segunda-feira, 28 de março de 2022

Deutsche Welle classificada como "agente estrangeiro" e impunida de trabalhar na Rússia: censura e banimento

O mínimo que eu espero, agora, é que o meu blog Diplomatizzando seja também classificado como "agente estrangeiro", o que eu de fato sou.

Paulo Roberto De Almeida

 LIBERDADE DE IMPRENSA - ALEMANHA

Rússia classifica DW como "agente estrangeiro"

Wesley Rahn
há 2 horas

Após ter de fechar sucursal em Moscou e ter seu site bloqueado, emissora alemã é incluída pelo governo russo em lista de "agentes estrangeiros". "É mais um ataque à liberdade de imprensa", afirma diretor-geral da DW.

https://www.dw.com/pt-br/r%C3%BAssia-classifica-dw-como-agente-estrangeiro/a-61282233?maca=bra-GK_RSS_Chatbot_Mundo-31505-xml-media

O Ministério da Justiça da Rússia incluiu nesta segunda-feira (28/03) a emissora internacional da Alemanha Deutsche Welle (DW) numa lista de "agentes estrangeiros".

"Esta decisão foi tomada com base nos documentos recebidos das autoridades estatais competentes", afirmou o ministério em comunicado, sem especificar de que autoridades ou documentos se trata.

Em resposta, o diretor-geral da DW, Peter Limbourg, afirmou: "Esta mais recente decisão arbitrária das autoridades russas infelizmente era de se esperar. É mais um ataque à liberdade de imprensa e uma nova tentativa de privar a população russa de uma mídia livre e independente. Começou com o fechamento forçado do nosso estúdio em Moscou no início de fevereiro, depois o nosso website em todos os idiomas foi bloqueado na Rússia. Seguiu-se então a restrição gradual dos serviços de mídias sociais, e agora a DW foi rotulada como um 'agente estrangeiro'. Isso não nos impedirá de continuar a fornecer uma cobertura abrangente e independente sobre a Rússia e a região a partir do nosso novo estúdio na Letônia e da Alemanha."

DW na Rússia

Em 3 de fevereiro, o Ministério do Exterior da Rússia afirmou que adotaria "medidas retaliatórias contra a mídia alemã" trabalhando na Rússia após autoridades alemãs banirem o canal de TV no idioma alemãoda emissora estatal russa RT, chamado RT DE.

Tais medidas incluiriam "reconhecer a DW como um meio de comunicação estrangeiro que cumpre as funções de um agente estrangeiro", disse o Ministério do Exterior em comunicado.

DW foi forçada a fechar sua sucursal em Moscou, e seus jornalistas na Rússia tiveram suas credenciais retiradas, tornando impossível seu trabalho no país.

No início de março, o website da DW foi bloqueado pelo regulador estatal de comunicações Roskomnadzor. Pouco depois, a DW transferiu sua sucursal em Moscou para a capital da Letônia, Riga.

"O governo russo aparentemente declarou uma 'guerra de informações' contra a DW", afirmou Christian Trippe, diretor da DW para Rússia, Ucrânia e Leste Europeu. "Nós jornalistas vamos prosseguir com nosso trabalho e fornecer informações confiáveis para nosso público-alvo na Rússia."

A DW, a emissora internacional da Alemanha, é financiada por impostos e oferece jornalismo livremente acessível em 32 idiomas. O Conselho de Telecomunicações da República Federal da Alemanha – órgão independente, apartidário e livre de influência governamental – supervisiona a conformidade da DW com seu mandato legal de oferecer informações independentes a usuários mundo afora. A empresa tem cerca de 4 mil funcionários, a maioria trabalhando a partir de Bonn e Berlim.

O que é a lista russa de "agentes estrangeiros"?

Desde 2012 essa lista do governo russo tem sido usada para cercear as operações tanto de veículos internacionais de mídia quanto de organizações sem fins lucrativos que recebem financiamento do exterior, em especial aquelas ativas na política ou que informam sobre corrupção.

Uma vez rotulados pelas autoridades como "agente estrangeiro", indivíduos e organizações ficam obrigados a indicar o fato em qualquer conteúdo que publicarem, até mesmo postagens nas redes sociais. Os "agentes estrangeiros" também são obrigados a apresentar ao governo relatórios sobre suas atividades a cada seis meses.

