From White Russia to Belarus: Norway snubs Kremlin - Peter Dickinson (The Atlantic Council).

 BelarusAlert

May 31, 2022

From White Russia to Belarus: Norway snubs Kremlin with name change

By Peter Dickinson

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Norway has announced that it will from now on use the name “Belarus” instead of “Hviterussland” (literally “White Russia”) in all official documents. The move is seen as a symbolic snub to Russia and recognition of Belarus’s aspirations to emerge from the Kremlin orbit and embrace democracy. “We believe it is right to change the use of names in solidarity with the Belarusian democratic movement,” commented Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre.

Norwegian Foreign Ministry officials underlined the symbolic importance of the switch and stressed the need to emphasize the difference between Belarus and Russia. 

Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Anniken Huitfeldt first broke the news of the name change in a personal call with the exiled leader of Belarus’s democratic opposition, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya (pictured), on the eve of this year’s International Day of Solidarity with Belarus, which is marked annually on May 29. “Although there are both historical and linguistic arguments for writing “Hviterussland,” it is ultimately a political issue,” stated Huitfeldt. “We do this as a sign of solidarity with the Belarusian democratic movement. They will not be a continuation of Russia.”

Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya welcomed the Norwegian gesture, which she praised as “more than just symbolic.” Belarusian journalist Hanna Liubakova shared this sentiment, commentingthat she saw Norway’s step as a sign of growing international recognition that referring to modern Belarus as “White Russia” was anachronistic and misleading. 

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Norway’s decision to begin using the name Belarus in official documents is part of a regional trend, with fellow Scandinavian countries Sweden and Denmark also making similar switches from their own outdated versions of “White Russia” in recent years. This reflects broader changes in international perceptions of the country following a 2020 pro-democracy uprising that thrust Belarus into the global headlines following decades spent in the post-Soviet shadows.

For much of the post-Soviet period, Belarus was perhaps best known internationally as the last dictatorship in Europe. It owed this dubious honor to Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who won election in 1994 before proceeding to dismantle the country’s fledgling democracy and reestablish a Soviet-style one-party state.  

For over a quarter of a century, Lukashenka was able to successfully suppress all domestic opposition and strengthen his grip on power while maintaining close ties with neighboring Russia. He faced the first serious challenge of his entire reign in August 2020 when heavy-handed attempts to rig the country’s presidential election served as a focal point for simmering public frustrations, leading to the eruption of mass protests across the country on the evening of the vote.

This pro-democracy protest movement gained momentum in subsequent weeks and caught the world’s imagination. It dominated international news coverage for much of late summer and early fall 2020, with many seeing the unprecedented people power uprising as the latest chapter in the slow-motion collapse of the Soviet Empire. The Lukashenka regime looked destined to fall until Russia intervened with a financial lifeline and a promise to send in the Russian security services if necessary.

Lukashenka has remained entirely dependent on Russian support ever since. In return, he has gradually surrendered his country’s sovereignty to the Kremlin, allowing Moscow to expand its political, economic, and military footprints in the country. In February 2022, Lukashenka permitted Putin to use Belarus as a platform for the invasion of Ukraine. Thousands of Russian troops flooded across the Belarusian border into Ukraine as part Putin’s failed attempt to seize Kyiv. The country has also served as a launch pad for the bombardment of Ukrainian towns and cities.

Isolado, Brasil perde credibilidade em cúpula ambiental de Estocolmo - Deutsche Welle

 O Brasil retrocedeu  50 anos, meio século, na temática ambiental. O governo atual trouxe o país e a sua diplomacia de volta aos tempos da ditadura militar, que é muito apreciada pelo chefe de governo.

Isolado, Brasil perde credibilidade em cúpula ambiental de Estocolmo
Deutsche Welle
02/06/22 - 07h58

De protagonista na diplomacia climática a pária internacional, país aprofunda isolamento em reedição da histórica conferência de meio ambiente de 1972, na capital sueca.Cinco décadas após sediar a primeira reunião da história sobre meio ambiente e inserir o tema no mundo diplomático, Estocolmo volta a ser palco de discussões a partir desta quinta-feira (02/06), sob um clima mais sombrio.

Em 1972, a então Conferência das Nações Unidas sobre o Meio Ambiente Humano, o primeiro grande evento da ONU, trazia à tona as primeiras evidências de que o estilo de vida, principalmente dos países ricos, causava estragos de dimensões planetárias. A poluição, vista como um lado negativo da industrialização acelerada, era considerada o maior problema na época.

A reedição da conferência na capital da Suécia em 2022, batizada de Estocolmo+50, se situa num contexto mais desconfortável. Passados 50 anos, o diagnóstico atualizado da saúde do planeta vai muito além da poluição: mudanças climáticas e perda da biodiversidade e de espaços naturais entram na lista como ameaças graves ao bem-estar da humanidade.

Embora esteja sob a sombra da guerra na vizinha Ucrânia e todos os seus impactos, como a insegurança alimentar, num mundo que ainda tenta superar a pandemia de covid-19, a reunião tenta recuperar o espírito pioneiro de 1972 e busca um lugar na história do movimento ambiental.

Pelo menos dez chefes de Estado devem comparecer; Jair Bolsonaro não estará entre eles. O Brasil deverá ser representado pelo ministro do Meio Ambiente, Joaquim Leite, e a secretária de Amazônia e Serviços Ambientais, Marta Lisli Giannichi.

