domingo, 7 de dezembro de 2025

Russia’s Reign of Terror: The Five Worst Atrocities in Ukraine - Chuck Pfarrer (Kyiv Post)

 Não sei se o Itamaraty precisa informar ao presidente Lula sobre estes mais “distinguidos” crimes de guerra contra a população civil ucraniana. PRA

Russia’s Reign of Terror: The Five Worst Atrocities in Ukraine

By Chuck Pfarrer, for the Kyiv Post
Nov 6, 2025

Three years into Putin’s war, Russia’s campaign of terror against civilians continues to shock the world.
From the bombing of the Mariupol Theater to the massacre in Bucha, Moscow’s forces have turned hospitals, train stations, and entire neighborhoods into killing fields.
In this episode of Point of Impact, former Navy SEAL Chuck Pfarrer reports on five of Russia’s worst war crimes — acts that define its reign of terror and Ukraine’s unbreakable resistance.
Each atrocity stands as a testament to both Russian cruelty and Ukrainian courage — from the children of Okhmatdyt Hospital to the survivors of Mariupol.
Justice is not yet served — but it’s coming.

https://youtu.be/qhfaNy9jQpc?si=1n3XAMBk1veBpoyE

O mundo em três tempos: 1925, 1945 e 2025 – Paulo Roberto de Almeida (Revista Será?)

O mundo em três tempos: 1925, 1945 e 2025

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Revista Será? ANOXIV 

Como um mosaico histórico que conecta três momentos decisivos da ordem global, Paulo Roberto de Almeida analisa as forças que moldaram o século XX e as ameaças contemporâneas à estabilidade internacional.

 De Hitler ao atual cenário geopolítico, o autor expõe continuidades inquietantes e alerta para riscos de retrocessos civilizatórios. Um texto instigante para compreender os dilemas que atravessam 2025 e o papel do Brasil nesse tabuleiro mundial. 

Siga o link para o artigo.

https://bit.ly/3YcN5ya

Revista Será?

Por um diálogo crítico, independente e transformador.

 *Leia, Compartilhe e Apoie!* 

Apoie nosso projeto, seja um doador

PIX: pix@iepfd.org


©️ Revista Será? – Instituto Ética e Democracia (IED). Todos os direitos reservados.

sábado, 6 de dezembro de 2025

O multilateralismo vazio da diplomacia brasileira, ou melhor, da política externa - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Reproduzo uma manchete de jornal: "BRICS é manifestação extremamente importante do multilateralismo", diz Mauro Vieira.
Isto ocorreu em abril de 2025, numa reunião de chanceleres do BRICS, preparatória a reunião de cúpula dois meses de depois, no Rio de Janeiro.
Os chanceleres do BRICS se reuniram novamente em outubro, à margem dos debates na Assembleia Geral da ONU, em NY.
Os chanceleres emitiram, nas duas ocasiões, enormes declarações finais, resumindo tudo o que eles haviam discutido nesses encontros. Pois eles conseguiram, nas duas vezes, falar de tudo e sobre tudo, mas em nenhum momento consta qualquer declaração sobre a guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia, certamente um veto russo a uma reunião fora do CSNU.
Surpreendentemente, o Brasil acata esses vetos, que vão contra nossos princípios e valores num ambiente multilateral, assim como conseguiu se abster numa resolução do Conselho de Direitos Humanos, em Genebra, uma renúncia vergonhosa de nossas posições tradicionais. Uma nota disse que a abstenção se deveu a que a resolução não era propensa ao diálogo, como se a Rússia fizesse algum diálogo em sua guerra criminosa de agressão.
Brasilia, 6/12/2025

Bertrand Arnaud: avaliação sumária da Estratégia de Segurança Nacional do governo Trump

Bertrand Arnaud efetua uma apresentação geral da Estratégia de Segurança Nacional do governo Trump (X):


This is big. The final U.S. National Security Strategy was just published and the refocus on the Western Hemisphere (i.e. the Americas) is confirmed.

