Russia-Ukraine War Briefing - The New York Times, Jan 25, 2023

The New York Times, Jan 25, 2023 

By Carole Landry Editor/Writer, Briefings Team

Welcome to the Russia-Ukraine War Briefing, your guide to the latest news and analysis about the conflict.

Ukraine said that its forces had retreated from Soledar, bringing Russian forces closer to the eastern city of Bakhmut. Several top Ukrainian officials including a deputy defense minister were fired amid a growing corruption scandal. The U.S. will boost its production of artillery shells by 500 percent within two years to make up for shortfalls caused by the war. A cemetery used by the Russian mercenary group Wagner has grown rapidly in size over the past several months, according to satellite imagery and video footage. Get the latest updates here.

A U.S. Abrams tank during military exercises in Poland in 2016.David Mdzinarishvili/Reuters

Tanks, finally

Germany and the U.S. announced today that they would send battle tanks to Ukraine, a move meant to unlock a wave of heavier aid to help Ukrainian forces beat back Russian forces.

President Biden spoke just hours after Chancellor Olaf Scholz said Germany would send an initial shipment of 14 Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine and lift export restrictions to allow other nations to send their own.

Speaking at the White House, Biden said the U.S. would provide 31 Abrams tanks, addressing Germany’s insistence that it would not supply the weaponry unless the U.S. did the same.

In recent weeks, the dispute with Germany had turned bitter, exposing divisions within NATO. Some German politicians and European leaders argued that Berlin was squandering a chance for leadership in Europe and actively hindering its allies.

While the pledges fell far short of the 300 tanks that Ukraine had said it needed to gain a decisive upper hand on the battlefield, Germany’s announcement prompted Finland, the Netherlands and Spain to say that they would also send tanks to Ukraine or were open to doing so.

Poland said yesterday that it was seeking Germany’s permission to send Leopard tanks from its own stocks. Britain has pledged to send 14 Challenger 2 tanks.

With Germany finally on board, attention turned to getting the tanks to the front lines quickly. It could take months for the first Leopard to arrive on the battlefield, and a year or longer for the Abrams.

A German Leopard 2 tank in 2011.Michael Sohn/Associated Press

“Sending the armor has the potential to be a game-changer,” said Daniel Fried, a former U.S. ambassador to Poland. “But it depends on when they get there. If you add up the tanks, plus the Bradleys, plus the German Marders, plus the French armored vehicles — once they all get there and are integrated into the Ukrainian forces, the Ukrainians are going to have a lot more punch.”

The Pentagon had been reluctant to send Abrams tanks, in part because they are challenging to operate and maintain. The Leopard 2 is a natural choice for Ukraine because it is easier to operate and there are already hundreds potentially available in Europe.

After Ukraine’s Russian-made tanks were destroyed or disabled in combat, there were fewer replacements to be found, my colleague John Ismay, who covers the Pentagon, told me.

Along with the deliveries of Abrams and Leopard tanks, “NATO nations also have stockpiles of ammunition and spare parts that Ukrainian troops can use to keep them engaged in combat against Russian forces,” he said.

Russia’s ambassador to Germany, Sergey Nechayev, warned that Germany’s move was an “extremely dangerous decision” that “takes the conflict to a new level of confrontation.”

The decision by the U.S. and Germany will generate enough tanks for about three new Ukrainian battalions. Western officials say that providing tanks and other heavy weaponry to Ukraine will prevent a long and static war that could favor Russia’s military.

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What else we’re following

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In Ukraine

Ukraine’s foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba, writes in Politico that the mistakes of previous cease-fire deals with Russia must be avoided to prevent an even bloodier war. Ukrainians have donated about $500 million directly to the army. Two British volunteers were killed while trying to rescue an elderly woman in Soledar, the BBC reported. Fifteen journalists were killed in Ukraine in 2022, according to a report from the Committee to Protect Journalists. Foreign Affairs asked experts whether Ukraine would end up making territorial concessions to Russia.

