segunda-feira, 8 de julho de 2013

Hannah Arendt: Eichmann in Jerusalem, a debate over a report and a movie


Misreading ‘Eichmann in Jerusalem’



The movie “Hannah Arendt,” which opened in New York in May, has unleashed emotional commentary that mirrors the fierce debate Arendt herself ignited over half a century ago, when she covered the trial of the notorious war criminal Adolf Eichmann. One of the pre-eminent political thinkers of the 20th century, Arendt, who died in 1975 at the age of 69, was a Jew arrested by the German police in 1933, forced into exile and later imprisoned in an internment camp. She escaped and fled to the United States in 1941, where she wrote the seminal books “The Origins of Totalitarianism” and “The Human Condition.”
It is easy to cite the ‘banality of evil.’ It is much more difficult to make sense of what Arendt actually meant.
When Arendt heard that Eichmann was to be put on trial, she knew she had to attend. It would be, she wrote, her last opportunity to see a major Nazi “in the flesh.” Writing in The New Yorker, she expressed shock that Eichmann was not a monster, but “terribly and terrifyingly normal.” Her reports for the magazine were compiled into a book, “Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil,” published in 1963.

The poet Robert Lowell proclaimed Arendt’s portrayal of Eichmann a “masterpiece,” a “terrifying expressionist invention applied with a force no imitator could rival.” Others excoriated Arendt as a self-hating Jew. Lionel Abel charged that Eichmann “comes off so much better in her book than do his victims.” Nearly every major literary and philosophical figure in New York chose sides in what the writer Irving Howe called a “civil war” among New York intellectuals — a war, he later predicted, that might “die down, simmer,” but will perennially “erupt again.” So it has.
This time, a new critical consensus is emerging, one that at first glimpse might seem to resolve the debates of a half century ago. This new consensus holds that Arendt was right in her general claim that many evildoers are normal people but was wrong about Eichmann in particular. As Christopher R. Browning summed it up recently in The New York Review of Books, “Arendt grasped an important concept but not the right example.”
Hannah Arendt in her Manhattan apartment, 1972.
Tyrone Dukes/The New York TimesHannah Arendt in her Manhattan apartment, 1972.
The many responses to the film — a feature by the German directorMargarethe von Trotta — have restated this conventional wisdom in some form.
In the German weekly Der Spiegel, Elke Schmitter argued that new evidence shows Eichmann’s “performance in Jerusalem was a successful deception” — that Arendt apparently missed the true Eichmann, a fanatical anti-Semite. In a review in The New Republic, Saul Austerlitzwrote that Arendt’s “book makes for good philosophy, but shoddy history.” David Owen, a professor of social and political philosophy at the University of Southampton, recently faulted the movie for not grasping that “while Arendt’s thesis concerning the banality of evil is a fundamental insight for moral philosophy, she is almost certainly wrong about Eichmann.” In an essay in the Times in May, Fred Kaplan wrote that “Arendt misread Eichmann, but she did hit on something broader about how ordinary people become brutal killers.”
Behind this consensus is new scholarship on Eichmann’s writings and reflections from the 1950s, when he was living among a fraternity of former Nazis in Argentina, before Israeli agents captured him and spirited him out of the country and to Israel. Eichmann’s writings include an unpublished memoir, “The Others Spoke, Now Will I Speak,” and an interview conducted over many months with a Nazi journalist and war criminal, Willem Sassen, which were not released until long after the trial. Eichmann’s justification of his actions to Sassen is considered more genuine than his testimony before judges in Jerusalem. In recent decades, scholars have argued that the Sassen interviews show that Arendt was simply wrong in her judgment of Eichmann because she did not have all the facts.
These facts, however, are not new. An excerpt from the Sassen interviews was published in Life magazine in 1960. Arendt read them and even wrote that “whether writing his memoirs in Argentina or in Jerusalem,” Eichmann always sounded and spoke the same. “The longer one listened to him, the more obvious it became that his inability to speak was closely connected with an inability to think, namely, to think from the standpoint of someone else.” His evil acts were motivated by thoughtlessness that was neither stupidity nor bureaucratic obedience, but a staggering inability to see the world beyond Nazi clichés.
