Dia do diplomata: 20 de Abril - Maria Celina de Azevedo Rodrigues

Uma verdadeira diplomata: a presidente da Associação dos Diplomatas Brasileiros – da qual já fui vice-presidente, e com a qual continuo a colaborar, elaborando resenhas dos livros dos diplomatas, na seção "Prata da Casa" em cada número de sua revista – conseguiu realizar a proeza de falar bem dos diplomatas e da diplomacia brasileira sem tocar uma única vez, sem sequer fazer uma menção passageira, à atual política externa, à diplomacia corrente, aos personagens que as comandam, aos que se envolvem direta e indiretamente, enfim, aos que supostamente as representam. Parabéns!
A frase que mais se aproxima da realidade presente está bem no começo: 
O momento atual exige diálogo para definir estratégias e um olhar de 360 graus para analisar os benefícios e os riscos dos rumos da política externa brasileira e de sua posição perante à comunidade internacional.
Assim vamos. Estamos esperando novos discursos fabulosos, dia 29 de abril, quando finalmente será realizada a cerimônia de formatura da nova turma de egressos do Instituto Rio Branco, nossa academia diplomática – turma que foi impedida de escolher livremente seu patrono e paraninfo – e quando também serão atribuídas as diversas comendas da Ordem de Rio Branco, a personagens certamente representativos do momento atual.
Finalizando, deixo também minha saudação e cumprimentos a todos os meus colegas que se exercem concretamente na diplomacia e na política externa, das quais estou, como é sabido, temporariamente afastado.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Brasília, 20 de abril de 2019

Dia do Diplomata, 20 de abril: uma data para relembrar desafios e reafirmar compromissos

Maria Celina de Azevedo Rodrigues* 

O Estado de S. Paulo, 20 de abril de 2019 | 08h00

Maria Celina de Azevedo Rodrigues. FOTO: DIVULGAÇÃO

A atuação dos diplomatas brasileiros sempre foi marcada e reconhecida pela excelência em representar o País no exterior. O momento atual exige diálogo para definir estratégias e um olhar de 360 graus para analisar os benefícios e os riscos dos rumos da política externa brasileira e de sua posição perante à comunidade internacional.

O interesse da opinião pública pelas relações exteriores do Brasil é crescente. Como porta-voz da associação que representa mais de 1600 diplomatas brasileiros, entendo a época atual como uma oportunidade para divulgarmos ainda mais as diversas frentes de atuação desta tradicional carreira de Estado.

Os desafios enfrentados pelos membros do serviço exterior são muitos e estão presentes desde o início da carreira, quando passam por um concurso público rigoroso e, posteriormente, por um curso de formação. A ascensão dos diplomatas dentro da casa se dá a partir da aprovação de critérios rígidos e de demandas exigentes por parte das hierarquias superiores. A rotina errante e a necessidade de constante aperfeiçoamento para garantir uma interface eficaz com representantes de outras nações fazem parte do dia a dia dos diplomatas.

Uma forte tradição da nossa diplomacia é a habilidade nas tratativas de questões multilaterais. O desafio em priorizar os interesses comerciais brasileiros junto às comunidades internacionais, sem ferir princípios éticos de outras nações, é sempre levada em consideração pelos diplomatas do País.

A diversidade dos temas sob responsabilidade dos membros do Ministério das Relações Exteriores ainda é pouco conhecida pelos brasileiros. Há diplomatas que, diariamente, desempenham funções nas áreas administrativa, cultural, ambiental, energética, econômica, comercial, consular, ciência e tecnologia, proteção aos direitos humanos, cooperação, paz e segurança internacionais, entre outras, além das representações diplomáticas e consulares do Brasil no exterior.

Vale destacar que, em muitos países, o número de brasileiros residentes tem aumentado a cada ano. As demandas de nossos compatriotas no exterior são crescentes e vão desde situações de emergência, como repatriação, encarceramento, acidente, morte, perda, furto e emissão de documentos a casos de inadmissão em outras nações. Estes são alguns exemplos do quotidiano da assistência prestada pelo serviço consular.

É fundamental que os membros do serviço exterior brasileiro (que, pela própria natureza de seu trabalho, estão disponíveis 24 horas por dia) tenham condições para seguir desempenhando, com efetividade, as funções atribuídas a esta carreira de Estado. Nesse sentido, como entidade representativa, a Associação dos Diplomatas Brasileiros (ADB) finalizou um projeto de nova Lei do Serviço Exterior, cujo principal objetivo é, uma vez acordado com os tomadores de decisão do MRE, criar um marco jurídico moderno, transparente, claro e inclusivo, que atenda às necessidades dos integrantes do Serviço Exterior Brasileiro, particularmente, no que se refere à previsibilidade das regras de remoção e do fluxo de carreira.

A tradição da diplomacia brasileira rem servir ao País e o desejo de vê-la forte e respeitada foi um compromisso firmado pelo Barão do Rio Branco ao assumir a pasta das Relações Exteriores. A comemoração do dia do diplomata no Brasil em 20 de abril ( Decreto n.º 66.217 de 1970) aniversário do Barão, é uma reafirmação por cada integrante da carreira diplomática daquele mesmo compromisso, o de servir à Nação com orgulho e entusiasmo.

*Maria Celina de Azevedo Rodrigues, embaixadora, é presidente da Associação e Sindicato dos Diplomatas Brasileiros (ADB Sindical), tendo chefiado a embaixada do Brasil em Bogotá, na Colômbia; a Missão do Brasil junto às Comunidades Europeias, em Bruxelas, na Bélgica; e o Consulado-Geral em Paris, França.