A expectativa de que a delegação brasileira cause qualquer boa impressão é baixa. “O Brasil do governo Bolsonaro é completamente obtuso em relação à importância ambiental, o que gera isolamento e consome o capital diplomático importante que o país tinha no plano internacional”, analisa Celso Lafer, ex-ministro das Relações Exteriores, em entrevista à DW.

Política do isolamento
O isolamento internacional parece ter sido opção do governo Bolsonaro quando o debate se volta para o meio ambiente. Em outras reuniões da ONU, como a Assembleia Geral de 2019, ele criticou o empenho de outros países em iniciativas que visam a preservação da Amazônia e a extensão de terras destinadas aos povos indígenas.

Naquele primeiro ano de seu mandato, Bolsonaro via sua imagem derreter junto à opinião pública à medida que a Amazônia sofria uma das mais severas temporadas de queimadas. A grande repercussão do desastre ambiental foi descrita como “ataques sensacionalistas” pelo presidente, que afirmou na plenária ter “um compromisso solene com a preservação do meio ambiente”.

Mas não é o que mostram os dados observados por satélite e divulgados anualmente há três décadas pelo sistema de monitoramento operado pelo Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (Inpe). Nos três primeiros anos da gestão Bolsonaro, a alta do desmatamento da maior floresta tropical foi de 52,9% em comparação com os anos anteriores.

“O Brasil perdeu credibilidade, está numa posição defensiva. Não é uma questão ideológica, é uma questão de número. Não tem como negar o aumento do desmatamento, estimulado tacitamente pelo governo, e o desrespeito aos direitos indígenas”, comenta Fábio Feldmann, ambientalista com longo histórico de atuação.

Nenhum porta-voz do governo federal respondeu aos pedidos de entrevista da DW Brasil.

Do protagonismo à pária
Meses antes da conferência em Estocolmo, publicações que apontavam o abismo para o qual caminhava a humanidade influenciavam a opinião pública e os rumos das conversas durante o evento.

Entre os exemplos estão o livro This endangered planet, de 1971, escrito por Richard Falk, e o relatório Limits to growth, de 1972, coordenado pelo Clube de Roma, que projetava que o crescimento econômico e populacional contínuo esgotaria os recursos da Terra e levaria ao colapso global até 2070.

Era o começo da compreensão da crise ambiental – que evoluiu bastante até os dias atuais, analisa Feldmann, amparada pela produção de conhecimento científico na área. “Em 1972 havia uma certa dificuldade dos países de entender a questão ambiental, era um tema novo, por isso houve naquela época essa linha de que tudo se tratava de uma conspiração”, argumenta.

Essa teoria, adiciona, não se sustenta em 2022, como tenta manter Bolsonaro. “É impossível negar a realidade hoje. O governo não controla mais toda a informação, a sociedade civil também monitora o desmatamento e os indicadores ambientais, e os cientistas comunicam bem à sociedade os dados que produz”, pontua.

O cenário atual parece aquele visto há 50 anos, quando o Brasil vivia uma ditadura militar, era alvo de críticas por violações dos direitos humanos e tinha péssimos indicadores ambientais e sociais. Ao mesmo tempo, chamava atenção pelas riquezas naturais, como a biodiversidade e reserva de água potável.

“A partir de Estocolmo, consolidou-se a percepção internacional de que o Brasil não parecia capaz de preservar esse extraordinário patrimônio. Isto se fortaleceu ainda mais nos anos subsequentes, agravando-se na segunda metade dos anos 80 em razão da repercussão da intensificação das queimadas na Amazônia”, escreve o diplomata André Aranha Corrêa do Lago, no livro Conferências de desenvolvimento sustentável.

Naquela ocasião, o posicionamento brasileiro foi visto como bastante atrasado, e chegou-se a falar que o país tentava boicotar a conferência. O Brasil tentava convencer outros países em desenvolvimento de que a reunião em Estocolmo era uma estratégia para impedir a industrialização das nações mais atrasadas – e mais pobres.

“O país não compreendeu a conferência, interpretou de maneira incorreta. Não conseguia entender que a crise ambiental havia chegado para ficar”, opina Feldmann.

O legado de Estocolmo
Mas tudo mudou depois da Rio 92 (Conferência das Nações Unidas sobre Meio Ambiente e Desenvolvimento), cujo processo de candidatura ocorreu quando o Brasil retornava ao regime democrático.

O empenho do país em sediar o evento se devia principalmente à deterioração de sua imagem no exterior, narra Corrêa do Lago em seu livro. Esse fato “vinha sendo acompanhado com preocupação pelo Itamaraty e, principalmente, por suas repartições na Europa e nos EUA, onde o Brasil se tornara o grande alvo de grupos ambientalistas e da imprensa”, diz um trecho.

Ministro à época, Celso Lafer afirma que o sucesso da Rio 92 consagrou o tema ambiental de grande peso na agenda internacional. “Ela foi a menos governamental das grandes conferências diplomáticas. Não teve nada de improvisação; muitos documentos foram preparados”, detalha.

Para Feldmann, um dado em particular ressalta a mobilização que o debate causou na capital fluminense: “Foram 102 chefes de Estado que compareceram ao Rio de Janeiro. Em Estocolmo, em 1972, foi apenas uma, a primeira-ministra da Índia, Indira Gandhi.”