In his 2006 book “Becoming Eichmann,” the historian David Cesaranifinds common ground with Arendt, writing, “as much as we may want Eichmann to be a psychotic individual and thus unlike us, he was not.” But Cesarani also uses the latest documents to argue what so many of Arendt’s detractors have expressed: “It is a myth that Eichmann unthinkingly followed orders, as Hannah Arendt argued.” Similarly, in her 2011 book “The Eichmann Trial,” the historian Deborah E. Lipstadt claims that Eichmann’s newly discovered memoir “reveals the degree to which Arendt was wrong about Eichmann. It is permeated with expressions of support for and full comprehension of Nazi ideology. He was no clerk.”
The problem with this conclusion is that Arendt never wrote that Eichmann simply followed orders. She never portrayed him, in Cesarani’s words, as a “dull-witted clerk or a robotic bureaucrat.” Indeed she rejected the idea that Eichmann was simply following orders. She emphasized that Eichmann took enormous pride in his initiative in deporting Jews and also in his willingness to disobey orders to do so, especially Himmler’s clear orders — offered in 1944 in the hope of leniency amid impending defeat — to “take good care of the Jews, act as their nursemaid.” In direct disobedience, Eichmann organized death marches of Hungarian Jews; as Arendt writes, he “sabotaged” Himmler’s orders. As the war ground to an end, as Arendt saw, Eichmann, against Himmler, remained loyal to Hitler’s idea of the Nazi movement and did “his best to make the Final Solution final.”
When Eichmann agreed at trial that he would have killed his own father if ordered to —but only if his father actually had been a traitor. Arendt pointed to this condition to show that Eichmann acted not simply from orders but also from conviction. To say that Arendt denied that Eichmann was a committed Nazi or that she saw Eichmann as a “clerk” is false.
The widespread misperception that Arendt saw Eichmann as merely following orders emerged largely from a conflation of her conclusions with those of Stanley Milgram, the Yale psychologist who conducted a series of controversial experiments in the early 1960s. Milgram was inspired by the Eichmann trial to ask test subjects to assist researchers in training students by administering what they thought were potentially lethal shocks to students who answered incorrectly. The test subjects largely did as they were instructed. Milgram invoked Arendt when he concluded that his experiments showed most people would follow orders to do things they thought wrong. But Arendt rejected the “naïve belief that temptation and coercion are really the same thing,” and with it Milgram’s claim that obedience carried with it no responsibility. Instead, Arendt insisted, “obedience and support are the same.” That is why she argued that Eichmann should be put to death.
Adolf Eichmann in the Jerusalem courtroom where he was tried in 1961 for war crimes committed during World War II.
Associated PressAdolf Eichmann in the Jerusalem courtroom where he was tried in 1961 for war crimes committed during World War II.
The insight of “Eichmann in Jerusalem” is not that Eichmann was just following orders, but that Eichmann was a “joiner.” In his own words, Eichmann feared “to live a leaderless and difficult individual life,” in which “I would receive no directives from anybody.” Arendt insisted that Eichmann’s professed fidelity to the Nazi cause “did not mean merely to stress the extent to which he was under orders, and ready to obey them; he meant to show what an ‘idealist’ he had always been.” An “idealist,” as she used the word, is an ideologue, someone who will sacrifice his own moral convictions when they come in conflict with the “idea” of the movement that gives life meaning. Evil was transformed from a Satanic temptation into a test of self-sacrifice, and Eichmann justified the evil he knowingly committed as a heroic burden demanded by his idealism.
