Temas de relações internacionais, de política externa e de diplomacia brasileira, com ênfase em políticas econômicas, em viagens, livros e cultura em geral. Um quilombo de resistência intelectual em defesa da racionalidade, da inteligência e das liberdades democráticas.
O que é este blog?
Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.
sábado, 2 de novembro de 2013
Esquerda Caviar: a praga que frequenta nossas faculdades, e o governo -resenha do livro de Rodrigo Constantino
O totalitarismo mediatico dos companheiros amestrados - Demetrio Magnoli
O Pensador Coletivo se preocupa imensamente com a crítica ao governo. Os sistemas políticos pluralistas estão sustentados pelo elogio da dissonância: a crítica é benéfica para o governo porque descortina problemas que não seriam enxergados num regime monolítico. O Pensador Coletivo não concorda com esse princípio democrático: seu imperativo é rebater a crítica imediatamente, evitando que o vírus da dúvida se espalhe pelo tecido social. Uma tática preferencial é acusar o crítico de estar a serviço de interesses de malévolos terceiros: um partido adversário, "a mídia", "a burguesia", os EUA ou tudo isso junto. É que, por sua própria natureza, o Pensador Coletivo não crê na hipótese de existência da opinião individual.
O Pensador Coletivo abomina argumentos específicos. Seu centro político não tem tempo para refletir sobre textos críticos e formular réplicas substanciais. Os militantes difusores não têm a sofisticação intelectual indispensável para refrasear sentenças complexas. Você está diante do Pensador Coletivo quando se depara com fórmulas genéricas exibidas como refutações de argumentos específicos. O uso dos termos "elitista", "preconceituoso" e "privatizante", assim como suas variantes, é um forte indício de que seu interlocutor não é um indivíduo, mas o Pensador Coletivo.
O Pensador Coletivo interpreta o debate público como uma guerra. "A guerra de guerrilha na internet é a informação e a contrainformação", explica o deputado André Vargas, um chefe do MAV. No seu mundo ideal, os dissidentes seriam enxotados da praça pública. Como, no mundo real, eles circulam por aí, a alternativa é pregar-lhes o rótulo de "inimigos do povo". Você provavelmente conversa com o Pensador Coletivo quando, no lugar de uma resposta argumentada, encontra qualificativos desairosos dirigidos contra o autor de uma crítica cujo conteúdo é ignorado. "Direitista", "reacionário" e "racista" são as ofensas do manual, mas existem outras. Um expediente comum é adicionar ao impropério a acusação de que o crítico "dissemina o ódio".
O Pensador Coletivo é uma máquina política regida pela lógica da eficiência, não pela ética do intercâmbio de ideias. Por isso, ele nunca se deixa intimidar pela exigência de consistência argumentativa. Suzana Singer seguiu a cartilha do Pensador Coletivo ao rotular o colunista Reinaldo Azevedo como um "rottweiler feroz" para, na sequência, solicitar candidamente um "bom nível de conversa". Nesse passo, trocou a função de ombudsman da Folha pela de Censora de Opinião. Contudo, ela não pertence ao MAV. Os procedimentos do Pensador Coletivo estão disponíveis nas latas de lixo de nossa vida pública: mimetizá-los é, apenas, uma questão de gosto.
Existem similares ao MAV em outros partidos? O conceito do Pensador Coletivo ajusta-se melhor às correntes políticas que se acreditam possuidoras da chave da porta do Futuro. Mas, na era da internet, e na hora de uma campanha eleitoral, o invento será copiado. Pense nisso pelo lado bom: identificar robôs de opinião é um joguinho que tem a sua graça.
Paraisos fiscais internos: entre a sadia competicao e a delinquencia: ocaso de Delaware (NYT)
Delaware, Den of Thieves?