Around the world

Swiss lawmakers are weighing whether to relax their policy of neutralityand allow countries to provide Swiss-made armaments to Ukraine. The Spanish police have arrested a 74-year-old man on suspicion of carrying out a letter bomb campaign that targeted several offices including the U.S. and Ukrainian embassies. Turkey has indefinitely postponed a meeting with Finland and Sweden to discuss their bid to join NATO. Russia and Estonia downgraded relations and each ordered the other’s ambassador out of the country. Latvia said that it, too, would downgrade relations with Russia. Russia’s invasion shook up Radio Free Europe’s operations, bringing in new audiences and highlighting the importance of its mission. The Doomsday Clock was set to the closest to midnight it had ever reached, largely because of Russia’s invasion. The U.S. has confronted China with evidence that some Chinese state-owned companies may be providing assistance for Russia’s war effort, Bloomberg reports.

We also recommend

From Opinion: A U.S. Special Forces soldier writes about the U.S.-trained Afghan commandos who have been recruited by Russia to fight in Ukraine. A collection of five episodes from “The Daily” looks back on the war.

Thanks for reading. I’ll be back Friday. — Carole

Email your thoughts to warbriefing@nytimes.com. Did a friend forward you the briefing? Sign up here.

What the future holds for the monetary system - Credit Suisse

 Todos querem escapar de Bretton Woods?

What the future holds for the monetary system

Credit Suisse, 17.01.2023

Share ButtoWhat does the future hold for the monetary system? Macroeconomic imbalances and geopolitics may accelerate change in the current largely USD-based monetary system into a more multipolar one.

Since its launch in 1944, the USD-centric monetary system has undergone radical change, typically in response to "systemic" crises such as major shifts in US monetary policy that generated stresses outside the United States. 

In recent years, the changes in the global economy, economic policy responses, and the geopolitical situation have triggered hefty reactions in financial markets, including money, bond, and foreign exchange markets. They have also raised the question as to whether the international monetary system may be subject to more long-term and fundamental changes.

In which direction is the monetary system heading?

It seems as if a gradual evolution to a more multipolar monetary system is the most probable outcome, with a more extreme turn away from the USD-centric system being much less likely.

Two unlikely scenarios: A common global currency or a different currency hegemon

1. Creation of a common global currency remains illusory

Proposals for a world currency have not materialized and, in the current geopolitical setting, are now even less likely. Put simply, handing over the power to print money from your own central bank to a supranational authority requires enormous mutual trust among countries and an intensely cooperative geopolitical environment.

2. Lack of an alternative currency hegemon

How about a currency other than the US dollar to take on a similarly dominant role in the global monetary system?
There are two regions that are similar in economic size to the United States, and which by their scale might in principle qualify: the euro zone and China.

• Euro zone

The euro now accounts for around 20% of global FX reserves – the second largest share behind the US dollar – and is also freely tradable across borders. And yet, euro zone policy makers are clearly not striving for their currency to take on such a role; indeed the focus of the European Central Bank (ECB) remains very much on the domestic economy.
The euro zone is still not a mature fiscal union and therefore lacks a region-wide safe asset like US Treasuries. This means there is no highly liquid and uniform asset that the rest of the world could hold as a reserve. The lack of an integrated capital market and banking union are further roadblocks, reducing the liquidity of the euro.

Global foreign currency reserves

Source: Hasver, IMF, Credit Suisse

• China

In contrast, China is a single fiscal entity and its few large banks can be regarded as money center banks. However, the renminbi lacks the third key characteristic which would qualify it as a competitor to the US dollar: international capital mobility. For the foreseeable future, it seems improbable that China will fully liberalize and open its financial markets for cross-border transactions. Other features, such as an internationally recognized legal system, also argue against the renminbi as a viable candidate for a dominant currency.

The creation of a truly new global currency, or the rise of an alternative "hegemonic" currency is, in our view, very unlikely in the foreseeable future.
So, what might a future monetary system look like in the absence of either a new world currency or a full replacement of the US dollar as the lead currency?

Gradual evolution of a more multipolar system

Essentially we see a new, more multipolar system evolving as a result of three drivers:

1. the trend increase in bilateral trade among many countries, allowing for returns to scale in the use of their respective currencies rather than the US dollar;

2. deepening of local capital markets in emerging markets; and

3. efforts (especially by leading emerging markets) to develop mutual insurance schemes against shocks resulting from shifts in US monetary policy.

Transactions in emerging market currencies are on the increase

Source: BIS, Credit Suisse

Since the financial crisis of 2008 we have seen efforts to increase the robustness of the monetary system and better protect emerging markets from the stresses that arise from the US dollar-centric system. 

