TPP vs Mercosul-UE: o primeiro começou 3 anos atras, o segundo se arrasta desde 1995...

Em qual acordo você aposta, caro leitor?
Bem, o TPP já está concluído, embora faltem alguns peso-pesados do comércio internacional, como China, Coreia do Sul, por exemplo. Mas está aí, e deve crescer, embora seus efeitos -- inclusive em função de outros esquemas de liberalização já em vigor -- devem se exercer ao longo dos próximos anos.
Quem aí aposta num acordo Mercosul-UE?
Alguém?
Bem, não quero chamar nenhum dos meus leitores, que acham que essa coisa vai sair, de ingênuos.
Ingênuos, e ideólogos estúpidos, são os companheiros, que implodiram a Alca-FTAA em 2005, e que achavam que depois iam conseguir rapidinho um acordo bonzinho com a UE. Sacripantas!
Nunca achei a Alca uma maravilha, e de fato não era; mas sem ela, os europeus não têm NENHUM motivo para ceder nos temas de interesse do Brasil e de seus parceiro no Mercosul.
Só idiotas não vêem isso.
Tenho muitos artigos e dezenas de postagens sobre a bobagem companheira, uma entre muitas que eles cometeram CONTRA os interesses do Brasil.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Mercosul e UE preparam lista de oferta para acordo de livre comércio
Portal UO, 5/10/2015
Com o início do último trimestre de 2015, começa a correr o prazo para Mercosul e União Europeia (UE) trocarem ofertas para um acordo de livre comércio entre os blocos econômicos. Os três meses finais deste ano são o período agendado com os europeus para a apresentação mútua de listas de produtos que poderão ter a tarifa zerada. Na quinta (1º) e sexta-feira (2) passadas, as delegações do Mercosul e da UE se reuniram no Paraguai para acertar os últimos detalhes.
O Ministério das Relações Exteriores informou que, agora, caberá aos chanceleres e ministros da área econômica do Mercosul avaliar o resultado das reuniões em Assunção e decidir quando a troca ocorrerá. O ministro do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior, Armando Monteiro, tem defendido a troca de ofertas ainda em outubro. As negociações para um acordo entre Mercosul e União Europeia começaram no fim da década de 1990 e, desde então avançam de maneira inconsistente.
Em 2004, chegou a acontecer uma troca de ofertas entre os blocos, que não resultou em acordo. Em 2010, as negociações foram retomadas mas a troca de ofertas agendada para 2013 não aconteceu. Segundo o Itamaraty, para serem consideradas satisfatórias, é esperado que as ofertas desonerem de 85% a 95% do volume do comércio de cada bloco econômico.
Na avaliação de Antônio Jorge Ramalho, professor do Instituto de Relações Internacionais da Universidade de Brasília, o acordo entre Mercosul e União Europeia é positivo e necessário para os países latino-americanos. "De um lado, você tem necessidade de abrir os mercados para, no médio e longo prazo, reduzir os preços e a pressão inflacionária nas economias do Mercosul. Do outro, há o interesse em tornar as indústrias locais mais competitivas. Dar mais sustentabilidade, no longo prazo, às indústrias da região", afirmou.
Ramalho lembra, no entanto, que o aumento da concorrência pode penalizar as empresas que não investem em tecnologia. "As indústrias que não investiram suficientemente em tecnologia vão ter que pagar um preço. Vão ter que, ou sair do mercado, ou dar um salto", afirmou o professor, que considera o acordo oportuno, em um momento de contração da atividade econômica brasileira. "Na situação atual, vai ser muito positivo. Isso passa a integrar a estratégia de reativação da nossa economia", disse.
Na visão dele, o Mercosul é mais responsável pelo atraso na negociação do acordo do que a União Europeia. "Por muito tempo, o principal obstáculo era a Argentina, pelo custo político que teria no curto prazo. Ela tem dificuldade em estabelecer trocas mais abertas por causa dos seus problemas de competitividade. Mas, do ponto de vista sistêmico, isso é necessário para o Mercosul e inclusive para a Argentina".
Apesar de não conhecer o teor das propostas atuais, Ramalho acredita que esteja havendo entendimento entre os blocos econômicos, já que as negociações estão avançando. "Essas coisas não se fazem isoladas. Eles vão sinalizando, é um processo de negociações. A dinâmica normal é que, quando é apresentada a proposta, a outra parte já está sabendo [o teor]", declarou.

