OPINION
China’s Public Diplomacy Strategy in Latin America and the Caribbean
By Rachel Yu
Introduction
October of 1949 marks the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the solidification of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This past year, China celebrated the 70th anniversary of the founding of the PRC. In its 70-year regime, the CCP has propelled China onto the international stage as one of the most powerful nations in the 21st century. China has been at the forefront of controversies concerning issues such as human rights, trade, and technology. Increasingly bold and influential, the PRC has established itself as a force to be reckoned with.
China’s emphasis on soft power has been growing. USC’s Center on Public Diplomacy ranks China’s soft power at twenty-seven while the United States sits at number four.[1] The PRC recognizes that their image and soft power capabilities must accompany their economic rise. D’Hooghe, senior associate fellow at the Clingendael, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, argues that China’s soft power is growing with the inclusion of non-state actors. She also posits that China’s culture and economic-political model has become more attractive to various parts of the world. China aims to accomplish four major public diplomacy messages: (1) China strives to create a harmonious society and give its people a better future, (2) China is a stable, reliable, and responsible economic partner, (3) China is a trustworthy member of the international community who works towards global peace, and (4) China is an ancient, respected, and vibrant culture.
In China, the Office of Foreign Propaganda of the CCP and the State Council Information Office (SCIO) are in charge of developing public diplomacy plans, monitoring foreign media, and censoring and guiding domestic media. In 1998, then-Minister of the SCIO, Zhao Qizheng, increased press conferences and encouraged the accommodation of journalists. Recently, the SCIO issued a white paper clarifying Chinese positions on human rights, minorities, and other controversial issues. Chinese leaders, such as President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Kejiang, also play major public diplomacy roles.[2] For example, President Xi visited Peking University on China’s 2019 Youth Day. During the trip, he encouraged students to take pride in their heritage, establish cultural confidence, and work to rejuvenate the Chinese nation. Students even reported viewing him as a people-friendly leader because “he brought his wife to visit other countries”.[3] Finally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) plays a significant but, surprisingly, restricted role in public diplomacy. The MFA is often restrained by lack of information and the instructions of central leadership. Although, the MFA has worked on increasing professionalism and the positive images of their diplomats. Aside from governmental players, non-state actors are sometimes as influential as state actors in Chinese public diplomacy. They include NGOs, academics, students, friendship associations, twin sister organizations, and tourists. However, it is important to note that many of these organizations and actors are often dependent on the CCP’s approval (or neglect).[4]
It is evident that China has focused on the importance of public diplomacy efforts, and thus employs more public diplomacy tools to varying levels of success. This paper seeks to paint a broad picture of trends in Chinese public diplomacy involvement in an often-overlooked region: Latin America and the Caribbean. Specifically, what soft-power and public diplomacy initiatives is China engaged in, and how it may relate to the United States’ foreign policy interests. Finally, this paper will give analysis as to how practitioners ought to approach these issues.
China in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC)
China’s relationship with regions in Latin America dates back before the 1850s. After the cessation of the African slave trade, coerced Chinese contract laborers filled the need for workers in Latin America. These workers, known as coolies, were exploited and worked under harsh conditions. The coolie trade officially ended in the late 19th century with the late-Qing dynasty taking increasingly firm efforts to protect overseas Chinese migrants. Fast forward a century and China has become a powerful player in the region.[5]
The United States still remains one of the region’s strongest trading partners. In 2017, total trade with the United States stood at $823 billion.[6] However, exports to the United States are growing at 7.1%- a significantly lower rate compared to a 28% growth rate in exports to China.[7] In fact, China-Latin America trade has increased eighteen-fold over the course of sixteen years. In 2002, China-Latin America trade amounted to $17 billion and rose to $306 billion in 2018. Recently, China made headlines in becoming the top trading partner for Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay, and prominent Chinese imports include ores, soybeans, petroleum, and copper while Chinese exports include electrical machinery, mechanical appliances, motor vehicles, and other industrial products.[8] In terms of development, China has gained the official support from nine LAC countries for its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Its engagement in the China-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) Forum highlighted increased efforts to facilitate China’s foreign policy objectives. Furthermore, China’s military and arms sales to LAC states deepens their relationship with leaders across the region. This conflicts with US and EU restrictions on arms sales to different countries. China also has access to Soviet-era intelligence facilities in Cuba and a tracking and space telemetry station in Argentina; this increases their intelligence collection abilities.[9]
LAC’s strengthening economic relations with China allows the region to become increasingly welcoming towards Chinese influence. In 2018, Argentinian Ambassador to the PRC, Diego Guelar, stated that “If you see the [trade] numbers nowadays, China is as important as the U.S. and sometimes it is more important than the U.S.”[10] Some analysts even argue that China’s current lag in soft power strength may be a strength in Chinese foreign policy objectives. The US case against Chinese 5G and Huawei is a perfect example. By staying under the radar coupled with the deepening trade ties in LAC, LAC countries see China primarily as a useful partner especially in offsetting Washington’s influence. With their eyes set on Chinese aid in development, LAC countries struggle to justify paying more for technology infrastructure in the name of security.[11] With the help of Chinese telecommunications companies, LAC countries have already invested in technology such as facial recognition software. In the name of fighting crime and monitoring natural disasters, LAC countries such as Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela have invested in Chinese surveillance equipment. This could introduce increased concerns about Chinese influence and interference across the region.[12]
Public Diplomacy Efforts
It is important to recognize that China is still relatively behind in terms of its soft power footprint in the region. Its lack of historical ties and geographic distance from the region poses a challenge. In 2018, Pew Research Center reported that at least 4 in 10 people hold positive views of China in Brazil, Mexico and Argentina.[13] However, China’s recent moves has shown it attempting to aggressively make up for those disadvantages.
