OMC afetada pela guerra de agressão russa contra a Ucrânia - Jamil Chade

 ✺ THE WAR IN UKRAINE CONTAMINATES THE WORK AT THE WTO

By Jamil Chade
Geneva, april 22/04/2022

The war in Ukraine continues to disrupt the work of an already deadlocked World Trade Organisation (WTO). Across different committees, negotiations, and working groups, the mutual accusations between Kiev and Moscow are overshadowing all other issues.

A case in point was the March 24–25 meeting of the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS). In the end, members did manage to raise 48 specific trade concerns on topics including restrictions and approval procedures for imports of animal and plant products, pesticide policies, and maximum residue levels. However, the meeting offered an opportunity for Ukraine to underline the impact of Russia’s invasion on its economy.

Ukraine warned that its participation on the Committee had been jeopardized by the Russian military invasion. “Military aggression of one member towards another WTO member puts the multilateral trading system and the institution in an unprecedented situation, one that does not allow us to conduct business as usual,” Ukraine’s delegate said. According to the country’s own estimates, as of last week, direct economic losses caused by Russia’s military aggression had already reached $565 billion.

Ukraine thanked those governments that have adopted strong economic sanctions and trade measures against Russia, and pressed for the “comprehensive support of all WTO members to end the Russian aggression against Ukraine with all available WTO tools.” Countries such as Japan, Canada, Norway, Australia, the United States, Korea, the United Kingdom and New Zealand took the floor to condemn the Russian invasion, reaffirming their commitment to ensure the Russian government pays a severe economic and diplomatic price for their aggression against Ukraine.

Russia responded that the WTO is a rule-based trade organization and should remain as such. The Russian delegation denounced what it considers a politicization of the WTO which leads to the fragmentation of the multilateral trading system. The Russian representative stressed that members should refrain from discussing political issues at the WTO.

On March 30, the conflict dominated the agenda again during the meetings of the Committee on Market Access. The war was not on the initial agenda, but Ukraine used a procedural clause to bring the issue to the fore. The delegation shared, “as a matter of urgency and for the sake of transparency,” a notification (https://nam12.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdocs.wto.org%2Fdol2fe%2FPages%2FSS%2Fdirectdoc.aspx%3Ffilename%3Dq%3A%2FG%2FMAQRN%2FUKR5A2.pdf%26Open%3DTrue&data=04%7C01%7C%7Ca39dba2c33f945817a1908da12fbc4ff%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C637843169833522997%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&sdata=CNlPtAr41osFB7AEspsgVrWq8n3tDk6CZQFImoUdccg%3D&reserved=0&mc_cid=fb3e64f45b&mc_eid=UNIQID)  dated March 25, which indicates that “due to Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the Government of Ukraine was forced to introduce export restriction measures on certain products in order to ensure national food
security.”

The restrictions apply to multiple food products, including: Live bovine animals, meat of bovine animals, frozen meat and edible meat by-products, poultry and eggs, wheat, corn, rye, oats, buckwheat, millet, sugar, salt and sunflower oil.
“OUR FARMERS ARE RISKING THEIR LIVES AS THEY HAVE ALREADY STARTED THE SOWING SEASON IN SOME REGIONS OF UKRAINE.”
The Ukrainian delegate said that active military actions have already halted trade and destroyed many sown areas and farms, adding that “even under these circumstances, our farmers are risking their lives as they have already started the sowing season in some regions of Ukraine.”

The Russian delegate claimed that consideration of global or regional security matters and UN Charter compliance does not fall under the mandate of the Committee on Market Access, and asked the chair to moderate the discussion accordingly. Delegates should be reminded that they are violating rules that they have themselves developed and adopted, Russia insisted, “Otherwise, we’re running the risk [of becoming] a medieval bazaar rather than a WTO committee meeting. I urge delegates to exercise self-restraint.”

Predictably, however, the meeting quickly became another platform for countries to reiterate their condemnation of the Russian invasion, and to point out the pertinence of the issue. The United Kingdom was first to take the floor, sharing its own notification on the decision to implement an additional 35% tariff for a number of goods originating in Russia and Belarus. The UK said it will continue to work with its allies and partners across the multilateral system to condemn Russia’s appalling actions and to isolate it on the international stage.

This discussion is absolutely relevant to the committee, the EU delegation said: “We could try and ignore the international context in which our meeting is taking place, but that would not [negate] the important impact the war has had on market access related issues, which have been felt all over the world”.