This means the world has gradually been moving toward a more multipolar currency system. The question is whether this process will continue in a fairly smooth manner, or whether we might see abrupt moves in one or the other direction.

What the future holds for the monetary system 

Understanding monetary developments and functioning is key to a global bank like Credit Suisse and to the broader financial sector, which plays a role in monetary transmission. We hope our report entitled The Future of the Monetary System makes a valuable contribution to current macroeconomic thinking.

Download the full study

China: o novo Império faz exigências ao Brasil - Ricardo Della Coletta (FSP)

 E elas serão cunpridas por Lula…

China envia recado ao Brasil e diz querer prioridade em viagem de chanceler à Ásia

Diplomata chinês afirma a embaixador brasileiro considerar oportuno que Mauro Vieira visite Pequim antes de ir à Índia

FSP, 24.jan.2023 às 23h15

Ricardo Della Coletta

BRASÍLIA - A China enviou um recado ao Itamaraty e disse esperar que o chanceler Mauro Vieira priorize Pequim em uma viagem à Ásia agendada para março.

Em meados de janeiro, o embaixador do Brasil em Pequim, Marcos Galvão, teve uma reunião no Ministério das Relações Exteriores local. Nela, o diplomata encarregado de temas relacionados ao Brasil disse a Galvão ter sido informado que Vieira planeja uma viagem à Índia em março, numa reunião de ministros do G20, e que a primeira passagem do chanceler pela China poderia ocorrer no mesmo contexto.

Em seguida, de acordo com relatos feitos à Folha, o diplomata disse considerar importante que Vieira passe primeiro por Pequim —e só depois vá à Índia.

 

Membros do governo que acompanham o tema disseram, sob condição de anonimato, entender que a mensagem foi uma sinalização de que a China espera um gesto simbólico do Itamaraty no sentido de mostrar que Pequim é o parceiro prioritário do Brasil no continente asiático.

O tema é especialmente sensível, uma vez que China e Índia, ainda que integrem o Brics (bloco com Brasil, Rússia e África do Sul), são rivais regionais e têm um histórico de escaramuças em pontos da fronteira. Déli ainda faz parte de uma aliança para se contrapor à influência de Pequim no Indo-Pacífico, o Quad, ao lado de EUA, Japão e Austrália.

A rivalidade se dá também no campo diplomático. Em 2020, em uma cúpula do Brics, os chineses agiram para que fosse suprimido de um documento oficial trecho sobre o apoio dado por Pequim e Moscou às aspirações dos demais membros para desempenhar "papéis mais relevantes na ONU" —referência ao pleito de Brasil e Índia pela ampliação do Conselho de Segurança da ONU, do qual China e Rússia são membros permanentes.

Na reunião, o gigante asiático se aproveitou da falta de interesse na reforma do colegiado por parte do então presidente Jair Bolsonaro (PL) para reforçar sua posição, num recado principalmente contra a possibilidade de a Índia ganhar um assento permanente.

Procurado, o Itamaraty disse que há uma visita prevista do chanceler Mauro Vieira à Índia nos dias 1º e 2 de março, por ocasião de reunião ministerial do G20. A eventual passagem pela China depende de questões de agenda de ambos os lados e ainda está em avaliação.

Segundo relataram à Folha pessoas com conhecimento do assunto, Galvão também tratou, na reunião na chancelaria chinesa, da ida do presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (PT) a Pequim. Ele ouviu que o regime de Xi Jinping espera receber o petista o quanto antes e que a visita é considerada prioritária pelo país.

No último dia 18, Lula disse que pretende viajar à China em março. O presidente cumpre nesta semana sua primeira agenda internacional, com passagens pela Argentina —onde se encontrou com o homólogo Alberto Fernández e participou da cúpula da Celac (Comunidade de Estados Latino-Americanos e Caribenhos)— e pelo Uruguai. Em 10 de fevereiro o petista embarca para Washington (EUA), a convite do presidente Joe Biden.

A retomada das relações com a China, principal parceiro comercial do Brasil, é um dos pontos prioritários da política externa agora comandada por Vieira. O maior desafio é encontrar um ponto de equilíbrio em meio ao atual conflito geopolítico protagonizado por Pequim e Washington.