Fonte: O Estado de S. Paulo, 20/04/2019

Diplomacia americana: seu longo declínio, no livro de William Burns - Jeremi Suri

O autor da resenha, Jeremi Suri, refere-se às memórias de Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, para sinalizar que, depois de sua longa e segura ascensão, a diplomacia americana empreendeu um longo declínio, provavelmente concomitante à militarização da presença americana no mundo.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

The Long Rise and Sudden Fall of American Diplomacy

One of Washington's most accomplished diplomats has traced how U.S. foreign policy went astray over decades—and how it can get back on track.

Jeremi Suri

Foreign Policy, April 17, 2019, 3:10 PM

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad shakes hands with U.S. under secretary for political affairs William Burns ahead of their meeting in Damascus on Feb 17, 2010. (Louai Beshara/AFP/Getty Images) 

On the afternoon of Sept. 11, 2001, one of America’s most experienced diplomats, William Burns, sat in the deserted U.S. State Department compound, five blocks from the evacuated White House, contemplating the future of American foreign policy. The department’s computer systems were down, so he reverted to writing longhand. Burns, the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, composed four pages that he later handed to Secretary of State Colin Powell, outlining ideas for the “imaginative and hard-nosed diplomacy” necessary to drain the Middle East of the terrorism that had now reached the United States. Burns’s advice was prescient; its rejection by the White House, Congress, and much of the American public reveals the debilitating “militarization of diplomacy”—the subject of Burns’s compelling memoir, The Back Channel.

“What was unfolding,” Burns writes, “was less a clash of civilizations than a clash within a civilization, a deeply battered Islamic world in the midst of a desperate ideological struggle. There were limits to what we could do directly to shape that debate. What we could do, however, was to help create a sense of geopolitical order that would deprive extremists of the oxygen they needed to fan the flames of chaos, and give moderate forces the sustained support they needed to demonstrate that they could deliver for their people.”

These were the insights of a former ambassador to Jordan who had served in high-ranking positions on the National Security Council (NSC) and in the State Department. In his memoir, Burns explains why his emphasis on diplomacy was so important as the United States embarked on a new global war against terrorism. Washington could never master the deeply complex histories, motivations, and factions within and around the region. The United States would have to rely on local relationships, which would require compromise, negotiation, and some humility. U.S. military power could not replace the necessary deference to regional sensibilities. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak captured this well when he warned Burns, “You must not underestimate how much trouble those Iraqis can be. They spend their whole lives plotting against each other.”

If Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s classic memoir, Present at the Creation, narrates the growth of U.S. diplomacy during the early Cold War, Burns’s memoir captures the apex of U.S. diplomacy and its rapid decline 50 years later. Acheson’s generation of political leaders valued and supported the nation’s diplomats; Burns’s political masters, particularly after 9/11, did not. Burns offers a cogent argument for why that must change, soon.

U.S. leaders had excelled in the diplomacy surrounding the end of the Cold War. President George H.W. Bush and Secretary of State James Baker built enduring relationships with diverse leaders across the Soviet bloc and the Middle East. They negotiated compromises that gave other leaders what they needed in return for endorsement of key U.S. aims: nuclear arms control, reunification of Germany, and the reversal of Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait. Bush and Baker were less successful in negotiating a peace agreement between Israel and its neighbors, but they made progress there, too. Baker was the great U.S. diplomat of the late 20th century, as seen by Burns, who served on the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff and frequently traveled with the secretary: “His skills, weight within the administration, relationships with all the key players in the region, and proven ability to deliver could not be easily replicated. He seemed like the right peacemaker at the right time.”

Bush and Baker’s international achievements left a void as their successors undervalued the diplomacy they had carefully crafted to reach those results. A unipolar post-Cold War hegemon, the United States possessed unmatched military and economic power, and its ideological righteousness seemed unassailable. Who needed difficult, slow diplomatic compromises when U.S. leaders could get what they wanted largely through pressure and force?

The militarization of U.S. diplomacy began, according to Burns’s account, when President Bill Clinton pushed for rapid NATO expansion into the former Soviet bloc, despite prior U.S. commitments to the contrary (as confirmed by Burns in his memoir) and strong Russian objections. Although Clinton offered strong personal support to Russian President Boris Yeltsin, he failed to address the growing sense of insecurity and grievance within Russia. It appeared that the United States was muscling into Russian geopolitical space, brandishing guns and dollars. Washington offered little to assure concerned Russians, other than continued aid to a drunk, pro-American figure in the Kremlin.

The former Soviet bloc states had good reason to seek NATO membership, but the United States needed to do more to accommodate Russian fears. Diplomacy of this kind received little attention among Clinton’s impatient advisors. Burns, then the U.S. minister-counselor for political affairs in Russia, recounts: “Sitting at the embassy in Moscow in the mid-1990s, it seemed to me that NATO expansion was premature at best, and needlessly provocative at worst. … It was wishful thinking, however, to believe that we could open the door to NATO membership without incurring some lasting cost with a Russia coping with its own historic insecurities.”

The destructive cocktail of U.S. wishful thinking, military power, and ideological self-righteousness reached maximum potency with the Iraq War. Burns calls it America’s “original sin” of the post-Cold War order, “born of hubris, as well as failures of imagination and process.” Burns commends President George W. Bush’s personal sincerity, but he describes him as “reckless” in his commitment to overthrow Saddam Hussein militarily and ignore all advice to the contrary. Burns recounts what he and others at State, and within the Western alliance, told the White House: “There was ‘no evidence of an Iraqi role’ in 9/11, ‘no [regional or international] support for military action,’ and ‘no triggering event.’ There was a ‘relatively weak internal opposition [in Iraq],’ and little clarity on what might happen on the day after.”

