segunda-feira, 2 de maio de 2022

MILICOS BURROS DO PLANALTO estão impedindo o Itamaraty de fazer Política Externa - matéria do Globo (Janaína Figueiredo, Lauro Jardim)

 A CACOFONIA na área externa do Brasil. Se os milicos BURROS do Planalto querem que o Itamaraty seja como eles – Hierarquia, Disciplina, aquelas bobagens –, eles teria de deixar o Itamaraty funcionar como se faz em operações de guerra: UNIDADE DE COMANDO, coerência nas ordens e acatamento disciplinado.

Se todo mundo se julga no direito de opinar e mandar, só pode dar confusão no pedaço.
APRENDAM MILICOS BURROS: deixem o Itamaraty trabalhar. Outro que está sempre interferindo é o incompetente do Guedes, um cara que nunca aprendeu o que é política externa ou mesmo política comercial.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida


Após um ano no posto, chefe do Itamaraty sofre desgaste com interferências em sua área
Guerra e discussões sobre a posição do Brasil no cenário internacional geram rumores de fritura de Carlos França, ratificado por Bolsonaro
Janaína Figueiredo
O Globo, 02/05/2022

A invasão da Ucrânia pela Rússia, iniciada em 24 de fevereiro, encerrou o que poderia ser chamado de período de graça do ministro das Relações Exteriores, Carlos França, que chegou ao posto em março de 2021. Desde então, questionamentos internos ao chanceler têm se intensificado, provocando o que fontes do governo consideram um “tiroteio” do qual, até agora, França saiu ileso.

Semana passada, o presidente Jair Bolsonaro, com quem o chanceler mantém uma excelente relação, ratificou França no cargo, na tentativa de pôr panos quentes em rumores sobre a possibilidade de uma troca de comando no Itamaraty, em plena campanha eleitoral.

— A nossa política externa, que tem à frente o ministro Carlos França, é realmente reconhecida por todos nós e por todo o mundo afora. Todos querem fazer comércio conosco — disse o presidente durante a abertura de uma feira de agricultura em Ribeirão Preto (SP).

França navegou em águas tranquilas durante quase um ano, mas hoje enfrenta fortes interferências em sua área, e elas têm alimentado versões sobre a fritura do ministro. Em palavras de uma fonte do governo, “hoje todo mundo dá pitaco sobre a guerra: temos a ala militar, a Faria Lima [em referência à equipe econômica], os ideológicos, e o Itamaraty”.

Bolsonaro ouve todos, e hoje continua respaldando o ministro das Relações Exteriores que, por seu passado como chefe de protocolo do Palácio do Planalto, tem acesso privilegiado ao poder e ao mundo político.

Poucos acreditam que França deixará o cargo antes das eleições, mas esse cenário não pode ser totalmente descartado. O desgaste é evidente. Relações que fluíam com facilidade alguns meses atrás, hoje, confirmaram fontes do governo, enfrentam tensões.

Uma delas é do chanceler com o secretário de Assuntos Estratégicos, almirante Flávio Viana Rocha, que circula com assídua frequência pelas embaixadas de Brasília, recebe muitos embaixadores no Palácio do Planalto e tem uma agenda internacional que, segundo fontes, “provoca desajustes”. França e o almirante sempre tiveram um vínculo cordial, e Viana Rocha, conhecido por sua simpatia e capacidade (entre outras, fala vários idiomas), trabalha em permanente contato com o Itamaraty. Mas os tempos mudaram, insistem as fontes.

Guedes e a OCDE
Hoje, França é mais cobrado internamente, e as brigas por espaço e por influenciar a posição do país sobre a guerra — condenação à agressão russa, mas não alinhamento aos EUA e à União Europeia — se acentuaram.

Alguns votos recentes do Brasil em organismos internacionais, como na Organização para a Cooperação e Desenvolvimento Econômico (OCDE), causaram “desconforto” no Ministério da Economia e, hoje, segundo fontes, existe um “receio” pela possibilidade de que políticas do Itamaraty que estão causando mal-estar entre americanos e europeus possam prejudicar a agenda econômica.

A visão nessa ala do governo é de que existem falhas de comunicação sobre a posição brasileira e, partindo dessa avaliação, o ministro Paulo Guedes tem falado sobre o assunto, no Brasil e no exterior.

— O Brasil vai trabalhar sempre no sentido de reforçar os valores das instituições multilaterais e abraçar a OCDE. Vamos avançar em todas as frentes. Queremos acesso à OCDE, queremos o acordo Mercosul-União Europeia, para garantir a segurança alimentar e energética dessa grande comunidade de nações — declarou o ministro da Economia, recentemente.

Depois de o Brasil se abster numa votação sobre a exclusão da Rússia do Conselho de Direitos Humanos das Nações Unidas, alinhada com seus sócios dos Brics (China, Índia e África do Sul, além de Rússia), Guedes criticou as guerras atuais, as quais chamou de “retrocesso”. O medo é de que o estremecimento das relações, sobretudo com os europeus, possa causar danos colaterais.

No próximo mês, o conselho de embaixadores e ministros da OCDE (organismo com sede em Paris e dominado amplamente pelos europeus) deve aprovar o chamado roteiro de ascensão para os seis países em processo de adesão, entre eles o Brasil. Estão se aproximando instâncias-chave no caminho para alcançar uma meta traçada por Guedes no começo do governo, o que eleva ainda mais as tensões.

As falas do ministro da Economia não caem bem em setores do Ministério das Relações Exteriores, que defendem a entrada do Brasil em organismos como a OCDE com uma voz própria e não abaixando a cabeça para as cada vez mais explícitas pressões externas, sobretudo de países da UE.

