Livros sobre Politica Externa brasileira: Matias Spektor e Oliver Stuenkel

Duas obras recém-publicadas de professores do Centro de Relações Internacionais, sediado no CPDOC/FGV, Matias Spektor e Oliver Stuenkel.

18 Dias: Quando Lula e FHC se uniram para conquistar o apoio de Bush
Matias Spektor
288 páginas | 16cm x 23cm | Brochura
Livro físico | ISBN 978-85-3900-581-9| R$36,90
EBook | ISBN 978-85-3900-601-4 | R$23,66

18 dias é a história por trás da ofensiva diplomática de Lula e FHC para quebrar a resistência do governo norte-americano ao PT nas eleições de 2002. O livro revela uma faceta desconhecida dos bastidores do poder: o papel da política externa durante uma troca de comando no Palácio do Planalto.

India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA): The Rise of the Global South
Oliver Stuenkel
198 páginas | 5in x 8 in | Brochura
Capa dura | ISBN 978-11-3878-908-1|$128,25
Um volume da série Global Institutions

​Este livro oferece a mais completa síntese das origens e trajetória do foro que veio a marcar uma década de coalizões Sul-Sul. Em linguagem clara, analisa criticamente o impacto do grupo no ordenamento global.

No One’s World, by Charles A. Kupchan - Resenha de Oliver Stuenkel

Acabo de receber este livro, que comprei de segunda mão, no Abebooks, bem barato, a despeito de ser relativamente recente.
Concordo, em grande medida, com a resenha abaixo de meu colega acadêmico e de Academia.edu, que fui buscar nessa plataforma, mas sempre insisto em que as pessoas, autores ou resenhistas, sempre fazem certa confusão em torno da política externa do Brasil, ao dizer, por exemplo: o Brasil fez isto, ou o Brasil fez aquilo. Sempre sou tentado a corrigir, dizendo: não foi o Brasil, foi o PT, ou foi Lula. O exemplo citado é o famoso "acordo nuclear" turco-brasileiro-iraniano", rejeitado imediatamente pelo P5+1, pois não preenchia os mínimos requerimentos solicitados pelos membros do CSNU mais a Alemanha, quanto às garantias de desenvolvimento pacífico da energia nuclear.
Foi o Brasil que fez esse acordo? Duvidoso que o Itamaraty se engajasse, por vontade própria, nesse assunto, que foi conduzido quase solitariamente pelo chanceler de Lula a pedido deste, que talvez aspirasse a qualquer outra coisa que não apenas o acordo nuclear em questão.
Bem, ainda vou ler o livro, e depois opinar.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Book review: 

No one’s world: the West, the rising rest and the coming global turn

Charles A. Kupchan

New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 272 p.

International Affairs, vol. 89, n. 4, 2013, p.1025-1027

What will replace the western world order once the United States is no longer capable of exercising global leadership? Will China’s rise be ‘unpeaceful’ and prove to be disruptive, as John Mearsheimer argues, or will rising powers support today’s system that is ‘easy to  join and hard to overturn’, as G. John Ikenberry predicts? Who will rule the world once the United States’ reign ends, and what will such a world look like? Is it a ‘post-American world’, a ‘Chinese world’, or simply a western world order under non-western leadership? 

Rejecting such predictions, Charles Kupchan predicts that tomorrow’s world will ‘belong to no one’. Before elaborating on this claim, the author briskly moves through centuries of history to explain why the West was quickly able to develop economically and leave other, tradition-ally successful, regions behind, thus initiating western global dominance. While the world had historically been compartmentalized, with each region operating according to cultur-ally particular and exclusive principles, the author argues that Europe’s rise helped create one single global system: as European powers conquered the world, ‘they also exported European conceptions of sovereignty, administration, law, diplomacy, and commerce’ (p. 65) — thus creating what we now call the ‘western world order’. Kupchan writes that ‘remaking the world in its own image was perhaps the ultimate exercise of Western power’ (p. 66). 

The West’s capacity to define modernity caused generations of non-western thinkers to argue about whether there was a difference between modernization and westernization. Kupchan shows that in a few decades, at least three BRIC countries will be among the world’s five leading economies, and he predicts that there will be multiple versions of modernity. Not only do the characteristics of Brazil’s, India’s and China’s rise differ markedly from Europe’s, but their cultural DNA is different, too, he argues. 

This is hardly news; the author fails to explain how internal peculiarities affect countries’ strategy vis-à-vis the global system. His assertion that ‘much of Latin America has been captivated by left-wing populism’ and that this represents ‘an alternative to the West’s brand of liberal democracy’ is controversial (p. 90). What exactly are the characteristics of the ‘West’s brand of liberal democracy’? Is Brazil’s democratic system fundamentally different from, say, Portugal’s?

  

The author speaks of the ‘West’ as if it were a cohesive bloc, a somewhat misleading idea to begin with. For example, he writes that Brazil’s then President Lula’s decision in 2010 to meet Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to negotiate Iran’s nuclear programme serves as proof that Brazil will not accept the western global order. Turkey’s quarrels with Israel are supposedly evidence of Turkey’s drift away from the West. Yet such views find little support among policy-makers and analysts in Brazil and Turkey. Equally controversially, Kupchan argues that India’s voting behaviour in the UN shows that ‘its interests and status as an emerging power are more important determinants of its foreign policy than its democratic institutions’ (p. 143), thus implying that the United States’ democratic institutions are somehow more important to US policy-makers than the national interest. 

Yet the history of US foreign policy is littered with instances when strong partnerships with non-democratic regimes were established to promote US national interest—not at least in the Middle East where Saudi Arabia remains an important US ally. This highly US-centric argument paradoxically shows how difficult it will be for policy-makers in Washington to adapt to a truly multipolar world in which the United States will be one among several large actors. 

Kupchan thus interprets emerging countries’ independent foreign policy strategies as evidence that they will undermine today’s global order, all the while overlooking the fact that despite their growing strength, there is little evidence that countries such as China seriously challenge the norms and rules that undergird today’s system. In the final chapter, Kupchan lays out a series of interesting ideas about how the new world order could appear. He argues that ‘the West will have to embrace political diversity rather than insist that liberal democracy is the only legitimate form of government’. He rightly observes that ‘even as the West does business with autocracies … it also delegitimizes them in word and action’ (p. 187). Kupchan argues that while such a pro-democracy stance  may be morally compelling, it was simply not pragmatic and made unnecessary enemies in the emerging world. He declines, however, to specify at which degree of a dictator’s nastiness the West should switch from cooperation to condemnation. 

No one’s world is sprinkled with interesting insights, yet the ground Kupchan covers is vast, forcing him often to remain superficial and to rely on sound bites when commenting on other countries’ domestic affairs. ‘The world’, he writes, ‘is headed toward a global dissensus’ (p. 145). The prediction that we will live in a world with competing narratives (rather than a convergence towards a western narrative) is an important starting point. Yet Kupchan could offer a more rigorous analysis of what these competing narratives might look like. 

Oliver Stuenkel, Fundação Getulio Vargas, Brazil

Eleicoes 2014: a politica externa de Marina Silva - Oliver Stuenkel

What Would a Marina Presidency Mean for Brazilian Foreign Policy?

