Why Putin Is Losing The War In Ukraine That He Thinks He Is Winning - Gilbert W. Merkx (The Cipher Brief)

Putin está perdendo a guerra que ele pensa estar ganhando. Mais: ele dobrou as fronteiras da Rússia com a Otan, e vai perder não só a guerra como o império que ele pensava conquistar como um segundo Stalin na história expansionista dessa autocracia selvagem. PRA

Why Putin Is Losing The War In Ukraine That He Thinks He Is Winning

Gilbert W. Merkx

The Cipher Brief, 10 November, 2025

Gilbert W. Merkx is a professor emeritus at the University of New Mexico and Duke University, where he also served as Vice Provost for International Affairs. He was the founding chair of the Group of Advisors to the National Security Education Program and served as a consultant to the Defense Intelligence College.

OPINION — The Russian invasion of Ukraine that began in January 2022 is now approaching its fourth year. The cost for Ukraine has been very high, but the cost for Russia has been astronomical. Russian forces have been pushed back nearly to the territory they controlled at the end of 2021. According to British Intelligence, by October 14, 2025, Russian casualties (killed and wounded) since January 2022 totaled 1,118,000 military personnel. This figure is only slightly lower than the Ukrainian estimate made on the same day of 1,125,150 Russian casualties. Ukraine also estimates Russian losses over the same period of 11,256 tanks, 23,345 armored combat vehicles, and 33,628 artillery systems. The scale of these losses can be compared with Russia’s force structure (FS) at the start of the invasion, which included 900,000 active duty personnel, 3,417 active tanks, 11,000 armored combat vehicles, and 5,000 active artillery systems. In short, Russia has lost more than twice its entire 1992 army force structure since the invasion.

Yet the Russian army continues to engage in desperate efforts to regain limited territory to the west. British intelligence estimates that since the start of 2025 Russia has suffered 332,000 casualties, the highest loss rate since the invasion. Russia has made only marginal gains, which Putin trumpets as victories as he throws more men and equipment into the Ukraine meatgrinder.

Of course, Putin cannot afford to admit failure, but it nonetheless seems as if he actually believes his strategy is succeeding. Why?

The answer lies in the perverse incentives of Russian command and control (C2), which conceal the weaknesses of Russian FS. Russian C2 is concentrated in one civilian with no military training (Putin), and his small circle of advisers.

Putin’s leadership discourages innovation by field officers and welcomes blind obedience. Bad news from field officers of all ranks is punished with demotion or arrest. Good news is rewarded with promotion. As a result, field officers routinely lie about their failures in hopes of promotion and reassignment. There is almost no active search for information by headquarters to correct misinformation sent by field officers.

Russian force structures are notoriously corrupt—a corruption that is expected and tolerated, but also can be an excuse for punishment. Officers steal from their units by exaggerating the size of the unit and pocketing the unused pay. Hence, many Russian units are severely understaffed. Soldiers steal from their units by selling weapons, ammunition, and fuel, leaving their units under-equipped. The vast majority of battle-hardened soldiers are long gone, as are military trainers, who were all sent to the front lines. New Russian recruits are untrained and unaware of the risks they face.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky (R) and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrsky (L) speak next to the first batch of Ukrainian made drone missiles "Peklo" (Hell) delivered to the Defence Forces of Ukraine in Kyiv on December 6, 2024, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Ukraine’s Long-Range War: How Drone & Missile Strikes Are Taking the Fight Deep Inside Russia

Russia's C2 and FS Problems from the Start of the Invasion

A brief review makes it clear that C2 and FS problems have bedeviled the Russian invasion from the start of the 2022 invasion. Planning for the invasion ignored standard military doctrine, which emphasizes that successful invasions require sufficient scale, speed, and force. The considerable literature on the force differentials needed for an invasion, including Soviet doctrine, agrees on the classic rule that a frontal assault requires a 3:1 force ratio to compensate for the higher casualties suffered by the invaders.

Effective command and control are also essential for the success of an invasion. This includes accurate intelligence about enemy forces, freedom for field officers to improvise as needed, rapid field intelligence upward to inform tactics and strategy as the invasion proceeds, and quick top-down decisions in response to field intelligence.

The 2022 invasion violated all these requirements. In order to conceal its intentions and achieve an operational surprise, the planning of the invasion was limited to a very small group led by Putin. Not even Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, was included in this group. The Russian field commanders on the ground in Belarus for military exercises had no idea that they would be leading an invasion. The success of this secrecy came at a high cost: there was no opportunity for critiquing the invasion plan and no consideration of fall-back strategies.

Russian intelligence about the Ukraine’s response was based entirely on faulty assumptions that a high-speed invasion would demoralize the Ukrainian military, the Russian military would easily defeat the Ukrainian military on the battlefield, the top Ukrainian leaders would be quickly captured and executed, and that the vast majority of Ukrainians would either welcome the Russian invaders or remain passive.

The 3:1 force differential rule should have required an invasion of 590,000 Russian, given that the Russians knew the Ukrainian military had 196,600 active-duty personnel. Instead, the Russians planned an invasion of 190,000 personnel, actually smaller than the combined Ukrainian armed forces. Even worse, instead of massing its invasion force at one point to achieve a breakthrough, the Russians decided to attack on six different axes: from the Black Sea in the southeast, from Crimea in the south, from Donbas in the east, from Belgorod in the northeast (towards Kharkiv), from Kursk in the northeast (towards Kyiv), and from Gomel, Belarus, in the north (towards Kyiv).

All the Russian invasion routes faced unexpected problems, but the flaws in Russian C2 and FS can be illustrated by the fate of Russia’s most promising attack, coming from Gomel, Belarus, and aimed at Kyiv. This included an airborne assault on Antonov airport, in the Kyiv suburb of Hostumel. The Ukrainians had not expected an attack from Belarus and were unprepared for both the land invasion and the airborne assault.

Why did these attacks fail? Russian secrecy about the invasion had left the Russian ground forces in Belarus completely unprepared. They were informed of their roles in the invasion only 24 hours before the invasion. As a result, they lacked ammunition, fuel, food, and communications. They did not anticipate heavy fighting. Mud forced their armor to use the few roads, causing traffic jams. They encountered entire towns that were not on their maps, requiring them to stop and ask civilians where they were. Residents reported the Russian positions to Ukrainian authorities.

