Law, Peace and Status: Brazil’s Call for Sovereign Equality During the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907 - Lars Janssen

Research Article

Law, Peace and Status: Brazil’s Call for Sovereign Equality During the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907

Lars Janssen

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/07075332.2024.2345226 

Abstract

(US$ 53, for full access to the article: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07075332.2024.2345226?scroll=top&needAccess=true )

This article reevaluates Brazil’s role in the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907, challenging prevailing narratives about Brazil’s call for sovereign equality. By combining theoretical insights on international status with an extensive examination of primary sources, such as diplomatic communications and conference proceedings, I show that Brazil’s call for sovereign equality was a strategic response to status struggles rather than an ideological commitment. The call enabled Brazil’s leading delegate, Rui Barbosa, to gain leadership over a Latin American multilateral coalition against a Great Power proposition to create a hierarchical international court. The leadership not only bolstered Brazil’s position as a regional power, but paradoxically, also strengthened the relations with its main opponent during the conference, the US. As such, this study both contributes to our understanding of Latin American historical diplomacy and underscores the nuanced dynamics of non-Great Powers in international politics.

Notes

1 Proceedings, Mtg., First Comission, James Brown Scott, The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conference, vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1921), 148; Gerry Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 132–47.

2 James Brown Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907: A Series of Lectures Delivered before the Johns Hopkins University in the Year 1908, Volume 1 – Conferences (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1909), 169.

3 Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 24–6; Martha Finnemore and Michelle Jurkovich, ‘Getting a Seat at the Table: The Origins of Universal Participation and Modern Multilateral Conferences’, Global Governance, xx (2014), 361–73; Max Paul Friedman and Tom Long, ‘Soft Balancing in the Americas: Latin American Opposition to U.S. Intervention, 1898-1936’, International Security, xl (2015), 120–156; Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States, 132–47; Arnulf Becker Lorca, Mestizo International Law: A Global Intellectual History 1842-1933 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 143–199.

4 My translations: ‘visionário’, ‘pilares do multilateralismo contemporâneo’. Celso Amorim, ‘A Diplomacia Multilateral do Brasil: Um Tribute a Rui Barbosa’, (Lecture, Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2007), 20; Fundação Casa de Rui Barbosa, ‘Águia de Haia’, http://www.casaruibarbosa.gov.br/interna.php?ID_S=298&ID_M=762; Isadora Loreto da Silveira, Laura de Castro Quaglia, Nathassia Arrúa de Oliveira Cardoso, Taiane de Bittencourt, ‘A Inauguração do Multilateralismo na Política Externa Brasileira: A Participação do Brasil na 2ª Conferência de Paz de Haia’, Fronteira, ix (2010), 29–46.

5 E. Bradford Burns, The Unwritten Alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966); Amado Luiz Cervo and Clodoaldo Bueno, História da Política Exterior do Brasil (Brasília: Editora UnB, 2002), 192–215; Luís Viana Filho, A Vida de Rui Barbosa (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1949), 331–53; Christiane Vieira Laidler, A Segunda Conferência da Paz de Haia, 1907: o Brasil e o Sistema Internacional no Início do Século XX (Rio de Janeiro: Edições Casa de Rui Barbosa, 2010); Rejane Magalhães. ‘Presença de Rui Barbosa em Haia’, Fundação Casa de Rui Barbosa (2007), 1–14; Antônio Celso Alves Pereira, ‘O Barão do Rio Branco e a II Conferência da Paz’ in Manoel Gomes Pereira (ed), Barão do Rio Branco: 100 Anos de Memória, (Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2012), 389–422; Joseph Smith, Unequal Giants: Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Brazil, 1889–1930 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991).

6 Carsten-Andreas Schulz, ‘Accidental Activists: Latin American Status-Seeking at The Hague’, International Studies Quarterly, lxi (2017), 612–22.

7 Ibid., 612, 619.

8 Edward Keene, ‘The Standard of “Civilisation”, the Expansion Thesis and the 19^th-Century International Social Space’, Millennium, xlii (2014), 651–73; Jonathan Renshon, ‘Status Deficits and War’, International Organization lxx (2016), 513–50; William C. Wohlforth, Benjamin de Carvalho, Halvard Leira & Iver B. Neumann, ‘Moral Authority and Status in International Relations: Good States and the Social Dimension of Status Seeking’, Review of International Studies, xliv (2017), 526–46.

9 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 31.

10 Carsten Holbraad, Middle Powers in International Politics (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), 75–91.

11 For an explanation of the shortcomings of the material approach, see Marina G. Duque, ‘Recognizing International Status: A Relational Approach’, International Studies Quarterly, lxii (2018), 578–80.

12 T. V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson and William C. Wohlforth, Status in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 7–10. Also see: Duque, ‘Recognizing International Status’, 577–92; Keene, ‘The Standard of “Civilisation”’, 651–73; Renshon, ‘Status Deficits and War’, 513–50; Ann E. Towns, ‘Norms and Social Hierarchies: Understanding the International Policy Diffusion from Below’, International Organization lxvi (2012), 179–209.

13 Renshon, ‘Status Deficits and War’, 529; Duque, ‘Recognizing International Status’, 588; David, A. Lake, ‘Status, Authority, and the End of the American Century’ in T.V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson and William C. Wohlforth (eds), Status in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 251.

14 Renshon, ‘Status Deficits and War’, 529; Keene, ‘The Standard of “Civilisation”’, 664.

15 Paul, Larson and Wohlforth, Status in World Politics, 18–19.

16 Renshon, ‘Status Deficits and War’, 526.

17 Wohlforth et al., ‘Moral Authority and Status’, 526–546.

18 Ibid, 530.

19 Adam Chapnick, ‘The Middle Power’, Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, vii (1999), 74–76; Bernard Jr. Prosper, ‘Canada and Human Security: From the Axworthy Doctrine to Middle Power Internationalism’, American Review of Canadian Studies, xxxvi (2006), 233–261; Wohlforth et al., ‘Moral Authority and Status in International Relations’, 526–546.