The document clearly establishes this as the U.S.'s number 1 priority, saying that the U.S. will now "assert and enforce a 'Trump Corollary' to the Monroe Doctrine."

In terms of military presence, they write that this means "a readjustment of our global military presence to address urgent threats in our Hemisphere, and away from theaters whose relative import to American national security has declined in recent decades or years."

On China, a couple of points.

The most striking aspect to me is that China is NOT anymore defined as "the" primary threat, "most consequential challenge," "pacing threat," or similar formulations used in previous such documents.

It's clearly downgraded as a priority. Based on the document's structure and emphasis, the top U.S. priorities could be characterized as:
1) Homeland security and borders (migration, cartels, etc.)
2) Western Hemisphere (Monroe Doctrine restoration)
3) Economic security (reindustrialization, supply chains)
4) China and Indo-Pacific

To be clear they don't define China as an ally or a partner in any shape or form but primarily as 1) an economic competitor, 2) a source of supply chain vulnerabilities (but also a trading partner) and 3) a player who regional dominance should be "ideally" denied because it "has major implications for the U.S. economy."

Interestingly, I believe for the first time ever, they mention the possibility of being overmatched militarily by China:
- They write that "deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority": "ideally" clearly means that it's ideal, but not necessarily a given. The fact that they call deterring conflict over Taiwan merely "a priority" also suggests, by definition, that it's no more a top strategic priority, or a vital interest.
- On Taiwan they also clearly imply that if the U.S.'s "First Island Chain allies" don't "step up and spend - and more importantly do - much more for collective defense", then there might be "a balance of forces so unfavorable to us as to make defending that island impossible."

They still maintain that "the United States does not support any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait" but, clearly, there's a widening gap between what the US says it opposes and what it's actually willing to do about it.

Interestingly as well, contrary to previous such document, there is zero ideological dimension in the document when it comes to China. No "democracy vs. autocracy" framing, no "rules-based international order" to defend, no values-based crusade. China is treated as a practical issue to be managed, not an ideological adversary to be defeated.

In fact the document explicitly mentions, I think for the first time ever as well, that US policy is now:
- "not grounded in traditional, political ideology"
- that they "seek good relations and peaceful commercial relations with the nations of the world without imposing on them democratic or other social change that differs widely from their traditions and histories"
- and that they seek "good relations with nations whose governing systems differ from ours."

Which is quite a stunning departure from the rhetoric of the past few decades. We all knew this but it's now amply clear that the era of missionary liberal internationalism in US foreign policy is dead and buried.

The competition with China is primarily described in economic terms, explicitly so: they write the competition is about "winning the economic future" and that economics are "the ultimate stakes."

Notably, they admit that the tariffs approach "that began in 2017" when it comes to China essentially failed because "China adapted" and has "strengthened its hold on supply chains."

The new strategy, as described in the document, is to build an economic coalition against China that can exert more leverage than the US economy alone - a tacit admission that America just isn't powerful enough on its own anymore.

The contradiction is however obvious: unclear how you build an economic coalition against China while simultaneously waging trade wars against your coalition partners, demanding they shoulder more of their own defense, and treating every allied relationship as a deal to be renegotiated in America's favor.

At some point these "allies" will be asking a very obvious question: why sacrifice our economic interests to prop up an America that can no longer compete on its own - and that offers us less and less in return?

From: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf

A estratégia de Trump para o Hemisfério Ocidental (extraído do documento global)

 A Grande Estratégia de Trump, agora publicada integralmente:

Transcriação parcial (p. 15-16): 

A. Western Hemisphere: The Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine

After years of neglect, the United States will reassert and enforce the Monroe Doctrine to restore American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere, and to protect our homeland and our access to key geographies throughout the region. We will deny non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or other threatening capabilities, or to own or control strategically vital assets, in our Hemisphere. This “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine is a common-sense and potent restoration of American power and priorities, consistent with American
security interests. 