The Ukrainians acted swiftly to confront the Russian assault from Gomel, which was approaching the outskirts of Kyiv. They committed most of their available special forces and special units of other security units, called up all their reserve units, and mobilized the cadets and staff of their military academies into new battalions, supported by two brigades of artillery and one mechanized brigade. Even so, the Russians had a 12:1 troop advantage on the Gomel axis. On 27 February, their advance units were able to capture the suburb of Bucha, just west of Kyiv.

However, the phone calls from residents from towns in the Russian path permitted Ukrainian artillery to target the Russian columns. The Ukrainian forces knew the territory well, giving them a huge tactical advantage, and they were able to assault the slow-moving Russian columns almost at will, causing panic, abandonment of equipment, and blockage of the roads. As the Russian columns stopped moving, their losses multiplied. The Russian advance units that had reached Bucha were short on fuel, ammunition, and manpower. They assumed defensive positions, waiting for reinforcements that never arrived.

In the battle for Antonov airport on the edge of Kyiv, the Russians used helicopters and elite airborne troops. These troops were to capture and execute the Ukrainian leadership. But the Ukrainians surrounded the airport with heavy armor, pounding the Russians. They were able to capture the airport, driving the Russians into the surrounding woods. While the Russians were able to recapture the airport after a couple of days, the Ukrainians had time to destroy the runways, making impossible the landing of reinforcements and preventing the Russians from capturing the Ukrainian leadership.

On March 16th the Ukrainian government announced a counteroffensive in the Kyiv region, and by the end of March, Russian ground forces were retreating north from the Bucha area. By April 2nd the entire Kyiv oblast was back in Ukrainian hands, including the area bordering Belarus.

What was the Russian response to this humiliating defeat? Those Russian generals who were not killed, were mostly cashiered or arrested, as were many of the colonels. The disaster resulted largely from Putin’s leadership, but the defeated units took the blame. This added to the incentive for officers to lie about failure and pretend achievement.

The First Stalemate

The war has continued through various phases. The second phase, from early April through the end of August, 2022, was marked by active fighting along front lines, with heavy Russian losses, but was a relative stalemate in terms of territorial gains by either side.

The Second Ukrainian Offensive

The third phase began on September 6, 2022, when Ukrainian troops attacked the Kharkiv front near the Russian border. On September 9, Ukrainian mechanized units broke through. Ukrainian forces raced north and east. The cities of Kupiansk and Izium fell to the Ukrainians on 10 September. By the next day the Russian forces north of Kharkiv had retreated over the border, leaving all of the Kharkiv Oblast under Ukrainian control. Pressing on to the east, Ukrainian forces on 12 September crossed the Siverskyi Donets, and on 1 October the Ukrainians recaptured Lyman, a major railway hub, and took as prisoners an estimated 5,000 Russian troops.

As Russian forces rushed to the northeast front, Ukraine launched its counteroffensive in the Kherson region on October 2. By 9 October Ukrainian forces had retaken 1,170 square kilometers of territory, pressing on toward the Dnieper River and the city of Kherson. On 11 November, Kherson was occupied by the Ukrainians.

The Second Stalemate

The second period of stalemate dates from 12 November 2022 until the present. During this three-year period, the war has seen the introduction of drone warfare on a massive scale, first by Ukraine and then by Russia. As a result of the drone warfare, the entire conflict has changed in character. Drones have made assaults by armored vehicles so costly that the war has reverted to trench warfare reminiscent of World War I. Drones now account for two-thirds or more of front-line casualties in the war.

Ukraine’s government discarded Soviet-era regulations to provide tax breaks and profit incentives to independent Ukrainian drone producers, authorizing the Ukrainian military to contract with them. These independent companies have made good use of Ukraine’s large cadre of skilled aeronautical engineers and information technology specialists. About 200 of these companies are officially recognized to receive military contracts, and as many as 300 other groups manufacture drones and donate them directly to military units. However, financial resources remain a limiting factor.

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Russia has rapidly developed its own drone capacity. Moreover, Russia has the resources to outproduce Ukraine, even if its drones are less sophisticated. Russian drone production is limited less by finances than by the search for microchips, smuggled from the west or bought from China. Russia also has ballistic and airborne missile systems that are hard for Ukraine to bring down. Russia has been using massive barrages of drones and missiles to demoralize Ukraine. But this effort is counterproductive. Bombings anger enemy populations and stiffen resistance, as shown in WWII by the Blitz of London and Allied carpet bombings of Germany. Russian barrages may have strained Ukraine’s economy, but they have not lessened resistance.

While the drone/missile war is well known, Ukraine’s other defense industry growth is less known. Ukraine now produces more artillery shells than all of NATO’s 32 members and Europe. Since 2022, domestic production of armored personnel carriers has increased by 400 percent, artillery by 200 percent, ammunition by 150 percent, and anti-tank weapons by 100 percent. By 2025, a single Ukrainian factory was producing 20 Bohdana howitzers each month, similar in specifications to the French Caesar. Ukrainian defense companies deliver howitzers in 60 days for $2.5 million compared to a several-year wait and a cost of $4.3 million in the West.

Russia has had to develop a new tactical approach for the active fronts. Groups of two or three soldiers are forced (by firing squads) to run towards Ukrainian lines and if they live, conceal themselves to fight later. Specialized units such as snipers, artillery spotters, or drone operators try to identify and target the sources of firing at these individuals. Then larger assault units move forward to capture territory. However, these assault units are now poorly trained, and their equipment is obsolete armor or more often simply cars, vans, and motorcycles, often heavily camouflaged. Ukrainian spotter drones are waiting for these assaults, and once the Russian vehicles are in motion and supported by Russian artillery, Ukrainian drones blow up both the vehicles and the artillery. On a typical day in autumn 2025, the Russians were losing 1,000 soldiers, 10 armored units, 25 artillery barrels, and 100 vehicles. By offering increasingly high incentives, Russia was recruiting 30,000 soldiers a month, barely enough to cover losses.

Russian electronic warfare has improved dramatically, with a focus on disrupting Ukrainian drones. As a result, Ukrainian forces are now losing about 10,000 drones per month. Russian air defenses also have improved, reducing the ability of Ukrainian fighter jets to attack. Russian engineers have been effective in designing and building defensive trenchworks, minefields, and tank traps in areas they control.

However, Ukraine air defenses have also improved. Russian airplanes now must launch airborne missiles from Russian territory, with a considerable loss of accuracy. Russian ground to ground ballistic missiles are hard to bring down, but also lack accuracy.