The United States also spoke of unity and reiterated its commitment to ensure the Russian government will pay a severe economic and diplomatic price for their actions, which, it noted, are incompatible with the rules-based system.

Russia responded by claiming that unilateral measures are the reason for a drastic increase in the cost of freight and insurance for Russian products, including agricultural ones. “Additional costs […] are passed on to consumers, resulting in growing global food prices,” the Russian delegate said. Moreover, disrupted plans of international commodity traders and international banks have resulted in reduced shipments of agricultural products to the global market.

The Russians also pointed to a number of measures which it saw as inconsistent with WTO provisions: implementation of import tariffs above MFN rates; import bans on Russian oil and refined oil products, as well as natural gas and coal; restrictions on exports to Russia of various goods, including oil refining equipment and technologies, foodstuff, and other goods; impeding Russian financial institutions, transportation companies and export support agencies; banning Russia’s use of EU seaports; and the freezing of a substantial part of the country’s currency reserves. For Moscow, “this is a robbery, if we call a spade a spade.”

The discussions on COVID-19 vaccines have not been spared. In the first half of March, during a meeting of the TRIPS Council, Ukraine simply asked members to refrain from engaging with the Russian delegation, claiming that “the Russian Federation has clearly abandoned the basic principles and values that the GATT and the WTO have promoted for almost 80 years since the end of World War II.”

-JC
READ OUR PREVIOUS BRIEFINGS (https://us19.campaign-archive.com/home/?u=b3372615f7a316d6426d48fc4&id=8a3adfe528&mc_cid=fb3e64f45b&mc_eid=UNIQID)

French Elections: Is Marine Le Pen a Fascist? - Robert Zaretsky (Foreign Policy)

  Uma análise do campo da direita na França, persistente e cada vez mais radical.

Analysis

Is Marine Le Pen a Fascist?

The French presidential contender’s reliance on referenda suggests she is more of a Bonapartist.

By Robert Zaretsky, a professor of history at the University of Houston’s Honors College and the author of Victories Never Last: Reading and Caregiving in a Time of Plague. 

 

Foreign Policy, April 21, 2022 

https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/21/france-election-le-pen-ideology/?utm_source=PostUp&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Editors%20Picks%20OC&utm_term=41624&tpcc=Editors%20Picks%20OC

Ever since its publication in 1954, historian René Remond’s classic work Les Droites en France has framed and, at times, enflamed how French historians discuss the political right. A growing number of scholars have, of late, insisted that Remond’s analysis is obsolete, superseded by events over the past few decades. Yet, the event that now rivets our attention—the faceoff between candidate Marine Le Pen, a figure often described in France as a “facho,” or fascist, and French President Emmanuel Macron in the second round of France’s presidential election on Sunday—suggests that Remond is more relevant than ever.
With the French Revolution, not only was the political left born but so too was the right. Although historians tend to focus on the former —1789 was, after all, all about liberty, equality, and fraternity—Remond turned to the latter. The funny thing about the right, he observed, was there was not one but three rights—triplets that, to varying degrees, resented the event that had heaved them into the world.
The first to appear was the Legitimist, fanatical about reversing the revolution and restoring the Bourbons. Then came the Orléanist, dedicated to the parliamentary legacy of the revolution but determined to keep out the people. The oddest offspring, however, was the romantic Bonapartists, dedicated to a ruler who, by channeling the will of the people, guaranteed their equality, glorified their fraternity, and garroted their liberty.
In 1851, the first (and last president) of the Second Republic, Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte, used two tricks from the repertoire of his uncle, Napoléon Bonaparte. First, he overthrew the republic by a coup; second, he offered a plebiscite—a vote by French citizens—to legitimize the coup. Just as the elder Napoleon employed a plebiscite to ratify his self-promotion from first consul to emperor, the younger Napoleon harnessed it to transform himself from former president to future emperor. What had been, under the Roman Republic, a device of democracy had become, under the Bonapartes, an accomplice of autocracy.
In this campaign, Le Pen has emphasized the issue of pouvoir d’achat (“purchasing power”) over her more traditional focus on immigration. Although some of Le Pen’s aides worried that this move would repel her base, it has proven to be a canny move. With the war in Ukraine stoking inflationary pressures in France, Le Pen appears to some voters as not just prescient but also presidential. Last week, a Le Figaro poll revealed that a clear majority of French—54 percent—believe that she, not Macron, is more sympathetic to their lot and more capable to help them make ends meet.
But a different kind of pouvoir has always been Le Pen’s real focus. This became clear at a tense press conference last week. Sitting behind a wall of microphones, she declared that France faced an “unprecedented democratic crisis” and that referendums were its cure. After becoming president, Le Pen vowed that she would “organize a referendum on the essential questions of the control of immigration, the protection of the French identity, and the primacy of national rights.” In the referendum, the French would vote up or down on “la priorité nationale”: a proposal blocking noncitizens living in France from seeking employment, housing, health care, and social benefits. A yes from the people would make “national priority” the law of the land.