‘Demoras e titubeios’
Existe entre diplomatas estrangeiros em Brasília a sensação de que muitas vozes dentro do governo estão opinando sobre a política externa desde que a guerra estourou, o que leva a demoras e titubeios do Brasil, termos usados por uma das fontes consultadas, que enfraquecem a gestão de França. O chanceler é visto como um equilibrista, que deve conciliar a visão do Planalto, para muitos observadores estrangeiros claramente pró Rússia, com as demandas de outros ministérios, a ala militar e tradições diplomáticas brasileiras.

As declarações de França defendendo a permanência da Rússia no G-20, na contramão do que pregam europeus e americanos, foram consideradas “inadmissíveis” por diplomatas de países da UE. Uma das fontes consultadas afirmou que “com a Rússia dentro, não haverá cúpula do G-20”.

— Você pode imaginar uma reunião com Putin e [o chanceler Serguei] Lavrov sentados à mesma mesa que autoridades europeias? Isso seria impensável — disse a fonte.

Não são tempos tranquilos para França. Sinais de fogo amigo apareceram pela primeira vez na gestão do chanceler, que continua sendo visto como a melhor opção por diplomatas ativos e já afastados. Na visão do embaixador Rubens Barbosa, que já chefiou as embaixadas brasileiras em Washington e Londres e atualmente preside o Instituto de Relações Internacionais e Comércio Exterior (Irice), uma mudança agora seria ruim para o Brasil.

— Não creio que o presidente vá fazer uma mudança neste momento. Uma mudança agora pareceria uma capitulação diante dos EUA e da UE — diz Barbosa.

Ambiguidades
O deputado federal Marcel van Hatten (Novo-RS), integrante da Comissão de Relações Exteriores e Defesa da Câmara, concorda que “no momento, França é a pessoa mais adequada para o posto”.

— O chanceler acomoda os interesses do presidente com os do país — opina ele.

Não é a mesma opinião que predomina em embaixadas estrangeiras em Brasília. As críticas pelo que é considerado falta de clareza e ambiguidade do Brasil em relação à guerra aumentam a cada semana, e os supostos massacres cometidos pelos militares russos na Ucrânia aprofundam o mal-estar.

Mas França está firme, e fontes do governo que defendem sua gestão garantem que “o ministro é ponderado, equilibrado, o melhor que poderíamos ter neste momento. O Brasil precisa ter uma política externa independente”.



O apelido de Flávio Rocha entre os diplomatas no Itamaraty

Por Lauro Jardim
O Globo, 01/05/2022

No Itamaraty, o ministro Flávio Rocha, chefe da Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos (SAE), tem sido chamado de "chefe da SAI", ou seja, uma inexistente Secretaria de Assuntos Internacionais.

O motivo, na visão dos diplomatas, é a quantidade de vezes em que Rocha se mete em temas de relações exteriores.


Entrevista do embaixador Aldemo Garcia com o Prêmio Nobel da Paz, José Ramos Horta (YouTube)

Entrevista do embaixador Aldemo Garcia com o Prêmio Nobel da Paz, José Ramos Horta (Novembro 2020)



38 visualizações 28 de abr. de 2022  
Uma Visão do Timor-Leste por José Ramos-Horta

O novamente presidente do Timor Leste, José Ramos-Horta, prêmio Nobel da Paz, que lutou pela libertação e independência de seu país, desde a sua invasão pela Indonésia em 1975, concedeu uma entrevista ao diplomata Aldemo Garcia, quando embaixador do Brasil em Dili, onde trata dos diversos temas de interesse do seu país, do Brasil e da Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (CPLP), agora disponível neste canal do YouTube:

Teorias desenvolvimentistas da CEPAL, em novo livro de Margarita Fajardo: The World That Latin America Created (2022)

Margarita Fajardo: 

The World That Latin America Created: The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America in the Development Era

Harvard University Press 2022

The World That Latin America Created: The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America in the Development Era presenta un relato que explica cómo un grupo de intelectuales y políticos transformó la economía del desarrollo y le dio a América Latina una nueva posición en el mundo. Después de que la Segunda Guerra Mundial demoliera el viejo orden, un grupo de economistas y legisladores de toda América Latina imaginaron una nueva economía global y lanzaron un movimiento intelectual que eventualmente conquistaría el mundo. 

Con base en la hipótesis de que los sistemas de comercio y finanzas internacionales estaban frustrando las perspectivas económicas de América Latina y otras regiones del mundo, a través de la Comisión Económica para América Latina de las Naciones Unidas (CEPAL, las siglas en español y portugués) los cepalinos desafiaron las ortodoxias de la teoría y la política del desarrollo para poner una alternativa basada en la teoría del centro y la periferia. Eventualmente, los cepalinos establecieron su propia forma de hegemonía, superando a Estados Unidos y al Fondo Monetario Internacional como entidades que marcaron la agenda de una región tradicionalmente mantenida bajo la órbita de Washington y sus instituciones en la era del desarrollo. Al hacerlo, los cepalinos reformaron la gobernanza regional e internacional y establecieron una agenda intelectual que todavía resuena hoy.

A partir de la revisión de fuentes inexploradas de las Américas y Europa, Margarita Fajardo vuelve a contar la historia de la teoría de la dependencia, revelando la diversidad de un movimiento a menudo demasiado simplificado y la tensa relación entre los cepalinos, sus críticos dependentistas y la izquierda regional y global. En este sentido, The World That Latin America Created es una historia de las instituciones, los personajes y la ideas latinoamericanas que tuvieron un impacto real en la gobernanza de la economía regional y global.