Faced with the hardening of Russian front lines, Ukrainian forces are focused on inflicting high Russian casualties, rather than attacking themselves. The exception occurs when the Ukrainians decide to roll back a Russian salient to prevent it from being hardened. The massive Russian missile and drone attacks deep in Ukraine have required the Ukrainians to invest heavily in missile and drone defenses of all types, which have something like a 90% success rate. Nonetheless, Ukraine suffers considerable damage. This serves as a constant reminder to Ukrainians of what is at stake.

Conclusion

Putin’s war in Ukraine has provided him with a rationale for stifling dissent in Russia, redirecting vast resources to turn Russia’s economy to military production, sponsoring efforts to overturn governments that support Ukraine, and preparing for additional invasions that will re-establish the Russian empire and cement his legacy as a modern Stalin.

In spite of all this, Putin is still losing the war in Ukraine. That conflict is chewing up men and equipment at an unsustainable rate. Moreover, it has been a strategic disaster. The war strengthened Ukrainian nationalism. It energized the European members of NATO and caused Finland and Sweden to join NATO, which doubled the length of NATO’s frontier with Russia. It destroyed the myth of Russian military superiority. It ended Russian natural gas exports to the European Union, which had been carefully cultivated for decades. It led to the emigration of more than half a million of Russia’s best and brightest.

Most NATO countries are now rearming and expanding their militaries. The E.U. countries combined gross domestic income EU GDP of $19.4 trillion in 2024 added to the UK GDP of $3.6 trillion totaled over 23 trillion dollars, whereas the gross domestic income of the Russian Federation RF GDP in 2024 was 2.1 trillion. Over the long run, Russia cannot compete with Western Europe. Europe can afford to support Ukraine’s economy and war effort while European countries ramp up their defense industries and military infrastructure. Putin will eventually lose not only his Ukraine War, but also his dream of a new Russian empire.

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How China Is Using Brazil to Reshape Power in the Americas - Patricl Ko (The Diplomat)

CHINA POWER | DIPLOMACY | EAST ASIA

How China Is Using Brazil to Reshape Power in the Americas

China is entrenching itself in the Brazilian industrial base and consumer economy, with implications for Chinese influence across the continent.
Patrick Ko
The Diplomat, Nov 21, 2025
https://thediplomat.com/2025/11/how-china-is-using-brazil-to-reshape-power-in-the-americas/

China’s increasing economic footprint in Brazil, Latin America’s largest economy, is redefining the region’s balance of power. Once primarily a trading partner, China is now entrenching itself in the Brazilian industrial base and consumer economy, turning the South American colossus into a gateway for Chinese influence across the continent. This shift challenges Washington’s traditional sphere of influence while carrying indirect consequences for Taiwan, whose diplomatic survival relies on a shrinking circle of allies in Latin America that have been progressively drawn into Beijing’s orbit.
China has been Brazil’s largest trading partner since 2009, but its economic presence was primarily confined to commodity trade. Now that boundary has disintegrated. Today, China’s economic presence is readily visible in everyday life. BYD’s electric vehicles (EV) dominate Brazilian roads and hold more than 80 percent of sales in the domestic EV market, while Chinese-backed apps such as Didi’s “99” and Meituan’s “Keeta” are competing for dominance in Brazil’s urban mobility and food delivery industries. Chinese companies have expanded from their past role as exporters to now be responsible for job creation and market shaping within Brazil’s economy.
Although China is not yet Brazil’s largest foreign investor – the U.S. still holds that title, accounting for 17.05 percent of the total – Beijing’s foreign direct investment (FDI) is escalating significantly. From 2023 to 2024, Beijing increased FDI to Brazil by 113 percent, while U.S. investment increased by only 0.057 percent. While the Trump 2.0 administration has placed Latin America at the core of its foreign policy, Washington’s economic engagement remains limited, leaving space for Beijing to expand unchallenged.
Alt hough the gap in total investment volume remains wide, the pace of China’s FDI increase should prompt attention from Washington and Brasília. If these trends continue, Brazil will become increasingly reliant on Chinese capital, consequently increasing China’s economic leverage over Brazil and pushing it closer to China’s foreign policy stances.
As China’s investment grows, Brazil’s domestic market has become a platform for regional expansion by Chinese companies like BYD. The automotive company chose Camaçari in Brazil’s Bahia state as the location for BYD’s first and largest complete-vehicle manufacturing base overseas. The factory will serve as a regional strategic hub handling exports to the entire South American market, including distribution to neighboring Argentina and Uruguay. The first vehicles have already rolled off the production line.
In 2024, BYD registered a 327.7 percent increase in sales to Brazil compared with 2023, indicating growing Brazilian consumer interest in its products. Companies like BYD are capturing significant market shares due to their marketing strategies, localized production, affordability, and improvements in quality and reliability. While in the past, Chinese products were considered low-cost and low-quality, strong sales have gradually repositioned them as reliable, competitive, and aspirational in the eyes of Brazilian and Latin American consumers.
China’s rising economic presence in Brazil has also granted it access to trade benefits in the region through Mercosur. According to Mercosur rules, a product manufactured in Brazil can contain up to 45 percent of non-Mercosur inputs and still qualify as a Brazilian-origin good. Through local manufacturing – for example, BYD’s electric vehicle factory in Brazil – Chinese firms are allowed to label their products as “Made in Brazil,” which qualifies them as Mercosur-origin goods.
This trade workaround allows Chinese brands to enter Paraguay, a market that otherwise engages with Taipei, at a lower cost. As Brazil and Paraguay are members of Mercosur, intra-bloc trade privileges, such as simplified customs procedures and tariff exemptions, allow Chinese-made-in-Brazil products to enter not only Paraguay but other regional markets with minimal barriers. As a result, China’s economic expansion in Brazil is indirectly eroding Taiwan’s economic leverage with Paraguay, one of its few remaining diplomacy allies.
China’s increasing economic presence in the region is not an accident. Brazil has identified Beijing as a reliable and strategic partner to achieve its foreign and domestic policy goals. Under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and the Worker’s Party (PT), Brazil has embraced an “active non-alignment” foreign policy, emphasizing sovereignty, multilateralism, and South-South cooperation. This approach strengthened Brazil’s partnership with China, creating new opportunities in favor of Beijing.
During Lula’s 2023 visit to Beijing, he advocated for settling trade in local currencies instead of the U.S. dollar, demonstrating Brazil’s eagerness to strengthen financial coordination with China and push for de-dollarization. Lula’s administration is expanding ties with China to increase Brazil’s international influence, while China is leveraging Brazil as a diplomatic and logistical gateway into Latin America’s institutions and markets, particularly the Mercosur bloc, which influences regional trade norms.
While economic cooperation promises advantages for both sides, this growing partnership risks subordinating Brazil’s strategic autonomy to Chinese capital and supply chains and may even compromise the sovereignty of neighboring countries such as Paraguay. China’s involvement in Brazil’s energy and industrial sectors poses particularly significant regional implications. According to a study by the Brazil-China Business Council (CEBC), of the $4.8 billion in Chinese investment in Brazil in 2024, 34 percent was directed to the electricity sector, 25 percent to the oil industry, and 14 percent to automobile manufacturing.
Recent technical cooperation and equipment supply between Brazil’s State Grid and China Three Gorges has integrated Chinese technology, capital and supply chains within Brazil’s energy infrastructure. But with Brazil and Paraguay holding joint ownership over the Itaipu Hydroelectric Power Station, which supplies 90 percent of Paraguay’s electric needs, these infrastructural changes have far-reaching consequences. Although China does not own stakes in Itaipu and does not have direct influence over Paraguay’s energy sector, Brazil’s growing partnership with Chinese companies opens it to Chinese influence could indirectly undermine Paraguay’s energy sovereignty.
China’s economic consolidation in Brazil is a long-term plan that could grant it leverage over key industries including energy, rare earth minerals, and agriculture. This economic expansion in Latin America also carries indirect but critical consequences for Taiwan. As Chinese companies scale their footprint in Brazil and gain access to Mercosur, they expand their capacity to influence regional trade and political networks, such as those in Paraguay, Taiwan’s last diplomatic ally in South America. If China strengthens its hold on Brazil’s domestic economy, Taiwan’s position in Latin America could weaken, narrowing its already limited international space.
To counter this trend, Washington and Taipei must cooperate more closely with Latin America. A recently introduced bill, the United States-Taiwan Partnership in the Americas Act, represents a step in that direction, but its implementation should extend beyond Taiwan’s current diplomatic allies. Engaging with major economies like Brazil (albeit informally on Taipei’s part) through technological cooperation, market diversification, and investment would improve regional autonomy and reduce dependency on Chinese capital.
China’s growing presence in Brazil represents a structural shift in hemispheric power. As Beijing leverages Brazil’s industrial and market capacity to expand its clout across Latin America, Washington risks losing influence in its own neighborhood, while Taipei risks losing diplomatic standing in one of its remaining supportive spheres of influence. If Washington and its partners fail to act, Beijing’s involvement in Brazil may evolve into a strong foothold for reshaping economic and political alignments across the Americas.