Our goals for the Western Hemisphere can be summarized as “Enlist and Expand.”

We will enlist established friends in the Hemisphere to control migration, stop drug flows, and strengthen stability and security on land and sea. We will expand by cultivating and strengthening new partners while bolstering our own nation’s appeal as the Hemisphere’s economic and security partner of choice.

Enlist
American policy should focus on enlisting regional champions that can help create tolerable stability in the region, even beyond those partners’ borders. These nations would help us stop illegal and destabilizing migration, neutralize cartels, nearshore manufacturing, and develop local private economies, among other things. We will reward and encourage the region’s governments, political parties, and movements broadly aligned with our principles and strategy. But we must not overlook governments with different outlooks with whom we nonetheless share interests and who want to work with us.
The United States must reconsider our military presence in the Western Hemisphere. This means four obvious things:
• A readjustment of our global military presence to address urgent threats in our Hemisphere, especially the missions identified in this strategy, and away from theaters whose relative import to American national security has declined in recent decades or years;
• A more suitable Coast Guard and Navy presence to control sea lanes, to thwart illegal and other unwanted migration, to reduce human and drug trafficking, and to control key transit routes in a crisis;
• Targeted deployments to secure the border and defeat cartels, including where necessary the use of lethal force to replace the failed law enforcement-only strategy of the last several decades; and 
• Establishing or expanding access in strategically important locations.
The United States will prioritize commercial diplomacy, to strengthen our own economy and industries, using tariffs and reciprocal trade agreements as powerful tools. The goal is for our partner nations to build up their domestic economies, while an economically stronger and more sophisticated Western Hemisphere becomes an increasingly attractive market for American commerce and investment. 

Strengthening critical supply chains in this Hemisphere will reduce dependencies and increase American economic resilience. The linkages created between America and our partners will benefit both sides while making it harder for nonHemispheric competitors to increase their influence in the region. And even as we prioritize commercial diplomacy, we will work to strengthen our security partnerships—from weapons sales to intelligence sharing to joint exercises.

Expand
As we deepen our partnerships with countries with whom America presently has strong relations, we must look to expand our network in the region. We want other nations to see us as their partner of first choice, and we will (through various
means) discourage their collaboration with others.
The Western Hemisphere is home to many strategic resources that America should partner with regional allies to develop, to make neighboring countries as well as our own more prosperous. The National Security Council will immediately begin a robust interagency process to task agencies, supported by our Intelligence
Community’s analytical arm, to identify strategic points and resources in the Western Hemisphere with a view to their protection and joint development with regional partners.
Non-Hemispheric competitors have made major inroads into our Hemisphere, both to disadvantage us economically in the present, and in ways that may harm us strategically in the future. Allowing these incursions without serious pushback is another great American strategic mistake of recent decades.
The United States must be preeminent in the Western Hemisphere as a condition of our security and prosperity—a condition that allows us to assert ourselves confidently where and when we need to in the region. The terms of our alliances,
and the terms upon which we provide any kind of aid, must be contingent on winding down adversarial outside influence—from control of military installations, ports, and key infrastructure to the purchase of strategic assets broadly defined.
Some foreign influence will be hard to reverse, given the political alignments between certain Latin American governments and certain foreign actors. However, many governments are not ideologically aligned with foreign powers but are instead attracted to doing business with them for other reasons, including low costs and fewer regulatory hurdles. The United States has achieved success in rolling back outside influence in the Western Hemisphere by demonstrating, with specificity, how many hidden costs—in espionage, cybersecurity, debt-traps, and other ways—are embedded in allegedly “low cost” foreign assistance. We should accelerate these efforts, including by utilizing U.S. leverage in finance and technology to induce countries to reject such assistance.
In the Western Hemisphere—and everywhere in the world—the United States should make clear that American goods, services, and technologies are a far better buy in the long run, because they are higher quality and do not come with the same kind of strings as other countries’ assistance. That said, we will reform our own system to expedite approvals and licensing—again, to make ourselves the partner of first choice. The choice all countries should face is whether they want to live in an American-led world of sovereign countries and free economies or in a parallel one in which they are influenced by countries on the other side of the world.
Every U.S. official working in or on the region must be up to speed on the full picture of detrimental outside influence while simultaneously applying pressure and offering incentives to partner countries to protect our Hemisphere.
Successfully protecting our Hemisphere also requires closer collaboration between the U.S. Government and the American private sector. All our embassies must be aware of major business opportunities in their country, especially major government contracts. Every U.S. Government official that interacts with these countries should understand that part of their job is to help American companies compete and succeed.
The U.S. Government will identify strategic acquisition and investment opportunities for American companies in the region and present these opportunities for assessment by every U.S. Government financing program, including but not limited to those within the Departments of State, War, and Energy; the Small Business Administration; the International Development Finance Corporation; the Export-Import Bank; and the Millennium Challenge Corporation. We should also partner with regional governments and businesses to build scalable and resilient energy infrastructure, invest in critical mineral access, and harden existing and future cyber communications networks that take full advantage of American encryption and security potential. The aforementioned U.S. Government entities should be used to finance some of the costs of purchasing U.S. goods abroad.
The United States must also resist and reverse measures such as targeted taxation, unfair regulation, and expropriation that disadvantage U.S. businesses. The terms of our agreements, especially with those countries that depend on us most and
therefore over which we have the most leverage, must be sole-source contracts for our companies. At the same time, we should make every effort to push out foreign companies that build infrastructure in the region.

