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Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.

sábado, 29 de janeiro de 2022

The sources of Soviet conduct - Anonymous [George Kennan] (Foreign Affairs, 1947)

From: Council on Foreign Relations

In 1922, the world was dealing with the aftershocks of a calamitous war, and the United States was haltingly assuming a larger role in world affairs. Foreign Affairs published its first issue that September. The magazine’s aim, wrote its first editor, was to “promote the discussion of current questions of international interest.” It would display “a broad hospitality to divergent ideas,” so long as contributions were “competent and well informed, representing honest opinions seriously held and convincingly expressed.” 

In 2022, the world is once again consumed by crisis, and the United States is once again struggling to define its proper role in world affairs. As our 100th anniversary approaches, Foreign Affairs remains as committed as ever to fostering debate about “current questions of international interest,” with “divergent ideas . . . representing honest opinions seriously held and convincingly expressed.” Yet we’re also taking the opportunity to reflect on the past. 

Every week until September, this newsletter will share noteworthy essays from the Foreign Affairs archive, paywall free and open for all to read. These essays provide both a glimpse into the most consequential foreign policy debates of the last century and insight into the most important challenges of today. Some of these essays are remarkable because they were influential, some because they were prophetic, some because their substance is as illuminating now as it was when they first published—or, in the case of this week’s essay, all three. 

 

The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” published in our July 1947 issue under the byline “X,” established a framework for Cold War strategy that would define U.S. policy for decades. In it, George Kennan—whose authorship was publicly confirmed several years after publication—laid out a rich analysis of the Soviet Union’s worldview and power, as well as a recommendation for strategists: the United States could manage the challenge from Moscow with “a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.” 

 

Today, with “Russian expansive tendencies” once again at the center of global politics—even as the United States grapples with a global pandemic, climate change, a new great-power challenger in China, and much more—Kennan’s essay remains fascinating reading, every page offering a relevant lesson or warning. In the decades since it was published, there have been countless attempts to revise or repurpose Kennan’s framework or to put forward an alternate framework that would prove as definitive as his did—with limited success. But one of Kennan’s most important conclusions requires little or nothing in the way of edits or updates: “To avoid destruction the United States need only measure up to its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation.”

 

Thank you for reading. We hope you’ll stay with us as we celebrate 100 years of Foreign Affairs.


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Anonymous


I

The political personality of Soviet power as we know it today is the product of ideology and circumstances: ideology inherited by the present Soviet leaders from the movement in which they had their political origin, and circumstances of the power which they now have exercised for nearly three decades in Russia. There can be few tasks of psychological analysis more difficult than to try to trace the interaction of these two forces and the relative role of each in the determination of official Soviet conduct. Yet the attempt must be made if that conduct is to be understood and effectively countered.

It is difficult to summarize the set of ideological concepts with which the Soviet leaders came into power. Marxian ideology, in its Russian-Communist projection, has always been in process of subtle evolution. The materials on which it bases itself are extensive and complex. But the outstanding features of Communist thought as it existed in 1916 may perhaps be summarized as follows: (a) that the central factor in the life of man, the factor which determines the character of public life and the "physiognomy of society," is the system by which material goods are produced and exchanged; (b) that the capitalist system of production is a nefarious one which inevitably leads to the exploitation of the working class by the capital-owning class and is incapable of developing adequately the economic resources of society or of distributing fairly the material goods produced by human labor; (c) that capitalism contains the seeds of its own destruction and must, in view of the inability of the capital-owning class to adjust itself to economic change, result eventually and inescapably in a revolutionary transfer of power to the working class; and (d) that imperialism, the final phase of capitalism, leads directly to war and revolution.

The rest may be outlined in Lenin's own words: "Unevenness of economic and political development is the inflexible law of capitalism. It follows from this that the victory of Socialism may come originally in a few capitalist countries or even in a single capitalist country. The victorious proletariat of that country, having expropriated the capitalists and having organized Socialist production at home, would rise against the remaining capitalist world, drawing to itself in the process the oppressed classes of other countries." [see endnote 1] It must be noted that there was no assumption that capitalism would perish without proletarian revolution. A final push was needed from a revolutionary proletariat movement in order to tip over the tottering structure. But it was regarded as inevitable that sooner or later that push be given.


For 50 years prior to the outbreak of the Revolution, this pattern of thought had exercised great fascination for the members of the Russian revolutionary movement. Frustrated, discontented, hopeless of finding self-expression—or too impatient to seek it—in the confining limits of the Tsarist political system, yet lacking wide popular support for their choice of bloody revolution as a means of social betterment, these revolutionists found in Marxist theory a highly convenient rationalization for their own instinctive desires. It afforded pseudo-scientific justification for their impatience, for their categorical denial of all value in the Tsarist system, for their yearning for power and revenge and for their inclination to cut corners in the pursuit of it. It is therefore no wonder that they had come to believe implicitly in the truth and soundness of the Marxian-Leninist teachings, so congenial to their own impulses and emotions. Their sincerity need not be impugned. This is a phenomenon as old as human nature itself. It has never been more aptly described than by Edward Gibbon, who wrote in The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire: "From enthusiasm to imposture the step is perilous and slippery; the demon of Socrates affords a memorable instance how a wise man may deceive himself, how a good man may deceive others, how the conscience may slumber in a mixed and middle state between self-illusion and voluntary fraud." And it was with this set of conceptions that the members of the Bolshevik Party entered into power.

Now it must be noted that through all the years of preparation for revolution, the attention of these men, as indeed of Marx himself, had been centered less on the future form which Socialism [see endnote 2] would take than on the necessary overthrow of rival power which, in their view, had to precede the introduction of Socialism. Their views, therefore, on the positive program to be put into effect, once power was attained, were for the most part nebulous, visionary and impractical. Beyond the nationalization of industry and the expropriation of large private capital holdings there was no agreed program. The treatment of the peasantry, which according to the Marxist formulation was not of the proletariat, had always been a vague spot in the pattern of Communist thought; and it remained an object of controversy and vacillation for the first ten years of Communist power.


The circumstances of the immediate post-revolution period—the existence in Russia of civil war and foreign intervention, together with the obvious fact that the Communists represented only a tiny minority of the Russian people—made the establishment of dictatorial power a necessity. The experiment with "war Communism" and the abrupt attempt to eliminate private production and trade had unfortunate economic consequences and caused further bitterness against the new revolutionary regime. While the temporary relaxation of the effort to communize Russia, represented by the New Economic Policy, alleviated some of this economic distress and thereby served its purpose, it also made it evident that the "capitalistic sector of society" was still prepared to profit at once from any relaxation of governmental pressure, and would, if permitted to continue to exist, always constitute a powerful opposing element to the Soviet regime and a serious rival for influence in the country. Somewhat the same situation prevailed with respect to the individual peasant who, in his own small way, was also a private producer.

Lenin, had he lived, might have proved a great enough man to reconcile these conflicting forces to the ultimate benefit of Russian society, though this is questionable. But be that as it may, Stalin, and those whom he led in the struggle for succession to Lenin's position of leadership, were not the men to tolerate rival political forces in the sphere of power which they coveted. Their sense of insecurity was too great. Their particular brand of fanaticism, unmodified by any of the Anglo-Saxon traditions of compromise, was too fierce and too jealous to envisage any permanent sharing of power. From the Russian-Asiatic world out of which they had emerged they carried with them a skepticism as to the possibilities of permanent and peaceful coexistence of rival forces. Easily persuaded of their own doctrinaire "rightness," they insisted on the submission or destruction of all competing power. Outside of the Communist Party, Russian society was to have no rigidity. There were to be no forms of collective human activity or association which would not be dominated by the Party. No other force in Russian society was to be permitted to achieve vitality or integrity. Only the Party was to have structure. All else was to be an amorphous mass.

And within the Party the same principle was to apply. The mass of Party members might go through the motions of election, deliberation, decision and action; but in these motions they were to be animated not by their own individual wills but by the awesome breath of the Party leadership and the over-brooding presence of "the word."

Let it be stressed again that subjectively these men probably did not seek absolutism for its own sake. They doubtless believed—and found it easy to believe—that they alone knew what was good for society and that they would accomplish that good once their power was secure and unchallengeable. But in seeking that security of their own rule they were prepared to recognize no restrictions, either of God or man, on the character of their methods. And until such time as that security might be achieved, they placed far down on their scale of operational priorities the comforts and happiness of the peoples entrusted to their care.

