democrático de direito e, sobretudo, c) à dignidade da pessoa humana. Imprescindível, portanto, virmos a público manifestar:
1. No dia 31 de dezembro de 2010, o presidente da república decidiu negar o pedido de extradição de Cesare Battisti, formulado pela Itália. A legalidade e legitimidade dessa decisão são inatacáveis. O presidente exerceu as suas competências constitucionais como chefe de estado. A fundamentação contemplou disposições do tratado assinado por Brasil e Itália, em especial o seu Art. 3º, alínea f, que obsta a extradição para quem possa ter a situação agravada se devolvido ao país suplicante, por “motivo de raça, religião, sexo, nacionalidade, língua, opinião política, condição social ou pessoal”.
2. O presidente da república assumiu como razões de decidir o detalhado e consistente parecer da Advocacia-Geral da União, de n.º AGU/AG-17/2010. A decisão do presidente também condiz com os sólidos argumentos de cartas públicas e manifestos firmemente contrários à extradição, assinados por juristas do quilate de Dalmo de Abreu Dallari, Bandeira de Mello, Nilo Batista, José Afonso da Silva, Paulo Bonavides e Juarez Tavares, entre outros. A decisão também confirmou o refúgio concedido a Cesare Battisti pelo governo brasileiro, em janeiro de 2009, pelo então ministro da justiça Tarso Genro, que da mesma forma admitira o status de perseguido político dele.
3. Vale lembrar que o STF, em acórdão de dezembro de 2009, confirmado em abril de 2010, reafirmou (por cinco votos contra quatro) que a palavra final no processo de extradição cabe exclusivamente ao presidente da república – o que já constituía praxe na tradição constitucional brasileira e no direito comparado. Na ocasião, o ministro Marco Aurélio de Mello (um dos votos vencidos) fez uma observação cristalina: o extraditando está preso enquanto se decide sobre sua extradição.
4. Em conseqüência, Cesare Battisti permaneceu preso aguardando o posicionamento do presidente da república. Nesse ínterim, o governo italiano encabeçado pelo primeiro-ministro Silvio Berlusconi utilizou de intimidações jactantes e declarações despeitadas para pressionar as autoridades brasileiras e fazer de Battisti uma espécie de espetáculo circense, para salvar o seu governo da crise interna que notoriamente atravessa.
5. Causou perplexidade e repúdio, portanto, quando, tendo conhecimento da decisão do presidente da república, o ministro Cézar Peluso, presidente do STF, negou a soltura de Cesare Battisti. O Art. 93, inciso XII, da Constituição determina que “a atividade jurisdicional será ininterrupta” e o faz, precisamente, para contemplar casos de emergência, em que direitos fundamentais estejam ameaçados. Ora, o magistrado investido da jurisdição dispunha, em 6 de janeiro, de todos os elementos factuais e jurídicos para decidir sobre o caso. Porém, resolveu não agir, diferindo a decisão para (pelo menos) fevereiro, determinando nova apreciação pelo plenário da corte. Tal adiamento serviu a novas manobras dos interessados na caça destemperada a Battisti, num assunto que, de direito, já foi decidido pela última instância: o presidente da república.
6. A decisão em sede monocrática do ministro Cézar Peluso afronta acintosamente o conteúdo do ato competente do presidente da república. Se, como pretende o presidente do STF, o plenário reapreciará a matéria, isto significa que o presidente da república não deu a palavra final. Ou seja, o ministro Cézar Peluso descumpriu não somente a decisão definitiva do Poder Executivo, como também os acórdãos de seu tribunal, esvaziando-os de eficácia. Em outras palavras, um único juiz, voto vencido nos acórdões em pauta, desafiou tanto o Poder Executivo quanto o Poder Judiciário. O presidente do STF não pode transformar a sua posição pessoal em posição do tribunal. Não lhe pode usurpar a autoridade, já exercida quando o plenário ratificara a competência presidencial sobre a extradição.
7. A continuidade da prisão de Cesare Battisti tornou-se uma abominação jurídica. Negada a extradição, a privação da liberdade do cidadão ficou absolutamente sem fundamento. A liberdade é regra e não exceção. A autoridade judicial deve decretar a soltura, de ofício e imediatamente, como prescreve o Art. 5º, inciso LXI, da Constituição. Cesare está recluso no presídio da Papuda, em Brasília, desde 2007. Mantê-lo encarcerado sem fundamento, depois de todo o rosário processual a que foi submetido nos últimos três anos, com sua carga de pressão psicológica, consiste em extremo desprezo de seus direitos fundamentais. Significa ser cúmplice com uma prisão arbitrária e injustificada, absolutamente vergonhosa para o país, em indefensável violação ao Art. IX da Declaração Universal dos Direitos Humanos de 1948, dentre inúmeros tratados e documentos internacionais de que o Brasil é signatário.
Manifestamos a total inconformidade diante da manutenção da prisão de Cesare Battisti, mal escorada numa sucessão incoerente de argumentos e decisões judiciais, que culminou no ato ilegal e inconstitucional do ministro Cézar Peluso, ao retornar o caso mais uma vez ao plenário do STF.
Por todo o exposto, reclamamos pela liberdade imediata de Cesare Battisti, fazendo valer a decisão competente do presidente da república em 31 de dezembro de 2010.
Assinam:
Os signatários
Respondi, simplesmente, dizendo que não concordava em absoluto com os termos da petição, e que eu era a favor da extradição, imediata e legal, do referido criminoso.
Ainda assim, como sempre sou a favor de ideias, e de seu debate, mesmo as más -- como é manifestamente este caso -- transcrevo a petição, para rechaçar de modo formal seus termos e intenções, e logo exponho por que.
Devo dizer, em primeiro lugar, que considero a decisão do STF de autorizar a extradição do criminoso em questão lamentável, ao dar ao presidente da República a faculdade de se pronunciar, em última instância, sobre essa expulsão, cabendo-lhe então a palavra final num imbróglio jurídico que esses juízes, sempre decidindo politicamente, e não legalmente, meteram o país e nossa credibilidade internacional.
Ao STF é quem cabe a palavra final, em nosso sistema constitucional -- e suponho que em qualquer outro -- em matéria de legalidade e de constitucionalidade.
O STF, e o presidente então, confundem o Brasil com a figura do presidente, que nada mais é do que o representante temporário do Estado brasileiro.
Quem tem acordo de extradição com a Itália é o Brasil, não o STF, ou sequer o presidente da República, a quem cabe apenas cumprir a lei -- neste caso, um tratado bilateral -- e muito menos o STF, a quem cabe apenas e tão somente cumprir a lei, não ficar inventando filigranas jurídicas que só complicam o caso.
Volto a dizer: o comportamento do STF neste caso foi abaixo de lamentável, e o comportamento do ex-presidente, então, foi abaixo de reprovável, indigna de um país que pretende respeitar tratados internacionais.
Venho agora ao texto da petição em questão (quem desejar lê-la em primeiro lugar, vá mais abaixo).
Os peticionários são obviamente militantes de uma causa qualquer, neste caso a mais deplorável de todas, que é a de defender um criminoso, julgado e condenado, e refugiado ilegalmente no Brasil (para o que contribuiu também um simulacro de decisão política de um lamentável ex-ministro da (in)Justiça, que não se pejou de expulsar para uma ditadura dois legítimos refugiados comuns, não políticos.
Eles começam por dizer o seguinte:
"A situação atual constitui profundo desprezo a) à decisão do presidente da república pela não-extradição, b) ao estado democrático de direito e, sobretudo, c) à dignidade da pessoa humana."
Corrijo: (a) o presidente não tinha que decidir sobre extradição ou não-extradição; o caso pertencia à Justiça, que decidiu pela extradição, em cumprimento de um acordo; o presidente só tinha de aplicar a decisão da Justiça, ou seja, tomar as providências para cumprir a decisão do STF; este, de modo idiota, "decidiu" que cabia ao presidente ter a última palavra; ora, a decisão pertence a um tratado do qual o Brasil é signatário, não à pessoa do presidente;
(b) o que é, ou o que seja, um Estado democrático de direito não pode ser definido por um punhado de indivíduos, mas tem parâmetros claros, que são decididos em última instância pelo STF; este bando de tiranetes togados esqueceram-se disso e se auto-castraram;
(c) dignidade da pessoa humana não está em causa aqui, pois quem define isso é a lei e a Justiça, e os peticionários são unilaterais e enviesados em seu julgamento.
Continuam os peticionários politizados:
"No dia 31 de dezembro de 2010, o presidente da república decidiu negar o pedido de extradição de Cesare Battisti, formulado pela Itália. A legalidade e legitimidade dessa decisão são inatacáveis. O presidente exerceu as suas competências constitucionais como chefe de estado."
Errado, completamente. Não cabia ao PR negar ou autorizar o pedido de extradição; ele apenas tinha de cumprir o que determina a lei, que era responsabilidade do STF. Este atuou, repito, de maneira inaceitável, ao auto-eximir-se de cumprir um tratado, esquecendo as obrigações internacionais do Estado brasileiro e dando responsabilidade sobre o caso a um mero representante temporário do Estado, que por acaso (e para nossa vergonha) era o ex-presidente. A legalidade e a legitimidade dessa "decisão" são altamente questionáveis, aliás profundamente erradas, equivocadas no mais alto grau. O presidente não tinha nenhuma competência na interpretação da lei, de nenhuma lei, tampouco no caso da decisão em causa, apenas lhe cabia cumprir a lei. Luis Inácio pensou que era o Estado brasileiro... (aliás, ele pensa muito alto sobre si mesmo...).
Todo o resto da petição é de uma pobreza jurídica inacreditável, aliás inaceitável em qualquer fórum que se considere aliado do direito. Cesare Battisti nunca foi perseguido político; se trata de um criminoso que foi processado e condenado por um Estado democrático, que recorreu até as mais altas instâncias europeias e que perdeu em todas. Cabia ao Brasil apenas e tão somente extraditá-lo, inclusive porque entrou no Brasil ilegalmente, fraudulentamente.
O ex-ministro da (in)Justiça que concedeu-lhe o status de refugiado extravasou de suas competências e não tem autoridade moral para fazer o que fez, depois da expulsão de cubanos para uma ditadura totalitária.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Petição MANIFESTO PELO FIM IMEDIATO DA PRISÃO INSUSTENTÁVEL E INCONSTTITUCIONAL DE CESARE BATTISTI
Para: STF, Governo Federal
Os cidadãos abaixo assinados expressam total inconformidade com a decisão do ministro Cézar Peluso, presidente do Supremo Tribunal Federal, de manter preso o cidadão italiano Cesare Battisti e instam pela sua soltura imediata e inadiável, por ser de justiça. A situação atual constitui profundo desprezo a) à decisão do presidente da república pela não-extradição, b) ao estado democrático de direito e, sobretudo, c) à dignidade da pessoa humana. Imprescindível, portanto, virmos a público manifestar:
1. No dia 31 de dezembro de 2010, o presidente da república decidiu negar o pedido de extradição de Cesare Battisti, formulado pela Itália. A legalidade e legitimidade dessa decisão são inatacáveis. O presidente exerceu as suas competências constitucionais como chefe de estado. A fundamentação contemplou disposições do tratado assinado por Brasil e Itália, em especial o seu Art. 3º, alínea f, que obsta a extradição para quem possa ter a situação agravada se devolvido ao país suplicante, por “motivo de raça, religião, sexo, nacionalidade, língua, opinião política, condição social ou pessoal”.
2. O presidente da república assumiu como razões de decidir o detalhado e consistente parecer da Advocacia-Geral da União, de n.º AGU/AG-17/2010. A decisão do presidente também condiz com os sólidos argumentos de cartas públicas e manifestos firmemente contrários à extradição, assinados por juristas do quilate de Dalmo de Abreu Dallari, Bandeira de Mello, Nilo Batista, José Afonso da Silva, Paulo Bonavides e Juarez Tavares, entre outros. A decisão também confirmou o refúgio concedido a Cesare Battisti pelo governo brasileiro, em janeiro de 2009, pelo então ministro da justiça Tarso Genro, que da mesma forma admitira o status de perseguido político dele.
3. Vale lembrar que o STF, em acórdão de dezembro de 2009, confirmado em abril de 2010, reafirmou (por cinco votos contra quatro) que a palavra final no processo de extradição cabe exclusivamente ao presidente da república – o que já constituía praxe na tradição constitucional brasileira e no direito comparado. Na ocasião, o ministro Marco Aurélio de Mello (um dos votos vencidos) fez uma observação cristalina: o extraditando está preso enquanto se decide sobre sua extradição.
4. Em conseqüência, Cesare Battisti permaneceu preso aguardando o posicionamento do presidente da república. Nesse ínterim, o governo italiano encabeçado pelo primeiro-ministro Silvio Berlusconi utilizou de intimidações jactantes e declarações despeitadas para pressionar as autoridades brasileiras e fazer de Battisti uma espécie de espetáculo circense, para salvar o seu governo da crise interna que notoriamente atravessa.
5. Causou perplexidade e repúdio, portanto, quando, tendo conhecimento da decisão do presidente da república, o ministro Cézar Peluso, presidente do STF, negou a soltura de Cesare Battisti. O Art. 93, inciso XII, da Constituição determina que “a atividade jurisdicional será ininterrupta” e o faz, precisamente, para contemplar casos de emergência, em que direitos fundamentais estejam ameaçados. Ora, o magistrado investido da jurisdição dispunha, em 6 de janeiro, de todos os elementos factuais e jurídicos para decidir sobre o caso. Porém, resolveu não agir, diferindo a decisão para (pelo menos) fevereiro, determinando nova apreciação pelo plenário da corte. Tal adiamento serviu a novas manobras dos interessados na caça destemperada a Battisti, num assunto que, de direito, já foi decidido pela última instância: o presidente da república.
6. A decisão em sede monocrática do ministro Cézar Peluso afronta acintosamente o conteúdo do ato competente do presidente da república. Se, como pretende o presidente do STF, o plenário reapreciará a matéria, isto significa que o presidente da república não deu a palavra final. Ou seja, o ministro Cézar Peluso descumpriu não somente a decisão definitiva do Poder Executivo, como também os acórdãos de seu tribunal, esvaziando-os de eficácia. Em outras palavras, um único juiz, voto vencido nos acórdões em pauta, desafiou tanto o Poder Executivo quanto o Poder Judiciário. O presidente do STF não pode transformar a sua posição pessoal em posição do tribunal. Não lhe pode usurpar a autoridade, já exercida quando o plenário ratificara a competência presidencial sobre a extradição.