By JOHN A. CASSARA
The New York Times, November 1, 2013
As origens da inflacao monetaria nos EUA - Joseph Salerno
by Joseph T. Salerno
... It was not ultimately budget deficits that allowed Kennedy to initiate the corporatist planning and militarization of the U.S. economy that bore first fruit in the emergence of the American welfare-warfare state during Johnson’s Great Society and culminated in Nixon’s fascist New Economic Policy. The policy that facilitated Johnson’s simultaneous financing of extravagant expenditures on welfare programs and the military adventure in Vietnam and made conditions ripe for Nixon's imposition of wage and price controls was not newfangled functional finance but old-fashioned monetary inflation. As the historian of macroeconomic policy, Kenneth Weiher, has pointed out, it was not the much-vaunted “fiscal revolution” but the overlooked “monetary revolution” that took place during the Kennedy administration which turned out to be the predominant influence on the economic events of the 1960s and 1970s. As Weiher stated: “There was a revolution all right, but the most important change occurred at the Federal Reserve; however, 10 years passed before more than a handful of people caught on to what was happening.”
In the three years of the Kennedy administration the growth of the money supply as measured by M2 averaged about 8 percent per year. If we take the eleven prior years going back to 1950, the rate of growth of M2 averaged 3.6 percent per year; if we go back four more years, to the first postwar year of 1946, the average annual rate of M2 growth over the fifteen-year period drops to 3.3 percent.
There were basically two reasons why the role of monetary policy tended to be so grossly underplayed in the economic histories of this period. The first was that the new economists themselves, as unreconstructed Keynesians, uniformly denigrated the potency of monetary policy while touting the effectiveness of fiscal policy. Thus the Kennedy tax-cut bill, which did not even take effect until 1964, receives the lion’s share of the credit for stimulating the recovery from the 1960-1961 recession. Second, because most economists since the 1930s, including and especially those of Keynesian orientation, identified inflation with increases in the price level, and interpreted the 1.2-percent average annual rate of increase of the CPI during the period 1961-1963 as evidence of the absence of inflation ...
Despite the negligible increase in the CPI, however, the effects of the rapid, and initially unanticipated, monetary inflation were visible in credit markets as real interest rates trended steadily downward throughout the decade. Unfortunately, both Keynesian and central bank orthodoxies of the 1960s focused on the nominal interest rate as an important indicator of the degree of ease or restraint of monetary policy, making no allowance for the effect of inflationary expectations on the nominal interest rate. Consequently, neither the new economists nor the monetary authorities believed that monetary policy was “unduly” expansionary because short-term nominal interest rates rose from 1961 to 1963. Indeed, the new economists were quite pleased with monetary policy during this period, an attitude typified in Seymour Harris’s observation that “the [Federal Reserve] board provided the country with a reasonably easy money policy ...”
Given that monetary policy was indeed grossly inflationary during the Kennedy years, what accounts for the sudden and radical shift in Federal Reserve policy from the moderate inflationism under the Eisenhower administration? The answer is Kennedy and his new economists, who conducted a relentless and incessant campaign for easy money from the very beginning of his administration. This campaign took the form of repeated public utterances on the part of the president and his economic advisers, as well as direct presidential pressure on William McChesney Martin, who was chairman of the Fed under Eisenhower and continued in that position until 1970.
Kennedy and key members of his administration also doggedly prodded the Fed, both publicly and privately, to ease monetary policy, even threatening to terminate its independent status if it did not acquiesce. As early as his campaign for the presidency, Kennedy expressed his disappointment with the Fed’s tendency to resort to restrictive monetary policy to rein in inflation and his intention to break with such a policy. In April 1962, Kennedy petitioned Congress for a revision of the terms of the Fed chairmanship that would enable each president to nominate a new chairman at the beginning of his term. Heller, Treasury Secretary Dillon, and Treasury Undersecretary Roosa also weighed in with calls for the Fed to ease monetary policy. Despite some initial foot-dragging and repeated caveats that the Fed would only finance real economic growth and not budget deficits, Fed Chairman Martin ultimately capitulated to the insistent demands of Kennedy and the new economists for a cheap-money policy. In fact, in February 1961, the Fed abandoned its long-standing “bills-only doctrine,” which dictated that open market operations be conducted exclusively in the market for short-term securities. In doing so, the Fed was accommodating the administration’s request to reduce long-term interest rates by buying long-term securities while simultaneously selling short-term securities in order to nudge up short-term interest rates. This attempt to artificially twist the interest-rate structure — nicknamed Operation Twist — was devised by the new economists to accomplish two goals: to stimulate domestic business investment and new housing purchases and to discourage the outflow of domestic and encourage the inflow of foreign short-term capital as a means of mitigating the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit. Needless to say, this attempt to have one’s cake and eat it too — to pursue a domestic cheap money policy and to avoid its adverse consequences for the balance of payments — was a failure ...