Now the outstanding circumstance concerning the Soviet regime is that down to the present day this process of political consolidation has never been completed and the men in the Kremlin have continued to be predominantly absorbed with the struggle to secure and make absolute the power which they seized in November 1917. They have endeavored to secure it primarily against forces at home, within Soviet society itself. But they have also endeavored to secure it against the outside world. For ideology, as we have seen, taught them that the outside world was hostile and that it was their duty eventually to overthrow the political forces beyond their borders. The powerful hands of Russian history and tradition reached up to sustain them in this feeling. Finally, their own aggressive intransigence with respect to the outside world began to find its own reaction; and they were soon forced, to use another Gibbonesque phrase, "to chastise the contumacy" which they themselves had provoked. It is an undeniable privilege of every man to prove himself right in the thesis that the world is his enemy; for if he reiterates it frequently enough and makes it the background of his conduct he is bound eventually to be right.

Now it lies in the nature of the mental world of the Soviet leaders, as well as in the character of their ideology, that no opposition to them can be officially recognized as having any merit or justification whatsoever. Such opposition can flow, in theory, only from the hostile and incorrigible forces of dying capitalism. As long as remnants of capitalism were officially recognized as existing in Russia, it was possible to place on them, as an internal element, part of the blame for the maintenance of a dictatorial form of society. But as these remnants were liquidated, little by little, this justification fell away; and when it was indicated officially that they had been finally destroyed, it disappeared altogether. And this fact created one of the most basic of the compulsions which came to act upon the Soviet regime: since capitalism no longer existed in Russia and since it could not be admitted that there could be serious or widespread opposition to the Kremlin springing spontaneously from the liberated masses under its authority, it became necessary to justify the retention of the dictatorship by stressing the menace of capitalism abroad.

This began at an early date. In 1924 Stalin specifically defended the retention of the "organs of suppression," meaning, among others, the army and the secret police, on the ground that "as long as there is a capitalist encirclement there will be danger of intervention with all the consequences that flow from that danger." In accordance with that theory, and from that time on, all internal opposition forces in Russia have consistently been portrayed as the agents of foreign forces of reaction antagonistic to Soviet power.


By the same token, tremendous emphasis has been placed on the original Communist thesis of a basic antagonism between the capitalist and Socialist worlds. It is clear, from many indications, that this emphasis is not founded in reality. The real facts concerning it have been confused by the existence abroad of genuine resentment provoked by Soviet philosophy and tactics and occasionally by the existence of great centers of military power, notably the Nazi regime in Germany and the Japanese Government of the late 1930s, which did indeed have aggressive designs against the Soviet Union. But there is ample evidence that the stress laid in Moscow on the menace confronting Soviet society from the world outside its borders is founded not in the realities of foreign antagonism but in the necessity of explaining away the maintenance of dictatorial authority at home.

Now the maintenance of this pattern of Soviet power, namely, the pursuit of unlimited authority domestically, accompanied by the cultivation of the semi-myth of implacable foreign hostility, has gone far to shape the actual machinery of Soviet power as we know it today. Internal organs of administration which did not serve this purpose withered on the vine. Organs which did serve this purpose became vastly swollen. The security of Soviet power came to rest on the iron discipline of the Party, on the severity and ubiquity of the secret police, and on the uncompromising economic monopolism of the state. The "organs of suppression," in which the Soviet leaders had sought security from rival forces, became in large measure the masters of those whom they were designed to serve. Today the major part of the structure of Soviet power is committed to the perfection of the dictatorship and to the maintenance of the concept of Russia as in a state of siege, with the enemy lowering beyond the walls. And the millions of human beings who form that part of the structure of power must defend at all costs this concept of Russia's position, for without it they are themselves superfluous.

As things stand today, the rulers can no longer dream of parting with these organs of suppression. The quest for absolute power, pursued now for nearly three decades with a ruthlessness unparalleled (in scope at least) in modern times, has again produced internally, as it did externally, its own reaction. The excesses of the police apparatus have fanned the potential opposition to the regime into something far greater and more dangerous than it could have been before those excesses began.

But least of all can the rulers dispense with the fiction by which the maintenance of dictatorial power has been defended. For this fiction has been canonized in Soviet philosophy by the excesses already committed in its name; and it is now anchored in the Soviet structure of thought by bonds far greater than those of mere ideology.

II

So much for the historical background. What does it spell in terms of the political personality of Soviet power as we know it today?

Of the original ideology, nothing has been officially junked. Belief is maintained in the basic badness of capitalism, in the inevitability of its destruction, in the obligation of the proletariat to assist in that destruction and to take power into its own hands. But stress has come to be laid primarily on those concepts which relate most specifically to the Soviet regime itself: to its position as the sole truly Socialist regime in a dark and misguided world, and to the relationships of power within it.

The first of these concepts is that of the innate antagonism between capitalism and Socialism. We have seen how deeply that concept has become imbedded in foundations of Soviet power. It has profound implications for Russia's conduct as a member of international society. It means that there can never be on Moscow's side any sincere assumption of a community of aims between the Soviet Union and powers which are regarded as capitalist. It must invariably be assumed in Moscow that the aims of the capitalist world are antagonistic to the Soviet regime, and therefore to the interests of the peoples it controls. If the Soviet government occasionally sets its signature to documents which would indicate the contrary, this is to be regarded as a tactical maneuver permissible in dealing with the enemy (who is without honor) and should be taken in the spirit of caveat emptor. Basically, the antagonism remains. It is postulated. And from it flow many of the phenomena which we find disturbing in the Kremlin's conduct of foreign policy: the secretiveness, the lack of frankness, the duplicity, the wary suspiciousness and the basic unfriendliness of purpose. These phenomena are there to stay, for the foreseeable future. There can be variations of degree and of emphasis. When there is something the Russians want from us, one or the other of these features of their policy may be thrust temporarily into the background; and when that happens there will always be Americans who will leap forward with gleeful announcements that "the Russians have changed," and some who will even try to take credit for having brought about such "changes." But we should not be misled by tactical maneuvers. These characteristics of Soviet policy, like the postulate from which they flow, are basic to the internal nature of Soviet power, and will be with us, whether in the foreground or the background, until the internal nature of Soviet power is changed.


This means that we are going to continue for a long time to find the Russians difficult to deal with. It does not mean that they should be considered as embarked upon a do-or-die program to overthrow our society by a given date. The theory of the inevitability of the eventual fall of capitalism has the fortunate connotation that there is no hurry about it. The forces of progress can take their time in preparing the final coup de gráce. Meanwhile, what is vital is that the "Socialist fatherland"—that oasis of power which has been already won for Socialism in the person of the Soviet Union—should be cherished and defended by all good Communists at home and abroad, its fortunes promoted, its enemies badgered and confounded. The promotion of premature, "adventuristic" revolutionary projects abroad which might embarrass Soviet power in any way would be an inexcusable, even a counterrevolutionary act. The cause of Socialism is the support and promotion of Soviet power, as defined in Moscow.


This brings us to the second of the concepts important to contemporary Soviet outlook. That is the infallibility of the Kremlin. The Soviet concept of power, which permits no focal points of organization outside the Party itself, requires that the Party leadership remain in theory the sole repository of truth. For if truth were to be found elsewhere, there would be justification for its expression in organized activity. But it is precisely that which the Kremlin cannot and will not permit.

The leadership of the Communist Party is therefore always right, and has been always right ever since in 1929 Stalin formalized his personal power by announcing that decisions of the Politburo were being taken unanimously.

On the principle of infallibility there rests the iron discipline of the Communist Party. In fact, the two concepts are mutually self-supporting. Perfect discipline requires recognition of infallibility. Infallibility requires the observance of discipline. And the two together go far to determine the behaviorism of the entire Soviet apparatus of power. But their effect cannot be understood unless a third factor be taken into account: namely, the fact that the leadership is at liberty to put forward for tactical purposes any particular thesis which it finds useful to the cause at any particular moment and to require the faithful and unquestioning acceptance of the thesis by the members of the movement as a whole. This means that truth is not a constant but is actually created, for all intents and purposes, by the Soviet leaders themselves. It may vary from week to week, month to month. It is nothing absolute and immutable—nothing which flows from objective reality. It is only the most recent manifestation of the wisdom of those in whom the ultimate wisdom is supposed to reside, because they represent the logic of history. The accumulative effect of these factors is to give to the whole subordinate apparatus of Soviet power an unshakable stubbornness and steadfastness in its orientation. This orientation can be changed at will by the Kremlin but by no other power. Once a given party line has been laid down on a given issue of current policy, the whole Soviet governmental machine, including the mechanism of diplomacy, moves inexorably along the prescribed path, like a persistent toy automobile wound up and headed in a given direction, stopping only when it meets with some unanswerable force. The individuals who are the components of this machine are unamenable to argument or reason which comes to them from outside sources. Their whole training has taught them to mistrust and discount the glib persuasiveness of the outside world. Like the white dog before the phonograph, they hear only the "master's voice." And if they are to be called off from the purposes last dictated to them, it is the master who must call them off. Thus the foreign representative cannot hope that his words will make any impression on them. The most that he can hope is that they will be transmitted to those at the top, who are capable of changing the party line. But even those are not likely to be swayed by any normal logic in the words of the bourgeois representative. Since there can be no appeal to common purposes, there can be no appeal to common mental approaches. For this reason, facts speak louder than words to the ears of the Kremlin; and words carry the greatest weight when they have the ring of reflecting, or being backed up by, facts of unchallengeable validity.