Margarita Fajardo es historiadora egresada de la Universidad de los Andes y doctora por la Universidad de Princeton. En los últimos años, ha recibido becas del Centro de Historia de la Economía Política de la Universidad de Duke. Su trabajo ha sido publicado en Latin American Research Review y en una serie de volúmenes editados sobre el desarrollismo en América Latina, las ciencias sociales de la Guerra Fría y las ciencias sociales globales. Está interesada en la historia del capitalismo latinoamericano y global, así como en la historia y la economía política de las ideas y de la ciencia.

Twitter: @mmfajardoh

NewbooksNetwork, abr. 29, 2022

 

China, três visões do seu crescimento econômico - Chartbook 118 - Adam Tooze

 Roubo, do último Chartbook de Adam Tooze, três gráficos sobre seu desempenho espetacular, mas a sua produção por trabalhador ainda está bem abaixo da dos trabalhadores americanos.

Primeiro, seu desempenho em matéria de PIB: 


Agora o valor agregado por trabalhador: 


Finalmente, as matrículas no terceiro ciclo têm crescido consistentemente: 



domingo, 1 de maio de 2022

Celso Lafer: o pai fundador das Relações Internacionais no Brasil

 Neste link do portal da revista Interesse Nacional: https://interessenacional.com.br/edicoes-posts/resenha-celso-lafer-o-pai-fundador-das-relacoes-internacionais-no-brasil/



Resenha – Celso Lafer: o pai fundador das relações internacionais no Brasil


Celso Lafer: Relações internacionais, política externa e diplomacia brasileira: pensamento e ação Brasília: Funag, 2018, 2 vols., 1437 p.; lo. vol., ISBN: 978-85-7631-787-6; 762 p.; 2o. vol., ISBN: 978-85-7631-788-3, 675 p.; disponíveis na Biblioteca Digital da Funag; 1o volume ; 2o volume ).

Por Paulo Roberto de Almeida*

A obra em dois volumes reproduz meio século de ideias, reflexões, pesquisas, andanças e um exercício direto de responsabilidades à frente da diplomacia brasileira (em duas ocasiões, 1992 e 2000-2002) e, através dela, de algumas funções relevantes na diplomacia mundial, como a presidência do Conselho da OMC, assim como em outras instâncias da política global. Celso Lafer, professor emérito da USP, articulista consagrado, mestre de várias gerações de estudiosos de relações internacionais e de direito, esteve à frente de decisões relevantes em alguns foros decisivos para as relações exteriores do Brasil, na integração regional, no comércio mundial, nos novos temas do multilateralismo contemporâneo. A obra constitui um aporte fundamental para os estudiosos de diplomacia e de relações internacionais do Brasil, uma vez que reúne os relevantes escritos do mais importante intelectual desse campo, praticamente o fundador da disciplina no Brasil, com a vantagem de o autor ter sido o condutor da diplomacia brasileira em momentos significativos da história recente.

A trajetória intelectual do autor se confunde com a evolução dos estudos e da prática das relações exteriores do Brasil no último meio século, mas a obra reproduz apenas uma pequena parte de sua gigantesca produção acadêmica, profissional ou jornalística, deixando de integrar, por especialização temática nas áreas do título, uma outra parte essencial de suas atividades intelectuais, que cobrem os terrenos literário, cultural e mesmo de política doméstica. Percorrendo as páginas dos dois volumes é possível registrar alguns grandes nomes do estadismo mundial, com quem Celso Lafer interagiu ou conviveu ao longo dessas décadas. Ele discorre sobre líderes estrangeiros como Mandela, Shimon Peres, Koffi Annan, Antonio Guterres e, retrospectivamente, sobre o êmulo português do embaixador Souza Dantas, o cônsul Aristides de Souza Mendes, um justo entre os injustos do salazarismo. Dentre os diplomatas distinguidos do Brasil figuram os nomes de Saraiva Guerreiro e de Sérgio Vieira de Mello, para mencionar apenas dois. Comparecem vários colegas, intelectuais da academia ou da diplomacia, como José Guilherme Merquior, Sergio Paulo Rouanet, Gelson Fonseca Jr., Synesio Sampaio Goes, Rubens Ricupero, Gilberto Dupas, Celso Furtado, Miguel Reale, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, entre os brasileiros. Estudiosos estrangeiros aparecem sob os nomes de Karl Deutsch, Raymond Aron, Andrew Hurrell, Octavio Paz, Hans Morgenthau, Henry Kissinger e Raul Prebisch.

A decisão de compilar dezenas e dezenas de artigos dispersos, vários publicados em revista nem sempre disponíveis, partiu da própria Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, e foi viabilizada pelo trabalho de revisão editorial do seu Instituto de Pesquisas de Relações Internacionais.

Pronunciamento do ex-ministro das Relações Exteriores Celso Lafer na Comissão de Relações Exteriores e Defesa Nacional (Roque de Sá/Agência Senado)

Em seu conjunto, os dois volumes da obra, construídos ao longo de alguns meses de garimpo documental e de lapidação formal, a partir de uma mina repleta de pepitas preciosas que vinham sendo carregadas pelo fluxo heteróclito de publicações no decorrer de várias décadas, apresentam, finalmente, o que se espera seja uma obra de referência e uma contribuição essencial ao conhecimento da diplomacia brasileira e da vida intelectual em nosso país, a partir dos anos 1960 até aqui. Suas qualidades intrínsecas, combinando sólida visão global e um conhecimento direto dos eventos e processos que o autor descreve e analisa, representam um aporte fundamental a todos os estudiosos de diplomacia e de relações internacionais do Brasil, uma vez que reúne os relevantes escritos do mais importante intelectual desse campo, com a vantagem de Celso Lafer ter tido a experiência prática de conduzir a diplomacia brasileira em momentos significativos da história recente. As “questões polêmicas” da quarta parte reúnem alguns de seus artigos de jornal, nos quais exerceu um olhar crítico sobre a “diplomacia” implementada a partir de 2003, rompendo pela primeira vez a tradição secular da política externa brasileira, no sentido de representar o consenso nacional em torno dos interesses do país, para adotar o sectarismo míope de um partido que tentou monopolizar de forma canhestra (e corrupta) o sistema político.