Because Le Pen also wants to ditch the principle of jus soli, which confers citizenship of those born on French soil, the number of noncitizens would increase dramatically. Moreover, as most constitutional scholars insist, such a law would violate the principle of equality embedded in every constitution France has enacted, stretching from the “Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen” to the constitution of the Fifth Republic. Passage of this law, declared constitutional expert Dominique Rousseau, would “be like a coup d’état.”
During her initial campaign, Le Pen had sought, with some success, to soften her abrasive and aloof image by distancing herself from her father’s persona. Yet the press conference revealed that she had no more changed than her party did when its name changed from the National Front—bequeathed to her by her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen—to the gentler Rassemblement National, or National Rally.
Little distinguishes Marine’s notion of “national priority” from “national preference,” the term employed by her father during his time as leader of the National Front. Similarly, the daughter’s use of phrases like “unprecedented democratic crisis” is bland shorthand for her father’s earlier and earthier claims that France’s political class, though mouthing republican and democratic pieties, was nothing more than “a cosmopolitan, totalitarian, and corrupt oligarchy.”
Since the elite firmly controls the levers of institutional power, the solution both Le Pens have offered is a referendum. In the 2002 presidential election, when he stunned the world by reaching the second round, Jean-Marie attacked what he called “creeping totalitarianism under the mask of democracy.” Hence, he called for the “establishment of a national and popular republic based on the use of referendums.” This would return to the people, Jean-Marie declared, the voice they had lost.
Jean-Marie’s appeal fell on deaf ears: He was trounced by Jacques Chirac, who won more than 80 percent of the vote in the second round. But Marine believes the promise of a plebiscitary democracy is a winning proposition. Along with a referendum on national priority, she would encourage further referenda on what she calls citizen initiatives. They could, she has said, address “every subject,” including the death penalty and abortion, and require just 500,000 signatures to be launched. (Such referendums are possible even now, but crucially, they require 4 million, not 500,000, signatures to reach critical institutional mass.)
Marine Le Pen has marinated too long in her father’s ideological stew to forget the referendum as an essential ingredient. But does its presence in the Le Pen stew make it taste more like Bonapartism than fascism? In the final edition of Remond’s book, published in 1982, the historian argued this was the case. He noted that the National Rally party, like its earlier iterations, from the Boulangist movement in the 1880s to the Poujadist movement of the 1950s, issued not from the left—which is the case of fascism—but from the right; that it sought to conserve, not destroy, traditional social structures; and that it aspired to authoritarian, not totalitarian control. In effect, whereas fascism denies the legitimacy and legacy of the Enlightenment and French Revolution, Bonapartism accepts aspects of both.
Moreover, Bonapartism, unlike totalitarianism, bases itself on plebiscitary principle. Both Napoléons turned to the people, not their representatives, to legitimize their coups against the republics they once led. While Le Pen is not planning an actual coup, her promise to hold a referendum nevertheless smacks of the Bonapartist tradition. One hitch: There is no legal means for Le Pen to either enact or act upon such a referendum. Although two articles allow for changes in the constitution through referendums, they are very clear on the whys and whens. In the case of Article 89, the constitution can be revised only after the most rigorous process. If each of the two legislative chambers—the National Assembly and the Senate—pass the proposed change, they must then meet in a joint session, where the bill requires a three-fifths majority to pass. Only then can voters decide its fate in the form of a referendum.
Not surprisingly, only once has a constitutional change—shortening the presidential term of office from seven to five years in 2000—managed to jump through all of these hoops. No less important, Le Pen knows that even if there was a majority in the National Assembly to support her proposal, the Senate, which is not facing elections, would prevent it from going any further.
This leaves Article 11, which allows the president to submit a referendum on the “organization of the public authorities” or with “economic or social policy … [or] public services.” According to legal experts, the constitutional change Le Pen seeks does not qualify under any of these rubrics. In 1962, this did not stop then-French President Charles de Gaulle, who famously used this article to change the constitution to allow the direct election of the president by popular suffrage. De Gaulle’s gamble paid off: More than 60 percent of voters marked “oui” on their ballots and, quite suddenly, the already awesome powers of the presidency were dramatically reinforced.
Inevitably, Le Pen made this Gaullist connection not only during her press conference but also at the end of last night’s debate against Macron, when she trumpeted her plan to hatch “une renaissance démocratique.” To hasten this rebirth, Le Pen again promised to enable citizens to launch referenda. More important, she cited de Gaulle when she pledged to offer a referendum on adding “national priority” to the constitution. “Let me be clear: I will use Article 11, as did General de Gaulle in 1962.”
Perhaps if she had made this claim earlier in the debate, Macron would have replied that de Gaulle’s use of the referendum was, at the time, widely seen as an extra-constitutional act. It sparked a political firestorm, enraging not just the left and center but also former Gaullists like the Senate’s then-leader, Gaston Monnerville.
He might have added two other crucial elements to this story. First, the 1962 referendum spurred the Constitutional Council to make clear that Article 11 cannot be used to do the very thing Le Pen seeks to do—namely, alter the fundamental text of the constitution. Second, in 1969, de Gaulle again used the referendum, this time to reform the Senate. Unlike the earlier referendum, this one fell flat, and almost immediately, de Gaulle announced he would resign from office.
This decision reflected, at least for de Gaulle, the plebiscitary nature of referendums. He understood it was a vote less against the proposed law than against his own person. Yet when Le Pen was asked if she would step down should her referendum fail, she replied she would not. It would mean, she explained, a political, not personal, failure. Whether this, too, is Bonapartist is an open question. What does seem clear, though, is that whether it is Bonapartist or fascist, a Le Pen government will seek to radically change France not for the better but for the worse.