But we have seen that the Kremlin is under no ideological compulsion to accomplish its purposes in a hurry. Like the Church, it is dealing in ideological concepts which are of long-term validity, and it can afford to be patient. It has no right to risk the existing achievements of the revolution for the sake of vain baubles of the future. The very teachings of Lenin himself require great caution and flexibility in the pursuit of Communist purposes. Again, these precepts are fortified by the lessons of Russian history: of centuries of obscure battles between nomadic forces over the stretches of a vast unfortified plain. Here caution, circumspection, flexibility and deception are the valuable qualities; and their value finds natural appreciation in the Russian or the oriental mind. Thus the Kremlin has no compunction about retreating in the face of superior force. And being under the compulsion of no timetable, it does not get panicky under the necessity for such retreat. Its political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal. Its main concern is to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power. But if it finds unassailable barriers in its path, it accepts these philosophically and accommodates itself to them. The main thing is that there should always be pressure, unceasing constant pressure, toward the desired goal. There is no trace of any feeling in Soviet psychology that that goal must be reached at any given time.

These considerations make Soviet diplomacy at once easier and more difficult to deal with than the diplomacy of individual aggressive leaders like Napoleon and Hitler. On the one hand it is more sensitive to contrary force, more ready to yield on individual sectors of the diplomatic front when that force is felt to be too strong, and thus more rational in the logic and rhetoric of power. On the other hand it cannot be easily defeated or discouraged by a single victory on the part of its opponents. And the patient persistence by which it is animated means that it can be effectively countered not by sporadic acts which represent the momentary whims of democratic opinion but only by intelligent long-range policies on the part of Russia's adversaries—policies no less steady in their purpose, and no less variegated and resourceful in their application, than those of the Soviet Union itself.

In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. It is important to note, however, that such a policy has nothing to do with outward histrionics: with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward "toughness." While the Kremlin is basically flexible in its reaction to political realities, it is by no means unamenable to considerations of prestige. Like almost any other government, it can be placed by tactless and threatening gestures in a position where it cannot afford to yield even though this might be dictated by its sense of realism. The Russian leaders are keen judges of human psychology, and as such they are highly conscious that loss of temper and of self-control is never a source of strength in political affairs. They are quick to exploit such evidences of weakness. For these reasons, it is a sine qua non of successful dealing with Russia that the foreign government in question should remain at all times cool and collected and that its demands on Russian policy should be put forward in such a manner as to leave the way open for a compliance not too detrimental to Russian prestige.

III

In the light of the above, it will be clearly seen that the Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence. The Russians look forward to a duel of infinite duration, and they see that already they have scored great successes. It must be borne in mind that there was a time when the Communist Party represented far more of a minority in the sphere of Russian national life than Soviet power today represents in the world community.

But if ideology convinces the rulers of Russia that truth is on their side and that they can therefore afford to wait, those of us on whom that ideology has no claim are free to examine objectively the validity of that premise. The Soviet thesis not only implies complete lack of control by the west over its own economic destiny, it likewise assumes Russian unity, discipline and patience over an infinite period. Let us bring this apocalyptic vision down to earth, and suppose that the western world finds the strength and resourcefulness to contain Soviet power over a period of ten to fifteen years. What does that spell for Russia itself?


The Soviet leaders, taking advantage of the contributions of modern technique to the arts of despotism, have solved the question of obedience within the confines of their power. Few challenge their authority; and even those who do are unable to make that challenge valid as against the organs of suppression of the state.

The Kremlin has also proved able to accomplish its purpose of building up in Russia, regardless of the interests of the inhabitants, an industrial foundation of heavy metallurgy, which is, to be sure, not yet complete but which is nevertheless continuing to grow and is approaching those of the other major industrial countries. All of this, however, both the maintenance of internal political security and the building of heavy industry, has been carried out at a terrible cost in human life and in human hopes and energies. It has necessitated the use of forced labor on a scale unprecedented in modern times under conditions of peace. It has involved the neglect or abuse of other phases of Soviet economic life, particularly agriculture, consumers' goods production, housing and transportation.

To all that, the war has added its tremendous toll of destruction, death and human exhaustion. In consequence of this, we have in Russia today a population which is physically and spiritually tired. The mass of the people are disillusioned, skeptical and no longer as accessible as they once were to the magical attraction which Soviet power still radiates to its followers abroad. The avidity with which people seized upon the slight respite accorded to the Church for tactical reasons during the war was eloquent testimony to the fact that their capacity for faith and devotion found little expression in the purposes of the regime.

In these circumstances, there are limits to the physical and nervous strength of people themselves. These limits are absolute ones, and are binding even for the cruelest dictatorship, because beyond them people cannot be driven. The forced labor camps and the other agencies of constraint provide temporary means of compelling people to work longer hours than their own volition or mere economic pressure would dictate; but if people survive them at all they become old before their time and must be considered as human casualties to the demands of dictatorship. In either case their best powers are no longer available to society and can no longer be enlisted in the service of the state.

Here only the younger generation can help. The younger generation, despite all vicissitudes and sufferings, is numerous and vigorous; and the Russians are a talented people. But it still remains to be seen what will be the effects on mature performance of the abnormal emotional strains of childhood which Soviet dictatorship created and which were enormously increased by the war. Such things as normal security and placidity of home environment have practically ceased to exist in the Soviet Union outside of the most remote farms and villages. And observers are not yet sure whether that is not going to leave its mark on the overall capacity of the generation now coming into maturity.

In addition to this, we have the fact that Soviet economic development, while it can list certain formidable achievements, has been precariously spotty and uneven. Russian Communists who speak of the "uneven development of capitalism" should blush at the contemplation of their own national economy. Here certain branches of economic life, such as the metallurgical and machine industries, have been pushed out of all proportion to other sectors of economy. Here is a nation striving to become in a short period one of the great industrial nations of the world while it still has no highway network worthy of the name and only a relatively primitive network of railways. Much has been done to increase efficiency of labor and to teach primitive peasants something about the operation of machines. But maintenance is still a crying deficiency of all Soviet economy. Construction is hasty and poor in quality. Depreciation must be enormous. And in vast sectors of economic life it has not yet been possible to instill into labor anything like that general culture of production and technical self-respect which characterizes the skilled worker of the west.

It is difficult to see how these deficiencies can be corrected at an early date by a tired and dispirited population working largely under the shadow of fear and compulsion. And as long as they are not overcome, Russia will remain economically a vulnerable, and in a certain sense an impotent, nation, capable of exporting its enthusiasm and of radiating the strange charm of its primitive political vitality but unable to back up those articles of export by the real evidences of material power and prosperity.

Meanwhile, a great uncertainty hangs over the political life of the Soviet Union. That is the uncertainty involved in the transfer of power from one individual or group of individuals to others.

This is, of course, outstandingly the problem of the personal position of Stalin. We must remember that his succession to Lenin's pinnacle of preeminence in the Communist movement was the only such transfer of individual authority which the Soviet Union has experienced. That transfer took 12 years to consolidate. It cost the lives of millions of people and shook the state to its foundations. The attendant tremors were felt all through the international revolutionary movement, to the disadvantage of the Kremlin itself.


It is always possible that another transfer of preeminent power may take place quietly and inconspicuously, with no repercussions anywhere. But again, it is possible that the questions involved may unleash, to use some of Lenin's words, one of those "incredibly swift transitions" from "delicate deceit" to "wild violence" which characterize Russian history, and may shake Soviet power to its foundations.