Celso Lafer, herdeiro intelectual de grandes pensadores do século XX, combina destreza acadêmica e tino empresarial, que também já tinha caracterizado um de seus familiares, e antecessor à frente da diplomacia brasileira, seu tio Horácio Lafer, ministro da Fazenda e das Relações Exteriores na República de 1946. Celso Lafer construiu sua educação diplomática na observação direta do que foi feito por esse tio, antes como ministro da Fazenda do Vargas dos anos 1950, depois à frente do Itamaraty, numa segunda fase do governo JK. 

A educação de Celso Lafer se fez, primordialmente, em intensas leituras e eventuais contatos, com grandes nomes do pensamento histórico, filosófico e político da tradição ocidental, desde mestres do passado remoto – Tucídides, Aristóteles, Grócio, Vico, Hume, Bodin, Hobbes Montesquieu, Kant, Tocqueville, Charles de Visscher e outros – até mestres do passado recente, inclusive alguns deles encontrados em carne e osso: Hans Kelsen, Carl Schmitt, Isaiah Berlin, Hanna Arendt, Norberto Bobbio, Raymond Aron, Hedley Bull, Martin Wight, Albert Hirschman, Stanley Hoffmann e muitos outros. Celso Lafer sempre foi um liberal doutrinal e filosófico, não obstante seu alinhamento pragmático com a socialdemocracia na política brasileira, no que, aliás, ele combina com um de seus mestres, o jurista e intelectual italiano Norberto Bobbio.

Mais de uma centena de textos comparecem nos dois volumes, organizados em cinco partes bem identificadas, embora algumas repetições sejam detectáveis aqui e ali. O conjunto dos escritos constitui, sem dúvida alguma, um completo curso acadêmico e um amplo repositório empírico em torno dos conceitos exatamente expressos no título da obra: Relações internacionais, política externa e diplomacia brasileira: pensamento e ação

Os artigos, ensaios, conferências e entrevistas podem servir, em primeiro lugar, a todos os estudantes desses campos, não restritos, obviamente, aos próprios cursos de Relações Internacionais, mas indo ao Direito, Ciência Política, Filosofia, Sociologia, História, além de outras vertentes das Humanidades. Mas, os diplomatas profissionais e os demais operadores consolidados trabalhando direta ou indiretamente nessas áreas também encontrarão aqui um rico manancial de ideias, argumentos e, mais importante, “recapitulações” em torno de conferências, negociações, encontros bilaterais, regionais ou multilaterais que figuraram na agenda internacional do Brasil nas últimas décadas.

A diversidade de assuntos, inclusive em relação aos próprios personagens que aqui comparecem, em “diálogos”, homenagens, obituários ou relatos de encontros pessoais, possuem um inegável vínculo entre si, pois todos eles têm a ver, de perto ou de longe, com a interface externa do Brasil e com os voos internacionais do autor. Os textos não esgotam, obviamente, o amplo leque de interesses e de estudos do autor, que se estende ainda aos campos da literatura e dos assuntos culturais em geral, trabalhos que figuram em diversos outros livros publicados de Celso Lafer, vários monotemáticos e alguns na categoria de coletâneas, como por exemplo os três volumes publicados pela Atlas, em 2015, enfeixados sob o título comum de Um percurso no Direito do século XXI, mas voltados para direitos humanos, direito internacional e filosofia e teoria geral do direito. A sua produção variada, acumulada intensa e extensivamente em tão larga variedade de assuntos, permite o mesmo tipo de “assemblagem” ocasional efetuada na presente obra em dois volumes.

O percurso de Celso Lafer, no Brasil e no mundo, sua postura filosófica, de defensor constante dos direitos humanos e da democracia política, suas aulas na tradicional Faculdade de Direito (e em muitas outras conferências em universidades e várias instituições em incontáveis oportunidades), sua luta pela afirmação internacional do Brasil nos mais diversos foros abertos ao engenho e arte da diplomacia nacional, todos esses aspectos estão aqui refletidos em mais de uma centena de trabalhos carinhosamente reunidos sob a direção do próprio mestre e oferecidos agora ao público interessado. Não apenas o reflexo de uma vida dedicada a construir sua própria trajetória intelectual, esses textos são, antes de qualquer outra coisa, aulas magistrais, consolidadas numa obra unitária, enfeixada aqui sob a tripla dimensão do título do livro.

Mais do que uma garrafa lançada ao mar, como podem ser outras coletâneas de escritos dispersos oferecidos a um público indiferenciado, a centena de “mensagens laferianas” aqui reunidas constituem um útil instrumento de trabalho oferecido aos profissionais da diplomacia, ademais de ser uma obra de referência aberta à leitura dos pesquisadores, dos professores e dos estudantes dessas grandes áreas de estudos e de trabalho acadêmico. Ao disponibilizar essa massa de escritos da mais alta qualidade intelectual ao grande público, esta obra faz mais do que reunir estudos dispersos numa nova coletânea de ensaios conectados entre si: ela representa, também e principalmente, um tributo de merecido reconhecimento ao grande mestre educador que sempre foi, e continuará sendo, Celso Lafer.