30 Aug. 2014 /

Oliver Stuenkel / 0 Comments /

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Marina Silva and her advisers faced a formidable challenge. After Eduardo Campos' tragic death on August 13, Marina Silva, Campos' running mate, suddenly turned into the best placed candidate to defeat President Dilma Rousseff in the upcoming elections. While other candidates had months to hone their arguments, Marina's team had merely days to finalize the document that lists her policy proposals. Contrary to 2010, when she was seen as a protest candidate, she has now turned into a serious contender, and the first option for many of those who are dissatisfied with the way the country is goverrned.
International issues will not be decisive in this election, of course. Voters care most issues such as health care, education, public transport, public security, the fight against corruption and the economy. And yet, compared to previous elections, foreign policy issues are set to play a more important role in weeks leading up to the election on October 5, underlining a growing notion among voters that the way Brazil relates to the world directly impacts their well-being. While security issues such as the Crimean Crisis are unlikely to matter much, candidates will have to explain their proposals on topics around Mercosur, possible trade agreements with the EU and the US and the rise of China. The more likely a victory by Marina seems, the more will people seek to understand her ideas about Brazil's foreign policy.
The 12 pages of her program dedicated to foreign policy (pp.28-40) provide interesting insights, some of which are analyzed below.
Trade
As big regional negotiations such as one between the EU and United States advance, one cannot but notice the prospect of a world divided into trade blocs. Brazil will have to make up its mind about which strategy to pursue. In the case of the negotiations with the EU, this involves making a decision about whether to take a highly protectionist and rather unpredictable Argentina along or whether to pursue a two-speed solution, temporarily leaving Argentina behind. According to her program, Marina would opt for the latter option of the "two-speed Mercosur" to facilitate the conclusion of trade negotiations with the European Union, among others. She argues that focusing on the WTO is fully compatible with seeking other regional and bilaratal trade deals. That seems reasonable, and even Brazil's current government has been increasingly open about its willingness to negotiate without Argentina. Marina Silva is also supportive of the ongoing process to fully liberalize trade between the Pacific Alliance and Mercosur, and calls for Brazil to make regional integration its top priority.
Regional leadership
Similar to her arguments made during the campaign four years ago, when Marina Silva said that Brazil had a "key role in mediating between the different regional interests" through exercising "respectful and supportive leadership" in the region, the 2014 program reads as a commitment to play a more active role in the neighborhood. While she frequently mentions defending human rights and democracy in South America, her program does not suggest a reckless idealistic position that may endanger strategic interests. Over the coming days and weeks, she will certainly have to say how she would deal with the ongoing political crisis in Venezuela.
Global governance
Contrary to critics who argue that Marina Silva would radically change course, there are signs that she could seek to reemphasize the importance of foreign policy after a relatively lacklustre performance under Dilma Rousseff. Notably, she stresses that both Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Lula contributed to strengthening Brazil's international projection, and has repeatedly argued, since 2010, in favor of reforming the international system  - such as the UN Security Council, the IMF, and the World Bank -  to increase its legitimacy and provide Brazil with more responsibility. Furthermore, as globally recognized environmental leader, Marina Silva has repeatedly argued that Brazil had the potential to assume international leadership in the debate about environmental sustainability. It is in this context that her proposals are most innovative - ranging from engaging with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and strengthening the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO). A more sophisticated strategy in the Amazon will also please nationalists, many of whom worry about Brazil's limited capacity to control its Western borders.
Despite expressing her desire to improve ties to the United States, Marina's proposals do not imply weakening Brazil's ties to the Global South - to the contrary, the explicitly refers to the BRICS grouping and the importance of Brazil-Africa ties. That will make it difficult for supporters of Lula's foreign policy to attack her approach. Nothing suggests that Marina would seek to undo his notable achievements (or, for that matter, Dilma's main achievement, Brazil's laudable internet governance initiative).
Her proposal to promote Brazilian culture more systematically on a global scale - she mentions learning from European institutions such as the Alliance Française, the British Council and the Goethe Institute - deserve attention and hint to a welcome willingness to introduce new ideas to strengthen Brazil's international visibility. In the same way, she suggests modernizing the Rio Branco Institute, Brazil's diplomatic academy, and further strengthening the dialogue between Itamaraty and civil society.
Putting foreign policy back at the center? 
Finally, and most importantly, Marina Silva argues that Dilma Rousseff did not sufficiently value Brazil's Foreign Ministry. And indeed, under no other Brazilian leader in recent history has the Foreign Ministry - historically above the political fray - been so secondary. As a result, Brazil's foreign policy under Rousseff has been far more hesitant and passive than during the presidencies of Cardoso and Lula.
Naturally, in the coming weeks Marina Silva will have to explain how some of her ideas would play out in practice. And yet, her program suggests that Marina would pursue an activist foreign policy, built on the notion that established countries' dominance in the global conversation is highly counterproductive and unlikely to produce sustainable solutions to the world's most pressing issues such as climate change, financial volatility, human rights and nuclear proliferation.
More than ever before, Brazil's stronger voice - be it in the UN Security Council, during climate change negotiations, as a mediator in Venezuela, as a defender of democracy in Guinea Bissau, or as an agenda setter on internet governance - is needed to create a richer and more balanced global debate. That requires a President unafraid of taking courageous decisions and occasionally generating international controversy.
Read also:
Marina’s foreign policy
What would Aécio do?
Brazil’s top 10 foreign policy challenges in 2014

• Oliver Stuenkel

  Oliver Stuenkel is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (FGV) in São Paulo, where he coordinates the São Paulo branch of the School of History and Social Science (CPDOC) and the executive program in International Relations. He is also a non-resident Fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin and a member of the Carnegie Rising Democracies Network. His research focuses on rising powers; specifically on Brazil’s, India’s and China's foreign policy and on their impact on global governance. He is the author of the forthcoming IBSA: The rise of the Global South? (2014, Routledge Global Institutions) and BRICS and the Future of Global Order (2014, Lexington).
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Eleicoes 2014: a politica externa de Aecio Neves - Oliver Stuenkel

A política externa de Aécio

Oliver StuenkelCientista político, professor da FGV, autor de “BRICS e o futuro da ordem global”