Mais de 100 veículos de comunicação e indivíduos estão atualmente na lista, incluindo as emissoras públicas dos EUA Voice of America e Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty e as ONGs Anistia Internacional e Human Rights Watch.


Pobres peruanos: não merece os politicos que tem - Gideon Long (Financial Times)

O Peru já teve uns cinco ou sete presidentes desde a década passada. Parece que os políticos lá são piores do que os nossos, o que é uma façanha...

Paulo Roberto de Almeida   

Financial Times, Londres – 26.3.2022

Is Peru becoming an ungovernable country?

Known for political turmoil, its president Pedro Castillo now faces an impeachment vote accused of ‘moral incapacity’

Gideon Long

 

When Félix Chero knelt before Peru’s president Pedro Castillo last Sunday and swore to serve as the country’s justice minister he became the 46th minister in the Castillo government in just eight months. 

Since taking office last July, the president has rattled through four cabinets, four prime ministers, three foreign ministers and two finance ministers. Chero is his third justice minister. No Peruvian president has made so many cabinet changes in their first year in office — and there are still four months to go.

“The word ‘chaos’ no longer seems strong enough to describe the country’s political situation,” says John Youle, executive president of ConsultAndes, a local political risk advisory group. “Peru is politically dysfunctional, with Castillo unable or unwilling to select an adequate cabinet, and with congress focused almost exclusively on forcing him from office.” 

The merry-go-round of appointments, resignations and sackings has spread well beyond the cabinet. Aides, senior police chiefs, army officers and magistrates have all been caught up in the churn, suggesting the country is becoming ungovernable. 

Some of Castillo’s ministers have lasted just days. Héctor Valer, his third prime minister, was sworn in on a Tuesday and resigned that Saturday when it emerged he once beat his daughter so badly she reported him to the police. The president’s first foreign minister quit after 19 days after claiming that Shining Path, the Maoist group that terrorised Peru in the 1980s, was “largely a product of the services of the CIA”. An environment minister lasted just a week after the state ombudsman pointed out he was unqualified for the job. 

On average, Castillo has changed a minister every nine days.

The tumult has been greeted with dismay by millions of poorer voters who backed Castillo last year, inspired by his campaign message: “no more poor people in a rich country”. The leftwing president’s approval ratings have dropped. His supporters had hoped for profound change in a nation where many have missed out on the economic growth of recent decades. Instead, the country — the second biggest copper producer in the world — seems stuck in a relentless battle between the president and his opponents. 

With so many changes government policy has been erratic. When Castillo’s first prime minister vowed to nationalise the gas industry, the president denied any such plan existed, but then, weeks later, proposed the same thing himself. He was forced to backtrack and his finance minister tweeted that when the president said “nationalise” he did not mean “nationalise”. 

Castillo’s second prime minister, Mirtha Vásquez, abruptly announced the government would seek to close four privately owned gold and silver mines “as soon as possible”, unnerving many in the sector who feared it might herald a broader assault on the industry. Mining is the lifeblood of the Peruvian economy, accounting for about 10 per cent of gross domestic product and 60 per cent of export revenue. Within days of the announcement, the government had made a U-turn and allowed the mines to stay open. 

Castillo’s first health minister, Hernando Cevallos, lasted longer than most — six months — before being sacked in February. “The turnover in personnel was so swift that I sometimes found myself working alongside ministers I’d never met before,” he says. “When I was finally dismissed, at least the president had the decency to call me and tell me. Most other ministers just got a WhatsApp message.” 

‘Moral incapacity’ Cevallos blames his sacking on party politics and the debt he says the president owes to Free Perú, the Marxist party that adopted Castillo, who has no party of his own, as its candidate last year. Free Perú is the biggest party in congress. Now, Cevallos says, it is payback time. 

“Pedro Castillo told me he didn’t want to get rid of me but he also told me that Free Perú wanted to put their own person in the health ministry,” says Cevallos, who is not a member of Free Perú. His replacement is. 

Some Peruvians have a simpler explanation: Castillo is incompetent or at best out of his depth. Before last year, he had never held elected office. A rural primary school teacher, peasant farmer and one-time trade union activist, he has always looked woefully unqualified for the job, say critics. 

