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Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org.

Mostrando postagens com marcador Japão. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador Japão. Mostrar todas as postagens

quarta-feira, 7 de junho de 2017

Why West often overlooks China’s WWII effort - Shanghai Daily

Entrevista com o historiador inglês Rana Mitter, especializado na história da China (tenho um livro dele, em italiano), sobre o papel tremendamente subestimado da China na II Guerra Mundial. Isto  ocorreu, em parte, por culpa dos ocidentais, que consideram importantes apenas as frentes de batalha no Ocidente e no Pacífico (EUA vs Japão), mas também por culpa de chineses, que mantiveram seus arquivos fechados desde os anos 1950, até pelo menos os anos 1980. O historiador inglês publicou um livro sobre o tema.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Why West often overlooks China’s WWII effort

EDITOR’S Note: There is a wealth of literature documenting WWII from a Western perspective but less is known in the West about China’s epic struggles against Japanese invasion. One of the few books that does justice to China’s war effort is the bestseller “Forgotten Ally: China’s World War II, 1937-1945” published in 2013. Its author, Rana Mitter, Director of University China Center and Professor of the History and Politics of Modern China at the University of Oxford, spoke to Shanghai Daily reporter Ni Tao at this year’s Shanghai Forum about his research on China’s wartime history and how it taught him about the dangers of being doctrinaire while understanding the country’s political future.
SD: Early this year, the Chinese authorities updated the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression from eight years to 14 years. What is behind this change?
Mitter: I think a reason that there has been an official decision to change the length of the war from eight to 14 years is to change the historical understanding of the war itself.
If you look at the way in which Chinese scholars have been writing about the war in academic journals, they have been using the 14-year-long definition for quite a number of years.
The reason of course is because it dates the war from the invasion and occupation of Manchuria in 1931 as the starting point.
In a way, it also matches the definition of the war, which has been used in Japan, particularly by the Left, for many years. And I think that part of the reasoning has been to try and create an idea in the public mind of the different aspects of the build-up to the war.
Personally, I still think the eight-year definition is valuable, because it marks a particular time when the outbreak of the war, the Lugouqiao Incident of July 7, 1937, significantly changed the way in which the relationship between China and Japan operated.
After 1937, it would have been very dif­ficult to arrange any kind of compromise agreement between the two sides. People within the Nationalist government who had perhaps more sympathy toward Japan were no longer able to operate on the basis of getting closer to Japan.
SD: Why are China’s struggles during WWII largely forgotten in the West?
Mitter: I think there are two reasons: one to do with the West, one to do with China.
On the Western side, the major problem has been that the war in China was not taken very seriously.
Despite the fact that it caused millions of deaths and tens of millions of refugees, and despite (China’s) important role of holding down the Japanese army in China for many years, these achievements and suffering were regarded secondary to what was considered as the real war in Europe and then in the Pacific.
I would argue quite strongly that actually some of the decisions China made were really fundamental.
The best example of this was in 1938, a time when the Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek could have surrendered to the Japanese and in fact his former ally Wang Jingwei did form an alliance with the Japanese.
But by making the decision not to surrender to Japan, even when China was very weak and had little outside assistance, it actually set a very important turning point for the eventual victory in Asia many years later.
However, we also have to remember that it was very difficult, or actually impossible, for a long time for Western scholars to come to China and use archives for most of the period from the 1950s up until the 1980s and 1990s.
SD: How would you judge China’s contributions and sacrifices in WWII?
Mitter: I think that China’s contributions and sacrifices during WWII were immensely important and under-appreciated in the wider world.
The example I often give when asked where did China make a difference in World War II is to point to 1937.
You have to look at that year as it was seen then, not as what we know now.
Now we know that Japan and Germany were eventually defeated. The Americans would eventually come into the war.
But this was not at all clear in 1938. At that time China’s national government had retreated to Chongqing (the wartime capital); the Communists were restricted to some areas in northern and central China; a large part of China fell under Japanese occupation.
Many observers including some British diplomats thought that the most sensible thing to do would be for China’s government to compromise, surrender, or at least come to an agreement with the Japanese.
The decision both by the Kuomintang, and by the Chinese Communist Party, to continue resistance at a time when China had very little outside support or few alliances was not an obvious and easy one to make.
By deciding in 1938 that they would continue to fight against Japan, the Chinese managed to hold the situation for long enough for the situation to eventually change and for the eventual entry of the United States and Britain into the global war after 1941.
I f it weren’t for the Chinese contributions, it would have been much harder to achieve an allied victory in Asia.
But without the Allied contributions, China would not have been on the victorious side. So both sides needed each other.
SD: In researching the book, you rely on the diaries of personalities like Chiang Kai-shek. But could referencing these diaries come at the expense of more important archives?
Mitter: It is an important question to ask, because when writing history, we have to be aware of the danger of getting too trapped in personalities.
This is what the famous 19th century English historian Thomas Carlyle meant by the “Great Man” theory of history.
And we have to avoid that, partly because history is not just about men, and certainly not just about great men.
But the reason that I think these diaries are important is that they reveal not just the personality of the individuals, but also their particular mindset and viewpoints about much bigger questions, which is what was China going to achieve if it got through with the war with Japan.
For example, if you read Chiang’s diary, you’ll find he was constructing a different vision, not just of China, but also of Asia, one in which China would play a bigger role.
But understanding how he viewed China’s role in the post-war period tells you a lot about the relationship between America and China, as well as the emergence of new post-colonial and post-imperial nationalism in many Asian nations.
Moreover, one of the areas where I looked quite extensively was the way in which social change happened on the ground.
For instance, reforms in areas like health care, hygiene, and social welfare provision, refugee provision, in large parts of China during the war.
Most of that has nothing to do with specific individuals at all, but has to do with policies and social change in government as a whole.
And I think the important thing is to combine these materials with very personal views that you get from diaries.
SD: Have your perspectives changed over the course of researching China’s past?
Mitter: I think over maybe 16 or 20 years of writing about China, my views basically haven’t changed, but developed, and I hope deepened over that time.
Probably the single change is that it becomes much harder for me to argue that there is any fixed or definite political path for China during that time.
Sometimes if you look at the present day, you hear people from the West say China should be this way, while some say China definitely should be that way.
I think looking at 20th century Chinese history shows that actually there are a whole variety of different paths. And it’s not always possible to tell which one is the best at one time.
The one thing I learned from studying that period is that in the end it has to be up to the Chinese people to decide what their political path is going to be.