20 Andrew Hurrell, ‘Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order, What Space for would be Great Powers?’, International Affairs, lxxxii (2006), 12–15; Eduard Jordaan, ‘The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations: Distinguishing between Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers’, Politikon, xxx (2003), 165–81; Wohlfort et al. ‘Moral Authority and Status’, 534–5.

21 Hurrell, ‘Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order’, 11.

22 Charalampos Efstathopoulos, ‘Leadership in the WTO: Brazil, India and the Doha Development Agenda’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, xxv (2012), 269–93; Stefan Schirm, ‘Leaders in Need of Followers: Emerging Powers in Global Governance’, European Journal of International Relations, xvi (2010), 197–221.

23 Sandra Destradi, ‘Regional Powers and their Strategies: Empire, Hegemony, and Leadership’, Review of International Studies, xxxvi (2010), 903–30; Hurrell, ‘Would be Great Powers?’, 8-9; Detlef Nolte, ‘How to Compare Regional Powers: Analytical Concepts and Research Topics,’ Review of International Studies, xxxvi (2010), 881–901.

24 Efstathopoulos, ‘Leadership in the WTO’, 269-293; Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, ‘Global Power Shifts and South Africa’s Southern Agenda: Caught between African Solidarity and Regional Leadership’ in Günther Taube (ed), Power Shifts and Global Governance: Challenges from South and North (London: Anthem Press, 2011), 141–52.

25 Jeremy Adelman, ‘An Age of Imperial Revolutions ‘,The American Historical Review, cxiii (2008), 337; Schulz, ‘Civilisation, Barbarism and the Making of Latin America’s Place in 19th-Century International Society’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, xlii, iii (2014), 849–51.

26 Liliana Obregón. 2006. ‘Between Civilisation and Barbarism: Creole Interventions in International Law’, Third World Quarterly, xxvii, v (2006), 822–3.

27 Lilia Moritz Schwarcz, ‘A Mestizo and Tropical Country: The Creation of the Official Image of Independent Brazil’, European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, lxxx (2006), 28.

28 Leslie Bethell, ‘O Brasil no Mundo’, in Alfredo Gomes, Leslie Bethel, Lilia Moritz Schwarcs, Luiz Aranha Côrrea do Lago, Gustavo Franco and José Murilo de Carvalho (eds), História do Brasil nação: 1808-2010 (Rio de Janeiro: Academia Brasileira de Letras, 2012), 153–57.

29 Mary Wilhelmine Williams, Dom Pedro the Magnanimous: Second Emperor of Brazil (Abingdon: Frank Cas & Co. Ltd., 1996), 141–56.

30 Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão. n.d., ‘Embaixadas do Brasil Histórico dos chefes de legações e embaixadas’, www.funag.gov.br/postos/.

31 Reşat Bayer, 2006. ‘Diplomatic Exchange Data set, v2006.1’, http://correlatesofwar.org.

32 Schulz, ‘Latin America’s Place in 19th-Century International Society’, 850–1.

33 Bethell, ‘O Brasil no Mundo’, 131–49.

34 Boris Fausto and Sergio Fausto, A Concise History of Brazil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 144–56.

35 Pereira, ‘II Conferência da Paz’, 391.

36 Amado Luiz Cervo and Clodoaldo Bueno, História da Política Exterior do Brasil (Brasília: Editora UnB, 2002), 167–72.

37 Carlos Henrique Cardim, ‘A Primeira Conferência de Paz da Haia, 1899: Por que a Rússia?’, in Manoel Gomes Pereira (ed), Barão do Rio Branco: 100 Anos de Memória (Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2012): 368–75.

38 Bayer, ‘Diplomatic Exchange Data set’.

39 Luiz Felipe de Seixas Corrêa, ‘O Barão do Rio Branco chefe de missão: Liverpool, Washington, Berna e Berlim’, in Manoel Gomes Pereira (ed), O Barão do Rio Branco: 100 Anos de Memória (Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2012), 31–56.

40 Alvaro Lins, Rio Branco: Biografia Pessoal e História Política (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1965), 259–60.

41 ‘Não venho servir a um partido político: venho servir ao nosso Brasil, que todos desejamos ver unido, íntegro, forte e respeitado’. Rio Branco, ‘No Clube Naval, 1 Dec. 1902, Manoel Gomes Pereira (ed), Obras do Rio Branco IX, Discursos(Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2012), 108.

42 Tânia Maria Pechir Gomes Manzur, ‘Opinião Pública e Política Externa do Brasil do Império a João Goulart: Um Balanço Historiográfico’, Revista Brasileira Política Internacional, xlii (1999), 42–43.

43 Ibid.

44 Laidler, A Segunda Conferência da Paz de Haia, 105; Smith, The United States and Latin America, 67.

45 Smith, The United States and Latin America, 67.

46 Juan Pablo Scarfi, ‘In the Name of the Americas: The Pan-American Redefinition of the Monroe Doctrine and the Emerging Language of American International Law in the Western Hemisphere, 1898-1933’, Diplomatic History, xv, ii (2016), 189–218; Friedman and Long, ‘Soft Balancing in the Americas’.

47 Smith, The United States and Latin America, 69.

48 Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention, 24-51; Finnemore and Jurkovich, ‘Getting a Seat at the Table’; Friedman and Long, ‘Soft Balancing in the Americas’.

49 Roberto Schwarz, ‘Misplaced Ideas: Literature and Society in Late Nineteenth-Century Brazil’, Comparative Civilizations Review, v (1980), 1–19.

50 Burns, The Unwritten Alliance.

51 Cervo and Bueno, História da Política Exterior do Brasil, 192; Clodoaldo Bueno, ‘O Barão do Rio Branco no Itamaraty (1902-1912)’, Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, lv (2012), 173.

52 Burns, The Unwritten Alliance.

53 Ibid, 90–3.

54 Ibid, 103–8.

55 Clodoaldo Bueno, ‘O Barão do Rio Branco no Itamaraty (1902-1912)’, Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, lv (2012), 177; Smith, Unequal Giants, 53–4.

