Uma enorme pergunta dessas que podem entrar nos exercícios de história virtual, desta vez econômica. A história virtual -- que eu cultivo, tendo pelo menos três ou quatro livros da série What If? -- se dedica bem mais a episódios militares ou simplesmente políticos (golpes, revoluções, ações humanas), do que propriamente a processos econômicos, que são bem mais "pesados" para serem influenciados facilmente pelas ações humanas.
Mas no caso da abertura americana para a China -- tomada por Nixo por motivos puramente estratégicos e geopolíticos: abrir uma outra frente para enfraquecer a União Soviética, então sob a liderança já gerontocrática, mas ainda extremamente ativa de Brejnev -- ela possui enormes consequências geoeconômicas.
Muito provavelmente a China não teria empreendido seu grande caminho de volta ao capitalismo tão facilmente quanto foi com a permissão dada a empresas americanas, e estrangeiras em geral, para se instalar nas zonas econômicas especiais criadas por Deng Xia-ping na sequência dessa abertura.
Sem uma China capitalista nos anos 70 e 80, não teríamos o gigante econômico da atualidade, e o mundo seria muito, mas muito diferente do que é...
Enfim, vale a reflexão, ainda que seja só um BIG IF...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
What would today’s global economic landscape look like had Nixon not gone to China in 1973?
By Martin Hutchinson
The Globalist, February 5, 2013
Richard Nixon was the first U.S. president to visit China while in office.
Takeaways
- Almost every inhabitant of China today owes a debt of gratitude to Richard Nixon.
- U.S. relations with China from 1949 to 1972 were very similar to U.S.-Iran relations today.
- The
official Mao-era vision of the United States as the Imperialist Wolves
would have remained dominant among China's decision-makers and most of
its people.
U.S. relations with China in the period 1949 to 1972 were very
similar to U.S.-Iran relations today. They were stuck in a rut and
nobody seemed capable of finding a constructive way forward.
Had President Richard Nixon not gone to China, in February 1972, we
can assume that the isolate-China policy of the United States would have
persisted much longer. President Jimmy Carter might well have attempted
to thaw relations, but he, as a Democrat, would have met with strong
opposition from Republicans.
It was said when Nixon opened to China that only a relatively hawkish
Republican could have done it. Domestic opposition to the move would
otherwise have been too fierce. It would probably have been left to the
Reagan Administration to change the policy, probably in President
Reagan’s second term (1985-89), when a general thaw in the Cold War
occurred.
In these circumstances, with a U.S trade embargo in force, the
Chinese opening to the world would have been very difficult to get
going. The availability of the gigantic U.S. market was essential to
provide the foreign exchange needed to develop Chinese industry and
agriculture.
The first burst of increased Chinese exports happened remarkably
quickly after China’s government changed orientation in 1976. Exports
more than tripled in five years, from $7.3 billion in 1976 to $24.4
billion in 1981 — modest figures now, but a vital source of foreign
exchange then.
The further increase in exports was then rather slow until an
explosion after 1987. With the United States embargoing Chinese goods in
1976-81, the initial surge would have been impossible.
Had visits by Nixon and President Gerald Ford, who went to Beijing in
1975, not taken place, the official Mao-era vision of the United States
as the Imperialist Wolves would have remained dominant among China’s
decision-makers and most of its people.
This might well have been sufficient to tip the scales towards
triumph for the Gang of Four, doubtless quickly followed by the
liquidation of Deng Xiaoping and probably the moderate Hua Guofeng,
Mao’s immediate successor.
Had this happened, there would certainly have been no opening to
capitalism before death of Jiang Qing, Mao’s last wife, in 1991, and
probably not for long thereafter. China today would well be the
impoverished, economically unimportant country it was in the later years
of Mao.
Almost every inhabitant of China (and the “almost” is purely there for courtesy) owes a debt of gratitude to Richard Nixon.
Without his action, the country would today be no freer than it is
and its people would be immeasurably poorer than they are. It is,
however, not clear whether Americans should also raise a glass to him
for this development.
Had China remained in its Maoist cave, other countries, notably India
and Vietnam (if that country had liberalized without China’s example)
would equally have been able to provide cheap labor and skills to
multinational corporations.
Indeed, some such countries — notably Indonesia, the Philippines and
Pakistan — may also be counted as marginal net losers from Nixon’s
opening and China’s subsequent emergence. They lost business they would
have otherwise obtained.
The two major gainers from China’s emergence are consumers of
Chinese-made products and the multinational corporations doing one-stop
sourcing from China.
A third group — multinationals selling to China — has notably failed
to make adequate returns. For every one of these companies eking out
modest profits in China, there are ten that have found it a bottomless
pit of loss.
Textile consumers have benefited spectacularly, with prices no higher
today in nominal terms than they were 20 years ago. In electronics, 20
years ago, most gadgetry was assembled in the United States and Japan.
Today its cost to consumers (or in Apple’s case, to Apple) is greatly
reduced by the magic of Foxconn’s Chinese production system.
Without China, sourcing in East Asia, including Foxconn’s own Taiwan, would be possible, but the cost would be much higher.
We now come to the unquestionable gainers from China’s emergence.
Just read the profit statements of multinational corporations. U.S.
corporate profits are at a level in terms of GDP not seen since the
glory days of 1929.
Thanks to China, Apple and its confrères are able to manufacture at —
what used to be called — third-world wages and sell at rarified Western
prices. That won’t last forever. Indeed, Apple’s shareholders already
seem to see the shadow of a coming return to normal.
However, so far the profit wave, which was caused by China’s
emergence and benefited top U.S. management, investment bankers and
hedge fund managers, has been greater than in any other of the world’s
great booms.
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