These observations—repeated and confirmed by virtually all experienced diplomats at the time—were not an argument for doing nothing. Burns fills many pages with elaborations on the options, short of U.S. invasion, that would have addressed terrorism and other threats in the Middle East. These options included tightened international sanctions, increased support for alternative groups and power centers in the region, and, most important, closer cooperation among U.S. allies—most of whom were eager to show their support for the United States after 9/11.

Washington ran roughshod over all of these diplomatic options. The United States isolated itself, antagonized allies and adversaries, and diverted its resources to a lengthy military occupation that further destabilized the region. The winner of the war was Iran, which saw a regional rival defeated and found new influence in Iraq. The United States was a clear loser, as the “war in Iraq sucked the oxygen out of the administration’s foreign policy agenda.” Mired in Iraq, facing opposition around the globe, Washington found its diplomatic leverage diminished in almost every region. Burns recounts how Russian President Vladimir Putin took advantage of this situation by throwing his weight around in Central Asia, the Middle East, and Southeastern Europe. The United States had cornered itself.

Most damaging, the United States never recovered the diplomatic capital lost in Iraq. Burns recounts many skilled U.S. efforts to contain Russia and denuclearize Libya and Iran, but from military intervention to drone warfare Washington consistently “overrelied on American hard power to achieve policy aims and ambitions.” Even critics of the Iraq War presumed the United States had underused or misused military power; they did not address the diplomatic deficit. U.S. leaders failed to educate the public about the importance of forging compromise abroad, and they frequently encouraged more skepticism toward diplomacy. This was most evident during the Barack Obama administration’s negotiations with Iran, when members of Congress worked to undermine sensitive negotiations while they were still in process, calling recklessly for military intervention instead.

Before Donald Trump’s presidency, many Americans had adopted a dangerous “dismissiveness toward diplomacy.” This was a marked change from the last decades of the 20th century and the presidency of George H.W. Bush in particular. Allies, including much of Western Europe, now distanced themselves from Washington, both frustrated and concerned about U.S. callousness. Adversaries, especially Russia and China, swooped in to acquire new partners and isolate the United States. Ironically, post-Cold War U.S. militarization cracked open the liberal international order that U.S. diplomats had carefully and successfully nurtured for more than 50 years.

There are no easy solutions. The skilled U.S. diplomacy of the late Cold War was a historical aberration, reflecting the accumulated experience of the prior half-century and the leadership of a few distinctive personalities. The U.S. electoral system does not favor diplomats or the slow compromises they nurture in foreign policy. And the United States invests far more in military power than other less kinetic elements.

Nonetheless, Burns’s memoir reminds us of the continued importance of diplomacy, and it points to a number of things Americans can do to improve its practice for the national interest. First, it is high time Americans grapple with the failure of the war in Iraq. They need to hold their leaders historically accountable for their disastrous dismissal of diplomacy, rather than hunting for successful military roads not taken. Recognizing that military power cannot succeed without diplomacy, as evidenced in Iraq, is crucial for building the domestic support U.S. diplomats desperately need. They are the keys to winning future conflicts.

Second, the militarization of U.S. diplomacy is centered in the White House. Burns recounts how the NSC grew in size and influence during his 30 years in government. It frequently crowds out the diplomatic voices coming from the State Department, as happened during deliberations surrounding the expansion of NATO and the war in Iraq. The NSC has become a crisis-driven center for foreign policy, which has repeatedly privileged rapid military solutions for deep diplomatic problems. Reducing its influence, and empowering professional diplomats with area-specific experience, will create more space for creative, informed policymaking. Burns makes this point well: “Responsibility needs to be pushed downward in Washington, and ambassadors in the field need to be empowered to make more decisions locally.”

Third, and perhaps most important, Americans need to educate themselves about diplomacy. This is an old problem in a society that is skeptical about cosmopolitan elites and generally ignorant of its own history. In a very competitive world, managing global relationships will be more important than ever for business and policy. Investing in educating citizens about diplomacy—through language instruction, history, political science, and other related subjects—must become a priority. Educational leaders should take up this cause. The U.S. government should also invest in the issue, beginning with the education of its own diplomats. A recent study that I completed with my colleague, Ambassador Robert Hutchings, shows that the U.S. foreign service is behind many of its peers in the quality and quantity of diplomatic education that it offers to its own diplomats. The United States should at least begin to address the diplomatic deficit among its talented representatives.

Burns’s career captures an underutilized asset in U.S. foreign policy. America has the capacity to produce world-class diplomats, and it needs more of them than ever before. The “imaginative and hard-nosed diplomacy” that Burns describes amid the smoldering ruins of 9/11 should guide thinking about U.S. foreign policy as the country emerges from recent setbacks. Without renewed diplomacy, U.S. force will never be enough.

Jeremi Suri holds the Mack Brown Distinguished Chair for Leadership in Global Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin. He is a professor in the University's Department of History and the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs.

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Venezuela: embaixador russo rejeita a nova versão da doutrina Monroe de John Bolton (AP)

Putin envoy in Caracas rejects US revival of Monroe Doctrine

CARACAS, Venezuela (AP) — As Venezuela’s reliance on Russia grows amid the country’s unfolding crisis, Vladimir Putin’s point man in Caracas is pushing back on the U.S. revival of a doctrine used for generations to justify military interventions in the region.