Stanley Hoffmann, o anti-Kissinger, o franco-americano: obituario (NYT)

Li dezenas de artigos de Stanley Hoffmann ao longo dos anos, seja em francês, seja em inglês, geralmente no New York Review of Books, mas em respeitáveis revistas de relações internacionais. Sempre tive curiosidade por conhecer melhor seu itinerário de vida, pois admirava sua capacidade analítica, sobretudo sendo um "americano" falando da França. Não sabia que ele era europeu, aliás austríaco, um dos muitos refugiados do nazismo criminoso.
Minha homenagem a ele está sintetizada no título desta postagem: o anti-Kissinger, não no sentido em que ele se opunha ao que Kissinger pensava como intelectual, mas ao Kissinger do poder, uma fascinação que Hoffmann nunca teve, mas que era uma obsessão para seu colega germano-americano.
Uma grande admiração e meu sentimento pela morte dessa grande intelectual.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

BOOKS

Stanley Hoffmann, Who Brought Passion to Foreign Policy Analysis, Dies at 86

By WILLIAM GRIMES

The New York Times, September 13, 2015

Photo

Stanley Hoffmann at Harvard. CreditHarvard University

 

Stanley Hoffmann, a French-educated political scientist and foreign-affairs analyst who perceptively interpreted France and the United States to each other, and who, in a series of influential books, explored the forces that govern the relations between states, died over the weekend at his home in Cambridge, Mass. He was 86.
His death was confirmed by his wife and only immediate survivor, Inge Schneier Hoffmann, who said he died in his sleep either late Saturday or early Sunday.
Mr. Hoffmann, who taught at Harvard for more than half a century, roamed freely across the disciplines of history, international law, sociology and political science to address pressing issues in international relations and foreign policy, particularly the relations between France and the United States, the nations he knew best.
Writing in French and English, he brought a passionate engagement to questions that grew out of his early experiences in the Europe of the 1930s and ’40s.
“It wasn’t I who chose to study world politics,” he wrote in an autobiographical essay in 1993. “World politics forced themselves on me at a very early age.”
On June 12, 1940, two days before the German Army entered Paris, Mr. Hoffmann, who was Austrian by birth and partly Jewish by heritage, fled with his mother to the south of France from their home in the fashionable suburb Neuilly. Thus ended his idyllic childhood.
On returning to Paris in 1945, he entered the Institut d’Études Politiques in a quest to understand the forces that had shaped the world in the 20th century.
“It wasn’t simply the discovery of the way in which public affairs take over private lives, in which individual fates are blown around like leaves in a storm once history strikes, that had marked me forever,” he wrote. “It was also a purely personal sense of solidarity with the other victims of history and Hitler with whom we had shared this primal experience of free fall.”
In a series of works regarded as models of clarity and analytic sophistication, notably “International Organizations and the Political Power of States” (1954) and “The State of War: Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Politics” (1965), Mr. Hoffmann explored the ways nations and leaders make policy, and the role of international law and organizations in world affairs.
A fervent admirer of Charles de Gaulle, he maintained a rather old-fashioned belief in the power of personality on the political stage and the ability of forceful leaders to determine the course of events. “The conflicts, the compromises, the rules and the institutions of world politics result from the moves of statesmen; and therefore the study of their character, of their ideas and of their style is essential,” he wrote.
Mr. Hoffmann was a frequent contributor to journals like Foreign Policy, The New York Review of Books and The New Republic, in whose pages he articulated his growing concerns about American foreign policy; its ambitions and shortcomings had been a source of concern to him since the days of the Kennedy administration.