Yet the current turmoil did not start with Castillo. Peru has cycled through five presidents in as many years, with successive leaders becoming ensnared in an intensifying feud between the executive and legislative branches of government. Nearly all Peru’s presidents of the past 30 years have become enmeshed in separate corruption scandals. 

Others argue that he has been poorly advised or allege that he is part of a corrupt clique that is governing solely for its own benefit. When Carlos Jaico, a chief presidential aide, quit in February, he said Castillo was being manipulated by “a cabinet in the shadows” that was “undermining national stability”. In January, the attorney-general opened a preliminary investigation into Castillo over allegations of collusion and influence peddling. The president denies all corruption allegations. 

Supporters counter that the country’s Lima-based elite of business leaders, rightwing politicians and a voracious conservative press have made life impossible for him, refusing to accept his victory, blocking his proposals and scrutinising ministerial appointments in a way they never did with previous administrations. 

 “They’re not letting him govern,” says Rubén Ramírez, the first of Castillo’s three environment ministers. “When a leftwing government comes in, the big economic powers naturally feel threatened, and they’ve used politicians from traditional parties to try to discredit the government.” 

Castillo’s opponents have waged a fierce war to oust him from day one. Many members of Popular Force, the second largest party in congress, have never accepted that he beat their candidate, Keiko Fujimori, in the 2021 election. Castillo won by the narrowest of margins, just 72,000 votes in a nation of 33mn people. Fujimori cried fraud but Peru’s electoral authorities dismissed the claims as baseless. 

In December, rightwing parties tried to impeach Castillo on the basis of a long list of alleged misdemeanours. They failed but are now trying again and congress is due to vote on Monday on his future. 

“People can’t stand any more of this government, not just because they’re incompetent but because they’re corrupt and they’re co-opting state institutions,” says Sara Palasz, one of a group of protesters who had gathered in the upmarket Lima district of Miraflores, calling for Castillo’s dismissal. “The only thing left is for them to close down congress and then we’ll have a totalitarian government, like Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua.” 

In their crusade to unseat Castillo, his opponents have found a useful weapon in the quirky phraseology in Peru’s constitution, which allows congress to impeach the president for “permanent moral incapacity”. This vague and highly subjective term was inserted into the charter in 1839 but for 150 years no one used it.

 “Even during the most disastrous of governments no one dreamt of impeaching the president for permanent moral incapacity,” says Juan Luis Orrego, a historian at the University of Lima. 

That has now changed. Monday’s vote will be the sixth time in just four years, against three different presidents, that Peru’s legislators have tried to play the “moral incapacity” card. Twice they have succeeded, bringing down Pedro Pablo Kuczynski in 2018 — he resigned on the eve of an impeachment vote — and his successor Martín Vizcarra in 2020. What was once an obscure article in a 19th-century constitution has become the weapon of choice for disgruntled parliamentarians seeking to topple presidents.

“The exception has become the norm,” says David Lovatón, a constitutional lawyer at the Pontifical Catholic University in Lima.“So much so that when this presidential term began last year, the executive and congress had their fingers on the trigger from the start.” 

 

Faltering support

 

 The revolving-door chaos of recent months has inevitably hit Castillo’s approval ratings, which have dropped from 38 per cent when he took office to 25 per cent. No president in Peru’s recent history has been so unpopular after such a short period of time. 

“When Castillo won, I thought everything would change and things would get better,” says Habraham Vilca, who lives on Lake Titicaca in the Andean highlands, where Castillo enjoyed huge support last year. “But now I see things have got worse. I wouldn’t vote for him again. He hasn’t got what it takes to run the country.” 

In southern regions of the country Castillo took over 80 per cent of votes in last year’s run-off against Fujimori. His approval rating in those regions is now 45 per cent. 

Half the country now thinks he should resign, according to two recent polls by IPSOS and the Institute of Peruvian Studies (IEP), a social sciences research centre. In Lima the figure is 70 per cent. The polls suggest that between half and three-quarters of Peruvians want fresh elections. 