In a rare interview, Russian Ambassador Vladimir Zaemskiy rejected an assertion this week by U.S. National Security Adviser John Bolton that the 1823 Monroe Doctrine is “alive and well.”

The policy, originally aimed at opposing any European meddling in the hemisphere, was used to justify U.S. military interventions in countries including Cuba, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic and Grenada, but had been left for dead by recent U.S. administrations trying to turn the page on a dark past.

“It’s hard to believe that the U.S. administration have invented a time machine that not only allows them to turn back the clock but also the direction of the universe,” the 66-year-old diplomat told The Associated Press this week.

In an example of how the Cold War-like rhetoric on all sides of Venezuela’s crisis has quickly escalated, the ambassador compared hostile comments by Bolton, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Republican Sen. Marco Rubio to those of the al Qaeda leaders behind the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

“Their obsession in imposing their will, in this case on Venezuela’s internal affairs, reminds me of the declarations of the leaders of al Qaeda, who in carrying out the attack on the Twin Towers also tried to position themselves as the only bearers of the truth,” said Zaemskiy, who was senior counselor at Russia’s mission to the United Nations on 9/11. “The history of humanity has shown that none of us are.”

Those specific, written remarks were prepared ahead of the interview.

While the Trump administration led a chorus of some 50 nations that in January recognized opposition leader Juan Guaidó as Venezuela’s rightful leader, Putin has steadfastly stood by Nicolás Maduro, sending planeloads of military personnel and blocking condemnation of his government at the U.N. Security Council.

In a speech this week commemorating the anniversary of the disastrous CIA-organized invasion of Cuba in 1961 by exiles opposed to Fidel Castro’s revolution, Bolton warned Russia against deploying military assets to “prop up” Maduro, considering such actions a violation of the Monroe Doctrine.

What the U.S. considers Russia’s destabilizing support for Maduro hit a high point in December when two Russian bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons touched down in Caracas. Then, last month, dozens of uniformed personnel arrived to service Sukhoi fighter jets and an S-300 missile system.

Zaemskiy said such military cooperation is perfectly legal and has been taking place for years — ever since the U.S. in 2006 banned all arms sales to the South American country. But he said the alliance has taken on added importance as the Trump administration repeatedly insists that a “military option” to remove Maduro remains on the table.

He was unwilling to say how far Russia would go to thwart an eventual U.S. attack, saying that as a diplomat he’s an optimist.

“I firmly believe that in the end reason will prevail and no tragedy will take place,” he said.

The soft-spoken, bookish Zaemskiy has specialized in Latin America since his days working for the Soviet Union and was posted to Washington for the first of two U.S. tours when the Cold War ended.

Because of his strong Spanish and English, he was a note-taker at the U.N. in September 2000 when Maduro’s mentor and predecessor Hugo Chavez met Putin for the first time. He said he recalls Chavez complaining to the newly elected Putin about the need to raise oil prices, then near three-decade low. The two petroleum powers gradually cemented a political, military and economic alliance over the next few years as oil prices surged to an all-time high, bringing riches to both.

Western diplomats describe Zaemskiy as an astute and affable interlocutor who even U.S. diplomats and leaders of the opposition are known to consult. He’s also the dean of foreign diplomats in Caracas’ dwindling diplomatic community, having presented his credentials in September 2009 — a few weeks before another staunch government ally, Cuban Ambassador Rogelio Polanco.

The aquamarine-colored Russian Embassy, where Zaemskiy also lives, was a mid-century mansion purchased in the 1970s from a wealthy military colonel trained in the U.S. It lies in the shadow the hilltop U.S. Embassy, whose flagpole has been bare since the last American diplomats pulled out of the country last month amid a feud with Maduro over its recognition of Guaidó.

He acknowledged that with hyperinflation raging and many goods in short supply, Venezuela is in a “very difficult” situation. Echoing Maduro, he blamed U.S. sanctions, as well as the stifling of private investment.

His first tour in Venezuela as a protocol officer came from 1976 to 1979, when modern skyscrapers paid for by a flood of petrodollars transformed Caracas’ skyline even as many outside the capital lived in what he described as a semi-feudal state. Zaemskiy said the legacy of Chavez’s economic and political revolution — that it restored dignity to the poor — remains intact.

“It’s perfectly clear to me that the economic situation of the country has deteriorated a great deal,” he said. “The way forward is to open more opportunities for the private sector, which still has a big role to play in the country and should be allowed to demonstrate that” — seemingly a veiled criticism of Maduro’s constant squeeze on private businesses.

To break the current stalemate, he urged something the government’s foes have so far rejected: burying the past and starting negotiations, perhaps with the mediation of the Vatican or U.N.

The U.S. and opposition insist that past attempts at dialogue have only served to give Maduro badly needed political oxygen while producing no progress.

“The lack of confidence is a problem on both sides, which is why they should think together on some innovative ways to create reassurances in this process,” he said. “To simply reject the possibility of dialogue and repeat that the only way forward is the ‘end of usurpation’ as the opposition says, won’t lead anywhere.”

Despite such outward care for Maduro, some have questioned the depth of Russia’s support.

Russia is major investor in Venezuela’s oil industry, but those interests have been jeopardized since the Trump administration in January imposed sanctions on state-run oil giant PDVSA and even went after a Moscow-based bank for facilitating its transactions. At the same time PDVSA last month moved its European headquarters to Moscow from Lisbon, Gazprombank said it was pulling out of a joint venture with the company, Russian state media reported.

