Um resumo de um paper importante, de um dos maiores especialistas no sistema de Bretton Woods.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
The Operation and Demise of the Bretton Woods System; 1958 to 1971
For your information, especially if you want to understand some important historical issues related to our international monetary system, here is a good paper by Michael Bordo (NBER Working Paper No. 23189), The Operation and Demise of the Bretton Woods System; 1958 to 1971.
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w23189?utm_campaign=ntw&utm_medium=email&utm_source=ntw
This chapter revisits the history of the origins, operation and demise of the Bretton Woods International Monetary System. The Bretton Woods system was created by the !944 Articles of Agreement to design a new international monetary order for the post war at a global conference organized by the US Treasury at the Mount Washington Hotel in Bretton Woods ,New Hampshire at the height of World War II. The Articles represented a compromise between the American plan of Harry Dexter White and the British plan of John Maynard Keynes. The compromise created an adjustable peg system based on the US dollar convertible into gold at $35 per ounce along with capital controls. It was designed to combine the advantages of fixed exchange rates of the pre World War I gold standard with some flexibility to handle large real shocks. The compromise gave members both exchange rate stability and the independence for their monetary authorities to maintain full employment.
It took over a decade for the fully current account convertible system to get started. The system only lasted for 12 years from 1959 to 1971 but it did deliver remarkable economic performance. The BWS evolved into a gold dollar standard which depended on the US monetary authorities following sound low inflation policies. As the System evolved it faced the same severe fundamental problems as in the interwar gold exchange standard of: adjustment, confidence and liquidity. The adjustment problem meant that member countries with balance of payments deficits, in the face of nominal rigidities, ran the gauntlet between currency crises and recessions. Surplus countries had to sterilize dollar inflows to prevent inflation.
The U.S. as center country faced the Triffin dilemma. With the growth of trade and income member countries held more and more dollars instead of scarce gold as reserves generated by a growing US balance of payments deficit. As outstanding dollar liabilities grew relative to the US monetary gold stock confidence in the dollar would wane raising the likelihood of a run on Fort Knox.This led to the possibility that the US would follow tight financial policies to reduce the deficit thereby starving the rest of the world of needed liquidity leading to global deflation and depression as occurred in the 1930s. Enormous efforts by the US, the G10 and international institutions were devoted to solving this problem.
As it turned out, after 1965 the key problem facing the global economy was inflation, not deflation, reflecting expansionary Federal Reserve policies to finance the Vietnam war and the Great Inflation. US inflation was exported through the balance of payments to the surplus countries of Europe and Japan leading them in 1971 to begin converting their outstanding dollar holdings into gold. In reaction President Richard Nixon closed the US gold window ending the BWS.
Mostrando postagens com marcador EUA. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador EUA. Mostrar todas as postagens
quarta-feira, 22 de março de 2017
sábado, 25 de fevereiro de 2017
A guerra no Pacifico poderia ter sido evitada? Diplomatas tentaram... - Book review
Não, não poderia ter sido evitada, pois os líderes militares japoneses já tinham decidido atacar os EUA, numa rara, inédita, demonstração de total irrealismo quanto às chances de prevalecer contra o que já era, naquele momento, a maior potência industrial e tecnológica do planeta (mas ainda não militar, obviamente).
Diplomatas costumam ser obedientes, e só em casos raros eles vão contra instruções recebidas, ou desobedecem deliberada e conscientemente ordens da capital.
Mas, eles possuem uma vantagem sobre líderes nacionais (civis ou militares): vivendo no exterior, convivendo com amigos e "inimigos", eles possuem uma percepção mais clara, mais realista, dos fatores em jogo, quando políticos ou militares no próprio país possuem uma visão deformada dessa realidade, quando não são completamente ignorantes do que é o mundo real.
Essa é a tragédia da profissão: atuar no exterior, tendo de receber instruções, muitas vezes, de ignaros nacionais...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
H-Diplo Article Review 682 on The Desperate Diplomat: Saburo Kurusu’s Memoir of the Weeks before Pearl Harbor
by George Fujii
H-Diplo
Article Review
No. 682
24 February 2017
Article Review Editors: Thomas Maddux and Diane Labrosse
Web and Production Editor: George Fujii
J. Garry Clifford and Masako R. Okura. The Desperate Diplomat: Saburo Kurusu’s Memoir of the Weeks before Pearl Harbor. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2016. ISBN: 978-0-8262-2037-0 (hardcover, $35.00).
URL: http://tiny.cc/AR682
Review by Justus D. Doenecke, New College of Florida, Emeritus
The reputation of Saburō Kurusu has not been good. As special envoy of the Japanese government in the final three months before the Pearl Harbor attack, Kurusu met with American leaders in a last-ditch effort to prevent Japan and the United States from engaging in a bloody conflict. In a famous encounter that took place at 2:20 P.M. on the afternoon of December 7, the Japanese diplomat—along with Ambassador Kichisaburō Nomura—met with Cordell Hull, who had already been informed of the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Secretary of State, his hand shaking, accused them of “fabrication and falsehood.”[1] In his memoirs, Hull accused Kurusu of seeking “to lull us with talk until the moment Japan got ready to strike.” [2]
Hull was not alone. Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles found the “oily” diplomat acting as the “goat tethered as bait for the tiger.” On Pearl Harbor day, Eleanor Roosevelt complained about that “nasty little Jap sitting there talking to my husband while Japanese planes were attacking Honolulu and Manila.” (9) Though no specialist has accepted this indictment, Kurusu’s popular image has been one of duplicity.
Thanks to the efforts of the late J. Garry Clifford and Masako R. Okura, a far more sympathetic—and accurate—picture of Kurusu has emerged. The two scholars have supervised the publication of an English translation of Kurusu’s memoir, published in Japanese in 1952 and deposited in the National Diet Library in 2007. The diplomat had died in 1954, before he could publish the English version. Okura, a political scientist conducting research in Tokyo in 2001, came upon the manuscript by accident and immediately recognized its importance. Okura and Clifford, her mentor at the University of Connecticut, have produced a beautifully edited document, whose introduction and elaborate endnotes reveal a superb knowledge of Japanese decision-making and the most recent scholarly literature. Manuscript sources include the papers of Kurusu, President Franklin Roosevelt, British Ambassador Halifax, Herbert Hoover, financier Bernard Baruch, diplomat Sumner Welles, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, and the U.S. State Department. This reviewer finds one slight error: “pace” should be “peace.” (12)
Kurusu had long been a major diplomatic figure, having served in posts as varied as Hankou, Honolulu, New York, Santiago, Rome, Athens, Lima, Hamburg, and Brussels. He was Ambassador to Germany when, in September 1940, Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka negotiated the Tripartite Pact. In his unpublished memoir Kurusu claimed he unsuccessfully sought to resign in protest of the accord.
Early in November 1941, Foreign Minister Shigenori Tōgō, realizing that relations with the U.S. were at a dangerous impasse, sent Kurusu to Washington as special envoy. Ambassador Kichisaburō Nomura, a former admiral, was well liked by the Roosevelt administration. However, Nomura, whose command of English was poor, found himself out of his depth. Hence, that summer he asked his foreign office for Kurusu’s aid. Before he left Tokyo, Kurusu met with Hideki Tōjō, who held the offices of Prime Minister and War Minister and was a full general. Tōjō stressed the necessity of concluding negotiations by the end of the month, although he did not reveal that war preparations were to be completed by early December. (Two days later, Japanese leaders fixed the date of December 7 for an attack on Pearl Harbor). Tōjō saw the negotiations having only thirty percent chance of success, but promised that despite powerful internal opposition he would keep any agreement.
Most of the memoir covers Kurusu’s negotiations with the Americans. During his first meeting with Roosevelt and Hull on November 17, the President suggested direct negotiations between Japan and China. There was, however, no follow through. Within a week, American decoders mistranslated significant Tokyo instructions to Kurusu. The U.S. thought that Japan would be obligated to act ‘automatically’ if Germany invoked the Tripartite Pact of September 1940. In reality the foreign office told Kurusu Japan would act ‘independently.’ When Nomura and Kurusu sought to assure Hull that their nation was under no obligation to assist Germany, the Secretary believed that the diplomats were deliberately lying.
The varied propositions of the American and Japanese representatives (Proposals A and B, Hull’s ten points of November 26) resemble a form of diplomatic ping pong. Because of deadlock over such matters as continued American support for China, the U.S. suggested a three-month modus vivendi: Japan would withdraw 50,000 troops from southern Indochina in return for which the United States would resume moderate sales of oil. Once China objected, Hull decided to “kick the whole thing over” (14). Hull’s ten points were the ultimate ‘nonstarter,’ as they included withdrawal of all Japanese forces from China and Indochina and support only for Chiang Kai-shek’s (Jiang Jieshi’s) government. War appeared inevitable.