The best treatment of Eichmann’s writing in Argentina is by the German scholar Bettina Stangneth. In her 2011 book “Eichmann vor Jerusalem” (not available in English), Stangneth showed that Sassen was a Holocaust denier who attempted to get Eichmann to deny the Holocaust, which Eichmann did not. On the contrary, Eichmann boasted of his accomplishments, worried that he hadn’t done enough, and justified his role. Stangneth also revealed that Eichmann dreamed of returning to Germany and putting himself on trial, even drafting an open letter to the West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer to propose just that. His hope was that the royalties from his book, written with Sassen, would support his family for what he imagined would be a short stay in jail.
Stangneth concludes that Eichmann’s manifest anti-Semitism was based neither on religious hatred nor a conspiratorial belief in Jewish world domination. He denied the “blood libel” (the false accusation that Jews had killed Christian children and used their blood in rituals) and rejected as a forgery the “Protocols of the Elders of Zion,” the notorious anti-Semitic tract (and a czarist forgery). Eichmann justified genocide and the extermination of the Jews by appealing to the “fatherland morality that beat within him.” He spoke of the “necessity of a total war” and relied on his oath to Hitler and the Nazi flag, a bond he calls “the highest duty.” Eichmann was an anti-Semite because Nazism was incomprehensible without anti-Semitism.
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Read previous contributions to this series.
Arendt famously insists Eichmann “had no motives at all” and that he “never realized what he was doing.” But she did not mean that he wasn’t aware of the Holocaust or the Final Solution. She knew that once the Führer decided on physical liquidation, Eichmann embraced that decision. What she meant was that he acted thoughtlessly and dutifully, not as a robotic bureaucrat, but as part of a movement, as someone convinced that he was sacrificing an easy morality for a higher good.
“What stuck in the minds” of men like Eichmann, Arendt wrote, was not a rational or coherent ideology. It was “simply the notion of being involved in something historic, grandiose, unique.” Eichmann described how difficult it was for him to participate in the Final Solution, but took pride in having done so. He added: “if I had known then the horrors that would later happen to the Germans, it would have been easier for me to watch the Jewish executions. At heart I am a very sensitive man.” In a terrifying act of self-deception, Eichmann believed his inhuman acts were marks of virtue.
Though von Trotta’s film is not a documentary, it does incorporate archival footage of the trial. The director has said that the footage was essential because it let the viewer encounter Eichmann directly. The movie cuts to Arendt, played by Barbara Sukowa, and captures the shock on her face, as Eichmann utters cliché after cliché. It makes visible how and why Arendt concluded that evil in the modern world is done neither by monsters nor by bureaucrats, but by joiners.
That evil, Arendt argued, originates in the neediness of lonely, alienated bourgeois people who live lives so devoid of higher meaning that they give themselves fully to movements. It is the meaning Eichmann finds as part of the Nazi movement that leads him to do anything and sacrifice everything. Such joiners are not stupid; they are not robots. But they are thoughtless in the sense that they abandon their independence, their capacity to think for themselves, and instead commit themselves absolutely to the fictional truth of the movement. It is futile to reason with them. They inhabit an echo chamber, having no interest in learning what others believe. It is this thoughtless commitment that permits idealists to imagine themselves as heroes and makes them willing to employ technological implements of violence in the name of saving the world.
Perhaps Arendt has been so violently misunderstood because her thinking is both provocative and demanding. Her blessing, and her curse was a facility for quotable aphorisms that, like Nietzsche’s, require whole books to reveal their unconventional meaning. It is easy to cite the “banality of evil.” It is much more difficult to make sense of what Arendt actually meant.
At a time when confidence in American institutions is at an all-time low, Arendt’s insistence that we see Eichmann as a terrifyingly normal “déclassé son of a solid middle-class family” who was radicalized by an idealistic anti-state movement should resonate even more urgently today. That is ever more reason to free Arendt’s book, once again, from the tyranny of the conventional wisdom.