Robert Zaretsky is a professor of history at the University of Houston’s Honors College and the author of Victories Never Last: Reading and Caregiving in a Time of Plague.

 

Bolsonaro avalia tirar Carlos França do comando do Itamaraty - Robson Bonin (Veja-Radar)

Minha opinião: eu acho que seria muito ruim para a imagem internacional do Brasil, mas muito bom para a carreira do Carlos França, para que não termine como o ex-chanceler acidental...

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Bolsonaro avalia tirar Carlos França do comando do Itamaraty

Presidente têm conversado com especialistas da área internacional do governo para encontrar um novo ministro das Relações Exteriores

Por Robson Bonin

Veja (Radar), 21 abr 2022

Descontente com as posições do Itamaraty em discussões internacionais — inclusive em temas recentes no Conselho de Segurança da ONU –, o presidente Jair Bolsonaro começou a ouvir figuras importantes do governo para encontrar um nome que substitua o chanceler Carlos Alberto França no comando do Itamaraty.

A situação do chanceler se deteriorou no Planalto nos últimos meses e piorou bastante nas últimas semanas, quando o Brasil não seguiu países árabes — além de Estados Unidos, Rússia, China, França e Reino Unido — numa discussão no Conselho de Segurança da ONU que condenava ações terroristas no Oriente Médio. Bolsonaro, ao ser cobrado sobre a posição da diplomacia brasileira, sequer havia sido informado pelo chanceler do assunto.

Diante da crise provocada pela falta de apoio do Brasil a países árabes, Bolsonaro enviou o almirante Flávio Rocha, secretário Especial de Assuntos Estratégicos, aos Emirados Árabes para desfazer o mal estar criado pela posição brasileira. A troca de comando na diplomacia brasileira é questão de tempo.

China’s discourse power operations in the Global South - Kenton Thibaut (Atlantic Council)

Report

Atlantic Council, April 20, 2022

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/chinas-discourse-power-operations-in-the-global-south/

China’s discourse power operations in the Global South

By Kenton Thibaut

As China’s military and economic power has grown, so too has its investment in propaganda and influence operations. Following Xi Jinping’s rise to power and China’s adoption of a more confrontational foreign policy, the country saw a need to sway global public opinion in its favor. Beijing refers to this as “discourse power,” a strategy to increase China’s standing on the world stage by promoting pro-China narratives while criticizing geopolitical rivals. The end goal is to shape a world that is more amenable to China’s expressions, and expansion, of power.