sábado, 25 de fevereiro de 2017

A guerra no Pacifico poderia ter sido evitada? Diplomatas tentaram... - Book review

Não, não poderia ter sido evitada, pois os líderes militares japoneses já tinham decidido atacar os EUA, numa rara, inédita, demonstração de total irrealismo quanto às chances de prevalecer contra o que já era, naquele momento, a maior potência industrial e tecnológica do planeta (mas ainda não militar, obviamente).
Diplomatas costumam ser obedientes, e só em casos raros eles vão contra instruções recebidas, ou desobedecem deliberada e conscientemente ordens da capital.
Mas, eles possuem uma vantagem sobre líderes nacionais (civis ou militares): vivendo no exterior, convivendo com amigos e "inimigos", eles possuem uma percepção mais clara, mais realista, dos fatores em jogo, quando políticos ou militares no próprio país possuem uma visão deformada dessa realidade, quando não são completamente ignorantes do que é o mundo real.
Essa é a tragédia da profissão: atuar no exterior, tendo de receber instruções, muitas vezes, de ignaros nacionais...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

H-Diplo Article Review 682 on The Desperate Diplomat: Saburo Kurusu’s Memoir of the Weeks before Pearl Harbor
by George Fujii
H-Diplo

Article Review
No. 682
24 February 2017

Article Review Editors:  Thomas Maddux and Diane Labrosse
Web and Production Editor: George Fujii

J. Garry Clifford and Masako R. Okura. The Desperate Diplomat: Saburo Kurusu’s Memoir of the Weeks before Pearl Harbor. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2016. ISBN: 978-0-8262-2037-0 (hardcover, $35.00).
URL:  http://tiny.cc/AR682
Review by Justus D. Doenecke, New College of Florida, Emeritus