Trabalhos publicados por Paulo Roberto de Almeida como colunista (apenas no ano de 2025)

Trabalhos publicados por Paulo Roberto de Almeida como colunista

(apenas no ano de 2025)
Compilado por Pau1o Roberto de Almeida
Atualizado em 6 de dezembro de 2025

1586. “A ideia do interesse nacional: o papel da ferramenta diplomática”, portal Interesse Nacional (3/07/2025; link: https://interessenacional.com.br/portal/a-ideia-do-interesse-nacional-o-papel-da-ferramenta-diplomatica/). Relação de Originais n. 4952.

1587. “O Brasil e o seu grande desafio, a partir de uma releitura de H. G. Wells”, Publicado no Portal Interesse Nacional (28/07/2025; link: https://interessenacional.com.br/portal/o-brasil-e-o-seu-grande-desafio-a-partir-de-uma-releitura-de-h-g-wells/). Relação de Originais n. 4977.

1591. “Onde buscar o interesse nacional nos programas de governo? Nas mensagens presidenciais ao Congresso”, portal Interesse Nacional (18 agosto 2025, link: https://interessenacional.com.br/portal/onde-buscar-o-interesse-nacional-nos-programas-de-governo-nas-mensagens-presidenciais-ao-congresso/). Relação de Originais n. 5007.

1592. “O interesse nacional nas mensagens ao Congresso entre 1933 e 1937: ameaça das ideologias e centralização a favor do Estado”, portal Interesse Nacional (4 setembro 2025, link: https://interessenacional.com.br/portal/o-interesse-nacional-nas-mensagens-ao-congresso-entre-1933-e-1937-ameaca-das-ideologias-e-centralizacao-a-favor-do-estado/). Relação de Originais n. 5009.

1593. “A ideia do interesse nacional e da ferramenta diplomática”, Revista Interesse Nacional (n. 71, outubro-dezembro de 2025, p. 54-57; link: https://interessenacional.com.br/a-ideia-do-interesse-nacional-e-da-ferramenta-diplomatica/); edição completa do n. 71 da Revista Interesse Nacional (link: https://interessenacional.com.br/edicoes/numero-71/). Relação de Originais n. 4952.