China sees the Global South as an important vector for enhancing discourse power and has deployed a number of tactics to disseminate Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-approved narratives there. Two pillars of its strategy include “using international friends for international propaganda” (通过国际友人开展国际传播) and “borrowing a boat out to sea (借船出海).” The first pillar relies on co-opting the voices of foreigners (and foreign leaders) to spread pro-China messaging. The second pillar relies on using international platforms to spread Chinese propaganda in target environments. This includes expanding China’s media footprint, conducting propaganda campaigns, and leveraging Beijing’s influence to gain government support for its initiatives in international forums like the United Nations. 

The logic behind this strategy is that, as China has begun to take a more active role in global affairs, Beijing has seen the need to address the potential for collective mobilization in response to its behavior. China understands that countries like the United States and the United Kingdom are assessing its expansionism and have already moved to counter its influence. By gaining control of the narrative to depict its expanding role in the world as legitimate, rules-based, and win-win, China is seeking to shift the burden of proof onto Western countries and silence potential critics. Xi outlined this strategy in a May 2021 speech to the Central Committee, emphasizing that China must “expand [its] international communication through international friends,” adding that these “foreign friends” will be the country’s “top soldiers of propaganda against the enemy” as China rises.

To this end, one focus of China’s global discourse power push has been to foster buy-in from leaders in the Global South for Chinese-defined norms. This includes its principles of “non-interference” in other countries’ internal affairs and on a concept of “human rights” that actively subordinates personal and civic freedoms in favor of state-centered economic development. It is meant to stand in opposition to a Western human rights framework that China criticizes as having been used for interventionist ends, for example, in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Beijing also sees control over the media environment as critical for enhancing its discourse power so that it can spread a positive “China story” (讲好中国故事). In doing so, it is better able to promote its image as a responsible power and gain support for China’s model of international relations—one that privileges state sovereignty over universal human rights, government control over public discourse, and authoritarianism over democracy. As Chinese scholars Mi Guanghong and Mi Yang put it, “strengthening the dissemination, influence and creativity of external propaganda is [in the fundamental interests of] the country, with profound practical significance.”

China’s discourse power strategy also involves creating multilateral regional organizations to advance its interests. This includes the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Africa, the Forum of China and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (China-CELAC Forum) in Latin America, and the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF) in the Middle East. China leverages its position in these forums to gain support for its international initiatives, to deepen its economic and political engagement, and to promote state narratives. For example, one concept central to China’s discourse power strategy is its vision to build a “community with a shared future”—language Chinese officials and diplomats often use in Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)-connected engagements with foreign counterparts to signify China’s pursuit of a multilateral approach to international relations as an alternative to the “unilateral” approach taken by the United States. This strategy is what Chinese scholars call the “subcutaneous injection” theory of communications—winning international “friends” who understand their own local contexts and are able to “tell China’s story” to allow for a more “immediate and quick” dissemination of Chinese discourse priorities in the region.

The regions addressed in this report—Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East—are located in the Global South, which is at the forefront of China’s discourse power push. This is for a number of reasons: China sees waning US involvement in these regions as an opportunity for it to win “international friends” as great-power competition increases; emerging economies offer fruitful opportunities to expand the scope and depth of the BRI, a massive predominantly infrastructure initiative; and Beijing wants to convince others of its “peaceful rise” in order to assuage growing concerns over its increasingly visible global presence. 

Yet these areas of the world have received less attention in public policy and research spaces than Chinese propaganda efforts in Western countries. In the meantime, the impacts of Chinese discourse power operations in these regions are affecting democratic norms and behaviors by constraining the space for organic civil society discourse and by further entrenching existing autocratic regimes. This report aims to shed light on China’s activities in these regions and to offer an initial assessment of the impacts of its efforts.

The first section of this report will provide an overview of Chinese discourse power operations, including its origins and aims. The second section is comprised of three regional subsections that focus on Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, respectively. Each subsection includes a broad overview of how the region fits into China’s global discourse power strategy and features an associated country case study. The case studies highlight recent Chinese influence campaigns and their effects on domestic political, social, and media environments.

The third and final section of this report synthesizes trends and themes, offering a preliminary assessment of their potential implications and impact.