Em resposta à desconfiança da primeira reunião na Suécia, o corpo diplomático brasileiro é apontado como o mais atuante para que o desenvolvimento dos países mais pobres não fosse impedido diante das questões ambientais. Nascia o conceito de desenvolvimento sustentável, que se firmou nas conferências seguintes da ONU.

“Diante da gravidade do problema, o copo parece muito vazio. Mas do ponto de vista do que se avançou desde então, está meio cheio”, classifica Lafer, mencionando entre os legados a criação de órgãos como o Programa das Nações Unidas para o Meio Ambiente (Pnuma) e o Painel Intergovernamental sobre Mudanças Climáticas (IPCC).

Apesar de as ações para frear a degradação ambiental em todo o planeta ainda estejam longe da efetividade necessária, Feldmann vê a reedição de Estocolmo como uma celebração. “Ainda precisamos de muito avanço, mas toda essa mobilização em torno da pauta ambiental só reforça o legado da conferência histórica de 1972”, opina.

https://www.istoedinheiro.com.br/isolado-brasil-perde-credibilidade-em-cupula-ambiental-de-estocolmo/

Brazil: A Growing Agribusiness Giant - Javier Chavarro (Agribusiness Global)

 Agribusiness Global, Ohio (EUA) – 1.6.2022

Brazil: A Growing Agribusiness Giant

Javier Chavarro

 

The agrochemical market in Brazil was valued at US $13.5 billion in 2019. By 2020, the value for crop protection products dropped to US $12.1 billion, a decrease of 10.4%. For the year 2021, the National Union of Vegetal Defense Products Industry (SINDIVEG), calculated agrochemicals will have a turnover in the country of around US $13.3 billion, a 9.9% increase over 2020.

This represents approximately 536,000 tons of agrochemical products to be applied in Brazilian fields, according to the Brazilian Association of the Chemical Industry (ABIQUIM). In 2021, 499 registrations were obtained, the highest number of products registered by the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply (MAPA) in Brazil in recent years.

 

 

Registrations granted by the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply (MAPA) in Brazil from 2000-2021.

Among the new registrations, six were new technical products based on the following active ingredients registered in the year 2021.

Seven of the new registered products had a formulation based on a new active ingredient. The following are the new formulated products registered also in the year 2021.

The registrations of 499 crop protection products approved by MAPA in 2021, became a turning point in the historical series of approvals with 16 registrations between technical product, 77 biological, 243 formulated chemicals, of which 470 (94%) are post-patent. Approvals have been increasing since 2016, when there was an opportunity to register only for 277 products (MAPA). In the MAPA chart, it shows records obtained since 2015.

According to SINDIVEG, the agrochemicals applied in Brazil are divided into four categories according to how they are used. Herbicides have the largest share of the market, followed by insecticides, fungicides, and other products.

The highest proportion of agricultural pesticides applied in Brazil, about 81%, is used for soybean, corn, sugar cane, and cotton crops, according to SINDIVEG.

This growth in products used as agricultural pesticides goes together with the impressive growth of the planted areas in the country. According to Companhia Nacional de Abastecimento / National Supply Company (CONAB), in 2020-21, a little more than 69 million hectares were planted, growth of 4.6% in the planted area from the prior year. For the 2021-22 season, the forecast made by CONAB in December 2021 is 72 million hectares, which indicates a growth of 4.3% in total planted area; confirmed in the evaluation done by CONAB in April 2022 with a value of 72.7 million hectares, growing 4.4% over last year.

These increases in 2021-22 occurred mainly in soybeans going from 39.2 million hectares to 40.7 million hectares, and corn with a growth of 6.5%, going from 19.9 million hectares to 21.1 million hectares. These two crops account for 62 million hectares, which represents 85% of the planted area.

With reference to the estimated production of grains in Brazil, the bet is even higher. It is expected that for the 2021-22 season that grain production will be approximately 269.3 million tons, up 5.4% over last season, which was 255.5 million tons. Most of the volume is concentrated in soy and corn production, which represent 88.4% of the total production in Brazil.

With respect to agrochemical products and according to ABIQUIM, the future of the national chemical industry passes through regulatory stability, commercial defense, legal security, infrastructure, and competitive access to raw materials and supplies.

ABIQUIM indicated that Brazil imported US $6.4 billion in chemical products in November 2021. The unprecedented value represents increases of 4.3% compared to October (a monthly record, until then) and a massive 65% increase compared to November 2020.

In regards to the imports of nearly 6.2 million tons (increases of 0.7% compared to October and 17.1% compared to the same month last year), it is also a record, and confirms the stabilization trend of foreign purchases to an alarming new level of products that could be manufactured in the country, if competitive conditions were more favorable.

The value of Brazilian pesticide imports from January to August 2021 was lower by 22.3% compared to the same period in 2020.

ABIQUIM noted that through November, imported chemical products totaled US $55 billion, an increase of 45.6% compared to the same period last year.

For Ciro Marino, General Director of ABIQUIM, the results of the trade balance of chemical products are at the same time discouraging, since they show the high level of external dependence on critical products for the sustainable development of the national economic activity (industrial uses) and for the country itself, such as fertilizers and pesticides.

One point that significantly affects the development of Brazilian agriculture, as it did in 2021, is the shortage of inputs in the country. It is important to note that the soybean planting in Brazil began in mid-October of 2021, developing slowly due to drought. During this time the need for inputs is quite high, as crops obviously require a critical time for their application.