56 Laidler, A Segunda Conferência da Paz de Haia, 114–115; Pereira, ‘II Conferência da Paz’, 392–393.

57 Speech from Rio Branco to the conference, July 23, 1906, in International American Conference (3^rd: 1906: Rio de Janeiro, Brazil), Minutes, Resolutions, Documents, (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1907), 39–40.

58 Armando de Senna Bittencourt, ‘O Emprego do Poder Militar como Estratégia de Rio Branco’, in Manoel Gomes Pereira (ed), O Barão do Rio Branco: 100 Anos de Memória (Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2012), 62, 73.

59 Burns, The Unwritten Alliance, 94; Laidler, A Segunda Conferência da Paz de Haia, 128.

60 João Paulo Alsina Jr., ‘Rio Branco, Grand Strategy and Naval Power’, Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, lvii (2014) 9–28; Bueno, ‘Rio Branco no Itamaraty’, 180-1; Burns, The Unwritten Alliance, 182; Doratioto, ‘A Política Platina do Barão do Rio Branco’, 132, 140.

61 Rio Branco, speech, 27 Aug. 1906, p. 405, International American Conference, Minutes, Resolutions, Documents (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1907); Doratioto, ‘A Política Platina do Barão do Rio Branco’, 130–49.

62 Cervo and Bueno, História da Política Exterior do Brasil, 210.

63 Doratioto, ‘A Polítical Platina do Barão de Rio Branco’, 134.

64 Maartje Abbenhuis, Christopher Ernest Barber and Annalise R. Higgins, War, Peace and International Order? The Legacies of the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017); Maartje Abbenhuis, The Hague Conferences and International Politics, 1898-1915 (London: Bloomsburg Academic, 2019).Finnemore and Jurkovich, ‘Getting a Seat at the Table’.

65 Nicholas II, ‘Rescript of the Russian Emperor (1898)’, in A Series of Lectures, vol 2, J. B. Scott (ed). (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1909), 1.

66 Scott, A Series of Lectures, vol.1, 95–100.

67 Finnemore and Jurkovich, ‘Getting a Seat at the Table’, 367.

68 Pereira, ‘II Conferência da Paz’, 402.

69 Filho, A Vida De Rui Barbosa.

70 Pereira, ‘II Conferência da Paz’, 402–3.

71 ‘desejo ardente de servir ao pais.’ Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 30 March 1906, [Rio de Janeiro, Arquivo de Rui Barbosa], [Série Segunda] C[onferência da Paz em] H[aia] 2/1, fo. 1.

72 Scott, Proceedings, vol. 1, 2–15.

73 ‘Quizera saber o que ha de exacto sobre assumpto.’ Rio Branco to Joaquim Nabuco, 14 Apr. 1907, CH 2/1, fo. 14G.

74 Joaquim Nabuco to Rio Branco, 17 Apr. 1907, CH 2/1 fo. 14G.

75 Memo Nabuco to US secretary of state Elihu Root, 25 May 1907, CH 6/1, fo. 1.

76 Smith, Unequal Giants, 59.

77 Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 30 May 1907, CH 2/2, fo. 26.

78 Conference list, 27 Sept. 1907, CH 18; Filho, A Vida de Rui Barbosa, 334.

79 ‘Estamos todos seguros do brilhante exito da sua missão.’ Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 27 May 1907, CH 2/2, fo. 25.

80 ‘Article discussing the map of the Hall of Knights’, Courier de la Conférence de la Paix, 18 June 1907, 2.

81 ‘Trabalho acumula-se cresce enormemente não havendo quasi tempo estudar’. Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 29 June 1907, p. 4, CH 9, fo. 1.

82 Ibid, p. 5.

83 Proceedings, Mtg., Fo[urth] C[commission], 5 July 1907, p. 770-7, Scott, Proceedings, vol. 3.

84 Ibid, 771–2.

85 Proceedings, Mtg., FoC, 12 July, p. 808, Scott, Proceedings, vol. 3.

86 Ibid.

87 Filho, A Vida de Rui Barbosa, 338–9.

88 ‘Consideram irritante impolitico.’ Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 14 July 1907, p. 10, CH 9, fo. 1.

89 ‘Elles a abandonaram appressando-se plena sessão solicitar proposta belga dando assim nossa como for a combate.’ Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 15 July 1907, p. 10, CH 9, fo. 1.

90 Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 3 Aug. 1907, p. 22, CH 9, fo. 1.

91 Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 25 July 1907, p. 16, CH 9, fo. 1.

92 Burns, The Unwritten Alliance, 118-20; Smith, Unequal Giants, 61.

93 ‘effeito partido seria deploravel … depois tantos brilhantes trabalhos.’ Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 26 July 1907, CH 2/2 fo. 62.

94 ‘aqui quasi todas contra nós.’ Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 21 July 1907, CH 9, fo. 1.

95 Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 29 July 1907, CH 22, fo. 65.

96 Roque Sáenz Peña, La Republica Argentina en la Segunda Conferencia International de la Paz (Buenos Aires: Imprenta y Litografia A. Pech. Cerrito 55, 1908), 34–7.

97 Proceedings, Mtg., FC: First Subcommission, 1 Aug. 1907, p. 312–31, Scott, Proceedings, vol. 2.

98 Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 3 Aug. 1907, p. 22, CH 9 fo. 1.

99 ‘amargo humiliação.’ Ibid.

100 Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 5 Aug. 1907, CH 2/3 fo. 71.

101 Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 8 Aug. 1907, CH 2/3 fo. 77; Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 10 Aug. 1907, CH 2/3 fo. 78; Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 16 Aug. 1907, CH 2/3 fo. 90.

102 ‘terem Brazil Argentina Chile cada um seu arbitro’, Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 12 Aug. 1907, CH 2/3 fo. 81.

103 Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 15 Aug. 1907, CH 2/3 fo. 87.

104 Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 16 Aug. 1907, CH 2/3 fo. 74.