Brazil Post (Huffington Post), 24/07/2014

A próxima campanha presidencial no Brasil deverá incluir uma discussão sobre como cada candidato pretende defender os interesses do Brasil no exterior. A atuação internacional do Brasil é muito maior hoje do que em qualquer momento de sua história, tornando o tema um elemento-chave da estratégia global de qualquer governo. As tropas brasileiras estão no Haiti, o Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento do Brasil (BNDES) empresta dinheiro a nível internacional, o Brasil aumentou o número de suas embaixadas na África e participou da criação dos grupos BRICS e UNASUL.
Esta forte presença internacional levanta questões importantes. Por exemplo, o que o foco direcionado do Brasil na África tem realmente alcançado na última década? Fazer parte do grupo BRICS pode aumentar a influência global do Brasil? Como podemos convencer os nossos vizinhos de que a ascensão do Brasil é boa para eles também? Qual é a visão a longo prazo do Brasil para a região? Qual é a função da ajuda brasileira ao desenvolvimento, da UNASUL e do Mercosul nesta visão regional? Como o Brasil pode melhor promover a estabilidade política e econômica na América Latina? Como o Brasil deveria lidar com a instabilidade na Venezuela e as violações de direitos humanos em Cuba?
Diante disso, todos os candidatos devem ser capazes de criticar a política externa do Brasil durante a presidência de Dilma Rousseff. Em comparação com FHC e Lula, que deixaram suas marcas no compromisso internacional do Brasil, a política externa da presidente tem sido uma política sem brilho. Diplomatas estrangeiros lamentam privadamente que ela não parece se importar muito com questões internacionais. Enquanto os Ministros das Relações Exteriores de FHC e Lula prosperavam, o Itamaraty foi rebaixado por Rousseff, e foi dado pouco espaço para o Ministro Patriota tomar iniciativa. O atual Ministro das Relações Exteriores, Figueiredo, parece ter maior acesso à Presidente, mas ele dificilmente é um de seus principais assessores. Os discursos de Dilma na Assembleia Geral da ONU, grandes oportunidades de articular a visão do Brasil, não foram inspiradores.
O que Aécio Neves, candidato do Partido da Social Democracia do Brasil (PSDB) faria se ele fosse eleito presidente? De todos os candidatos, é o ex-governador de Minas Gerais que articulou a crítica mais forte à atual política externa dos últimos governos. Sob as presidências tanto de Lula quanto Rousseff, Aécio argumenta que o Brasil tem mantido laços excessivamente cordiais com regimes autoritários como Cuba e Irã e tem feito muito pouco para promover os direitos humanos e a democracia. Da mesma forma, ele argumenta que convidar Chávez da Venezuela para participar do Mercosul foi um erro. Finalmente, segundo Aécio, o Brasil errou ao aceitar expropriações de refinarias da Petrobras na Bolívia - dando a entender que a resposta do Brasil foi, em grande parte, determinada por simpatias ideológicas do governo com o esquerdista Evo Morales da Bolívia.
Em questões internacionais, ele parece acreditar que a ênfase do Brasil em fortalecer os laços com outras potências emergentes e África foi mal concebida, com tendências ideológicas e não necessariamente a serviço do interesse nacional brasileiro.
Aécio Neves, portanto, não apenas critica a política externa do governo, mas também oferece alternativas relativamente claras: o Brasil deve deixar de cultivar laços estreitos com Cuba, Venezuela e outros governos de esquerda na região e adotar um tom mais crítico a esses países. Deve também condenar abertamente as violações de direitos humanos em Cuba e pedir a libertação de todos os presos políticos do governo Castro. O Brasil pode ainda gastar menos tempo estreitando os laços com o Sul Global e buscar consolidar sua relação com os Estados Unidos.
No entanto, mesmo sendo de alguma maneira construtiva, sua crítica é baseada no pressuposto maior que toda a política externa do Brasil baseia-se em fundamentos ideológicos puramente de esquerda - uma reivindicação questionável considerando que a política externa mudou relativamente pouco quando o presidente Lula assumiu, em 2002, em comparação com o governo anterior. Nem o presidente Itamar Franco, nem Fernando Henrique Cardoso criticaram Fidel Castro abertamente (mesmo que Luiz Felipe Lampreia tenha uma vez insistido em conhecer uma figura da oposição durante uma viagem a Cuba). Na mesma linha, o primeiro presidente a propor a participação da Venezuela no Mercosul foi FHC. As estreitas relações do Brasil com a Venezuela durante a última década podem ser explicadas por interesses econômicos do Brasil, não por uma forte ligação ideológica. Dilma Rousseff desprezou o estilo abrasivo de Hugo Chávez e critica a gestão econômica do presidente Maduro.
Por fim, diversificar parcerias e construir uma presença diplomática mais forte no mundo em desenvolvimento - que gerou muitos benefícios para o Brasil - também foi uma iniciativa de Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Lula, de maneira muito habilidosa, continuou e intensificou a estratégia. A participação brasileira no grupo do BRICS é uma estratégia pragmática e, contrário ao que argumentam alguns comentaristas conservadores, não motivada por questões ideológicas ("Os benefícios do grupo BRICS para o Brasil"). A política externa atual do Brasil pode ser menos ideológica do que algumas das críticas de Aécio Neves sugerem. A decisão de Lula de negociar com o Irã em 2010 foi muito mais uma tentativa (correta, ao meu ver) de fortalecer a projeção global do Brasil do que uma prova de alinhamento com Mahmoud Ahmadinejad - embora os radiantes sorrisos de Lula com o presidente do Irã, fazendo manchetes em todo o mundo, podem, de fato, ter enviado uma mensagem errada para o público global.
Tudo isso não significa que toda a crítica de Aécio seja equivocada. Por exemplo, ele tem razão em apontar que os laços com os Estados Unidos chegaram a um ponto baixo no final do segundo mandato de Lula, mesmo que o Ministro Patriota, no governo Dilma tenha conseguido normalizar boa parte das relações antes do escândalo de espionagem desfazer a sua obra. Aécio Neves criticou a decisão de Dilma de cancelar a visita de Estado, dizendo que não ter ido à Casa Branca pode ter feridos interesses comerciais. Diante do contexto político do escândalo de espionagem, porém, a decisão da Presidente cancelar sua viagem foi razoável, e parece pouco provável que interesses comerciais sofreram como consequência.
Quanto à abordagem regional da Aécio, duas questões se destacam. Primeiro de tudo, uma postura mais assertiva pró-direitos humanos e pró-democracia poderia conduzir Estados menores a ver o Brasil como um hegemon regional? Como Aécio teria certeza de que criticar o governo venezuelano não afetaria os interesses comerciais sólidos do Brasil lá? Afinal, mesmo a Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo (FIESP) apoiou a entrada da Venezuela no Mercosul, e os laços estreitos de Lula com Chávez protegeram os investimentos brasileiros contra a interferência política na Venezuela até o momento. Por outro lado, isso parece impedir que o Brasil desempenhe um papel construtivo como mediador-chave, uma vez que a Venezuela enfrenta um conflito interno profundo. Mais importante ainda, ele não só criticaria abusos de direitos humanos cometidos por governos de esquerda (como Venezuela e Cuba), mas também por governos conservadores, como do ex-presidente Uribe?
Em segundo lugar, como exatamente ele pretenderia influenciar a política de Cuba? Considerando que um embargo dos EUA não desestabilizou o regime cubano, nem o tornou mais liberal, isolar Cuba é a estratégia correta para o Brasil? Como defenderia os interesses econômicos brasileiros na ilha? Isso remete a uma das questões mais complexas nas relações internacionais: Como os países democráticos liberais devem lidar com os países não democráticos? Devemos procurar mudá-los através envolvimento com eles (como as diferentes vertentes de pensamento liberal sugerem) ou do isolamento? Ou devemos nos abster de influenciar assuntos internos de outros países (o que reflete uma abordagem mais realista)?
Ainda assim, não é claro em que medida Aécio prevê uma "política externa pragmática" (termo que ele usa frequentemente) baseada em interesses estratégicos e econômicos do Brasil ou uma política externa mais orientada por valores que promovem a democracia e os direitos humanos (mesmo que arrisque ferir interesses empresariais brasileiros). Se for o último, o termo "pragmático" parece estar fora do lugar. Nesse caso, ele teria que explicar como ele lidaria com crescentes laços econômicos do Brasil com cleptocracias como Angola ou a Guiné Equatorial, ou com ditaduras como a China.
Como a atuação internacional do Brasil aumentará na próxima década, e como o bem-estar dos cidadãos brasileiros será cada vez mais afetado pela estratégia de política externa do Brasil, discutir profundamente estas questões é fundamental - independentemente do apoio ou não à linha de argumentação de Aécio Neves, é preciso fortalecer o debate sobre a política externa e obrigar cada candidato a defender a sua estratégia.

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Brics meetings and summits: much ado about almost nothing? - Oliver Stuenkel, Alan Beattie

A despeito de todo o hype em volta dos Brics, não consigo perceber o que de novo, de interessante, de útil, de benéfico para a humanidade, ou para si mesmos, o grupo que não é um grupo, mas uma coisa indefinida, pode trazer de realmente de diferente para este nosso planetinha redondo.

OK, eles são mais do que reuniões de cúpula, e também tem reuniões especializadas.

Mas, estas seriam coisa mais substantiva do que meros encontros de burocratas, de alguns acadêmicos conformistas, que se reunem to talk and talk?

O que vai sair de positivo para os seus povos, e para a humanidade, de todos esses encontros?