Confucius Institutes are international Chinese educational centers organized by the PRC’s Ministry of Education. Chinese scholars often view Confucius Institutes as a unique and successful tool for Chinese public diplomacy. These institutions were established in order to “promote Chinese language and culture in foreign countries in order to satisfy the ‘sharp increase in the world’s demand for Chinese learning”[14]. However, Confucius Institutes are also perceived to be linked to the CCP’s broader foreign policy objectives.[15] In 2017, Hanban reported 106 Confucius Institutes and Classrooms in the Western Hemisphere region (47 of which are in Canada).[16] Administrators report that more than 100,000 students in Latin America are enrolled in Confucius Institute language programs while more than one million people participate in the cultural activities and workshops each year. Recent trends indicate that Latin America’s participation in Confucius Institute activities have risen (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Total Confucius Institutes and Classrooms in WHA
Source: Hanban Annual Report (2012, 2017)
The rise of Confucius Institutes is complimented with other educational indicators. This is illustrated in Argentina with the number of Chinese-language students doubling between the years 2008 and 2013 (see Figure 2). Established in 2014, the Confucius Institute Regional Center for Latin America “plays a strategic role in the process of deepening the relationship between China and Latin America”.[17] Within these institutions and other academic forums, Chinese exchanges (students, teachers, scholars, etc.) contribute greatly to China’s deepening relationship with the region. These Institutes and Classrooms are countered by 127 American Spaces.
Figure 2: Confucius Institutes and Classrooms in Latin America (Country Breakdown)
Source: Hanban Annual Report (2012, 2017)
Cultural ties are also an important component in China’s public diplomacy efforts. The First Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Forum of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and the PRC named 2016 as the “Year of Cultural Exchanges between China and Latin America and the Caribbean.” This led to more than one hundred activities between March and November hosted across the region and in China. The festivities included music festivals, literature translations, art exhibitions, and even a tour of Argentina and Chile by renowned Chinese pianist Lang Lang. Most of the events, organized by the Chinese Ministry of Culture, while the programming tended to target political elites rather than the general public, were a vigorous attempt to reframe and deepen CELAC-China relations through “an example of harmonious coexistence between cultures”.[18] In 2018, the China-CELAC Forum hosted its second ministerial and produced the second CELAC-China Joint Plan of Action. Specifically, the plan outlines the strengthening of CELAC-China cultural exchanges. The report lays out eleven cultural objectives, almost three times the number of objectives outlined by the previous joint plan of action. These objectives include strengthening academic exchanges, deepening resources for these exchanges and cultural centers, protecting historical artifacts, and increasing dialogue in thought and culture. Interestingly, the agreement also aims to strengthen cooperation and exchange in press and media. [19] The sheer increase in cultural objectives and China’s active engagement in this forum suggests that the PRC is seeking to broaden its public diplomacy efforts on this front.
Education and culture are only two examples of increased public diplomacy engagement China has undertaken in the LAC region. In an age of increased connectivity through technology, trade, and the permeability of information, China’s public diplomacy extends beyond these engagements – and will continue to.
Recommendation
The importance of public diplomacy and interacting with publics must never be discounted, and practitioners must recognize that every interaction with foreign nations must have a public diplomacy component. However, it is disadvantageous to match Chinese public diplomacy efforts dollar for dollar. Thus, practitioners must focus on targeting the region in a nuanced and strategic manner.
Figure 3: Average LAC Favorability Towards the U.S. and China
Source: Pew Research Global Indicators Database (Data derived from Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Columbia, Peru, El Salvador, and Venezuela from 2013-2017.)
Many LAC countries may assume that Chinese exchanges and organizations operate separately from the Chinese government. After all, in most democratic countries, academic organizations, universities, and friendship associations operate with a degree of freedom.[20] This may not be the case for Chinese entities as some may be inextricably linked to the CCP. For example, the President of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Xie Fuzhan, “is a research fellow and doctoral supervisor enjoying a special government stipend from the State Council.”[21] It is important for LAC entities and academics to be fully clarified on the degree of independence these entities may have. This not only applies to Chinese entities, but to all entities that may have competing interests with LAC countries. This is not to encourage LAC countries to abandon all ties with Chinese exchanges; rather, LAC countries must be encouraged to think critically about and ask thoughtful questions of even the most seemingly innocuous entities.