Roger Berkowitz
Roger Berkowitz is associate professor of political studies and human rights, and academic director of the Hannah Arendt Center for Politics and the Humanities, at Bard College.

BNDES: seu desmantelamento na gestao companheira

Patrimônio do BNDES recua 38% com dividendos ao governo e perda na Bolsa

Lu Aiko Otta
O Estado de S.Paulo07 de julho de 2013 

Em dois anos, patrimônio líquido do banco caiu de R$ 75,6 bilhões para R$ 46,8 bilhões, o que, segundo economistas, pode ter impacto no mercado de crédito


BRASÍLIA - Na contramão do mercado, o patrimônio do Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES) encolheu 38% entre março de 2011 e março de 2013, enquanto a média de cinco grandes bancos públicos e privados registrou crescimento de 25%. É o que mostra levantamento realizado pelo Instituto Brasileiro de Economia da Fundação Getúlio Vargas (Ibre/FGV).
Para os economistas José Roberto Afonso e Gabriel Leal de Barros, ambos do Ibre, essa é uma clara evidência de que o governo está enfraquecendo os bancos públicos, principalmente o BNDES, com sua política de recolher dividendos antecipados. Essa é a tese que eles defendem no estudo Receitas de Dividendos, Atipicidades e (Des) Capitalização.
"O governo fala em capitalização, mas na verdade o que está acontecendo é descapitalização", frisou Afonso. "O Tesouro sacou reserva de lucro acumulado sem um aumento de capital compatível com o crescimento do crédito." Outra causa para esse desempenho são as "violentas" perdas sofridas pelo banco com ações de Petrobrás, Embratel e Vale, por exemplo. Para ele, essa perda de fôlego pode ter consequências negativas no mercado de crédito.
Questionado, o BNDES apontou as perdas no mercado acionário como a principal causa para a redução do patrimônio. "O impacto negativo dessa oscilação no patrimônio líquido do BNDES foi de R$ 23 bilhões, quase o dobro do que foi pago em dividendos líquidos de aumento de capital no mesmo período", diz o banco. "Portanto, é equivocado atribuir a redução do patrimônio líquido, majoritariamente, à distribuição de dividendos nos anos citados."
Queda. De acordo com o levantamento, o patrimônio líquido do BNDES caiu de R$ 75,602 bilhões em março de 2011 para R$ 46,799 bilhões em março passado, uma redução de 38%. No mesmo período, o Itaú Unibanco registrou aumento de 17% em seu patrimônio e o Bradesco, de 35%. O patrimônio líquido do Banco do Brasil teve expansão de 19%.
O patrimônio menor diminui a capacidade de o banco emprestar. As instituições brasileiras precisam seguir regras internacionais de prudência na concessão de crédito. Elas seguem o Acordo de Basileia, cuja norma básica é que, para cada R$ 100 emprestados pelo banco, ele precisa ter um patrimônio de pelo menos R$ 11. Nesse exemplo, o banco teria um Índice de Basileia de 11%.
No caso do BNDES, esse índice recuou de 21,9% em março de 2011 para 14,5% em março deste ano. "Eu não questiono o índice, que ainda está acima do mínimo permitido, mas a trajetória", observa Afonso. Foi uma queda de 34% em apenas dois anos.
De acordo com informações da área econômica, o índice do BNDES caiu ainda mais. Não foi por acaso que o governo editou, no início de junho, a Medida Provisória 618, que autoriza o Tesouro a aumentar o capital da instituição em R$ 15 bilhões. A explicação oficial é exatamente de que o dinheiro será injetado para melhorar o Índice de Basileia do banco.
Um eventual estreitamento na possibilidade do BNDES de emprestar afetaria a principal aposta do governo para "virar" o humor na economia: o programa de concessões em infraestrutura.
Apenas em rodovias e ferrovias, o investimento previsto é de R$ 133 bilhões, dos quais R$ 79,5 bilhões ocorreriam nos próximos cinco anos. A promessa é que o banco de desenvolvimento financiará 70% dos empreendimentos - ou o equivalente a R$ 93,1 bilhões.

domingo, 7 de julho de 2013

Egito: os dilemas de El Baradei (WP)

Three reasons Mohamed ElBaradei is an odd choice to be Egypt’s new prime minister
By Max Fisher
The Washington Post, July 6, 2013

Mohamed ElBaradei, the 71-year-old Nobel Peace Prize winner, former head of the United Nations’ nuclear agency and Egyptian opposition figure has just added a new line to his resume: He’s been appointed the interim prime minister of Egypt. ElBaradei is in some ways a good choice: He’s well-known, internationally respected, old enough that he’s perhaps more likely to cede power willingly, and seen as too much of a statesman to indulge in the self-serving power grabs that have marked the tenures of past Egyptian leaders. And ElBaradei is likely to do well with international institutions such as the IMF, which now-deposed president Mohamed Morsi had rebuffed.