Data from the Foreign Trade Secretariat (SECEX) of the Brazilian Ministry of Economy reveal that the phytosanitary products formulated are mainly from the United States, China, and India. By volume, China accounted for 32% of the total in 2020, ahead of the United States and India with 11% each.

According to the Brazilian Association of Post-Patent Defensives (AENDA), in a study by IBAMA and Phillips McDougall Consulting, the active ingredients most used in Brazil in their order of importance by business class:

• Herbicides: glyphosate, 2,4-D, atrazine, paraquat, diuron, s-metolachlor, mesotrione, acetochlor, dicamba, and sulfentrazone
• Fungicides: mancozeb, copper-based compounds, sulfur, pyraclostrobin, azoxystrobin, prothioconazole, fluxapiroxade, tebuconazole, and epoxiconazole
• Insecticides: acefate, imidacloprid, and bifenthrin

In terms of supply of raw materials and formulated products, China is a key supplier of raw materials for formulating agrochemicals in Brazil, in addition to formulated products imported from there.

Recent decisions by the Chinese government on the environment have the potential to bring very positive results to global climatic conditions.

However, they generate strong short-term uncertainties regarding the delivery time and costs of products.

The shortage of agricultural chemicals due to current situations and high prices may affect the 2022 growing season, because the coal shortage and power cuts in China have also affected the supply chain for agrochemicals and fertilizers.

China’s energy policy will affect the supply and price of agrochemical intermediaries and active ingredients, as the impact on factories in Yunnan and Jiangsu provinces, where yellow phosphorus production serves as a feedstock for glyphosate, acetate, and malathion.

The situation affects to a greater extent the price of glyphosate, its intermediaries and raw material such as glycine, since its extraction requires a lot of energy. There has already been an increase in the price of glyphosate. (The price of technical material in Brazil doubled as of September 2021).

On the other hand, American farmers are already preparing for less herbicide availability in 2022.

Glyphosate and glufosinate are the two main active ingredients that may potentially be in short supply for the upcoming growing season. And as indicated, China is also an essential source of raw materials and intermediaries for the formulation of agricultural pesticides. The increase in the prices of precursors has a cascading effect on other manufacturing countries, and the impact will be felt by nearly all Latin  America, which is a net importer of pesticides.

According to IBAMA, 72% of the active ingredients in agricultural pesticides marketed in Brazil are imported, either formulated or in the form of technical products to be formulated in the country.

Another point that must be considered are the impacts of the lack of containers that have not yet been normalized.

An important element that requires all the consideration that affects the commercialization of agrochemicals in Brazil is the threat of the illegal market of agricultural pesticides. The Institute for Border Economic and Social Development (IDESF) carried out the study, “The Illegal Market of Agricultural Defenses in Brazil,” where it is indicated that the illegalities of the market are characterized by theft, counterfeiting, smuggling, and deviation of the purpose of use. The most smuggled products in Brazil are emamectin benzoate, thiamethoxam, and paraquat, in addition to many others.

However, it appears that more pesticides are being smuggled from neighboring Paraguay, where regulations on these products are much more relaxed.

In the report by IDESF, it is estimated that 25% of the pesticides sold in Brazil are of illegal origin and 30% of the seeds have an unknown origin.

According to the National Association of Agricultural and Veterinary Supplies Distributors (ANDAV), distribution issues reach the field with knowledge, technologies, and innovation, approximately 50% of all inputs that arrive today in the Brazilian field go through a distributor, and ANDAV has grouped more than 2,000 distributors nationwide for more than 30 years.

How does the war between Russia and Ukraine affect agricultural businesses in Brazil?

The impact on agricultural business in Brazil is important, since it imports about 85% of its fertilizer needs with Russia as the main supplier of fertilizers to Brazil.

One of the main inputs for agricultural production are the fertilizers that Brazil imports from different countries globally, and 80% of the flow of fertilizers comes from ten countries, among which are the Russian Federation, Morocco, Canada, the United States, China, Belarus, Qatar, Israel, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia.

The flow of fertilizers to Brazil indicates that it has a 13% share in the global fertilizer trade of a total of US $64.8 billion and that the Russian Federation is the main supplier of potassium fertilizers, nitrogenous fertilizers, and mixed fertilizers for an approximate value of US $1.7 billion that correspond to 20% of the fertilizers that Brazil buys during the year 2020, Brazil imported fertilizers from more than 60 different countries with a value of US $8.5 billion (according to resourcetrade.com). The export of fertilizers to Brazil is led by the Russian Federation, from which 20% is imported according to the portals of The Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) and Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs; followed by Morocco with 11%, Canada with 9.7% and the United States with 8%. Being 10 countries that export 80% of the fertilizers to Brazil.

These are the fertilizers imported to Brazil: 32.3% mixed, 31.8% potassium, 31.7% nitrogen, 3.9% phosphate, and 0.2% organic.

On the other hand, Brazil exports 0.73% to Russia of its total export volume, which corresponds to US $1.6 billion, represented mainly in the following products: soybeans, walnuts, coffee, sugar, and tobacco among others that represent almost 50% of exports to Russia.