In books like “Gulliver’s Troubles: Or, the Setting of American Foreign Policy” (1968) and “Primacy or World Order: American Foreign Policy Since the Cold War” (1978), he took a skeptical look at the ideological imperatives driving America’s foreign policy, a constant theme in his writing that eventually, he admitted, wore him out. “Being a permanent denouncer of recurrent mistakes is, after a while, no fun,” he wrote.
Instead, he turned his attention to Europe and the evolving European Union, whose prospects he regarded askance, in numerous essays collected in “The European Sisyphus: Essays on Europe, 1964-1994” (1995). In “Duties Beyond Borders” (1981), he considered both the limits and the potential of an ethical foreign policy.
Stanley Hoffmann was born on Nov. 27, 1928, in Vienna. He was taken to Nice a year later by his mother after she separated from his father, an American who returned to the United States. They moved to Neuilly in 1936, only to be forced back south by the German invasion.
Mr. Hoffmann graduated at the top of his class at the Institut d’Études Politiques in 1948, but as a foreign citizen he could not take competitive examinations for the Civil Service or for admission to the newly created École Nationale d’Administration, the gateway to a diplomatic career. He studied international law instead, eventually publishing a doctoral thesis on the veto rights of the major powers in the United Nations. He later deemed it “quite unreadable.”
In 1951, he spent a year as a visiting graduate student at Harvard’s government department, where his fellow students included Zbigniew Brzezinski, Judith N. Shklar and Samuel Huntington, and where he became a protégé of McGeorge Bundy, a professor in the department.
After military service in France, Mr. Hoffmann was invited back to Harvard by Mr. Bundy to be an instructor. And there he remained, earning tenure only four years after arriving. He became an American citizen in 1960.
At Harvard, he founded the social studies program and, in 1969, joined with Henry Kissinger, David Landes and Guido Goldman to found the Center for European Studies. He was the center’s chairman until 1995.
In addition to his works in English on international relations, Mr. Hoffmann wrote many books on specifically French subjects, including “Le Mouvement Poujade” (1956), on the populist, anti-tax Poujade movement of the 1950s; “Decline or Renewal? France Since the 1930s” (1974); and “Sur la France” (1976).
The challenges posed by the post-Sept. 11 world and American military involvement in the Middle East motivated him to return to American foreign policy in “America Goes Backward” (2004), “Gulliver Unbound: America’s Imperial Temptation and the War in Iraq” (2004), written with Frédéric Bozo, and “Chaos and Violence: What Globalization, Failed States, and Terrorism Mean for U.S. Foreign Policy” (2006).
Unlike Mr. Kissinger, his Harvard colleague, and Mr. Brzezinski, his former fellow student, Mr. Hoffmann avoided the role of counselor to government leaders. He once wrote that he regarded political influence with dread rather than desire.
“I study power so as to understand the enemy,” he explained, “not so as better to be able to exert it.”

Correction: September 16, 2015 
An obituary on Monday about the political scientist and foreign-affairs analyst Stanley Hoffmann referred incorrectly to McGeorge Bundy, of whom Mr. Hoffman became a protégé when he was a visiting graduate student at Harvard’s government department in 1951. Mr. Bundy was a professor in the department, not its chairman. The obituary also misstated part of the name of the graduate school that is considered the gateway to a diplomatic career in France. It is the École Nationale d’Administration, not the École Normale d’Administration. And it misstated Mr. Hoffmann’s birth date. It was Nov. 27, 1928 — not Nov. 28.
 Iman Stevenson contributed reporting. A version of this article appears in print on September 14, 2015, on page A20 of the New York edition with the headline: Stanley Hoffmann, 86; Explored Foreign Policy.