Our conclusion then is that Kennedy and the new economists succeeded in wringing from the Fed precisely the inflationary monetary policy they desired and that this policy represented a radical break with the monetary policy pursued in the 1950s. This conclusion, which is certainly reflected in the money-supply growth rates cited above, also accords with the perceptions of the new economists themselves. Seymour Harris, long-time Kennedy economic adviser and chief academic consultant to the Kennedy Treasury, made this pellucidly clear in his book on the economic policies of the Kennedy years. Harris concluded that:
In short, monetary policy under Kennedy was much more expansionist than under Eisenhower. ...Thus, inflationary monetary policy was the sine qua non for the regime of permanent budget deficits that was initiated in the early 1960s and continued uninterrupted almost to the end of the twentieth century. That private investment was able to continually expand concurrently with sharply increasing government spending on military and other programs was attributable in large measure to the fact that, during the Kennedy years, the Fed was induced to “cooperate” by routinely monetizing the cumulating budget deficits necessary to finance these programs.
Federal Reserve policy in 1961-1963 was not like that of 1952-1960. At the early stages of recovery in the 1950s, the Federal Reserve, overly sensitive to inflationary dangers, aborted recoveries. Whether the explanation was the growing conviction that inflation was no longer a threat, or whether it was an awareness that the Kennedy administration would not tolerate stifling monetary policies, the Federal Reserve made no serious attempts to deflate the economy after 1960. In fact, in 1963 Mr. Martin boasted of the large contributions made to expansion ...
Joseph Salerno is academic vice president of the Mises Institute, professor of economics at Pace University, and editor of the Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics. He has been interviewed in the Austrian Economics Newsletter and on Mises.org. Send him mail. See Joseph T. Salerno's article archives.
You can subscribe to future articles by Joseph T. Salerno via this RSS feed.
Mensagem aos Companheiros, e seus apaniguados - Ciro Bondesan dos Santos
Humanidades: virando o primo pobre de uma educacao universitaria? - TheAmerican Interest
Students Tuning Out Humanities Professors
“In the scholarly world, cognitive sciences has everybody’s ear right now, and everybody is thinking about how to relate to it,” said Louis Menand, a Harvard history professor. “How many people do you know who’ve read a book by an English professor in the past year? But everybody’s reading science books.”Many distinguished humanities professors feel their status deflating. Anthony Grafton, a Princeton history professor who started that university’s humanities recruiting program, said he sometimes feels “like a newspaper comic strip character whose face is getting smaller and smaller.”
sexta-feira, 1 de novembro de 2013
Cozinha do STF mantem reserva de mercado para jornalistas,contraditoriamente ao Plenario
- Publicado em Quinta, 31 Outubro 2013 20:49
- Escrito por Redação Comunique-se
Com remuneração inicial de R$ 7.506,55, interessados na vaga de ‘Analista Judiciário – Comunicação Social’ do STF devem se inscrever no site do Cespe-UnB até a próxima segunda-feira, 4 de novembro, mediante o pagamento da taxa de R$ 80. A carga horária da função, assim como as demais do concurso, não foi divulgada. Informações sobre o modelo de avaliação e critérios para a seleção podem ser conferidas no edital.
“Realizar atividades de nível superior, de natureza técnica, relacionadas ao planejamento, organização, coordenação, supervisão, assessoramento, estudo, pesquisa e execução de tarefas que envolvam todas as etapas de uma cobertura jornalística integrada: produção, redação, reportagem e edição de conteúdos para mídias eletrônicas como rádio, TV, internet e imprensa escrita”.
Protecionismo comercial e promocao industrial nos EUA - trecho de livro
Aliás, o Brasil foi tão, ou mais -- e posso provar que foi mais -- protecionista do que os EUA e no entanto não se tornou uma potência industrial. Teria sido o nosso protecionismo insuficiente? Mas ele foi, de fato, maior...