Especially in garnering support for the Belt and Road Initiative, the Chinese government seems to heavily target elites and political leaders in the region. Winning the support of the people of LAC countries may prove to be an effective strategy for US interests and offset Chinese influence. Unfortunately, this may prove to be an uphill battle, as public favorability towards China ranks above public favorability towards the U.S. On average, favorability towards the U.S. (44.4%) has declined significantly in Latin American countries. Favorability towards the Chinese (51.6%) has also declined, however they currently remain more popular than the U.S. (See Figure 3). In order to gain support within the region, it is important to keep in mind that the “us versus them” mentality surrounding many conversations about the region may be counterproductive. Conducting research on topics that resonate with both the American and LAC people is paramount to the success of any public diplomacy effort. Perhaps the strength of American entrepreneurship will resonate with local business owners; or, the freedom of expression in American academic institutions will appeal to young LAC scholars. And maybe, the U.S.’ staunch support of minority groups such as the Uighurs in Xinjiang and prosecuted Tibetans will strike a chord with freedom-loving people throughout the LAC. In other words, search for ways in which the American “brand” resonates with the LAC people.
Rachel Yu is a student at the University of Maryland, College Park, where she studies Government and Politics and Information Systems.
[1]“The Soft Power 30,” Portland and USC Center on Public Diplomacy, accessed August 6, 2019, https://softpower30.com/.
[2] Ingrid D’Hooghe, “The Rise of China’s Public Diplomacy,” Clingendael Diplomacy Papers, no. 12 (2007): 17-24
[3] Pinghui Zhang, “Xi Jinping stresses ‘cultural heritage’ on Youth Day,” South China Morning Post, May 5, 2014.
[4] D’Hooghe, 24-28
[5] “Coolie Trade in the 19th Century,” University of Minnesota Immigration History Research Center, accessed August 6, 2019, https://cla.umn.edu/ihrc/news-events/other/coolie-trade-19th-century.
[6] U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Latin America and the Caribbean: Issues in the 115th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan, June S. Beittel, Nese F. Debruyne, Peter J. Meyer, Clare Ribando Seelke, Maureen Taft-Morales, and M. Angeles Villarreal, R45120 (2019), 19.
[7] U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, “Latin America and the Caribbean’s Foreign Trade Will Grow in 2018 Amid Global Tensions that Require Greater Regional Integration,” October 31, 2018, https://www.cepal.org/en/pressreleases/latin-america-and-caribbeans-foreign-trade-will-grow-2018-amid-global-tensions-require.
[8] U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, China’s Engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean, by Mark P. Sullivan and Thomas Lum, IF10982 (2019), 1.
[9] Katherine Koleski and Alec Blivas, “China’s Engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean,” U.S. - China Economic and Security Review Commission, (2018): 4.
[10] Laura Zhou, “‘China is just as important to South America as the US’: why Argentina is keen to start talks on free-trade agreement,” South China Morning Post, April 23, 2018.
[11] Oliver Stuenkel, “Huawei heads South: The Battle Over 5G Comes to Latin America,” Foreign Affairs, May 10, 2019.
[12] Raquel Carvalho, “In Latin America, Big Brother China is watching you,” South China Morning Post, December 21, 2018.
[13] Richard Wike, Bruce Stokes, Jacob Poushter, Laura Silver, Janell Fetterolf, and Kat Devlin, “International publics divided on China,” Pew Research Center, October 1, 2018.
[14] Falk Hartig, “Confucius Institutes: The star of China’s public diplomacy” in Chinese Public Diplomacy: The rise of the Confucius Institute, (2015): 100.
[15] Hartig, 102.
[16] “Confucius Institute Annual Development Report 2017,” Confucius Institute Headquarters (Hanban), accessed August 6, 2019, http://www.hanban.org/report/2017.pdf.
[17] Juan Pablo Cardenal, “Sharp Power Rising Authoritarian Influence: China in Latin America,” National Endowment for Democracy, (2017): 29.
[18] Cardenal, 28-29.
[19] “CELAC and China Joint Plan of Action for Cooperation on Priority Areas (2019-2021),” CELAC Forum, accessed August 6, 2019, https://www.google.com/url?q=http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/images/2ForoCelacChina/Joint-Action-Plan-II-CELAC-China-Forum-FV-22-01-18.pdf&sa=D&ust=1565104851843000&usg=AFQjCNED7jfpTxq_NwFosS7jIb7U7kr04Q.
[20] Cardenal, 32.
[21] “Xie Fuzhan,” Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), accessed August 6, 2010, http://casseng.cssn.cn/about/about_leadership/201902/t20190228_4839054.html.
Nenhum comentário:
Postar um comentário