By and large historians have overlooked the fact, so clearly brought out in the Kurusu memoir, that even after November 26 the Japanese diplomats actively continued their peace efforts. Due to the efforts of Herbert Hoover, Kurusu met with international lawyer Raoul Desvernine, an attorney on trade matters for Japan’s embassy. Desvernine in turn put him in touch with financier Bernard Baruch, who convinced Roosevelt to reconsider the modus vivendi. Meanwhile, the Methodist missionary E. Stanley Jones suggested that Roosevelt communicate with Emperor Hirohito directly and immediately. By the evening of December 6, however, when the president cabled the emperor, it was too late.
In their perceptive introduction to the memoir, Clifford and Okura indicate that the Pacific War might have been avoided. They write, “Without rekindling conspiracy theories about who fired the first shot in 1941, we are nonetheless struck by the pervasive atmosphere of fatalism and diplomatic passivity in the final days prior to war” (12). American fatigue played an obvious role. Hull, who suffered from tuberculosis, had put in sixteen-hour days. The Japanese envoys noted that Roosevelt, too, appeared “very tired” (22). The President had undergone blood transfusions that spring and summer and may well have been suffering aftereffects in late fall. The two historians speculate that had Roosevelt contacted Hirohito shortly after Hull’s ten-point note, the diplomatic process might have been continued. Conscious that the U.S. was committed to a ‘Europe first’ strategy, American military officials were pressing Roosevelt and Hull for more time, so as to deliver B-17 bombers to the Pacific.
Thanks to the labors of Clifford and Okura, it will be difficult to look again at the last three weeks of peace in quite the same way.
Justus Doenecke is emeritus professor of history at New College of Florida with a Ph.D. from Princeton (1966). He has written twelve books, including Storm on the Horizon: The Challenge to American Intervention, 1939-1941 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), and in 2015 came out with the 4th edition, with John E. Wilz, of From Isolation to War, 1931-1941 (Malden: Wiley Blackwell, 2015). He is writing a sequel to Nothing Less Than War: A New History of America’s Entry into World War I (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011). The volume will cover the politics and diplomacy of U.S. as a full-scale belligerent, the period from April 6, 1917- November 11, 1918.
Diplomatas costumam ser obedientes, e só em casos raros eles vão contra instruções recebidas, ou desobedecem deliberada e conscientemente ordens da capital.
Mas, eles possuem uma vantagem sobre líderes nacionais (civis ou militares): vivendo no exterior, convivendo com amigos e "inimigos", eles possuem uma percepção mais clara, mais realista, dos fatores em jogo, quando políticos ou militares no próprio país possuem uma visão deformada dessa realidade, quando não são completamente ignorantes do que é o mundo real.
Essa é a tragédia da profissão: atuar no exterior, tendo de receber instruções, muitas vezes, de ignaros nacionais...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
by George Fujii
H-Diplo
Article Review
No. 682
24 February 2017
Article Review Editors: Thomas Maddux and Diane Labrosse
Web and Production Editor: George Fujii
J. Garry Clifford and Masako R. Okura. The Desperate Diplomat: Saburo Kurusu’s Memoir of the Weeks before Pearl Harbor. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2016. ISBN: 978-0-8262-2037-0 (hardcover, $35.00).
URL: http://tiny.cc/AR682
Review by Justus D. Doenecke, New College of Florida, Emeritus
The reputation of Saburō Kurusu has not been good. As special envoy of the Japanese government in the final three months before the Pearl Harbor attack, Kurusu met with American leaders in a last-ditch effort to prevent Japan and the United States from engaging in a bloody conflict. In a famous encounter that took place at 2:20 P.M. on the afternoon of December 7, the Japanese diplomat—along with Ambassador Kichisaburō Nomura—met with Cordell Hull, who had already been informed of the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Secretary of State, his hand shaking, accused them of “fabrication and falsehood.”[1] In his memoirs, Hull accused Kurusu of seeking “to lull us with talk until the moment Japan got ready to strike.” [2]
Hull was not alone. Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles found the “oily” diplomat acting as the “goat tethered as bait for the tiger.” On Pearl Harbor day, Eleanor Roosevelt complained about that “nasty little Jap sitting there talking to my husband while Japanese planes were attacking Honolulu and Manila.” (9) Though no specialist has accepted this indictment, Kurusu’s popular image has been one of duplicity.
Thanks to the efforts of the late J. Garry Clifford and Masako R. Okura, a far more sympathetic—and accurate—picture of Kurusu has emerged. The two scholars have supervised the publication of an English translation of Kurusu’s memoir, published in Japanese in 1952 and deposited in the National Diet Library in 2007. The diplomat had died in 1954, before he could publish the English version. Okura, a political scientist conducting research in Tokyo in 2001, came upon the manuscript by accident and immediately recognized its importance. Okura and Clifford, her mentor at the University of Connecticut, have produced a beautifully edited document, whose introduction and elaborate endnotes reveal a superb knowledge of Japanese decision-making and the most recent scholarly literature. Manuscript sources include the papers of Kurusu, President Franklin Roosevelt, British Ambassador Halifax, Herbert Hoover, financier Bernard Baruch, diplomat Sumner Welles, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, and the U.S. State Department. This reviewer finds one slight error: “pace” should be “peace.” (12)
Kurusu had long been a major diplomatic figure, having served in posts as varied as Hankou, Honolulu, New York, Santiago, Rome, Athens, Lima, Hamburg, and Brussels. He was Ambassador to Germany when, in September 1940, Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka negotiated the Tripartite Pact. In his unpublished memoir Kurusu claimed he unsuccessfully sought to resign in protest of the accord.
Early in November 1941, Foreign Minister Shigenori Tōgō, realizing that relations with the U.S. were at a dangerous impasse, sent Kurusu to Washington as special envoy. Ambassador Kichisaburō Nomura, a former admiral, was well liked by the Roosevelt administration. However, Nomura, whose command of English was poor, found himself out of his depth. Hence, that summer he asked his foreign office for Kurusu’s aid. Before he left Tokyo, Kurusu met with Hideki Tōjō, who held the offices of Prime Minister and War Minister and was a full general. Tōjō stressed the necessity of concluding negotiations by the end of the month, although he did not reveal that war preparations were to be completed by early December. (Two days later, Japanese leaders fixed the date of December 7 for an attack on Pearl Harbor). Tōjō saw the negotiations having only thirty percent chance of success, but promised that despite powerful internal opposition he would keep any agreement.
Most of the memoir covers Kurusu’s negotiations with the Americans. During his first meeting with Roosevelt and Hull on November 17, the President suggested direct negotiations between Japan and China. There was, however, no follow through. Within a week, American decoders mistranslated significant Tokyo instructions to Kurusu. The U.S. thought that Japan would be obligated to act ‘automatically’ if Germany invoked the Tripartite Pact of September 1940. In reality the foreign office told Kurusu Japan would act ‘independently.’ When Nomura and Kurusu sought to assure Hull that their nation was under no obligation to assist Germany, the Secretary believed that the diplomats were deliberately lying.
The varied propositions of the American and Japanese representatives (Proposals A and B, Hull’s ten points of November 26) resemble a form of diplomatic ping pong. Because of deadlock over such matters as continued American support for China, the U.S. suggested a three-month modus vivendi: Japan would withdraw 50,000 troops from southern Indochina in return for which the United States would resume moderate sales of oil. Once China objected, Hull decided to “kick the whole thing over” (14). Hull’s ten points were the ultimate ‘nonstarter,’ as they included withdrawal of all Japanese forces from China and Indochina and support only for Chiang Kai-shek’s (Jiang Jieshi’s) government. War appeared inevitable.
By and large historians have overlooked the fact, so clearly brought out in the Kurusu memoir, that even after November 26 the Japanese diplomats actively continued their peace efforts. Due to the efforts of Herbert Hoover, Kurusu met with international lawyer Raoul Desvernine, an attorney on trade matters for Japan’s embassy. Desvernine in turn put him in touch with financier Bernard Baruch, who convinced Roosevelt to reconsider the modus vivendi. Meanwhile, the Methodist missionary E. Stanley Jones suggested that Roosevelt communicate with Emperor Hirohito directly and immediately. By the evening of December 6, however, when the president cabled the emperor, it was too late.