GUEST AUTHOR
Patrick Ko

Patrick Ko is a policy analyst at Safe Spaces, a policy consulting firm based in Taiwan and Washington, D.C. He specializes in East Asian and Latin American international affairs. His analysis has been featured in Defense News, Asia Times, Commonwealth Magazine, Taiwan Plus, and other regional media. 

Papers Paulo Roberto de Almeida na plataforma Academia.edu

You read the paper Livros sobre temas da diplomacia brasileira - Paulo Roberto de Almeida. We found a related paper on Academia:

A carreira diplomatica: questionario pessoal e consolidacao de trabalhos produzidos por Paulo Roberto de Almeida  Paulo Roberto de Almeida 232 Views  View PDF ▸   Download PDF ⬇ ABSTRACT Resposta a questionário sobre a carreira diplomática e listagem dos trabalhos pessoais sobre a preparação à carreira e o desempenho na diplomacia.

Your recent reading history:

Livros sobre temas da diplomacia brasileira - Paulo Roberto de Almeida - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Velhos e Novos Manifestos: o socialismo na era da globalizacao (1999) - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Capitalismo e liberdade nos Estados Unidos e no Brasil (2025) - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

4939) A politica externa brasileira em face das ameacas ao multilateralismo e ao equilibrio diplomatico (2025) - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

4786) Planejando o futuro do Brasil: uma mania recorrente (2024) - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

De poderes, armas e um barão assinalado - Dante Lima (circulado entre diplomatas)

Uma crônica de um colega muito querido de todos os diplomatas: Dante Lima

DE PODERES, ARMAS E UM BARÃO ASSINALADO

“A diplomacia sem as armas é como a música sem os instrumentos”(Otto von Bismarck)

Mas, existem armas e armas. Há poder e poder.
“Soft power”. Foi o poder ao que aprendi a lançar mão ao longo de minha carreira como diplomata. Claro que houve situações em que a defesa dos interesses do Brasil e de cidadãos brasileiros me fizeram atuar no campo da “real politics", na diplomacia política ou consular. Não fiz mais que a minha obrigação de diplomata, nada que qualquer colega não teria feito. Essa é nossa missão.
Mas agindo assim, os diplomatas brasileiros recorrem ao nosso “soft power”, esse outro poder, essa idiossincrasia da nossa postura diplomática. Poder menos contundente na aparência, sem o “big stick” que - de resto - nunca brandimos. Mas, efetivo e eficiente na sua essência.
Não foi diferente comigo quando, sob instruções ou por índole ou afeição a esse jeito brasileiro de ser, vali-me dessa boa imagem de que goza o Brasil.
Acho que assim é que deve ser feito. Vale dizer, construir uma atmosfera de cordialidade e respeito em torno da diplomacia brasileira e de suas atitudes. Isso, é claro, emana da nossa escola e de nossa formação. Mas, sobretudo, do berço, desse berço esplêndido chamado Brasil.
“Soft power” e diplomacia cultural.
Lembro que cheguei a Belgrado com a bagagem carregada de quinquilharias alusivas ao Brasil, camisetas, flâmulas, bonés que eu comprei naquele espaço do Rio que chamam de Saara, antes da viagem, depois da sabatina no Senado em Brasília.
Foi assim que, poucas semanas antes da Copa do Mundo de 2006, a nossa Embaixada soube que a Prefeitura de Belgrado estava organizando uma mini-Copa do Mundo, com equipes de escolas primárias da cidade representado as 32 seleções da competição. Armaram um campinho de futsal com piso sintético na Trg República (Praça da República), no centro da cidade. Convoquei meus colaboradores e fomos pra lá conferir. Me apresentei ao Prefeito, e fiz distribuir regalos e mimos, inclusive a bola verde-amarela do jogo final: Brasil x Suécia. A Suécia foi a campeã. Mas os outros meninos também ganharam presentinhos.
Ao final das celebrações fui procurado por um grupo de pais dos alunos, que chamaram a atenção para o fato de que, dos 32 países da Copa, apenas o Embaixador do Brasil se fez presente, prestigiando a iniciativa.
A partir daí, e tão logo retornadas as aulas, recebi muitos convites de Diretores de escolas para apresentações sobre o Brasil. E foram muitas iniciativas da Embaixada, desde a participação em programas de rádio de fim de semana da BG-202, sobretudo o “Brazilska Corba” (literalmente, Sopa Brasileira) a exibição de filmes brasileiros na Cinemateca Iugoslava. Todo ano havia uma “Semana do Filme Brasileiro”.
Durante a Copa do Mundo de Futebol de 2006, a Embaixada fechou um espaçoso e popular “sports bar” em zona nobre de Belgrado. Farta distribuição de camisetas e adereços verde-amarelos. A fábrica de cerveja Jelen Pivo, na época pertencente à IMBEV, contribuiu para o patrocínio do evento.
Ademais, o Embaixador do Brasil passou a ser com frequência convidado para a entrega de medalhas em competições esportivas escolares. Não apenas na Capital, mas em cidades próximas.
Na área das chamadas “performing arts”, a Embaixada sempre patrocinou a participação do Brasil nos diferentes festivais de Belgrado, piano, violão, dança, jazz, etc.
Tudo isso não seria possível se o Brasil e os brasileiros não gozassem de uma ótima imagem e grande simpatia na alma e no coração dos sérvios, que nunca esqueceram o nosso apoio em momentos críticos da história recente da país, como a manutenção de nossa Embaixada aberta durante os bombardeios da OTAN em 1999 e no caso da secessão do Kossovo, província cuja independência unilateral o Brasil nunca reconheceu.
Dito isso, recordo ter recebido há dias uma mensagem de e-mail de um funcionário local da Embaixada em Abidjan, onde servi de 1983 a 1986. Sylla Mory Yaby;