105 Proceedings, Mtg., FC: Committee B, 17 Aug. 1907, p. 609-13, Scott, Proceedings, vol. 2.

106 Ibid, 610.

107 Ibid.

108 Proceedings, FC: Second Subcommission, 4 July 1907, p. 783-786, Scott, Proceedings, vol. 2.

109 Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 11 Aug. 1907, p. 30, CH 9 fo. 1.

110 Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 14 Aug. 1907, CH 2/3 fo. 86.

111 Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 16 Aug. 1907, CH 2/3 fo. 90.

112 Proceedings, FC, 10 Sept. 1907, p. 11-13, Scott, Proceedings, vol. 2.

113 ‘Não sei como obter supplente quando americanos recusam … Tenho dito vocencia bastante para habilital-o jugar realidade nossa posição aqui quasi isolados entre estados e americanos e impotentes contra predominio absoluto … potencias’ Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 16 Aug. 1907, p. 35, CH 9 fo. 1.

114 Ibid.

115 ‘Nenhum representante por mais habil e competente que seja mesmo representante um paiz forte pode estar certo de conseguir tudo quanto deseja ou seu paiz deseja.’ Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 17 Aug. 1907, CH 2/6 fo. 235.

116 ‘enthusiasmo pelo brilho vocencia.’ Ibid.

117 Pereira, ‘O Barão do Rio Branco e a II Conferência da Paz’, 411.

118 Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 17 Aug. 1907, p. 37, CH 9 fo. 1.

119 Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 24 Aug. 1907, CH 2/3 fo. 106.

120 Proceedings, FC: First Subcommission, 20 Aug. 1907, p. 619-22, Scott, Proceedings, vol. 2.

121 Ibid., 623–30.

122 ‘Nossa autoridade moral cresce todos dias.’ Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 23 Aug. 1907, p. 44, CH 9 fo. 1.

123 Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 23 Aug. 1907, p. 47, CH 9 fo. 1; Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 26 Aug. 1907, p. 49-50, CH 9 fo. 1; Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 23 Aug. 1907, CH 2/3 fo. 102; Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 26 Aug. 1907, CH 2/3 fo. 111; Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 27 Aug. 1907, CH 2/3 fo. 115.

124 Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 23 Aug. 1907, p. 45, CH 9 fo. 1.

125 Ibid.

126 Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 4 Sept. 1907, p. 61-2, CH 9 fo. 1.

127 Proceedings, FC: Committee of Examination, 17 Aug. 1907, p. 827, Scott, Proceedings, vol. 2.

128 Ibid.

129 ‘Esteva levantou-se dizendo adheria completamente nossa attitude.’ Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 18 Aug. 1907, CH 9 fo. 1.

130 ‘Abandonalos alem de deslealdade seria transferir-lhes vantagem posição que hoje occupamos.’ Rui Barbosa to Rio Branco, 31 Aug. 1907, p. 56, CH 9 fo. 1.

131 Schulz, ‘Accidental Activists’, 613.

132 Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 19 Sept. 1907, CH 2/4 fo. 150.

133 William Hull, The Two Hague Conferences and their Contributions to International Law (New York: Kraus, 1908), 423–5; Scott, A Series of Lectures, vol.1, 169.

134 Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 31 Aug. 1907, CH 2/4 fo. 122; Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 31 Aug. 1907, CH 2/4 fo. 123.

135 ‘Grande pezar que nos causa a dissidencia em que infelizmente nos achamos.’ Rio Branco to Rui Barbosa, 31 Aug. 1907, CH 2/4 fo. 123.

136 ‘Article Discussing the Brazilian Banquet’, Courier de la Conférence de la Paix, 25 Aug. 1907, 3; Filho, A Vida de Rui Barbosa, 340.

137 ‘Les Sept Sages de la Conférence’, Courier de la Conférence de la Paix, 7 Sept. 1907, 1.

138 Schulz, ‘Accidental Activists’, 619–20.

139 Ibid., Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States, 162.

140 Burns, The Unwritten Alliance; Smith, Unequal Giants.

141 Proceedings, Mtg., FC: Committee B, 17 Aug. 1907, p. 613, Scott, Proceedings, vol. 2.

142 Proceedings, FC: Second Subcommission, 4 July 1907, p. 1086, Scott, Proceedings, vol. 2.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Lars Janssen

At the moment of publication, Lars Janssen is a PhD-candidate at Utrecht University. His research focuses on diplomatic history, and specifically the roles of, and the interactions with, Latin American actors in the development of the international order.

AL CAPONE, um nome apropriado para examinar crime e corrupção na América Latina - Universidade Harvard

America Latina Crime and Policy Network 

(AL CAPONE).

Nada poderia ser mais apropriado para caracterizar a América Latina.

The David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies (DRCLAS) at Harvard University and the America Latina Crime and Policy Network (AL CAPONE) –a network of the Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association (LACEA) —are pleased to announce the 13th Annual Meeting of AL CAPONE, to be held at Harvard University on May 10 and 11, 2024.

Topics for this year's conference include mafia, youth crime prevention, economic shocks and crimes, drugs, police behaviour and criminal justice in Latin America and the Caribbean.

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Book review: Ruth Elizabeth Gordon: Development Disrupted: The Global South in the Twenty-First Century, by Fathimath Musthaq (H-Diplo)

Impossível fazer uma análise coerente, adequada, significativa, de duas coisas inexistentes: um Global South, que é um conceito fantasioso, não uma realidade, e UMA economia desse Sul Global, coisa absolutamente sem sentido. Uma terceira coisa totalmente sem sentido é pretender falar de um "processo de desenvolvimento" – o que é isso, para uma multitude de 150 países? – em "ruptura", ou interrompido NO SÉCULO XXI, que está apenas começando.

Loucuras acadêmicas acontecem. Essa pode ser uma delas.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

H-Diplo: New posted content

Musthaq on Gordon, 'Development Disrupted: The Global South in the Twenty-First Century' [Review]

H-Net Reviews

Gordon, Ruth Elizabeth.  Development Disrupted: The Global South in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022. 254 pp. $105.00 (cloth), ISBN 9781108424172.$27.99 (paper), ISBN 9781108439527.