But if Castillo is unpopular, so is congress. The IEP poll suggested only 14 per cent of Peruvians have a positive image of their legislators. Many people blame them for what they call the treachery, jockeying for power and barefaced opportunism that has characterised Peruvian politics for years. 

“They’re all rats,” says Jessica Llantoy, a 20-year-old fruit seller in Lima. “I hope they impeach Castillo but the truth is the rest of them are no better.” 

 

Resilient economy takes a hit

 

For now at least, the Peruvian economy — one of the fastest growing in the region since the turn of the century — is proving relatively resilient in the face of this political instability. In the days after Castillo took office, the currency, the sol, weakened to a historic low of over four to the dollar, but has since recovered to about 3.75, its strongest in almost a year. 

And although the central bank counted $18bn in capital flight in the first nine months of last year — blamed by many observers on the uncertainty around the election outcome — the tendency has slowed or even reversed. This is in part due to a realisation that Castillo will simply not be able to enact his more radical proposals, such as taxing miners much more heavily or convening a constituent assembly to write a new constitution. 

“That whole programme he outlined on July 28when he took office — he can’t implement because he doesn’t have popular support,” says Alfredo Thorne, a former economy minister and head of Thorne Associates, a local economic consultancy. 

Thorne says the mining companies that account for the lion’s share of foreign investment in Peru regard Castillo’s government as a blip that will not disrupt their long-term plans. “They don’t care about Castillo,” he says. “They see a weak government, incapable of expropriating anything, and know it’ll eventually fall.” 

Even so, some of the numbers coming out of Peru are worrying. While the economy grew more than 13 per cent in 2021 as it bounced back from the pandemic, it shuddered almost to a halt in the fourth quarter, Castillo’s first in power. Seasonally adjusted fourth-quarter growth was just 0.3 per cent due to a contraction in public spending and a slowdown in private investment. 

“That gives you some idea of the deceleration we’ve seen since this government came to power,” Thorne says. 

Rating agency Fitch highlighted the “continued political instability and policy paralysis in Peru” in a recent note, arguing that with so much political noise and so many cabinet reshuffles, nothing is getting done. 

“Tensions among the president, cabinet and congress have undermined policymaking and execution and elevated political uncertainty,” it said. “This, in turn, has dampened the investment outlook.”

 

Castillo peace deal with

 

The most immediate threat to Castillo’s rule is Monday’s impeachment vote. Political analysts say his opponents will come close to securing the two-thirds majority they need in the 130-seat congress to topple him but will probably fall just short. 

ven if Castillo is impeached, his job would in theory pass to his vice-president, Dina Boluarte, a member of Free Perú until January when she was expelled for criticising the party’s hardline Marxist leader. 

There is an outside chance that Castillo quits, but that looks unlikely, not least because of the corruption allegations stacking up against him. Another option, if the situation deteriorates, is a military takeover or a popular uprising, but both seem remote. There have been both pro and anti-Castillo protests but they have been small, and the country’s military has stressed the need to avoid any intervention in politics. 

Castillo could try to shut down congress. The quirks of the constitution allow for that. It says that if congress defies the president in two votes of confidence on their choice of cabinet during one five-year term, he or she can dissolve it and rule by decree before calling congressional elections. 

That too is unlikely, though. Current members of congress would be barred from re-election and it is therefore not in their interests to reject Castillo’s cabinet choices, however much they disagree with them. Castillo has already put three cabinets to congress and each time legislators have given them the thumbs up. 

 

The president has told congress that he wants to move on from his bruising first eight months in power after acknowledging his mistakes and saying he was willing “to make amends and corrections”. “For more than five years, polarisation and unbridled political confrontation have affected our governability and our fragile democratic institutions,” he said. Peru deserves a fresh political start In some homes in Peru, he still enjoys support. “I still believe in Pedro Castillo,” says Tony Palomino, a community worker in Villa El Salvador, a former shanty town in southern Lima that is now a gritty suburb of breeze block houses, home to a population of about 500,000. “Castillo is trying to do things for the people and this battle between congress and government is doing enormous damage to the country.” Monday’s vote will determine whether Castillo gets another chance, but even if he does, analysts say, it is difficult to see him lasting a full five-year term such is the toxicity in Peruvian politics at present. “No country can stand so much instability,” Lovatón says. “Latin American history teaches us that after periods of instability an autocrat comes along — from the left or the right — who brings stability, and the country grabs hold of him. “That’s the Latin American way,” he adds. “That’s the fear.”