According to the Brazilian Agency of the Brazilian Communication Company, to manage this situation of importing fertilizers, Brazil launched the “National Fertilizer Plan” since the country depends on imported nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium. According to the Minister of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply, food security is a matter of national security, and fertilizers play an important role in avoiding a food crisis.

China Is Winning in Asia. Biden’s Plans Won’t Change That - Susannah Patton (NYT)

 Há muito tempo que os EUA – que ganharam a primeira Guerra Fria geopolítica, 1947-1991 – vêm perdendo a segunda Guerra Fria econômica, aliás, desde 2001 

The New York Times – 2.6.2022

China Is Winning in Asia. Biden’s Plans Won’t Change That.

Susannah Patton

 

President Biden has said the United States won’t stand by and let China “win the 21st century,” and his first trip to Asia was meant to match words with action.

Mr. Biden huddled last week with leaders of the four-nation “Quad” group formed to counter Beijing, vowed to defend Taiwan against China and launched a new economic pact involving a dozen nations to shore up U.S. economic influence in the region.

Yet China is already winning throughout much of Asia on both the economic and diplomatic front, and nothing the United States is doing seems likely to change that.

The Lowy Institute’s Asia Power Index, which tracks economic data to assess regional power dynamics, shows that U.S. leverage has declined precipitously since as recently as 2018, while China has surged ahead.

Twenty years ago, just 5 percent of exports from Southeast Asia went to China, and 16 percent to the United States. By 2020, they were even at around 15 percent. China’s increasing clout becomes clearer when considering total trade: it does around two and a half times more volume in the region than the United States. China is now the largest trading partner of almost every Asian country.

Investment — driven by a vibrant U.S. private sector — has long been an American advantage in Asia. But that edge is rapidly eroding, too. In 2018, 10-year cumulative flows of investment from China to other countries in the region were half those of the United States. They are now 75 percent of the U.S. total and rising.

Competing robustly in the region is essential for America. The Obama administration recognized this with its proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which would have been the largest trade bloc ever. But President Donald Trump withdrew over concerns that it would erode U.S. competitiveness and ship American jobs overseas.

That was a gift to Beijing. China is already the largest economy in a separate trade grouping called the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and last year applied to join the TPP’s successor agreement, which retains many of the original pact’s core provisions. The United States is out of both.

The Biden administration’s answer, unveiled last week in Tokyo, is its Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. It falls far short.

The plan calls for cooperation on trade, supply chains, infrastructure and fighting corruption. But it does not include better access to the huge U.S. import market, a crucial carrot that normally underpins trade agreements.

U.S. officials counter that the plan is more suited to the 21st century than “past models.” But potential Asian partners have trouble seeing what’s in it for them. A lack of buy-in could undermine the United States’ ability to set the rules on emerging issues like the digital economy, which would give American firms a leg up.

Meanwhile, China has forged ahead. State-owned companies have locked up big projects around the region, often under the umbrella of China’s sprawling Belt and Road Initiative.

China also practices persistent diplomacy. Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s travels in Southeast Asia and the Pacific has far outstripped the pace of his U.S. counterpart, Antony Blinken. Despite the fanfare of Mr. Biden’s recent trip to Asia, it was his first to the region since taking office 16 months ago and only included visits to close allies South Korea and Japan.

China also cultivates powerful elites. In the Philippines, its newly elected president and vice president have both politically benefited from China’s investments in their home constituencies. In Cambodia and the Solomon Islands, China has opened pathways for expanding its military presence far from home. In Indonesia, a strong relationship with the coordinating minister for maritime affairs and investment gives Beijing the access needed to pursue objectives such as deals for Huawei in the country’s 5G network.

The United States does have something China lacks: time-tested alliances with what the Biden administration calls “like-minded” democracies such as its fellow members of the “Quad” grouping — Japan, Australia and India — as well as South Korea. The Quad is meant to demonstrate that the United States and its partners can provide an alternative to China on, for example, vaccines and infrastructure.

But the Quad is yet to have much real impact. An ambitious pledge to deliver one billion vaccines to Indo-Pacific countries by the end of this year has run into manufacturing obstacles in India.

The Quad, in fact, highlights an American weakness: the United States is strong in the democracies fringing the region but weak at the center in Southeast Asia. Over time, a more dominant China could impede U.S. military access to regional bases during crises, pose challenges for American companies doing business and force U.S. diplomats to work harder to make their voices heard.

Unless Washington’s economic statecraft improves, its influence in Asia will continue to ebb. Rather than its uninspiring new regional economic plan, the Biden administration should summon the political courage to join the TPP’s successor pact, making clear to U.S. domestic opponents that it would be an important tool in countering China. It also needs to more aggressively engage with smaller but still important non-aligned countries of Southeast Asia and the Pacific that China is steadily winning over.

Competing with China in Asia will not be easy. But it starts with recognizing that right now the United States is losing.

 

Susannah Patton (@SusannahCPatton) researches Indo-Pacific strategy at the Lowy Institute in Sydney, Australia, and is project director of the Asia Power Index.

Sanções contra a Rússia vão criar uma recessão global? - Clifford Krauss (NYT)

  Europe’s Russian Oil Ban Could Mean a New World Order for Energy

The effort could hurt Russia but could also help drive up already high oil prices, hurting the global economy and enriching energy companies.

Clifford Krauss

The New York Times – 2.6.2022

 

Houston - The European Union’s embargo on most Russian oil imports could deliver a fresh jolt to the world economy, propelling a realignment of global energy trading that leaves Russia economically weaker, gives China and India bargaining power and enriches producers like Saudi Arabia.