Reviewed by Fathimath Musthaq (Reed College)
Published on H-Diplo (May, 2024)
Commissioned by Seth Offenbach (Bronx Community College, The City University of New York)

Printable Version: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showpdf.php?id=59722

September 11, 2023, marked the fiftieth anniversary of the CIA-assisted overthrow of Chile’s democratically elected socialist president, Salvador Allende. In his short time as president, Allende worked tirelessly to secure technology sovereignty for Chile, something that countries of the Global South continue to struggle with to this day. Allende was an ardent advocate of the 1969 Andean Pact, signed between Colombia, Ecuador, Chile, Peru, and Bolivia, to create a free trade bloc to collectively pursue industrialization. Central to the pact was finding ways to access technology more affordably, by curbing the influence of multinational corporations and fostering the domestic market. Inspired by the Santiago School of Technology’s thesis that countries needed technology sovereignty for realizing growth, Allende nationalized the State Development Corporation (Corfo) that housed the powerful Institute for Technological Research, tasked with assisting private firms and government ministries in acquiring technological capacity.[1] During this time, Allende launched the National Electronics Company whose goal was to build a semiconductor plant. While these plans unfortunately never came to fruition, the necessity of technology sovereignty to development became well established in the development discourse coming out of Latin America during this time.

Ruth Elizabeth Gordon’s Development Disrupted: The Global South in the Twenty-First Century echoes the centrality of technology to development but approaches the issue from a less state-oriented and more market-based perspective. Gordon begins with the claim that “development is ripe for disruption,” thanks to rapidly advancing technology. The book seeks to uncover these disruptions, which Gordon argues is “a very good news story, not perfect by any means, but progress nonetheless” (p. 1). People in the Global South are configuring new ways to have basic needs met, thanks to technology: digital wallets provide payments systems for unbanked masses, while online platforms provide the latest market prices for rural farmers, allowing them to obtain better prices, and digital platforms allow teachers and students to acquire knowledge and training from afar. As a self-avowed “techno optimist,” Gordon celebrates the proliferation of technology-aided solutions to long-standing development challenges (p. ix).

Gordon begins the book by providing an account of the history of development, starting in the 1940s with US president Harry Truman’s IV Point Program. In chapter 1, she introduces the reader to various international actors and ideologies that have shaped development over the decades, which she dubs as cycles of “conventional wisdom” (p. 8). In chapter 2, she juxtaposes development models espoused by international financial institutions (IFIs), primarily the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, to the East Asian developmental (EAD) state, with the conclusion that the latter was more successful in facilitating development, thanks to active industrial and financial policy and competent bureaucracies, among other things. The account in this first part of the book does not touch on the contentious issue of technology transfer, surprising given that from the perspective of the Global South, technology transfer was a longstanding issue in the period covered here, for example, in the Andean Pact mentioned above and in the 1974 New International Economic Order that explicitly called on rich Global North countries to share technology with the Global South.[2] Similarly, in the discussion of EAD states, the centrality of technology-management to the success of the development state, through the acquisition of foreign licenses and investment in research and development, is overlooked.[3] Locating the failures and shortcomings of existing development models to resolve the sticky issue of technology transfer would have nicely motivated the rest of the chapters.

Part 2 of the book is where Gordon begins to engage with the concept of “disruption.” Interestingly, however, the disruption she alludes to here is not technological but more cultural and ideological. In chapter 3, she introduces the actors that are disrupting development: middle-income Global South countries, of which China is treated as a special case, and philanthropic organizations and donors primarily based in the West. Along with a vast and burgeoning literature, Gordon details how Chinese lending differs from IFI lending, the subject of chapter 4. Whereas IFIs turned to “soft infrastructure such as free market reforms, good governance, human rights, and other matters” in the 1990s, Chinese lending has primarily focused on large infrastructure projects and resource extraction, rendering them appealing partners to many African countries seeking such investment (p. 91). China, along with other Global South lenders, Gordon argues, embraces a lending model built on horizontal ties and partnerships, which is, in turn, informed by “mutual benefit, non-interference, and respect for the sovereignty of their partners/recipients” (p. 83).

Chapter 5 introduces the second disrupter: private Western donors that operate considerably differently from traditional donors. Identifying this new trend as “philanthrocapitalism,” Gordon contends that while there are many criticisms to be made of philanthrocapitalism (for example, lack of accountability, absence of transparency), she is more interested in articulating its “positive impacts” since the traditional development model is in severe need of disruption (pp. 110, 111). For Gordon, what is exciting about the turn to philanthrocapitalism is how it has energized a range of financial flows to yield various blended finance instruments, such as public private partnerships that hold the promise of meeting basic needs in the Global South. She agrees with proponents of such models who assume a double coincidence between “business principles” and “social transformation” (p. 110). The optimism Gordon espouses, however, seems unwarranted in light of the growing literature in political economy that identifies “de-risking” as a poor development strategy, given that it prioritizes profit incentives over social purpose in the execution of development projects. Gordon highlights some of these concerns in the chapter but appears to subordinate these to the benefits provided by an increase in financial flows (in her words, “more resources”) to the Global South (p. 122). This argument would have benefited from a demonstration of more specific instances where philanthropists take on risky projects avoided by governments. In practice, what we tend to see more often, under a “de-risking” logic, is states taking on various risks associated with development projects in order to entice investors, which carries with it fiscal implications and equity concerns.[4]

Gordon’s optimism extends not only to new initiatives inaugurated under the banner of philanthrocapitalism but also to the capitalists themselves. One of the running assumptions in this chapter is that tech billionaires can innovate (or “disrupt”) philanthropy just as well as they innovate for the market. The book includes a very short case study of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, which, Gordon claims, has “literally disrupted the [global health] space” (p. 122). She notes generous funding, new technologies, and new methods of service delivery as underpinning this disruption. However, the application of the idea is cursory, and the role of technology in the disruption process is not examined.