* Paulo Roberto de Almeida é diplomata de carreira, doutor em ciências sociais pela Université Libre de Bruxelles, mestre em Planejamento Econômico pela Universidade de Antuérpia, licenciado em ciências sociais pela Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1975). Atua como professor de economia política no Programa de Pós-Graduação em direito do Centro Universitário de Brasília (Uniceub). É editor adjunto da Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional.






Dorothy Borg: pioneira dos estudos chineses nos EUA e das relações bilaterais - H-Diplo

 

H-Diplo/ISSF Forum 34 (2022) on the Importance of the Scholarship of Dorothy Borg

by George Fujii

H-Diplo | ISSF Forum 34 (2022) on the Importance of the Scholarship of Dorothy Borg

Editor: Diane Labrosse | Commissioning Editor and Chair: Warren I. Cohen
Production Editor: George Fujii

Published on 29 April 2022

https://issforum.org/to/Forum34

Contents

Introduction by Warren I. Cohen, University of Maryland, Baltimore County and Michigan State University, Emeritus. 2

Essay by Lloyd C. Gardner, Rutgers University, Emeritus. 5

Essay by Akira Iriye, Harvard University, Emeritus. 8

 

Introduction by Warren I. Cohen, University of Maryland, Baltimore County and Michigan State University, Emeritus

Dorothy Borg:  Founder of American-East Asian Relations Specialization

Born in 1902, a granddaughter of the banker Jacob Schiff—who bequeathed $1 million to each of his grandchildren—Dorothy never had to work to pay the rent.  Her family was part of the famed Our Crowd: The Great Jewish Families of New York and she appears as a young woman in a photograph published in Stephen Birmingham’s book so titled.[1]  But she rebelled against the family ethos, hated being dragged to Paris every year for new clothes.  After graduating from Wellesley, she found work as a journalist with the New York World. 

Inspired by the career of her uncle, George Louis Beer, who had been a prize-winning historian of international relations, a member of Woodrow Wilson’s Inquiry, and a delegate to the Paris Peace Conference, she decided to attend Columbia University for graduate work, developing a particular interest in Chinese-American relations, especially the role of public opinion in influencing American policy.  Her research also resulted in a deep interest in historiography, specifically writings about American-East Asian Relations.

In the late 1930s, after passing her Ph.D. orals, she joined the staff of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) as a research associate.  Her dissertation, written during the war, was published in 1947, by the IPR, asAmerican Policy and the Chinese Revolution, 1925-1928. In its systematic examination of congressional and public opinion, newspapers and special interest groups, the book revealed the climate of opinion in which Secretary of State Frank Kellogg functioned.  Previous writers had contended that American policy had been rigidly committed to the “Open Door,” a policy peculiar to China that was attributed to Secretary of State John Hay at the close of the previous century.  Borg demonstrated that Kellogg and his advisors adapted policy toward China toward the same conditions that affected American policy generally, primarily the dominance in the 1920s of the peace movement.  She also provided readers with an understanding of the Chinese context, without which much of Chinese-American relations in the 1920s is incomprehensible.

In late 1946, she went to China for the first time, representing the IPR in Shanghai and Peiping for two years.  She taught one semester at Peking National University where faculty friends and students explained why they had turned against the Kuomintang (KMT) and were prepared to accept Communist control of their country.  At least one of her students went on to be a high-ranking diplomat for the People’s Republic (and reached out to me as her friend when I was in Beijing in 1980).  An article she wrote suggesting that it was a mistake for the United States to continue to support the KMT in the Chinese Civil War reached the desk of Secretary of State Dean Acheson (one of her admirers), which may explain the course of action he recommended to the president.[2]

In China, Borg confirmed her suspicion that America’s China hands were an inbred lot.  American missionaries she met had often spent their entire careers in the country and had raised their children there.  The children went on to be academics or journalists or government officials, but frequently specializing in Chinese affairs.  Foreign service officers and journalists, unlike their colleagues stationed elsewhere, seemed exempt from rotation and spent unusually large parts of their careers in China.  She suspected that long residence in China and insulation from the United States and the rest of the world had allowed these people to develop and disseminate an unrealistic conception of a special relationship between the United States and China—that Americans felt particularly close to China and obliged to assist and protect the Chinese.  Borg, on the other hand, was convinced that most Americans, in or out of government, were indifferent to China, that China was a peripheral concern of Americans.  This idea permeates her work and that of a generation of scholars influenced by her.  She could never have imagined a powerful China emerging as a strategic competitor of the United States.

After the war, before she had gotten very far with the research for her next book, the IPR came under attack from Senators Joe McCarthy (R-Wisconsin) and Pat McCarran (D-Nevada).  With help from Alfred Kohlberg, “the China Lobby man,” they promoted the idea that Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) had lost China because of the activities of the IPR.  In particular, McCarran went after Owen Lattimore, a close friend of Borg’s.  She put aside her own work and spent the early 1950s preparing materials for the defense of Lattimore and other IPR colleagues.  As a result she was denied access to historical records of the Department of State.  Although she spoke often of the influence of World War II on her life, it was clear that McCarthyism also left its impact.  In her second book she omitted the name of a foreign service officer she praised cautiously for his careful reporting of the Chinese Communist movement—lest he, O. Edmund Clubb, be victimized.