In other ways, though, the decision to appoint ElBaradei and his decision to accept the post are strange choices for Egypt at this moment. Here are a few.

(1) Little natural constituency, likely to alienate key groups

Egypt has more than a few serious problems right now, sadly, but one of the biggest is its political divisions, which are so wide and bitter that any single leader or group would struggle to govern. Maybe ElBaradei can unite the country, but he is not ideally situated for the task.

This is a moment when the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists, who are not few in Egypt, are probably asking themselves whether they should even bother participating in this government or just dedicate themselves to undoing it. ElBaradei is seen as associated with Egypt’s relatively small population of well-off, well-educated, secular, liberal urbanites - or, worse, associated with Westerners. When I looked for a photo to illustrate this post, the first one that popped up showed ElBaradei smiling alongside Angelina Jolie, on stage at the Berlin International Film Festival.

ElBaradei is almost perfectly positioned to further enrage and alienate Islamists, who are popular among Egypt’s many rural and low-income communities. While he had a warm relationship with the group before the revolution, making common cause with it against then-President Mubarak, he is so much the opposite of everything the Muslim Brotherhood stood for while Morsi was in power that the group could see him as anti-Brotherhood choice.

Shadi Hamid, who follows Egyptian politics for the Brookings Institution, told USA Today that ElBaradei and the Brotherhood are now “arch enemies of sorts.” And it’s not just Islamists. Hamid wrote on Twitter that ElBaradei “was the man pro-army nationalists seemed to hate most not too long ago.”

(2) Has not proved to be a charismatic or populist leader

This also gets to the challenge of uniting Egypt, an urgent and difficult task for the country’s post-Morsi government. ElBaradei, for all his considerable credibility, seems most comfortable giving interviews to reporters or posting to Twitter, not speaking before crowds.

On Jan. 30, 2011, as protests against Mubarak’s government gained steam, ElBaradei landed at a still-idealist Tahrir Square. The protest movement was then the closest it would be to matching his vision; his name was already floating around as a possible leader for this leaderless movement. The crowds should have been putty in his hands. But his visit was strangely brief and disappointingly uninspiring, an opportunity lost for ElBaradei. It will only be more difficult now for him to champion the movement, and these are the people who should be his natural base.

(3) Compromising his democratic ideals

Even if the military coup that deposed Morsi and dissolved the constitution ends up being a good thing for Egypt’s democracy in the long term, it’s hard to think of anything more anti-democratic than a coup. ElBaradei, whatever his faults, has remained so untarnished in the two-and-a-half difficult years since Mubarak’s fall in large part because of his adherence to the democratic idealism of those first revolutionary days. In January 2012, he quit Egypt’s first post-Mubarak presidential race, announcing, “My conscience does not permit me to run for the presidency or any other official position unless it is within a democratic framework.”

Yet, strangely enough, as the military stepped in to remove Morsi on July 3, ElBaradei was there on Egyptian state TV, implicitly blessing the anti-democratic act that has now installed him in power. Maybe, from ElBaradei’s perspective, the coup was inevitable or necessary and that shouldn’t force him to turn down the prime ministerial appointment just for the sake of consistency. But it’s a sad bit of irony that, by taking the job, ElBaradei sacrifices some of the democratic credibility that got him there in the first place.

A erosao do BNDES - Editorial Folha

BNDES fragilizado
Editorial Folha de São Paulo, 06/07/2013

Há décadas o Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social tem papel essencial no financiamento de investimentos de longo prazo. Para preservar essa função, é importante que o BNDES se mantenha disciplinado e bem capitalizado --o que vem se perdendo.

Em 2011, a cada R$ 100 emprestados, o BNDES tinha R$ 20,6 em patrimônio. No ano passado, essa proporção caiu para R$ 15,4. Embora próxima da média dos bancos privados e acima do piso definido pelo Banco Central (R$ 11), ela preocupa por sinalizar a rápida redução do colchão patrimonial.

As razões para tal mudança são conhecidas: pressa em expandir o crédito e algumas práticas contábeis duvidosas que fragilizam o balanço da instituição.