À Folha o chanceler brasileiro disse que o país pretende se guiar pelo interesse nacional. "O que for de interesse nacional será feito, de um lado ou de outro. Não são coisas conflitantes, não vamos deixar de ter uma relação estratégica importantíssima com a China por qualquer outro motivo", disse. "Os EUA foram durante um século o principal parceiro comercial do Brasil. Em 2010, passou a ser a China. Não podemos deixar de conversar e ter relações com nosso maior parceiro, com o qual nós temos um enorme superávit. Da mesma forma com os EUA, que estão no centro de poder mundial."

https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/amp/mundo/2023/01/china-envia-recado-ao-brasil-e-diz-querer-prioridade-em-viagem-de-chanceler-a-asia.shtml

Estrutura do Ministério das Relações Exteriores - Governo Lula, 2023-2026

Estrutura do Ministério das Relações Exteriores, anunciada no documento da CGU em 23/01/2023, a vigorar a partir de 24/01, com vários nomes já anunciados para as lacunas existentes no documento abaixo, páginas 57-59 do documento disponível aqui.

 

MINISTÉRIO DAS  Relações Exteriores - MRE 

Perspectivas

Como foi anunciado pelo ministro no dia de sua posse, o foco do Ministério será a retomada da política externa do Brasil. Isso deve ser feito com foco no crescimento econômico, no meio ambiente, na agricultura, na educação, na cultura, na ciência e tecnologia, na inovação, nos direitos humanos, no desenvolvimento social e na defesa de interesses. De acordo com o ministro, a política externa do país foi enfraquecida durante o governo anterior. 

Composição

·       ƒ  Ministro: Mauro Vieira 

·       ƒ  Secretária-Geral das Relações Exteriores: Maria Laura 

da Rocha 

·       ƒ  Instituto Rio Branco: A definir 

·       ƒ  Secretário de América Latina e Caribe: Michel Arslanian 

·       ƒ  Secretaria de Europa e América do Norte: A definir 

·       ƒ  Secretaria de África e de Oriente Médio: A definir 

·       ƒ  Secretaria de Ásia e Pacífico: A definir 

·       ƒ  Secretaria de Assuntos Econômicos e Financeiros: A definir 

·       ƒ  Secretaria de Assuntos Multilaterais Políticos: A definir 

·       ƒ  Secretaria de Promoção Comercial, Ciência, Tecnologia, 

Inovação e Cultura: A definir 

·       ƒ  Secretaria de Comunidades Brasileiras e Assuntos Consulares e Jurídicos: A definir 

·       ƒ  Secretaria de Clima, Energia e Meio Ambiente: A definir 

·       ƒ  Secretaria de Gestão Administrativa: A definir 

Destaques da nova estrutura organizacional 

A organização das secretarias se mantém por regiões (América, Europa, Ásia e África), o que será indispensável para a retomada das relações do governo com países que perderam contato diplomático no governo anterior. Além disso, a secretaria de Clima, Energia e Meio Ambiente vem como um diferencial do que estava sendo feito pelo último governo. A pauta ambiental será restaurada e, com isso, o país voltará a participar de acordos e discussões sobre o assunto. A estrutura do ministério foi consideravelmente alterada. O órgão agora conta com uma maior organização em pastas, sendo 6 delas para atuação direta ao lado do Chanceler (assessorias especiais, secretaria de controle interno e consultoria jurídica). O Instituto Rio Branco fica classificado como órgão vinculado à Secretaria-Geral. Mais seis secretarias foram criadas para assuntos específicos, e o ministério deve contar com unidades descentralizadas e no exterior. 

Reviravoltas da História - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Reviravoltas da História

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

A reforma da Lei das Estatais, para abrigar companheiros e seus associados em cargos de direção e nos conselhos de administração dos dinossauros públicos, constitui mais um passo no caminho para Sua Majestade Lula III virar uma espécie de Luís XVIII da República brasileira, um Bourbon tupiniquim, da mesma família daqueles que “não aprenderam nada e não esqueceram nada”.

A Restauração francesa, depois dos ciclos revolucionário e napoleônico, não durou dez anos: depois dos Bourbons, vieram os Orleans, aliás conhecidos por aqui também. Foram igualmente descartados na revolução seguinte, que criou uma efêmera terceira república, que rapidamente sucumbiu a um novo Império, por sua vez aniquilado mais adiante. A França conseguiu ter mais repúblicas do que o Brasil, e muito mais constituições (se não me engano 14, quase o dobro das nossas).