The reputation of Saburō Kurusu has not been good. As special envoy of the Japanese government in the final three months before the Pearl Harbor attack, Kurusu met with American leaders in a last-ditch effort to prevent Japan and the United States from engaging in a bloody conflict. In a famous encounter that took place at 2:20 P.M. on the afternoon of December 7, the Japanese diplomat—along with Ambassador Kichisaburō Nomura—met with Cordell Hull, who had already been informed of the attack on Pearl Harbor.  The Secretary of State, his hand shaking, accused them of “fabrication and falsehood.”[1] In his memoirs, Hull accused Kurusu of seeking “to lull us with talk until the moment Japan got ready to strike.” [2]

Hull was not alone. Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles found the “oily” diplomat acting as the “goat tethered as bait for the tiger.” On Pearl Harbor day, Eleanor Roosevelt complained about that “nasty little Jap sitting there talking to my husband while Japanese planes were attacking Honolulu and Manila.” (9) Though no specialist has accepted this indictment, Kurusu’s popular image has been one of duplicity.

Thanks to the efforts of the late J. Garry Clifford and Masako R. Okura, a far more sympathetic—and accurate—picture of Kurusu has emerged. The two scholars have supervised the publication of an English translation of Kurusu’s memoir, published in Japanese in 1952 and deposited in the National Diet Library in 2007. The diplomat had died in 1954, before he could publish the English version. Okura, a political scientist conducting research in Tokyo in 2001, came upon the manuscript by accident and immediately recognized its importance. Okura and Clifford, her mentor at the University of Connecticut, have produced a beautifully edited document, whose introduction and elaborate endnotes reveal a superb knowledge of Japanese decision-making and the most recent scholarly literature. Manuscript sources include the papers of Kurusu, President Franklin Roosevelt, British Ambassador Halifax, Herbert Hoover, financier Bernard Baruch, diplomat Sumner Welles, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, and the U.S. State Department.  This reviewer finds one slight error: “pace” should be “peace.” (12)

Kurusu had long been a major diplomatic figure, having served in posts as varied as Hankou, Honolulu, New York, Santiago, Rome, Athens, Lima, Hamburg, and Brussels. He was Ambassador to Germany when, in September 1940, Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka negotiated the Tripartite Pact. In his unpublished memoir Kurusu claimed he unsuccessfully sought to resign in protest of the accord.

Early in November 1941, Foreign Minister Shigenori Tōgō, realizing that relations with the U.S. were at a dangerous impasse, sent Kurusu to Washington as special envoy. Ambassador Kichisaburō Nomura, a former admiral, was well liked by the Roosevelt administration. However, Nomura, whose command of English was poor, found himself out of his depth. Hence, that summer he asked his foreign office for Kurusu’s aid. Before he left Tokyo, Kurusu met with Hideki Tōjō, who held the offices of Prime Minister and War Minister and was a full general. Tōjō stressed the necessity of concluding negotiations by the end of the month, although he did not reveal that war preparations were to be completed by early December. (Two days later, Japanese leaders fixed the date of December 7 for an attack on Pearl Harbor). Tōjō saw the negotiations having only thirty percent chance of success, but promised that despite powerful internal opposition he would keep any agreement.

Most of the memoir covers Kurusu’s negotiations with the Americans. During his first meeting with Roosevelt and Hull on November 17, the President suggested direct negotiations between Japan and China. There was, however, no follow through. Within a week, American decoders mistranslated significant Tokyo instructions to Kurusu. The U.S. thought that Japan would be obligated to act ‘automatically’ if Germany invoked the Tripartite Pact of September 1940. In reality the foreign office told Kurusu Japan would act ‘independently.’ When Nomura and Kurusu sought to assure Hull that their nation was under no obligation to assist Germany, the Secretary believed that the diplomats were deliberately lying.