Her second book was the Bancroft Prize winning The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933-1938.[3]  She focused on the climate of public opinion in which President Franklin Roosevelt and his advisers worked.  She demonstrated the constraints imposed on foreign policy by the primacy the administration had to give to coping with the Depression and by the pacifist and neo-isolationist sentiment that followed the inability of the United States or the League of Nations to respond adequately to Japan’s seizure of Manchuria.  Intending to write a book on Chinese-American relations, she found China a marginal concern of the Roosevelt administration.  Avoidance of war with Japan was the heart of the administration’s East Asian policy.  Suggestions of American responsibility to help China were met with indignation.  American interests were best served by conciliating (appeasing?) Japan.  When US policy began to shift toward collective security in 1938, it was the threat to the world order in Europe, not Asia, that was central.

For most of the 1960s and 1970s, Borg devoted herself to historiographic concerns and development of the field.   In 1966 she persuaded the Association of Asian Studies (AAS) to hold a session on “Historians and American Far Eastern Policy” at its annual meeting.  She compiled the papers and comments and had them published by the East Asian Institute at Columbia, where she was now an unpaid research associate.  In her introductory remarks she called on diplomatic historians to learn to use Asian sources and on East Asianists to work on relations between the United States and Asia. And in 1969 she arranged for an extraordinary binational conference at Lake Kawaguchi, the papers for which became the prize-winning Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations 1931-1941.[4]  The conference paired Japanese and American scholars in sessions that dealt with their respective leaders, militaries, business, public opinion, political parties, the press, and intellectuals.

In the years that followed she devoted much of her time to working with younger scholars who were attracted to her conception of American-East Asian relations.  Among these I would include Bruce Cumings, Rosemary Foot, Lloyd Gardner, Waldo Heinrichs, Michael Hunt, Akira Iriye, Steven Levine, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Marilyn Blatt Young, and myself.  She never stopped looking for bright young men and women to recruit to the field.  All of us have raised the kind of questions Borg demanded.  Most used East Asian language materials—and all are more understanding of the Asian context than was an earlier generation of scholars.  Much has been accomplished, but Borg would be the last to argue that our work is done.

One last characteristic to which I would point was her unending search for new questions to ask, new methods to use.  Not realizing that she, too, was mortal, I assumed that long after those I’ve named had retired to defend the interpretations of our youth against the next generation, Dorothy Borg would be urging our grandchildren to answer the questions we never asked, using the methods we never mastered.

Participants:

Warren I. Cohen is Distinguished University Professor, Emeritus, at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County and Michigan State University.  He has written 13 books and edited eight others.  He is currently preparing a new edition of East Asia at the Center.  He has served as editor of Diplomatic History, president of the Society of Historians of American Foreign relations, and chairman of the Department of State Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation.  He has been a consultant on Chinese affairs for various governmental organizations

Akira Iriye is Charles Warren Professor of American History, Emeritus, Harvard University. His publications include Cultural Internationalism and World Order (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World (University of California Press, 2004), and The Globalizing of America: American Foreign Relations, 1913-1945, Volume III of The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, ed., Warren I. Cohen (Cambridge University Press, 1993).

Lloyd C. Gardner is Professor Emeritus of History at Rutgers University.  A Wisconsin Ph.D., he is the author or editor of more than fifteen books on American foreign policy, including Safe for Democracy (Oxford University Press, 1984), Approaching Vietnam (W.W. Norton, 1988), Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam (Ivan R. Dee, 1995), and The War on Leakers (The New Press, 2016).  He has been president of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations.

 

 

Essay by Lloyd C. Gardner, Rutgers University, Emeritus

Meeting a Legend

I was sitting in my office in Bishop House, the nineteenth-century mansion that had once belonged to the man who lost out in the patent fights for vulcanized rubber to Harvey Firestone.  Mr. Bishop’s family had given the White Elephant to Rutgers University.  Thus it became, appropriately enough some would argue, the home of a discipline concerned with past failures.  So much for that.  At any rate I was there for office hours—that time when students are supposed to bond, however briefly or inconsequentially, with their instructors.  As was often the case no one had yet stopped by.

During some of those vacant times, I had stepped from my office, leaving the door open, to the one next to me on the third floor where Eugene Genovese and I played an occasional game of chess.  Once I remember, Gene was quite agitated.  The FBI had paid him one of its frequent visits seeking information about his contacts within the Communist Party. 

But again, enough of that.  The phone rang and I picked up the receiver.  “This is Dorothy Borg, am I speaking to Lloyd Gardner?”  For a second or two I could not answer.  A flood of memories of graduate school simply blotted out present reality, the early spring of 1968.  Instead, I was thinking about a book Fred Harvey Harrington had assigned in my first semester of graduate school at the University of Wisconsin in the fall of 1956.  It was by my caller, and the title was American Policy and the Chinese Revolution, 1925-1928.[5]  The book was among the very first I read in the fall of 1956 as I began a graduate and professional career deeply involved in the responses to twentieth-century revolutions.  My senior thesis at Ohio Wesleyan had been on Woodrow Wilson and Mexico.  But now I wanted to see how policymakers viewed and tried to cope with the challenges presented by Russia and China as well.

Those first books one reads in graduate school often leave lasting impressions, and this was certainly the case for me in grasping for a hold on how American policymakers attempted to deal with the Chinese Revolution as it developed over what the French might call the longue durée.  Her book was a beginning point for understanding why Americans had moved to “contain” Japan in the 1920s within the structures of the Washington Naval Conference, and why that effort was doomed to fail.  She thus became one of my mentors for life.  But I never expected a phone call inviting me to participate in a conference with other American and Japanese historians on the subject of Pearl Harbor as history. 