“Je me rappelle très bien des nombreux matches ( jogos) de football organisés régulièrement, à votre initiative contre des équipes des villages environnant d'Abidjan. Je me souviens de votre l'initiative quand nous sommes allés jouer contre une équipe de villageois sur un terrain situé en pleine plantations de palmiers ( dênde ) dans la région de Bonoua, après la ville de Grand Bassam. C'était tellement vivant, cordial et amical avec tous ces villageois qui voyaient pour la première fois une équipe ( composés de brésiliens ) venir jouer contre eux. C'était une diplomatie de proximité que vous avez inventée.

Chef Dante, en plus de tout ce que je viens de relater, vous avez été pour moi quelqu'un de bien et un excellent Chef car, c'est vous qui m'avez tout faciliter en intégrant l'Ambassade, permis de me réaliser en créant aujourd'hui une famille heureuse. Merci pour cela. Qu'Allah vous bénisse et ainsi que tous les membres de votre Famille”.
Sylla faleceu logo depois.
Mas a memória do nosso soft power ficou por ali.
Ali e alhures onde pude exercê-lo com sentido de missão.

ZIRIGUIDUM IN SIGUIDUNUM
(ou o quase malogro de uma pretensa boa ideia)

Belgrado, Sérvia, Embaixada do Brasil. O povo sérvio gostava muito da cultura brasileira. Na Embaixada fazíamos muita coisa a baixo custo, como, por exemplo, os já populares “bate-papos com o Brasil” que a dedicada colega Rujiza criou e organizava. Aulas informais de língua e cultura brasileiras num bar da esquina, depois do expediente. Todo mundo gostava. Difusão cultural quase a custo zero.
A emissora local de rádio BG-202 criou um programa de uma hora aos sábados, dedicado à música e à cultura brasileira.
A Embaixada contribuía com uma módica subvenção e meu filho André fazia dupla com um jornalista sérvio na apresentação do programa. Eu cedia livros e discos que eram usados para transmissão e debates no programa. O programa de rádio levava para a emissão toda personalidade brasileira de passagem pelo país.
Eu até conhecia a expressão latina “Sutor, ne supra crepidam” (sapateiro, não vá além do sapato), mas não quis desperdiçar tamanho ambiente favorável e a avidez que eu via na sede de consumo cultural brasileira na Sérvia, e pretendi dar um passo mais largo que a própria perna. Menos mal que minha perna nunca foi assim muito longa…E fui além do sapato. . .
Uma vez sobrou uma graninha da dotação cultural da Embaixada. Pensei em levar adiante um projeto de difusão adicional da música brasileira no país.
Mas, afinal feitos os cálculos, faltaram uns caraminguás. Meti a mão na minha rasa algibeira e botei mais alguns cobres e produzimos uns CDs, com coletâneas de música brasileira. Impecavel seleção, modéstia à parte. Distribuição gratuita. Nada de venda, fui logo avisando.
Na hora de escolher o título do CD, deu-se um debate. E pretendi fazer-me de engraçado. Lembrei-me de uma instalação que a Prefeitura de Belgrado montara no alto da outrora fortaleza turca de Kalemegdan, que sobranceia o encontro das águas dos rios Danúbio e Sava. A pororoca balcânica. A tal instalação trazia a lista dos nomes que a capital tivera em diversas fases de sua longa história de país invadido e conquistado.
O primeiro nome de Belgrado fora SIGUIDUNUM, palavra de origem ceuta, remontando à época em que uma certa tribo ceuta colonizou a área no século III a.C., após a invasão gaulesa dos Bálcãs.
Perfeito. Estava criado o sonoro título do projeto: “Ziriguidum in Siguidunum”. Eu era mesmo um craque, pensei comigo, desses que gostam de brincar com as palavras. Que grande achado.

Mas, qual o que. Não vingou minha brilhante ideia. Ninguém, sérvio ou brasileiro, foi capaz de captar a mensagem do “amado Mestre”, como pretenderia o Rolando Lero, na Escolinha do Professor Raimundo.
Acabou sendo algo como o prosaico “o Brasil musical em Belgrado”.
Mas as músicas eram muito boas, tipo Tom e Vinícius, Chico, Caetano, Gil, Noel Rosa, Cartola e outros, escolhidos a dedo. E a coração.