The varied propositions of the American and Japanese representatives (Proposals A and B, Hull’s ten points of November 26) resemble a form of diplomatic ping pong. Because of deadlock over such matters as continued American support for China, the U.S. suggested a three-month modus vivendi: Japan would withdraw 50,000 troops from southern Indochina in return for which the United States would resume moderate sales of oil. Once China objected, Hull decided to “kick the whole thing over” (14). Hull’s ten points were the ultimate ‘nonstarter,’ as they included withdrawal of all Japanese forces from China and Indochina and support only for Chiang Kai-shek’s (Jiang Jieshi’s) government. War appeared inevitable.

By and large historians have overlooked the fact, so clearly brought out in the Kurusu memoir, that even after November 26 the Japanese diplomats actively continued their peace efforts. Due to the efforts of Herbert Hoover, Kurusu met with international lawyer Raoul Desvernine, an attorney on trade matters for Japan’s embassy. Desvernine in turn put him in touch with financier Bernard Baruch, who convinced Roosevelt to reconsider the modus vivendi. Meanwhile, the Methodist missionary E. Stanley Jones suggested that Roosevelt communicate with Emperor Hirohito directly and immediately. By the evening of December 6, however, when the president cabled the emperor, it was too late.

In their perceptive introduction to the memoir, Clifford and Okura indicate that the Pacific War might have been avoided.  They write, “Without rekindling conspiracy theories about who fired the first shot in 1941, we are nonetheless struck by the pervasive atmosphere of fatalism and diplomatic passivity in the final days prior to war” (12). American fatigue played an obvious role. Hull, who suffered from tuberculosis, had put in sixteen-hour days.  The Japanese envoys noted that Roosevelt, too, appeared “very tired” (22). The President had undergone blood transfusions that spring and summer and may well have been suffering aftereffects in late fall. The two historians speculate that had Roosevelt contacted Hirohito shortly after Hull’s ten-point note, the diplomatic process might have been continued.  Conscious that the U.S. was committed to a ‘Europe first’ strategy, American military officials were pressing Roosevelt and Hull for more time, so as to deliver B-17 bombers to the Pacific.

Thanks to the labors of Clifford and Okura, it will be difficult to look again at the last three weeks of peace in quite the same way.

Justus Doenecke is emeritus professor of history at New College of Florida with a Ph.D. from Princeton (1966). He has written twelve books, including Storm on the Horizon: The Challenge to American Intervention, 1939-1941 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), and in 2015 came out with the 4th edition, with John E. Wilz, of From Isolation to War, 1931-1941 (Malden: Wiley Blackwell, 2015). He is writing a sequel to Nothing Less Than War: A New History of America’s Entry into World War I (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011). The volume will cover the politics and diplomacy of U.S. as a full-scale belligerent, the period from April 6, 1917- November 11, 1918.

segunda-feira, 31 de outubro de 2016

Comercio internacional e serguranca na Asia: perspectivas japonesas - palestras no IPRI

Gostaria de lembrar a todos os interessados sobre as duas palestras programadas para esta terça-feira à tarde, no Bolo de Noiva, do Itamaraty



Palestras no IPRI-Funag: Japão, comércio e segurança

O presidente da Funag, embaixador Sérgio Eduardo Moreira Lima, e o diretor do IPRI-Funag, ministro Paulo Roberto de Almeida, convidam para as palestras sobre "International Trade and Security in Asia: Japanese Perspectives", a serem proferidas no dia 1º de novembro, às 16h, no Auditório Paulo Nogueira Batista (Anexo II), respectivamente pelo professor de Economia Política Internacional da Keio University, Yorizumi Watanabe, e pelo Diretor Geral do Japanese Institute of International Affairs, Shingo Yamagami. Ambos, enviados especiais pelo gabinete do primeiro ministro do Japão, são eminentes especialistas em suas esferas de estudo e de atividades, tendo participado de inúmeras negociações diplomáticas a serviço do Japão. Dois diplomatas da Casa comentarão suas palestras, feitas em inglês (sem tradução simultânea), após o que haverá um debate aberto a todos os participantes do evento.

Mr. Yorizumi WATANABE is Professor of International Political Economy, Faculty of Policy Management of Keio University. Prof. Watanabe’s distinguished career has featured significant engagement in all the major bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations in which Japan has been involved in the past two decades. This included the role of policy advisor to relevant Ministers, and postings to Japan's foreign service such as Deputy Director-General of the Economic Affairs Bureau and Chief Negotiator for the Japan-Mexico Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA).