1595. “As mensagens presidenciais de 1947 a 1960: desenvolvimentismo e inflacionismo”, portal Interesse Nacional (8 outubro 2025, link: https://interessenacional.com.br/portal/as-mensagens-presidenciais-de-1947-a-1960-desenvolvimentismo-e-inflacionismo/); republicado no blog Diplomatizzando (link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2025/10/as-mensagens-presidenciais-de-1947-1960.html). Relação de Originais n. 5010.

1599. “Opções da diplomacia brasileira num mundo em desordem”, artigo publicado na revista digital Será? (ano xiv, n. 681, 24/10/2025, link: https://revistasera.info/2025/10/opcoes-da-diplomacia-brasileira-num-mundo-em-desordem/); divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (24/10/2025, link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2025/10/opcoes-da-diplomacia-brasileira-num.html). Relação de Originais n. 5097.

1600. “Trump, ou a diplomacia pelo método confuso”, revista digital Será? (ano xiv, n. 682, 31/10/2025, link: https://revistasera.info/2025/10/trump-ou-a-diplomacia-pelo-metodo-confuso/); divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (31/10/2025, link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2025/10/trump-ou-diplomacia-pelo-metodo-confuso.html). Relação de Originais n 5098.

1601. “Rupturas nas relações internacionais no contexto do triunvirato imperial”, Revista Será? (ano XIV, n. 683, 7/11/2025, link: https://revistasera.info/2025/11/rupturas-nas-relacoes-internacionais-no-contexto-do-triunvirato-imperial/; divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (9/11/2025, link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2025/11/rupturas-nas-relacoes-internacionais-no.html). Relação de Originais n. 5104.

1602. “Política externa e diplomacia do Brasil: como são, como podem ser, 1/2”, revista digital Será? (ano xiv, n. 684, Recife, 21 de novembro de 2025; link: https://bit.ly/4o6CUpD ou https://revistasera.us2.list-manage.com/track/click?u=411db2b245b4b4625516c92f4&id=5960193be7&e=b9cc4cc5fd); divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2025/11/politica-externa-e-diplomacia-do-brasil.html). Relação de Originais n. 5109.

1603. “Política externa e diplomacia do Brasil: como são e como podem ser, 2”, revista Será? (ano xiv, n. 684, Recife, 21 de novembro de 2025; link: https://bit.ly/4o6CUpD ou https://revistasera.us2.list-manage.com/track/click?u=411db2b245b4b4625516c92f4&id=5960193be7&e=b9cc4cc5fd); divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2025/11/politica-externa-e-diplomacia-do-brasil.html). Relação de Publicados n. 1602. Relação de Originais n. 5110.

1605. “Mensagens presidenciais dos governos Jânio Quadros e João Goulart: crises políticas e ruptura democrática, 1961-1964”, Publicado no portal Interesse Nacional (1/12/2025; link: https://interessenacional.com.br/portal/mensagens-presidenciais-dos-governos-janio-quadros-e-joao-goulart-crises-politicas-e-ruptura-democratica-1961-1964/); Postado no blog Diplomatizzando (link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2025/12/as-mensagens-presidenciais-de-1947-1960.html). Relação de Originais n. 5011.

1607. “O mundo em três tempos: 1925, 1945, 2025”, revista Será? (ano xiv, n. 686, Recife, 5 de dezembro de 2025; link: https://revistasera.us2.list-manage.com/track/click?u=411db2b245b4b4625516c92f4&id=c311615905&e=1647837395); divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2025/12/o-mundo-em-tres-tempos-1925-1945-2025.html). Relação de Originais n. 5128.


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Uma estratégia destinada ao fracasso: a de Trump para o Hemisfério Ocidental - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Uma estratégia destinada ao fracasso: a de Trump para o Hemisfério Ocidental

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Os EUA já tiveram grandes estratégias na era contemporânea. A primeira, desenhada ao início da Guerra Fria, em 1947, contou com aportes significativos de militares e de técnicos vinculados à segurança nacional, inclusive a diplomacia, como a “doutrina da contenção” (da União Soviética), sugerida pelo diplomata George F. Kennan.