In their perceptive introduction to the memoir, Clifford and Okura indicate that the Pacific War might have been avoided. They write, “Without rekindling conspiracy theories about who fired the first shot in 1941, we are nonetheless struck by the pervasive atmosphere of fatalism and diplomatic passivity in the final days prior to war” (12). American fatigue played an obvious role. Hull, who suffered from tuberculosis, had put in sixteen-hour days. The Japanese envoys noted that Roosevelt, too, appeared “very tired” (22). The President had undergone blood transfusions that spring and summer and may well have been suffering aftereffects in late fall. The two historians speculate that had Roosevelt contacted Hirohito shortly after Hull’s ten-point note, the diplomatic process might have been continued. Conscious that the U.S. was committed to a ‘Europe first’ strategy, American military officials were pressing Roosevelt and Hull for more time, so as to deliver B-17 bombers to the Pacific.
Thanks to the labors of Clifford and Okura, it will be difficult to look again at the last three weeks of peace in quite the same way.
Justus Doenecke is emeritus professor of history at New College of Florida with a Ph.D. from Princeton (1966). He has written twelve books, including Storm on the Horizon: The Challenge to American Intervention, 1939-1941 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), and in 2015 came out with the 4th edition, with John E. Wilz, of From Isolation to War, 1931-1941 (Malden: Wiley Blackwell, 2015). He is writing a sequel to Nothing Less Than War: A New History of America’s Entry into World War I (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011). The volume will cover the politics and diplomacy of U.S. as a full-scale belligerent, the period from April 6, 1917- November 11, 1918.
domingo, 8 de janeiro de 2017
After Obama years, back to Kissinger years? - Eli Lake
Bom artigo, equilibrado, informativo, analítico.
Grato a meu amigo Stelio Amarante, pelo envio.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
BLOOMBERG VIEW - POLITICS
Kissinger's Washington Is Coming Back Around
JAN 4, 2017 6:00 AM EST
By Eli Lake
Let’s take a moment to savor what looks to be Henry Kissinger’s final act. The man is 93 years old. At that age, most people are lucky to have enough energy for “Wheel of Fortune” and a few Facebook posts. Not Kissinger. These days, he’s playing the influence game against insiders who hadn’t even been born when he was Richard Nixon’s secretary of state.
Officials with Donald Trump’s transition team tell me Kissinger has spent several hours since the election advising incoming national security adviser Michael Flynn and his team. He’s also putting his network in place. He recommended his former assistant, K.T. McFarland, to be Flynn’s deputy, and urged Trump to nominate Rex Tillerson, the chief executive officer of Exxon Mobil, as his secretary of state. Kissinger is one of the few people in Trump’s orbit who can get him on the phone whenever he wants, according to one transition adviser.
That’s just behind the scenes. Consider that Kissinger is also an important validator for Trump in the press. When some Republicans questioned Tillerson’s closeness to Russian President Vladimir Putin, Kissinger defended the pick on “Face the Nation.” Kissinger helped soften the blow of Trump’s phone call with Taiwan’s president in December before the Committee of 100, which advocates for the U.S.-China relationship. Before that, Kissinger winged his way to Oslo to urge his fellow Nobel laureates to give the next president’s foreign policy a chance. It feels like 1975 all over again. I’m half-expecting to read something in the tabloids about a Kissinger affair with a Hollywood starlet.
It should be said that almost all recent presidents and secretaries of state at one time or another have consulted Kissinger for advice. But in the Obama years, Kissinger was not that influential. After he co-authored an op-ed critical of the Iran nuclear deal, State Department deputy spokeswoman Marie Harf dismissed it as “big words and big thoughts” with few specifics.
It’s nonetheless strange that Kissinger would have Trump’s ear. To start, he is the author of many of the policies Trump is hinting he will undo. It’s not just the one-China policy, which forbids official recognition of Taiwan, even though it allows the U.S. to arm the island. Kissinger is also an architect of arms-control deals that recent Trump tweets suggest may be in jeopardy.
“Kissinger is apparently willing to advise someone who has publicly questioned the essential building blocks of the international system that Kissinger himself helped create,” Tim Naftali, a former executive director of the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, told me.
Then there’s the matter of how Trump won the presidency. Remember his closing argument: “For those who control the levers of power in Washington and for the global special interests, they partner with these people who don’t have your good in mind.” That’s not an unreasonable description of Kissinger’s own consulting firm, which has provided strategic advice to foreign governments and big corporations since 1982.
Of course, Kissinger has always contained multitudes. For his supporters, he is the American Metternich, the 19th-century Austrian diplomat and scholar who both shaped and explained the geopolitics of his era. It’s no coincidence that Metternich was a subject of Kissinger’s first book, published in 1957.
Niall Ferguson, the historian and Kissinger biographer, put it like this: “The reason Trump has turned to Kissinger is that he rightly sees him as the most brilliant and experienced geopolitical theorist and diplomatic practitioner in the United States today, and he realizes he could use Kissinger’s advice to sort out his strategic priorities.”
This is no doubt music to the ears of the Washington and New York foreign-policy establishment. For idealists on the left and right, however, Kissinger’s influence on Trump is a red flag. For all of his foreign-policy success, Kissinger is also an author of more dubious moments in Cold War history. He helped orchestrate the 1973 coup that toppled Chile’s elected president, Salvador Allende. Kissinger devised the strategy to bomb North Vietnamese Army positions in Cambodia, something he kept from Congress. This history earned Hillary Clinton a rebuke from Bernie Sanders during the Democratic primary, when he questioned the judgment of anyone who would consider Kissinger to be a personal friend.
But Kissinger is not just a bête noire for the left. He also clashed with neoconservatives when he was Richard Nixon’s national security adviser. Democratic Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson pushed the Nixon administration to adopt sanctions on the Soviet Union tied directly to its treatment of Jewish dissidents. Kissinger famously opposed this policy because it would undermine his own policy to lower tensions with Moscow, known as detente.
As Trump prepares to take power, Russia is once again dividing Washington. The Obama administration just last week released a report from the FBI and Department of Homeland Security that concluded Russian intelligence services hacked leading Democrats and leaked the information to the press. Trump and his transition team have cast doubt on the intelligence.
Kissinger hasn’t weighed in on that. But he has been saying for the past few years that it would be smart to find ways to work more closely with Putin. In a speech in February at the Gorchakov Foundation in Moscow, he said, “In the emerging multipolar order, Russia should be perceived as an essential element of any new global equilibrium, not primarily as a threat to the United States.”
This perspective meshes nicely with Trump’s own view that a deal can be done with Putin. Ferguson told me that one of the appeals of Kissinger for Trump is that voters were fed up with the approaches of George W. Bush and Barack Obama to foreign policy. “Kissinger was associated with neither approach, though he was much less openly critical of the former,” he said. “I think Trump is attracted to Kissinger’s reputation as a realist, though -- as I have argued -- this is rather an inaccurate characterization of him. He surely also appreciates the unique network of relationships Kissinger brings to the table: Think only of his regular meetings with Presidents Putin and Xi.”
Delicious. The president-elect who waged a campaign against global elites is turning to a man who knows most of them on a first-name basis. It’s an irony Henry Kissinger’s former clients likely appreciate.
Grato a meu amigo Stelio Amarante, pelo envio.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
BLOOMBERG VIEW - POLITICS
Kissinger's Washington Is Coming Back Around
JAN 4, 2017 6:00 AM EST
By Eli Lake
Let’s take a moment to savor what looks to be Henry Kissinger’s final act. The man is 93 years old. At that age, most people are lucky to have enough energy for “Wheel of Fortune” and a few Facebook posts. Not Kissinger. These days, he’s playing the influence game against insiders who hadn’t even been born when he was Richard Nixon’s secretary of state.
Officials with Donald Trump’s transition team tell me Kissinger has spent several hours since the election advising incoming national security adviser Michael Flynn and his team. He’s also putting his network in place. He recommended his former assistant, K.T. McFarland, to be Flynn’s deputy, and urged Trump to nominate Rex Tillerson, the chief executive officer of Exxon Mobil, as his secretary of state. Kissinger is one of the few people in Trump’s orbit who can get him on the phone whenever he wants, according to one transition adviser.
That’s just behind the scenes. Consider that Kissinger is also an important validator for Trump in the press. When some Republicans questioned Tillerson’s closeness to Russian President Vladimir Putin, Kissinger defended the pick on “Face the Nation.” Kissinger helped soften the blow of Trump’s phone call with Taiwan’s president in December before the Committee of 100, which advocates for the U.S.-China relationship. Before that, Kissinger winged his way to Oslo to urge his fellow Nobel laureates to give the next president’s foreign policy a chance. It feels like 1975 all over again. I’m half-expecting to read something in the tabloids about a Kissinger affair with a Hollywood starlet.