Ambassador Shingo Yamagami is Director General (Acting) of the Japan Institute of International Affairs which is a private, nonpartisan policy think-tank focused on foreign affairs and security issues in Japan, founded in 1959. He was Ambassador for Policy Planning and International Security Policy, and Deputy Director-General of Foreign Policy Bureau at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan (MOFA). He has great expertise in international politics and security from his experience including working as Political Minister at the Embassy in London (2009-12).

terça-feira, 25 de outubro de 2016

Palestras no IPRI-Funag: Japao, comercio e seguranca - 1/11/2016, 16:00hs (MRE)

Palestras no IPRI-Funag: comércio internacional e segurança na Ásia

O presidente da Funag, embaixador Sérgio Eduardo Moreira Lima, e o diretor do IPRI-Funag, ministro Paulo Roberto de Almeida, convidam para as palestras sobre:

International Trade and Security in Asia: Japanese Perspectives

a serem proferidas no dia 1º de novembro, às 16h, no Auditório Paulo Nogueira Batista (Anexo II do Itamaraty), respectivamente pelo:

professor de Economia Política Internacional da Keio University, 
Yorizumi Watanabe,

e pelo Diretor Geral do Japanese Institute of International Affairs, 
Shingo Yamagami.

      Ambos, enviados especiais pelo gabinete do primeiro ministro do Japão, são eminentes especialistas em suas esferas de estudo e de atividades, tendo participado de inúmeras negociações diplomáticas a serviço do Japão.


Diplomatas da Casa comentarão suas palestras, feitas em inglês (sem tradução simultânea), após o que haverá um debate aberto a todos os participantes do evento.

Mini CVs dos palestrantes: 


Mr. Yorizumi WATANABE is Professor of International Political Economy, Faculty of Policy Management of Keio University. Prof. Watanabe’s distinguished career has featured significant engagement in all the major bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations in which Japan has been involved in the past two decades. This included the role of policy advisor to relevant Ministers, and postings to Japan's foreign service such as Deputy Director-General of the Economic Affairs Bureau and Chief Negotiator for the Japan-Mexico Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA).

Ambassador Shingo Yamagami is Director General (Acting) of the Japan Institute of International Affairs which is a private, nonpartisan policy think-tank focused on foreign affairs and security issues in Japan, founded in 1959. He was Ambassador for Policy Planning and International Security Policy, and Deputy Director-General of Foreign Policy Bureau at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan (MOFA). He has great expertise in international politics and security from his experience including working as Political Minister at the Embassy in London (2009-12).

segunda-feira, 12 de outubro de 2015

Reconstruindo o Japao: lei das consequencias involuntarias - Michael Schaller (Delanceyplace)



A relação entre os EUA e o Japão no segundo pós-guerra evoluiu da submissão e da subserviência militar para a equiparação econômica e, ao cabo, na supremacia da manufatura japonesa sobre a americana, em praticamente todos os setores, com base nos próprios ensinamentos americanos em matéria de organização industrial, controle de qualidade e marketing. Ou seja, os japoneses aprenderam com os americanos -- inclusive se apropriando de tecnologias valiosas -- como fazer os mesmos produtos, mas melhor e mais baratos, inclusive compactando os bens, de rádios a automóveis, e portanto tornando-os mais econômicos e de design avançado.
Houve época em que se achava que toda a indústria americana estava condenada a desaparecer, sob pressão da competição japonesa nos mesmos setores, e que o próprio país ficaria sob dependência japonesa em determinadas tecnologias -- como circuitos integrados, por exemplo, essenciais para a indústria de defesa --, o que realmente arriscou acontecer no setor automobilístico, por exemplo.
Depois dos dois choques consecutivos do petróleo, em 1973 e 1979, os carros japoneses ameaçaram simplesmente arrasar com os grandes da indústria automobilística americana: GM, Ford, Chrysler, etc. Elas só foram salvas com protecionismo americano, contenção bilateral das exportações e muitos subsídios governamentais dados a essas indústrias.
O excerto deste livro trata mais das questões de segurança, mas o substrato econômico está presente.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Today's selection -- from Altered States by Michael Schaller.
In the years after World War II, the Allies were concerned that the fragile economies of Germany and Japan would cause them to fall under the influence of the Soviet Union or Communist China. As a result, they took extraordinary steps to assist these economies -- for example, from 1947 to 1953, the U.S. and its Allies forgave essentially all of Germany's external debt, an amount estimated at 280% of Germany's GDP. Similarly, the U.S. gave Japan preferential status in trade and economic support, a strategy that worked so well that by 1970s, the U.S. considered Japan an economic threat and sought to open its doors to China as a counterbalance:

