Lulopetismo diplomático, no tocante à Ucrânia, é muito diferente do bolsonarismo diplomático?

 Uma postagem do início de 2023, que pode ser lida como absolutamente atual, pelo menos no tocante à Ucrânia e nos amores petistas para com a Rússia:

quinta-feira, 16 de fevereiro de 2023

Contrastes históricos na diplomacia - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

 Contrastes históricos na diplomacia:

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

O Brasil avançou na pauta ambiental multilateral, desde a superação recente da antipolítica ambiental de Bolsonaro, que foi totalmente destrutiva no sentido estrito e lato do termo, ou seja, nos planos conceitual e operacional. 

Cabe no entanto reconhecer que ele recuou tremendamente na pauta da paz e da segurança internacional, e isso desde a invasão da Crimeia em 2014 (quando Dona Dilma julgou a anexação ilegal de Putin um “assunto interno” da Ucrânia), e mais ainda desde a guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia um ano atrás, quando Bolsonaro tinha recém se “solidarizado” com Putin, ao realizar uma inoportuna visita uma semana antes da invasão. 

Fato inédito na história diplomática do país, o Brasil parece ter abandonado o Direito Internacional, postura que foi observada estritamente mesmo sob o Estado Novo de Vargas e durante o regime de exceção da ditadura militar de 1964. 

No Estado Novo, nunca reconhecemos a invasão escabrosa da Polônia por Hitler, em 1939 (continuando relações com o governo no exílio, pois que nossa doutrina jurídica nunca aceitou usurpações pela força), assim como não reconhecemos a invasão e anexação pela URSS de Stalin, em 1940, dos três Estados bálticos, com os quais mantínhamos relações diplomáticas desde os anos 1920. Na ditadura militar, mesmo exibindo certa diplomacia blindada em direção de regimes esquerdistas da região— no Chile de Allende, por exemplo, na Bolívia do general Torres, no Uruguai ameaçado pelos Tupamaros, que chegaram a sequestrar um cônsul brasileiro —, mantínhamos um respeito pró-forma pelo Direito Internacional, absolutamente acatado pela diplomacia profissional.

Nesse sentido, o lulopetismo diplomático e o bolsonarismo na política externa se equivalem de maneira vergonhosa, ao se distanciarem de uma das tradições mais caras de nossa diplomacia, que vinha do próprio Império— ainda que usando o Direito internacional para defender o “direito” do Brasil ao tráfico escravo —, passando pelo Barão do Rio Branco, Rui Barbosa, Oswaldo Aranha, Afonso Arinos e San Tiago Dantas, entre outros. 

Direita e esquerda negligenciam nossas maiores e melhores tradições jurídicas em nome do mais vulgar oportunismo economicista — por algumas toneladas de fertilizantes — ou de uma anacrônica oposição ao “hegemonismo” ocidental, o que nos coloca do lado de duas grandes autocracias, sendo uma a violadora brutal das normas mais elementares do Direito Internacional, assim como da própria Carta da ONU, que juramos defender desde 1945, mesmo não concordando com o iníquo e abusivo direito de veto exercido por cinco grandes potências. 

O recuo não é só operacional, mas é sobretudo conceitual, isto é, no plano dos princípios e valores de nossa diplomacia. Lulopetismo e bolsonarismo diplomáticos deixaram completamente de lado a dimensão moral da nossa política externa. Retrocedemos a um populismo que já faz a nossa desgraça no plano doméstico. 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 16/02/2023

China Continues To Dominate An Expanded BRICS - Alicia Garcia-Herrero (East Asia Forum)

 Nada de muito novo…

China Continues To Dominate An Expanded BRICS – Analysis 

 April 15, 2024  0 Comments

By East Asia Forum

By Alicia Garcia-Herrero

(…)

BRIC was officially launched in 2009 and was renamed BRICS in 2010 when South Africa joined the group. Since then, trade relations have clearly grown, but in a very unbalanced manner.

Most of the growth in trade has been China-centric, with the contribution from the rest of BRICS remaining quite flat until recently. The recent increase is mostly explained by India, which has experienced an acceleration in economic growth. BRICS members are increasingly intertwined with China as far as trade is concerned, but the remaining members have very few ties among themselves. Bilateral trade between BRICS members other than China remains extremely low.

China’s sheer economic size — five times greater than India’s — and China’s increasing assertiveness in foreign policy explain China’s dominance of BRICS. BRICS countries have increasingly similar positions to China at the United Nations. This is not only the case for issues within China’s sphere, such as Xinjiang-related resolutions, but also more global issues such as resolutions on the invasion of Ukraine and the Israel–Palestine crisis.