Research Gate: estatisticas de um servico academico - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Não sei com qual frequência, talvez semanal, mas de vez em quando recebo uma mensagem do Research Gate, esta plataforma de intercâmbio acadêmico que passei a usar, desde 3 anos aproximadamente, juntamente com o Academia.edu.
Pois bem, o que aparece nesta segunda-feira pela manhã, dia 5 de outubro?
Isto:

Congratulations 

With 45 new reads, you were the most read author from your institution 

 

Your article reached 20 reads

Article: Never before seen in Brazil: Luis Inácio Lula da Silva's grand diplomacy  

 

Your dataset reached 400 reads

Dataset: Pensamento Diplomático Brasileiro Parte 1 

 

Your article reached 50 reads

Article: EVOLuÇÃO HISTÓRICA DO REGIONALISmO ECONÔmICO E POLÍTICO DA AmÉRICA DO SuL: um BALANÇO DAS EXPERIÊNCI... 

 

Achieved on Oct 5^th

Mais ainda, no Score do Research Gate, aparece isto:

Percentile Your score is higher than 70% of ResearchGate members'.

How does the RG Score work?

Your RG Score is calculated based on the publications in your profile and how other researchers interact with your content on ResearchGate.

Publications · 171

100% of RG SCORE

4.96 TOTAL IMPACT

• Articles · 148
• Books · 10
• Chapters · 1
• Conference Papers · 3
• Datasets · 6
• Theses · 2
• Full-texts · 128
• Other Research · 1

Gengis Khan, o democrata (autoritario) - Jack Weatherford

Foi um inovador, como argumenta este  historiador.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Today's selection -- from Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World by Jack Weatherford. By almost any measure, Genghis Khan was the most successful warrior in history, amassing the largest contiguous empire the world had ever seen. (Only the British Empire was larger). His success was in large part due to his ability and willingness to innovate. As an example, he developed a way to successfully integrate a large contingent of conquered people into his nation. Before Khan, conquered enemies had been slaughtered or taken strictly as slaves: "[When] the Mongols ... defeated the Tatars [in the thirteenth century], they had ... captured almost the entire army and all the civilians.  "In traditional steppe systems of thought, everyone outside the kinship network was an enemy and would always be an enemy unless somehow brought into the family through ties of adoption or marriage. Temujin sought an end to the constant fighting between such groups, and he wanted to deal with the Tatars the same way that he had dealt with the Jurkin and the Tayichiud clans -- kill the leaders and absorb the survivors and all their goods and animals into his tribe. Although this policy had worked with clans of hundreds, however, the Tatars were a tribe of thousands, For such a massive social transformation, he needed the full support of his followers, and to achieve that support he summoned a khuriltai [council] of his victorious warriors.  Ghengis Khan on his throne The members of the khuriltai agreed to the plan, determining to kill Tatar males taller than the linchpin holding the wheels on a cart, which was not only a measure of adulthood but a symbolic designation of the nation itself, in much the same way that maritime people often use the ship as a symbol of their state. Once again, as a counter to the killing, Temujin wanted the surviving Tatars taken in as full members of his tribe, not as slaves. To stress this, he not only adopted another Tatar child for his mother, but also encouraged intermarriage. Until this time he had only one official wife, Borte, who bore him four sons and an unknown number of daughters, but he now took the aristocratic Tatar Yesugen and her elder sister Yesui as additional wives. The Tatars had had a much greater reputation than the Mongols, and after this battle, the Mongols took in so many Tatars, many of whom rose to high office and great prominence in the Mongol Empire, that the name Tatar became synonymous with, and in many cases better known, than the name Mongol leading to much historic confusion through the centuries.  "Intermarriage and adoption would not suffice, however, to achieve Temujin's goal of merging the two large groups into one people. If kin groups were allowed to remain essentially intact, the larger group would eventually fragment. In 1203, therefore, the year after the Tatar conquest, Temujin ordered yet another, and even more radical, reformation of the Mongol army and tribe.  "He organized his warriors into squads, or arban, of ten who were to be brothers to one another. No matter what their kin group or tribal origin, they were ordered to live and fight together as loyally as brothers; in the ultimate affirmation of kinship, no one of them could ever leave the other behind in battle as a captive. Like any family of brothers in which the eldest had total control, the eldest man took the leadership position in the Mongol arban, but the men could also decide to choose another to hold this position.  "Ten of the squads formed a company, or zagun, of one hundred men, one of whom they selected as their leader. And just as extended families united to form lineages, ten Mongol companies formed a battalion, or mingan, of one thousand men. Ten mingan were then organized into a tumen, an army of ten thousand; the leader of each tumen was chosen by Temujin, who knew the qualities needed in such a leadership position. He allowed fathers and sons and brothers and cousins to stay together when practical, but by forcing them into new units that no man could desert or change, under penalty of death, he broke the power of the old-system lineages, clans, tribes, and ethnic identities. At the time of his reorganization, he reportedly had ninety-five mingan, units of a thousand, but since some of the units were not staffed to capacity, the total number of troops may have been as low as eighty thousand.  "The entire Mongol tribe became integrated by means of the army. Under this new system, all members of the tribe -- regardless of age or gender -- had to perform a certain amount of public service. If they could not serve in the military, they were obliged to give the equivalent of one day of work per week for public projects and service to the khan. This included caring for the warriors' herds, gathering dung for fuel, cooking, making felt, repairing weapons, or even singing and entertaining the troops. In the new organization, all people belonged to the same bone. Temujin the boy, who had faced repeated rejections ascribed to his lower-status birth, had now abolished the distinction between [people of different ethnic status]. All of his followers were now one united people."

Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World Author: Jack Weatherford Publisher: Three Rivers Press Copyright 2004 by Jack Weatherford Pages 51-53

In Brazil, Free-Market Ideas Rise as the Economy Falls - Antony P. Mueller (Mises Daily)

In Brazil, Free-Market Ideas Rise as the Economy Falls
Antony P. Mueller
Mises Daily, October 5, 2015
 
The Mises Institute spoke with Associated Scholar Antony Mueller last week about recent economic and ideological trends in Brazil. Prof. Mueller teaches economics at Federal University of Sergipe (UFS) in Brazil.

Mises Institute: For those of us not in Brazil, it is hard to interpret the commentary on Brazil’s economy right now. Brazil’s debt was recently reduced to junk status, and we can see that Brazil’s economy is not doing well. But how severe is the crisis?

Antony Mueller: Part of the explanation is that for a large part of the population and for the government itself, the crisis came as a shock. At first, the Brazilian government ignored the coming of the crisis and when it arrived, the government ignored its existence.

Imagine Brazil like a family with a lot of inherited wealth that spends as if there were no tomorrow. Yet someday this family wakes up to the fact that its wealth has been squandered and its financial accounts are in the red. The government did not recognize that the boom would be temporary. The Brazilian economy began to sputter as commodity prices fell and the demand from China decreased. Yet in order to adapt to the new situation and cut expenditures, the Brazilian government spent even more.

Incumbent President Dilma Rousseff from the Workers Party, which has been in power since 2003, won a second term in 2014 with a campaign that deceived the population about the true state of the economy. The government implemented a series of cheap financial tricks such as delaying the rise of the prices for fuel and electricity and of other items in the large list of administered prices.

After the election, hell broke loose and the true state of the economy became visible for the broad public. The popularity of the president began to fall to single-digit approval ratings. The crisis is serious in itself, yet its psychological impact becomes more severe because of the shock of disillusion. In part, this shock also applies to foreign observers and investors who bought into government propaganda or based their outlook on the projections of the International Monetary Fund whose prognosis in 2013 said that Brazil would maintain economic growth rates of at least over 4 percent for each of the years to come up to 2018.

MI: Ambrose Evans-Pritchard is writing off Brazil as if it’s a total disaster area, and he quotes one observer who says “things will get much worse before they get better.” Is this true, and if so, what are the obstacles to improvement?

AM: Evans-Pritchard’s remarks reflect the consensus among foreign observers and there is indeed little doubt that the crisis will deteriorate before it gets better. Even worse, the recuperation could take much longer than is generally assumed. The reason for a pessimistic outlook comes from the fact that the crisis is not only economic, but also political in character. Not only members of the present government, but also figures of the opposition parties are under investigation about massive corruption linked to the major Brazilian oil company Petrobras. There is much frustration in the country because there is no promising alternative in sight.