Apenas dizer: Oi pessoal, nós estamos aqui, nós existimos, não se esqueçam de nós, OK? Tragam os seus fotógrafos, nós vamos soltar uma declaração conjunta logo, logo, confirmando que existimos, estamos aqui, fazemos alguma coisa, nos reunimos, escrevemos declarações, etc. etc. etc...

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Post-Western World - BRICS: There Is More Than Just the Summits

Oliver Stuenkel - 08 Jun. 2014

When BRICS leaders come together in Fortaleza in mid-July, analysts from around the world will have a quick look at the dynamics during the meeting and the 6th summit declaration, and then offer their view on the future of the grouping. Yet believing that the yearly summits make up the entire BRICS' edifice would be mistaken. The BRICS leaders summits are an important symbolic expression of political commitment, but what truly matters is the ongoing intra-BRICS cooperation that takes place throughout the year.

A brief look at BRICS-related meetings this year shows that intra-BRICS consultation and cooperation takes place continuously. In February, the first BRICS Science Technology and Innovation Ministerial Meeting took place in Cape Town. Ministers decided to strengthen cooperation in five fields: climate change and natural disaster mitigation (led by Brazil), water resources and pollution treatment (led by Russia), geospatial technology and its applications (led by India), new and renewable energy, and energy efficiency (led by China) and astronomy (led by South Africa).

In early March, the inaugural BRICS seminar on population matters took place, where participants discussed ways to address the challenges associated with demographic phenomena and processes, including migration, declining fertility rates, rising life expectancy, ageing population and changes in production and consumption patterns.

A week later, the 6th BRICS Academic Forum took place in Rio de Janeiro, bringing together scholars from Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa to discuss their research. Largely due to China's participation, these meetings tend to suffer from a boring whiff of officialdom, making truly innovative/contrarian academic ideas unlikely to be voiced, but still they serve an important purpose: To connect academic communities which have historically been disconnected from each other.

At the end of March, the BRICS Foreign Ministers met on the sidelines of the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague, issuing a high-profile statement opposing restrictions on the participation of Russian President Vladimir Putin at the G-20 Summit in Australia in November 2014.

A day later, on March 25th 2014, the BRICS Seminar on Systems of Innovation and Development took place in Brasília, as a direct result of the meeting of Ministers of Science and Technology in February.

In early April, BRICS Finance Ministers met on the sidelines of an IMF/World Bank gathering in Washington DC, in which they discussed preparations for the BRICS-led development bank, a U$ 100 billion contingency reserve arrangement and the forthcoming Summit in Fortaleza in Brazil. In late April, a public seminar meant to inform the Brazilian public about the upcoming Summit took place in Fortaleza.

In mid-May, the 4th Meeting of the BRICS Cooperatives took place in Curitiba (Brazil), and less then a week later, the BRICS Ministerial Meeting on the sideline of the 67th World Health Assembly (WHA) occurred. There, the side event on “Access to medicines: challenges and opportunities for developing countries” was organized by the BRICS countries.

Merely organizing a never-ending string of meetings will not create sustainable cooperation, skeptics will argue. That is true, and the impact of several of the gatherings listed above may not have the desired outcome. Only time will tell in how far these meetings can generate more sustainable cooperation. But they do show that intra-BRICS cooperation is indeed taking place in many different areas. Those who criticize the BRICS concept can no longer just take a quick glance at the yearly leaders' summits; rather, intra-BRICS cooperation has, over the past years, grown far too complex to be easily dismissed.

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Post-Western World - BRICS Summit is Chance to Strengthen Brazil’s Global and Regional Ties

Oliver Stuenkel - 11 Jun. 2014

The BRICS are not a group. - Martin Wolf, Financial Times

It’s time to bid farewell to the Brics.- Philip Stephens, Financial Times

Lack of unity is symptomatic of the BRICS members’ underlying incompatibilities. - Joe Nye, Harvard University

Since its first Summit, in 2009, BRICS has consolidated its position as a positive force for the democratization of international relations and for the enhancement of existing institutions of international governance. It has also forged an impressive partnership carrying out cooperation initiatives in more than 30 areas between its members. -  2014 BRICS Summit website

One month before the 6th BRICS, the Brazilian government has finally launched a website providing ample information about past summits, leaders declarations, and main areas and topics of dialogue between the BRICS countries. For the first time, journalists quickly find out about intra-BRICS cooperation without hours of tedious research through non-functioning websites. Together, this information goes some way to establish a counter narrative against the general global consensus that the BRICS grouping is a weird and useless aberration set to fall into oblivion. Irrespective of who is right, the website will undoubtedly contribute to turning the debate into a more informed one, particularly since continuous intra-BRICS cooperation is virtually unknown outside a small group of specialists.

Reading the leaders declarations since 2009 provides interesting insight into how intra-BRICS cooperation has advanced over the past five years - even though, as Ambassador Graça Lima, Brazil's summit sherpa, pointed out during a press briefing, the grouping's institutionalization is still low.

While the World Cup will inevitably crowd out a broad discussion about the BRICS Summit, global attention is assured. The 2014 BRICS Summit will be one of the most important meetings of global leaders this year, bringing together the West's no.1 enemy, the leader of the soon-to-be greatest economy, the leader of Latin America's largest country, Africa's most powerful (though increasingly embattled) leader, and the man who is supposed to bring India back on track, the latter on his first trip outside of Asia. The summit will be dominated by the creation of the BRICS Development Bank, and the lingering question of whether the institution may challenge existing Bretton Woods institutions, a powerful symbol of Western-led global order.

In addition, Brazil's decision to invite all South American leaders to meet Xi, Modi, Zuma and Putin after the summit as part of an "outreach" is a shrewd attempt to position itself as the region's leader and representative. If structured in the right way, the summit marathon in mid-July would not only help strengthen Brazil's ties to the world's leading emerging economies, but also show its neighbors that Brasília has a regional project that involves connecting the entire continent to the world.
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A BRICS bank: can it outdo the World Bank?

by Alan Beattie

beyondbrics (Financial Times), Jun 19, 2014

As a coordinated entity, the BRICS grouping of emerging markets has produced little except inspiring the name of a widely-read blog.

Next month, the five governments – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – are planning to erect an actual edifice amid the swirling mists of rhetoric with the launch of a development bank dedicated to filling some of the gigantic hole in the financing of infrastructure and growth in fast-growing emerging economies.

The BRICS are seeking to avoid some of what they say are the faults of the World Bank and regional development banks – too much rich country dominance and too many conditions attached to lending. But that leaves the exact function and operation of the BRICS bank open to a great deal of political jockeying and uncertainties over how it is run.

That much more low-cost finance is needed in the emerging and developing world is hardly in doubt. Two former World Bank chief economists, Nick Stern and Joseph Stiglitz, say that (registration required) the contribution to infrastructure finance from multilateral development banks and overseas aid is likely to be $40-$60bn a year for the next few years, only 2-3% of the estimated $2tn annual need.

They might have added that the environmental and human resettlement safeguards adopted by the World Bank after decades of lobbying by (mainly western-based) NGOs have made its infrastructure lending complex and expensive for borrowers. Hostility to the effects of big dams, for example, means the bank has only a handful of large hydropower projects worldwide.

Development banks already run by emerging markets have stepped into the breach with varying degrees of opacity and indifference to collateral damage.

China, for example, honed its use of the huge China Development Bank (CDB) on its own infrastructure, including the much-criticised Three Gorges Dam, which the World Bank declined to finance on environmental and human rights grounds. It has since sent it out to do China’s mercantile and foreign policy bidding abroad. The CDB, which now lends far more than the World Bank, routinely hands out low-interest loans, particularly in Africa, conditioned less on development need than on the desire to secure natural resources and promote Chinese exports – and to encourage governments to de-recognise Taiwan at the UN.