It should be said that almost all recent presidents and secretaries of state at one time or another have consulted Kissinger for advice. But in the Obama years, Kissinger was not that influential. After he co-authored an op-ed critical of the Iran nuclear deal, State Department deputy spokeswoman Marie Harf dismissed it as “big words and big thoughts” with few specifics.
It’s nonetheless strange that Kissinger would have Trump’s ear. To start, he is the author of many of the policies Trump is hinting he will undo. It’s not just the one-China policy, which forbids official recognition of Taiwan, even though it allows the U.S. to arm the island. Kissinger is also an architect of arms-control deals that recent Trump tweets suggest may be in jeopardy.
“Kissinger is apparently willing to advise someone who has publicly questioned the essential building blocks of the international system that Kissinger himself helped create,” Tim Naftali, a former executive director of the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, told me.
Then there’s the matter of how Trump won the presidency. Remember his closing argument: “For those who control the levers of power in Washington and for the global special interests, they partner with these people who don’t have your good in mind.” That’s not an unreasonable description of Kissinger’s own consulting firm, which has provided strategic advice to foreign governments and big corporations since 1982.
Of course, Kissinger has always contained multitudes. For his supporters, he is the American Metternich, the 19th-century Austrian diplomat and scholar who both shaped and explained the geopolitics of his era. It’s no coincidence that Metternich was a subject of Kissinger’s first book, published in 1957.
Niall Ferguson, the historian and Kissinger biographer, put it like this: “The reason Trump has turned to Kissinger is that he rightly sees him as the most brilliant and experienced geopolitical theorist and diplomatic practitioner in the United States today, and he realizes he could use Kissinger’s advice to sort out his strategic priorities.”
This is no doubt music to the ears of the Washington and New York foreign-policy establishment. For idealists on the left and right, however, Kissinger’s influence on Trump is a red flag. For all of his foreign-policy success, Kissinger is also an author of more dubious moments in Cold War history. He helped orchestrate the 1973 coup that toppled Chile’s elected president, Salvador Allende. Kissinger devised the strategy to bomb North Vietnamese Army positions in Cambodia, something he kept from Congress. This history earned Hillary Clinton a rebuke from Bernie Sanders during the Democratic primary, when he questioned the judgment of anyone who would consider Kissinger to be a personal friend.
But Kissinger is not just a bête noire for the left. He also clashed with neoconservatives when he was Richard Nixon’s national security adviser. Democratic Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson pushed the Nixon administration to adopt sanctions on the Soviet Union tied directly to its treatment of Jewish dissidents. Kissinger famously opposed this policy because it would undermine his own policy to lower tensions with Moscow, known as detente.
As Trump prepares to take power, Russia is once again dividing Washington. The Obama administration just last week released a report from the FBI and Department of Homeland Security that concluded Russian intelligence services hacked leading Democrats and leaked the information to the press. Trump and his transition team have cast doubt on the intelligence.
Kissinger hasn’t weighed in on that. But he has been saying for the past few years that it would be smart to find ways to work more closely with Putin. In a speech in February at the Gorchakov Foundation in Moscow, he said, “In the emerging multipolar order, Russia should be perceived as an essential element of any new global equilibrium, not primarily as a threat to the United States.”
This perspective meshes nicely with Trump’s own view that a deal can be done with Putin. Ferguson told me that one of the appeals of Kissinger for Trump is that voters were fed up with the approaches of George W. Bush and Barack Obama to foreign policy. “Kissinger was associated with neither approach, though he was much less openly critical of the former,” he said. “I think Trump is attracted to Kissinger’s reputation as a realist, though -- as I have argued -- this is rather an inaccurate characterization of him. He surely also appreciates the unique network of relationships Kissinger brings to the table: Think only of his regular meetings with Presidents Putin and Xi.”
Delicious. The president-elect who waged a campaign against global elites is turning to a man who knows most of them on a first-name basis. It’s an irony Henry Kissinger’s former clients likely appreciate.
quarta-feira, 21 de dezembro de 2016
Educacao fundamental: um desastre americano (imaginem no Brasil) - Daniel J. Mitchell
O milagre da multiplicação dos "coelhos", ops, dos professores do fundamental, nos EUA. De 1970 a 2010, os gastos subiram exponencialmente com o "professorado", mas a taxa de matrícula aumentou tão marginalmente que pode-se dizer que estacionou.
Os gastos por aluno TRIPLICARAM, em dólares constantes, mas os resultados em Leitura, Matemáticas e Ciências permaneceram absolutamente estáveis, isto é, medíocres, e até diminuíram. Ou seja, o problema está na gestão, com muitos funcionários da "educação", que não trabalham na verdade com educação.
Isto acontece nos EUA. Imagino que no Brasil, o quadro deve ser igual ou PIOR.
Alguém espera alguma melhoria no ensino público, lá e aqui? Ingênuos.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Os gastos por aluno TRIPLICARAM, em dólares constantes, mas os resultados em Leitura, Matemáticas e Ciências permaneceram absolutamente estáveis, isto é, medíocres, e até diminuíram. Ou seja, o problema está na gestão, com muitos funcionários da "educação", que não trabalham na verdade com educação.
Isto acontece nos EUA. Imagino que no Brasil, o quadro deve ser igual ou PIOR.
Alguém espera alguma melhoria no ensino público, lá e aqui? Ingênuos.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
The Failure of Public Schooling in One Chart
While I have great fondness for some of the visuals I’ve created over the years (especially “two wagons” and “apple harvesting“), I confess that none of my creations have ever been as clear and convincing as the iconic graph on education spending and education outcomes created by the late Andrew Coulson.
I can’t imagine anyone looking at his chart and not immediately realizing that you don’t get better results by pouring more money into the government’s education monopoly.
But the edu-crat lobby acts as if evidence doesn’t matter. At the national level, the state level, and the local level, the drumbeat is the same: Give us more money if you care about kids.
So let’s build on Coulson’s chart to show why teachers’ unions and other special interests are wrong.
Gerard Robinson of the American Enterprise Institute and Professor Benjamin Scafidi from Kennesaw State University take a close look at this issue.
…education is important to the economic and social well-being of our nation, which is why it is the No. 1 line item in 41 state budgets. …Schools need extra money to help struggling students, or so goes the long-standing thinking of traditional education reformers who believe a lack of resources – teachers, counselors, social workers, technology, books, school supplies – is the problem. …a look back at the progress we’ve made under reformers’ traditional response to fixing low-performing schools – simply showering them with more money – makes it clear that this approach has been a costly failure.
And when the authors say it’s been a “costly failure,” they’re not exaggerating.
Since World War II, inflation-adjusted spending per student in American public schools has increased by 663 percent. Where did all of that money go? One place it went was to hire more personnel. Between 1950 and 2009, American public schools experienced a 96 percent increase in student population. During that time, public schools increased their staff by 386 percent – four times the increase in students. The number of teachers increased by 252 percent, over 2.5 times the increase in students. The number of administrators and other staff increased by over seven times the increase in students. …This staffing surge still exists today. From 1992 to 2014 – the most recent year of available data – American public schools saw a 19 percent increase in their student population and a staffing increase of 36 percent. This decades-long staffing surge in American public schools has been tremendously expensive for taxpayers, yet it has not led to significant changes in student achievement. For example, public school national math scores have been flat (and national reading scores declined slightly) for 17-year-olds since 1992.
By the way, the failure of government schools doesn’t affect everyone equally.
Parents with economic resources (such as high-profile politicians) can either send their kids to private schools or move to communities where government schools still maintain some standards.
But for lower-income households, their options are very limited.
While 40% of white Americans age 25-29 held bachelor’s degrees in 2013, that distinction belonged to only 15% of Hispanics, and 20% of blacks. …The root of this problem: Millions of black and Hispanic students in U.S. schools simply aren’t taught to read well enough to flourish academically. …according to a March report by Child Trends, based on 2015 data from the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), only 21% of Hispanic fourth-grade students were deemed “proficient” in reading. This is bad news. A fourth-grader’s reading level is a key indicator of whether he or she will graduate from high school. The situation is worse for African-Americans: A mere 18% were considered “proficient” in reading by fourth grade.
But Juan points out that the problems aren’t confined to minority communities. The United States has a national education problem.
The problem isn’t limited to minority students. Only 46% of white fourth-graders—and 35% of fourth-graders of all races—were judged “proficient” in reading in 2015. In general, American students are outperformed by students abroad. According to the most recent Program for International Student Assessment, a series of math, science and reading tests given to 15-year-olds around the world, the U.S. placed 17th among the 34 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries in reading.
This is very grim news, especially when you consider that the United States spends more on education – on a per-pupil basis – than any other country.