Portanto, há de se pensar em outros fatores, como a própria capacitação humana da sociedade em empreender atividades sofisticadas como são às ligadas à indústria.
De resto, basta ver o peso, muito pequeno, do comércio exterior, na formação dos PIBs americano e brasileiro, o que não deve pesar muito nas tendências econômicas gerais. Seria capaz o "rabo" da política comercial abanar o "cachorro" do desenvolvimento? Não acredito.
Todas as condições nos EUA eram favoráveis ao desenvolvimento industrial, inclusive porque fizeram (pelo menos na New England) uma Revolução industrial praticamente simultânea à aquela feita na Inglaterra, e se não o fizeram antes é porque as vantagens comparativas dos EUA estavam concentradas nos recursos naturais e na exploração das atividades primárias, onde eles eram abundantes em terra, mas escassos em mão-de-obra (que era cara, para ser concentrada na manufatura imediatamente).
Um pouco de história não faz mal a ninguém...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Is free trade a good thing?
delanceyplace.com, November 1, 2013
In today's selection -- today, the majority of politicians and economists advocate free trade among nations with no tariffs -- or at least equal tariffs between trading partners. However, from its inception in the 1780s almost until the twentieth century, America was a highly protectionist nation with heavy tariffs on imports. This was primarily because the fledgling American manufacturing base was not nearly strong enough to stand up to competition from powerhouse nations -- especially Britain. Furthermore, the trade situation was gravely out of balance with imports far exceeding exports. The situation was most dire in the 1780s and 1790s, but even decades later a politician as revered as Abraham Lincoln was a strong advocate of protectionist tariffs. (When America eventually became the world's manufacturing powerhouse -- in part because the tariff had provided a shield that allowed them to mature -- its views on tariffs changed). From the outset, though, this high-tariff posture favored the manufacturing-oriented states of the northern U.S. at the expense of the agriculture-exporting South:
"After the war ended in 1783, America's external economy was still tied to the British Empire almost as tightly as it had been before the Revolution. And while the country's imports rose by more than 69 percent during the twenty years from 1770 to 1790, its exports grew by only 2.7 percent, one twenty-sixth as much. This was a path to disaster. For the period 1787- 1792, more than 90 percent of all imported manufactures came from Britain. As against this incoming flood, only 43 percent of America's small quantities of exports went to Britain and its empire; 25 percent went to the French Empire, 10 percent to the Dutch Empire, 8 percent to the Spanish Empire, and 6 percent to the Portuguese Empire (mainly Brazil). At none of these destinations were American traders as welcome as they wished to be. Nowhere did American merchants sell as much as they could have in the absence of imperial restrictions. Nor, back home, could the thirteen states come to agreement among themselves as to what to do about it.
"Heavy dependence for public funds on import tariffs (customs duties or 'imposts') made foreign policy inseparable from economic policy. Until the new government under the Constitution entered office in 1789, customs duties belonged not to the national government but to whatever state included the port where the incoming goods happened to enter. This was one of the many elements that had made the financing of the Revolution so chaotic.
"Then, too, both before and after 1789, such heavy reliance on imposts deepened sectional discord. Many Southerners disliked having to pay tariffs on imported British goods. They believed that the North, where manufacturing was more highly developed, could supply its local consumers with a larger amount of domestically made products than the South was able to do. This meant, in turn, that the South was having to buy proportionately more British goods, and, accordingly, having to contribute more than its share of duties on manufactured imports. And yet, tariffs on British imports furnished the bulk of all federal income. A reduction or stoppage of this income would imperil the new nation's independence. The intertwined issues of finance and foreign relations therefore tended to divide the country along sectional lines of North versus South.
"Because we know how this story turned out -- that the Union survived and prospered -- it is hard to imagine how perilous the situation of the 1780s and 1790s actually was."
Author: Thomas K. McGraw
Title: The Founders and Finance
Publisher: Belknap Harvard
Date: Copyright 2012 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College
Pages: 48-49
The Founders and Finance: How Hamilton, Gallatin, and Other Immigrants Forged a New Economy
by Thomas K. McCraw by Belknap Press
If you wish to read further: Buy Now
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