“The core value of Russia’s association with Chavismo is a challenge to U.S. prerogatives in its supposed backyard,” said Ivan Briscoe, the head in Latin American for the Crisis Group, a Brussels-based think tank. “That said, Russian diplomacy is nothing if not realistic. They know Venezuela is plunging into an economic abyss with tragic humanitarian consequences. When the moment comes and tensions reach a height, they are likely to help negotiate a settlement, but will aim to exact the highest price they can.”

___

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Copyright © 2019 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, written or redistributed.

Trump years: hard times for diplomacy - Amb. Gerard Araud

Não só nesse circuito, caro embaixador, em outras latitudes também; é difícil ser embaixador nesta assemblagem de tempos similares Trump-Bolso.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

How Trump Practices ‘Escalation Dominance’

“You have restraint on your side. He has no restraint. So you lose,” says outgoing French Ambassador Gérard Araud.

Michael Hirsh

Foreign Policy, April 19, 2019, 12:00 AM

https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/19/how-trump-practices-escalation-dominance/?utm_source=PostUp&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=12151&utm_term=Editor

Gérard Araud, the French ambassador to the United Nations, attends a U.N. Security Council meeting at U.N. headquarters in New York on June 9, 2010. (Emmanuel Dunand/AFP/Getty Images) 

Following in the footsteps of Alexis de Tocqueville, Gérard Araud has made a study of the United States while serving as France’s ambassador to Washington for nearly five years. Araud has also frequently expressed frank opinions on the fate of the West, sometimes on Twitter. After a stellar career in the French foreign service that earned him a reputation as an able negotiator on Middle East issues and took him to an ambassadorship in Israel, as well as to senior positions at NATO and the United Nations, Araud officially retired on April 19. He plans to publish a memoir of his experiences this year. Araud, 66, sat down with Foreign Policy to give his parting reflections on how to handle U.S. presidents—based on his own experience with Barack Obama and Donald Trump.

Foreign Policy: What advice would you give your successor on how to handle the Trump administration?

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Gérard Araud: First, I think I prefer somebody who doesn’t have heart problems. I will give you an example. We were in mid-May last year, and everybody in the administration was telling us the president was not going to take a decision [on the Iran nuclear deal] because no meeting had been scheduled on Iran in the White House. So, of course, I sent that to Paris, and, of course, Donald Trump took the decision [to withdraw from the deal] that following Tuesday because Donald Trump didn’t need a meeting.

FP: Is there any way you can predict what Trump will do, say, or tweet?

GA: I will tell you the advice I gave [to Paris] about the tweets. He once criticized the French president [Emmanuel Macron], and people called me from Paris to say, “What should we do?” My answer was clear: “Nothing.” Do nothing because he will always outbid you. Because he can’t accept appearing to lose. You have restraint on your side, and he has no restraint on his side, so you lose. It is escalation dominance.

FP: As ambassador, you bridged two very different presidents, Obama and Trump. Talk about what that was like.

GA: On one side, you had this ultimate bureaucrat, an introvert, basically a bit aloof, a restrained president. A bit arrogant also but basically somebody who every night was going to bed with 60-page briefings and the next day they were sent back annotated by the president. And suddenly you have this president who is an extrovert, really a big mouth, who reads basically nothing or nearly nothing, with the interagency process totally broken and decisions taken from the hip basically. And also, for an ambassador, you had a normal working administration with Obama. People in the executive branch offices were able to explain to you what the president was thinking or what the president was going to do. And suddenly it’s the opposite. A lot of offices are still empty. It’s amazing—after 55 months, a lot of people are changing overnight. It’s the fourth G-7 [emissary] we’ve had in the White house in two years! So the first problem is we have nobody in the offices or if they are there, they’re going to leave. But on top of that, even if you have somebody in the offices, they don’t know what the president is going to say. And if the president has said something, they don’t know what he means.

Very often even the secretary of state is surprised by a presidential announcement. When there was the announcement on Dec. 19 about the U.S. withdrawal from Syria, nobody was aware of it, including the director of the CIA. And for the [decision to concede Israeli sovereignty over the] Golan Heights, what I understand was that the secretary of state was not informed. So it means the job of the ambassador has become much more complicated.

FP: Do you report back on a regular basis: We have no idea what the Americans are going to do?

GA: Exactly. Which means that very often that’s the use of having Macron call Trump. Very often I’m obliged to tell Paris, “I’m sorry, I don’t know. If you really want to know, the president has to call Trump.”

FP: Recently, for example, your defense minister was here, and she had to go talk to acting Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan about getting clarity on U.S. policy in Syria.

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GA: The problem of Syria is the problem of the way the president has been working. First the president says—to the total surprise of everybody including the secretary of defense, who resigned after that, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman—that the Americans are withdrawing. Then these administration officials don’t try to push the president to change his mind, but they go through modalities to change his policy, beginning with what number of U.S. troops will remain. But to be able to bargain for that, they need to be able to say to the president, “Oh, the French are going to double their contribution.” Which doesn’t make sense because on the French side we say, “We’re really sorry. We can’t tell you how many soldiers we’ll have if we don’t know how many soldiers you’re going to put in.” It’s chicken and egg. So basically we are used for the only negotiation that matters—which is the negotiation between the Defense Department and Trump.

FP: So has there been any resolution on the number of U.S. troops in Syria?

GA: No, of course not. The Americans, because of the Trump constraint, are not acting very logically. They are totally unable to tell us whether it will be 200 or 800.