domingo, 27 de março de 2022

The Toll of Economic War - Nicholas Mulder (Foreign Affairs)


The Toll of Economic War

How Sanctions on Russia Will Upend the Global Order

Nicholas Mulder

Foreign Affairs, Nova York – 24.3.2022

 

The Russian-Ukrainian war of 2022 is not just a major geopolitical event but also a geoeconomic turning point. Western sanctions are the toughest measures ever imposed against a state of Russia’s size and power. In the space of less than three weeks, the United States and its allies have cut major Russian banks off from the global financial system; blocked the export of high-tech components in unison with Asian allies; seized the overseas assets of hundreds of wealthy oligarchs; revoked trade treaties with Moscow; banned Russian airlines from North Atlantic airspace: restricted Russian oil sales to the United States and United Kingdom; blocked all foreign investment in the Russian economy from their jurisdiction; and frozen $403 billion out of the $630 billion in foreign assets of the Central Bank of Russia. The overall effect has been unprecedented, and a few weeks ago would have seemed unimaginable even to most experts: in all but its most vital products, the world’s eleventh-largest economy has now been decoupled from twenty-first-century globalization.

How will these historic measures play out? Economic sanctions rarely succeed at achieving their goals. Western policymakers frequently assume that failures stem from weaknesses in sanctions design. Indeed, sanctions can be plagued by loopholes, lack of political will to implement them, or insufficient diplomatic agreement concerning enforcement. The implicit assumption is that stronger sanctions stand a better chance of succeeding.

Yet the Western economic containment of Russia is different. This is an unprecedented campaign to isolate a G-20 economy with a large hydrocarbon sector, a sophisticated military-industrial complex, and a diversified basket of commodity exports. As a result, Western sanctions face a different kind of problem. The sanctions, in this case, could fail not because of their weakness but because of their great and unpredictable strength. Having grown accustomed to using sanctions against smaller countries at low cost, Western policymakers have only limited experience and understanding of the effects of truly severe measures against a major, globally connected economy. Existing fragilities in the world’s economic and financial structure mean that such sanctions have the potential to cause grave political and material fallout.

 

THE REAL SHOCK AND AWE

 

Just how severe the current sanctions against Russia are can be seen from their effects across the world. The immediate shock to the Russian economy is the most obvious. Economists expect Russian GDP to contract by at least 9–15 percent this year, but the damage could well become much more severe. The ruble has fallen more than a third since the beginning of January. An exodus of skilled Russian professionals is underway, while the capacity to import consumer goods and valuable technology has fallen drastically. As Russian political scientist Ilya Matveev has put it, “30 years of economic development thrown into the bin.”

The ramifications of the Western sanctions go far beyond these effects on Russia itself. There are at least four different kinds of broader effects: spillover effects into adjacent countries and markets; multiplier effects through private-sector divestment; escalation effects in the form of Russian responses; and systemic effects on the global economy.

Spillover effects have already caused turmoil in international commodities markets. A generalized panic erupted among traders after the second Western sanctions package—including the SWIFT cutoff and the freezing of central bank reserves—was announced on February 26. Prices of crude oil, natural gas, wheat, copper, nickel, aluminum, fertilizers, and gold have soared. Because the war has closed Ukrainian ports and international firms are shunning Russian commodity exports, a grain and metals shortage now looms over the global economy. Although oil prices have since dropped in anticipation of additional output from Gulf producers, the price shock to energy and commodities across the board will push global inflation higher. African and Asian countries reliant on food and energy imports are already experiencing difficulties.

These former Soviet states are strongly connected to the Russian economy through trade and outward labor migration. The collapse of the ruble has caused serious financial distress in the region. Kazakhstan has imposed exchange controls after the tenge, its currency, fell by 20 percent in the wake of the Western sanctions against Moscow; Tajikistan’s somoni has undergone a similarly steep depreciation. Russia’s impending impoverishment will force millions of Central Asian migrant workers to seek employment elsewhere and dry up the flow of remittances to their home countries.