Other emerging market countries’ development banks are much more transparent, but still attract credible criticism for not going far enough. Global Witness, the campaigning NGO, last week launched a broadside against BNDES, the Brazilian development bank that is partly funded by the national Treasury. BNDES funded some of the World Cup stadia that have been widely accused in Brazil of benefiting politically well-connected companies, running way over cost and and having little lasting growth impact. BNDES argue that they finance SMEs as well as large companies, but it is hard to believe that a heavily subsidised development bank, rather than fundamental reform of capital markets and lower long-term market interest rates, is what Brazilian businesses really need.

Even plurilateral development banks have yet to match the transparency standards of their multilateral cousins. The Andean Development Corporation (CAF), which brings together sixteen central and South American emerging economies (plus Spain and Portugal), now finances more infrastructure in Latin America than the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank together, but also attracts accusations (link in Spanish) of opacity and low lending standards.

Satisfying these demands while recognising political realities will be a difficult task for the BRICS bank. Who runs the institution and how it makes lending decisions have yet to be revealed, but it is inevitable that some raw politics will be involved.

The creation of the bank has revealed how delicate are these negotiations. China, which could easily finance an institution several times the size of the BRICS bank on its own, and whose high credit rating will be enormously helpful, had to be persuaded to accept a minority shareholding. Essentially, Beijing is gaining greater credibility for international cooperation at the cost of a greater implicit financial contribution and more constraints on its action. How far it is prepared to accept the latter to gain the former remains to be seen.

Although Beijing will not be able to use the bank to buy political favours as it does with the CDB, there will be some quiet but fierce struggles if one of the BRICS feels its own interests are being threatened. Nor is China likely to be very happy if it ends up simply subsidising the borrowing of other emerging markets – including BRICS nations like India – whose companies may compete with Chinese businesses for export markets.

Jim O’Neill, the former Goldman Sachs chief economist who invented the BRIC classification, suggests the bank approve loans based on their ability to help borrowers to achieve benchmarks for governance, education and access to technology. It is an interesting idea, but probably a quixotic one. Many governments correctly take “governance” in this context as a euphemism for combating corruption, and regard loans with governance conditions attached as intrusive political meddling. Given the emerging markets want to escape what they consider to be the challenge to their sovereignty from World Bank conditionality, they – particularly China – are unlikely to want it to re-emerge in their own development institution.

The BRICS bank certainly has an opportunity to make a considerable difference. There is an unoccupied niche in governance as well as in financing. It ought be possible to be more transparent than the likes of BNDES and CAF without being choked by bureaucracy like the World Bank.

By agreeing to finance a joint development bank, the BRICS have committed to a greater degree of scrutiny than going it alone. Pooling money and credit ratings may produce financing greater than the sum of its parts. But it seems hopeful rather than certain that a joint venture of five disparate countries – whose own governance is frequently murky – will do the same for the transparency of the new bank and its decisions to whom, and for what, to lend.

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Can the BRICS avoid the “Power South vs. Poor South” Dynamic?

Oliver Stuenkel

Post-Western World, 20 Jun. 2014

Bridging the gap between the Global North and Global South was one of the key ambitions when global leaders created the G20 in response to the global financial crisis of 1997-99. In the same way, supporters of the BRICS and IBSA groupings have often argued that such outfits would strengthen the voice of the developing world in global affairs.

Yet the past decade has also seen the emergence of a new division: That of the "Power South" against the "Poor South", as Amitav Acharya argues in his recent book. Countries' quest for status as an "emerging power", he argues, can undermine its regional engagement. There is always a temptation to "leapfrog" their unglamorous neighborhood in order to pursue to global glitz and prestige that BRICS and G20 membership brings.

Contrary to previous developing country clubs like the Bandung Conference and its offshoot, the Non-Aligned Movement, which were broad and inclusive, the new outfits are exclusive and plagued by questions about their legitimacy and capacity to represent the developing world. Nations represented at Bandung, including Nehru's India, Mao's China, and Nasser's Egypt, had few illusions about achieving global power status, whether individually or collectively. The BRICS, on the contrary, harbor an individual aspiration to project power globally. The more powerful they become, the more pressing are worries in smaller developing countries about whether the BRICS of the G20 can still represent their interests? Or have countries like Brazil, India and China long joined a global oligarchy that knows little about the challenges small poor countries face?

At the same time, none of the BRICS countries enjoy broad regional support - quite to the contrary, in almost all cases, the BRICS countries' immediate neighbors are most skeptical of the emerging powers' leadership ambitions. Paradoxically, the BRICS' leadership ambitions are more recognized and even openly demanded on a global scale than regionally. The key challenge, then, of each BRICS country is how to show that their individual rise is good for their neighborhood, too.

Finally, the issue raises an important question several emerging powers have to face: How important is regional support to sustain a credible leadership ambition on a global scale? Put differently, is it necessary to be recognized as a regional leader before projecting influence globally?

These are important questions as Brazil prepares the BRICS-South America Summit in Brasília, which will take place shortly after the 6th BRICS Summit in Fortaleza. The decision to invite the continent's leaders is a shrewd one; yet Brazil should use this golden opportunity to articulate a clearer regional vision and answer pressing questions: What should UNASUR look like ten years from now? How does it think about South America's place in a global economy increasingly divided by big trade blocs? What should be the future of the South American Defense Council? And how should the region think about and respond to China's growing presence?

Organizing the summit marathon in the second half of July is a formidable logistical and diplomatic challenge. Yet if Dilma Rousseff is able to articulate a clear vision to the many participants, it would be a considerable success of a President who is generally thought to have neglected foreign policy since taking office in January 2011.

Ajuda ao desenvolvimento: tem alguma importancia? - o caso do Fundo IBSA (Oliver Stuenkel)

A matéria abaixo tenta ser generosa e positiva em relação ao Fundo IBSA.
A realidade é que a ajuda ao desenvolvimento vem sendo realizada nas últimas cinco décadas, em montantes equivalentes a dezenas de bilhões de dólares anuais, sem resultados muito visíveis.
A África está melhor hoje em função dessa ajuda, ou através de comércio e investimentos?
O fato é que os países que mais crescerão no mundo nas últimas décadas, com destaque para a China e a Índia, o fizeram com base em sua integração nos circuitos produtivos da economia mundial, ou seja, graças à globalização, não por causa de qualquer ajuda ao desenvolvimento.
Seria muito difícil de compreender isso?
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

South-South cooperation: Does the IBSA Fund matter?

By Oliver Stuenkel

Post-Western World, 27 de janeiro de 2014

Ten years ago, leaders from India, Brazil and South Africa, which had just launched the trilateral IBSA grouping, decided to join forces as so-called "emerging donors" and established the IBSA Fund, which would come to symbolize their efforts to promote "South-South cooperation". For the past ten years, policy makers involved in the IBSA process frequently and proudly point to the IBSA Fund's great success. Yet what exactly is the IBSA Fund? More importantly, does it matter?

The IBSA Facility Fund for Alleviation of Poverty and Hunger was created in 2004 and became operational in 2006. Countries decided to contribute an annual amount of US $ 1 million. According to the IBSA governments, the Trust Fund operates through a demand-driven approach. Governments of developing countries requesting support by this fund initiate discussions with focal points appointed among IBSA countries’ officers around the world. These focal points then submit proposals to the IBSA board of directors for review. If a proposal receives a favorable review, UNDP’s Special Unit for South-South Cooperation, which acts as the Fund's  manager and board of directors’ secretariat, initiates contact with a potential executing agency to advance a project formulation, and to facilitate the project’s implementation.