Claro, o primeiro volume esgotou-se rapidamente. Meus amigos sérvios (mas não só) proprietários de barzinhos, pediram mais, tamanho o sucesso e a demanda. Não pude, contudo, deixar de estranhar. Fui lá conferir. E descobri que os caras estavam vendendo meus CDs. Quase chorei de raiva. Apesar da clara menção: “Slobodna distribucija, prodaja zabranjena” (Distribuição gratuita, venda proibida). E mandei produzir mais CDs.
Fazer o que?
“Soft power” é (mais ou menos) isso.
Dante Lima

 

Política Externa e Interesse Nacional: seminário organizado pelo embaixador Rubens Barbosa (IRICE)

Aos que não assistiram ao debate organizado pelo embaixador Rubens Barbosa (IRICE), nesta tarde de sexta-feira, 21/11/2025, 17hs, sobre Política Externa e Interesse Nacional, saibam que o vídeo gravado será postado em algum momento, no site do IRICE ou no da revista Interesse Nacional.
Como informei, preparei três curtos textos em torno do assunto, que acabei unificando num único paper, este aqui:

5122. “Política Externa e Interesse Nacional: uma visão crítica sobre as difíceis convergências no caso brasileiro”, Brasília, 20 novembro 2025, 13 p. Junção dos trabalhos 5105, 5119 e 5120, preparados tendo como foco o seminário do Irice, coordenado pelo embaixador Rubens Barbosa, no dia 21/11/2025, na companhia de Vitélio Brustolin e de Karina Stange Calandrin. Disponível na plataforma acadêmica Academia.edu (link: https://www.academia.edu/145065684/5122_Politica_Externa_e_Interesse_Nacional_uma_visao_critica_sobre_as_dificeis_convergencias_no_caso_brasileiro_2025_); divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2025/11/politica-externa-e-interesse-nacional_17.html  

Sexta-feira 21/11/2025 repleta: netos, debate sobre Política Externa e Interesse Nacional e homenagem ao professor Amado Luiz Cervo

Dia de muitas atividades a partir desta tarde. Depois de pegar os netos para passar o fim de semana comigo e com Carmen Lícia Palazzo, tenho dois compromissos online:

1) debate organizado pelo embaixador Rubens Barbosa sobre Política Externa e Interesse Nacional, na companhia de Vitelio Brustolin e Karina Stange Calandrin, às 17hs, no canal YouTube do IRICE, neste link:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4w74yJrglGg

2) Homenagem ao professor emérito da UnB, Amado Luiz Cervo, organizada pelo professor Carlos Domínguez, na companhia de Tereza Cristina Nascimento França (UFS), Albene Miriam Menezes Klemi (UnB), Günther Richter Mros (UFSM), Paulo Roberto de Almeida (MRE), Carlos Eduardo Vidigal (UnB), Raúl Bernal-Meza (UNICEN-Argentina), Lídia de Oliveira Xavier (Unieuro), Delmo Arguelhes (UFF); neste link:
https://www.youtube.com/live/JYKBcLA9DBQ?si=-lNNFqaq9wieR2v2

Depois, de volta aos netos.

Política externa e diplomacia do Brasil: como são, como podem ser, 1 - Paulo Roberto de Almeida (Revista Será?)

Artigo mais recente publicado:

1602. “Política externa e diplomacia do Brasil: como são, como podem ser, 1/2”, revista digital Será? (ano xiv, n. 684, Recife, 21 de novembro de 2025; link: https://revistasera.us2.list-manage.com/track/click?u=411db2b245b4b4625516c92f4&id=5960193be7&e=b9cc4cc5fd . Relação de Originais n. 5109.

Política externa e diplomacia do Brasil: como são, como podem ser, 1

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Diplomata, professor (diplomatizzando.blogspot.com)

Algumas premissas conceituais
        O estabelecimento de uma política externa e a sua materialização diplomática para um determinado país costumam ser expressões setoriais da sua política nacional, tanto no plano das principais definições conceituais, quanto no terreno da ação prática. Elas representam a vertente exterior das grandes escolhas que a sociedade estabelece, preferencialmente de maneira consensual, para o atingimento dos grandes objetivos estratégicos que o país e sua sociedade pretendem concretizar. Estes grandes objetivos estão balizados primeiramente no texto constitucional, e costumam refletir as aspirações nacionais em termos de desenvolvimento, de prosperidade e bem-estar, de consolidação institucional de um sistema político democrático e de defesa de valores e princípios que fazem parte do patrimônio cultural e espiritual da nação, assim como, obviamente, de resguardo da soberania nacional e da defesa do território e dos patrimônios nacionais.
        O Brasil pretende ser uma sociedade democrática, baseada num regime de livre iniciativa, fortemente integrada à economia mundial, desejosa de participar plenamente da sociedade internacional, com apoio principalmente no direito internacional, sem descurar os necessários cuidados com sua defesa e capacidade de garantir o atingimento dos interesses nacionais em total autonomia decisória. Com base nesses pressupostos, os governos formulam definições básicas no tocante à política externa que precisam ser executadas de acordo a diretrizes emanadas do poder executivo, usando para tal tarefa da principal instituição a ela devotada, o Ministério das Relações Exteriores.
        Historicamente, a diplomacia profissional brasileira, atuando em consonância com as grandes opções de política nacional definidas recorrentemente por meio de eleições livres e transparentes, tem sabido interpretar os anseios da sociedade brasileira por meio de um diversificado leque de ações nos planos multilateral, regional e bilaterais, em resposta a desafios externos ou por meio de iniciativas que sempre gozaram de amplo consenso na opinião pública e nos meios especializados. Ao longo das décadas que se estendem desde a República de 1946, até a atual fase de consolidação democrática, cobrindo inclusive, embora parcialmente, o período militar, governos sucessivos e o corpo diplomático profissional lograram construir um formato de política externa baseado na autonomia e na independência de suas principais diretrizes, focadas essencialmente no desenvolvimento econômico e social da nação, com a neutralidade desejável em face de conflitos entre as grandes potências, sobretudo na fase clássica da Guerra Fria e na evolução posterior do sistema internacional. Havia um claro consenso de que a política externa deveria permanecer à margem das disputas políticas internas, como já havia declarado o patrono da diplomacia nacional, o Barão do Rio Branco, fixando-se num conjunto de objetivos prioritários vinculados aos interesses nacionais, isto é, os do desenvolvimento autônomo da nação brasileira.