After I said an astonished yes, Dorothy turned the phone over to Ernest May, the famed Harvard historian, who was one of the American organizers of the proposed conference to meet at Lake Kawaguchi in July 1969.  I was to prepare a paper on the Commerce and Treasury Departments in the decade 1931-1941.  Apparently, one of the two had read my book, Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy, and determined that was the proper topic for me to undertake.  My book appeared the same year as Dorothy’s great second book, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933-1938.[6]  The idea of this binational effort, with teams of scholars taking up matching topics in government departments and some private interests, was to approach the subject of Pearl Harbor as an endpoint in the big picture of Japanese-American competition across Asian frontiers.[7]  After I responded to Professor May, he turned the phone back to Dorothy who explained that the American side of the conference would be organized by the Columbia East Asian Institute, and that a preparatory conference would be held in New York later in the year. 

In the meantime, she said, she would come out to New Brunswick on the bus to talk specifically with me about what was expected of participants.  Would I be available to meet her at the bus stop the following Tuesday?  Or maybe it was Wednesday, or Thursday, for of course I can’t remember after all these years exactly what day was set for this dramatic meeting with the author.  But what I do remember with absolute precision was my first view of this slim, elegant, woman getting off the bus.  She came down the steps dressed in a black coat, her white hair held in place with a ribbon and a cameo, spotting me with piercing eyes that seemed to see right through you. 

“Where can we get some ice cream?”  those were Dorothy’s first words to me.  I hardly knew where the bus stop was in New Brunswick because we always went to New York by train in those days.  As for knowing where to get ice cream within walking distance of the bus stop, I was flummoxed.  Fortunately, I did spy out a luncheon spot that proved the answer and allowed me to breathe a sigh of relief at not failing this first test.  Back in those days before much of the rebuilding of downtown New Brunswick had taken place it was not the easiest thing to find in a hurry.

Once we were seated and had settled into ice cream, Dorothy put down her spoon and began a lecture on the do’s and don’ts for the conference.  The big don’t was that we were not allowed to take any money from the U.S. government to travel around Japan and East Asia giving lectures.  “The Japanese are very particular about that,” she said with an especially stern gaze that riveted me to the booth cushions.  I was informed that the Conference would fund airfare and hotel rooms for my wife and myself.  It was, to put it simply, the first big invitation of my career to participate in such a project.

We then enjoyed the rest of our treat and she noted the time for a returning bus to the City.  I had not worn an overcoat to meet Dorothy, and by the time we left the dinette it was getting quite cool.  As we waited at the stop, I shuffled my feet a bit, prompting Dorothy to ask with some emphasis, “Do you always move around like that?”  I could have sunk into the ground, six feet or more.  No, I assured her, just a bit cold I guess.  She nodded and then the bus came and our first meeting was over.

Frankly, I feared I had failed the test.  But from the first night in Japan I realized I had the wrong impression.  Dorothy was by turns serious, solicitous, and just plain fun to be with at all times.  She did not give a paper at the conference, but she was in every one of them.  This was the beginning of a relationship that lasted until her death—and after, along with the dozens of others that she had come in contact with, aided, and befriended.  We saw each other but a few times over the years, but always on memorable occasions.  We went to dinner with her in Greenwich Village once or twice, I lectured for some of the students at the East Asia Institute, and I went to New York to see her with another great friend, Christopher Thorne, when he came over and stayed with us at the time he received the Bancroft Prize for Allies of a Kind.[8]

They chatted together after I left, and I learned later from Chris that a big topic of discussion was about Sir John Pratt in the British Foreign Office.  Dorothy, according to Chris, had been upset at an Institute of Pacific Relations meeting during World War II, when she told Sir John that Britain would have to give up Hong-Kong.  He had said, “Dorothy, in my heart I believe Hong Kong must be British.”  But, replied Chris, what you don’t know is that in Foreign Office debates, Sir John had in fact advised returning Hong Kong to China.  She smiled and the conversation ended on a good note.  I have never asked anyone about whether Dorothy Borg had been a key voice in nominating Chris for the prize.  I have long suspected that she might have been.

Over the years we corresponded and talked on the telephone.  A second time she came out to Rutgers was to attend a seminar given by Owen Lattimore.  She was accompanied this time by her good friend in the Columbia History Department, Carol Gluck.  Lattimore and Borg had known one another for a long time, perhaps from pre-World War II days, and it was a delightful afternoon as Lattimore recalled at one point a trip on a train with many American missionaries heading someplace in China.  Suddenly the train stopped in the middle of nowhere, and the Chinese passengers got out and stood admiring of a mountain view.  When told that the mountain was sacred, one of the missionary wives commented that she “would not honor some heathen mountain.”  I remember Dorothy’s smile, and her smiles other times about friends in the IPR, Frank Merrill of Merrill’s Marauders fame, and Frederick V. Field.

Later I would learn of those (not all, of course, because there were so many) she had befriended and aided over the years from their graduate student days and in their academic careers, perhaps best of all, my collaborator on several edited books and great good friend, Marilyn Young.  Dorothy Borg was a very special person, and I feel privileged to have known her and learned from her.  She reached out and touched the lives of more than a generation of young scholars with a magic wand of friendship that would create an informal group today known as the “Borgians.”

 

 

Essay by Akira Iriye, Harvard University, Emeritus

I first met Dorothy Borg in September 1957, when I started my graduate studies in history at Harvard University.  She had been invited by John Fairbank, professor of Chinese history who was a member of a newly established program in what was then called “American-Far Eastern Relations.” The program had been designed to bring together specialists in US history and East Asian history, and to encourage students to study both fields so that they would eventually write dissertations dealing with US relations with one or more of the East Asian countries.  The initial membership on the committee included John K. Fairbank in Chinese history and Oscar Handlin and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., in US history.  During the academic year 1956-1957 the committee widely advertised its program in colleges and universities so that their students, in particular those in the process of applying to graduate school, would consider the new field.