But this is not only a question of Stalin himself. There has been, since 1938, a dangerous congealment of political life in the higher circles of Soviet power. The All-Union Congress of Soviets, in theory the supreme body of the Party, is supposed to meet not less often than once in three years. It will soon be eight full years since its last meeting. During this period membership in the Party has numerically doubled. Party mortality during the war was enormous; and today well over half of the Party members are persons who have entered since the last Party congress was held. Meanwhile, the same small group of men has carried on at the top through an amazing series of national vicissitudes. Surely there is some reason why the experiences of the war brought basic political changes to every one of the great governments of the west. Surely the causes of that phenomenon are basic enough to be present somewhere in the obscurity of Soviet political life, as well. And yet no recognition has been given to these causes in Russia.

It must be surmised from this that even within so highly disciplined an organization as the Communist Party there must be a growing divergence in age, outlook and interest between the great mass of Party members, only so recently recruited into the movement, and the little self-perpetuating clique of men at the top, whom most of these Party members have never met, with whom they have never conversed, and with whom they can have no political intimacy.

Who can say whether, in these circumstances, the eventual rejuvenation of the higher spheres of authority (which can only be a matter of time) can take place smoothly and peacefully, or whether rivals in the quest for higher power will not eventually reach down into these politically immature and inexperienced masses in order to find support for their respective claims? If this were ever to happen, strange consequences could flow for the Communist Party: for the membership at large has been exercised only in the practices of iron discipline and obedience and not in the arts of compromise and accommodation. And if disunity were ever to seize and paralyze the Party, the chaos and weakness of Russian society would be revealed in forms beyond description. For we have seen that Soviet power is only a crust concealing an amorphous mass of human beings among whom no independent organizational structure is tolerated. In Russia there is not even such a thing as local government. The present generation of Russians have never known spontaneity of collective action. If, consequently, anything were ever to occur to disrupt the unity and efficacy of the Party as a political instrument, Soviet Russia might be changed overnight from one of the strongest to one of the weakest and most pitiable of national societies.

Thus the future of Soviet power may not be by any means as secure as Russian capacity for self-delusion would make it appear to the men in the Kremlin. That they can keep power themselves, they have demonstrated. That they can quietly and easily turn it over to others remains to be proved. Meanwhile, the hardships of their rule and the vicissitudes of international life have taken a heavy toll of the strength and hopes of the great people on whom their power rests. It is curious to note that the ideological power of Soviet authority is strongest today in areas beyond the frontiers of Russia, beyond the reach of its police power. This phenomenon brings to mind a comparison used by Thomas Mann in his great novel Buddenbrooks. Observing that human institutions often show the greatest outward brilliance at a moment when inner decay is in reality farthest advanced, he compared the Buddenbrook family, in the days of its greatest glamour, to one of those stars whose light shines most brightly on this world when in reality it has long since ceased to exist. And who can say with assurance that the strong light still cast by the Kremlin on the dissatisfied peoples of the western world is not the powerful afterglow of a constellation which is in actuality on the wane? This cannot be proved. And it cannot be disproved. But the possibility remains (and in the opinion of this writer it is a strong one) that Soviet power, like the capitalist world of its conception, bears within it the seeds of its own decay, and that the sprouting of these seeds is well advanced.

IV

It is clear that the United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy political intimacy with the Soviet regime. It must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena. It must continue to expect that Soviet policies will reflect no abstract love of peace and stability, no real faith in the possibility of a permanent happy coexistence of the Socialist and capitalist worlds, but rather a cautious, persistent pressure toward the disruption and weakening of all rival influence and rival power.

Balanced against this are the facts that Russia, as opposed to the western world in general, is still by far the weaker party, that Soviet policy is highly flexible, and that Soviet society may well contain deficiencies which will eventually weaken its own total potential. This would of itself warrant the United States entering with reasonable confidence upon a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interest of a peaceful and stable world.

But in actuality the possibilities for American policy are by no means limited to holding the line and hoping for the best. It is entirely possible for the United States to influence by its actions the internal developments, both within Russia and throughout the international Communist movement, by which Russian policy is largely determined. This is not only a question of the modest measure of informational activity which this government can conduct in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, although that, too, is important. It is rather a question of the degree to which the United States can create among the peoples of the world generally the impression of a country which knows what it wants, which is coping successfully with the problems of its internal life and with the responsibilities of a world power, and which has a spiritual vitality capable of holding its own among the major ideological currents of the time. To the extent that such an impression can be created and maintained, the aims of Russian Communism must appear sterile and quixotic, the hopes and enthusiasm of Moscow's supporters must wane, and added strain must be imposed on the Kremlin's foreign policies. For the palsied decrepitude of the capitalist world is the keystone of Communist philosophy. Even the failure of the United States to experience the early economic depression which the ravens of the Red Square have been predicting with such complacent confidence since hostilities ceased would have deep and important repercussions throughout the Communist world.


By the same token, exhibitions of indecision, disunity and internal disintegration within this country have an exhilarating effect on the whole Communist movement. At each evidence of these tendencies, a thrill of hope and excitement goes through the Communist world; a new jauntiness can be noted in the Moscow tread; new groups of foreign supporters climb on to what they can only view as the bandwagon of international politics; and Russian pressure increases all along the line in international affairs.

In would be an exaggeration to say that American behavior unassisted and alone could exercise a power of life and death over the Communist movement and bring about the early fall of Soviet power in Russia. But the United States has it in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the breakup or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power. For no mystical, messianic movement—and particularly not that of the Kremlin—can face frustration indefinitely without eventually adjusting itself in one way or another to the logic of that state of affairs.

Thus the decision will really fall in large measure on this country itself. The issue of Soviet-American relations is in essence a test of the overall worth of the United States as a nation among nations. To avoid destruction the United States need only measure up to its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation as a great nation.

Surely, there was never a fairer test of national quality than this. In the light of these circumstances, the thoughtful observer of Russian-American relations will find no cause for complaint in the Kremlin's challenge to American society. He will rather experience a certain gratitude to a Providence which, by providing the American people with this implacable challenge, has made their entire security as a nation dependent on their pulling themselves together and accepting the responsibilities of moral and political leadership that history plainly intended them to bear.

[1] "Concerning the Slogans of the United States of Europe," August 1915. Official Soviet edition of Lenin's works

[2] Here and elsewhere in this paper "Socialism" refers to Marxist or Leninst Communism, not to liberal Socialism of the Second International variety.

quinta-feira, 27 de janeiro de 2022

Genocídio racial estatístico - José Murilo de Carvalho (2004, mas ainda muito atual)

 

Genocídio racial estatístico

O Globo (Rio de Janeiro) 27/12/2004

Está em andamento no Brasil uma tentativa de genocídio racial perpetrado com a arma da estatística. A campanha é liderada por ativistas do movimento negro, sociólogos, economistas, demógrafos, organizações não-governamentais, órgãos federais de pesquisa. A tática é muito simples. O IBGE decidiu desde 1940 que o Brasil se divide racialmente em pretos, brancos, pardos, amarelos e indígenas. Os genocidas somam pretos e pardos e decretam que todos são negros, afro-descendentes. Pronto. De uma penada, ou de uma somada, excluem do mapa demográfico brasileiro toda a população descendente de indígenas, todos os caboclos e curibocas. Escravizada e vitimada por práticas genocidas nas mãos de portugueses e bandeirantes, a população indígena é objeto de um segundo genocídio, agora estatístico. A não ser pelos trezentos e tantos mil índios, a América desaparece de nossa composição étnica. Restam Europa e África. 

O problema da cor ou raça persegue nossos demógrafos e estatísticos desde 1849. Haddock Lobo, organizador do censo do Rio de Janeiro desse ano, rejeitou o item cor por considerar essa classificação odiosa, além de inconfiável pela “infidelidade com que cada indivíduo faria de si próprio a necessária declaração”. O primeiro censo nacional, feito em 1872, enfrentou o problema e dividiu as raças (não se diferenciava raça de cor) em branca, preta, parda e cabocla (indígena). Os responsáveis pelo censo de 1890 substituíram pardo por mestiço, argumentando, corretamente, que a cor parda “só exprime o produto do casamento do branco com o preto”. O censo de 1920 eliminou o item raça porque “as respostas ocultavam em grande parte a verdade”, sobretudo as respostas dos mestiços. O registro de cor foi reintroduzido no censo em 1940, quando voltaram os pardos e se estabeleceu o padrão atual, com a única diferença que hoje se separam amarelos (asiáticos) e indígenas. 