Part 3 is the heart of the book, which is why it is unfortunate that it comes so late. Here is the first time Gordon provides a definition of “disruption,” and only in a footnote (p. 149n1). For a concept that appears in the title and in the introduction as a central idea, it would have been helpful to the reader if there was a more complete discussion of this concept much sooner. Some of the key markers of “disruption” are that products or services are offered to “non-consumers” (for example, the unbanked) even if the product is a lesser version of the more established version, but because it is also more adaptable and simpler, it triggers a migration from incumbents to the disruptive innovator. Before describing her case studies, in chapter 6, Gordon provides a sweeping account of how technology shapes development through its exponential rate of progress, digitization, and leapfrogging in a so-called Fourth Industrial Revolution. In chapter 7, she summons evidence for technology-led disruptions in finance, education, agriculture, and health care. Throughout, she centers the power of the mobile phone as a platform for information sharing and enabling basic service delivery.

The book first outlines the case of M-Pesa, which was introduced in Kenya in 2007 to provide banking services to a largely unbanked population. Its rapid success was evident in the fact that within 2.5 years of its inauguration, the platform enrolled 8.5 million users and registered 3.7 billion US dollars in transactions (p. 158). She also identifies mobile learning through Text2Teaching (first inaugurated in the Philippines), MoMaths (in South Africa), and Dr. Maths projects (in South Africa) as effective teaching and learning models. The assessment of these platforms, however, seems prematurely optimistic. Since the COVID-19 pandemic, numerous studies have documented an association between remote learning and decline in student learning and academic behavior.[5] While remote learning may be the only option for some in the Global South, it is important to note the downsides of remote learning so that a vision of collective learning can be defended, nurtured, and foregrounded, and not sidelined because mobile learning is more cost effective and easier to implement.

Chapter 8 is different from the rest of the book. It is a stand-alone chapter on climate change, it is mostly descriptive, and it covers some elementary facts about climate change and international coordination over climate action. A few pages at the end of the chapter touch on the ideas of “environmental leapfrogging” and “energy leapfrogging,” noting the importance of China and India moving from a simple model of technology transfer to strengthening domestic innovative capacities to make technologies more context suitable (pp. 209, 210).

One of the defining aspects of the book is how it (re)conceives development. Gordon espouses a development that is centered on the delivery of basic needs, an approach that in many ways resonates with Amartya Sen’s “capabilities approach” (in Development as Freedom [rep. ed. 2000]) that places emphasis on human well-being. The subject of Gordon’s book, however, is more about how we get there, which involves technology developed in local contexts. In the final chapter of the book, Gordon acknowledges a major issue with pursuing technology-led development: jobless growth. For countries in the Global South, premature deindustrialization, thanks to technology, “removes a rung in the development ladder” (p. 229). But she remains optimistic, positing the possibility that Global South countries could potentially “leapfrog” over industrialization. Local innovators that respond to local problems, she portends, may be one way to do this. She writes, “Rather than depending on the robust R&D that produces the state of the art technology that is found in Global North environs, emerging countries must ... focus on solving practical problems” where the solutions may be “quite basic” (p. 233). In fact, in her own words, “one of the most exciting things about the technological revolution” in the Global South is “that it is bottom-up rather than top-down, thus returning power to local entities, individuals, and entrepreneurs” (p. 235).

While offering a unique view of development, Gordon’s conception of development through technology carries with it problematic assumptions. First is the assumption that a profit-oriented private sector can be a long-term solution to development woes. Meeting basic needs is certainly part of the development agenda, but for many in the Global South, development means more than that. According to 1950s Latin American structuralists, it is about creating the conditions for the delivery of basic and complex needs on a long-term sustainable basis. In other words, development has to be about building the capacities of countries to carve out autonomous development paths by reducing dependence on external sources. As a result, the state often plays an important role, even if that role changes over time. Gordon’s account in the second half of the book is largely silent on the role of the state, which is surprising since she champions EAD states in the first part of the book. Private tech-led solutions also introduce precariousness to basic service delivery. For example, with privately delivered services such as M-Pesa, there is no guarantee that terms of service will evolve over time to deliver a better, more accessible product. One thing we have observed with platforms like Uber is that once they acquire a considerable market share, prices go up.[6] Reliance on the private sector for basic service delivery makes uncertain the continuity of the service and its accessibility.

Second, the assumption that locally produced technologies can address development issues at the needed scale seems premature. Throughout the book, there is little acknowledgment of the contentious geopolitics around technology production and access. In the 1950s, Latin American structuralists identified lack of technological capacity as a major impediment to autonomous industrialization.[7] Technological capacity itself is determined, as Evgeny Morozov argues, by the history of geoeconomic and geopolitical struggles, that is, how much power and sovereignty a country possesses in the global economy.[8] Without technology sovereignty, southern economies face falling terms of trade and endure unequal exchange. The dependency school posited that the South’s technological dependence reinforced the development of the center at the expense of the periphery. The case of Indonesia, recently highlighted in the scholarship as a success story, is instructive. After China and India, Indonesia has the largest share of labor in global value chains (GVCs) and has significantly increased the share of value added manufacturing driven by foreign direct investment (FDI).[9] Yet Indonesia’s industrialization is hemmed in by hierarchical structures of foreign corporate control, the result being that industrialization in Indonesia reflects the interests of Japanese multinational corporations (MNCs) more than the needs of the Indonesian economy.[10] The recent trade war between the United States and China over semiconductor chips (with the US government banning the sale of chips made in the United States or involving US technology to Chinese company Huawei) demonstrates the importance of geopolitics to the acquisition of technology. A third issue is how our privacy may be compromised by migrating basic service delivery to privately owned online platforms that mine data for sale. While loss of privacy may be increasingly treated like a forgone conclusion in a world so interconnected, it remains a central issue to our capacity to live free lives, as Shoshana Zuboff argues in her book The Age of Surveillance Capitalism (2019).

Gordon’s book is heavy on details and sparse on analysis. A stronger analytical framework that centers technology could have helped avoid some of the book’s oversights, such as the contentious issue of technology transfer and the geopolitics of technology production. Notwithstanding these lacunas, the book is a serious invitation to consider the power and possibilities of technology for the Global South.