IBSA projects are executed through partnerships with the UN’s Development Program, national institutions or local governments. Important concerns of IBSA partners in the design of their projects include capacity building among projects’ beneficiaries, build-in project sustainability and knowledge sharing among Southern experts and institutions.

Despite its small size, the IBSA Fund received the 2010 MDG (Millennium Development Goals) Award for South-South Cooperation by the NGO “Millennium Development Goals Awards Committee”. In 2012 the Fund earned the "South-South and Triangular Cooperation Champions Award", given by the United Nations for its innovative approach.

The IBSA Fund finances or has financed projects in Haiti, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, Burundi, Palestine, Cambodia, Lao PDR and Sierra Leone. Until today, a series of small projects in developing countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia have been implemented. For example, in Burundi, the IBSA Fund supported, until 2012, a project to increase the government’s capacity to combat HIV/ AIDS. In Cape Verde, a public health center was reformed and modernized in 2008. In Guinea Bissau, an agricultural project was implemented until 2007. In a second phase, operationalized by 2011, the project was expanded. In Haiti, a waste collection project was supported in Port-au-Prince, finalized in 2011. A sports complex has been completed and inaugurated in 2011 in Ramallah under the IBSA Fund. In 2012, the refurbishment of a hospital in Gaza began.

At this point, projects in Cape Verde (Desalinization to increase access to drinking water and provide water for agriculture), Cambodia (medical services for children and adolescents with special needs), Guinea Bissau (farming, solar energy), Laos (irrigation), Palestine (support for a hospital, center for people with special needs), Sierra Leone (leadership training), Vietnam (agriculture).

While such cooperation is notable, even IBSA-enthusiasts must admit that the amounts involved remain extremely small compared to existing development institutions. While policy makers officially hail the IBSA Fund as a centerpiece of the grouping, former diplomats concede that a lack of political will is the only way to explain why the fund remains so small – in particular when considering that all IBSA members spend far larger amounts on bilateral development and humanitarian aid.

Rajiv Bhatia, who served as India's High Commissioner to South Africa from 2006-09, commented that “IBSA assistance is too limited, with each member-state contributing just $1 million annually. Surely, they can afford to be more generous. If IBSA truly wants to make a difference, it should step up its assistance, expedite its decision-making and undertake more projects.”

Governments point out in response that the IBSA Fund is meant to develop “new paradigms” and can thus be successful even while maintaining its small size. Yet several development experts who are not involved in the IBSA Fund pointed out that unless the funds’ size increases, it is virtually impossible to judge its scalability – i.e., in how far others can learn from and copy the IBSA Fund’s strategy.

As a consequence, several observes have called on the fund to be expanded if it is to be taken seriously. Lyal White argues that, if countries committed more financial resources, the Fund could become IBSA’s “flagship and its interface with the developing world.” He recommends that a greater part of Brazilian, Indian and South African bilateral aid should be incorporated into an enlarged IBSA development fund.

Notably, civil society organizations have criticized the IBSA Fund for its lack of transparency. Laura Waisbich of Conectas, a Brazilian human rights NGO, argues that

apart from the annual report which retrospectively gives broad details of projects undertaken by the IBSA Fund, there is very little information on IBSA projects. The website dedicated to the Fund shields any information of relevance, with passwords. An interested citizen has no access to information on - the selection process of projects, the projected timeline, details of sub-contractors, impact assessment reports, target beneficiaries, overall project assessment, etc.

Waisbich writes about a conversation with Vrinda Choraria, from the Delhi-based Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, who had argued that

this lack of information on the Fund is frustrating as even a recent exercise of filing formal requests under the respective information laws, by organisations based in the three countries elicited no relevant information. (..) It is perplexing that a Fund that the three countries promote as a symbol of cooperation and assistance should be shrouded in such secrecy.

Finally, she reports that an information request to the UN Office for South-South Cooperation in United Nations Development Programme, which manages the IBSA fund, under its information disclosure policy, did not provide the information that was sought.

The incapacity of civil society to monitor and assess the impact of IBSA Fund projects reduces the buy-in of NGOs and public opinion makers, which directly impacts the grouping’s image in India’s, Brazil’s and South Africa’s civil society. On the IBSA Fund’s website, a project description affirms that a project in Guinea Bissau was “received positively in the local oficial press” - yet inviting independent NGOs to visit and evaluate the projects would certainly enhance trust in the IBSA Fund.

The IBSA Fund - one of the IBSA groupings few elements that produced tangible results - is a great idea that may not only alleviate poverty, but also enhance the debate about innovative ways of poverty reduction and South-South cooperation in more general. Yet in order to make a serious contribution in the global debate, IBSA governments should dramatically enhance financial support, and make the Fund's operation more transparent.

Globonews Painel, 25/01/2014: Celso Lafer, Rubens Barbosa, Oliver Stuenkel

Para quem não assistiu ao programa de entrevistas sobre a realidade mundial, sempre dirigido pelo competente jornalista William Waack, colocações interessantes  dos três participantes, acima referidos, sobre os desafios do mundo atual:

http://g1.globo.com/globo-news/globo-news-painel/videos/t/todos-os-videos/v/convidados-debatem-relacoes-internacionais-no-mundo-hoje/3103848/

Dez desafios do Brasil em 2014; Brazil's Top Ten Challenges in 2014 - Oliver Stuenkel

Brazil’s top 10 foreign policy challenges in 2014

Oliver Stuenkel

Post Western World, December 29, 2013

[Nota inicial: Não concordo com o título, e sugestão de programa, de "post western world", pelo menos até que o "non western world" seja capaz de oferecer coisas melhores do que o atual, certamente não perfeito, mundo ocidental; o que nos vem desse mundo não ocidental, no qual eu incluo países erráticos, estatizantes e tendencialmente autoritários, como vários da América Latina, entre eles o Brasil, não é certamente algo superior aos valores, contribuições e liberdades do mundo ocidental. Devemos, sim, valorizar, absolutamente o mundo ocidental, pois é dele que nos vem todos os valores e princípios que prezamos, e que estão no coração de nossa prosperidade atual e de TODAS as nossas liberdades; países insuficientemente democráticos, não capitalistas, estatizantes, com governos autoritários e alguns até totalitários, não oferecer nenhum modelo desejável.  Paulo Roberto de Almeida ]

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Disclaimer: Selecting merely ten issues from the multitude of challenges Brazil faces is, of course, a rather impossible task, and bound to omit crucial topics. This list therefore does not claim to be complete (it does not contemplate key topics such as the environment, development aid, non-proliferation, peacekeeping in Haiti, the WTO and the Middle East), but seeks to stimulate the debate about an exciting year ahead. Comments (preferably of the critical sort) are, as usual, most welcome.

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1. Get Brazil-US ties back on track

With a tight election race looming, Brazil's President Dilma Rousseff preferred not to risk being seen as weak and submissive in the face of an ongoing US spying scandal and rightly canceled her 2013 trip to Washington, D.C. After this historic low point in the bilateral relationship, it is time to take first steps to eventually get things back to normal. Studying Germany's reaction and negotiation tactics after the spying revelations may be instructive when thinking about how Brazil could benefit most from the episode. Important projects such as the visa-waiver agreement that have been put on hold after the NSA affair could be restarted, even if seeking closer ties to the US is currently unpopular. Then, Brazil could adopt a proactive policy vis-à-vis the United States and build on Obama's previous statement that he "appreciates" Brazil's desire for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Despite China's rise, the United States remains a crucial actor that profoundly influences Brazil's foreign relations.