The impact of the sanctions goes beyond decisions taken by G-7 and EU governments. The official sanctions packages have had a catalyzing effect on international businesses operating in Russia. Virtually overnight, Russia’s impending isolation has set in motion a massive corporate flight. In what amounts to a vast private sector boycott, hundreds of major Western firms in the technology, oil and gas, aerospace, car, manufacturing, consumer goods, food and beverage, accounting and financial, and transport industries are pulling out of the country. It is noteworthy that these departures are in many cases not required by sanctions. Instead, they are driven by moral condemnation, reputational concerns, and outright panic. As a result, the business retreat is deepening the economic shock to Russia by multiplying the negative economic effects of official state sanctions.

The Russian government has responded to the sanctions in several ways. It has undertaken emergency stabilization policies to protect foreign exchange earnings and shore up the ruble. Foreign portfolio capital is being locked into the country. While the stock market has remained closed, the assets of many Western firms that have departed may soon face confiscation. The Ministry of Economic Development has prepared a law that grants the Russian state six months to take over businesses in case of an “ungrounded” liquidation or bankruptcy.

The potential nationalization of Western capital is not the only escalatory effect of the sanctions. On March 9, Putin signed an order restricting Russian commodity exports. Although the full array of items to be withheld under the ban is not yet clear, the threat of its use will continue to hang over international trade. Russian restrictions on fertilizer exports imposed in early February have already put pressure on global food production. Russia could retaliate by restricting exports of important minerals such as nickel, palladium, and industrial sapphires. These are crucial inputs for the production of electrical batteries, catalytic converters, phones, ball bearings, light tubes, and microchips. In the globalized assemblage system, even small changes in materials prices can massively raise the production costs faced by final users downstream in the production chain. A Russian embargo or large export reduction of palladium, nickel, or sapphires would hit car and semiconductor manufacturers, a $3.4 trillion global industry. If the economic war between the West and Russia continues further into 2022 at this intensity, it is very possible that the world will slide into a sanctions-induced recession.

 

MANAGING THE FALLOUT

 

The combination of spillover effects, negative multiplier effects, and escalation effects means that the sanctions against Russia will have an effect on the world economy like few previous sanctions regimes in history. Why was this great upheaval not anticipated? One reason is that over the last few decades, U.S. policymakers have usually deployed sanctions against economies that were sufficiently modest in size for any significant adverse effects to be contained. The degree of integration into the world economy of North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, Myanmar, and Belarus was relatively modest and one-dimensional. Only the rollout of U.S. sanctions against Iran required special care to avoid upsetting the oil market. In general, however, the assumption held that sanctions use was economically almost costless to the United States. This has meant that the macroeconomic and macrofinancial consequences of global sanctions are insufficiently understood.

To better grasp the choices to be made in the current economic sanctions against Russia, it is instructive to examine sanctions use in the 1930s, when democracies similarly attempted to use them to stop the aggression of large-sized autocratic economies such as Fascist Italy, imperial Japan, and Nazi Germany. The crucial backdrop to these efforts was the Great Depression, which had weakened economies and inflamed nationalism around the world. When Italian dictator Benito Mussolini invaded Ethiopia in October 1935, the League of Nations implemented an international sanctions regime enforced by 52 countries. It was an impressive united response, similar to that on display in reaction to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

But the league sanctions came with real tradeoffs. Economic containment of Fascist Italy limited democracies’ ability to use sanctions against an aggressor who was more threatening still: Adolf Hitler. As a major engine of export demand for smaller European economies, Germany was too large an economy to be isolated without severe commercial loss to the whole of Europe. Amid the fragile recovery from the Depression, simultaneously placing sanctions on both Italy and Germany—then the fourth- and seventh-largest economies in the world—was too costly for most democracies. Hitler exploited this fear of overstretch and the international focus on Ethiopia by moving German troops into the demilitarized Rhineland in March 1936, advancing further toward war. German officials were aware of their commercial power, which they used to maneuver central European and Balkan economies into their political orbit. The result was the creation of a continental, river-based bloc of vassal economies whose trade with Germany was harder for Western states to block with sanctions or a naval blockade.