Esgotamento do consenso básico?
        Não obstante, em certos períodos – identificados aos governos lulopetistas de 2003 a 2016, depois sob o pequeno terremoto bolsonarista (2019-2022), e de novo na fase atual, no terceiro mandato de Lula, a partir de 2023 –, o consenso descrito acima parece ter deixado de existir, uma vez que a política externa demonstrou linhas ideológicas de atuação e opções setoriais que colocaram a diplomacia profissional a serviço de teses e objetivos em ruptura com os eixos tradicionais de ação pelos quais se guiavam o Itamaraty e a sociedade brasileira ao longo de décadas, senão secularmente.
        Os promotores desses vieses diplomáticos não esconderam sua preferência por temas e prioridades bem mais alinhadas com teses e posturas alinhadas às orientações ideológicas de suas respectivas correntes políticas, do que com os padrões exibidos pela política externa brasileira de forma consensual ao longo de décadas.             Esse “desvio” continua na atualidade, até se acentuou, e pode ser decorrente, como no governo imediatamente anterior, da ausência de um programa definido de políticas gerais ou setoriais em direção a metas ou objetivos claramente explicitados no plano externo, expostos e discutidos com a sociedade brasileira, podendo gerar o consenso anterior. Em resumo, registra-se a inexistência de uma declaração de política externa que expresse nitidamente o que o Brasil pretende ser, e quais interesses pensa defender, numa conjuntura que já foi identificada como sendo a de uma Segunda Guerra Fria.
        O que se vê atualmente, no campo da política externa, é mais propriamente um processo de ruptura com padrões tradicionais no establishment diplomático brasileiro, indicando um reforço de tendências partidárias não convergentes com o relacionamento equilibrado que o Brasil sempre manteve no tocante às grandes potências e seus enfrentamentos eventuais. Ainda que defendendo causas amplamente consensuais em áreas setoriais, como meio ambiente, direitos humanos, cultura, educação, tratamento de minorias – áreas que tinham sido praticamente abandonadas no governo anterior – a insistência do governo atual em posicionar-se numa das vertentes dessa divisão artificialmente criada entre uma ordem essencialmente “ocidental” (da democracia, dos direitos humanos, da liberdade de imprensa) e uma “nova ordem global”, alternativa (supostamente “multipolar”), tem revelado uma nítida inclinação por esta última. Tal tomada de posição, bastante nítida na conformação de um bloco, o Brics+, identificado a uma alternativa, senão oposição, ao G7, tem contribuído para alimentar dúvidas a respeito da continuidade das grandes linhas da diplomacia brasileira, assim como pode redundar em certa deterioração da reconhecida credibilidade diplomática brasileira no plano mundial, em especial junto aos tradicionais parceiros do “mundo ocidental”.

Vale rever premissas e orientações setoriais?
        Caberia, nessas condições, não exatamente retornar a padrões e posturas anteriores de diplomacia e de política externa do Brasil, mas ousar inovar em diversos terrenos e modalidades de ação, de maneira a facilitar e até estimular uma maior integração do Brasil ao mundo, uma vez que o país exibe notoriamente baixos coeficientes de abertura econômica externa e vem perdendo competitividade nos mercados internacionais nos últimos anos, em função da baixa produtividade geral da economia e da escassa atratividade externa pelos nossos produtos manufaturados.
        Os argumentos alinhados esquematicamente na sequência deste trabalho, pretendem oferecer subsídios à definição das principais linhas de atuação externa do Brasil, segundo as grandes áreas de atividade de sua diplomacia, geograficamente, politicamente ou economicamente, e até no terreno da segurança internacional. Eles partem do pressuposto que os principais desafios a uma maior integração do Brasil ao mundo dependem quase que inteiramente, senão totalmente, do próprio Brasil, uma vez que os processos de globalização e de regionalização observados em diversos cenários geopolíticos e geoeconômicos têm oferecido, a despeito das turbulências atuais, boas oportunidades para que países emergentes como o Brasil possam prosperar e avançar em seu processo de desenvolvimento econômico e social num ambiente internacional marcado pela grande interdependência econômica e crescente cooperação científica e tecnológica entre nações abertas a essas características do atual sistema internacional.
        O presente texto não pretende fazer um diagnóstico dos problemas acumulados na área da política externa e da diplomacia. O que se pretende, sinteticamente, seria oferecer um conjunto de propostas centradas numa política externa visando a plena inserção do país na economia global, por meio da integração regional e da abertura econômica geral. A condição para o estabelecimento de uma nova política externa parte de uma revisão dos conceitos básicos da política externa, no sentido da abertura econômica e da liberalização comercial, tendo em vista os seguintes objetivos básicos: (a) abertura comercial global, concomitante à reforma tributária; ((b) revisão do processo de integração com a perspectiva de inserção externa; (c) análise das “alianças estratégicas” num sentido puramente pragmático; (d) atuação do Itamaraty.
        Consoante a nova visão de plena inserção do Brasil na globalização, cabe empreender uma revisão dos conceitos básicos da política externa, no sentido da abertura econômica e da interdependência global. A soberania sequer necessita ser objeto de retórica, pois ela se exerce, simplesmente. A diplomacia do Brasil sempre foi universalista, focada no interesse nacional e no direito internacional. O multilateralismo é uma de suas bases inquestionáveis, assim como a ausência de quaisquer limitações de ordem ideológica ou partidária na definição dos grandes objetivos na frente externa. Sem aprofundar grandes definições conceituais em torno da agenda internacional do Brasil, caberia inseri-la num processo de reformas econômicas e política, nas frentes delimitadas acima.
(segue...)

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 5109, 8 novembro 2025, 4 p.

Plano Trump I Love You Putin!: Capitulação completa da Ucrânia à Rússia (Financial Times)

 Trump merece o Prêmio IgNobel!

E o Putin um outro, por ditar ao “negociador” do Trump as suas condições, inteiramente adotadas.

From: Financial Times, Nov. 20, 2025

1. Ukraine’s sovereignty will be confirmed.

2. A comprehensive and comprehensive [sic] non-aggression agreement will be concluded between Russia, Ukraine and Europe. All ambiguities of the last 30 years will be considered settled.

3. It is expected that Russia will not invade neighbouring countries and NATO will not expand further.

4. A dialogue will be held between Russia and NATO, mediated by the United States, to resolve all security issues and create conditions for de-escalation in order to ensure global security and increase opportunities for cooperation and future economic development.

5. Ukraine will receive reliable security guarantees.

6. The size of the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be limited to 600,000 personnel.

7. Ukraine agrees to enshrine in its constitution that it will not join NATO, and NATO agrees to include in its statutes a provision that Ukraine will not be admitted in the future.

8. NATO agrees not to station troops in Ukraine.

9. European fighter jets will be stationed in Poland.

10. US guarantee:

The US will receive compensation for the guarantee.

If Ukraine invades Russia, it will lose the guarantee.