Notes

[1]. Evgeny Morozov, “The Lessons of Chile’s Struggle against Big Tech,” New Statesman (blog), September 9, 2023, https://www.newstatesman.com/the-weekend-essay/2023/09/salvador-allende-fight-big-tech.

[2]. UN General Assembly, Resolution 3201, Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, 1974, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/2775/download.

[3]. Alice H. Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

[4]. Daniela Gabor and Ndongo Samba Sylla, “Derisking Developmentalism: A Tale of Green Hydrogen,” Development and Change 54, no. 5 (2023): 1169-96, https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12779.

[5]. Jill V. Klosky, Julie A. Gazmararian, Olivia Casimir, and Sarah C. Blake, “Effects of Remote Education during the COVID-19 Pandemic on Young Children’s Learning and Academic Behavior in Georgia: Perceptions of Parents and School Administrators,” Journal of School Health 92, no. 7 (2022): 656–64, https://doi.org/10.1111/josh.13185.

[6]. Len Sherman, “Uber’s New Math: Increase Prices and Squeeze Driver Pay,” Forbes, January 16, 2023, https://www.forbes.com/sites/lensherman/2023/01/16/ubers-new-math-increase-prices-and-squeeze-driver-pay/.

[7]. Raúl Prebisch, “The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems,” Sede de la CEPAL en Santiago (Estudios e Investigaciones), Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), April 27, 1950, https://econpapers.repec.org/paper/ecrcol093/29973.htm.

[8]. Morozov, “Lessons of Chile’s Struggle.”

[9]. Intan Suwandi, “Value Chains: The New Economic Imperialism,” Monthly Review (blog), September 3, 2019, https://monthlyreview.org/product/value-chains/.

[10]. Ingrid Harvold Kvangraven, “Beyond the Stereotype: Restating the Relevance of the Dependency Research Programme,” Development and Change 52, no. 1 (2021): 76–112, https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12593.

Fathimath Musthaq is assistant professor of political science at Reed College, Portland. Her primary interests are in central banking and financialization in the Global South, development and dependency, and international monetary reform.

Citation: Fathimath Musthaq. Review of Gordon, Ruth Elizabeth. Development Disrupted: The Global South in the Twenty-First Century. H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews. May, 2024.
URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=59722

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.

A certidão de nascimento de Brasília está em Portugal - José Roberto Bassul (Correio Braziliense)

 Consequência da falta de um projeto museológico no Brasil, muitos arquivos particulares estão sendo expatriados, e é para salvá-los, não para extraditá-los. 

Certos patrimônios teriam sido inegavelmente perdidos, ou deteriorados, se por acaso tivessem permanecido no Brasil. É triste reconhecer isso, mas é verdade.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

 

Correio Braziliense, 5/05/2024

CIDADE NOSSA

A certidão de nascimento de Brasília está em Portugal

Brasília, de fato, é especial. E isso, em qualquer âmbito, seja nas artes visuais ou na sua capacidade de encantar, reconhecer isso é uma forma de preservar o passado e respeitar o futuro

INÍCIOREVISTA DO CORREIO

REV-0505-CRONICA - (crédito: Editoria de Arte sobre imagem de Lucio Costa)

Especial para o Correio — José Roberto Bassul

O título deste artigo não é uma metáfora, é uma notícia. Boa e triste. Em 2021, todo o acervo de Lúcio Costa foi doado pela família do urbanista à Casa da Arquitectura, uma associação cultural apoiada pelo Estado português. À época, certa ou errada, a neta do inventor de Brasília alegou em entrevista a este jornal que, no Brasil, "falta uma consciência de preservação cultural. Ainda vamos chegar lá, mas, por enquanto, não temos condições". Entre os mais de 11 mil documentos doados está o desenho original do Plano Piloto.

A notícia não deixa de ser boa. Lá estive, em 2023, para a inauguração de Siza e Oscar, para além do mar, uma exposição de fotografias minhas. Pude, então, conhecer a instituição e perceber o cuidado e os meios de que dispõe para a conservação, em ótimas condições, dessa preciosidade.

Mas a notícia é também triste. Ela nos coloca diante de nós mesmos, das nossas fragilidades, da nossa incapacidade de reconhecer, preservar e partilhar a multifacetada, polêmica, trágica, épica e rica história cultural que vimos construindo. Como deixamos escapar de Brasília aquilo que nos constituiu como espaço? E quantos outros legados, individuais ou coletivos, estamos deixando que se apaguem a cada dia?

A cidade que não respeita seu passado não tem futuro. Lúcio Costa sabia disso. Já no preâmbulo de seu Relatório do Plano Piloto vaticinava que Brasília deveria tornar-se, "além de centro de governo e administração, num foco de cultura dos mais lúcidos e sensíveis do país". Os brasilienses, de nascimento e adoção, têm realizado esse vaticínio. Em meio a imensas dificuldades e barreiras, artistas, produtores, galeristas, curadores e gestores vêm construindo um impressionante patrimônio simbólico neste inquieto e criativo quadradinho.

Seja nas artes visuais, na arquitetura, na literatura, no cinema, no teatro ou na música, não faltam exemplos dessa afirmação. O projeto Plano das Artes, conduzido pela professora da UnB Cinara Barbosa, já mapeou mais de uma centena de espaços autônomos de artes visuais no Distrito Federal. Escritórios de arquitetura multipremiados, a prosa e a poesia de inúmeros talentos, o cinema de Vladimir Carvalho, o teatro de Hugo Rodas, o choro de Hamilton de Holanda, o rock de Renato Russo e Cássia Eller, as obras de Antonio Obá ou o som eletrônico de Alok, ao lado de muitos outros nomes de mulheres e homens, estão aí para não deixar ninguém mentir.

Por que então deixamos fechado o Teatro Nacional de Brasília e perdemos acervos cobiçados como o de Lúcio Costa? Não haverá uma resposta só. É evidente, contudo, que, de um lado, as políticas públicas de cultura têm sido incapazes de disputar, com a força devida, a difícil partilha orçamentária. De outro, salta aos olhos a omissão de nossa elite econômica. Os que aqui formaram grandes patrimônios poderiam, e deveriam, investir mais — e mais democraticamente — na preservação da memória e na expansão criativa das manifestações culturais em todo o Distrito Federal.