Here’s a table confirming Juan’s argument. It lacks the simple clarity of Andrew Coulson’s graph, but if you look at these numbers, it’s difficult to reach any conclusion other than we spend a lot in America and get very mediocre results.
Juan concludes his column with a plea for diversity, innovation, and competition.
For black and Hispanic students falling behind at an early age, their best hope is for every state, no matter its minority-student poverty rate, to take full responsibility for all students who aren’t making the grade—and get those students help now. That means adopting an attitude of urgency when it comes to saving a child’s education. Specifically, it requires cities and states to push past any union rules that protect underperforming schools and bad teachers. Urgency also means increasing options for parents, from magnet to charter schools. Embracing competition among schools is essential to heading off complacency based on a few positive signs. American K-12 education is in trouble, especially for minority children, and its continuing neglect is a scandal.
He’s right, but he should focus his ire on his leftist friends and colleagues. They’re the ones (including the NAACP!) standing in the proverbial schoolhouse door and blocking the right kind of education reform.
P.S. This is a depressing post, so let’s close with a bit of humor showing the evolution of math lessons in government schools.
P.P.S. If you want some unintentional humor, the New York Times thinks that education spending has been reduced.
P.P.P.S. Shifting to a different topic, another great visual (which also happens to be the most popular item I’ve ever shared on International Liberty) is the simple image properly defining the enemies of liberty and progress.
Republished from Dan Mitchell's blog.
quinta-feira, 15 de dezembro de 2016
Taxing the Rich: A History of Fiscal Fairness in the United States and Europe - book review
Tem gente que acha que nos EUA os ricos não pagam impostos, que estes recaem só sobre os pobres e a classe média, e que a renda tem se concentrado nos altos estratos da população por causa dessas políticas regressivas (contra os pobres, e a favor dos ricos).
Nada mais distante da realidade.
Este estudo bem fundamentado sobre a questão fiscal e tributária nos EUA e na Europa restabelece a verdade.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Published by EH.Net (December 2016)
Kenneth Scheve and David Stasavage:
Taxing the Rich: A History of Fiscal Fairness in the United States and Europe.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016. xv + 266 pp. $30 (hardcover), ISBN: 978-0-691-16545-5.
Reviewed for EH.Net by Barry W. Poulson, Department of Economics, University of Colorado.
In this study Kenneth Scheve (Professor of Political Science at Stanford University) and David Stasavage (Professor of Politics at New York University) address an important question: given evidence of increasing inequality in recent years, why is there not greater effort to tax the rich? To answer this question they survey the history of progressive taxation in twenty countries over the past two centuries, and the literature on taxation and the distribution of income and wealth.
Their evidence reveals an inverted-U curve for the average top marginal rates of income taxation in these countries in the twentieth century. Using evidence for the income share going to the top 0.01 percent of the income distribution, their evidence suggests an inverse relationship between the top rate of income taxation and the share of income received by the top income group. They also find evidence of an inverted-U for average top rates of inheritance taxation in the twentieth century. Using evidence for the share of wealth owned by the top 1 percent of wealth holders, their evidence suggests an inverse relationship between the top rate of inheritance taxes and the share of wealth held by this wealthy group.
The authors maintain that higher tax rates on the rich were a form of compensatory taxation. Mass conscription during World War I and World War II imposed a heavy burden on citizens. The rich, as owners of most of the capital, captured extraordinary profits during these war years. Higher marginal tax rates on the rich compensated for this privileged position they enjoyed during the war, and the differential burdens imposed on citizens by mass conscription.
Their explanation for declining tax rates on the rich in the post-World War II period is the converse of this argument. Technological changes eliminated the requirement for massive conscription of citizens into the military. As countries relied on a voluntary army, this argument for compensatory taxation of the rich no longer held. Further, they find that other arguments for compensatory taxation of the rich based upon privilege or rent seeking are not persuasive. The authors conclude that current economic and political conditions are such that the compensatory compensation argument for taxing the rich is no longer valid. The authors agree with Thomas Piketty that taxation of the rich and income inequality in the twentieth century were linked to war; but, they do not agree that this was a random process (Piketty 2014, Piketty and Saez 2007). They argue that taxation of the rich and trends in income inequality were driven by long-run trends involving international rivalries and technologies available for waging war.
My major concern with this study is that their analysis ignores fundamental issues in this debate, especially as it relates to tax and fiscal policy in the U.S. Their analysis is based on the ‘public interest theory’ of government; the assumption is that progressive taxation satisfies a norm of fairness or equality. The public choice literature provides an alternative explanation for the differential tax burdens imposed on the rich relative to the non-rich. If the preferences of elected officials differ from those of their constituents, self-interested politicians will attempt to minimize the political costs associated with raising a given budget or revenue, where political costs result from opposition to taxes by taxpayer interest groups. Politicians can minimize these costs by shifting the tax burden to citizen groups that are less sensitive or effective in influencing tax policy. The use of a specific tax or marginal tax rate will then depend upon this tax price defined in terms of political costs. Allan Meltzer and Scott Richard use this model to show why preferences of voters for taxes are ranked by income, and how extension of the franchise could lead to higher taxation and redistribution of income from rich to poor (Meltzer and Richard 1981). (Scheve and Stasavage refer to this literature in a footnote on page 220, but argue that there is no general theory supporting the argument.)
The public choice literature reveals a systematic bias toward increased spending and deficits. From this perspective, the challenge in democratic societies is to design fiscal rules and institutions to constrain the growth of government, and to allow the preferences of citizens to dominate those of their elected representatives. Progressive tax systems are analyzed within the context of these fiscal rules and institutions (Merrifield and Poulson 2016b).
After World War II, under the leadership of the U.S., industrialized countries successfully removed barriers to international trade and capital flows. This so called “Pax Americana” set the stage for rapid growth in international trade and the global economy. To compete in this new global economy countries significantly reduced tax burdens.
As Chris Edwards and Daniel Mitchell document, the tax reforms enacted in major competitors have left the U.S. behind (Edwards and Mitchell 2008). While the U.S. retains certain tax advantages, there are a growing number of disadvantages. Its top individual income tax rate is now about average compared to other OECD countries, although it kicks in at a higher income level than most countries, and thus penalizes fewer people. However, U.S. businesses are increasingly at a competitive disadvantage with respect to tax burdens when compared to businesses in other OECD countries. The U.S. now has the second highest corporate income tax rate, at 40 percent when calculating federal and state corporate income taxes. U.S. businesses face high business tax and compliance costs. American businesses face a tax penalty when they repatriate profits earned by their foreign subsidiaries. The U.S. has the eighth highest dividend tax rate, and the highest estate and inheritance tax rate among OECD countries. Finally, the U.S. has one of the highest tax rates in the world on corporate capital gains. Much of this tax burden on business is borne by workers in the form of lower wages and employment opportunities.
In contrast, the most successful OECD countries have enacted new fiscal rules to constrain the growth in government spending. John Merrifield and I document how new fiscal rules have enabled these countries to reduce taxes and borrowing. By the end of the twentieth century Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries imposed the lowest top income tax rates compared to other OECD countries; and these countries are successfully addressing unfunded liabilities in their entitlement programs (Merrifield and Poulson 2016a).
Fiscal rules in the U.S. have been relatively ineffective in constraining the growth in federal spending. For half a century rapid growth in federal spending has been accompanied by deficits and debt accumulation. With total debt now in excess of 20 trillion dollars, the U.S. is one of the most indebted countries in the OECD. The total debt burden as a share of GDP exceeds 100 percent, and is projected to grow even higher in coming decades under current law. Growing unfunded liabilities threaten the viability of federal entitlement programs. These flaws in tax and fiscal policy are causing a massive redistribution of income and wealth in the U.S (Merrifield and Poulson 2016b).
References:
Chris Edwards and Daniel Mitchell. 2008. Global Tax Revolution: The Rise of Tax Competition and the Battle to Defend It. Cato Institute, Washington D.C.
Allan H. Meltzer and Scott F. Richard. 1981. “A Rational Theory of the Size of Government,” Journal of Political Economy 81: 914-927.
John Merrifield and Barry Poulson. 2016a. “Swedish and Swiss Fiscal Rule Outcomes Contain Key Lessons for the United States,” The Independent Review 21: 251-74.
John Merrifield and Barry Poulson. 2016b. Can the Debt Growth be Stopped? Rules Based Policy Options for Addressing the Federal Fiscal Crisis. New York, Lexington Books.
Thomas Piketty. 2014. Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez. 2007. “How Progressive is the U.S. Federal Tax System? A Historical and International Perspective,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 21: 3-24.