MI: Assuming we are looking at real declines in standards of living, how long will it take the country to get back to where it was at the height of the boom?

AM: This is a difficult question for a specific answer. So let me answer in a more fundamental way. Brazil’s economic development has been on a roller coaster ride for centuries. Phases of extraordinary booms were followed by long periods of busts and stagnation.

In the second half of the twentieth century, the boom of the 1950s, with the promise that Brazil would achieve growth and development of “fifty years in five years” ended in economic disaster and the military dictatorship that lasted from 1964 to 1985, which in turn ended with Brazil’s catastrophic foreign debt crisis. It took a “lost decade” for the country to recuperate.

The 1990s saw a series of reforms that put the country back on the track. In 2003, when the newly elected president, Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva from the Workers Party took over the government, the economy was already on a growth path. Then came the commodity boom with a seemingly insatiable appetite for Brazilian natural and agricultural products. Yet, instead of using the good times that filled the coffers of the Brazilian treasury to carry out highly necessary reforms, the Labor government pursued a populist policy of generous social spending, particularly for the poor parts of the population.

Now, these achievements of reducing poverty and inequality have come under threat because of the lack of financial funds. This means that Brazil must face not only an economic and a political crisis, but also a social crisis. The confluence of such a triple crisis increases the risks that any one of them gets worse because each individual crisis affects negatively the other crises. The consequential chain from the economic to the political and from there to the social crisis then goes into reverse and the social crisis worsens the outlook to get out of the political and the economic crisis.

MI: Brazil was a big part of the BRICS effort to create a group of up-and-coming economies that could rival the big economies like the US and Germany. Is that idea totally dead, or is the demise of BRICS overstated?

AM: The BRICS never managed to operate as a coherent group. Now, that not only Brazil is in crisis, but also Russia, and that China is in troubled waters, the outlook for the BRICS as a group of playing a major role in global affairs has diminished even more.

It is similar with MERCOSUL, the common market project in South America. Instead of achieving free exchange, trade conflicts are on the rise and not a single supranational institution has become effective. From my observations of Latin America and of Brazil in particular, I conclude that there are still vast mental and ideological barriers in place that work against sustained prosperity. The ideological dominance of statism, socialism, and interventionism is present in every layer of the Brazilian society — not only in politics or academia, but also in the business community itself.

Bureaucracy is a nightmare without end. Taxation is high and brings little return. The public educational system is in shambles. The legal system is unable to cope with an enormous backlog of unresolved cases, while at the same time, judges and other legal authorities enjoy grandiose privileges. Salaries in the judiciary are astronomical compared to what the average person or the poorer parts of the Brazilian society earn.

The public sector in general is extremely inefficient and is an El Dorado of rent-seekers. I do not expect that any of these obstacles will be resolved in the coming years. I fear that it is not much different in some other BRICS countries. They are all stuck in the “middle income trap,” as they are apparently unable to change from a statist to a free market system. There are many vested interests in place, in both politics and in established business, preventing change from state capitalism to an entrepreneurial capitalism. Only based on a fundamental change of ideology in favor of markets and individual and entrepreneurial liberty, will countries like Brazil gain long-term prosperity. I would also say that the same holds for China and the other members of the BRICS and emerging markets in general.

MI: Ideologically, is there any hope of a shift in Brazilian ideology? Some in the US media have featured libertarian free market groups in Brazil and suggested there is a change going on. Do you see any of that?

AM: Well, there is hope, yet it is a long way down the road. The Brazilian libertarian movement is gaining strength, particularly among students and young people in general. In fact, the spread of libertarian ideas among young Brazilians is amazing. The Brazilian Mises Institute is overwhelmed by visits to its site and the Institute’s events are grandiose. There is much good will, high hopes, a lot of serious dedication and extreme diligence at work in the libertarian movement of Brazil. If this trend continues, the walls that surround the established ideology will finally crumble. Anybody with an alert mind must see that statism has failed; that the ideas of socialism and interventionism are sterile and that they produce mainly frustration, stagnation, and crises. The libertarian movement in Brazil is the new avant-garde; its members are the true “progressives.”