Retrocedeu-se a 1872, ignorado o alerta feito em 1890. Os descendentes de indígenas ficaram embutidos na classificação de pardos, da qual são agora definitivamente enxotados. Ora, é óbvio para qualquer um que os 39% de pardos do censo de 2000 se compõem em boa parte de descendentes de indígenas. Aí está, aliás, a razão de ser do tribunal racial da Universidade de Brasília, destinado a apontar entre os pardos os afro-descendentes. A Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego do IBGE, de 1998, mostrou que as pessoas classificadas como pardas pelos critérios impostos, quando deixadas livres para se autoclassificarem se disseram morenas e morenas claras em 60% dos casos. Apenas 34% dos pardos concordaram com essa classificação e apenas 2% se disseram mulatos. Pesquisa feita na Região Metropolitana do Rio de Janeiro em 1997 revelou que 50% dos que foram classificados de pardos pelos entrevistadores se disseram morenos ou brancos. Outra pesquisa no Rio, de 2000, mostrou que 48% dos pardos diziam ter antecedentes indígenas. Nos estados do Norte, onde foi fraca a presença da escravidão africana, os descendentes de indígenas formam sem dúvida a grande maioria dos pardos. 

A inspiração do genocídio vem naturalmente dos Estados Unidos. Mas a operação é falaciosa. Para corrigir os males de uma sociedade em preto e branco, os americanos começaram a valorizar todas as etnias. Como se sabe, não existem mais americanos. Lá, as pessoas são euro, afro, latino, nativo, asiático-americanas. Professores brasileiros quando vão dar aulas por lá têm que se autoclassificar racialmente. Eu sou latino. Importou-se essa valorização das etnias. A falácia consiste em ter sido ela importada não para acabar com a polarização, mas para implantá-la num país em que ela não existia. Valorizam-se duas cores, raças, etnias, seja lá o que for, com exclusão das outras. Viramos um país em preto e branco, ou melhor, em negro e branco. 

Deixados livres para definir sua cor, os brasileiros exibem enorme variedade e grande ambigüidade. Essa riqueza foi aprisionada no leito de Procusto das cinco categorias pré-codificadas do IBGE. Os americanizantes querem mutilá-la ainda mais, reduzindo-a à polarização branco-negro. Se é para valorizar as etnias, vamos copiar direito os americanos. Vamos incluir todas as etnias, sem esquecer a dos primitivos habitantes do país, instaurando entre nós a sociedade hifenizada. Para isso, nenhuma das opções dos censos, de 1872 a 2000, é satisfatória. 



quarta-feira, 26 de janeiro de 2022

Brasil-China Ensaios 2002-2021, de Anna Jaguaribe (CEBRI)

 26/01/2022: 


 O CEBRI lança hoje o livro Brasil-China Ensaios 2002-2021, de Anna Jaguaribe, com o apoio da Fundação Alexandre Gusmão (FUNAG), do Banco BOCOM BBM e de Marcelo Vieira. A publicação traz artigos inéditos da socióloga pioneira nos estudos sobre a China e aborda temas como as relações diplomáticas entre China e Brasil, a presença chinesa no multilateralismo, a projeção internacional do país e suas consequências geopolíticas, o desenvolvimento chinês e a modernização de Pequim.

O projeto gráfico é assinado por Mariana Jaguaribe, sobrinha de Anna, e as fotos, muitas inéditas, compartilhadas pela irmã Cláudia Jaguaribe, retratam momentos especiais de sua trajetória.
 
Anna Jaguaribe contribuiu de forma inestimável com o Centro Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (CEBRI). Foi membro do Conselho Curador, desde 2017 e estruturou o Núcleo Ásia e o Grupo de Análise sobre China. Seu legado é mais uma vez celebrado com a publicação deste livro.
 
Acesse a versão digital do livro aqui.

ARTIGOS
2002

032
 China modern: The city
as a battleground for identities

2010

054
 Visões de futuro:
A China e os seus desafios,

elementos do debate atual

2011

084
 Brasil e China na
reorganização das relações

econômicas internacionais:

Desafios e oportunidades

2013

104
 On state capacities
2014

120
 Políticas de inovação,
cruzando caminhos: Os casos

de Brasil e China

2015

142
 Estratégias de
governança no século XXI:

Observações sobre os novos

desafios da China

2016
166
 Desafios da economia
chinesa hoje

2018

174
 Characteristics and
direction of China’s global

investment drive

NOTAS SOBRE A

CONTEMPORANEIDADE

2019

210
 Brasil e China no
contexto da urbanização

2020

216
 Geopolitics and the
economics of innovation:

Different strategies

2021

222 Geopolitics and the rise
of China

228
 Reform and opening of
China’s financial system

Sobre a natureza do declínio relativo do Brasil no último meio século - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

 Sobre a natureza do declínio relativo do Brasil no último meio século 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Não existe qualquer fatalidade interna ou externa que explique a perda de impulso para o crescimento e o desenvolvimento econômico e social que afeta o Brasil desde a fase final, de crises e desacertos, do regime militar. As razões são essencialmente políticas e self-made.

O Brasil afundou menos pela ação persistente de algum projeto organizado de pensamento equivocado aplicado à nação — como podem ter sido os fenômenos do bolchevismo e do peronismo, nos casos bem mais graves dos desacertos ocorridos na Rússia e na Argentina durante décadas— e mais pela inconsciência geral quanto aos destinos do país por parte daqueles que ascenderam ao poder, de esquerda ou direita, desde aquela época.

Os problemas foram se acumulando lentamente, asfixiando não só a possibilidade de correções pontuais pela via da política, como a própria consciência de que problemas conjunturais estivessem reforçando tendências estruturais negativas, já longamente estabelecidas, como por exemplo a persistência de baixos níveis de educação na população.


A correção dos desacertos é difícil e incerta, ao observarmos o cenário de curto prazo, uma vez que ainda persistimos em identificar um improvável “salvador da pátria” como o redentor dos nossos males, sendo que este pode estar tanto à direita quanto à esquerda. Tais são as indefinições que persistem, e que mostram a divisão do país, num quadro de incerteza geral quanto a um programa geral de ajustes. As “soluções” ainda são buscadas em nível de pessoas, não de políticas.


Vejo qualquer inversão da atual tendência declinante e de recuperação da nação como um processo longo e desgastante, tantas são as deformações criadas por políticos desonestos e medíocres no comando do país — de esquerda e de direita —, ao lado da incultura ainda largamente predominante em todos os estratos sociais.

Não há nenhuma dúvida quanto a inexistência de fatalidades inevitáveis, pois todos os nossos problemas são o resultado de disfuncionalidades cumulativas criadas domesticamente. Mas muitas são as dúvidas de que possamos ter, no ambiente atual da fragmentada política brasileira (ou seja, as “elites dirigentes”) e da virtual inexistência de qualquer consenso sobre a natureza dos desafios entre as elites verdadeiramente dominantes (ou seja, os donos do capital), alguma possibilidade de correção de rumos no futuro previsível.


Em resumo: a retomada do dinamismo é incerta e provavelmente tomará mais de uma geração. Perdemos o rumo e até a consciência de que devemos ter algum tipo de rumo, qualquer que seja ele. Vai demorar para encontrar algum outro, tal a rigidez de interesses consolidados na atual anomia societal.

De minha parte, persistirei a pensar no Brasil do futuro, 80 anos depois que Stefan Zweig ousou predizer boas promessas nessa perspectiva, em boa medida pelo caráter plástico de nossas relações raciais. Parece que até isso se perdeu. Vamos insistir naquilo que nos distingue como povo tolerante e culturalmente integrado.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 26/01/2022

terça-feira, 25 de janeiro de 2022

Mini reflexão sobre mais do mesmo - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

 Mini reflexão sobre mais do mesmo

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

O Brasil vai saltando de salvador em salvador, continuando a afundar na mediocridade de esperar que um presidente “dê jeito nas coisas”. Construímos nós mesmos essa gaiola de ferro que não leva a nada, a não ser a novas frustrações. 

Ainda não crescemos o suficiente. Custa pensar?

Por que, como é que toda uma sociedade, que possui gente capaz, pesquisadores e professores que produzem obras magníficas de saber consistente, empresários inteligentes e batalhadores, e até alguns políticos sagazes, como é que tanta gente se deixa aprisionar e levar por um punhado de aproveitadores, mentirosos e incompetentes, que são saudados como “líderes”, dos quais se espera a solução a tantos problemas criados pelos mesmos mentirosos aproveitadores?

A sociedade como um todo, em sua grande maioria formada de cidadãos contribuintes e votantes, se deixa levar por alguns poucos pilantras, que continuam a praticar falcatruas a prazos regulares?