FP: Is there any policy on which you do have clarity from the Trump administration?

GA: I think trade. It’s really very clear. Trade conceived as a zero-sum game on a bilateral basis and on the basis of the crude balance of power between both sides.

FP: So it’s mercantilism from the 18th century.

GA: Yeah, exactly. You have a big stick, and you don’t care who your interlocutor is. You treat China the same way you treat the U.K. or the European Union.

FP: Can the concept of the West survive this reversion to mercantilism?

GA: Basically the current president doesn’t care about the West. He is a nationalist. He is America alone.

FP: I understand your memoir is finished. Can you give us some highlights?

GA: What for me was striking was realizing that I had started my career more or less when Ronald Reagan was elected and I was completing my career when Trump was elected. And suddenly I realized by chance my career nearly exactly fit a particular period in history—a period that I’m convinced is over. I’m really convinced the direction of Trump is a signal that 40 years of what people call neoliberalism is over. This period where everybody was convinced that free trade was good, the market good, taxes were bad, and state intervention was bad, and suddenly with the election of Trump but also with Brexit and the populist wave in the Western countries, including France, the signal is that some of our citizens are saying, “No way, it’s over.” Nearly overnight all the certainties of my diplomatic life were shattered. You had an American president saying suddenly that the EU is a threat, that NATO is dangerous. That for me was the stepping stone of my memoirs.

FP: So if this era is over, what follows?

GA: I think that what’s interesting on the right wing of the political spectrum is you have a new conservatism that is suddenly defined. The Republican Party was the party of free trade, the party of active foreign policy, of budgetary restraint, and suddenly it’s over. In a sense Trump hijacked the Republican Party. So you can argue that after the mandate of the current president, things will come back to business as usual, but I don’t think so. That’s the advantage of being a foreigner: You see that conservatism is moving in the same direction everywhere. The French conservative party—and I’m not talking about the far-right—is also moving in the direction of identity, [closed] borders, anti-immigration, anti-globalism, so you have sort of a new right. And I’m regretting a bit leaving my post now because I’m convinced the 2020 elections will be a critical moment for the American left to redefine itself, and of course it has influence on the rest of the world.

FP: What went wrong? Why is this era ending in a backlash where people feel that the verities of the period you describe didn’t hold true anymore?

GA: The statistics show that half of Americans, roughly speaking, have seen stagnation of their income in the last 30 years. Overall the opening of the borders has been good for the poor countries, and very good for the rich of the rich countries, but the lower middle class and lower end have been really hit. And it’s not only the opening of borders but also automation. And on top of that, you had the storm of the financial crisis of 2008. I think it was very well managed, especially by Obama, but millions of Americans lost their homes and millions of Americans lost their jobs. So there was a moment when 30 or maybe 35 to 40 percent of Americans said, “It’s over.” And the genius of Trump has been to feel this crisis.

FP: Would Trump’s re-election in 2020 be a disaster for the West?

GA: I don’t know if it will be a disaster. I’m sure it won’t be a good thing. But at the same time it’s too easy to say Trump is responsible. Because on the European side, the crisis is on both sides of the Atlantic. You see the incredible soap opera [over Brexit] offered up by the British. Whatever the result, it’s a lose-lose situation for Europe. It’s a disaster that we are losing the British, all the capabilities they are bringing to us.

FP: You may not lose them now.

GA: Yeah. But even if we don’t lose them, it will be bad. Because for the British citizens, it will mean that once more the elites have stolen their future, and that is bad for British democracy. You see Italians, where they are. The Germans are also conservative, shifting to the right. Macron was the only voice for European integration, and you see the challenges he’s facing. So again, we can always hope for a rebound, but on both sides of the Atlantic, we have real reason for concern.

FP: What other advice, finally, would you give to your successor?

GA: Travel. Travel. Travel. We are talking too much about Washington, D.C. The job for an ambassador is traveling throughout the country. And as soon as you cross the Beltway, people don’t care so much about what is happening in Washington.

This conversation has been condensed and edited for publication. 

Michael Hirsh is a senior correspondent at Foreign Policy. Twitter: @michaelphirsh

More from Foreign Policy

By Taboola

Dois juizes inconstitucionais e um bravo jornalista - Mario Sabino

Os dois juízes não são apenas inconstitucionais. Eles são anti-constitucionais, e deveriam ser sancionados não apenas pelo próprio STF – que provavelmente vai se acovardar e não fazer nada – como também pelo Senado, que pode chamá-los a se explicar e até destituí-los, se tiver coragem e respeito pela Constituição.
O presidente atual do STF, um completo despreparado, ex-advogado do PT, uma organização criminosa, como todos sabem, cometeu calúnia contra o Antagonista e a revista Crusoé, e deveria ser processado por isso. Proponho um pedido inicial de R$ 200.000,00 como reparação.
Acho também que, tendo contribuído para aumentar a audiência e provavelmente as assinaturas da revista Crusoé, os editores poderiam lhe oferecer um ano de assinatura gratuita, como prêmio pelo serviço involuntário de ajuda no marketing (e um prêmio Darwin, pela estupidez demonstrada).
Abaixo, o artigo de Mário Sabino na Crusoé desta memorável semana.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Brasília, 20 de abril de 2019