Historicamente, os empréstimos do banco são alimentados principalmente por recursos captados pelo Fundo de Amparo ao Trabalhador (FAT) e retenção de lucros. O crescimento do crédito sempre foi ancorado nessas contas, que tendem a aumentar gradualmente.

Nos últimos anos, o governo, a fim de acelerar a economia, mudou os critérios. Cresceram os aportes do Tesouro, que emite papéis de dívida pública e os repassa ao BNDES. Inflado o balanço, sua capacidade de emprestar aumenta.

A manobra traria ainda benefícios ao governo: com maiores lucros contábeis, o banco pagaria mais dividendos ao Tesouro. Assim, melhoraria o superavit primário (soma de receitas e despesas do governo antes de pagar juros), aparentando controle fiscal.

Desde 2009, o BNDES recebeu mais de R$ 300 bilhões por essa via e pôde emprestar mais --os desembolsos foram de R$ 91 bilhões em 2008 para R$ 156 bilhões em 2012.

Mas a impressão de vigor é em parte ilusória. Verifica-se erosão da qualidade do capital do banco e piora dos indicadores de solidez.

O governo tem forçado o BNDES a absorver ações de estatais como capital --cerca de 40% do total já seria formado por esses papéis, cujos preços têm derretido na Bolsa.

Não há sinais de que a estratégia esteja no caminho certo. Nesta semana, o Tesouro injetou mais R$ 15 bilhões no banco para manter o ritmo de expansão de crédito, algo temerário a esta altura.

Por seu turno, a prática de emprestar grandes montantes a pretensos campeões nacionais tem se mostrado pouco eficaz.

Finalmente, seguem fragilizadas as próprias contas do governo, cuja saúde depende cada vez mais dos dividendos pagos pelo BNDES e por outras estatais.

Governo vende pele de urso antes...

Dinheiro dos royalties no cofre só em 2020

A proposta apresentada pela presidente Dilma de usar os recursos arrecadados com os royalties do petróleo para turbinar os investimentos na educação — o projeto aprovado esta semana, no Congresso, também destina 25% do montante para a área da saúde — pode demorar a surtir efeitos práticos para a maioria dos municípios.

Apesar do grande volume arrecadado com a extração, e da expectativa de aumento da produção em novas áreas, a regra atual mantém cerca de 80% da riqueza nos estados produtores, casos do Rio de Janeiro, do Espírito Santo e de São Paulo, em menor escala.

Apenas os contratos futuros representarão rendas extras para se investir na educação e na saúde nas outras unidades da Federação, pois a discussão sobre o mérito da lei aprovada, que torna a divisão mais equilibrada, está parada no Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF).

(da coluna diária do jornalista gaúcho Políbio Braga, 6/07/2013)

A real agenda de problemas do Brasil real - Editorial O Globo

A agenda de problemas reais
Editorial O Globo, 06/07/2013

Enquanto o debate é alimentado por uma espécie de factoide — o plebiscito da reforma política —, a vida real segue o curso, e problemas muito concretos vão se avolumando.

O próprio governo parece ter caído na armadilha da invenção diversionista da “constituinte exclusiva” — origem do plebiscito, ao se constatar a ilegalidade da ideia —, lançada como suposta medida de atendimento às manifestações de rua, mas cujo objetivo primordial é afastar o Planalto do centro da crise e transferir responsabilidades para o Congresso. Que há problemas de representatividade política, não se discute. Resumir o mau momento do Brasil a isto é exagero.

Impossível prever até quando o truque funcionará. Até porque as dificuldades econômicas aumentam e tendem a funcionar cada vez mais como amplificador da voz das ruas. A inflação de junho, divulgada ontem, medida pelo IPCA, foi de 0,26%, abaixo da de maio (0,37%). Mas, como em junho do ano passado havia ficado quase estável (0,08%), o IPCA anualizado novamente ultrapassou o teto superior da meta de inflação (6,5%), fechando em 6,7%.

Há grandes possibilidades de o índice recuar até o final do ano. A curto prazo, até como reflexo do corte de tarifas, forçado pelas manifestações. Mas num setor-chave para o bolso da população, o de serviços, a inflação continua a rodar na velocidade de 8% ao ano.