The modern electronic media help to accelerate their ascendancy to influence and recognition. The current crisis will be a further wake-up call for young people to recognize that it is their future which is at stake if Brazil should continue in its old ways. With ever more young people joining the libertarian movement, I am sure that sometime in the future a critical mass will be reached and things will change.

Documentario: "Aide-Memoire: caminhos da diplomacia brasileira" - Jon Tob Azulay

Encontra-se disponível no YouTube o documentário

Aide-Mémoire: caminhos da diplomacia brasileira

feito pelo cineasta Jon Tob Azulay para a Funag.

Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5nP1IMIG5Ms&app=desktop
Aide-Mémoire: Caminhos da Diplomacia Brasileira (1997)

Publicado em 1 de jul de 2015

FUNAG - Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão
Diretor: Jon Tob Azulay
Duração: 52 min.

Minha opinião: aceitável para quem conhece pouco da história política do país e a de sua política exterior, mas um pouco elementar para quem já tem algum conhecimento nessas áreas.
O mais interessante são os depoimentos de personagens participantes da diplomacia -- mas cujas avaliações caberia tomar com muitas doses de sal -- e as imagens, filmes, trechos de documentários sobre fatos marcantes da vida internacional e brasileira.
Feito em 1997, ele refleta uma visão específica da diplomacia brasileira, e se fosse feito na era Lula provavelmente refletiria outras concepções.
Para guiar a preparação do documentário, os autores utilizaram basicamente três obras sobre a diplomacia brasileira:
1) Três Ensaios sobre a Diplomacia Brasileira, com textos de João Hermes Pereira de Araújo (história), Marcos Azambuja (multilateralismo) e Rubens Ricupero (desenvolvimento);
2) A Palavra do Brasil nas Nações Unidas, uma coleção de discursos do representante do Brasil na abertura do debate geral na AGNU, desde 1946, organizada pelo Embaixador Luiz Felipe Seixas Correa;
3) Imagens da Formação Territorial Brasileira (mapas), livro editado pela Fundação Odebrecht.
Interessantes as obras mas insuficientes para uma compreensão mais específica das tomadas de posição do Brasil no cenário internacional ao longo do tempo.
Em várias passagens, pelo depoimento de diversos protagonistas da diplomacia brasileira, se revelam os temas mais relevantes defendidos pelos tomadores de decisão, entre eles a luta pelo desarmamento e a demanda por uma reorganização econômica do mundo, o que também revela certa falta de realismo quanto ao mundo real.
Considerando-se que diplomatas são seres treinados pelo Estado para trabalhar no Estado, para o Estado, feitos portanto para servi-lo, fiel e exclusivamente, eles são guiados bem mais pela razão do Estado (no sentido comezinho, ou puramente burocrático da expressão) do que por uma compreensão mais acurada do mundo real e de sua base econômica; a maior parte dos burocratas-diplomatas não tem qualquer experiência do mundo empresarial, daí decorrendo certa agenda descolada das necessidades mais vinculadas ao mundo micro-econômico, que é aquele que produz riquezas, parte das quais apropriada pelo Estado para pagar seus diplomatas.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Triplex na praia: um dos subprodutos da corrupcao petralha (VEJA)

http://veja.abril.com.br/noticia/brasil/lula-e-a-dinda-do-guaruja

Lula e a Dinda do Guarujá

Brasil

A reforma do apartamento tríplex do ex-presidente — que incluiu a instalação de um elevador privativo — foi paga por uma das empreiteiras envolvidas no escândalo de corrupção da Petrobras