7. A continuidade da prisão de Cesare Battisti tornou-se uma abominação jurídica. Negada a extradição, a privação da liberdade do cidadão ficou absolutamente sem fundamento. A liberdade é regra e não exceção. A autoridade judicial deve decretar a soltura, de ofício e imediatamente, como prescreve o Art. 5º, inciso LXI, da Constituição. Cesare está recluso no presídio da Papuda, em Brasília, desde 2007. Mantê-lo encarcerado sem fundamento, depois de todo o rosário processual a que foi submetido nos últimos três anos, com sua carga de pressão psicológica, consiste em extremo desprezo de seus direitos fundamentais. Significa ser cúmplice com uma prisão arbitrária e injustificada, absolutamente vergonhosa para o país, em indefensável violação ao Art. IX da Declaração Universal dos Direitos Humanos de 1948, dentre inúmeros tratados e documentos internacionais de que o Brasil é signatário.
Manifestamos a total inconformidade diante da manutenção da prisão de Cesare Battisti, mal escorada numa sucessão incoerente de argumentos e decisões judiciais, que culminou no ato ilegal e inconstitucional do ministro Cézar Peluso, ao retornar o caso mais uma vez ao plenário do STF.
Por todo o exposto, reclamamos pela liberdade imediata de Cesare Battisti, fazendo valer a decisão competente do presidente da república em 31 de dezembro de 2010.
Assinam:
Os signatários
Brazil: What's Next? - Albert Fishlow
Um veterano brasilianista analisa os desafios da nova presidente do Brasil.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Brazil: What's Next?
by Albert Fishlow
Americas Quarterly, Winter 2011 Issue
The post-Lula, or Dilma, era promises both change and continuity.
To virtually no one’s surprise, Dilma Rousseff took office on January 1, 2011, as Brazil’s first female president. She won decisively—by a 12 percent margin nationwide in the second round—through capturing the many voters at the bottom of the income scale who look forward to continuing gains in their daily lives under her presidency.
Dilma’s ascension to the presidential palace is really Lula’s victory, with his popularity exceeding 80 percent upon departing office. The rapid recovery from world recession, increasing employment and stable prices—all achieved during the Lula administration—ensured that Brazilians’ satisfaction would extend to his chosen successor. Lula not only picked her but guided her political campaign and has even influenced the structuring of the cabinet. Lula’s finance minister, Guido Mantega, for example, will remain in his post.
But what happens afterwards? What role will Lula play in their party, the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), as leaders of the Left inevitably contest with more moderate forces?
Political Change
The Dilma era will begin with the PT emerging as the largest party in the Chamber of Deputies, as it did in 2002, but with only about one-fifth of all seats. That is typical. Joined with the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB) and its other political partners, the overall majority comes to more than the 60 percent needed for constitutional amendments. This represents a slight increase from its 53 percent control at the time of the last election in 2006.
In the Senate, the PMDB retains its numerical lead, followed by the PT. But additional support from allied parties assures the needed super-majority, with overall parties aligned with Dilma now holding a comparable 60 percent of the seats. In 2006 the margin was 54 percent. These totals exclude the Partido Progressista (PP) and Partido Verde (PV), both of which will be inclined to vote with the government on some legislation. In sum, the PT, with less than a fifth of each body, stands better able to manage legislatively than previously.
This ascension of the PT coincides with the strong decline of the Democratas (the former Partido da Frente Liberal and, before that, Partido Democrático Social). At one time, the Democratas benefited from the more-than-proportional representation afforded to the Northeast and occupied a strong position in the national legislature. But that position has now been eroded—a result of long-standing differences between the South and the Northeast. With this power erosion, future realignment becomes a possibility. Already São Paulo Mayor Gilberto Kassab has spoken of defecting.
A restructuring of political parties will be a possible consequence of last fall’s election. More than 20 parties have again won seats in the Congress. The much-reduced Democratas could consider a merger with the Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB), now led by Senator Aécio Neves of Minas Gerais. With governors in São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Paraná, Goias, and elsewhere, the PSDB, the party of former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso, will hold sway over more than half the Brazilian population. Federalism counts in Brazil, and any effective opposition to the PT will likely emanate from state capitals rather than Brasilia.
Also on the table is the never-fulfilled possibility of political reform. Lula has suggested an interest in leading the process and calling a Constituent Assembly. Brazil simply has too many individual political parties, which complicates electoral choice and the effectiveness of congressional action. Current rules are oriented to individual appeal and, not immaterially, to past benefits bestowed. Movement toward a closed electoral list for the Chamber of Deputies as well as formal district affiliation within states could lead to more coherent political parties.
The election of Francisco Oliveira Silva, a clown known as Tiririca (Grumpy), with the highest popular vote in the country illustrates the need for changes to the electoral system. After winning on slogans such as “It can’t get any worse,” Oliveira transferred through the proportional voting system the surplus (about 1 million) of his 1.3 million votes to elect four more deputies.
A total of 6,000 candidates from 27 separate parties competed for the Chamber’s 513 seats. Few of the victors owe their place to party platform and many are unlikely to pursue active, long-term careers within the legislature. Several will become members of the baixo clero (or backbenchers) called upon to vote in specific circumstances, before returning to compete for preferred positions in mayoral and state elections.
The result of this dysfunctionality is that Brazilian politics in the New Republic has centered on the executive. The medida provisória, which allows for immediate temporary passage of legislation, subject to congressional overturn, has become an often-used presidential mechanism to enact laws. Although a constitutional amendment has stopped their continued executive extension, the measure remains a potent alternative to passing proposed legislation.
One likely change, now more possible under a Dilma administration, is greater legislative initiative. Political parties no longer need to contend with a president whose personal popularity is far-reaching. They can assert themselves. This is even more likely since Vice President Michel Temer is a long-time leader and former Speaker of the PMDB within the Chamber.
Economic Realities
Dilma has promised to retain the key elements of the economic strategy in place since 1999: inflation targeting with a 4.5 percent increase annually, a variable exchange rate and a primary surplus of 3.3 percent of GDP annually. That will join a commitment to reinforce declining poverty through Bolsa Familia’s social transfers, as well as to assure current high rates of economic expansion. She has promised attention to fiscal discipline and to tax reform and pledged a more efficient expenditure policy.
An immediate issue is the potential increase in the minimum wage, now scheduled to rise by 5.5 percent in 2011, which is more than the inflation rate. Other tasks include restricting government expenditures and dealing with an appreciated real, in addition to responding to unpopular Central Bank hikes in interest rates.
Import substitution may be gone, but greater federal intervention is on its way back. Dilma—along with the PT and many of its allies—believes in a bigger state role in this next phase of Brazilian expansion. She was central to the preparation and management of the Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento (Growth Acceleration Program, PAC) put into effect in 2007.
This means a more aggressive industrial policy to select future winners and a greater willingness to apply state investment (and management) than during the Lula government. There was much talk about this but little practical action for a long time. Not until the crisis of 2009, when the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES) assumed a much expanded role, did that begin to change. However, many in the PT would have preferred a greater BNDES effort to strengthen the industrial sector and domestic market rather than agricultural and mining exports. This issue will recur, but Luciano Coutinho’s reappointment as head of BNDES assures him a continued central role.
Inevitably, Petrobras, Brazil’s semi-public energy company, will be the lead actor. There is an understandable preference for counting the gains rather than recognizing the costs deriving from the sub-salt oil deposits found some 250 kilometers (160 miles) offshore from Rio de Janeiro. This goes beyond the technical risks inherent in exploration and development that BP brought to the forefront in the Gulf of Mexico. Brazilian oil deposits are 50 percent deeper than the Gulf deposits, and the difficulties in extracting them are undetermined.
A great deal of expenditure is promised in the coming years—much of it committed domestically rather than internationally—to develop these petroleum riches. This means larger investment, but it is not clear that domestic savings will rise to finance it. Recent years—with the exception of 2009—have been good for Brazil, and especially for the rising lower-middle class. But growth via internal consumption, bolstered by rising terms of trade, has limits. Continued spending is also ahead for the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games in Brazil.
In the midst of talk about the primary surplus, it is easy to forget that Brazil still faces an overall fiscal deficit. Although its increase in 2009 undoubtedly helped recovery, the deficit became larger in 2010. During the 1950s and the 1970s, the state invested, and the private sector saved—both contributing voluntarily and involuntarily—through what amounted to an inflation tax that fell most prominently upon the poorest. No one wants a repetition of inflation now.
To grow at a steady 5 percent a year implies a much higher investment rate of close to 25 percent. Domestic savings now amount to about 17 percent. Foreign savings can help, but by no more than 3 percentage points or so. That limit emerges not only from the lessons of the debt crisis of the 1980s, but from more recent downturns in Mexico and Argentina. Savings ought to come from the public sector to guarantee their continuity. Eliminating the annual deficit—now greater than 3 percent of GDP—in the pension system is one way to do that.
A larger state must be financed somehow. The Brazilian public is unlikely to want even higher tax rates, so reducing the social security deficit and not spending the surplus provides a way out. Will Dilma be inclined to confront that problem and to procure the necessary broad support in Congress? It happened before in a PT government: Lula’s first constitutional amendment in 2003 dealt with social security.
In these good years, Brazil must also deal with an appreciated exchange rate that is beginning to hinder its industrial sector. It is easy to accuse the U.S. and China of creating the problem, while portraying Brazil as an innocent victim. Capital flows come in response to high domestic interest rates. Eliminating the fiscal deficit—which social security reform would do—would lead to lower interest rates. Higher taxes on capital inflows can work only in the short run.
Foreign Policy
Lula was quite popular internationally. During his presidency, he traveled widely and gained plaudits—and wider markets—for Brazil with a foreign policy that transcended Latin America. The search for a permanent position on the UN Security Council has been emphasized, along with a desire for greater status on such issues as the environment, nuclear weapons, peace in the Middle East, and conclusion of the Doha Round at the World Trade Organization.
Dilma cannot, and will not, match this record. Satisfying Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and U.S. President Barack Obama simultaneously, as well as Chilean President Sebastián Piñera and Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez closer to home, is a daunting effort that requires first-class diplomatic skills. Lula managed to be a star at meetings of the World Economic Forum as well as the Social World Forum. But few expect her to try to duplicate Lula’s foreign policy initiatives.
Dilma may be able to depend on others to a greater extent. The foreign ministry has been shifting and becoming fully aligned to active participation in world affairs. Foreign policy has become more attuned to domestic politics, mirroring the experience of other major powers. At the same time, the PT is now integrated into the foreign ministry.
Dealing with the world is no longer a choice but a necessity. Brazil has become too important globally to slide back to a more regional focus. But, for Dilma, defining an effective strategy may take more time and effort than many have yet considered.
The Road Ahead
Following the election, Dilma expressed her immense gratitude to Lula for his help during her campaign. She suggested that she will continue to consult and depend upon him. But Lula’s advice may turn out to be more of a burden than a blessing. In the recent past, former Brazilian President Itamar Franco [1992–1994] created problems for his successor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso. That is why a former president’s “exile” to diplomatic service is so appealing.
Lula is too central and active a participant in recent Brazilian history to simply become a mute observer. Already he is speaking of a Constituent Assembly next year. Perhaps that will work. After the death of Néstor Kirchner, some mentioned the possibility of him becoming the new Secretary-General of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). He rejected that, much as Chávez might have liked Brazil under the aegis of Venezuela. The possibility of a future UN role remains.
In the meantime, Lula is staying. Having Brazil successfully develop at a high rate, more equally and more democratically, and with a PT dominant position, is what he cares about.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Brazil: What's Next?
by Albert Fishlow
Americas Quarterly, Winter 2011 Issue
The post-Lula, or Dilma, era promises both change and continuity.
To virtually no one’s surprise, Dilma Rousseff took office on January 1, 2011, as Brazil’s first female president. She won decisively—by a 12 percent margin nationwide in the second round—through capturing the many voters at the bottom of the income scale who look forward to continuing gains in their daily lives under her presidency.
Dilma’s ascension to the presidential palace is really Lula’s victory, with his popularity exceeding 80 percent upon departing office. The rapid recovery from world recession, increasing employment and stable prices—all achieved during the Lula administration—ensured that Brazilians’ satisfaction would extend to his chosen successor. Lula not only picked her but guided her political campaign and has even influenced the structuring of the cabinet. Lula’s finance minister, Guido Mantega, for example, will remain in his post.
But what happens afterwards? What role will Lula play in their party, the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), as leaders of the Left inevitably contest with more moderate forces?
Political Change
The Dilma era will begin with the PT emerging as the largest party in the Chamber of Deputies, as it did in 2002, but with only about one-fifth of all seats. That is typical. Joined with the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB) and its other political partners, the overall majority comes to more than the 60 percent needed for constitutional amendments. This represents a slight increase from its 53 percent control at the time of the last election in 2006.
In the Senate, the PMDB retains its numerical lead, followed by the PT. But additional support from allied parties assures the needed super-majority, with overall parties aligned with Dilma now holding a comparable 60 percent of the seats. In 2006 the margin was 54 percent. These totals exclude the Partido Progressista (PP) and Partido Verde (PV), both of which will be inclined to vote with the government on some legislation. In sum, the PT, with less than a fifth of each body, stands better able to manage legislatively than previously.
This ascension of the PT coincides with the strong decline of the Democratas (the former Partido da Frente Liberal and, before that, Partido Democrático Social). At one time, the Democratas benefited from the more-than-proportional representation afforded to the Northeast and occupied a strong position in the national legislature. But that position has now been eroded—a result of long-standing differences between the South and the Northeast. With this power erosion, future realignment becomes a possibility. Already São Paulo Mayor Gilberto Kassab has spoken of defecting.
A restructuring of political parties will be a possible consequence of last fall’s election. More than 20 parties have again won seats in the Congress. The much-reduced Democratas could consider a merger with the Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB), now led by Senator Aécio Neves of Minas Gerais. With governors in São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Paraná, Goias, and elsewhere, the PSDB, the party of former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso, will hold sway over more than half the Brazilian population. Federalism counts in Brazil, and any effective opposition to the PT will likely emanate from state capitals rather than Brasilia.