Europe, the United States and much of the rest of the world could suffer because oil prices, which have been marching higher for months, could climb further as Europe buys energy from more distant suppliers. European companies will have to scour the world for the grades of oil that its refineries can process as easily as Russian oil. There could even be sporadic shortages of certain fuels like diesel, which is crucial for trucks and agricultural equipment.

In effect, Europe is trading one unpredictable oil supplier — Russia — for unstable exporters in the Middle East.

Europe’s hunt for new oil supplies — and Russia’s quest to find new buyers of its oil — will leave no part of the world untouched, energy experts said. But figuring out the impact on each country or business is difficult because leaders, energy executives and traders will respond in varying ways.

China and India could be protected from some of the burden of higher oil prices because Russia is offering them discounted oil. In the last couple of months, Russia has become the second biggest oil supplier to India, leapfrogging other big producers like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. India has several large refineries that could earn rich profits by refining Russian oil into diesel and other fuels in high demand around the world.

Ultimately, Western leaders are aiming to weaken President Vladimir V. Putin’s ability to wreak havoc in Ukraine and elsewhere by denying him billions of dollars in energy sales. They hope that their moves will force Russian oil producers to shut down wells because the country does not have many places to store oil while it lines up new buyers. But the effort is perilous and could fail. If oil prices rise substantially, Russia’s overall oil revenue may not fall much.

Other oil producers like Saudi Arabia and Western oil companies like Exxon Mobil, BP, Shell and Chevron stand to do well simply because oil prices are higher. The flip side of that is that global consumers and businesses will have to pay more for every gallon of fuel and goods shipped in trucks and trains.

“It’s a historic, big deal,” said Robert McNally, a former energy adviser to President George W. Bush. “This will reshape not only commercial relationships but political and geopolitical ones as well.”

E.U. officials have yet to release all the details of their effort to squelch Russian oil exports but have said that those policies will go into effect over months. That is meant to give Europeans time to prepare, but it will also give Russia and its partners time to devise workarounds. Who will adapt better to the new reality is hard to know.

According to what European officials have said so far, the union will ban Russian tanker imports of crude oil and refined fuels like diesel, representing two-thirds of the continent’s purchases from Russia. The ban will be phased in over six months for crude and eight months for diesel and other refined fuels.

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In addition, Germany and Poland have pledged to stop importing oil from Russia by pipeline, which means Europeans could reduce Russian imports by 3.3 million barrels a day by the end of the year.

And the union has said that European companies will no longer be allowed to insure tankers carrying Russian oil anywhere. That ban will also be phased in over several months. Because many of the world’s largest insurers are based in Europe, that move could significantly raise the cost of shipping Russian energy, though insurers in China, India and Russia itself might now pick up some of that business.

Before the invasion of Ukraine, roughly half of Russia’s oil exports went to Europe, representing $10 billion in transactions a month. Sales of Russian oil to E.U. members have declined somewhat in the last few months, and those to the United States and Britain have been eliminated.

Some energy analysts said the new European effort could help untangle Europe from Russian energy and limit Mr. Putin’s political leverage over Western countries.

“There are many geopolitical repercussions,” said Meghan L. O’Sullivan, director of the geopolitics of energy project at Harvard’s Kennedy School. “The ban will draw the United States more deeply into the global energy economy and it will strengthen energy ties between Russia and China.”

Another hope of Western leaders is that their moves will reduce Russia’s position in the global energy industry. The idea is that despite its efforts to find new buyers in China, India and elsewhere, Russia will export less oil overall. As a result, Russian producers will need to shut wells, which they will not be able to easily restart because of the difficulties of drilling and producing oil in inhospitable Arctic fields.

Still, the new European policy was the product of compromises between countries that can easily replace Russian energy and countries like Hungary that can’t easily break their dependence on Moscow or are unwilling to do so. That is why 800,000 barrels a day of Russian oil that comes to Europe by pipeline was excluded from the embargo for now.

The Europeans also decided to phase in the restrictions on insuring Russian oil shipments because of the importance of the shipping industry to Greece and Cyprus.

Such compromises could undermine the effectiveness of the new European effort, some energy experts warned.

“Why wait six months?” said David Goldwyn, a top State Department energy official in the Obama administration. “As the sanctions are configured now, all that will happen is you will see more Russian crude and product flow to other destinations,” he said. But he added, “It’s a necessary first step.”

 

The Russia-Ukraine War and the Global Economy

 

A far-reaching conflict. Russia’s invasion on Ukraine has had a ripple effect across the globe, adding to the stock market’s woes. The conflict has caused?? dizzying spikes in gas prices and product shortages, and is pushing Europe to reconsider its reliance on Russian energy sources.

 

Global growth slows. The fallout from the war has hobbled efforts by major economies to recover from the pandemic, injecting new uncertainty and undermining economic confidence around the world. In the United States, gross domestic product, adjusted for inflation, fell 0.4 percent in the first quarter of 2022.

Energy prices rise. Oil and gas prices, already up as a result of the pandemic, have continued to increase since the beginning of the conflict. The sharpening of the confrontation has also forced countries in Europe and elsewhere to rethink their reliance on Russian energy and seek alternative sources.