Copyright (c) 2016 by EH.Net. All rights reserved. This work may be copied for non-profit educational uses if proper credit is given to the author and the list. For other permission, please contact the EH.Net Administrator (administrator@eh.net). Published by EH.Net (December 2016). All EH.Net reviews are archived at http://eh.net/book-reviews/
Nada mais distante da realidade.
Este estudo bem fundamentado sobre a questão fiscal e tributária nos EUA e na Europa restabelece a verdade.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Published by EH.Net (December 2016)
Kenneth Scheve and David Stasavage:
Taxing the Rich: A History of Fiscal Fairness in the United States and Europe.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016. xv + 266 pp. $30 (hardcover), ISBN: 978-0-691-16545-5.
Reviewed for EH.Net by Barry W. Poulson, Department of Economics, University of Colorado.
In this study Kenneth Scheve (Professor of Political Science at Stanford University) and David Stasavage (Professor of Politics at New York University) address an important question: given evidence of increasing inequality in recent years, why is there not greater effort to tax the rich? To answer this question they survey the history of progressive taxation in twenty countries over the past two centuries, and the literature on taxation and the distribution of income and wealth.
Their evidence reveals an inverted-U curve for the average top marginal rates of income taxation in these countries in the twentieth century. Using evidence for the income share going to the top 0.01 percent of the income distribution, their evidence suggests an inverse relationship between the top rate of income taxation and the share of income received by the top income group. They also find evidence of an inverted-U for average top rates of inheritance taxation in the twentieth century. Using evidence for the share of wealth owned by the top 1 percent of wealth holders, their evidence suggests an inverse relationship between the top rate of inheritance taxes and the share of wealth held by this wealthy group.
The authors maintain that higher tax rates on the rich were a form of compensatory taxation. Mass conscription during World War I and World War II imposed a heavy burden on citizens. The rich, as owners of most of the capital, captured extraordinary profits during these war years. Higher marginal tax rates on the rich compensated for this privileged position they enjoyed during the war, and the differential burdens imposed on citizens by mass conscription.
Their explanation for declining tax rates on the rich in the post-World War II period is the converse of this argument. Technological changes eliminated the requirement for massive conscription of citizens into the military. As countries relied on a voluntary army, this argument for compensatory taxation of the rich no longer held. Further, they find that other arguments for compensatory taxation of the rich based upon privilege or rent seeking are not persuasive. The authors conclude that current economic and political conditions are such that the compensatory compensation argument for taxing the rich is no longer valid. The authors agree with Thomas Piketty that taxation of the rich and income inequality in the twentieth century were linked to war; but, they do not agree that this was a random process (Piketty 2014, Piketty and Saez 2007). They argue that taxation of the rich and trends in income inequality were driven by long-run trends involving international rivalries and technologies available for waging war.
My major concern with this study is that their analysis ignores fundamental issues in this debate, especially as it relates to tax and fiscal policy in the U.S. Their analysis is based on the ‘public interest theory’ of government; the assumption is that progressive taxation satisfies a norm of fairness or equality. The public choice literature provides an alternative explanation for the differential tax burdens imposed on the rich relative to the non-rich. If the preferences of elected officials differ from those of their constituents, self-interested politicians will attempt to minimize the political costs associated with raising a given budget or revenue, where political costs result from opposition to taxes by taxpayer interest groups. Politicians can minimize these costs by shifting the tax burden to citizen groups that are less sensitive or effective in influencing tax policy. The use of a specific tax or marginal tax rate will then depend upon this tax price defined in terms of political costs. Allan Meltzer and Scott Richard use this model to show why preferences of voters for taxes are ranked by income, and how extension of the franchise could lead to higher taxation and redistribution of income from rich to poor (Meltzer and Richard 1981). (Scheve and Stasavage refer to this literature in a footnote on page 220, but argue that there is no general theory supporting the argument.)
The public choice literature reveals a systematic bias toward increased spending and deficits. From this perspective, the challenge in democratic societies is to design fiscal rules and institutions to constrain the growth of government, and to allow the preferences of citizens to dominate those of their elected representatives. Progressive tax systems are analyzed within the context of these fiscal rules and institutions (Merrifield and Poulson 2016b).
After World War II, under the leadership of the U.S., industrialized countries successfully removed barriers to international trade and capital flows. This so called “Pax Americana” set the stage for rapid growth in international trade and the global economy. To compete in this new global economy countries significantly reduced tax burdens.
As Chris Edwards and Daniel Mitchell document, the tax reforms enacted in major competitors have left the U.S. behind (Edwards and Mitchell 2008). While the U.S. retains certain tax advantages, there are a growing number of disadvantages. Its top individual income tax rate is now about average compared to other OECD countries, although it kicks in at a higher income level than most countries, and thus penalizes fewer people. However, U.S. businesses are increasingly at a competitive disadvantage with respect to tax burdens when compared to businesses in other OECD countries. The U.S. now has the second highest corporate income tax rate, at 40 percent when calculating federal and state corporate income taxes. U.S. businesses face high business tax and compliance costs. American businesses face a tax penalty when they repatriate profits earned by their foreign subsidiaries. The U.S. has the eighth highest dividend tax rate, and the highest estate and inheritance tax rate among OECD countries. Finally, the U.S. has one of the highest tax rates in the world on corporate capital gains. Much of this tax burden on business is borne by workers in the form of lower wages and employment opportunities.
In contrast, the most successful OECD countries have enacted new fiscal rules to constrain the growth in government spending. John Merrifield and I document how new fiscal rules have enabled these countries to reduce taxes and borrowing. By the end of the twentieth century Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries imposed the lowest top income tax rates compared to other OECD countries; and these countries are successfully addressing unfunded liabilities in their entitlement programs (Merrifield and Poulson 2016a).
Fiscal rules in the U.S. have been relatively ineffective in constraining the growth in federal spending. For half a century rapid growth in federal spending has been accompanied by deficits and debt accumulation. With total debt now in excess of 20 trillion dollars, the U.S. is one of the most indebted countries in the OECD. The total debt burden as a share of GDP exceeds 100 percent, and is projected to grow even higher in coming decades under current law. Growing unfunded liabilities threaten the viability of federal entitlement programs. These flaws in tax and fiscal policy are causing a massive redistribution of income and wealth in the U.S (Merrifield and Poulson 2016b).
References:
Chris Edwards and Daniel Mitchell. 2008. Global Tax Revolution: The Rise of Tax Competition and the Battle to Defend It. Cato Institute, Washington D.C.
Allan H. Meltzer and Scott F. Richard. 1981. “A Rational Theory of the Size of Government,” Journal of Political Economy 81: 914-927.
John Merrifield and Barry Poulson. 2016a. “Swedish and Swiss Fiscal Rule Outcomes Contain Key Lessons for the United States,” The Independent Review 21: 251-74.
John Merrifield and Barry Poulson. 2016b. Can the Debt Growth be Stopped? Rules Based Policy Options for Addressing the Federal Fiscal Crisis. New York, Lexington Books.
Thomas Piketty. 2014. Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez. 2007. “How Progressive is the U.S. Federal Tax System? A Historical and International Perspective,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 21: 3-24.
Copyright (c) 2016 by EH.Net. All rights reserved. This work may be copied for non-profit educational uses if proper credit is given to the author and the list. For other permission, please contact the EH.Net Administrator (administrator@eh.net). Published by EH.Net (December 2016). All EH.Net reviews are archived at http://eh.net/book-reviews/
terça-feira, 6 de dezembro de 2016
Rumo ao mundo sinocentrico? - palestra de Oliver Stuenkel no IPRI (Brasilia, 13/12/2016)
O presidente da
Funag, embaixador Sérgio Eduardo Moreira Lima, e o Diretor do Instituto de Pesquisa
de Relações Internacionais (IPRI), Paulo Roberto de Almeida, convidam para a
palestra-debate com o professor de Relações Internacionais da FGV-SP Oliver
Stuenkel, no auditório Paulo Nogueira Batista, no próximo dia 13/12, às 16:00hs.
Stuenkel, colaborador regular de diversas publicações na área de relações
internacionais e autor de vários livros – entre eles The Brics and the Future of Global Order (2015) e do recentemente
publicado Post-Western World (2016) –
falará sobre “Rumo ao mundo sinocêntrico? - As transformações globais e suas
implicações para o Brasil”.
Nota curricular:
Oliver
Stuenkel é Professor de Relações Internacionais da Fundação Getulio Vargas
(FGV) em São Paulo, onde coordena a Escola de Ciências Sociais e o MBA em
Relações Internacionais. Tem graduação pela Universidade de Valência, na
Espanha, Mestrado em Políticas Públicas pela Kennedy School of Government de
Harvard University, e Doutorado em Ciência Política pela Universidade de
Duisburg-Essen, na Alemanha. É autor de três livros, entre eles Post-Western
World: How Emerging Power Are Remaking Global Order (2016, Polity) e colunista
da revista Americas Quarterly.