Also on the table is the never-fulfilled possibility of political reform. Lula has suggested an interest in leading the process and calling a Constituent Assembly. Brazil simply has too many individual political parties, which complicates electoral choice and the effectiveness of congressional action. Current rules are oriented to individual appeal and, not immaterially, to past benefits bestowed. Movement toward a closed electoral list for the Chamber of Deputies as well as formal district affiliation within states could lead to more coherent political parties.
The election of Francisco Oliveira Silva, a clown known as Tiririca (Grumpy), with the highest popular vote in the country illustrates the need for changes to the electoral system. After winning on slogans such as “It can’t get any worse,” Oliveira transferred through the proportional voting system the surplus (about 1 million) of his 1.3 million votes to elect four more deputies.
A total of 6,000 candidates from 27 separate parties competed for the Chamber’s 513 seats. Few of the victors owe their place to party platform and many are unlikely to pursue active, long-term careers within the legislature. Several will become members of the baixo clero (or backbenchers) called upon to vote in specific circumstances, before returning to compete for preferred positions in mayoral and state elections.
The result of this dysfunctionality is that Brazilian politics in the New Republic has centered on the executive. The medida provisória, which allows for immediate temporary passage of legislation, subject to congressional overturn, has become an often-used presidential mechanism to enact laws. Although a constitutional amendment has stopped their continued executive extension, the measure remains a potent alternative to passing proposed legislation.
One likely change, now more possible under a Dilma administration, is greater legislative initiative. Political parties no longer need to contend with a president whose personal popularity is far-reaching. They can assert themselves. This is even more likely since Vice President Michel Temer is a long-time leader and former Speaker of the PMDB within the Chamber.
Economic Realities
Dilma has promised to retain the key elements of the economic strategy in place since 1999: inflation targeting with a 4.5 percent increase annually, a variable exchange rate and a primary surplus of 3.3 percent of GDP annually. That will join a commitment to reinforce declining poverty through Bolsa Familia’s social transfers, as well as to assure current high rates of economic expansion. She has promised attention to fiscal discipline and to tax reform and pledged a more efficient expenditure policy.
An immediate issue is the potential increase in the minimum wage, now scheduled to rise by 5.5 percent in 2011, which is more than the inflation rate. Other tasks include restricting government expenditures and dealing with an appreciated real, in addition to responding to unpopular Central Bank hikes in interest rates.
Import substitution may be gone, but greater federal intervention is on its way back. Dilma—along with the PT and many of its allies—believes in a bigger state role in this next phase of Brazilian expansion. She was central to the preparation and management of the Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento (Growth Acceleration Program, PAC) put into effect in 2007.
This means a more aggressive industrial policy to select future winners and a greater willingness to apply state investment (and management) than during the Lula government. There was much talk about this but little practical action for a long time. Not until the crisis of 2009, when the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES) assumed a much expanded role, did that begin to change. However, many in the PT would have preferred a greater BNDES effort to strengthen the industrial sector and domestic market rather than agricultural and mining exports. This issue will recur, but Luciano Coutinho’s reappointment as head of BNDES assures him a continued central role.
Inevitably, Petrobras, Brazil’s semi-public energy company, will be the lead actor. There is an understandable preference for counting the gains rather than recognizing the costs deriving from the sub-salt oil deposits found some 250 kilometers (160 miles) offshore from Rio de Janeiro. This goes beyond the technical risks inherent in exploration and development that BP brought to the forefront in the Gulf of Mexico. Brazilian oil deposits are 50 percent deeper than the Gulf deposits, and the difficulties in extracting them are undetermined.
A great deal of expenditure is promised in the coming years—much of it committed domestically rather than internationally—to develop these petroleum riches. This means larger investment, but it is not clear that domestic savings will rise to finance it. Recent years—with the exception of 2009—have been good for Brazil, and especially for the rising lower-middle class. But growth via internal consumption, bolstered by rising terms of trade, has limits. Continued spending is also ahead for the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games in Brazil.
In the midst of talk about the primary surplus, it is easy to forget that Brazil still faces an overall fiscal deficit. Although its increase in 2009 undoubtedly helped recovery, the deficit became larger in 2010. During the 1950s and the 1970s, the state invested, and the private sector saved—both contributing voluntarily and involuntarily—through what amounted to an inflation tax that fell most prominently upon the poorest. No one wants a repetition of inflation now.
To grow at a steady 5 percent a year implies a much higher investment rate of close to 25 percent. Domestic savings now amount to about 17 percent. Foreign savings can help, but by no more than 3 percentage points or so. That limit emerges not only from the lessons of the debt crisis of the 1980s, but from more recent downturns in Mexico and Argentina. Savings ought to come from the public sector to guarantee their continuity. Eliminating the annual deficit—now greater than 3 percent of GDP—in the pension system is one way to do that.
A larger state must be financed somehow. The Brazilian public is unlikely to want even higher tax rates, so reducing the social security deficit and not spending the surplus provides a way out. Will Dilma be inclined to confront that problem and to procure the necessary broad support in Congress? It happened before in a PT government: Lula’s first constitutional amendment in 2003 dealt with social security.
In these good years, Brazil must also deal with an appreciated exchange rate that is beginning to hinder its industrial sector. It is easy to accuse the U.S. and China of creating the problem, while portraying Brazil as an innocent victim. Capital flows come in response to high domestic interest rates. Eliminating the fiscal deficit—which social security reform would do—would lead to lower interest rates. Higher taxes on capital inflows can work only in the short run.
Foreign Policy
Lula was quite popular internationally. During his presidency, he traveled widely and gained plaudits—and wider markets—for Brazil with a foreign policy that transcended Latin America. The search for a permanent position on the UN Security Council has been emphasized, along with a desire for greater status on such issues as the environment, nuclear weapons, peace in the Middle East, and conclusion of the Doha Round at the World Trade Organization.
Dilma cannot, and will not, match this record. Satisfying Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and U.S. President Barack Obama simultaneously, as well as Chilean President Sebastián Piñera and Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez closer to home, is a daunting effort that requires first-class diplomatic skills. Lula managed to be a star at meetings of the World Economic Forum as well as the Social World Forum. But few expect her to try to duplicate Lula’s foreign policy initiatives.
Dilma may be able to depend on others to a greater extent. The foreign ministry has been shifting and becoming fully aligned to active participation in world affairs. Foreign policy has become more attuned to domestic politics, mirroring the experience of other major powers. At the same time, the PT is now integrated into the foreign ministry.
Dealing with the world is no longer a choice but a necessity. Brazil has become too important globally to slide back to a more regional focus. But, for Dilma, defining an effective strategy may take more time and effort than many have yet considered.
The Road Ahead
Following the election, Dilma expressed her immense gratitude to Lula for his help during her campaign. She suggested that she will continue to consult and depend upon him. But Lula’s advice may turn out to be more of a burden than a blessing. In the recent past, former Brazilian President Itamar Franco [1992–1994] created problems for his successor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso. That is why a former president’s “exile” to diplomatic service is so appealing.
Lula is too central and active a participant in recent Brazilian history to simply become a mute observer. Already he is speaking of a Constituent Assembly next year. Perhaps that will work. After the death of Néstor Kirchner, some mentioned the possibility of him becoming the new Secretary-General of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). He rejected that, much as Chávez might have liked Brazil under the aegis of Venezuela. The possibility of a future UN role remains.
In the meantime, Lula is staying. Having Brazil successfully develop at a high rate, more equally and more democratically, and with a PT dominant position, is what he cares about.
Alto Representante do Mercosul -- quem é, o que faz, ou pode fazer...
Alto representante, em parte também auto-representante, pela natureza da personalidade -- na pessoa do Embaixador, ex-Seceretário-Geral do Itamaraty e ex-Ministro de Assuntos Estratégicos, Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães --, que todos conhecem, pelo menos os que se interessam pelas relações internacionais e a política externa do Brasil, mas também pela cultura, pela economia, pelo desenvolvimento, enfim, por vários aspectos da nacionalidade. Dispensa, assim, apresentações mais enfáticas, bastando transcrever suas atribuições, segundo a decisão tomada na reunião de cúpula do Mercosul de dezembro de 2010, mas também se pode ter certeza de que o personagem em questão fará, ou pelo menos tentará fazer, muito mais do que suas atribuições formais.
Ele faz parte da "biografia", ou do itinerário do Mercosul, para o bem e para outras coisas também, sendo de se esperar que promova o bloco, o fortaleça, ou que pelo menos contribua para que ele cumpra -- o que até agora não foi o caso -- com o que está estipulado no artigo 1ro. do Tratado de Assunção, aquele que diz que os quatro países membros funcionarão como mercado comum a partir de 1ro de janeiro de 1995 (ops, estamos um pouco atrasados na tarefa...).
Bem, seja como for, a intenção é cumprir o estipulado no tratado e seus anexos, protocolos, penduricalhos, whatever...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
MERCOSUL/CMC/DEC. N° 63/10
O CONSELHO DO MERCADO COMUM DECIDE:
Art. 1 – Criar o Alto Representante-Geral do MERCOSUL como órgão do Conselho do Mercado Comum (CMC)
Art. 2 – O Alto Representante-Geral será uma personalidade política destacada, nacional de um dos Estados Partes, com reconhecida experiência em temas de integração.
Art. 3 – Será designado pelo Conselho do Mercado Comum para um período de 3 (três) anos. Seu mandato poderá ser prorrogado por igual período, uma única vez.
Art. 5 – A designação do Alto Representante-Geral do MERCOSUL respeitará o princípio da rotação de nacionalidades.
Art. 6 – O Alto Representante-Geral do MERCOSUL deverá reportar-se ao CMC.
Art. 7 – O Alto Representante-Geral e os Coordenadores Nacionais do GMC deverão reunir-se, pelo menos duas vezes em cada semestre, com o objetivo de assegurar uma estreita coordenação de atividades.
Art. 8 – São atribuições do Alto Representante-Geral do MERCOSUL:
a) Apresentar propostas , relacionadas com as seguintes áreas:
- saúde, educação, justiça, cultura, emprego e seguridade social, habitação, desenvolvimento urbano, agricultura familiar, gênero, combate à pobreza e à desigualdade;
- cidadania do MERCOSUL;
- identidade cultural do MERCOSUL;
- facilitação de atividades empresariais;
- promoção comercial conjunta dos Estados do MERCOSUL;
- promoção do MERCOSUL como área de recepção de investimentos extra-zona;
- missões de observação eleitoral;
- cooperação para o desenvolvimento.
b) Assessorar o CMC, no tratamento de temas do processo de integração, em todas as suas áreas.
c) Coordenar os trabalhos do Plano de Ação para o Estatuto da Cidadania do MERCOSUL.
d) Impulsionar iniciativas para a divulgação do MERCOSUL.
e) Representar o MERCOSUL, por mandato expresso do Conselho do Mercado Comum nas:
I. relações com terceiros países, grupos de países e organismos internacionais;
II. organismos internacionais junto aos quais o MERCOSUL tenha status de observador e
III. reuniões e foros internacionais nos quais o MERCOSUL considere conveniente participar por meio de uma representação comum.
f) Participar, como convidado, em eventos e seminários que tratem de temas de interesse do MERCOSUL , informando o CMC sobre sua participação.
g) Contribuir para a coordenação das ações dos órgãos da estrutura institucional do MERCOSUL.
h) Manter diálogo com outros órgãos do MERCOSUL, como o Parlamento, o Foro de Consulta e Concertação Política, o Foro Consultivo Econÿmico-Social e o Foro Consultivo de Municípios, Estados Federados, Províncias e Departamentos do MERCOSUL.
i) Coordenar as missões de observação eleitoral solicitadas ao MERCOSUL e a realização de atividades e estudos vinculados à consolidação da democracia na região.
j) Coordenar com o GMC a organização de missões conjuntas de promoção comercial e/ou de investimentos.
l) Participar, como convidado, das reuniões do CMC e das reuniões do GMC.
m) Elaborar e apresentar seu orçamento anual ao GMC.
Art. 9 – O Alto Representante-Geral do MERCOSUL apresentará ao Conselho do Mercado Comum programa anual de atividades. Deverá apresentar ao CMC relatórios semestrais de suas atividades.
Art. 11 – O Alto Representante-Geral do MERCOSUL será assessorado por funcionários diplomáticos designados pelos Estados Partes e por um Gabinete administrativo, que terá sede em Montevidéu.
Art. 12 – O Gabinete será composto por um Chefe de Gabinete e por funcionários contratados por concurso.
Art. 13 – O Alto Representante-Geral contará com o apoio da Secretaria do MERCOSUL (SM) para a realização de todas as tarefas previstas na presente Decisão.
O Alto Representante-Geral poderá solicitar ao Setor de Assessoria Técnica da SM a elaboração de estudos e relatórios relativos à presente Decisão.
Art. 14 – A Unidade de Apoio à Participação Social (UPS), funcionará no âmbito do Alto Representante-Geral e coordenará suas atividades com o Instituto Social do MERCOSUL.
Art. 16 – O Alto Representante-Geral e seu Gabinete, bem como a Unidade de Apoio à Participação Social, contarão com orçamento próprio.
Art. 17 – O orçamento do Alto Representante será constituído por contribuições anuais, distribuídas segundo as seguintes porcentagens:
Argentina: 25%
Brasil: 50%
Uruguai: 15%
Paraguai: 10%
Art. 18 – O Alto Representante-Geral elaborará, em consulta com o GMC, projeto de orçamento para o ano de 2012. O orçamento, que incluirá a estrutura de pessoal, os gastos de instalação e de funcionamento, será aprovado pelo GMC.
Até a data de entrada em vigor da presente Decisão e de início da execução do primeiro orçamento, a pessoa designada para o cargo de Alto Representante-Geral do MERCOSUL exercerá suas funções de maneira transitória, cabendo ao Estado Parte de que seja nacional a provisão dos recursos financeiros necessários para o desempenho de suas tarefas.
Art. 20 – O Conselho do Mercado Comum toma nota da decisão do Governo da República Oriental do Uruguai de outorgar ao Alto Representante-Geral as mesmas prerrogativas concedidas aos Chefes de Missão das Representações Permanentes junto a Organismos Internacionais, como inviolabilidade pessoal, imunidades, privilégios, franquias e isenções tributárias. Essas prerrogativas se estenderão aos membros economicamente dependentes de sua família.