Depois acrescentaram algumas “teorias”, como a do dominó, que se revelou um desastre. Levou ao “over strecht”, que provocou excesso de extensão e de compromissos inviáveis economicamente. A quebra do padrão de Bretton Woods, em 1971, sinalizou a ruptura de um sistema que já era insustentável desde o final dos anos 1950.

Mas o poderio americano continuou a se exercer pela força de atração de sua economia e de um regime de liberdades inigualável no mundo, atraindo braços e cérebros de todo o mundo, enquanto perdurou esse dinamismo econômico e político.

Certos vícios americanos se acentuaram com a prosperidade, e a integração com o resto do hemisfério se fez pelas vias mais indesejáveis: drogas, de um lado, armas do outro. 

Um filho de imigrantes especialmente imbecil resolveu “corrigir” alguns problemas criados pelo próprio império em declínio relativo, em face do renascimento de um velho império asiático, não agressivo e não intrusivo (mas impérios estabelecidos costumam ser paranoicos).

Em lugar de definir uma estratégia de complementaridade para uma prosperidade comum, se decide pela “estratégia do enfrentamento” e se começa pelo próprio Hemisfério Ocidental, no qual perfila ao Sul uma América Latina pouco dinâmica, mas que é classificada como “problema”.

O fato de classificar a nova estratégia como sendo um “corolário Trump à doutrina Monroe” já revela a imensa ignorância de seus formuladores, que exibem uma pretensão absurda de “Enlist and Expand”, ou seja, de incorporar e de ampliar, como se seus autores pudessem determinar sozinhos e unilateralmente o curso dos eventos, da evolução e da sua própria interação com o resto do Hemisfério. 

Essa estratégia está destinada ao fracasso, mas enquanto durar o poder dos ignorantes no império declinante ela está destinada a provocar maiores fracassos e desapontamentos, para os próprios EUA e para os vizinhos ao sul do Rio Grande. 

Poucas vezes na história do mundo grandes impérios tiveram o cuidado de documentar e registrar o caminho de sua própria decadência e fracasso. 

A razão neste caso específico pode ser explicada: o documento não cuidou de “enlist and expand” o número e a diversidade de seus formuladores, mas permaneceu restrito ao pequeno núcleo de seguidores, bajuladores, conversos e submissos ao chefão ignorante, apenas focados em preencher suas fantasias numa terminologia artificial aparentemente triunfante.

Logo após o Western Hemisphere vem a Asia no documento, de onde virão exatamente os piores fracassos da “estratégia”, baseada numa nova doutrina de “contenção” simplesmente inaplicável, absurda e equivocada.

Os “aliados”, hoje desprezados, não vão rir, porque seria politicamente incorreto e pouco diplomático. O suposto “adversário” tampouco vai reagir; ao contrário, vai ficar quieto. Afinal, como já recomendava Sun Tzu, não se deve fazer nada quando o seu “inimigo” estiver fazendo bobagens.

A única coisa que Trump consegue produzir é uma bobagem atrás da outra, além de desastres para o seu próprio país e para o mundo.

De vez em quando, na história, surgem personagens que conseguem atravessar o curso dos eventos, pelos motivos os mais bizarros. A Guerra de Troia, finalmente, não está tão longe assim, e Trump pode ser apenas um novo Menelau. Depois teremos algum novo Homero para relatar a epopeia; por enquanto só temos alguns novos seguidores que pretendem reescrever Tucídides, esquecendo-se da ironia de que Atenas foi vencida por seus próprios erros diplomáticos. É o que está fazendo Trump, para desgosto de dirigentes normais ao redor mundo. Acontece


Paulo Roberto Almeida

Brasília, 6/12/2025

Postagem em destaque

Livro Marxismo e Socialismo finalmente disponível - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Meu mais recente livro – que não tem nada a ver com o governo atual ou com sua diplomacia esquizofrênica, já vou logo avisando – ficou final...