Existe algo próximo à promiscuidade autoprotetora nos círculos dirigentes e entre os membros de certas elites do poder, o que os faz defender a cooptação dos “mais iguais”, como Orwell, no Animal Farm, chamava aqueles que tinham ascendido ao pináculo do poder estatal e passavam a reproduzir as deformações do Antigo Regime. Essa “revolução dos bichos” também é muito conhecida entre nós, e não precisa ser nenhum Orwell para detectar os mesmos movimentos.

Lula III, por gosto ou necessidade, precisa premiar os companheiros não eleitos e mais alguns aliados de ocasião na festa do poder, mesmo que estes não sejam tão “iguais” quanto a companheirada do primeiro escalão.

Não tem problema: se não tiver estatais suficientes, criam-se mais algumas, como já feito sob Lula I e Lula II. 

Gaetano Mosca e Vilfredo Pareto, dois grandes intelectuais italianos, descreveram muito bem os fenômenos da rotação e da circulação das elites. Lula certamente não deve conhecer esses analistas, mas ele nem precisa se guiar pela teoria. Ele atua por instinto, um pouco como comentava outro italiano, Lampedusa, aquele que dizia que “é preciso que algo mude, para que tudo continue como sempre foi”.

Gatopardianamente, o Brasil de Lula III vai ficando mais ou menos parecido com o Brasil de Lula I e de Lula II. 

Espera-se apenas que não termine como Dilma 1,5…

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Brasília, 24/01/2023

An end to the war in Ukraine? - Stephen Collinson, Caitlin Hu and Shelby Rose (CNN Meanwhile in America)

 How are we going to find an exit?

Stephen Collinson, Caitlin Hu and Shelby Rose

CNN Meanwhile in America, January 24, 2023

An email from a reader in Australia got us thinking about the West’s expanding effort to defeat Russia in Ukraine, as the brutal invasion approaches its one-year anniversary.

 

The reader called for more anti-war skepticism in press reporting, and argued that “piling it on with weapons” is the wrong answer, since Putin would never surrender in Ukraine. Others question whether the West’s escalation of its strategy to arm Ukraine is destined to create an even bloodier stalemate. Already the trench warfare of frozen frontlines in eastern Ukraine and the merciless Russian bombing of Ukrainian cities recalls dark historic echoes from 20th century total warfare, and there’s no meaningful international diplomatic effort even to forge a ceasefire.

 

Strategists warn of a new Russian spring offensive while the West debates whether a swift influx of missiles, tanks, artillery and defensive weapons could help Ukraine push Russia out. Many more civilians are likely to die, along with young troops and young Russians being used as cannon fodder by President Vladimir Putin.

 

So why not try to stop the war before it lasts another year?

 

To begin with, Ukraine is committed to defending every last inch of its territory. And though Kyiv has said it’s open to talks, it doesn’t trust Putin and won’t accept any semblance of victory for the Russian strongman. Western leaders meanwhile fear the broader consequences if Ukraine loses; allowing a large authoritarian state to crush a small democracy would set a dangerous precedent and make Europe far less stable and secure. They also reason that stopping the flow of weapons to support Ukraine would allow Putin a quick victory and shatter NATO’s credibility. So it’s hard to imagine any peace that would be simultaneously palatable to Russia, Ukraine, and the West.

 

Yet, the longer the war drags on and the deadlier the weapons poured into Ukraine by allies, the greater the risk of a spillover clash between NATO and Russia. “Shouldn’t we now ask ourselves how we are going to find an exit from this war?” asked former senior French politician and diplomat Pierre Lellouche, in a commentary in “Le Monde” last week : He warned of “an immense frozen conflict on the Old Continent” and that the allies were sliding into anti-Russia belligerence and increasingly direct confrontation with Moscow.

 

Such voices are often drowned out in American media coverage driven by political hawks and retired generals who came up during the Cold War. A group of progressive Democrats was shouted down last year when they suggested President Joe Biden should negotiate an end to the war. Hardline House Republicans are also increasingly skeptical about the war: they want to keep US billions at home.

 

Still, the top US General Mark Milley caused a stir last year when he suggested that it would be hard for Ukraine to fully vanquish Russia and that eventually it might have to think about a political solution — though he later walked it back. 

 

These views are not yet approaching critical mass. But the question posed by our correspondent and many others is ineluctable: How many more thousands need to die before the war ends.