Art. 22 – Esta Decisão necessita ser incorporada ao ordenamento jurídico dos Estados Partes. Esta incorporação deverá ser feita antes de 31/XII/2011.
XL CMC – Foz do Iguaçu, 16/XII/10.
Ele faz parte da "biografia", ou do itinerário do Mercosul, para o bem e para outras coisas também, sendo de se esperar que promova o bloco, o fortaleça, ou que pelo menos contribua para que ele cumpra -- o que até agora não foi o caso -- com o que está estipulado no artigo 1ro. do Tratado de Assunção, aquele que diz que os quatro países membros funcionarão como mercado comum a partir de 1ro de janeiro de 1995 (ops, estamos um pouco atrasados na tarefa...).
Bem, seja como for, a intenção é cumprir o estipulado no tratado e seus anexos, protocolos, penduricalhos, whatever...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
MERCOSUL/CMC/DEC. N° 63/10
O CONSELHO DO MERCADO COMUM DECIDE:
Art. 1 – Criar o Alto Representante-Geral do MERCOSUL como órgão do Conselho do Mercado Comum (CMC)
Art. 2 – O Alto Representante-Geral será uma personalidade política destacada, nacional de um dos Estados Partes, com reconhecida experiência em temas de integração.
Art. 3 – Será designado pelo Conselho do Mercado Comum para um período de 3 (três) anos. Seu mandato poderá ser prorrogado por igual período, uma única vez.
Art. 5 – A designação do Alto Representante-Geral do MERCOSUL respeitará o princípio da rotação de nacionalidades.
Art. 6 – O Alto Representante-Geral do MERCOSUL deverá reportar-se ao CMC.
Art. 7 – O Alto Representante-Geral e os Coordenadores Nacionais do GMC deverão reunir-se, pelo menos duas vezes em cada semestre, com o objetivo de assegurar uma estreita coordenação de atividades.
Art. 8 – São atribuições do Alto Representante-Geral do MERCOSUL:
a) Apresentar propostas , relacionadas com as seguintes áreas:
- saúde, educação, justiça, cultura, emprego e seguridade social, habitação, desenvolvimento urbano, agricultura familiar, gênero, combate à pobreza e à desigualdade;
- cidadania do MERCOSUL;
- identidade cultural do MERCOSUL;
- facilitação de atividades empresariais;
- promoção comercial conjunta dos Estados do MERCOSUL;
- promoção do MERCOSUL como área de recepção de investimentos extra-zona;
- missões de observação eleitoral;
- cooperação para o desenvolvimento.
b) Assessorar o CMC, no tratamento de temas do processo de integração, em todas as suas áreas.
c) Coordenar os trabalhos do Plano de Ação para o Estatuto da Cidadania do MERCOSUL.
d) Impulsionar iniciativas para a divulgação do MERCOSUL.
e) Representar o MERCOSUL, por mandato expresso do Conselho do Mercado Comum nas:
I. relações com terceiros países, grupos de países e organismos internacionais;
II. organismos internacionais junto aos quais o MERCOSUL tenha status de observador e
III. reuniões e foros internacionais nos quais o MERCOSUL considere conveniente participar por meio de uma representação comum.
f) Participar, como convidado, em eventos e seminários que tratem de temas de interesse do MERCOSUL , informando o CMC sobre sua participação.
g) Contribuir para a coordenação das ações dos órgãos da estrutura institucional do MERCOSUL.
h) Manter diálogo com outros órgãos do MERCOSUL, como o Parlamento, o Foro de Consulta e Concertação Política, o Foro Consultivo Econÿmico-Social e o Foro Consultivo de Municípios, Estados Federados, Províncias e Departamentos do MERCOSUL.
i) Coordenar as missões de observação eleitoral solicitadas ao MERCOSUL e a realização de atividades e estudos vinculados à consolidação da democracia na região.
j) Coordenar com o GMC a organização de missões conjuntas de promoção comercial e/ou de investimentos.
l) Participar, como convidado, das reuniões do CMC e das reuniões do GMC.
m) Elaborar e apresentar seu orçamento anual ao GMC.
Art. 9 – O Alto Representante-Geral do MERCOSUL apresentará ao Conselho do Mercado Comum programa anual de atividades. Deverá apresentar ao CMC relatórios semestrais de suas atividades.
Art. 11 – O Alto Representante-Geral do MERCOSUL será assessorado por funcionários diplomáticos designados pelos Estados Partes e por um Gabinete administrativo, que terá sede em Montevidéu.
Art. 12 – O Gabinete será composto por um Chefe de Gabinete e por funcionários contratados por concurso.
Art. 13 – O Alto Representante-Geral contará com o apoio da Secretaria do MERCOSUL (SM) para a realização de todas as tarefas previstas na presente Decisão.
O Alto Representante-Geral poderá solicitar ao Setor de Assessoria Técnica da SM a elaboração de estudos e relatórios relativos à presente Decisão.
Art. 14 – A Unidade de Apoio à Participação Social (UPS), funcionará no âmbito do Alto Representante-Geral e coordenará suas atividades com o Instituto Social do MERCOSUL.
Art. 16 – O Alto Representante-Geral e seu Gabinete, bem como a Unidade de Apoio à Participação Social, contarão com orçamento próprio.
Art. 17 – O orçamento do Alto Representante será constituído por contribuições anuais, distribuídas segundo as seguintes porcentagens:
Argentina: 25%
Brasil: 50%
Uruguai: 15%
Paraguai: 10%
Art. 18 – O Alto Representante-Geral elaborará, em consulta com o GMC, projeto de orçamento para o ano de 2012. O orçamento, que incluirá a estrutura de pessoal, os gastos de instalação e de funcionamento, será aprovado pelo GMC.
Até a data de entrada em vigor da presente Decisão e de início da execução do primeiro orçamento, a pessoa designada para o cargo de Alto Representante-Geral do MERCOSUL exercerá suas funções de maneira transitória, cabendo ao Estado Parte de que seja nacional a provisão dos recursos financeiros necessários para o desempenho de suas tarefas.
Art. 20 – O Conselho do Mercado Comum toma nota da decisão do Governo da República Oriental do Uruguai de outorgar ao Alto Representante-Geral as mesmas prerrogativas concedidas aos Chefes de Missão das Representações Permanentes junto a Organismos Internacionais, como inviolabilidade pessoal, imunidades, privilégios, franquias e isenções tributárias. Essas prerrogativas se estenderão aos membros economicamente dependentes de sua família.
Art. 22 – Esta Decisão necessita ser incorporada ao ordenamento jurídico dos Estados Partes. Esta incorporação deverá ser feita antes de 31/XII/2011.
XL CMC – Foz do Iguaçu, 16/XII/10.
A frase do ano, do seculo, de toda uma historia economica
“Argentina destruye por el día lo que la naturaleza crea por la noche”.
Eduardo Frei, chileno, candidato presidencial en 2010 pela Concertación Democrática, em reunião privada com Arturo Valenzuela, Sunsecretário de Estado para o Hemisfério do Departamento de Estado, em relato da embaixada dos EUA em Santiago, de 12 de janeiro de 2010, "capturado" pelo Wikileaks.
A Argentina realmente é um caso extraordinário, de destruição self-applied, de inacreditável desmantelamento da riqueza pelas mãos incompetentes de seus políticos (e militares).
Outra frase memorável do economista historiador Simon Kuznetz:
"Existem duas coisas que a história econômica não consegue explicar: o sucesso do Japão e o fracasso da Argentina."
Tudo está dito...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Eduardo Frei, chileno, candidato presidencial en 2010 pela Concertación Democrática, em reunião privada com Arturo Valenzuela, Sunsecretário de Estado para o Hemisfério do Departamento de Estado, em relato da embaixada dos EUA em Santiago, de 12 de janeiro de 2010, "capturado" pelo Wikileaks.
A Argentina realmente é um caso extraordinário, de destruição self-applied, de inacreditável desmantelamento da riqueza pelas mãos incompetentes de seus políticos (e militares).
Outra frase memorável do economista historiador Simon Kuznetz:
"Existem duas coisas que a história econômica não consegue explicar: o sucesso do Japão e o fracasso da Argentina."
Tudo está dito...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
quarta-feira, 26 de janeiro de 2011
Wikileaks-Chile-Argentina: vamos sentir falta da sinceridade...
Bem, um dia isso tudo vai terminar...
Vai acabar nossa alegria, e vão acabar as preocupações de muitos.
Embora ainda tenha um bocado de coisa para sair, dos 250 mil "telegramas" desviados, isso um dia acaba, para alívio de muitos na diplomacia, e não apenas americana, e também para desconforto dos jornalistas, que vão perder uma mina a céu aberto e vão precisar trabalhar duramente, de novo.
Até agora, eles estavam se acostumando mal: chovendo indiscrições em suas mesas, o único trabalho era fazer alguns comentários banais e soltar o material, quase sem esforço...
Como escrevi em um recente trabalho, o Wikileaks é o inferno dos diplomatas, um tesouro para os jornalistas e um perfeito limbo para os historiadores.
Como sempre, as informações abaixo podem ser constrangedoras para uns e outros (e outras), mas depois dos primeiros (talvez últimos) sorrisos amarelos, a vida segue seu curso, ou seja, ninguém mais vai falar nada de nada com os americanos (mas isso deve contaminar outros serviços diplomáticos também).
Meu artigo sobre o Wikileaks é este aqui:
Wikileaks: verso e reverso
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Mundorama, 14.01.2011
Divirtam-se...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Michelle Bachelet: “Argentina tiene problemas de credibilidad como país”
El País, 25/01/11
Madrid – Habló sin pelos en la lengua. En un almuerzo celebrado con el máximo responsable para América Latina de Estados Unidos, Arturo Valenzuela, la entonces presidenta de Chile expresó su visión sobre los líderes del continente sin ningún tapujo. Fue el 12 de enero de 2010 en el palacio presidencial de La Moneda. Tres días después, el embajador de EE UU en Chile, Paul Simons, enviaba su informe a Washington. Argentina, según Bachelet, tiene problemas de “credibilidad como país”. “Su democracia no es robusta y sus instituciones no son fuertes. Tiende a vivir de crisis en crisis, en vez de perseguir políticas estables”, indicó.
El subsecretario de Exteriores, Ángel Flisfisch, presente en la reunión, añadió que el “inusual sistema federal” de Argentina y la ideología peronista, que “pueden llevar a la paranoia política, suman obstáculos a la estabilidad”.Eduardo Frei, el candidato presidencial en 2010 por la Concertación, se expresaba en parecidos términos en otra reunión privada con Arturo Valenzuela por las mismas fechas: “Argentina destruye por el día lo que la naturaleza crea por la noche”.
Respecto a la presidenta, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, Bachelet añadió que condensaba en su persona los problemas de Argentina. “Kirchner no es anti-Estados Unidos, pero está convencida de que el maletinazo de 2007 [el empresario venezolano-estadounidense Guido Alejandro Antonini Wilson fue sorprendido en el aeropuertode Buenos Aires con un maletín con 800.000 dólares para financiar presuntamente la campaña de Cristina Kirchner] fue tramado contra ella y no admitirá pruebas que la contradigan”. “Kirchner tiende a creer los rumores y los artículos calumniosos de prensa y tiene tendencia a hacer comentarios desafortunados en público”, añadió.
El interlocutor de la ex presidenta en aquel almuerzo era y sigue siendo el máximo representante para América Latina de la Administración Obama. Valenzuela nació en Chile en 1944 y emigró a Estados Unidos con 16 años. Michelle Bachelet parecía expresarse con plena confianza frente a su antiguo compatriota.
Respecto a Brasil, la ex presidenta indicó que aunque la prensa retrata a este país como un importante mediador regional, “no ejerce un papel importante en la mayoría de los temas regionales”. Brasil está más interesado en desempeñar una función importante en la escena mundial en temas como el cambio climático y la no proliferación de armamento nuclear, según Bachelet. Para ella,Lula es “un zorro político, inteligente y encantador”. Y la entonces candidata presidencialbrasileña Dilma Rousef era vista como “distante y formal”.
La ex presidenta y máxima responsable de ONU Mujeres insistió en la necesidad de no dejarse llevar por los estereotipos de países populistas o prooccidentales y fijarse en los matices de cada líder latinoamericano. Insistió en que el boliviano Evo Morales es “muy diferente” del venezolano Hugo Chávez y añadió que Morales había sido elegido de forma limpia. Se mostró especialmente elogiosa con el ministro de Exteriores boliviano, David Choquehuanca, de quien destacó que es “sereno y capaz” y mejor preparado que otros líderes bolivianos. Señaló que es importante tener en cuenta las diferencias culturales para comprender a Bolivia. Hablando con Bachelet sobre crecimiento económico, Choquehuanca se mostró más interesado en la “calidad de vida que en el desarrollo económico como objetivo en sí mismo”.
En cuanto a la situación doméstica, Bachelet mostró su preocupación ante la “tremenda concentración de poder” que podría acaparar el multimillonario Sebastián Piñera si alcanzase la presidencia, cosa que ocurriría en menos de dos meses. La ex presidenta expresó también su preocupación por el “sensacionalismo” de la prensa chilena y los prejuicios contra la Concertación, la formación de centro-izquierda que gobernó el país durante 20 años. Cada vez que el entonces candidato presidencial Eduardo Frei hablaba del conflicto de intereses que podría producirse con Piñera como presidente, la prensa conservadora lo tachaba de “guerra sucia”, según Bachelet.
La Embajada de Estados Unidos miraba con muy buenos ojos a Bachelet. Con motivo de un viaje a Washington en junio de 2009 en el que Bachelet se iba a entrevistar con Barack Obama, el embajador Simons presentó unas credenciales inmejorables sobre ella. El viaje era visto como la oportunidad para “ensanchar y profundizar la relación con una de las más exitosas democracias del hemisferio”. El diplomático elogió los logros del ministro de Economía, Andrés Velasco, por responder de forma eficiente a la crisis financiera mundial. “A pesar de su éxito económico, Bachelet observa su legado, sobre todo en la esfera social. Sus iniciativas han expandido el esquema de pensiones privadas a la población de ingresos más bajos, ha ofrecido cuidados gratis para los niños y nutrición básica para familias de bajos ingresos, ha expandido el acceso a la sanidad y fortalecido la educación pública”. Y aún hay más: “Gracias al crecimiento económico y a las medidas puestas en marcha, la pobreza ha caído desde el 40% de la población en 1990 al 14% en 2006″.