Não percamos de vista o que nos é peculiar. Há cidades que são obras da natureza, como o Rio de Janeiro. Outras são obras humanas, como São Paulo. Mas raras são obras de arte, como Brasília.

*José Roberto Bassul é arquiteto e fotógrafo

 

Seminário: Europa Integração e Fragmentação, livro; no Centro de Estudos Globais da UnB, 10/05/2024

 🗓 10/05/2024, 10h às 12h

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A hipocrisia religiosa-criminosa de Putin precisa ser denunciada - Yasmina Lombaert (via X)

 From: Yasmina @yasminalombaert 

So f*cking hypocrite

The Russian demon at the Easter service at the Cathedral of Christ the Savior, led by KGB agent Kirill and accompanied by another mafia gangster, Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin. 

The Russian dictator breathes orthodoxy reminiscent of the time when tsars were declared God-appointed rulers of Russia.

The Russian Orthodox Church is complicit in aiding and abetting the territorial ambitions of one man, all for the greater glory of self-interest and the accumulation of territory, wealth and power.

And yet, the church, indeed all of Christianity, is based on the teachings of Christ, heralded as the “Prince of Peace.” It was Christ whom people asked what the greatest commandments were. His answer was simple to “love God unconditionally” and to “love your neighbour as yourself.”

Waging a war aimed at unilateral conquest was never part of Christ's message. Killing people, kidnapping children, bombing schools, destroying civilian power grids, and destroying hospital complexes full of patients are not really actions that lend themselves to the way of Christ.

An insult to real Christians.

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; Russian losses from war - Canadian Kolbzar (X)

 Canadian Kobzar

Russians killed, wounded in Ukraine

k soldiers (KIA or WIA), 2k tanks and vehicles, 300 aircraft, and 11 ships.  This is literally the entire invasion force (and more) sent into Ukraine back in 2022. GONE.  Which in itself is insane. 

While Ukraine certainly has its losses, it is not nearly as comparable to russia's.  But even it if it was, what is really critical here - and the reason why russia is unequivocally losing, notwithstanding any uninhabited farmers fields it temporarily occupies - russia's reserves are not unlimited and it cannot replace its losses at the same rate it is losing. These losses are not only problematic in quantity, but in quality. 

russia has about 12,000 tanks in reserve.  Which means they have about 10,000 to go, but these tanks are ancient.  This is why you are seeing cold war era (1950's-1970's) being rolled out. They have dated optics, require more men, are not as effective, and do not stand up to modern equipment. russia does not have the resources to rebuild or replace these tanks.  But even worse, Ukraine has demonstrated with FPVs, russian tanks are largely redundant.  Dont even get me started on the russian navy or airforce which is in even worse condition. 

While russia is making head way on the FPV drones, they are still behind Ukraine in terms of tactics, manufacturing and defence of drones (for now). 

But lets look at manpower.  Everyone keeps talking about new mobilizations in russia, but the reality is that this is not a bottomless pit, and more critically you have a problem with inflow.  

Pre-war russia had about 8 million men in their 20's to draft.  Now, 600k are dead, and another 1 million have fled russia.  That leaves you with 6 million (in only two years!) 

Its also not a problem of just quantity, but quality.  A few weeks ago, the 76th Pskov paratroopers were decimated by Ukrainian attacks.  These are considered the elite of the russian army.  They were equipped with the best equipment russia has.  Losses like this cannot be replaced with fresh conscripts.  This takes decades to get to this level of quality. 

But here is the thing that people often overlook - russian mobilization isn't to capitalize on massive gains, its quite literally just to sustain the frontline. Despite Ukraine quite literally running out of ammunition, russia has not made any material gains on the front line.  russia has become entirely dependent on through put  just to fight the war. If they don't deploy on the front, thats game over russia loses.  Ironically, the more they push forward, the more they lose. 

The fact that russia is deploying Indian, Nepali, Syrian, African and Asian troops is telling of how dire the situation really is. 

If death rate remained the same as in 2022, russia would be able to keep up this war for another 5-6 years.  HOWEVER, even during the period where Ukraine was not supplied with US aid, russian casualties have steadily INCREASED.  With new aid, longer ranged weapons and F-16s... well we can start seeing a dimmer picture for russia. 

Again, to reiterate this is why russia was so dead set on killing the foreign aid bill and why much if its strategy has been on trying to stop aid.

Now remember, this is the total mobilization force.  So in 5-6 years time this isn't just about mobilization against Ukraine, this is mobilization capabilities for ANY WAR GOING FORWARD.  russia quite literally is demilitarizing itself. 

This is why I do not think you will see counter-offensives like last summer from Ukraine again.  russia is happy to continue throwing meat waves to Ukraine.  The further russia expands, the more vulnerable its supply lines become - as General Barrow once said "amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics." 

In my opinion, the best way to win this war is through defensive tactics.  Let russia continue to throw meat waves at Ukraine and sustain massive casualties.  They are only destroying themselves. Not only in this war, but for the long term.  We need to clip the eagle's wings once and for all.  This is a prime example of pyrrhic victory in real time.  

At this rate, we could easily see 1 mil russians KIA by 2025. Ukraine does not need to retake cities at this point, because eventually russia will run out of men, functioning, equiment and morale. At the rate russia is losing men and equipment,  not only will it not be able to occupy eastern Ukraine or Crimea, but it wont be able to conduct any type of military engagement (offensive or defensive) in the near future. 

Now I am not saying this will be a cake walk, this obviously will come at a great cost to Ukrainians - however, we are getting better equipped, better trained, and better adapted.  With Patriot defences rearmed, you will see less dead Ukrainians.  However, there is no victory in sight for russia not withstanding the sabre rattling of online uneducated russian trolls. 

Believe in Ukraine.  Support Ukraine.  Stand with Ukraine.