Mais de dez mil anos de “civilização”, religiões salvadoras, maravilhas da modernidade tecnológica, e até economistas competentes, para no final nos deixarmos levar por alguns espertinhos, que possuem a retórica adequada em face das dificuldades da vida e que continuam a apregoar falsas soluções? 

Somos tão crédulos assim, ou apenas passivos e acomodados?

Estamos no limiar de um novo exercício do mesmo gênero, mais um autoengano, que vai beneficiar velhos e novos espertinhos, e deixar a maioria mais ou menos como ela estava antes. 

Até a próxima vez…

É, parece que, finalmente, a humanidade, as sociedades nacionais, os povos constituídos em forma de Estados, nós não avançamos tanto assim: continuamos ingênuos e incapazes de cuidar de nós mesmos, e temos de recorrer a outros para organizar a bagunça. Tem um preço em tudo isso: não avançamos tanto quanto poderíamos: conflitos de opinião continuam possíveis. As paixões e os interesse ainda nos dominam.

Finalmente, não estamos tão longe assim da guerra de Troia. Acho que vou voltar para a minha Ítaca: o caminho será longo, e semeado de escolhos.

Mas há outra via?

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Brasília, 25/01/2022


Chile: a direita militar pinochetista ensaia um começo de rebelião: não terá sucesso...

 Transcrevo o que recebi: 


Comienzan los problemas en Chile

¡CARTA DE UN COMANDANTE EN JEFE INSTITUCIONAL!!! 


Sugerencia del Comandante de Ejército: Jaime Manuel Ojeda Torrent 

Veterano del 73.


Del: Comandante en Jefe Institucional.

Al:  Señor Gabriel Boric Font, Presidente electo de la Nación.

Presente:

Me dirijo a usted en mi condición de Comandante en Jefe Institucional, conforme a las leyes y reglamentos vigentes, con el fin de reclamar por haber designado  como Ministro de Defensa a la señora Maya Fernández Allende. 

La designación de la señora Maya Fernández Allende, representa una severa afrenta y humillación para con nuestra institución y su sagrada historia.

El suscrito no pone en duda su derecho legal y constitucional de nombrar sus ministros, pero no puede aceptar la humillación a nuestra sagrada Institución que conlleva la designación que Ud. hace, como Ministra de Defensa,  de la señora Fernández Allende.

Su nombramiento, a todas luces, representa una subrepticia forma de vengar a su abuelo, el ex Presidente Salvador Allende Gossens, del cual usted, conforme públicamente lo ha señalado, es admirador. 

El único mérito que presenta la señora Maya Fernández Allende, para haber sido designada Ministro de Defensa, es el odio que siente para con las Fuerzas Armadas, las cuales el 11 de Septiembre de 1973, derrocaron a su abuelo 

Me es un deber moral, como Comandante en Jefe Institucional,  hacerle presente que el ex Presidente Allende, abuelo de la señora Maya Fernández, es reconocido en nuestra historia militar por el profundo daño causado a nuestra sagrada Patria y en particular a nuestra Institución.

El trascendental daño causado por el ex presidente Allende, abuelo de la Ministro de Defensa por usted designada, y sus consecuencias, aún lo pagamos con un inconmensurable daño humano, como es el que han padecido y padecen nuestros Veteranos del 73.  

Mi reclamo está basado en los siguientes hechos irrefutables que el ex Presidente Allende, realizó para  el logro de su objetivo político de imponer una dictadura comunista en el país:

-Intentó, sin lograrlo, sobornar a todos nuestros altos mandos.

-Trató de infiltrar ideológicamente nuestra Institución y fomentar la división entre oficiales y suboficiales. 

-Intentó crear un institución militar paralela a la nuestra, con el apoyo de Luis Fernández Oña, agente enviado por Fidel Castro para tales efectos, y nada menos que padre de la señora Fernández Allende.  

-Fomentó la formación, capacitación y entrenamiento guerrillero, con el apoyo humano y material, principalmente de Fidel Castro. 

-Sus terroristas del MIR, a quienes fraternalmente llamaba: "Los Jóvenes Idealistas", asesinaron a mansalva a muchos de nuestro personal y Allende graciosamente  los amnistió. 

-El primer decreto que firmó Allende, una vez que asumió el poder, fue indultar a los terroristas del MIR condenados por asesinatos, asaltos, secuestros y por colocación de bombas. 

(Espero que usted no lo imite, amnistiando a  los delincuentes terroristas responsables de las explosiones antisociales.)

En consideración a lo anterior, solicito a usted reconsiderar el nombramiento de la ciudadana Maya Fernández Allende, por conformar su designación una clara ofensa a nuestra Institución, a nuestros hombres de ayer, de hoy y del mañana.

De no hacerlo, la señora Maya Fernández, se verá expuesta a que uno de los nuestros, imite la honorabilidad y valentía moral de uno de los militares que se negó a rendir honores a Fidel Castro.

Me refiero al Coronel Alberto Labbé Troncoso (QEPD), cuyo nombre está grabado en letras de oro en la historia de las FF.AA.

Como también, por mínima moral, el suscrito le presentaría su indeclinable renuncia al cargo de Comandante en Jefe Institucional.

Ya que de no renunciar estaría traicionando a mi institución y también  a aquellos que, por culpa de Allende, han perdido la vida o se encuentran procesados, condenados, o prisioneros como los Veteranos del 73.

Si bajo resquicios legales se me acusa de deliberar, asumo las consecuencias con la dignidad que amerita mi alto cargo y por mi deber de lealtad de predicar con el ejemplo personal ante mis subalternos. 

Lo saluda atentamente,   

Fdo. Comandante en Jefe Institucional*( E,A y/o FA ).*


Eleições 2022: Terceira via, miragem e realidade - Demétrio Magnoli (O Globo)

Como eu próprio anunciei, assim que saiu essa novidade da aliança Lula-Alkmin, no último trimestre de 2021, ela está destinada a liquidar a fatura já no primeiro turno, sem precisar sequer fazer campanha, ou fazendo, pró-forma, pois também tem aquela dinheirama toda para gastar.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

    Terceira via, miragem e realidade

    Demétrio Magnoli

    01:24:54 | 24/01/2022 | Economia | O Globo | Demétrio Magnoli | BR

    O fracasso da "terceira via" está expresso nas sondagens de opinião pública. Segundo as análises convencionais, a explicação para o fracasso encontra-se na polarização política entre Bolsonaro e Lula, que fecharia o caminho a uma candidatura alternativa, de centro. Há bem mais que um simples equívoco no diagnóstico.

    Polarização? As pesquisas evidenciam que a rejeição a Bolsonaro situa-se em torno de 60% do eleitorado. São os que não votariam no presidente em nenhuma hipótese, parcela que chega a 64% entre os pobres e 54% na Região Sul, suposta fortaleza do bolsonarismo. Se o pleito fosse hoje, Lula triunfaria no primeiro turno. A polarização circunscreve-se às redes sociais. Não existe polarização eleitoral.

    A tese da "terceira via" assenta-se exclusivamente sobre a antiga constatação de que o lulismo não controla a maioria do eleitorado. Isso ficou provado nas quatro vitórias consecutivas do lulopetismo, duas de Lula e duas de Dilma, que só tiveram desenlace no segundo turno. Daí os arautos da "terceira via" concluem pela existência de uma vasta parcela dos eleitores dispostos a sufragar uma candidatura alternativa.

    É uma tese que ignora a história. Ao longo de um quarto de século, o sistema político partidário brasileiro equilibrou-se sobre a polaridade PT-PSDB. Contudo, durante a crise aberta pelo impeachment de Dilma (2016) e pela eleição de Bolsonaro (2018), o polo centrista implodiu. A falência do partido de centro manifestou-se duplamente, nas formas do desastre eleitoral da candidatura Alckmin e da adesão das novas lideranças tucanas ao candidato da extrema direita. A miragem da "terceira via" hipnotiza os que se recusam a encarar a morte do PSDB original.

    "Terceira via"? Moro e Doria, que tentam colar o rótulo sobre suas próprias candidaturas, não conseguem decolar, pois são vistos pelos eleitores como ramificações do bolsonarismo. O passado recente esmaga o presente almejado: nenhum dos dois tem legitimidade política para ocupar o centro de uma cena supostamente tensionada entre polos extremos. Ciro, que poderia ocupar essa posição, carece de estruturas partidárias e alcance eleitoral: perambula numa paisagem árida, como um Quixote destituído até mesmo do inseparável Sancho Pança.