The  only exception on Ukraine has been Brazil, which voted in line with the West in March 2022. But Brazil’s diplomatic stance on Ukraine has become much more blurred since then and its position has fully aligned with China’s on the conflict in Gaza.

China has been the leading proponent of expanding BRICS to BRICS+. The main reason for expansion was to make BRICS more representative of the developing world and give it a stronger voice on the global stage.

But the six countries invited to join — which has become five after Argentina’s withdrawal — are quite heterogenous. Some are net creditors (such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates), while others are net debtors and in a very weak financial position. Half of them are large exporters of fossil fuels (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Iran). Ethiopia and Egypt stand out as members from Africa, a continent that has become increasingly important for China’s and India’s foreign policy.

The questions that arise are what BRICS can achieve with such a heterogeneous group of members, and whether it will be able to maintain its objectives after expansion.

The group has called for comprehensive reform of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to make the institutions more representative, accountable and effective in addressing global challenges. BRICS has also consistently advocated for comprehensive reform of the United Nations, arguing that its current structure with five permanent members holding veto power does not represent the interests of all member states.

One increasingly important objective of BRICS is to become the new platform for developing countries to voice their concerns and interests. The international financial architecture is an area where members’ positions can clearly be aligned. BRICS promotes the use of local currencies in trade between its member states, especially in trade with China, as well as supporting rules-based, open and transparent global trade. The expansion of its membership evidently supports this objective.

The actual impact of BRICS expansion will depend on several factors, including the group’s ability to overcome its internal challenges and the response of the West. Still, the smooth expansion is a clear sign that the global balance of power is shifting and that developing countries are playing an increasingly important role in global affairs.

How BRICS will fare over time depends on several factors. First and foremost is how China’s power evolves. There is increasing consensus that China’s long-term growth will continue to decelerate, which will reduce the opportunities that the Chinese market has to offer for BRICS members and others. A second important factor is how BRICS members and their populations come to perceive China.

The heterogeneity of BRICS is not only economic but also political. The elephant in the room is India, which finds itself in an increasingly uncomfortable position in groupings that are dominated by China. Still, the group’s diversity and its members’ respective comparative advantages could turn out to be a boon not only for China but also for India.

BRICS, which started as a primarily economic initiative to mark the transfer of economic power to the emerging world, has grown into an important geopolitical grouping. China’s centrality and the diversity of its members present both challenges and opportunities.

The future of the grouping is uncertain, given its heavy economic dependence on China and the deteriorating sentiment towards China among its members. India’s fast growth and increasing geopolitical heft create additional challenges for the continuation of a China-centric BRICS.

• About the author: Alicia Garcia-Herrero is Senior Research Fellow at the Brussels-based think tank Bruegel and Adjunct Professor at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.
• Source: This article was published by East Asia Forum. A version of this article was first published here in EconPol Forum.

Os novos donos da verdade oficial: juizes censores - Demetrio Magnoli

 Dá para ler aumentando:

Como anda a militância da diplomacia ideológica e militante? Mais um exemplo… - Augusto de Franco, Nelson Zornitta, Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Transcrevo primeiro a nota de Augusto de Franco:

“ "Irã queria fazer um gesto, a questão é como Israel responderá" - diz Celso Amorim, o militante ideológico do século 20 que continua desencaminhando nossa política externa, sob as ordens de Lula, é claro. Que "gesto" é esse com 300 mísseis e drones sobre áreas civis de Israel?”

Agora um comentário a esta nota de @NelsonZornitta:

“ O ponto a que chegamos é: Amorim não condena o "gesto" do Irã com potencial de matar milhares de israelenses civis e iniciar a guerra derradeira que matará bilhões, mas se eu fizer um gesto para o Celso Amorim, posso ser condenado por atentar contra a democracia?”

Agora meu comentário:

“ Celso Amorim é “mestre” em frases estarrecedoras. Levado a uma exposição em Bucha, na Ucrânia, palco de crimes de guerra e contra a humanidade por soldados russos, disse que “não dá para saber, são apenas fotos”. São “apenas 300 mísseis” diz agora.” (PRA)

Uma história de resistência à violência da ocupação e tirania- Elsie Maréchal (Bélgica, IIGM) - Helen Fry

 Como este espaço é por mim considerado como um “quilombo de resistência intelectual” contra o arbítrio, a prepotência e a violência dos poderosos, eu não posso deixar de homenagear outros resistentes;

From: HelenFry (IIWW Historian)

“Elsie Maréchal was among the few surviving female helpers of the Comet Escape Line, a resistance organisation stretching from Brussels to Paris and down to Bilbao in Spain during the Second World War.