"Since the United States restored Japan's sovereignty in 1952, relations between the two nations have evolved in mostly unforeseen ways. For more than a decade after the signing of the San Francisco peace treaty, American policymakers worried that Japan's feeble economy required massive foreign assistance to prevent Tokyo from reaching an accommodation with China or the Soviet Union. The underlying concern, as John Foster Dulles, peace treaty negotiator and, later, secretary of state, often remarked, was that 'unless Japan worked for us ... it will work for the other side.' Unfortunately, Dulles believed, Japanese products had 'little future ... in the United States' since they were just 'cheap imitations of our own goods.' Survival as a member of the free world required that Japan limit trade with China and develop markets in 'underdeveloped areas such as Southeast Asia' under American protection. Much of what follows examines how this nexus of beliefs -- some accurate, some distorted -- fostered cooperation between the United States and Japan while leading to conflict with China, Korea, and Vietnam.


Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru signs the bilateral security treaty with the United States on September 8, 1951. Secretary of State Dean Acheson (right) and special ambassador John Foster Dulles stand directly behind him.

"Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the United States urged Japan to play a more forceful role in the cold war, such as expanding its armed forces and assisting American military efforts in Korea and Vietnam. Yet, the more Washington pushed, the more determined to resist these demands Tokyo remained. The ruling Liberal Democrats as well as their Socialist opponents stressed the constitutional prohibition on armed forces, their fear of revived militarism, Japan's economic weakness, and the danger of being dragged into conflict with China or the Soviet Union as reasons for going slow. Despite divisions over domestic priorities, the Liberal Democrats and Socialists forged a tacit alliance to resist American pressure.

"As Yoshida Shigeru, Japan's pivotal postwar prime minister, put it in the early 1950s, rearmament would come some day 'naturally if our livelihood recovers.' It was best to 'let the Americans handle [our security] until then.' Yoshida considered it Japan's 'god-given luck that the constitution bans arms.' He noted the irony that the American-inspired document provided him 'adequate cover' to deflect Washington's demands. Yoshida dismissed politicians who wanted to amend the constitution as 'oafs.' During the past half-century, nearly all Yoshida's successors shunned an activist foreign policy in favor of economic nationalism and commercial expansion made possible by the cold war.

"Takeshita Noboru, a conservative power broker who served as prime minister in 1988-89, remarked that throughout the cold war the 'Liberal Democrats had used the possibility of criticism by the Socialists to avoid unpleasant demands by the United States, such as taking a more active role internationally.' In that sense, 'there was a sort of burden sharing between' the rival parties that Takeshita characterized as 'cunning diplomacy.' And so it was.

"By the early 1970s, the economic pendulum had swung so far in the other direction that American political and business leaders considered Japan's export-driven economy a threat to U.S. security. A member of the Nixon cabinet complained in 1971 that 'the Japanese are still fighting the war,' with the 'immediate intention ... to try to dominate the Pacific and then perhaps the world.' Uncertainty over how to respond to Japan's trade onslaught, along with a desire to enlist Chinese power to contain the Soviet Union and end the war in Vietnam, prompted President Richard Nixon's journey to the People's Republic in 1972. In a remarkably nimble reversal of twenty years of cold war rhetoric, Nixon told Mao Zedong that the United States-Japan Security Treaty protected China from both Soviet and Japanese threats."

Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation
Author: Michael Schaller
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Copyright 1997 by Oxford University Press
Pages 3-4

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