The sanctions dilemmas of the 1930s show that aggressors should be confronted when they disrupt the international order. But it equally drives home the fact that the viability of sanctions, and the chances of their success, are always dependent on the global economic situation. In unstable commercial and financial conditions, it will be necessary to prioritize among competing objectives and prepare thoroughly for unintended effects of all kinds. Using sanctions against very large economies will simply not be possible without compensatory policies that support the sanctioners’ economies and the rest of the world.

The Biden administration is aware of this problem, but its actions so far are inadequate to the scale of the problem. Washington has attempted to reduce strains in the oil market by a partial reconciliation with Iran and Venezuela. Countering the spillover effects of sanctions against one leading petrostate may now require lifting sanctions on two smaller petrostates. But this oil diplomacy is insufficient to meet the challenge posed by the Russia sanctions, the effects of which are aggravating preexisting economic woes. Supply chain issues and pandemic-era bottlenecks in global transport and production networks predated the war in Ukraine. The unprecedented use of sanctions in these already troubled conditions has made an already difficult situation worse.

The problem of managing the fallout of economic war is greater still in Europe. This is not only because the European Union has much stronger trade and energy links with Russia. It is also the result of the political economy of the eurozone as it has taken shape over the last two decades: with the exception of France, most of its economies follow a heavily trade-reliant, export-focused growth strategy. This economic model requires foreign demand for exports while repressing wages and domestic demand. It is a structure that is very ill suited to the prolonged imposition of trade-reducing sanctions. Increasing EU-wide renewable energy investment and expanding public control in the energy sector, as French President Emmanuel Macron has announced, is one way to absorb this shock. But there is also a need for income-boosting measures for consumer goods and price-dampening interventions in producer goods markets, from strategic reserve management to the excess profits taxes that are being rolled out in Spain and Italy.

Then there are the consequences of sanctions cause for the world economy at large, especially in the “global South.” Addressing these problems will pose a major macroeconomic challenge. It is therefore imperative for the G-7, the European Union, and the United States’ Asian partners to launch bold and coordinated action to stabilize global markets. This can be done through targeted investment to clear up supply bottlenecks, generous international grants and loans to developing countries struggling to secure adequate food and energy supplies, and large-scale government funding for renewable energy capacity. It will also have to involve subsidies, and perhaps even rationing and price controls, to protect the poorest from the destructive effects of surging food, energy, and commodity prices.

Such state intervention is the price to be paid for engaging in economic war. Inflicting material damage at the scale levelled against Russia simply cannot be pursued without an international policymaking shift that extends economic support to those affected by sanctions. Unless the material well-being of households is protected, political support for sanctions will crumble over time.

 

THE NEW INTERVENTIONISTS

 

Western policymakers thus face a serious decision. They must decide whether to uphold sanctions against Russia at their current strength or to impose further economic punishment on Putin. If the goal of the sanctions is to exert maximum pressure on Russia with minimal disruption to their own economies—and thus a manageable risk of domestic political backlash—then current levels of pressure may be the most that is politically feasible now.

At the moment, simply maintaining existing sanctions will require active compensatory policies. For Europe especially, neither laissez-faire economic policies nor fiscal fragmentation will be sustainable if the economic war persists. But if the West decides to step up the economic pressure on Russia further still, far-reaching economic interventions will become an absolute necessity. More intensive sanctions will inflict further damage, not just to the sanctioners themselves but to the world economy at large. No matter how strong and justified the West’s resolve to stop Putin’s aggression is, policymakers must accept the material reality that an all-out economic offensive will introduce considerable new strains into the world economy.

An intensification of sanctions will cause a cascade of material shocks that will demand far-reaching stabilization efforts. And even with such rescue measures, the economic damage may well be serious, and the risks of strategic escalation will remain high. For all these reasons, it remains vital to pursue diplomatic and economic paths that can end the conflict. Whatever the results of the war, the economic offensive against Russia has already exposed one important new reality: the era of costless, risk-free, and predictable sanctions is well and truly over.

 

NICHOLAS MULDER is Assistant Professor of History at Cornell University and the author of The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War.


Postagem em destaque

Livro Marxismo e Socialismo finalmente disponível - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Meu mais recente livro – que não tem nada a ver com o governo atual ou com sua diplomacia esquizofrênica, já vou logo avisando – ficou final...