At the age of 16, she enlisted in the Comet Line in 1940, amidst the severe German occupation of Belgium. Bravely, Elsie served as a resistance operative, bearing witness to the atrocities inflicted by the Nazis in her homeland. She observed trains departing daily and witnessed the suffering of her fellow citizens, particularly the Jews.

This only strengthened her resolve to resist. However, tragedy struck in November 1942 when Elsie and her family were betrayed. Despite enduring brutal interrogations and torture, her commitment remained strong and she did not crack.

Although her capture and absence posed temporary setbacks for the Comet Line, Elsie's courage endured as she spent three gruelling years in concentration camps, facing unimaginable suffering.

In recalling her experiences to me in person, Elsie remained modest about her wartime contributions. She collaborated with other inspiring WW2 figures, including Andrée and Elvire de Greef.

Elsie passed away in 2022.”

Defendendo a liberdade de expressão - Lygia Maria (via Roberto Freire)

Transcrevendo a oartir de uma pistagem do ex-deputado Roberto Freire:

Ai esta o artigo que merece ser lido (RF)

“A ESQUERDA QUE APOIA CENSURA

Artigo da jornalista Lygia Maria  

Mestre em Jornalismo pela Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina e doutora em Comunicação e Semiótica pela PUC-SP. 

 “Se você nunca pensou em dinamitar um porta-aviões, mandar pelos ares paióis de munição ou metralhar o palácio do governo, cuidado! Você pode vir a ser preso a qualquer instante". Assim começa o artigo da revista Pif Paf, publicada por Millôr Fernandes em 1964, sobre a prisão do cartunista Claudius pelas forças de segurança da ditadura militar.

Mas, então, qual seria o motivo da detenção? Aí o texto escancara o aspecto surrealista dos regimes autoritários: "Nem você nem eles sabem por que você foi preso".

Por isso uma das bases do Estado democrático de Direito é a transparência das decisões judiciais, que garante o direito ao contraditório exigido pelo devido processo legal.

O cidadão precisa saber por que é investigado ou punido. A razão é evidente: evitar abusos de autoridade. É vital proteger o indivíduo do poder de polícia estatal.

Esse princípio, contudo, têm sido infringido por decisões do STF, muitas delas monocráticas, em casos envolvendo liberdade de expressão —notadamente aqueles sob comando do ministro Alexandre de Moraes.

Não se sabe quantas contas das redes sociais foram bloqueadas nem a justificativa para tal censura. Sim, censura: remover conteúdo criminoso já publicado é diferente de proibir alguém de publicar. E numa democracia digna do nome, ninguém pode ser proibido de escrever ou falar.

À falta de transparência nas decisões soma-se a precariedade na caracterização dos crimes. Punir palavras que promovam "ataque à democracia", por exemplo, é de uma vaguidão descomunal.

Não é preciso gostar de Elon Musk para perceber que há algo de muito errado na forma como STF, TSE e Moraes têm lidado com a liberdade de expressão nos últimos anos.

Também não é preciso ser bolsonarista para criticar as cortes. A esquerda democrática, como a da Pif Paf, sempre apontou abusos do Poder Judiciário e defendeu a liberdade de expressão, mas parece que agora resolveu vilipendiar sua história por motivação partidária rasteira.“

Uma guerra civil esquecida: a do Sudão - Ishaan Tharoor, Sammy Westfall (The Washington Post)

 