2. Convince the President and Congress that foreign policy (and the Foreign Ministry) matters

2013 was a difficult year for Itamaraty - it included the crisis in Bolivia which led to Minister Patriota's resignation, public attacks against supposed super-salaries and budget cuts. In order to reverse the situation, the Foreign Ministry needs to convince both the President and Congress that it requires more, not less resources. As Brazil seeks to project more influence, its relatively low number of diplomats may pose limitations on its capacity to operationalize new policies. Smart strategies developed at home may fail to have the desired impact because there are not enough foreign service officers to implement the new policy. Complex bilateral negotiations can be negatively affected if one side's negotiators have not been briefed properly due to a lack of diplomatic staff and on-the-ground knowledge on the domestic constraints the other side is facing. Finally, maintaining an understaffed embassy can send a negative signal to the host country, in some cases causing more damage than opening no embassy at all. Yet the President cares little about diplomacy, and some of Brazil's major international initiatives - such as the successful campaign to put a Brazilian at the helm of the World Trade Organization (WTO) - was not coordinated by Itamaraty, but by other parts of government. Foreign policy makers' thus face a double challenge: convince both Congress and the President that foreign policy matter, and that the Foreign Ministry is the best place to design and implement it.

3. Assume leadership in the global debate about internet governance

In September 2013, Rousseff took the initiative and placed Brazil in the center of the debate about the future of internet governance. This is indicative of a growing willingness to play a key role in international affairs. At the same time, Rousseff's presentation has also raised global expectations considerably. In April, the government will organize a summit that will involve national governments as well as representatives from industry, civil society, and the private sector International Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which currently oversees aspects of Internet governance like IP addresses. In São Paulo, they will brainstorm about new global rules for privacy in the digital age. The debates may strengthen those who wish to wrest management of the Internet from the multi-stakeholder ICANN and place it in the hands of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), where it would be even more susceptible to national manipulation.

Brazil's credibility as a global actor will, to no small degree, depend on its capacity to follow-up on such promises and make a meaningful contribution to this highly complex debate. As I have argued before in the debate about RwP, Brazil's attempt to act as an agenda-setter may have been useful to provide a glimpse of what Brazil is capable of on a global scale. Between 2011 and 2012, despite Brazil's limited hard power, it temporarily exercised international leadership in the debate about humanitarian intervention. Just like back then, Brazil will have to prepare for a tough discussion, which is likely to include fierce criticism from many sides.

4. Continue to engage in the global debate about how to prevent mass atrocities

With Ambassador Patriota in New York, Brazil possesses considerable authority at the UN to play a leading role in the discussions about how to deal with humanitarian crises around the world. Having created the concept of RwP (the Responsibility while Protecting), Patriota placed Brazil in the midst of the controversy about the legality of the way the Libya intervention was conducted. In many ways, RwP symbolized the very strategy Brazil aspired to pursue: turn into a bridge builder, mediator and consensus seeker through thought leadership. RwP, despite its flaws, was an innovative and constructive proposal to bridge the gap between an overly trigger-happy NATO and excessively resistant China and Russia.With the severe humanitarian crisis in Syria ongoing, and new ones erupting in South Sudan and the Central African Republic, Brazil would do well to take a leading role in the global debate about preventing mass atrocities in the future - a debate that is far richer and more complex than the usual NATO-Russia duality.

5. Show that the BRICS grouping is worth keeping

During the first week of April, Brazil will organize the 6th BRICS Summit. Since the host has the right to set the agenda of the summit, Brazil has a unique chance to give the 6th BRICS Summit its own imprint - and thus engage the leaders of China, India, Russia and South Africa on one or several topics of its choice. This is a tremendous opportunity for Brazil. Yet the public is likely to remain skeptical of the usefulness of the BRICS concept, particularly as growth in the Global South has slowed markedly. Add to that a President who never really warmed to the idea and foreign policy makers face a tough challenge to keep the momentum going and show that Brazil benefits from being part of the BRICS grouping. In the midst of all the gloom, the BRICS grouping will hold its 6th Summit in Brazil and launch the BRICS Development Bank, marking the most important step towards institutionalization in its young history.

6. Project stability in the neighborhood

As political and economic stability has led to unknown levels of prosperity and reduced levels of inequality and poverty, Brazil’s economic ties with the region have grown considerably. Brazil’s relative economic growth vis-à-vis its neighbors created significant structural incentives for Brasília to design more assertive strategies to boost regional cooperation. This implies the necessity to offer credit to large Brazilian companies that are in search for opportunities in largely untapped markets, and as a consequence, to establish clear rules and guidelines to make these countries more predictable and navigable for Brazilian companies. While demand from China will remain important, it may weaken, increasing the significance of Brazil's neighborhood even further. Yet the region does not only present opportunities, but also risks. Rather than merely the strength of other states, the weakness of others may produce threats, as weak nations may not be able to provide basic levels of public order. For example, violence and chaos that ensues in Bolivia could spill into Brazilian territory. Brazil is strong and getting stronger – but some of its neighbors are weak and some appear to be getting weaker. It is within this context that Brazil faces its biggest security challenges. Projecting political stability and strengthening governance and the rule of law in the neighborhood thus remain high on Brazil's foreign policy agenda.

7. Engage the public - both at home and abroad 

Few Foreign Ministers spent as much time talking to students, representatives of NGOs and academics as Antonio Patriota during his time in office. Rightly so: Itamaraty must convince civil society that Brazil should turn into a global actor strongly involved in many issues around the world. Yet foreign policy still plays only a marginal role in Brazil's bustling public debate. Itamaraty's greatest projects are often greeted with a mixture of neglect and rejection by both the media and public opinion. A supportive public, however, could help the Foreign Ministry precisely with the sort of problems it faced in 2013. A youtube channel, a public diplomacy blog, a twitter presence and an accessible Foreign Minister are important first steps. Launching a complete English-language Foreign Ministry website would make a tremendous difference to those who follow Brazilian foreign policy abroad, making Brazil's international strategy more transparent and accessible.

8. Solve the trade conundrum

In the past 13 years more than 350 trade deals were registered at the WTO.  Mercosur, for its part, signed just four, with Egypt, Peru, Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Trade talks between the EU and Mercosur are also incredibly difficult, having started 14 years ago. They stalled over similar issues to those which made the WTO negotiations so complex: European unwillingness to expose its protected farmers to competition and South American desire to shelter industry from high-quality imports. Yet in Brazil, a number of stakeholders supports trade agreements not only with Europe but also with the United States, arguing that Brazil's industry could compete on equal terms if the government reduced the long-standing “Brazil cost” by facilitating tax rules and improving infrastructure. As big regional negotiations such as one between the EU and United States advance, one cannot but notice the prospect of a world divided into trade blocs. Brazil will have to make up its mind about what strategy to pursue should such a scenario come true. In the case of the negotiations with the EU, this involves making a decision about whether to take more protectionist Argentina along or whether to pursue a two-speed solution,  leaving Argentina behind.

9. Keep IBSA alive

In 2013, the IBSA grouping celebrated its tenth anniversary. Yet the way leaders in the Global South marked the special occasion was rather underwhelming: They canceled the summit that was supposed to take place in June 2013 in New Delhi. To make matters worse, the schedule in 2014 looks particularly crowded, with a BRICS Summit and a Football World Cup in Brazil, and general elections in all three member countries. While IBSA's survival does not solely depend on leaders' summits (the grouping contains 16 working groups and a trilateral commission), not organizing a leaders' meeting in 2014 would send a bad signal.