If Russia invades Ukraine, in addition to a decisive coordinated military response, all global sanctions will be reinstated, recognition of the new territory and all other benefits of this deal will be revoked.

If Ukraine launches a missile at Moscow or St. Petersburg without cause, the security guarantee will be deemed invalid.

11. Ukraine is eligible for EU membership and will receive short-term preferential access to the European market while this issue is being considered.

12. A powerful global package of measures to rebuild Ukraine, including but not limited to:

a. The creation of a Ukraine Development Fund to invest in fast-growing industries, including technology, data centres, and artificial intelligence.

b. The United States will cooperate with Ukraine to jointly rebuild, develop, modernise, and operate Ukraine’s gas infrastructure, including pipelines and storage facilities.

c. Joint efforts to rehabilitate war-affected areas for the restoration, reconstruction and modernisation of cities and residential areas.

d. Infrastructure development.

e. Extraction of minerals and natural resources.

f. The World Bank will develop a special financing package to accelerate these efforts.

13. Russia will be reintegrated into the global economy:

a. The lifting of sanctions will be discussed and agreed upon in stages and on a case-by-case basis.

b. The United States will enter into a long-term economic cooperation agreement for mutual development in the areas of energy, natural resources, infrastructure, artificial intelligence, data centres, rare earth metal extraction projects in the Arctic, and other mutually beneficial corporate opportunities.

c. Russia will be invited to rejoin the G8.

14. Frozen funds will be used as follows: $100 billion in frozen Russian assets will be invested in US-led efforts to rebuild and invest in Ukraine. The US will receive 50% of the profits from this venture. Europe will add $100 billion to increase the amount of investment available for Ukraine’s reconstruction. The remainder of the frozen Russian funds will be invested in a separate US-Russian investment vehicle that will implement joint projects in specific areas. This fund will be aimed at strengthening relations and increasing common interests to create a strong incentive not to return to conflict.

15. A joint American-Russian working group on security issues will be established to promote and ensure compliance with all provisions of this agreement.

16. Russia will enshrine in law its policy of non-aggression towards Europe and Ukraine.

17. The United States and Russia will agree to extend the validity of treaties on the non-proliferation and control of nuclear weapons, including the START I Treaty.

18. Ukraine agrees to be a non-nuclear state in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

19. The Zaporizhzhya [sic] Nuclear Power Plant will be launched under the supervision of the IAEA, and the electricity produced will be distributed equally between Russia and Ukraine — 50:50.

20. Both countries undertake to implement educational programmes in schools and society aimed at promoting understanding and tolerance of different cultures and eliminating racism and prejudice:

a. Ukraine will adopt EU rules on religious tolerance and the protection of linguistic minorities.

b. Both countries will agree to abolish all discriminatory measures and guarantee the rights of Ukrainian and Russian media and education.

c. All Nazi ideology and activities must be rejected and prohibited.

21. Territories:

a. Crimea, Luhansk and Donetsk will be recognised as de facto Russian, including by the United States.

b. Kherson and Zaporizhzhia will be frozen along the line of contact, which will mean de facto recognition along the line of contact.

c. Russia will relinquish other agreed territories it controls outside the five regions.

d. Ukrainian forces will withdraw from the part of Donetsk Oblast that they currently control, and this withdrawal zone will be considered a neutral demilitarised buffer zone, internationally recognised as territory belonging to the Russian Federation. Russian forces will not enter this demilitarised zone.

22. After agreeing on future territorial arrangements, both the Russian Federation and Ukraine undertake not to change these arrangements by force. Any security guarantees will not apply in the event of a breach of this commitment.

23. Russia will not prevent Ukraine from using the Dnieper River for commercial activities, and agreements will be reached on the free transport of grain across the Black Sea.

24. A humanitarian committee will be established to resolve outstanding issues:

a. All remaining prisoners and bodies will be exchanged on an ‘all for all’ basis.

b. All civilian detainees and hostages will be returned, including children.

c. A family reunification programme will be implemented.

d. Measures will be taken to alleviate the suffering of the victims of the conflict.

25. Ukraine will hold elections in 100 days.

26. All parties involved in this conflict will receive full amnesty for their actions during the war and agree not to make any claims or consider any complaints in the future.

27. This agreement will be legally binding. Its implementation will be monitored and guaranteed by the Peace Council, headed by President Donald J. Trump. Sanctions will be imposed for violations.

28. Once all parties agree to this memorandum, the ceasefire will take effect immediately after both sides retreat to agreed points to begin implementation of the agreement.

Livro genial de Marisa Lajolo: Monteiro Lobato: um brasileiro sob medida (2000) - mini-apresentação - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Recebi, da querida Carmen Lícia Palazzo, este livro de uma autora conhecida por suas muitas obras lobatianas:

Marisa Lajolo

Monteiro Lobato: um brasileiro sob medida

(São Paulo: Moderna, 2000)

Sou um lobatiano precoce e eterno, pois devo ter lido praticamente toda a sua obra infantil, na idade certa, e depois, parte de sua obra adulta (a questão do petróleo, por exemplo).

Retiro, da p. 61, uma frase de Marisa Lajolo sobre o valor formativo da obra infantil de Monteiro Lobato:

"Se seus livros têm alguma grande lição, esta é a da irreverência, da ironia, da leitura crítica e do que estionamento, da independência e do absurdo".

Creio que muito do que fiz, em meus livros, artigos, ensaios, escritos diversos e igualmente as atividades profissionais, na docência universitária e na diplomacia, guarda esse espírito lobatiano entranhado.

O Lobato de que mais gostei foi o seu História do Mundo para as Crianças (1933), no qual Dona Benta resume a seu modo um livro homônimo para o público infantil americano. Creio que o li diversas vezes, a partir de um exemplar que tinha sido ganho pelo meu irmão maior, Luiz Flávio. Nasceu ali, acredito, minha concepção laica do mundo e um precoce afastamente da religião, mas só agora, graças a Marisa Lajolo aprendi que o livro foi censurado pela Igreja, e possivelmente queimado nas escolas religiosas. Vou lê-lo outra vez, e recomendá-lo a meus netos e netas (ou ler para eles).

Preciso voltar a ler mais sobre Lobato, e os seus livros, todos eles.

Grande leitura a deste livrinho (99 páginas) de Marisa Lajolo. Recomendo fortemente, para quem tiver curiosidade de conhecer um pouco mais a vida atribulada de Lobato, que sempre repetia (provavelmente em causa própria) que "um país se faz com homens e livros" (mas ele nunca foi machista).

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 20/11/2025