Dos meses después del encuentro con Obama, en agosto de 2009, con motivo de la visita a Chile del general Douglas Fraser, el embajador en Santiago enviaba otro cable a Washington en el que elogiaba la política internacional de Bachelet, pero recordaba: “El pasado otoño, durante la Asamblea General de la ONU, Bachelet dijo que Estados Unidos y Chile son ‘amigos políticos, pero no amigos incondicionales’ y criticó a Estados Unidos por su papel en precipitar la crisis financiera”.
No obstante, el diplomático recordó: “En los últimos tres meses Chile ha desempeñado un papel constructivo en la entrada con condiciones de Cuba en la Organización de Estados Americanos, en el conflicto de Honduras y en rebajar la retórica que surgió contra los acuerdos militares de cooperación entre Colombia y Estados Unidos”. En ese último aspecto, al que Venezuela se opuso de lleno, Bachelet desempeñó un trabajo tan eficaz como discreto, según Estados Unidos: “Chile no se siente cómodo con la retórica y las acciones populistas del presidente Hugo Chávez, pero ha preferido trabajar calladamente detrás de la escena para conseguir una moderada influencia antes que rebatir en público sus declaraciones más descabelladas”.
Vai acabar nossa alegria, e vão acabar as preocupações de muitos.
Embora ainda tenha um bocado de coisa para sair, dos 250 mil "telegramas" desviados, isso um dia acaba, para alívio de muitos na diplomacia, e não apenas americana, e também para desconforto dos jornalistas, que vão perder uma mina a céu aberto e vão precisar trabalhar duramente, de novo.
Até agora, eles estavam se acostumando mal: chovendo indiscrições em suas mesas, o único trabalho era fazer alguns comentários banais e soltar o material, quase sem esforço...
Como escrevi em um recente trabalho, o Wikileaks é o inferno dos diplomatas, um tesouro para os jornalistas e um perfeito limbo para os historiadores.
Como sempre, as informações abaixo podem ser constrangedoras para uns e outros (e outras), mas depois dos primeiros (talvez últimos) sorrisos amarelos, a vida segue seu curso, ou seja, ninguém mais vai falar nada de nada com os americanos (mas isso deve contaminar outros serviços diplomáticos também).
Meu artigo sobre o Wikileaks é este aqui:
Wikileaks: verso e reverso
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Mundorama, 14.01.2011
Divirtam-se...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Michelle Bachelet: “Argentina tiene problemas de credibilidad como país”
El País, 25/01/11
Madrid – Habló sin pelos en la lengua. En un almuerzo celebrado con el máximo responsable para América Latina de Estados Unidos, Arturo Valenzuela, la entonces presidenta de Chile expresó su visión sobre los líderes del continente sin ningún tapujo. Fue el 12 de enero de 2010 en el palacio presidencial de La Moneda. Tres días después, el embajador de EE UU en Chile, Paul Simons, enviaba su informe a Washington. Argentina, según Bachelet, tiene problemas de “credibilidad como país”. “Su democracia no es robusta y sus instituciones no son fuertes. Tiende a vivir de crisis en crisis, en vez de perseguir políticas estables”, indicó.
El subsecretario de Exteriores, Ángel Flisfisch, presente en la reunión, añadió que el “inusual sistema federal” de Argentina y la ideología peronista, que “pueden llevar a la paranoia política, suman obstáculos a la estabilidad”.Eduardo Frei, el candidato presidencial en 2010 por la Concertación, se expresaba en parecidos términos en otra reunión privada con Arturo Valenzuela por las mismas fechas: “Argentina destruye por el día lo que la naturaleza crea por la noche”.
Respecto a la presidenta, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, Bachelet añadió que condensaba en su persona los problemas de Argentina. “Kirchner no es anti-Estados Unidos, pero está convencida de que el maletinazo de 2007 [el empresario venezolano-estadounidense Guido Alejandro Antonini Wilson fue sorprendido en el aeropuertode Buenos Aires con un maletín con 800.000 dólares para financiar presuntamente la campaña de Cristina Kirchner] fue tramado contra ella y no admitirá pruebas que la contradigan”. “Kirchner tiende a creer los rumores y los artículos calumniosos de prensa y tiene tendencia a hacer comentarios desafortunados en público”, añadió.
El interlocutor de la ex presidenta en aquel almuerzo era y sigue siendo el máximo representante para América Latina de la Administración Obama. Valenzuela nació en Chile en 1944 y emigró a Estados Unidos con 16 años. Michelle Bachelet parecía expresarse con plena confianza frente a su antiguo compatriota.
Respecto a Brasil, la ex presidenta indicó que aunque la prensa retrata a este país como un importante mediador regional, “no ejerce un papel importante en la mayoría de los temas regionales”. Brasil está más interesado en desempeñar una función importante en la escena mundial en temas como el cambio climático y la no proliferación de armamento nuclear, según Bachelet. Para ella,Lula es “un zorro político, inteligente y encantador”. Y la entonces candidata presidencialbrasileña Dilma Rousef era vista como “distante y formal”.
La ex presidenta y máxima responsable de ONU Mujeres insistió en la necesidad de no dejarse llevar por los estereotipos de países populistas o prooccidentales y fijarse en los matices de cada líder latinoamericano. Insistió en que el boliviano Evo Morales es “muy diferente” del venezolano Hugo Chávez y añadió que Morales había sido elegido de forma limpia. Se mostró especialmente elogiosa con el ministro de Exteriores boliviano, David Choquehuanca, de quien destacó que es “sereno y capaz” y mejor preparado que otros líderes bolivianos. Señaló que es importante tener en cuenta las diferencias culturales para comprender a Bolivia. Hablando con Bachelet sobre crecimiento económico, Choquehuanca se mostró más interesado en la “calidad de vida que en el desarrollo económico como objetivo en sí mismo”.
En cuanto a la situación doméstica, Bachelet mostró su preocupación ante la “tremenda concentración de poder” que podría acaparar el multimillonario Sebastián Piñera si alcanzase la presidencia, cosa que ocurriría en menos de dos meses. La ex presidenta expresó también su preocupación por el “sensacionalismo” de la prensa chilena y los prejuicios contra la Concertación, la formación de centro-izquierda que gobernó el país durante 20 años. Cada vez que el entonces candidato presidencial Eduardo Frei hablaba del conflicto de intereses que podría producirse con Piñera como presidente, la prensa conservadora lo tachaba de “guerra sucia”, según Bachelet.
La Embajada de Estados Unidos miraba con muy buenos ojos a Bachelet. Con motivo de un viaje a Washington en junio de 2009 en el que Bachelet se iba a entrevistar con Barack Obama, el embajador Simons presentó unas credenciales inmejorables sobre ella. El viaje era visto como la oportunidad para “ensanchar y profundizar la relación con una de las más exitosas democracias del hemisferio”. El diplomático elogió los logros del ministro de Economía, Andrés Velasco, por responder de forma eficiente a la crisis financiera mundial. “A pesar de su éxito económico, Bachelet observa su legado, sobre todo en la esfera social. Sus iniciativas han expandido el esquema de pensiones privadas a la población de ingresos más bajos, ha ofrecido cuidados gratis para los niños y nutrición básica para familias de bajos ingresos, ha expandido el acceso a la sanidad y fortalecido la educación pública”. Y aún hay más: “Gracias al crecimiento económico y a las medidas puestas en marcha, la pobreza ha caído desde el 40% de la población en 1990 al 14% en 2006″.
Dos meses después del encuentro con Obama, en agosto de 2009, con motivo de la visita a Chile del general Douglas Fraser, el embajador en Santiago enviaba otro cable a Washington en el que elogiaba la política internacional de Bachelet, pero recordaba: “El pasado otoño, durante la Asamblea General de la ONU, Bachelet dijo que Estados Unidos y Chile son ‘amigos políticos, pero no amigos incondicionales’ y criticó a Estados Unidos por su papel en precipitar la crisis financiera”.
No obstante, el diplomático recordó: “En los últimos tres meses Chile ha desempeñado un papel constructivo en la entrada con condiciones de Cuba en la Organización de Estados Americanos, en el conflicto de Honduras y en rebajar la retórica que surgió contra los acuerdos militares de cooperación entre Colombia y Estados Unidos”. En ese último aspecto, al que Venezuela se opuso de lleno, Bachelet desempeñó un trabajo tan eficaz como discreto, según Estados Unidos: “Chile no se siente cómodo con la retórica y las acciones populistas del presidente Hugo Chávez, pero ha preferido trabajar calladamente detrás de la escena para conseguir una moderada influencia antes que rebatir en público sus declaraciones más descabelladas”.
Nao existe Fim da Historia - Ludwig von Mises
There Is No End to History, No Perfect Existence
by Ludwig von Mises
Mise Daily, January 26, 2011
[Excerpted from chapter 16 of Theory and History (1957). An audio version of this article, excerpted from the forthcoming audiobook version, read by John Pruden, is available as a free MP3 download.]
All doctrines that have sought to discover in the course of human history some definite trend in the sequence of changes have disagreed, in reference to the past, with the historically established facts and where they tried to predict the future have been spectacularly proved wrong by later events.
Most of these doctrines were characterized by reference to a state of perfection in human affairs. They placed this perfect state either at the beginning of history or at its end or at both its beginning and its end. Consequently, history appeared in their interpretation as a progressive deterioration or a progressive improvement or as a period of progressive deterioration to be followed by one of progressive improvement. With some of these doctrines the idea of a perfect state was rooted in religious beliefs and dogmas. However, it is not the task of secular science to enter into an analysis of these theological aspects of the matter.
It is obvious that in a perfect state of human affairs there cannot be any history. History is the record of changes. But the very concept of perfection implies the absence of any change, as a perfect state can only be transformed into a less perfect state — i.e., can only be impaired by any alteration. If one places the state of perfection only at the supposed beginning of history, one asserts that the age of history was preceded by an age in which there was no history and that one day some events which disturbed the perfection of this original age inaugurated the age of history. If one assumes that history tends toward the realization of a perfect state, one asserts that history will one day come to an end.
It is man's nature to strive ceaselessly after the substitution of more satisfactory conditions for less satisfactory. This motive stimulates his mental energies and prompts him to act. Life in a perfect frame would reduce man to a purely vegetative existence.
History did not begin with a golden age. The conditions under which primitive man lived appear in the eyes of later ages rather unsatisfactory. He was surrounded by innumerable dangers that do not threaten civilized man at all, or at least not to the same degree. Compared with later generations, he was extremely poor and barbaric. He would have been delighted if opportunity had been given to him to take advantage of any of the achievements of our age, as for instance the methods of healing wounds.
Neither can mankind ever reach a state of perfection. The idea that a state of aimlessness and indifference is desirable and the most happy condition that mankind could ever attain permeates utopian literature. The authors of these plans depict a society in which no further changes are required because everything has reached the best possible form.
In utopia there will no longer be any reason to strive for improvement, because everything is already perfect; history has been brought to a close. Henceforth, all people will be thoroughly happy.[1] It never occurred to one of these writers that those whom they were eager to benefit by the reform might have different opinions about what is desirable and what not.
A new sophisticated version of the image of the perfect society has arisen lately out of a crass misinterpretation of the procedure of economics. In order to deal with the effects of changes in the market situation, the endeavors to adjust production to these changes, and the phenomena of profit and loss, the economist constructs the image of a hypothetical, although unattainable, state of affairs in which production is always fully adjusted to the realizable wishes of the consumers and no further changes whatever occur.
"It is man's nature to strive ceaselessly."
In this imaginary world tomorrow does not differ from today, no maladjustments can arise, and no need for any entrepreneurial action emerges. The conduct of business does not require any initiative; it is a self-acting process unconsciously performed by automatons impelled by mysterious quasi instincts. There is for economists (and, for that matter, also for laymen discussing economic issues) no other way to conceive what is going on in the real, continually changing world than to contrast it in this way with a fictitious world of stability and absence of change.
But the economists are fully aware that the elaboration of this image of an evenly rotating economy is merely a mental tool that has no counterpart in the real world in which man lives and is called to act. They did not even suspect that anybody could fail to grasp the merely hypothetical and ancillary character of their concept.
Yet some people misunderstood the meaning and significance of this mental tool. In a metaphor borrowed from the theory of mechanics, the mathematical economists call the evenly rotating economy the static state, the conditions prevailing in it equilibrium, and any deviation from equilibrium disequilibrium. This language suggests that there is something vicious in the very fact that there is always disequilibrium in the real economy and that the state of equilibrium never becomes actual.
The merely imagined hypothetical state of undisturbed equilibrium appears as the most desirable state of reality. In this sense some authors call competition as it prevails in the changing economy imperfect competition. The truth is that competition can exist only in a changing economy. Its function is precisely to wipe out disequilibrium and to generate a tendency toward the attainment of equilibrium. There cannot be any competition in a state of static equilibrium because in such a state there is no point at which a competitor could interfere in order to perform something that satisfies the consumers better than what is already performed anyway.
The very definition of equilibrium implies that there is no maladjustment anywhere in the economic system, and consequently no need for any action to wipe out maladjustments, no entrepreneurial activity, no entrepreneurial profits and losses. It is precisely the absence of the profits that prompts mathematical economists to consider the state of undisturbed static equilibrium as the ideal state, for they are inspired by the prepossession that entrepreneurs are useless parasites and profits are unfair lucre.
The equilibrium enthusiasts are also deluded by ambiguous thymological connotations of the term "equilibrium," which of course have no reference whatever to the way in which economics employs the imaginary construction of a state of equilibrium. The popular notion of a man's mental equilibrium is vague and cannot be particularized without including arbitrary judgments of value. All that can be said about such a state of mental or moral equilibrium is that it cannot prompt a man toward any action. For action presupposes some uneasiness felt, as its only aim can be the removal of uneasiness.
The analogy with the state of perfection is obvious. The fully satisfied individual is purposeless, he does not act, he has no incentive to think, he spends his days in leisurely enjoyment of life. Whether such a fairy-like existence is desirable may be left undecided. It is certain that living men can never attain such a state of perfection and equilibrium.