    Paradoxalmente, a "terceira via" vai se tornando uma realidade - e atende pelo nome de Lula. O ex-presidente definiu uma estratégia de campanha baseada na ideia de ocupar o centro do tabuleiro político. A democracia unida contra o autoritarismo -eis a mensagem que o candidato procura veicular. A manobra destina-se a fechar o caminho do centro, ocupando-o.

    Não é novidade. Lula operou segundo a mesma estratégia em seu triunfo pioneiro, duas décadas atrás, divulgando a Carta ao Povo Brasileiro e compondo chapa com o empresário José Alencar. A i novação é o passo ousado de articular uma chapa com Alckmin, símbolo de um PSDB que não mais existe. A mensagem: meu governo conectará as políticas sociais lulistas à política econômica tucana. Reconciliação é o nome de seu jogo.

    Nas hostes de esquerda, a valsa da aliança provoca acesa controvérsia. Tipicamente, surgiu um abaixo-assinado de lideranças relevantes e diminutas do PT contra o "pacto com a direita". A margem, os "companheiros de viagem" do PSOL manifestam santa indignação. José Dirceu, um realista que sabe calcular, já apresentou sua defesa do pacto lulista. Para persuadir a esquerda, sugere que a presença de Alckmin destina-se a evitar uma futura desestabilização do governo Lula pelas maléficas elites. Talvez cole, mas Dirceu sabe que a lógica estratégica é outra.

    A alta finança e os empresários financiados pelo BNDES amaram Lula durante dois mandatos e permaneceram com Dilma até 2015, depositando suas esperanças no providencial Joaquim Levy. A ruptura só se deu quando o populismo econômico atingiu o paroxismo, apontando rumo a um túnel argentino ou a um abismo venezuelano. Sem os feiticeiros dilmistas da "nova matriz econômica", Lula não corre risco de desestabilização. A chapa com Alckmin é para inscrever na pedra a "terceira via" - e, assim, triunfar no primeiro turno. 

    segunda-feira, 24 de janeiro de 2022

    Maracá - Emergência indígena; denúncia de genocídio indígena

    O policial federal que preside a FUNAI desde o ano passado mandou processar a principal organização indígena do país, a Apib, por ter produzido a série em 9 capítulos chamada "Maracá", feita em 2020 para denunciar o genocídio indígena.


     Por favor, ajudem a divulgar, assistam, salvem os arquivos, compartilhem, traduzam e enviem para outros países. Divulgue isso amplamente, os indígenas agradecem

    Maracá - Emergência indígena

    Episódio 1 - Plano de Cura

    Episódio 2 - A mãe do Brasil é indígena

    Episódio 3 - Ancestralidade

    Episódio 4 - Antropoceno

    Episódio 5 - Genocídio
    https://youtu.be/i_BioJyaBe0

    Episódio 6 - Sangue indígena: nenhuma gota a mais.
    https://youtu.be/HzfRaGIOM8o

    Episódio 7 - O grande aldeamento


    Eleições 2022: Doria no Itamaraty: o que o presidenciável tucano tem a oferecer em política externa? - Ana Lívia Esteves (Sputnik)

    Doria no Itamaraty: o que o presidenciável tucano tem a oferecer em política externa?

    Ana Lívia Esteves

    Sputnik Brasil09:31 20.01.2022 

    https://br.sputniknews.com/20220120/doria-no-itamaraty-o-que-o-presidenciavel-tucano-tem-a-oferecer-em-politica-externa-21094505.html 


    Apesar das dificuldades para consolidar sua campanha dentro do PSDB e decolar nas pesquisas de intenções de voto, Doria pode usar CoronaVac para se promover como melhor candidato para política externa brasileira. 
    Depois de prévias tumultuadas no PSDB, que contaram com acirrada disputa interna e até ataques de hackers, o governador de São Paulo, João Doria, luta para consolidar sua pré-campanha à presidência da República. 
    Com desempenho desanimador nas pesquisas de intenção de votos, os caciques do partido teriam colocado um "prazo de validade" à candidatura de Doria, de acordo com o jornal Correio Brasiliense. 
    O governador de São Paulo teria até março para decolar nas pesquisas, sob pena de perder apoio interno do partido. Para melhorar sua posição na corrida ao Palácio do Planalto, Doria anunciou agenda de viagens pelo Brasil e reuniões com líderes do agronegócio e empresariado. 
    Além disso, a equipe econômica do tucano, que conta com economistas como Henrique Meireles, Zeina Latiff, Ana Carla Abraão e Vanessa Rahal Canado, foi anunciada em dezembro. 
    Assessores de Doria acreditam que o pré-candidato tem um trunfo perante seus adversários: o sucesso no desenvolvimento e produção da CoronaVac no estado de São Paulo, empreitada que beneficiou a campanha de vacinação nacional. 
    Governador de São Paulo, João Doria, com vacina CoronaVac, 22 de agosto de 2021 - Sputnik Brasil, 1920, 20.01.2022
    Governador de São Paulo, João Doria, com vacina CoronaVac, 22 de agosto de 2021
    Essa carta na manga de Doria indica que o setor de política externa poderá gerar dividendos na sua campanha. 

    "Doria deve trazer a questão das vacinas para os debates [da campanha presidencial de 2022]", disse o doutorando em Ciência Política (UFSC) e membro do Núcleo de Estudos em Comportamento e Instituições Políticas (NECIP), Gabriel Mendes, à Sputnik Brasil. "Essa foi uma grande negociação internacional que ele liderou, diretamente com a China." 

    Para Mendes, o tucano deve enfatizar que, apesar de a China ser um país comunista, ela teve altivez e neutralidade para negociar a obtenção da vacina, em prol do povo paulista e brasileiro. Doria ainda deve capitanear na atuação internacional do governo paulista. 
    O governo do estado de São Paulo acaba de inaugurar um escritório de representação na América do Norte, sediado em Nova York, nos EUA, em prática conhecida como "paradiplomacia"
    "A paradiplomacia é quando entes não federais, como prefeituras, estados, ou o legislativo, fazem negociações com outros entes políticos internacionais não federais", disse Mendes. "Doria é muito afeito a isso." 

    Prefeito de São Paulo, João Dória, visita o papa Francisco - Sputnik Brasil, 1920, 20.01.2022
    Prefeito de São Paulo, João Dória, visita o papa Francisco
    O Palácio dos Bandeirantes ainda comanda representações em Munique, na Alemanha, Dubai, nos Emirados Árabes Unidos, e em Xangai, na China, no âmbito do projeto InvestSp. 

    Política de Defesa 

    De acordo com Mendes, a política externa proposta por Doria poderá ser mais alinhada com os Estados Unidos do que aquelas propostas por Lula ou Ciro. 

    "Ainda que não proponha o alinhamento subordinado que vemos com o governo Bolsonaro [...] Doria se voltaria novamente aos EUA, talvez dando um pouco às costas para as relações Sul-Sul, como os outros governos do PSDB fizeram", acredita o especialista. 

    Nesse sentido, haveria baixa possibilidade de retomada de projetos de integração da América do Sul, como a UNASUL, durante um eventual governo Doria. "Sob um governo do PSDB, não vejo possibilidade de retomada da UNASUL [...] porque se trata de um projeto de alinhamento regional na área de defesa", garante Mendes. 
    O especialista lembra que a política de defesa nacional brasileira foi alterada durante os governos de Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva e Dilma Rousseff, para adquirir um caráter de parceria em relação aos vizinhos sul-americanos. 

    Sede da UNASUL, em Quito: países da região não puderam chegar a um consenso em relação à participação da Venezuela na organização, levando a sua paralisação - Sputnik Brasil, 1920, 20.01.2022
    Sede da UNASUL, em Quito: países da região não puderam chegar a um consenso em relação à participação da Venezuela na organização, levando a sua paralisação
    "Antes, tínhamos uma política de defesa nacional que considerava cenários de guerra com Argentina e Uruguai", lembra Mendes. "Isso tudo o PT alterou, e hoje a política de defesa é voltada para os vizinhos no sentido de formar uma parceria. [...] E esse é o objetivo central da UNASUL." 
    Segundo ele, "o PSDB não está de acordo, está incomodado com a política nacional de defesa brasileira", e deve propor a sua alteração, como o fez durante as campanhas presidenciais de 2014 e 2018. 