Russia’s economy faces slowdown. Though pro-Ukraine countries continue to adopt sanctions against the Kremlin in response to its aggression, the Russian economy has avoided a crippling collapse for now thanks to capital controls and interest rate increases. But Russia’s central bank chief warned that the country is likely to face a steep economic downturn as its inventory of imported goods and parts runs low.

Trade barriers go up. The invasion of Ukraine has also unleashed a wave of protectionism as governments, desperate to secure goods for their citizens amid shortages and rising prices, erect new barriers to stop exports. But the restrictions are making the products more expensive and even harder to come by.

Food supplies come under pressure. The war has driven up the cost of food in East Africa, a region that depends greatly on exports of wheat, soybeans and barley from Russia and Ukraine and is already dealing with a severe drought. Amid dwindling supplies, supermarkets around the world have begun asking customers to limit their purchases of sunflower oil, of which Ukraine is a top exporter.

Prices of essential metals soar. The price of palladium, used in automotive exhaust systems and mobile phones, has been soaring amid fears that Russia, the world’s largest exporter of the metal, could be cut off from global markets. The price of nickel, another key Russian export, has also been rising.

 

Despite the oil embargo, Europe will likely remain reliant on Russian natural gas for some time, possibly years. That could preserve some of Mr. Putin’s leverage, especially if gas demand spikes during a cold winter. European leaders have fewer alternatives to Russian gas because the world’s other major suppliers of that fuel — the United States, Australia and Qatar — can’t quickly expand exports substantially.

Russia also has other cards to play, which could undermine the effectiveness of the European embargo.

China is a growing market for Russia. Connected mainly by pipelines that are near capacity, China increased its tanker shipments of Russian crude in recent months.

Saudi Arabia and Iran might lose from those increased Russian sales to China, and Middle Eastern sellers have been forced to reduce their prices to compete with the heavily discounted Russian crude.

Dr. O’Sullivan said that the relationship between Russia, Saudi Arabia and other members of the OPEC Plus alliance could become more complicated “as Moscow and Riyadh compete to build and maintain their market share in China.”

Even as energy commercial ties are scrambled, big oil producers like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have benefited overall from the war in Europe. Many European companies are now eager to buy more oil from the Middle East. Saudi oil export revenues are climbing and could set a record this year, according to Middle East Petroleum and Economic Publications, which tracks the industry, pushing the kingdom’s trade surplus to more than $250 billion.

India is another beneficiary because it has big refineries that can process Russian crude, turning it into diesel, some of which could end up in Europe even if the raw material came from Russia.

“India is becoming the de facto refining hub for Europe,” analysts at RBC Capital Markets said in a recent report.

But buying diesel from India will raise costs in Europe because it’s more expensive to ship fuel from India than to have it piped in from Russian refineries. “The unintended consequence is that Europe is effectively importing inflation to its own citizens,” the RBC analysts said.

India is getting about 600,000 barrels a day from Russia, up from 90,000 barrels a day last year when it was a relatively minor supplier. Russia is now India’s second biggest supplier after Iraq.

But India could find it difficult to keep buying from Russia if the European Union’s restrictions on European companies insuring Russian oil shipments raise costs too much.

“India is a winner,” said Helima Croft, RBC’s head of commodity strategy, “as long as they are not hit with secondary sanctions.”

O Paradoxo do Merito - Fernando Schüler

 Estudo a fundo, trabalho intenso, aproveitamento das oportunidades, focar a utilidade da cada ação que se empreende, reconhecer talentos alheios, incorporar as boas ideias disponíveis e agradecer a todos que lhe ajudam na caminhada; acredito que pode ser uma boa fórmula para o sucesso.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

O Paradoxo do Merito

Fernando Schüler

Dias atrás li uma entrevista de Michael Sandel, filósofo de Harvard, sugerindo que Messi e Cristiano Ronaldo deveriam estar em “dívida”, em vez de celebrar seu sucesso como resultado de algum tipo de mérito pessoal. Sandel escreveu um best-seller, A Tirania do Mérito, atacando o que chama de “retórica da ascensão”. Critica Bill Gates por associar a ideia de “ganhar mais” com “estudar mais” e coisas do tipo. Sugere substituir a competição por vagas nas universidades, a partir do conhecimento de cada um, por sorteios. Seria uma forma de mostrar a força do acaso, e não de coisas como o preparo e o estudo, na vida das pessoas. Sempre admirei Sandel. Até trabalhamos juntos, em algum momento, mas suspeito que exista alguma coisa mal colocada em seu argumento.

“A ideia meritocrática fez o mundo moderno”, diz Adrian Wooldridge, editor da The Economist e autor do belíssimo livro The Aristocracy of Talent. A obra mostra como a ideia das “carreiras abertas ao talento” desempenhou um papel-chave na ruptura com as velhas estruturas da Europa aristocrática, em que o sucesso dependia essencialmente do nascimento e do pertencimento social. A noção de que qualquer um poderia ocupar a posição que quisesse, “sem outra distinção que não suas virtudes e talentos”, estava lá, inscrita na Declaração dos Direitos Humanos, da Revolução Francesa. Essa foi uma ideia central na grande tradição iluminista. Ela esteve na base da gradativa universalização do acesso à educação, no mundo moderno, e serviu de pavimento para a enorme transformação econômica, na era industrial, assim como para a lenta afirmação de nossas democracias.