It is no less certain that, sorely tried by the imperfections of real life, people will dream of such a thorough fulfillment of all their wishes. This explains the sources of the emotional praise of equilibrium and condemnation of disequilibrium.
However, economists must not confuse this thymological notion of equilibrium with the use of the imaginary construction of a static economy. The only service that this imaginary construction renders is to set off in sharp relief the ceaseless striving of living and acting men after the best possible improvement of their conditions. There is for the unaffected scientific observer nothing objectionable in his description of disequilibrium. It is only the passionate prosocialist zeal of mathematical pseudoeconomists that transforms a purely analytical tool of logical economics into an utopian image of the good and most desirable state of affairs.
Ludwig von Mises was the acknowledged leader of the Austrian School of economic thought, a prodigious originator in economic theory, and a prolific author. Mises's writings and lectures encompassed economic theory, history, epistemology, government, and political philosophy. His contributions to economic theory include important clarifications on the quantity theory of money, the theory of the trade cycle, the integration of monetary theory with economic theory in general, and a demonstration that socialism must fail because it cannot solve the problem of economic calculation. Mises was the first scholar to recognize that economics is part of a larger science in human action, a science that Mises called "praxeology." See Ludwig von Mises's article archives.
This article is excerpted from chapter 16 of Theory and History (1957). An audio version of this article, excerpted from the forthcoming audiobook version, read by John Pruden, is available as a free MP3 download.
Notes:
[1] In this sense Karl Marx too must be called a utopian. He too aimed at a state of affairs in which history will come to a standstill. For history is, in the scheme of Marx, the history of class struggles. Once classes and the class struggle are abolished, there can no longer be any history. It is true that the Communist Manifesto merely declares that the history of all hitherto existing society, or, as Engels later added, more precisely, the history after the dissolution of the golden age of primeval communism, is the history of class struggles and thus does not exclude the interpretation that after the establishment of the socialist millennium some new content of history could emerge.
But the other writings of Marx, Engels, and their disciples do not provide any indication that such a new type of historical changes, radically different in nature from those of the preceding ages of class struggles, could possibly come into being. What further changes can be expected once the higher phase of communism is attained, in which everybody gets all he needs? — The distinction that Marx made between his own "scientific" socialism and the socialist plans of older authors whom he branded as utopians refers not only to the nature and organization of the socialist commonwealth but also to the way in which this commonwealth is supposed to come into existence. Those whom Marx disparaged as utopians constructed the design of a socialist paradise and tried to convince people that its realization is highly desirable.
Marx rejected this procedure. He pretended to have discovered the law of historical evolution according to which the coming of socialism is inevitable. He saw the shortcomings of the utopian socialists, their utopian character, in the fact that they expected the coming of socialism from the will of people — i.e., their conscious action — while his own scientific socialism asserted that socialism will come, independently of the will of men, by the evolution of the material productive forces.
by Ludwig von Mises
Mise Daily, January 26, 2011
[Excerpted from chapter 16 of Theory and History (1957). An audio version of this article, excerpted from the forthcoming audiobook version, read by John Pruden, is available as a free MP3 download.]
All doctrines that have sought to discover in the course of human history some definite trend in the sequence of changes have disagreed, in reference to the past, with the historically established facts and where they tried to predict the future have been spectacularly proved wrong by later events.
Most of these doctrines were characterized by reference to a state of perfection in human affairs. They placed this perfect state either at the beginning of history or at its end or at both its beginning and its end. Consequently, history appeared in their interpretation as a progressive deterioration or a progressive improvement or as a period of progressive deterioration to be followed by one of progressive improvement. With some of these doctrines the idea of a perfect state was rooted in religious beliefs and dogmas. However, it is not the task of secular science to enter into an analysis of these theological aspects of the matter.
It is obvious that in a perfect state of human affairs there cannot be any history. History is the record of changes. But the very concept of perfection implies the absence of any change, as a perfect state can only be transformed into a less perfect state — i.e., can only be impaired by any alteration. If one places the state of perfection only at the supposed beginning of history, one asserts that the age of history was preceded by an age in which there was no history and that one day some events which disturbed the perfection of this original age inaugurated the age of history. If one assumes that history tends toward the realization of a perfect state, one asserts that history will one day come to an end.
It is man's nature to strive ceaselessly after the substitution of more satisfactory conditions for less satisfactory. This motive stimulates his mental energies and prompts him to act. Life in a perfect frame would reduce man to a purely vegetative existence.
History did not begin with a golden age. The conditions under which primitive man lived appear in the eyes of later ages rather unsatisfactory. He was surrounded by innumerable dangers that do not threaten civilized man at all, or at least not to the same degree. Compared with later generations, he was extremely poor and barbaric. He would have been delighted if opportunity had been given to him to take advantage of any of the achievements of our age, as for instance the methods of healing wounds.
Neither can mankind ever reach a state of perfection. The idea that a state of aimlessness and indifference is desirable and the most happy condition that mankind could ever attain permeates utopian literature. The authors of these plans depict a society in which no further changes are required because everything has reached the best possible form.
In utopia there will no longer be any reason to strive for improvement, because everything is already perfect; history has been brought to a close. Henceforth, all people will be thoroughly happy.[1] It never occurred to one of these writers that those whom they were eager to benefit by the reform might have different opinions about what is desirable and what not.
A new sophisticated version of the image of the perfect society has arisen lately out of a crass misinterpretation of the procedure of economics. In order to deal with the effects of changes in the market situation, the endeavors to adjust production to these changes, and the phenomena of profit and loss, the economist constructs the image of a hypothetical, although unattainable, state of affairs in which production is always fully adjusted to the realizable wishes of the consumers and no further changes whatever occur.
"It is man's nature to strive ceaselessly."
In this imaginary world tomorrow does not differ from today, no maladjustments can arise, and no need for any entrepreneurial action emerges. The conduct of business does not require any initiative; it is a self-acting process unconsciously performed by automatons impelled by mysterious quasi instincts. There is for economists (and, for that matter, also for laymen discussing economic issues) no other way to conceive what is going on in the real, continually changing world than to contrast it in this way with a fictitious world of stability and absence of change.
But the economists are fully aware that the elaboration of this image of an evenly rotating economy is merely a mental tool that has no counterpart in the real world in which man lives and is called to act. They did not even suspect that anybody could fail to grasp the merely hypothetical and ancillary character of their concept.
Yet some people misunderstood the meaning and significance of this mental tool. In a metaphor borrowed from the theory of mechanics, the mathematical economists call the evenly rotating economy the static state, the conditions prevailing in it equilibrium, and any deviation from equilibrium disequilibrium. This language suggests that there is something vicious in the very fact that there is always disequilibrium in the real economy and that the state of equilibrium never becomes actual.
The merely imagined hypothetical state of undisturbed equilibrium appears as the most desirable state of reality. In this sense some authors call competition as it prevails in the changing economy imperfect competition. The truth is that competition can exist only in a changing economy. Its function is precisely to wipe out disequilibrium and to generate a tendency toward the attainment of equilibrium. There cannot be any competition in a state of static equilibrium because in such a state there is no point at which a competitor could interfere in order to perform something that satisfies the consumers better than what is already performed anyway.
The very definition of equilibrium implies that there is no maladjustment anywhere in the economic system, and consequently no need for any action to wipe out maladjustments, no entrepreneurial activity, no entrepreneurial profits and losses. It is precisely the absence of the profits that prompts mathematical economists to consider the state of undisturbed static equilibrium as the ideal state, for they are inspired by the prepossession that entrepreneurs are useless parasites and profits are unfair lucre.
The equilibrium enthusiasts are also deluded by ambiguous thymological connotations of the term "equilibrium," which of course have no reference whatever to the way in which economics employs the imaginary construction of a state of equilibrium. The popular notion of a man's mental equilibrium is vague and cannot be particularized without including arbitrary judgments of value. All that can be said about such a state of mental or moral equilibrium is that it cannot prompt a man toward any action. For action presupposes some uneasiness felt, as its only aim can be the removal of uneasiness.
The analogy with the state of perfection is obvious. The fully satisfied individual is purposeless, he does not act, he has no incentive to think, he spends his days in leisurely enjoyment of life. Whether such a fairy-like existence is desirable may be left undecided. It is certain that living men can never attain such a state of perfection and equilibrium.
It is no less certain that, sorely tried by the imperfections of real life, people will dream of such a thorough fulfillment of all their wishes. This explains the sources of the emotional praise of equilibrium and condemnation of disequilibrium.
However, economists must not confuse this thymological notion of equilibrium with the use of the imaginary construction of a static economy. The only service that this imaginary construction renders is to set off in sharp relief the ceaseless striving of living and acting men after the best possible improvement of their conditions. There is for the unaffected scientific observer nothing objectionable in his description of disequilibrium. It is only the passionate prosocialist zeal of mathematical pseudoeconomists that transforms a purely analytical tool of logical economics into an utopian image of the good and most desirable state of affairs.
Ludwig von Mises was the acknowledged leader of the Austrian School of economic thought, a prodigious originator in economic theory, and a prolific author. Mises's writings and lectures encompassed economic theory, history, epistemology, government, and political philosophy. His contributions to economic theory include important clarifications on the quantity theory of money, the theory of the trade cycle, the integration of monetary theory with economic theory in general, and a demonstration that socialism must fail because it cannot solve the problem of economic calculation. Mises was the first scholar to recognize that economics is part of a larger science in human action, a science that Mises called "praxeology." See Ludwig von Mises's article archives.
This article is excerpted from chapter 16 of Theory and History (1957). An audio version of this article, excerpted from the forthcoming audiobook version, read by John Pruden, is available as a free MP3 download.
Notes:
[1] In this sense Karl Marx too must be called a utopian. He too aimed at a state of affairs in which history will come to a standstill. For history is, in the scheme of Marx, the history of class struggles. Once classes and the class struggle are abolished, there can no longer be any history. It is true that the Communist Manifesto merely declares that the history of all hitherto existing society, or, as Engels later added, more precisely, the history after the dissolution of the golden age of primeval communism, is the history of class struggles and thus does not exclude the interpretation that after the establishment of the socialist millennium some new content of history could emerge.
But the other writings of Marx, Engels, and their disciples do not provide any indication that such a new type of historical changes, radically different in nature from those of the preceding ages of class struggles, could possibly come into being. What further changes can be expected once the higher phase of communism is attained, in which everybody gets all he needs? — The distinction that Marx made between his own "scientific" socialism and the socialist plans of older authors whom he branded as utopians refers not only to the nature and organization of the socialist commonwealth but also to the way in which this commonwealth is supposed to come into existence. Those whom Marx disparaged as utopians constructed the design of a socialist paradise and tried to convince people that its realization is highly desirable.
Marx rejected this procedure. He pretended to have discovered the law of historical evolution according to which the coming of socialism is inevitable. He saw the shortcomings of the utopian socialists, their utopian character, in the fact that they expected the coming of socialism from the will of people — i.e., their conscious action — while his own scientific socialism asserted that socialism will come, independently of the will of men, by the evolution of the material productive forces.
A estupidez da semana, talvez do ano: defesa comercial
Retirado de uma matéria sobre a "nova política comercial e industrial" do MDIC, e seu ativismo contra as "importações desnecessárias" (ou seja, aquelas que burocratas assim determinarem, com base em pressões de industriais protecionistas):
Deslealdade
Para o Ministério do Desenvolvimento, considera-se que há prática de dumping quando uma empresa exporta para o Brasil um produto a preço de exportação inferior àquele que pratica para o produto similar nas vendas para o seu mercado interno. Dessa forma, a diferenciação é, por si só, considerada como uma prática desleal de comércio.
Acredito que o governo, este ano, vai contribuir muito para aumentar o PIB, ou seja, a Produção Interna de Bobagens...
Vem mais por aí...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Deslealdade
Para o Ministério do Desenvolvimento, considera-se que há prática de dumping quando uma empresa exporta para o Brasil um produto a preço de exportação inferior àquele que pratica para o produto similar nas vendas para o seu mercado interno. Dessa forma, a diferenciação é, por si só, considerada como uma prática desleal de comércio.
Acredito que o governo, este ano, vai contribuir muito para aumentar o PIB, ou seja, a Produção Interna de Bobagens...
Vem mais por aí...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
O Estado da (des)Uniao: Brasil e EUA comparados
O título é uma evidente ironia com o discurso anual do presidente americano frente ao Congresso, quando ele de certa forma presta contas de suas ações e indica a política a ser seguida dali para a frente, ou pelo menos nos 12 meses seguintes.
Este editorial do Wall Street Journal é especialmente crítico das políticas intervencionistas do presidente Obama e creio que o mesmo poderia ser dito, mutatis mutandis, do Brasil, que tem um Estado, políticos e políticas ainda mais dirigistas e intervencionistas.
Nos dois países -- mas nos EUA a carga fiscal fica apenas em 30% do PIB, quando no Brasil ela já se aproxima de 40%, quando não superou, efetivamente -- os governos pretendem fazer "investimentos", o que é uma palavra profundamente errada para o que de fato fazem: retiram dinheiro dos cidadãos e das empresas, que poderia estar sendo usado para fins de consumo ou de investimento produtivo, passam esse dinheiro pelo moedor de carne da administração federal -- que já cobra um pedágio elevado, ainda mais elevado no Brasil do que nos EUA -- e depois pretendem alocar esses recursos com base em decisões políticas, não guiados pelos preços de mercado, como indica apropriadamente o editorial do WSJ.
Concluindo: só pode dar errado, aqui e lá. As consequências são "misallocations" de recursos, desvio de dinheiro de oportunidades de maior retorno relativo e distorsão geral das regras econômicas, com perda de oportunidades para todos, para o país, para a sociedade, para os indivíduos. Os únicos que ganham são os políticos e os burocratas.
Leiam e comparem, Brasil e EUA.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
The Great Misallocators
Editorial The Wall Street Journal, January 26, 2011
What Barack Obama and General Electric have in common.
President Obama on Tuesday night stressed U.S. economic competitiveness as a new policy theme, accentuating the point he made last week by naming General Electric CEO Jeffrey Immelt to lead his new jobs council. This is welcome, though not solely because it may signal less Administration hostility to business. The pairing is also instructive because both Mr. Obama and GE symbolize a major reason the U.S. has become less competitive—the misallocation of resources.