E lá fui eu parar na PF outra vez

Mario Sabino, revista Crusoé, 19/04/2019

https://crusoe.com.br/edicoes/51/e-la-fui-eu-parar-na-pf-outra-vez/

Na última terça-feira, dia 16 de abril, apenas 24 horas depois de ser intimado pelo ministro Alexandre de Moraes, eu me apresentei ao delegado da Polícia Federal escolhido para conduzir o inquérito sigiloso e inconstitucional aberto para intimidar a imprensa (a história de que serve para apurar fake news e ameaças ao STF nas redes sociais é conversa para boi dormir. Pegaram uns coitados ao acaso). Foi a quarta vez na minha carreira profissional que me vi convocado a comparecer diante de um delegado pelo fato de ser jornalista. Na primeira, em 2008, fui à mesma Superintendência da PF em São Paulo, como redator-chefe da Veja, para sair de lá como o único indiciado no caso do dossiê dos aloprados. Contei essa história aqui, há menos de um mês. Em 2016, Lula também quis me levar para uma delegacia, sob a acusação de que O Antagonista era uma associação criminosa. Nossos advogados conseguiram evitar essa ignomínia. Em 2017, Wagner Freitas, presidente da CUT, foi outro a querer que um delegado me interrogasse. A tentativa foi novamente abortada.

É perturbador que um jornalista, pelo fato de exercer a sua profissão, seja intimado a ir quatro vezes à polícia, na vigência de um regime democrático. Tendo a crer que sou um recordista no Brasil. O delegado designado para conduzir o inquérito inconstitucional saído da cachola de Dias Toffoli e Alexandre de Moraes não soube dizer aos meus advogados em qual condição eu estava ali: se de investigado, testemunha ou, sei lá, colaborador. Ele afirmou ainda que, por ser sigiloso, desconhecia o teor exato do inquérito a meu respeito. Sim, você leu certo: o delegado designado para conduzir o inquérito inconstitucional saído da cachola de Dias Toffoli e Alexandre de Moraes disse não ter ideia sobre o que estava sendo investigado sobre mim. Se é que eu era investigado, claro.

Eu, no entanto, sei que não há objeto de investigação nenhum. Apenas quiseram calar a boca dos jornalistas da Crusoé e de O Antagonista que ousaram fazer reportagens sobre ministros do Supremo Tribunal Federal. Como não conseguiram – e nem conseguirão, se o Brasil realmente for uma democracia digna de tal nome –, o inquérito teratológico ampliou a sua ousadia autoritária, com Alexandre de Moraes prestando-se ao papel vexaminoso de censor da Crusoé e de O Antagonista.

Dias Toffoli e Alexandre de Moraes nutrem a ilusão de que irão destruir a Crusoé e O Antagonista, acusando-me de estar à frente de sites que não são jornalísticos, mas destinados a produzir notícias falsas contra o Supremo Tribunal Federal, em conluio com procuradores da Lava Jato e militares golpistas – ambos os veículos financiados por gente escusa do mercado financeiro. A ideia agora, pelo que depreendo, é tentar provar que não sou jornalista, embora tenha 35 anos de carreira e seja sócio-fundador de O Antagonista, que tem 15 milhões de leitores únicos por mês, e da Crusoé, a primeira revista inteiramente digital do país, que conta hoje com 72 mil assinantes.

Dias Toffoli mostrou que seguirá o caminho de tentar nos desqualificar e criminalizar, em entrevista ao Valor. Ele disse que orquestramos narrativas inverídicas para constranger o Supremo às vésperas de uma decisão sobre a prisão de condenados em segunda instância, o que seria obstrução de administração da Justiça. Respondi que o único constrangimento causado ao Supremo se dá pelo comportamento abusivo de Dias Toffoli, que está abolindo o devido processo legal, com o seu inquérito inconstitucional.

No dia seguinte, a Crusoé publicou que Dias Toffoli simplesmente mentiu ao Valor. Porque a reportagem foi publicada na quinta-feira, dia 11, “o julgamento estava marcado para o dia 10, um dia antes de ela ser publicada, mas já havia sido adiado seis dias antes, no dia 4, a pedido da Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil. E nem sequer havia sido marcada uma nova data. Alem disso, o documento da Odebrecht em que se baseou a reportagem foi anexado nos autos da Lava Jato no dia 9 de abril — após o julgamento ter sido adiado, portanto”. Pergunto-me se Dias Toffoli mentiria assim diante do delegado da Polícia Federal que tomou o meu depoimento.

O presidente do Supremo Tribunal Federal também disse que a Crusoé e O Antagonista não são imprensa livre, mas “imprensa comprada”. Respondi que não recebemos mesada e que Dias Toffoli não está imune a processo por calúnia.

Dias Toffoli e Alexandre de Moraes imaginavam que nós nos acovardaríamos porque teríamos rabo preso. Nós não nos acovardamos porque não temos o rabo preso. Eles imaginavam que não teríamos apoio dos grandes jornais e emissoras de rádio e TV. Nós tivemos o apoio dos grandes jornais e emissoras de rádio e TV. Todos perceberam que a ameaça não era apenas contra nós, mas contra a liberdade de imprensa. Eles imaginavam que nós mentíamos sobre a nossa imensa base de leitores. Nós temos uma imensa base de leitores, que podem não concordar com todas as nossas opiniões, mas sabem que somos honestos e transparentes. Os nossos ganhos são financiados por publicidade, jamais estatal, e assinaturas. Em 2018, finalmente consegui recuperar o dinheiro que gastei das minhas economias, enquanto procurávamos viabilizar comercialmente O Antagonista. Eles imaginavam que não contaríamos com o apoio de juristas e entidades de classe. Nós tivemos o apoio de juristas e entidades de classe.