Por: Robson Bonin e Kalleo Coura

02/10/2015 às 21:56 - Atualizado em 03/10/2015 às 11:01

Bancar melhorias na Casa da Dinda, a residência de Fernando Collor, no Lago Norte, em Brasília, era uma das muitas maneiras de agradar ao então presidente, deposto do cargo por corrupção em 1992. A mesma tática foi e está sendo usada por empreiteiras para demonstrar afeição ao ex-presidente Lula. Em meados de 2014, depois de quase dez anos de espera, a ex-primeira-dama Marisa Letícia viajou à Praia das Astúrias, no Guarujá, para buscar as chaves do apartamento dos sonhos da família. O refúgio dos Lula da Silva no litoral é um tríplex de 297 metros quadrados. São três quartos, suíte, cinco banheiros, dependência de empregada, sala de estar, sala de TV e área de festas com sauna e piscina na cobertura. Ah, sim, para um eventual panelaço das elites, o tríplex tem varanda gourmet no 1º andar. O plano de comemorar o réveillon no imóvel foi adiado pela decisão de fazer ali uma reforma. O porcelanato e os acabamentos de gesso foram refeitos, a planta interna foi modificada para abrigar um escritório e um elevador privativo, interligando os ambientes do 1º andar com a ala dos quartos, no 2º nível, e a área de festas, na cobertura. Acompanhada de perto por dona Marisa, a obra não custou um centavo à família do ex-presidente. Do primeiro parafuso ao último azulejo, tudo foi pago pela OAS, uma das empreiteiras envolvidas no escândalo de corrupção da Petrobras.

VEJA teve acesso a documentos e a fotos (em VEJA.com) que detalham a reforma do tríplex presidencial e mostram que os serviços foram contratados pela empreiteira. O trabalho foi feito pela Tallento Inteligência em Engenharia, uma empresa conhecida no mercado por executar obras de alto padrão em prazos curtos - duas exigências dos contratantes, mas não as principais. A exigência maior era a discrição. As investigações da Lava-Jato revelariam meses depois as razões disso. Iniciada em 1º de julho de 2014, a reforma transcorreu sob medidas de segurança incomuns. A fechadura da porta de acesso era trocada toda semana. A reforma da cobertura tríplex chamou a atenção dos moradores do prédio.

"Nos dias em que eles marcavam para visitar a obra, a gente tinha de parar o trabalho e ir embora. Ninguém era autorizado a permanecer no apartamento. Só ficamos sabendo quem era o dono muito tempo depois, pelos vizinhos e funcionários do prédio, que reconheceram dona Marisa e o Lulinha (Fábio Luís Lula da Silva, o filho mais velho do ex-presidente)", disse a VEJA um dos profissionais que colaboraram na reforma. O ex-presidente Lula esteve no tríplex algumas vezes. O segredo durou até dezembro do ano passado, quando o jornal O Globo publicou detalhes de uma investigação sobre a Cooperativa Habitacional dos Bancários de São Paulo (Bancoop). Controlada pelo PT, a entidade faliu e deixou 3 000 famílias sem receber seus imóveis. O tríplex destinado a Lula, com uma das melhores vistas do Guarujá, avaliado em 2,5 milhões de reais, foi um dos poucos a ser entregues. VEJA revelou em abril passado que, depois de um pedido feito pelo próprio ex-presidente a Léo Pinheiro, executivo da OAS, seu amigo, preso na Operação Lava-Jato, a OAS assumiu a construção do prédio, que estava parada. Além de Lula, parentes do tesoureiro petista João Vaccari Neto, também preso, sindicalistas e familiares de Rosemary Noronha, a amiga íntima de Lula, foram contemplados com apartamentos em outros prédios da Bancoop assumidos pela OAS. Revelado o privilégio, e diante da repercussão negativa, desapareceu o entusiasmo da família Lula pelo imóvel.

O ex-presidente passou a negar ser o proprietário do tríplex, embora admita que sua esposa seja dona das cotas de um apartamento no mesmo edifício, o Solaris. Não é mentira. É apenas uma meia verdade. No papel, o tríplex ainda está em nome da OAS. Funcionários da empreiteira procurados por VEJA confirmaram que o apartamento pertence aos Lula da Silva, está parcialmente mobiliado, permanece fechado e está à venda por 2,3 milhões de reais. "Para entrar aí, só com autorização da cúpula da construtora. Só eles e o Lula têm a chave", disse a VEJA, na semana passada, um funcionário da própria OAS.

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