***
Step back for a minute from the day to day policy fights and consider how an economy can grow faster. One way is to get people to work harder or longer. The government can contribute here with policies that reward work and investment, such as lower taxes.
A second route to faster growth is innovation, which means inventions or new processes that increase productivity. Government can help with money for basic research, but private investment, human ingenuity and luck are the main drivers.
The third way is through the more efficient use of capital, both human and monetary. These resources are scarce in any economy, and growth will be fastest if they are allowed to find their highest return. If resources are allocated to less productive uses or create asset bubbles due to bad policy, then overall growth will be slower than it should be.
In our view, this third point has been the largest but least appreciated problem in the U.S. economy in recent years. First the Federal Reserve's subsidy for credit and other policies pushed resources into the financial industry, and especially into real estate. When that bubble burst, triggering the 2008 financial panic and recession, the U.S. responded over two years with a huge expansion of the federal government.
Both periods were marked by the misallocation of trillions of dollars into wasted investments. One reason the current recovery has been so lackluster is that it takes time for an economy to retool from these mistakes. Money that went to build now-empty condos on the Vegas Strip—or to government transfer payments—can't be reclaimed to rebuild American manufacturing and technology.
***
No company illustrates this great misallocation better than the General Electric Co. For decades it was a symbol of U.S. manufacturing and export prowess, building jet engines, gas turbines, consumer appliances and more.
Yet during the bubble years, its fastest growing and often most profitable subsidiary became GE Capital. In some years, GE derived nearly half its total profits from the finance business. This contributed greatly to profits and made former CEO Jack Welch a shareholder hero before he retired in 2001.
Mr. Immelt inherited the time bomb that was GE Capital and it is probably too much to have expected him to defuse it before the panic hit. Most other finance CEOs and everyone in government also misjudged the mania. Yet without federal loan guarantees for debt issuance, among other government aid during the crisis, GE Capital might well have taken the entire company down.
Along with Mr. Obama, Mr. Immelt is now preaching the virtues of U.S. manufacturing and innovation. A glance at the GE homepage invites readers to "watch the rebirth of rails," of all things. GE also wants to produce more in the U.S., even though its domestic employment fell by about 34,000 from 2000 to 2009. These are laudable intentions.
Less laudable is Mr. Immelt's habit of inviting government to be his business partner and promoter. In his 2008 letter to shareholders, the CEO declared that the financial crisis and election of Mr. Obama meant that the U.S. economy had been fundamentally "reset."
His key line: "The interaction between government and business will change forever. In a reset economy, the government will be a regulator; and also an industry policy champion, a financier, and a key partner."
This is an invitation to the same kind of capital misallocation that led to the housing bubble. Mr. Immelt's particular goal is to promote policies and subsidies that aid green energy, in which GE is deeply invested. But if wind turbines are a good business, they will find a market on their own. If wind power turns out to be an uncompetitive bust, then the government will have misallocated hundreds of billions more dollars that could have found more productive uses.
***
Which brings us to Mr. Obama and the government bubble. In last night's State of the Union, Mr. Obama tried to reposition himself as a champion of business and reformer of government. His support for lower corporate tax rates was especially welcome. The test of his sincerity will come in his policy choices in the coming months.
Yet Tuesday night can't erase the fact that in his first two years Mr. Obama has overseen an historic expansion of government. He has increased federal spending to as much as 25% of the economy from a modern average between 20% and 21%. In terms of allocating resources, this means that 4% of annual economic output was suddenly taken out of private hands and put under government control.
Government "investments"—Mr. Obama's favorite word last night—are by definition made for political purposes, rather than for their highest potential return. They are allocated by politics rather than by prices. In our view, that 4% of GDP a year could have contributed far more to economic recovery had it stayed in private hands.
But even if you believe that such spending prevented a depression, it makes no economic sense to keep those resources under political sway now that the recovery is underway. Would you rather have Congress allocating that 4% of GDP, or millions of individuals deciding among Apple, Gilead Sciences, or the next great idea?
The path back to faster growth, more jobs and a more competitive U.S. economy does not travel through more political mediation. Nor does it lie in endlessly easy Fed policy in a misguided attempt to refloat the housing bubble or revive the financial boom. A better economy requires policies that reward work and innovation, while letting capital flow to the companies and individuals with the best ideas. They might even be GE's.
Este editorial do Wall Street Journal é especialmente crítico das políticas intervencionistas do presidente Obama e creio que o mesmo poderia ser dito, mutatis mutandis, do Brasil, que tem um Estado, políticos e políticas ainda mais dirigistas e intervencionistas.
Nos dois países -- mas nos EUA a carga fiscal fica apenas em 30% do PIB, quando no Brasil ela já se aproxima de 40%, quando não superou, efetivamente -- os governos pretendem fazer "investimentos", o que é uma palavra profundamente errada para o que de fato fazem: retiram dinheiro dos cidadãos e das empresas, que poderia estar sendo usado para fins de consumo ou de investimento produtivo, passam esse dinheiro pelo moedor de carne da administração federal -- que já cobra um pedágio elevado, ainda mais elevado no Brasil do que nos EUA -- e depois pretendem alocar esses recursos com base em decisões políticas, não guiados pelos preços de mercado, como indica apropriadamente o editorial do WSJ.
Concluindo: só pode dar errado, aqui e lá. As consequências são "misallocations" de recursos, desvio de dinheiro de oportunidades de maior retorno relativo e distorsão geral das regras econômicas, com perda de oportunidades para todos, para o país, para a sociedade, para os indivíduos. Os únicos que ganham são os políticos e os burocratas.
Leiam e comparem, Brasil e EUA.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
The Great Misallocators
Editorial The Wall Street Journal, January 26, 2011
What Barack Obama and General Electric have in common.
President Obama on Tuesday night stressed U.S. economic competitiveness as a new policy theme, accentuating the point he made last week by naming General Electric CEO Jeffrey Immelt to lead his new jobs council. This is welcome, though not solely because it may signal less Administration hostility to business. The pairing is also instructive because both Mr. Obama and GE symbolize a major reason the U.S. has become less competitive—the misallocation of resources.
***
Step back for a minute from the day to day policy fights and consider how an economy can grow faster. One way is to get people to work harder or longer. The government can contribute here with policies that reward work and investment, such as lower taxes.
A second route to faster growth is innovation, which means inventions or new processes that increase productivity. Government can help with money for basic research, but private investment, human ingenuity and luck are the main drivers.
The third way is through the more efficient use of capital, both human and monetary. These resources are scarce in any economy, and growth will be fastest if they are allowed to find their highest return. If resources are allocated to less productive uses or create asset bubbles due to bad policy, then overall growth will be slower than it should be.
In our view, this third point has been the largest but least appreciated problem in the U.S. economy in recent years. First the Federal Reserve's subsidy for credit and other policies pushed resources into the financial industry, and especially into real estate. When that bubble burst, triggering the 2008 financial panic and recession, the U.S. responded over two years with a huge expansion of the federal government.
Both periods were marked by the misallocation of trillions of dollars into wasted investments. One reason the current recovery has been so lackluster is that it takes time for an economy to retool from these mistakes. Money that went to build now-empty condos on the Vegas Strip—or to government transfer payments—can't be reclaimed to rebuild American manufacturing and technology.
***
No company illustrates this great misallocation better than the General Electric Co. For decades it was a symbol of U.S. manufacturing and export prowess, building jet engines, gas turbines, consumer appliances and more.
Yet during the bubble years, its fastest growing and often most profitable subsidiary became GE Capital. In some years, GE derived nearly half its total profits from the finance business. This contributed greatly to profits and made former CEO Jack Welch a shareholder hero before he retired in 2001.
Mr. Immelt inherited the time bomb that was GE Capital and it is probably too much to have expected him to defuse it before the panic hit. Most other finance CEOs and everyone in government also misjudged the mania. Yet without federal loan guarantees for debt issuance, among other government aid during the crisis, GE Capital might well have taken the entire company down.
Along with Mr. Obama, Mr. Immelt is now preaching the virtues of U.S. manufacturing and innovation. A glance at the GE homepage invites readers to "watch the rebirth of rails," of all things. GE also wants to produce more in the U.S., even though its domestic employment fell by about 34,000 from 2000 to 2009. These are laudable intentions.
Less laudable is Mr. Immelt's habit of inviting government to be his business partner and promoter. In his 2008 letter to shareholders, the CEO declared that the financial crisis and election of Mr. Obama meant that the U.S. economy had been fundamentally "reset."
His key line: "The interaction between government and business will change forever. In a reset economy, the government will be a regulator; and also an industry policy champion, a financier, and a key partner."
This is an invitation to the same kind of capital misallocation that led to the housing bubble. Mr. Immelt's particular goal is to promote policies and subsidies that aid green energy, in which GE is deeply invested. But if wind turbines are a good business, they will find a market on their own. If wind power turns out to be an uncompetitive bust, then the government will have misallocated hundreds of billions more dollars that could have found more productive uses.
***
Which brings us to Mr. Obama and the government bubble. In last night's State of the Union, Mr. Obama tried to reposition himself as a champion of business and reformer of government. His support for lower corporate tax rates was especially welcome. The test of his sincerity will come in his policy choices in the coming months.
Yet Tuesday night can't erase the fact that in his first two years Mr. Obama has overseen an historic expansion of government. He has increased federal spending to as much as 25% of the economy from a modern average between 20% and 21%. In terms of allocating resources, this means that 4% of annual economic output was suddenly taken out of private hands and put under government control.
Government "investments"—Mr. Obama's favorite word last night—are by definition made for political purposes, rather than for their highest potential return. They are allocated by politics rather than by prices. In our view, that 4% of GDP a year could have contributed far more to economic recovery had it stayed in private hands.
But even if you believe that such spending prevented a depression, it makes no economic sense to keep those resources under political sway now that the recovery is underway. Would you rather have Congress allocating that 4% of GDP, or millions of individuals deciding among Apple, Gilead Sciences, or the next great idea?
The path back to faster growth, more jobs and a more competitive U.S. economy does not travel through more political mediation. Nor does it lie in endlessly easy Fed policy in a misguided attempt to refloat the housing bubble or revive the financial boom. A better economy requires policies that reward work and innovation, while letting capital flow to the companies and individuals with the best ideas. They might even be GE's.
Socialismo do seculo 21: a cegueira cronica de seu ideologo
Existem pessoas que são cegas de nascimento, o que obviamente é uma tragédia humana. Outras pessoas se tornam cegas por acidentes ou doenças, o que também é uma tragédia pessoal incomensurável, mas estas pessoas, como as primeiras, procuram compensar ou remediar a perda do sentido da visão pelo desenvolvimento de outras habilidades pessoais.
Existem, também, aqueles cegos voluntários, que escolhem ser cegos, e disso fazem uma escada para espalhar a cegueira em volta de si.
O personagem entrevistado nesta matéria abaixo transcrita já foi objeto de minhas considerações neste texto sobre as falácias acadêmicas mais comuns:
Falácias acadêmicas, 9: o mito do socialismo do século 21
Brasília, 24 maio 2009, 17 p.
Nono artigo da série especial, desta vez sobre as loucuras econômicas de certos conselheiros do príncipe.
Espaço Acadêmico (vol. 9, n. 97, junho 2009, p. 12-24)
Já rebati o que era possível rebater das loucuras desse pobre conselheiro de um príncipe que mais parece um sapo. Em todo caso, deixo vocês com a leitura da entrevista.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Guru de Chávez critica modelo venezuelano
Daniel Rittner
Valor Econômico, 26/01/2011
Buenos Aires - O coronel Hugo Chávez Frías estava na prisão em 1992, após a fracassada tentativa de golpe de Estado que liderou na Venezuela, quando tomou gosto pela obra do sociólogo alemão Heinz Dieterich. Eram textos sobre Simón Bolívar, Manuela Sáenz, a libertação da América Latina e os conflitos na região - temas caros a Dieterich, radicado no México há mais de três décadas, como professor da Universidade Autônoma Metropolitana.
O alemão, que começou sua vida política agitando os estudantes e correndo da polícia nas ruas de Frankfurt, foi companheiro do ex-ministro Joschka Fischer e de Daniel Cohn-Bendit nas passeatas de 1968. Intelectual de esquerda, manteve sua veia revolucionária e cunhou o termo "socialismo do século XXI", em um livro homônimo de 1996. Três anos mais tarde, já sentado no gabinete presidencial do Palácio de Miraflores, Chávez chamou o alemão para uma conversa e contou a ele ser um leitor habitual de sua obra.
Os dois se aproximaram e, segundo biógrafos do presidente venezuelano, Dieterich se transformou em uma espécie de guru de Chávez - responsável pelo aperfeiçoamento de sua formação política e por incutir ideias sobre como colocar em prática a "revolução bolivariana". Por motivos jamais esclarecidos, Chávez e Dieterich se afastaram nos últimos anos. Não se sabe quando foi o último contato entre eles.
Questionado sobre isso, o alemão diz que prefere manter o assunto "de maneira confidencial". É o único assunto que evita, em entrevista ao Valor, por email. Para o sociólogo, Chávez vive o momento mais difícil desde 2002 - quando o feitiço se inverteu e ele conseguiu resistir a um golpe frustrado - e corre risco real de perder as eleições presidenciais de 2012. "O que está em jogo é a sobrevivência de seu projeto político", disse.
Contrariando a avaliação corrente, Dieterich acredita que Chávez está migrando para o centro, a fim de conquistar o eleitorado necessário para continuar no poder. "Vai fazer o contrário do que diz publicamente", acredita o professor.
Valor: A Venezuela vem de dois anos seguidos de recessão na economia, a oposição teve excelente votação nas eleições legislativas de setembro e o governo voltou a desvalorizar a moeda na virada do ano. Este é o momento mais difícil nos 12 anos de "revolução bolivariana"?
Heinz Dieterich: Não, os momentos mais difíceis foram o golpe militar de 11 de abril de 2002 e o golpe petroleiro que o seguiu. No entanto, depois daquela crise, a conjuntura atual é a mais difícil que já enfrentou o presidente. O que está em jogo é a sobrevivência de seu projeto político.