At that time, I was a senior at Haverford College, majoring in history, with a focus on modern Britain.  I was interested in continuing my studies in graduate school and applied to Harvard and several other universities.  When the historians on Harvard’s new committee saw my application, they got in touch with me and invited me to come to Cambridge for an interview.  So I spent the Thanksgiving recess in November 1956 visiting Harvard and meeting with Fairbank, Handlin, and others. It so happened that the professor who had headed Harvard’s British history program had just been appointed president of Radcliffe College, and thus it would be rather difficult for me to study with him as a graduate student.  But Fairbank and other members of the committee encouraged me to apply to the new program.  That would mean switching from the study of British history, on which I was focusing as an undergraduate under the guidance of Wallace MacCafferey, to US and Asian history.  He was spending that year in Cambridge University as a Rhodes scholar, so I wrote to him for advice.  He thought this would be an excellent opportunity to continue my study of history, especially as the new committee at Harvard was offering a substantial scholarship—$5,000 per year, if I remember correctly—so that I would not have to worry about tuition and living expenses as a graduate student.  It was a very fortunate development for me personally, and I have never regretted the switch.

So I went to Cambridge in September 1957. And there I met Dorothy Borg, who was visiting Harvard University as a guest of the Far Eastern Research Center, which was under the leadership of Fairbank. She had published in 1947 her first book, American Policy and the Chinese Revolution, 1925-1928, and was at that time one of a few scholars working on the history of US-East Asian relations.[9] The book’s strength lies in its thorough documentation, mostly on the basis of published material.  (At that time State Department archives for the 1920s were not yet open to research.) It may have been at one of the Thursday afternoon teas that the Fairbanks held at their house to which they invited graduate students and other guests that I first met Dorothy.  She was very kind and cordial to junior scholars and graduate students, and we spent many hours with her discussing her and our projects.  It would be no exaggeration to say that the students who met her remained within her circle of young colleagues.

Re-reading her book today, I am as impressed as ever with her determination to make US-East Asian relations a major field of study.  Thanks to her initiative, a number of scholarly conferences were organized, and she was always eager to attend and interact with the participants.  I especially remember the international conference convened in Japan in 1973 to which she came.  The conference was organized by James W. Morley (Columbia University), Hosoya Chihiro (Hitotsubashi University), and others.  I was among the small number of junior participants, and I still recall the freshness and excitement that we all felt at this remarkable gathering.  It would be no exaggeration to say that Dorothy was one of the founders of the scholarly field of the history of US-East Asian relations.

The field has continued to thrive, but today it seems to have developed in ways that Dorothy may not have entirely anticipated.  First, more and more historians in the field seem capable of using original sources in Chinese, Japanese, and other Asian languages.  This is in part due to the fact that such material has become available to research, whether archival or in print, and that an increasing number of scholars from these countries are publishing in English.  Western scholars, too, are eager to learn one or more of these languages so that their work may become “multi-archival,” a requirement that would have been unthinkable for Dorothy’s generation of scholars.  But even more importantly, the field today tends to be considered an aspect of international history – or global history, as it has become more and more common to refer to it.  Global history presupposes that all national histories as well as the history of international relations must be comprehended within a world (global) framework.  Toward the end of the twentieth century, in particular during the 1970s, historians began to recognize that national and regional histories make sense only within a global framework.  There is nothing so unique about a country’s development that it can be understood without reference to what is happening elsewhere.  National history is too narrow a framework, not only because the world’s nations and peoples are interdependent but also, more fundamentally, because nations have been around for a relatively brief period of time, compared to human beings endowed with such existential identities as gender, age, and race.  All subjects, including US-East Asian relations, must be understood in the context of these identities.

Global history as an overarching framework for the study of history is likely to stay.  Although few of us would feel confident in dealing with more than a handful of languages, we would still be well advised to put our subjects in that larger framework.  There was a time, for instance during the 1950s when my generation of historians studied history in colleges and graduate schools, when the idea of national uniqueness was extremely influential.  When I went to graduate school to study history, Americanist faculty often told us that there was something very unique about US history, including individual Americans.  As one of or professors told us, you could always tell an American no matter where you were in the world.  But the same thing was being said by scholars in other countries.  The study of the past was a way to explore the uniqueness of each country.  It was probably also during the 1970s that such intellectual parochialism began to give way to a broader, more global perspective.  Globalization of scholarship is frequently challenged, but it not likely to go away.  This is fundamentally because we are all global beings.

Such a perspective may not have appeared plausible to Dorothy’s generation, but she would have understood its implications.  She was always open to foreign scholars and students, freely mingling with them at academic settings and conferences, in the United States and abroad.  She was a globally oriented scholar long before the coming of the age of globalization.

 

Notes

[1] Stephen Birmingham, Our Crowd: The Great Jewish Families of New York  (New York: Harper & Row,1967)

[2] Dorothy Borg, “America Loses Chinese Good Will,” Far Eastern Survey (February 23, 1949), 37-45.

[3] Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933-1938 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964).

[4] Borg, Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations 1931-1941 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973).

[5] Dorothy Borg, American Policy and the Chinese Revolution, 1925-1928 (New York: American Institute of Pacific Relations and Macmillan, 1947).

[6] Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933-1938 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964).

[7] We were later told by someone after the conference that the Japanese historians approached the subject as fated to end the way it did in war, while the Americans looked for escape routes along the way.  And that we convinced one another. Post conference positions were reversed! I don’t know if that was really the case, but it is an interesting comment.

[8] Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978).

[9] Dorothy Borg, American Policy and the Chinese Revolution, 1925-1928.  (New York: American Institute of Pacific Relations and Macmillan, 1947).

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