Mister Trump parece facilitar as coisas para a China na America Latina - Oliver Stuenkel
Oliver Stuenkel deve fazer uma palestra no IPRI (Funag, Brasília), que estou dirigindo, no próximo dia 13/12, quando deve falar, justamente sobre a possível "sinização" do Brasil, da América Latina, do mundo (o que vier antes...).
Vou informar mais detalhadamente.
Este artigo parece preparar o terreno para o debate.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Vou informar mais detalhadamente.
Este artigo parece preparar o terreno para o debate.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Web Exclusive
How Trump Benefits China in Latin America
Growing Chinese engagement in the region will test Latin America's ability to adapt.
Anderson Riedel (flickr - Michel Temer) November 7, 2013 CC by 2.0
The timing was perfect, and the symbolism could not have been stronger. A mere week after Donald Trump’s upset victory stunned the world, Xi Jinping traveled to Lima for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit and projected China as a bastion of stability, predictability and openness. With the U.S. increasingly skeptical of globalization, Xi promised that China would stand up for free trade. Faced with an emerging global leadership vacuum, Beijing was quick to recognize a window of opportunity. Compared with the abrasive U.S. president-elect, the Chinese president, with his avuncular charm, seemed to have a soothing effect on the gathering in the Peruvian capital.
No region in the world will remain unaffected by the unprecedented combination of the United States as a source of uncertainty and China as a potential stabilizer. The consequences for Latin America, however, are particularly important, as the recent political shift in the region has led to a growing consensus that greater openness to trade is a prerequisite to economic recovery. While trade negotiators in Brasília and Buenos Aires may have hoped for a deal with Europe or the United States, Beijing increasingly looks like the only partner offering a meaningful opportunity, building on already existing free-trade agreements with Costa Rica, Peru and Chile. Similarly, when it comes to attracting investors to modernize the region’s rotten infrastructure, no country offers as much as the Middle Kingdom. China, free to promote alternative trade deals now that Trump promised he would pull out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), faces a world of opportunities in Latin America.
This trend may be accelerated if U.S. policy toward the region resembles that of former President George W. Bush. During his presidency, more pressing short-term priorities elsewhere (such as the “war on terror”) caused Washington to largely turn away from Latin America, allowing China to boost its influence. Much suggests a similar scenario will materialize again over the next four years. Chinese trade with Latin America has grown more than 20-fold over the past fifteen years. Xi announced that Chinese companies will invest a quarter of a trillion dollars in the region over the next decade, diversifying from traditional industries such as mining, oil and gas to areas like finance, agriculture and infrastructure (energy, airports, ports and roads).
Yet for Latin America, Beijing’s growing engagement is a mixed blessing. As China increasingly focuses on value-added goods, it now purchases fewer commodities from Latin America but sells more to the region, causing Latin America’s trade deficit with China to increase. Countries like Brazil face a risk of deindustrialization and face direct competition as they seek to export to its neighborhood. Chinese imports are affecting, among others, industrial machinery, textiles, footwear and clothing, while copper, iron, oil and soybeans account for the greatest share of the region’s exports to China. Many new projects that China may finance (such as the Trans-Amazonian Railway from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean) would help integrate the region, but also enhance Latin America’s dependence on China, in addition to posing threats to the environment and creating relatively few jobs.
Lack of preparedness
China’s growing influence is remarkable, but it should not come as a surprise. Brazil's former Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira argued as early as 1974 that China "had consolidated itself as an emerging power," urging then-President Ernesto Geisel to normalize diplomatic relations with the country. And yet, particularly in Brazil, the lack of preparedness and knowledge about China on most policy-making levels is remarkable. During debates in Brasília, comments often reveal a worrying degree of ignorance of Chinese affairs. Yet governments are not the only ones to blame. Thinkers both left and right of the ideological spectrum are often stuck in a 20th century Western-centric worldview, still regarding the United States as the source of most good and evil. The left still regards U.S. meddling in the region as the most urgent concern at a time when Chinese clout in capitals like Caracas now exceeds Washington’s influence even in countries that are seen as pro-U.S., such as Colombia. Mostly through the China Development Bank, Beijing now lends far more to the region than the World Bank.
Oblivious to these trends, it is not uncommon to witness dinner party debates among left-of-center Brazilian intellectuals about whether the Lava Jato corruption investigation and former President Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment are actually schemes by the FBI to destroy Petrobras (as a professor at USP, a leading university, recently argued in a newspaper interview).
All the while, Brazil’s Foreign Minister José Serra is said to have only a vague understanding of Asia, and was recently unable to name the members of the BRICS grouping during an interview. Add to that the absence of sinologists and Brazilian foreign correspondents based in China, the result is a disturbing unpreparedness for an increasingly Asia-centric world.
Designing a regional strategy
What is to be done? For starters, while Peru, Chile and others have already begun to adapt to new realities, foreign ministries in the region should coordinate their positions regarding China better to avoid competing for Chinese largesse, which will lead to a race to the bottom. That involves discussing and possibly aligning legislation regarding Chinese investments, transnational environmental rules for Chinese-financed projects that cross borders, and cohesive policies regarding bigger questions such as China’s role in the World Trade Organization.
This discussion should also include a broad debate, all ideological passions aside, about how the emerging global competition between Washington and Beijing can be used to the region’s advantage. That requires being as knowledgeable about domestic affairs in Beijing as in Washington, which, given the opacity of China, requires a far greater diplomatic presence than most countries possess today.
Considering the influence China already has on Latin American economics and politics (for example, the current situation in Venezuela is impossible to understand without making sense of China’s role as a lender), the lack of a regional debate over how to grapple with the implications of multipolarity is remarkable. The longer policy makers in the region wait, the smaller their capacity to learn to operate in the new environment.
--
Stuenkel is a contributing columnist for Americas Quarterly and teaches International Relations at the Getulio Vargas Foundation in São Paulo. He is the author of The BRICS and the Future of Global Order (2015) and the Post-Western World (2016).
Any opinions expressed in this piece do not necessarily reflect those of Americas Quarterly or its publishers.
sexta-feira, 28 de outubro de 2016
Guerra Fria, 1962: término da crise dos misseis em 28 de outubro
NESTA DATA
Crise dos Mísseis chega ao fim
Em 28 de outubro de 1962, a União Soviética concordou em retirar seus mísseis de sua base militar em Cuba, encerrando a Crise dos Mísseis
Em 28 de outubro de 1962, o líder da União Soviética Nikita Kruschev decidiu retirar seus mísseis do território cubano, o que encerrou o episódio conhecido como a Crise dos Mísseis. Em troca, o presidente americano John Kennedy teve que respeitar soberania territorial de Cuba e também teve que retirar os mísseis americanos da Turquia.
O caso teve início após um avião de espionagem americano ter sobrevoado o território cubano em 14 de outubro de 1962 e visto o que parecia ser uma base militar em construção. Dias depois, as autoridades americanas descobriram que os soviéticos estavam instalando diversos mísseis nucleares na ilha caribenha, com alcance para atingir o solo americano.
Em 22 de outubro, o presidente americano comunicou a população sobre a existência desses mísseis e da possibilidade de um ataque nuclear soviético, o que iniciaria mais uma guerra mundial. No entanto, do lado soviético, Kruschev alegou que a instalação dos mísseis tinha como finalidade de impedir que houvesse uma nova invasão dos Estados Unidos à Cuba, como a ocorrida em 1961, no chamado “Ataque à Baia dos Porcos”, para derrubar o governo de Fidel Castro.
O período ficou marcado pela grande tensão dos dois lados, devido ao poderio bélico-nuclear de ambas as nações hegemônicas. Após dias de negociações entre Kennedy e Kruschev, os dois líderes chegaram a um acordo pela retirada da base soviética em Cuba no dia 28 de outubro.
Como consequência desse conflito, as relações diplomáticas entre os dois países ficaram bastante instáveis. Contudo, em 1968, Estados Unidos e União Soviética assinaram o Tratado de Não-Proliferação de Armas Nucleares.
quarta-feira, 24 de agosto de 2016
Golpe militar de 1964 no Brasil: mais documentos dos EUA - NSArchives
Continuando a postagem de alguns documentos relevantes para nossa própria história.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
|
BRAZIL
MARKS 40th ANNIVERSARY OF MILITARY COUP
DECLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS SHED LIGHT ON U.S. ROLE
Audio
tape: President Johnson urged taking "every step that we
can" to support overthrow of Joao Goulart
U.S.