Valor: Em um relatório recente, a Cepal mostrou que a Venezuela foi o país latino-americano onde a pobreza mais caiu entre 2002 e 2008. Mas a inflação continua rondando 30% e há falta de investimentos privados. Na sua opinião, o modelo venezuelano requer correções ou é o próprio modelo que está errado?
Dieterich: É necessário promover mudanças estruturais no modelo atual, que foi funcional durante o período pós-golpista de 2003 a 2007, mas que hoje em dia é insustentável, diante dos desequilíbrios que provoca.
Entre eles, menciono a alta taxa de inflação, o alto gasto corrente, o déficit fiscal, a baixa taxa de investimento, a falha em substituir importações, a extrema dependência do petróleo, a distorção da estrutura de preços entre bens e serviços importados e nacionais, a irreal paridade dólar/bolívar.
Esses desequilíbrios se devem em parte à política antigovernamental de setores do capital privado, mas em maior grau à ineficiência do governo na gestão macroeconômica e sua incompreensão sobre a necessária flexibilização do modelo, conforme a mudança das circunstâncias.
Valor: Quais foram os principais acertos do presidente Chávez nos últimos anos?
Dieterich: Entender rapidamente que a hegemonia unilateral de Washington havia chegado ao seu fim e construir uma política global correspondente. Ter superado a inércia e o medo das classes políticas e elites econômicas locais, particularmente no Brasil e na Argentina, para apoiar ou tolerar um projeto comum hemisférico. Do lado interno, ter consolidado seu apoio nas Forças Armadas e ter implementado uma política keynesiana, contra a hegemonia neoliberal do momento, que lhe assegurava o apoio das massas. Isto é, a tentativa de criar um Estado de bem-estar e de direito em condições do Terceiro Mundo.
Valor: E os principais erros?
Dieterich: O principal erro consistiu em não aceitar que a fase pós-golpista da política venezuelana terminou perto do fim de 2007 e que ele deve mudar o modelo de governança do período 2003-2007.
Não vejo nenhuma tentativa séria do presidente - Chávez - de transcender o capitalismo
Valor: Depois dos acontecimentos de 2002, a oposição não pôde desconstruir a imagem de golpista, durante muitos anos. O senhor considera que alguma coisa mudou na oposição venezuelana ou que tenha surgido alguma nova figura dissociada dos eventos de 2002?
Dieterich: Não se vê nenhuma evolução na oposição. O discurso, o ódio, o comportamento são os mesmos que em 2002, ainda que alguns tratem de ocultá-los. Mas, de fato, continuam sendo amantes do Consenso de Washington e do Império.
Não há evolução do projeto político, nem ideias frescas, nem figuras transcendentes emergentes neste momento.
Valor: Por que tantos aliados e amigos de Chávez - poderíamos mencionar desde o governador de Lara, Henry Falcón, e o ex-ministro da Defesa Raúl Baduel até o senhor mesmo - se afastaram tanto dele ao longo desses 12 anos?
Dieterich: São casos diferentes. O general Raúl Baduel [hoje preso] pedia, a partir do centro, um projeto de governo transparente, explicado racionalmente, por exemplo no que diz respeito ao socialismo do século XXI. A aliança com ele era possível, mas a direita da classe política bolivariana queria excluí-lo porque ele não era servil com o poder. Além disso, ele era, depois de Chávez, o homem mais popular do bolivarianismo porque salvou a revolução durante o golpe de Estado.
Henry Falcón [hoje dirigente do partido oposicionista Pátria para Todos, formado majoritariamente por ex-chavistas] pedia o mesmo, a partir da centro-esquerda, e, além disso, uma condução coletiva do processo. Novamente, Chávez negou os dois pleitos. Insistia na "lealdade incondicional" dos chavistas diante do "líder". Perderam-se, então, alianças importantes e possíveis como o centro e a centro-esquerda do espectro político venezuelano.
Eu me afastei a partir da esquerda, porque não vejo nenhuma tentativa séria do presidente de transcender o capitalismo, além do perigo de que uma condução unipessoal possa destruir o processo.
Valor: O senhor considera que há um risco real de derrota de Chávez nas eleições presidenciais de 2012?
Dieterich: Falta muito tempo, mas agora eu diria que sim, que há razões estruturais que poderiam levar ao empate ou à perda do poder eleitoral do presidente. Chávez se deu conta desse perigo e se deslocará em direção ao centro, como mostram suas últimas medidas. Isto é, vai fazer o contrário do que diz publicamente: não vai "radicalizar" o processo de forma revolucionária, mas aproximar-se mais da burguesia. Será semelhante às mudanças entre o primeiro e o segundo governo de Perón.
Valor: A que medidas o senhor se refere?
Dieterich: O veto à lei de reforma universitária, a oferta à oposição de retirar a Lei Habilitante em cinco meses, mesmo tendo-a autorizada por 18 meses, o cancelamento do aumento do IVA, a nova desvalorização do bolívar, o desalojamento de fazendas militarizadas no sul do Estado de Zulia, o congelamento contínuo de Eduardo Samán [ex-ministro do Comércio e militante radical do PSUV] a ausência total de iniciativas reais para iniciar o socialismo do século XXI e a moderação retórica perante o governo americano.
Valor: Se tivesse a oportunidade de dar a Chávez um único conselho, com a certeza de que ele o seguiria, o que diria?
Dieterich: Conduza a economia de mercado como se deve conduzi-la - respeitando que é um sistema complexo de retroalimentação - e comece a construir as instituições da democracia real, as instituições do socialismo democrático do século XXI.
Existem, também, aqueles cegos voluntários, que escolhem ser cegos, e disso fazem uma escada para espalhar a cegueira em volta de si.
O personagem entrevistado nesta matéria abaixo transcrita já foi objeto de minhas considerações neste texto sobre as falácias acadêmicas mais comuns:
Falácias acadêmicas, 9: o mito do socialismo do século 21
Brasília, 24 maio 2009, 17 p.
Nono artigo da série especial, desta vez sobre as loucuras econômicas de certos conselheiros do príncipe.
Espaço Acadêmico (vol. 9, n. 97, junho 2009, p. 12-24)
Já rebati o que era possível rebater das loucuras desse pobre conselheiro de um príncipe que mais parece um sapo. Em todo caso, deixo vocês com a leitura da entrevista.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Guru de Chávez critica modelo venezuelano
Daniel Rittner
Valor Econômico, 26/01/2011
Buenos Aires - O coronel Hugo Chávez Frías estava na prisão em 1992, após a fracassada tentativa de golpe de Estado que liderou na Venezuela, quando tomou gosto pela obra do sociólogo alemão Heinz Dieterich. Eram textos sobre Simón Bolívar, Manuela Sáenz, a libertação da América Latina e os conflitos na região - temas caros a Dieterich, radicado no México há mais de três décadas, como professor da Universidade Autônoma Metropolitana.
O alemão, que começou sua vida política agitando os estudantes e correndo da polícia nas ruas de Frankfurt, foi companheiro do ex-ministro Joschka Fischer e de Daniel Cohn-Bendit nas passeatas de 1968. Intelectual de esquerda, manteve sua veia revolucionária e cunhou o termo "socialismo do século XXI", em um livro homônimo de 1996. Três anos mais tarde, já sentado no gabinete presidencial do Palácio de Miraflores, Chávez chamou o alemão para uma conversa e contou a ele ser um leitor habitual de sua obra.
Os dois se aproximaram e, segundo biógrafos do presidente venezuelano, Dieterich se transformou em uma espécie de guru de Chávez - responsável pelo aperfeiçoamento de sua formação política e por incutir ideias sobre como colocar em prática a "revolução bolivariana". Por motivos jamais esclarecidos, Chávez e Dieterich se afastaram nos últimos anos. Não se sabe quando foi o último contato entre eles.
Questionado sobre isso, o alemão diz que prefere manter o assunto "de maneira confidencial". É o único assunto que evita, em entrevista ao Valor, por email. Para o sociólogo, Chávez vive o momento mais difícil desde 2002 - quando o feitiço se inverteu e ele conseguiu resistir a um golpe frustrado - e corre risco real de perder as eleições presidenciais de 2012. "O que está em jogo é a sobrevivência de seu projeto político", disse.
Contrariando a avaliação corrente, Dieterich acredita que Chávez está migrando para o centro, a fim de conquistar o eleitorado necessário para continuar no poder. "Vai fazer o contrário do que diz publicamente", acredita o professor.
Valor: A Venezuela vem de dois anos seguidos de recessão na economia, a oposição teve excelente votação nas eleições legislativas de setembro e o governo voltou a desvalorizar a moeda na virada do ano. Este é o momento mais difícil nos 12 anos de "revolução bolivariana"?
Heinz Dieterich: Não, os momentos mais difíceis foram o golpe militar de 11 de abril de 2002 e o golpe petroleiro que o seguiu. No entanto, depois daquela crise, a conjuntura atual é a mais difícil que já enfrentou o presidente. O que está em jogo é a sobrevivência de seu projeto político.
Valor: Em um relatório recente, a Cepal mostrou que a Venezuela foi o país latino-americano onde a pobreza mais caiu entre 2002 e 2008. Mas a inflação continua rondando 30% e há falta de investimentos privados. Na sua opinião, o modelo venezuelano requer correções ou é o próprio modelo que está errado?
Dieterich: É necessário promover mudanças estruturais no modelo atual, que foi funcional durante o período pós-golpista de 2003 a 2007, mas que hoje em dia é insustentável, diante dos desequilíbrios que provoca.
Entre eles, menciono a alta taxa de inflação, o alto gasto corrente, o déficit fiscal, a baixa taxa de investimento, a falha em substituir importações, a extrema dependência do petróleo, a distorção da estrutura de preços entre bens e serviços importados e nacionais, a irreal paridade dólar/bolívar.
Esses desequilíbrios se devem em parte à política antigovernamental de setores do capital privado, mas em maior grau à ineficiência do governo na gestão macroeconômica e sua incompreensão sobre a necessária flexibilização do modelo, conforme a mudança das circunstâncias.
Valor: Quais foram os principais acertos do presidente Chávez nos últimos anos?
Dieterich: Entender rapidamente que a hegemonia unilateral de Washington havia chegado ao seu fim e construir uma política global correspondente. Ter superado a inércia e o medo das classes políticas e elites econômicas locais, particularmente no Brasil e na Argentina, para apoiar ou tolerar um projeto comum hemisférico. Do lado interno, ter consolidado seu apoio nas Forças Armadas e ter implementado uma política keynesiana, contra a hegemonia neoliberal do momento, que lhe assegurava o apoio das massas. Isto é, a tentativa de criar um Estado de bem-estar e de direito em condições do Terceiro Mundo.
Valor: E os principais erros?
Dieterich: O principal erro consistiu em não aceitar que a fase pós-golpista da política venezuelana terminou perto do fim de 2007 e que ele deve mudar o modelo de governança do período 2003-2007.
Não vejo nenhuma tentativa séria do presidente - Chávez - de transcender o capitalismo
Valor: Depois dos acontecimentos de 2002, a oposição não pôde desconstruir a imagem de golpista, durante muitos anos. O senhor considera que alguma coisa mudou na oposição venezuelana ou que tenha surgido alguma nova figura dissociada dos eventos de 2002?
Dieterich: Não se vê nenhuma evolução na oposição. O discurso, o ódio, o comportamento são os mesmos que em 2002, ainda que alguns tratem de ocultá-los. Mas, de fato, continuam sendo amantes do Consenso de Washington e do Império.
Não há evolução do projeto político, nem ideias frescas, nem figuras transcendentes emergentes neste momento.
Valor: Por que tantos aliados e amigos de Chávez - poderíamos mencionar desde o governador de Lara, Henry Falcón, e o ex-ministro da Defesa Raúl Baduel até o senhor mesmo - se afastaram tanto dele ao longo desses 12 anos?
Dieterich: São casos diferentes. O general Raúl Baduel [hoje preso] pedia, a partir do centro, um projeto de governo transparente, explicado racionalmente, por exemplo no que diz respeito ao socialismo do século XXI. A aliança com ele era possível, mas a direita da classe política bolivariana queria excluí-lo porque ele não era servil com o poder. Além disso, ele era, depois de Chávez, o homem mais popular do bolivarianismo porque salvou a revolução durante o golpe de Estado.
Henry Falcón [hoje dirigente do partido oposicionista Pátria para Todos, formado majoritariamente por ex-chavistas] pedia o mesmo, a partir da centro-esquerda, e, além disso, uma condução coletiva do processo. Novamente, Chávez negou os dois pleitos. Insistia na "lealdade incondicional" dos chavistas diante do "líder". Perderam-se, então, alianças importantes e possíveis como o centro e a centro-esquerda do espectro político venezuelano.
Eu me afastei a partir da esquerda, porque não vejo nenhuma tentativa séria do presidente de transcender o capitalismo, além do perigo de que uma condução unipessoal possa destruir o processo.
Valor: O senhor considera que há um risco real de derrota de Chávez nas eleições presidenciais de 2012?
Dieterich: Falta muito tempo, mas agora eu diria que sim, que há razões estruturais que poderiam levar ao empate ou à perda do poder eleitoral do presidente. Chávez se deu conta desse perigo e se deslocará em direção ao centro, como mostram suas últimas medidas. Isto é, vai fazer o contrário do que diz publicamente: não vai "radicalizar" o processo de forma revolucionária, mas aproximar-se mais da burguesia. Será semelhante às mudanças entre o primeiro e o segundo governo de Perón.
Valor: A que medidas o senhor se refere?
Dieterich: O veto à lei de reforma universitária, a oferta à oposição de retirar a Lei Habilitante em cinco meses, mesmo tendo-a autorizada por 18 meses, o cancelamento do aumento do IVA, a nova desvalorização do bolívar, o desalojamento de fazendas militarizadas no sul do Estado de Zulia, o congelamento contínuo de Eduardo Samán [ex-ministro do Comércio e militante radical do PSUV] a ausência total de iniciativas reais para iniciar o socialismo do século XXI e a moderação retórica perante o governo americano.
Valor: Se tivesse a oportunidade de dar a Chávez um único conselho, com a certeza de que ele o seguiria, o que diria?
Dieterich: Conduza a economia de mercado como se deve conduzi-la - respeitando que é um sistema complexo de retroalimentação - e comece a construir as instituições da democracia real, as instituições do socialismo democrático do século XXI.
Assinar:
Postagens (Atom)