Related Experts: Kenton Thibaut, Simin Kargar, Daniel Suárez Pérez, Andy Carvin, Iain Robertson, Emerson T. Brooking, and Jean le Roux

Download the Report: 

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Chinas_Discourse_Power_in_the_Global_South.pdf 

França: resultados do 1ro turno das eleições presidenciais

 Candidates

Vote %Vote count

Emmanuel Macron

LREM

27.8%

9,783,058

Marine Le Pen

RN

23.1%

8,133,828

Jean-Luc Mélenchon

LFI

22%

7,712,520

Éric Zemmour

Reconquête

7.1%

2,485,226

Valérie Pécresse

LR

4.8%

1,679,001

Yannick Jadot

EELV

4.6%

1,627,853

Jean Lassalle

Résistons

3.1%

1,101,387

Fabien Roussel

PCF

2.3%

802,422

Nicolas Dupont-Aignan

DLF

2.1%

725,176

Anne Hidalgo

PS

1.7%

616,478

Philippe Poutou

NPA

0.8%

268,904

Nathalie Arthaud

LO

0.6%

197,094

Alex Navalny, prisioneiro político de Putin, se dirige aos eleitores franceses às vésperas do 2do turno de Macron contra Le Pen, uma serviçal de Putin

Mensagem de Alex Navalny aos eleitores franceses: 

20/04/2022 

 

Alexey Navalny; @navalny

 

1/18 Je me rends compte de l'ironie de la situation : un prisonnier politique russe s'adresse aux électeurs français. Mais techniquement, je suis en prison à cause d’une plainte déposée par une entreprise française.

 

2/18 J’ai étudié le à l'université, et quand je viens à Paris, je porte une écharpe par tous les temps. Donc, ce pays m’est proche, et je vais essayer.

 

3/18 C’est sans hésitation aucune que j'appelle les Français à voter pour @EmmanuelMacron le 24 avril, mais je voudrais m’adresser à ceux qui n'excluent pas de voter pour @MLP_officiel. Je voudrais vous parler de la corruption et du conservatisme.

 

4/18 Avant tout, mes collègues et moi menons des enquêtes sur la corruption en Russie et j'en sais plus que les autres.

 

5/18 Et, en plus, j'ai passé de nombreuses années à créer une coalition politique anti-Poutine composée non seulement de libéraux, mais aussi de conservateurs de droite qui voyaient justement

@MLP_officiel

comme un exemple à suivre.

 

6/18 On m’a beaucoup critiqué pour ça, mais je crois que ma capacité de parler avec des personnes aux opinions politiques différentes est mon avantage et je ne pense pas que tous ceux avec qui je suis en désaccord doivent être effacés de l’arène politique.

 

7/18 La corruption. J'ai été choqué d’apprendre que la partie @MLP_officiel a obtenu un prêt de 9 millions d'euros auprès de la banque FRCB. Croyez-moi, il ne s'agit pas d'une simple «affaire douteuse».

 

8/18 Cette banque est une agence de blanchiment d'argent bien connue qui a été créée à l'instigation de Poutine. Ça vous plairait si un politicien français obtenait un prêt auprès de la Cosa Nostra? Bon, ça, c'est pareil.

 

9/18 Je ne doute pas un seul instant que leurs négociations avec ces gens et leurs transactions avec eux comportent un accord politique secret. C'est de la corruption. Et c'est une vente de l'influence politique à Poutine.

 

10/18 Le conservatisme. À chaque fois que la droite européenne témoigne de la sympathie pour le «conservatisme» de Poutine, ça me laisse perplexe.

 

11/18 Poutine et son élite politique sont complètement immoraux, ils méprisent les valeurs familiales : avoir une deuxième et même une troisième famille, des amantes et des yachts, c'est la norme pour eux.

 

12/18 Ce sont des hypocrites. Tout récemment, ils emprisonnaient des gens pour la Bible, et maintenant, ils se signent dans des églises. Ils détestent la classe moyenne et traitent les travailleurs avec mépris. En Russie, ceux qui travaillent sont très pauvres.

 

13/18 Poutine a mis en œuvre une politique migratoire complètement insensée dans laquelle l'entrée libre de migrants de l'Asie centrale coïncide avec la transformation de ces migrants en esclaves privés de leurs droits.

14/18 Enfin, Poutine a créé et il soutient et profite d'un véritable État terroriste en Tchétchénie où des meurtres, des enlèvements et des intimidations sont devenus la norme.