O radicalismo antimeritocrático atual se organiza sobre uma espécie de falácia do espantalho, que consiste em “denunciar a ideia fraudulenta de que vivemos em sociedades meritocráticas”. O truque é fazer acreditar que de fato alguém defenda a ideia esdrúxula de que, em uma economia de mercado, o sucesso é definido pelo mérito pessoal. Isso é uma bobagem. Não há uma régua para definir ou medir o que significa mérito individual. O mercado remunera o valor, não o mérito. As pessoas compram celulares da Apple não por reconhecer o talento de Steve Jobs, mas pela boa relação custo-benefício de seus produtos. No mais, é perfeitamente plausível que alguém faça sucesso, ou fique milionário, simplesmente por um lance de sorte. O sujeito pode ganhar na loteria, por exemplo, ou herdar 1 milhão de dólares de uma tia distante. Simplesmente não há como separar o que é resultado do esforço ou do acaso.

Isso não significa que o esforço, a disciplina e a capacidade de renúncia não sejam decisivos para o sucesso. Reside aí o paradoxo do mérito. Tyler Cowen e Daniel Gross observam que nos EUA, de 1980 a 2000, o grau de escolaridade explicava 75% da desigualdade de salários; nas últimas duas décadas, esse porcentual caiu para 38%. As diferenças de ganhos surgem majoritariamente dentro dos grupos de mesmo padrão educacional. O que vai fazendo a diferença são precisamente aspectos ligados ao mérito e ao talento. A capacidade de alguém apresentar uma performance superior, pela capacidade de inovar ou de trabalhar duro, mesmo competindo com pessoas com a mesma base educacional. Há algo associado ao fator humano, à “capacidade de perseverar em objetivos de longo prazo”, como define a psicóloga Angela Duckworth, fazendo a diferença na vida das pessoas. E é simplesmente um erro fazer de conta que essas coisas não existem, quem sabe para não destoar da multidão barulhenta.

O desafio é cultivar uma visão inclusiva do mérito. Em vez de renunciar ao princípio das “carreiras abertas ao talento”, crucial na formação moderna, deveríamos andar para a frente. Assegurar que cada um tenha direito a uma base de oportunidades iguais. A igualdade pura e simples de oportunidades não passa de uma miragem. Seria preciso separar os filhos das famílias, impor a todos a mesma educação e, por fim, equalizar a sorte e o azar. O segredo é focar no que Harry Frankfurt chamou de “suficiente”. Isso pode significar muitas coisas, mas todos concordariam com o pacote básico, que inclui uma sociedade aberta, feita de direitos iguais e uma boa educação. Educação que realmente faça a diferença, colocando alunos de menor renda nas mesmas escolas, ou ao menos em escolas similares, onde estudam os alunos de maior renda. Curiosamente, o que nossa elite atrasada não quer nem ouvir falar.

Assegurado o básico, são as escolhas de cada um que devem fazer a diferença. Na prática, a famosa frase de Obama: “Se você tentar, você pode conseguir”. Meu amigo Sandel achou a frase um insulto. Acha que ela é ofensiva para os que não conseguiram chegar lá. Fico com Obama. Se alguém falhou (e quem nunca?), deve ter a chance de aprender e voltar ao jogo. Essa ideia contém um claro sentido ético: desejamos não apenas ter sucesso, mas saber que somos autores do caminho pelo qual trilhamos. E talvez seja por aí que se mova uma boa sociedade. Aquela que não trate as pessoas como “vítimas das circunstâncias”, como diz Wooldridge.

Para uma visão inclusiva do mérito, sugiro prestar atenção à hipótese de Howard Gardner, psicólogo de Harvard, de que a inteligência humana é múltipla. Ele identificou nove grandes campos, que vão da inteligência lógico-matemática à inteligência interpessoal. Neymar pode não se interessar muito por filosofia, mas sua capacidade corporal-cinestésica é constrangedoramente melhor que a minha. A tese de Gardner recupera a velha ideia iluminista de que todos somos capazes. E que é preciso acreditar um pouco mais nas pessoas. Apostar que, recebendo a chance devida, as pessoas saberão voar muito mais alto do que nossos preconceitos permitem imaginar.

É o que diz Ken Robinson, o grande educador inglês. Ele conta a história de uma “menina-problema” na Inglaterra elitista dos anos 1930. Uma daquelas alunas dispersivas, que não param no lugar e terminam por irritar os mais pacientes professores. A guria ia ser mandada para uma escola de “alunos-problema”, mas sua mãe pediu uma última chance. Foi a um psicólogo, que a deixou por algum tempo sozinha, em uma sala, com uma música ao fundo. Minutos depois, a menina dançava pela sala. O psicólogo chamou a mãe dela e, quando ambos observavam aquela cena, vaticinou: sua filha não é um problema, é uma bailarina.

Essa história sempre mexeu comigo. Qualquer um de nós poderia ser aquela menina. O que ela recebeu não foi muito. Foi uma chance básica de fazer a diferença no mundo. Seu nome era Gillian Lynne. Ela se tornou uma estrela do Royal Ballet, mas essa é apenas a sua história. A vida é feita de infinitas histórias. Todas elas nos dizem para acreditar nas pessoas e no melhor que cada um pode ser. Isso está lá, no coração do projeto moderno, e diz respeito a valores dos quais não deveríamos abrir mão.

Fernando Schüler é cientista político e professor do Insper