    De volta para o futuro 

    Especialista em política externa partidária, Mendes sugere que a atuação internacional de um eventual governo Doria se assemelhe à política conduzida durante o governo de Michel Temer, entre maio de 2016 e 1º de janeiro de 2019. 
    Durante esse governo, o PSDB ficou a cargo da política externa brasileira e emplacou dois chanceleres: José Serra, entre de maio de 2016 a fevereiro de 2017, e Aloísio Nunes, de março de 2017 a janeiro de 2019. 
    "Eu apostaria que o governo Doria seria uma continuação da política externa do governo Temer", declara Mendes. "Na época, o PSDB solicitou [a condução da política externa] porque viu ali uma grande vitrine de políticas que poderiam surtir efeito nas eleições de 2018." 
    Uma das principais conquistas do governo Temer na área externa foi a assinatura do acordo Mercosul-União Europeia, depois de mais de 20 anos de negociações. O acordo, no entanto, corre o risco de não ser ratificado, em função da oposição de países relevantes, como a França. 

    Michel Temer, presidente do Brasil, na abertura da 73ª Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas, em Nova York - Sputnik Brasil, 1920, 20.01.2022
    Michel Temer, presidente do Brasil, na abertura da 73ª Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas, em Nova York
    "Acho que o PSDB retomaria a discussão do tratado com a União Europeia [...] e fortaleceria o Mercosul, que é considerado importante para a indústria brasileira", acredita Mendes. 
    Já quando o assunto é a aliança com países como Rússia e China, em fóruns como o BRICS, Mendes é mais reticente. 
    "Se avaliarmos pelo o que ocorreu no governo Temer, poderá haver um novo freio nas negociações com o BRICS. O PSDB é mais afeito a órgãos como o Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI), o Banco Mundial (BM), e países como os Estados Unidos. Prefere as relações hemisféricas", explica Mendes. 

    Da esquerda para a direita, Xi Jinping, presidente da China, Vladimir Putin, presidente da Rússia, Jair Bolsonaro, presidente do Brasil, Narendra Modi, primeiro-ministro da Índia, e Cyril Ramaphosa, presidente da África do Sul, após reunião do BRICS no Palácio do Itamaraty em Brasília, Brasil, 14 de novembro de 2019 - Sputnik Brasil, 1920, 20.01.2022
    Da esquerda para a direita, Xi Jinping, presidente da China, Vladimir Putin, presidente da Rússia, Jair Bolsonaro, presidente do Brasil, Narendra Modi, primeiro-ministro da Índia, e Cyril Ramaphosa, presidente da África do Sul, após reunião do BRICS no Palácio do Itamaraty em Brasília, Brasil, 14 de novembro de 2019
    Além disso, uma política externa tucana poderia voltar a dar prioridade a países desenvolvidos do continente asiático, com destaque para o Japão. 

    "Países da Ásia, principalmente Japão, sempre foram preferenciais nas políticas externas executadas pelo PSDB", lembra Mendes. "Então acredito em um resgate no investimento em países altamente capitalistas que deram certo, em detrimentos de áreas como América do Sul, África e Oriente Médio." 

    Quando o assunto é política externa, João Doria pode estar mais bem posicionado do que o atual presidente, Jair Bolsonaro. Só nos resta saber se o tema está na pauta do eleitor brasileiro para 2022 e "se é um capital político importante em termos de voto", conclui o especialista.

    domingo, 23 de janeiro de 2022

    Eleições 2022: os Faria-Lulers - Helena Chagas, Lydia Medeiros (Capital Político)

     Lá vêm os “farialulers”

    Helena Chagas, Lydia Medeiros

    Uma análise da conjuntura 

    Capital Político, Brasília, 23/1/2022 - no145

    A entrevista do ex-presidente Lula aos sites independentes, afirmando que não quer voltar ao cargo para resolver os problemas do sistema financeiro e dos empresários, que pretende “botar os pobres no Orçamento e os ricos no Imposto de Renda” e que não dará prioridade a compromissos fiscalistas, mas, sim, a “pagar a dívida social”, não compõe exatamente uma narrativa agradável aos ouvidos do chamado mercado.

     Mas a boa repercussão da fala junto ao setor financeiro não surpreendeu seus analistas, porque tem origem num processo de aproximação que começou há semanas. Setores do mercado que leram as pesquisas da virada do ano, confirmando a liderança isolada do petista e as chances rarefeitas de uma terceira via, começam, pragmaticamente, a trabalhar com a possibilidade de vitória do ex-presidente. Isso vem implicando um esforço para ver o copo meio cheio em relação a Lula e buscar convergências.

    No caso da entrevista, elas foram encontradas no discurso aliancista do ex-presidente, que praticamente confirmou Geraldo Alckmin como vice em sua chapa, enquadrou a ala petista contrária à parceria e mostrou que, se vencer, seu governo irá além do PT e da esquerda. A disposição de “conversar com todo mundo”, inclusive com o setor financeiro, foi o suficiente para “encher o copo” do mercado, com repercussão positiva no câmbio e nos negócios.

    Não há data para essas conversas. A pauta desses “farialulers”, como estão sendo chamados de brincadeira, é complexa. Terá que ser reduzida a pontos básicos quando for apresentada a Lula — se é que já não foi, informalmente. Um deles passa pela recuperação da imagem externa do país, com a urgência de se criar um ambiente favorável ao retorno de investidores, como os fundos ambientais que fugiram de Bolsonaro. Analistas acham que, se o próximo presidente sinalizar com nomes experientes e respeitados para essa área, a reação positiva será imediata.

    Há previsões também de que, eleito o petista, o mercado não vai confrontar sua prioridade aos investimentos públicos para retomada do desenvolvimento e a uma forte injeção de recursos no campo social. Aos olhos desse pessoal, esses gastos são comparativamente pequenos, e devem aumentar. Preocupam-se, sim, em compatibilizar princípios que sustentam a rentabilidade e a remuneração do setor com uma política desenvolvimentista. Vão lembrar a Lula que estão previstos investimentos

    privados maciços no setor de infraestrutura — portos, ferrovias, energias renováveis — no próximo governo. Já contratados, podem fazer parte da retomada da economia, organizada e conduzida por quem ganhar a eleição.

    Se a conversa avançar, certamente vai aflorar a ansiedade do pessoal do mercado em relação à escolha da futura equipe econômica. Nenhum dos nomes de petistas e antigos auxiliares que vêm circulando nas discussões sobre o programa de governo agrada ao setor — o que não chega ser novidade. Há torcida por um nome novo, técnico ou de político experiente, como, por exemplo, algum ex-governador que tenha fechado direitinho as contas do estado. Como a torcida do mercado financeiro pode ter efeito contrário, alguns acham melhor ficar calados.

    As referências do petista à reforma tributária agradaram, bem como o tom contido em relação à rediscussão da reforma trabalhista. Outra grande apreensão dessa turma começou a se dissipar. Lula não falou em reverter a autonomia do Banco Central. Agradou ao dizer que chamará para conversar o presidente da instituição, Roberto Campos Neto, hoje com mandato, e que “o BC tem que ter compromisso com o Brasil, e não comigo”.

    Ao fim e ao cabo, ao falar para blogs de esquerda, o ex-presidente parece ter alcançado, mesmo sem mirar, inusitada sintonia com setores da direita no mercado. Foram tantos os recados considerados tranquilizadores que o serviço Scoop by Mover, um portal de notícias do ramo, chamou Lula de “roteador de sinais”.


    A parábola do Brasil no último meio século - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

     A parábola do Brasil no último meio século

    Paulo Roberto de Almeida

    O Brasil vinha construindo, desde a ditadura militar, um Estado atuante e funcional, com erros de gestão aqui e ali.
    Elevaram o patamar da economia, mas deixaram legados pesados na inflação e na dívida externa.
    O plano Real, com ajustes no tripé macroeconômico, venceu o fantasma da hiperinflação e melhorou a qualidade das políticas públicas, macro e setoriais.
    Lula, a despeito da corrupção e das alianças com ditaduras execráveis, elevou a imagem externa do país.
    Dilma, a arrogante incompetente, destruiu tudo isso, provocando a maior recessão da história do país, e ainda foi conivente com a megacorrupção do PT.
    Bozo está ultimando a catástrofe: se aliou aos piores meliantes da política, para exacerbar sua obra destrutiva no plano institucional e genocida no plano da saúde pública; como tantos ainda conseguem apoiar um psicopata perverso é uma infeliz descoberta sobre características pouco apreciáveis da sociedade brasileira, com insanos entre a própria elite social.
    Já chegamos no limite de nosso declínio de civilidade, ou ainda temos novas frustrações pela frente?
    No ano do Bicentenário, o balanço, para mim, é extremamente constrangedor ao contemplarmos as “realizações” do último meio século.
    Estaríamos em condições de esperar mais?
    Com nossas “elites” parece difícil…

    Brasília, 22/01/2022