Today's WorldView

By Ishaan Tharoor with Sammy Westfall  Email Sudan marks grim anniversary of civil war in shadow of other conflicts Sudanese refugees gather as teams from Doctors Without Borders assist the war-wounded from West Darfur, Sudan, in Adre hospital, Chad, in June. (Mohammad Ghannam/MSF/Reuters) Exactly a year ago, Sudan’s ruinous collapse began. Tensions between two powerful rival factions that had already carved out fiefdoms in the country — the Sudanese Armed Forces, headed by Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), headed by Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo — exploded into open war. Airstrikes hit civilian centers; militiamen and vigilantes set up checkpoints and looted neighborhoods. The capital, Khartoum, transformed into a sprawling battlefield. The conflict flared elsewhere in the African nation of close to 50 million people, including the already war-ravaged region of Darfur. For a time, Sudan’s civil war attracted some global attention. President Biden and his European counterparts whirred into action to evacuate their embassies and hundreds of foreign citizens and dual nationals based mostly in Sudan’s big cities. International journalists met convoys of refugees in the Saudi port city of Jeddah to hear their desperate, harrowing journeys to escape the country. The conflict marked a sad turn of events: A fledgling transition toward democracy in the years prior had won Sudan closer ties to a host of Western governments, and some relief from decades of U.S. sanctions. Even after Burhan and Dagalo, known universally by his sobriquet Hemedti, collaborated in interrupting that transition in 2021, ousting a civilian-led government, Sudan remained the subject of eager diplomacy. A U.S.-led initiative hoped to add Khartoum to the list of Arab capitals that could normalize relations with Israel. But the war seems to have doomed all that. The Sudanese state has essentially collapsed in many parts of the country. In some areas, hospitals and health services barely function. Thousands of civilians have been killed, including in atrocities and massacres likely to be remembered as war crimes. Courageous civil rights groups are documenting myriad accounts of sexual violence and rape. Lackluster rounds of peace talks, convened in some instances by Arab governments that tacitly back one party or the other, have yielded failed cease-fires. And as destruction and death mounts, international awareness and interest in Sudan’s misery has waned. RSF soldiers on a motorbike drive by a destroyed tank belonging to the defeated Sudanese Armed Forces, on a main street in El Geneina, the capital of West Darfur, Sudan, on February 20. (Diana Zeyneb Alhindawi for The Washington Post/for The Washington Post) Twelve months on, the humanitarian situation in Sudan is astonishingly grim. The country is the site of the world’s largest displacement crisis, with more than a fifth of its population forced out of their homes by the civil war, as well as earlier rounds of conflict. Nearly a third of the population is acutely food insecure, according to U.N. data. Some 19 million children are out of school; an estimated 3 million Sudanese children are malnourished. Humanitarian officials have been warning of hunger — and its attendant miseries, such as cholera and other diseases — gripping the country. “This is a huge, looming problem, and they are very close to famine,” Cindy McCain, executive director of the U.N.’s World Food Program, told my colleagues at the beginning of the month. “Kids are dying of starvation within Darfur and other parts of the country.” International organizations complain that it’s logistically impossible to service much of the country. “Constraints to humanitarian access are severely impeding the delivery of life-saving assistance, and humanitarian funding needs have gone largely unmet,” noted a reportby the International Rescue Committee. By February, food prices in Sudan had spiked by more than 110 percent since the war began. In ramshackle refugee camps in neighboring Chad and South Sudan, aid groups say a dearth of funding may see food distribution cease imminently. The World Food Program says the “roots of the hunger problem are twofold: access and funding,” explained my colleagues Diana Zeyneb Alhindawi and Katharine Houreld. “Within Sudan, WFP trucks have been blocked, hijacked, attacked, looted and detained. Outside Sudan, makeshift camps are swollen with hungry and sick arrivals — but there’s no money to feed them.” On Monday, international governments, humanitarians and donors will convene in Paris for a conference aimed at raising funds for Sudan. They meet at a time when a paltry 5 percent of the humanitarian requests put out for Sudan by U.N. agencies have been met. There’s no question that the wars in Ukraine and Gaza — exacerbated furthermore by the recent escalation between Israel and Iran — have put Sudan’s tragedy in the shade. “As communities barrel toward famine, as cholera and measles spread, as violence continues to claim countless lives, the world has largely remained silent,” said U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, last week. That must change now, she added. “The international community must give more. It must do more, and it has to care more.” “For one year, the people of Sudan have been neglected and ignored as they bore the brunt of violent clashes” between the warring parties, said Tigere Chagutah, Amnesty International’s regional director for East and Southern Africa, in a statement. “Diplomatic efforts have so far failed to end violations, protect civilians, provide sufficient humanitarian aid, or hold the perpetrators of war crimes to account.” Women prepare a meager meal on Feb. 18 in the yard of a former primary school, one of the numerous sites where thousands displaced by the war are seeking shelter in Sirba, a town north of El Geneina. (Diana Zeyneb Alhindawi for The Washington Post/for The Washington Post) Yet the warring parties are as likely to sharpen their hatchets as they are to bury them. The country is roughly split now between west and east, with the RSF ascendant in the former and Burhan and his allies better entrenched in the latter. In its Sudan briefing, the International Crisis Group, a think tank, urged countries such as the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates to use more of their leverage to bring the feuding factions to heel, open up access for humanitarian relief and place Sudan back on a path to stability. “The alternative is grim to contemplate, as the country teeters on the brink of chaos, mass starvation and a war that could spread across its borders to a troubled region,” noted the Crisis Group. “Time is of the essence – particularly since the parties are inveigling new warlords to join the fight with promises that they will share in victory’s eventual spoils, which promises to make negotiations to end the war that much more difficult.”