Mesmo assim, e apesar do discurso do governo — um dos pactos propostos pela presidente Dilma trata do tema —, a política fiscal continua expansionista, aumentando a temperatura do consumo, fator de pressão sobre os preços.

Mantém-se o uso irresponsável da “contabilidade criativa”, para injetar recursos de endividamento público em bancos públicos, como BNDES e CEF, a fim de o dinheiro voltar sob o disfarce de dividendos e embonecar o superávit primário, como se houvesse uma austeridade que na realidade inexiste.

Chegou-se à situação escalafobética de a Caixa pagar mais dividendos à União do que teve de lucro (R$ 7,7 bilhões contra R$ 6,1 bilhões). Tanto é que começa a cair em descrédito mesmo a nova meta, mais baixa, de 2,3% do PIB de superávit. Enquanto aumenta a expectativa de efetivo rebaixamento da classificação do país em agências de avaliação de risco.

O jogo de espelhos para melhorar números também chegou à balança comercial, encerrada no primeiro semestre com um déficit de US$ 3 bilhões, o pior resultado em 18 anos. E isso porque ajudou nos números a contabilização de US$ 1,5 bilhão de uma exportação fictícia de três plataformas da Petrobras. Elas apenas foram registradas em subsidiária no exterior. A operação é legal, mas só faz aumentar a desconfiança crescente na administração da economia num momento como este. Inflação elevada, economia em desaquecimento — a indústria retrocedeu 2% de abril para maio — e empresário pouco motivado.

As manobras políticas deveriam ceder espaço na agenda do Planalto para questões mais relevantes relacionadas a esta conjuntura.

Brasilia, capital de extraterrestres; o Plebiscito de Veja

Sobra até para a política externa. Veja quais são as dez perguntas de Veja.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Veja condena perguntas de Dilma. Leia quais são as 10 perguntas de Veja.

Plebiscito de Veja
O conjunto de questões reflete inquietações do dia a dia dos brasileiros, com o objetivo de demonstrar o despropósito de convocar plebiscito para debater e resolver impasses que qualquer governo e qualquer parlamento civilizado já deveriam ter resolvido.

1) Os brasileiros trabalham cinco meses do ano só para pagar impostos e agora o governo quer que paguemos também todas as campanhas eleitorais dos políticos. Você concorda?
2) Se bem gasto, o dinheiro dos impostos seria mais do que suficiente para prover de educação, saúde e segurança os brasileiros. No entanto, a população tem de pagar uma segunda vez por escolas privadas, médicos e seguranças. Você concorda?
3) Você concorda em proibir o uso de jatinhos da FAB por políticos e, com o dinheiro economizado, investir na melhoria do transporte coletivo urbano e na saúde?
4) Aos 16 anos, um(a) brasileiro(a) já pode votar e se casar. Caso ele(a) cometa crimes bárbaros, deve ser julgado(a) como se fosse uma criança?
5) Você concorda que Brasília deveria abandonar a galáxia distante onde vive e voltar para o Brasil?
6) Você concorda que deveria acabar a alegação de "réu primário" uma vez que isso beneficia quem mata pela primeira vez, mesmo que de maneira cruel e sem chance para a vítima?
7) Você aceita ceder aos caciques dos partidos políticos seu direito de escolher o candidato em quem votar?
8) Você concorda que deveriam ser fechadas as embaixadas brasileiras na Coreia do Norte, Cuba, Azerbaijão, Mali, Timor-Leste, Guiné Equatorial, São Cristóvão e Névis, Santa Lúcia, Botsuana, Nepal, Barbados e em outros países sem a menor expressão, e o dinheiro gasto com elas investido nos hospitais públicos no Brasil?
9) Você concorda que quem recebe dinheiro do governo federal poderia ter o direito de se declarar impedido de votar por óbvio conflito de interesses?
10) O governo tem 39 ministérios e nenhum deles resolveu sequer um problema relevante do Brasil. Você fecharia a maioria deles?

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Meu mais recente livro – que não tem nada a ver com o governo atual ou com sua diplomacia esquizofrênica, já vou logo avisando – ficou final...