10. Keep opening up Brazil

Brazil has undergone an incredible and unprecedented process of internationalization over the past decade. Foreign investment skyrocketed. Never in history have as many Brazilians traveled or studied abroad. The number of foreign tourists, business travelers and exchange students has never been as high. And yet, Brazil remains, in many ways, more isolated than other countries. Far more tourists travel to Argentina than to Brazil. The number of foreign tourists coming to Paris alone exceeds that of visitors to all of Brazil by more than three times. The number of Brazilian students who go abroad remains low by international comparison. The government's growing financial support for exchange programs is thus to be welcomed. Universities should push governments to make recognizing diplomas abroad easier. Following the example of the Brazil-Russia visa waiver deal, visa requirements with other countries (such as the United States) should be eased. Brazil has little to lose and lots to gain from enhancing this international people-to-people diplomacy.

Read also:

International Politics in 2014: Ten Predictions

The Thirteen Most-Read Post-Western World Articles of 2013

Post-Western World’s Books of the Year

2013 Review: Events at the Center for International Relations – FGV

Photo credit: Valter Campanato/ABr

Oliver Stuenkel: previsoes para o mundo em 2014

Eu ainda preciso postar aqui as minhas previsões imprevidentes para 2014, algo fantasiosas, mas já tenho aqui algumas mais sérias, do professor de RI da FGV-SP.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

International Politics in 2014: Ten Predictions

2013 DECEMBER 12

ENGLISH, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

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by Oliver Stuenkel

Post-Western World, 12/12/2013

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10. The Global South goes to the polls

In 2014, four large democracies in the Global South will organize general elections: Brazil, India, Indonesia and South Africa. During election years, policy makers tend to focus more on internal challenges and less on foreign affairs. Neither outgoing leaders nor recent winners are likely to propose important international initiatives.My guess: Indonesia and India will see leadership transitions. Brazil and South Africa will reelect Dilma Rousseff and Jacob Zuma, respectively.

Read more: 
Crunch time in the Global South

9. The future of internet governance

After the spying revelations that dominated the global debate during the second half of the year, the future of internet governance will be discussed at several international fora, including the UN, during the coming year. Brazil and Germany have taken a leadership role by drafting a resolution that promotes the right of privacy in the internet, and Brazil will organize a summit in April in São Paulo. Laws that seek to keep data in-country could threaten the cloud system – where data stored by US internet firms is accessible from anywhere in the world. My guess:China and Russia will propose rules to increase government control over the internet, a move that is unlikely to find much support in the rest of the world.

Read more: 
Can Brazil assume leadership in the debate about internet governance?

8. Where are the BRICS?

In 2014 the United States will add more to global economic growth than China (at market exchange rates) and Japan will add more than India. Growth in Brazil and South Africa is poised to remain low. In the midst of all the gloom, the BRICS grouping will hold its 6th Summit in Brazil and launch the BRICS Development Bank, marking the most important step towards institutionalization in its young history. Still, most observers will remain skeptical about the grouping's future, particularly now that growth rates are unimpressive. My guess: Intra-BRICS cooperation will continue, though most of it under the radar, ranging from issues such as agriculture, education, public health to voting behavior in international institutions.

Read more:
Despite economic slowdown, BRICS grouping is here to stay
BRICS Development Bank: Patience required
The end of the emerging world?

7. Will Iran join the international community?

The historic interim agreement concluded in late November between six world powers and Iran is an important step in the right direction. The West will provide  “limited, temporary and reversible” relief from some economic sanctions, and Iran will not only stop its work on nuclear weapons, but revert some of the steps. The political leadership in Tehran accepts a more intrusive inspection regime; this makes the deal very different from the one reached with North Korea in 2005, which the Koreans broke. Reintegrating Iran into the international community would transform politics in the Middle East, making US support for an Israeli attack against Iran unlikely. A deal could possibly help obtain Iranian support to broker a peace deal in Syria. My guess: Guarded optimism is permitted and Iran may see a reduction of its painful isolation from the international community.

6. What's next for Syria?

As the civil war in Syria continues, the United States and Europe have three priorities: a negotiated peace agreement to end the violence; a reduction of Iran’s influence in the region; and the removal of Bashar Assad. My guess: Obtaining all three will be impossible. Since stopping the carnage is most important of all, a peace accord will, if reached at all, most likely involve both the Syrian President and Iran.

Read more:
The BRICS and R2P: Was Syria an exception?

5. The Global Protests

After the massive protests that shook Brazil and Turkey, where will they continue in 2014? Particularly countries with a growing yet angry middle class that do not invest enough in education and infrastructure are at risk. Protests against austerity measures (such as Spain), corruption (as in India and China), police violence (U.K.) and oppression (Egypt and Russia, among others) will become ever more frequent as technology allows protesters to organize very quickly, leaving policy makers with little time to prepare. Host countries of big political summits and sporting events face additional risk of widespread protests. My guess: Brace for protests across the world, including Brazil (though not as large as in 2013, since Brazil's World Cup triumph will limit public rage there).

Read more:
From Taksim Square to Paulista Avenue
Brazil’s Hazare moment

4. Africa's rise

Africa is the last economic frontier of the global economy. It possesses 40 percent of the world's raw materials and 60 percent of its uncultivated arable land. No other continent has developed as rapidly in the last decade as Africa, where real economic growth was between 5% and 10% per year. When the Cold War ended, just three out of 53 African nations had halfway functional democracies. Today, that figure is 25 out of 54. More than 300 million Africans are now part of the middle class, roughly the population of the United States. No important global actor can afford not to build a strong presence in Africa. My guess: As growth in South Africa falters, fast-growing economies such as Angola, Nigeria and Ethiopia will seek to play a stronger role in international affairs. Africa's role in global affairs will increase further.

Read more:
Africa’s new no. 1
As the BRICS rise in Africa, Japan seeks to hold its ground
What is Brazil doing in Africa?

3. Can Merkel fix Europe?

As the economic crisis lingers on in Europe, all eyes are on Germany. Angela Merkel is demonized across Europe for her determined enforcement of austerity. Critics say Germany is too austere, too insistent on fiscal consolidation even in recession, too prone to put the burden of adjustment on deficit countries, too dominated by lawyers, not economists. She keeps pointing out that Europe has 7% of the world’s population, 25% of its GDP and 50% of its social spending, and that it cannot continue to be so generous. My guess: Germany's chancellor remains overwhelmingly popular at home and is set to remain so next year, so very little indicates that she will change her strategy vis-à-vis the EU.

2. Will China liberalize?

After a promising start, the world will expect Xi Jinping to implement the reforms announced in 2013 and continue his battle against corruption and better public services. Furthermore, the world's largest economy in waiting has to leave Deng's model of cheap labor, capital and focus on export markets behind. Wages are increasing, capital is becoming too expense, and domestic demand will have to pick up in order to keep economic growth as high as it used to be over the past decades. For the first time since the 70s, many argue, playing it safe means undertaking some more substantial economic reforms. The Central bank is expected to formally launch financial liberalizations in the new Shanghai free-trade zone in early 2014, with the hope of soon extending the reforms to other parts of the country if the trial run proves successful. My guess: Despite continuing protests in many parts of the country (against corruption, pollution and censorship), the reforms will succeed and China will grow at 7%.

Read more:
Can Xi be the new Deng?
Book review: “What does China want?” by Matias Spektor and Dani Nedal (orgs.)
Will China promote autocracy?
 

1. The US is back on track

While long-term predictions about China's rise remain valid, the United States' economic recovery (partly driven by shale gas) is likely to provide policy makers in Washington with additional assertiveness in international affairs. My guess: If history is any guide, Obama will focus more on foreign affairs in his second term and seek to build a global legacy. That may include attempting to follow-up on the Iran deal, adopting a more reasonable Cuba policy and building a stronger presence in China's backyard. In addition, the United States may take important steps towards promoting free trade across the Atlantic and the Pacific, mediate tensions between China and Japan, end the war in Syria, and even try to bring Israel and Palestine to the table.