 

15/18 C’est pour ça que tous ceux qui se disent « conservateurs » et qui sympathisent avec Poutine ne sont que des hypocrites sans scrupule.

 

16/18 Les élections, c’est toujours difficile. Mais il faut absolument y aller, au moins pour voter contre.

 

17/18Le 24 avril,je ne pourrai pas mettre d’écharpe en signe de solidarité avec les Français. Ça constitue une «violation du code vestimentaire» ici,ils peuvent même me mettre en cellule disciplinaire. Mais je soutiendrai quand même la France, les Français et 

@EmmanuelMacron

 

18/18 Vous pouvez en savoir plus sur notre travail et nous soutenir ici :

 https://t.co/C0YGJxCpML

 

 

 

México nacionaliza exploração de lítio - Deutsche Welle

 Mais um presidente esquerdista que acha que o governo pode fazer melhor do que o setor privado na exploração de produtos naturais. Vai criar uma LítioMex que só vai dar prejuízos ao país...

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

EconomiaMéxico

México nacionaliza exploração de lítio

Deutsche Welle, 20/04/2022

https://www.dw.com/pt-br/m%C3%A9xico-nacionaliza-explora%C3%A7%C3%A3o-de-l%C3%ADtio/a-61523059?maca=bra-GK_RSS_Chatbot_Mundo-31505-xml-media

Lei proíbe novas concessões privadas para explorar o metal e governo diz que irá rever as concessões vigentes. Presidente esquerdista López Obrador afirma que seu governo desenvolverá tecnologia para extrair o lítio.

O Senado mexicano aprovou nesta terça-feira (19/04) a nacionalização da exploração do lítio no país, defendida pelo presidente esquerdista Andrés Manuel López Obrador. A medida já havia sido aprovada no dia anterior pela Câmara dos Deputados.

O lítio é essencial para produzir baterias elétricas, e o tamanho exato das reservas do metal no México ainda não é conhecido. O governo mexicano estima que o país teria a décima maior reserva do mundo. 

A reforma na lei da mineração aprovada pelo Parlamento mexicano declara o minério "patrimônio da nação", proíbe qualquer nova concessão para exploração de lítio e estabelece que a exploração seja de exclusiva responsabilidade do Estado. López Obrador disse que o Estado mexicano desenvolverá a tecnologia para extrair o metal.

O presidente mexicano também afirmou que seu governo não permitirá que estrangeiros explorem lítio, mesmo que tenham concessões prévias, e que irá rever as concessões já aprovadas a empresas privadas, em referência aos 150 mil hectares concedidos pelo seu antecessor, Enrique Peña Nieto.

Representante de empresas cita "muita incerteza"

O presidente do Senado, Ricardo Monreal, e o partido governista Movimento para a Regeneração Nacional (Morena) saudaram a votação como um "dia histórico" para o México. Durante a aprovação na Câmara, deputados da oposição se retiraram do plenário em protesto contra a iniciativa e falaram em uma "artimanha" patrocinada pelo chefe do Executivo.

O presidente da Câmara Mexicana de Minas, Jaime Gutiérrez, criticou a alteração na lei de mineração. "Ainda não há informação sobre a quantidade de lítio que existe. Não é certo que tenhamos um volume de lítio do qual possamos nos beneficiar", disse Gutiérrez, frisando que a reforma "não era necessária" e criou "muita incerteza" para os investidores no setor mineiro.

A reforma da Lei da Mineração foi aprovada dois dias depois de López Obrador ter sido derrotado na Câmara em um projeto de reforma constitucional para ampliar o papel do setor público no mercado da eletricidade. O Morena e seus aliados conseguiram 275 votos para a reforma no setor elétrico, abaixo da maioria de dois terços, ou 334 votos, necessários.

Empresa chinesa já detém concessão

Uma empresa de capital chinês, a Bacanora Lithium, detém uma concessão no estado de Sonora, no noroeste do México, que permite a extração de 35 mil toneladas por ano de carbonato de lítio, que agora está sob risco de ser cancelada pelo governo.

O depósito de lítio em Sonora é considerado um dos maiores do mundo, com 8,8 milhões de toneladas equivalentes, com reservas que durariam 250 anos, segundo o governo.

Austrália, Chile, Argentina e China são os principais produtores de lítio do mundo. A Austrália produziu pelo menos 42 mil toneladas em 2019, de acordo com estatísticas da indústria.