Ambassador Requested Pre-positioned Armaments to aid Golpistas;
Acknowledged covert operations backing street demonstrations, civic
forces and resistance groups
Edited
by Peter Kornbluh
peter.kornbluh@gmail.com / 202 994-7116 |
Washington D.C., 31 March 2004 - "I think we ought to take every step that we can, be prepared to do everything that we need to do," President Johnson instructed his aides regarding preparations for a coup in Brazil on March 31, 1964. On the 40th anniversary of the military putsch, the National Security Archive today posted recently declassified documents on U.S. policy deliberations and operations leading up to the overthrow of the Goulart government on April 1, 1964. The documents reveal new details on U.S. readiness to back the coup forces.
The Archive's posting includes a declassified audio tape of Lyndon Johnson being briefed by phone at his Texas ranch, as the Brazilian military mobilized against Goulart. "I'd put everybody that had any imagination or ingenuity…[CIA Director John] McCone…[Secretary of Defense Robert] McNamara" on making sure the coup went forward, Johnson is heard to instruct undersecretary of State George Ball. "We just can't take this one," the tape records LBJ's opinion. "I'd get right on top of it and stick my neck out a little."
Among the documents are Top Secret cables sent by U.S. Ambassador Lincoln Gordon who forcefully pressed Washington for direct involvement in supporting coup plotters led by Army Chief of Staff General Humberto Castello Branco. "If our influence is to be brought to bear to help avert a major disaster here-which might make Brazil the China of the 1960s-this is where both I and all my senior advisors believe our support should be placed," Gordon wrote to high State Department, White House and CIA officials on March 27, 1964.
To assure the success of the coup, Gordon recommended "that measures be taken soonest to prepare for a clandestine delivery of arms of non-US origin, to be made available to Castello Branco supporters in Sao Paulo." In a subsequent cable, declassified just last month, Gordon suggested that these weapons be "pre-positioned prior any outbreak of violence," to be used by paramilitary units and "friendly military against hostile military if necessary." To conceal the U.S. role, Gordon recommended the arms be delivered via "unmarked submarine to be off-loaded at night in isolated shore spots in state of Sao Paulo south of Santos."
Gordon's cables also confirm CIA covert measures "to help strengthen resistance forces" in Brazil. These included "covert support for pro-democracy street rallies…and encouragement [of] democratic and anti-communist sentiment in Congress, armed forces, friendly labor and student groups, church, and business." Four days before the coup, Gordon informed Washington that "we may be requesting modest supplementary funds for other covert action programs in the near future." He also requested that the U.S. send tankers carrying "POL"-petroleum, oil and lubricants-to facilitate the logistical operations of the military coup plotters, and deploy a naval task force to intimidate Goulart's backers and be in position to intervene militarily if fighting became protracted.
Although the CIA is widely known to have been involved in covert action against Goulart leading up to the coup, its operational files on intervention in Brazil remain classified-to the consternation of historians. Archive analyst Peter Kornbluh called on the Agency to "lift the veil of secrecy off one of the most important episodes of U.S. intervention in the history of Latin America" by completely declassifying the record of CIA operations in Brazil. Both the Clinton and Bush administrations conducted significant declassifications on the military regimes in Chile and Argentina, he noted. "Declassification of the historical record on the 1964 coup and the military regimes that followed would advance U.S. interests in strengthening the cause of democracy and human rights in Brazil, and in the rest of Latin America," Kornbluh said.
On March 31, the documents show, Gordon received a secret telegram from Secretary of State Dean Rusk stating that the Administration had decided to immediately mobilize a naval task force to take up position off the coast of Brazil; dispatch U.S. Navy tankers "bearing POL" from Aruba; and assemble an airlift of 110 tons of ammunition and other equipment including "CS agent"-a special gas for mob control. During an emergency White House meeting on April 1, according to a CIA memorandum of conversation, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara told President Johnson that the task force had already set sail, and an Esso tanker with motor and aviation gasoline would soon be in the vicinity of Santos. An ammunition airlift, he reported, was being readied in New Jersey and could be sent to Brazil within 16 hours.
Such U.S. military support for the military coup proved unnecessary; Castello Branco's forces succeeded in overthrowing Goulart far faster and with much less armed resistance then U.S. policy makers anticipated. On April 2, CIA agents in Brazil cabled that "Joao Goulart, deposed president of Brazil, left Porto Alegre about 1pm local time for Montevideo."
The documents and cables refer to the coup forces as "the democratic rebellion." After General Castello Branco's takeover, the military ruled Brazil until 1985.
Note: Documents are in PDF format. You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.
Hear/Read the Documents
l) White House Audio Tape, President Lyndon B. Johnson discussing the impending coup in Brazil with Undersecretary of State George Ball, March 31, 1964
This audio clip is available in several formats:2) State Department, Top Secret Cable from Rio De Janiero, March 27, 1964
Windows Media Audio - High bandwidth (7.11 MB)
Windows Media Audio - Low bandwidth (3.57 MB)
MP3 - (4.7 MB)
In this 5:08 minute White House tape obtained from the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, President Johnson is recorded speaking on the phone from his Texas ranch with Undersecretary of State George Ball and Assistant Secretary for Latin America, Thomas Mann. Ball briefs Johnson on that status of military moves in Brazil to overthrow the government of Joao Goulart who U.S. officials view as a leftist closely associated with the Brazilian Communist Party. Johnson gives Ball the green light to actively support the coup if U.S. backing is needed. "I think we ought to take every step that we can, be prepared to do everything that we need to do" he orders. In an apparent reference to Goulart, Johnson states "we just can't take this one." "I'd get right on top of it and stick my neck out a little," he instructs Ball.
Ambassador Lincoln Gordon wrote this lengthy, five part, cable to the highest national security officers of the U.S. government, including CIA director John McCone and the Secretaries of Defense and State, Robert McNamara and Dean Rusk. He provides an assessment that President Goulart is working with the Brazilian Communist Party to "seize dictatorial power" and urges the U.S. to support the forces of General Castello Branco. Gordon recommends "a clandestine delivery of arms" for Branco's supporters as well as a shipment of gas and oil to help the coup forces succeed and suggests such support will be supplemented by CIA covert operations. He also urges the administration to "prepare without delay against the contingency of needed overt intervention at a second stage."3) State Department, Top Secret Cable from Amb. Lincoln Gordon, March 29, 1964
Ambassador Gordon updates high U.S. officials on the deterioration of the situation in Brazil. In this cable, declassified on February 24, 2004 by the LBJ Presidential Library, he reiterates the "manifold" need to have a secret shipment of weapons "pre-positioned prior any outbreak of violence" to be "used by paramilitary units working with Democratic Military groups" and recommends a public statement by the administration "to reassure the large numbers of democrats in Brazil that we are not indifferent to the danger of a Communist revolution here."4) CIA, Intelligence Information Cable on "Plans of Revolutionary Plotters in Minas Gerias," March 30, 1964
The CIA station in Brazil transmitted this field report from intelligence sources in Belo Horizonte that bluntly stated "a revolution by anti-Goulart forces will definitely get under way this week, probably in the next few days. The cable transmits intelligence on military plans to "march toward Rio." The "revolution," the intelligence source predicted, "will not be resolved quickly and will be bloody."5) State Department, Secret Cable to Amb. Lincoln Gordon in Rio, March 31, 1964
Secretary of State Dean Rusk sends Gordon a list of the White House decisions "taken in order [to] be in a position to render assistance at appropriate time to anti-Goulart forces if it is decided this should be done." The decisions include sending US naval tankers loaded with petroleum, oil and lubricants from Aruba to Santos, Brazil; assembling 110 tons of ammunition and other equipment for pro-coup forces; and dispatching a naval brigade including an aircraft carrier, several destroyers and escorts to conduct be positioned off the coast of Brazil. Several hours later, a second cable is sent amending the number of ships, and dates they will be arriving off the coast.6) CIA, Secret Memorandum of Conversation on "Meeting at the White House 1 April 1964 Subject-Brazil," April 1, 1964
This memorandum of conversation records a high level meeting, held in the White House, between President Johnson and his top national security aides on Brazil. CIA deputy chief of Western Hemisphere operations, Desmond Fitzgerald recorded the briefing given to Johnson and the discussion on the progress of the coup. Defense Secretary reported on the movements of the naval task force sailing towad Brazil, and the arms and ammunition being assembled in New Jersey to resupply the coup plotters if necessary.7) CIA, Intelligence Information Cable on "Departure of Goulart from Porto Alegre for Montevideo," April 2, 1964
The CIA station in Brazil reports that the deposed president, Joao Goulart, left Brazil for exile in Uruguay at l pm, on April 2. His departure marks the success of the military coup in Brazil.
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