A censura foi levantada, mas não sei até que ponto os demais ministros do Supremo Tribunal Federal deixarão essa alopragem correr solta. Sugiro modestamente que contenham Dias Toffoli e Alexandre de Moraes (o despacho que levantou a censura que não era censura, por exemplo, tem pegadinhas). A pretexto de salvaguardar o Supremo, a dupla só fez afundar ainda mais a imagem do tribunal como guardião da Constituição. São eles, portanto, que ameaçam a corte. Sem o Supremo Tribunal Federal, não há democracia. Assim como não há democracia sem liberdade de imprensa, o que significa o direito de criticar e fiscalizar todas as instituições, inclusive o STF. E, não canso de repetir, a liberdade de imprensa só se enfraquece quando não a exercemos. Se tiver de voltar à PF, direi isso ao delegado.

O recuo do Brasil na economia mundial - FMI, FSP, Ricardo Bergamini

Ricardo Bergamini, sempre atento à atualidade econômica, sintetiza as más (inevitáveis) notícias sobre a perda de peso do Brasil na economia mundial, não exatamente porque os outros foram mais rápidos e dinâmicos – o que também aconteceu –, mas porque nós recuamos, e não deixamos de estagnar. Ao final, matéria da FSP sobre o mesmo assunto.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasil perde importância econômica no contexto mundial

Em 2018, o PIB CORRENTE (US$ 1.860,4 bilhões) e PIB PER CAPITA (US$ 8.923,00) do Brasil, retornaram aos patamares próximos ao ano de 2008 com PIB CORRENTE (US$ 1.693,0 bilhões) e PIB PER CAPITA (US$ 8.839,00), cabendo alertar que uma tragédia dessa magnitude levará, no mínimo, dez anos de austeridade fiscal para colocar o Brasil nos patamares do ano de 2011, com PIB CORRENTE (US$ 2.614,5 bilhões) e PIB PER CAPITA (US$ 13.237,00).

Participação do Brasil na economia global atinge o pior nível em 38 anos

Fatia do país em bens e serviços é de 2,5%

Já foi de 4,4% em 1980 e 3,1% em 2011

Neste século, o pico da participação brasileira na economia global foi em 2011, quando o Brasil representava 3,1% do total

PODER360 , 19.abr.2019 (sexta-feira) 

Levantamento do FMI (Fundo Monetário Internacional) mostra que a participação do Brasil na economia global atingiu o pior nível em 38 anos. Em 2018, a fatia do país na produção de bens e serviços globais foi de 2,5% – a 7ª queda anual seguida.

A informação foi publicada nesta 6ª (19.abr.2019) pelo jornal Folha de S.Paulo. 

Parte inferior do formulário

A maior marca deste século foi atingida em 2011, quando o Brasil representava 3,1% do total. De lá para cá, no entanto, não parou de cair. O pico da participação brasileira nos setores foi em 1980, quando detinha 4,4%.

O resultado fez com que país perdesse o posto de 7ª maior economia global – mantido desde 2005 – para a Indonésia.

De acordo com as projeções do Fundo, o Brasil deve perder espaço nesse quesito pelo menos até 2024, quando a parcela do país na economia mundial recuará para 2,3%.

Ricardo Bergamini

Participação do Brasil na economia global cai ao menor nível em 38 anos

Fatia do país na produção de bens e serviços no mundo foi de 2,5% no ano passado, segundo o FMI

Erica Fraga

Folha de S. Paulo, 19.abr.2019 às 2h00

Dados recém-divulgados pelo FMI (Fundo Monetário Internacional) mostram que o Brasil completou, em 2018, o sétimo ano consecutivo de perda de participação na economia global.

A fatia do país na produção de bens e serviços do mundo, que era de 4,4% em 1980, chegou, entre altos e baixos, a 3,1% em 2011 e, desde então, caiu sem parar, atingindo 2,5% no ano passado, o nível mais baixo ao longo das quase quatro décadas na série histórica que mostra as trocas realizadas entre Brasil e o resto do mundo.

Os dados se referem à participação no PIB (Produto Interno Bruto) global em dólares ajustados pela paridade do poder de compra (PPC), que reflete as diferenças de custo de vida entre os países.

Por essa medida, que é mais estável, o Brasil perdeu, no ano passado, o posto de sétima maior economia do mundo, que detinha desde 2005, para a Indonésia, caindo para o oitavo lugar.

No ranking feito a partir da conversão simples do PIB em dólares, que é mais volátil, a posição brasileira sempre variou bastante e, em 2018, o país voltou a recuar também da sétima para a oitava posição, ultrapassado pela Itália.

Segundo as projeções do Fundo, a tendência de perda de espaço do Brasil se manterá pelo menos até 2024, quando a parcela do país na economia global, pelas projeções realizadas na instituição, recuará para 2,3% (em PPC).

Esse padrão histórico de encolhimento não é uma exclusividade brasileira.

Desde 1980, quase todos os gigantes econômicos cederam espaço para a China passar, movida por suas taxas de crescimento que chegavam a dois dígitos. A exceção foi a Índia, que também se expandiu a um ritmo acelerado em todo o período.

Mas outras comparações —como a análise da trajetória de países emergentes na década atual— evidenciam que a deterioração brasileira no contexto global tem características peculiares e bem particulares.

Desde 2010, a perda de 0,64 ponto percentual de participação do país no PIB mundial só foi inferior aos recuos registrados por Estados Unidos e Japão, que, na esteira da crise financeira de 2008, cresceram, em média, muito abaixo da taxa global.

Os dois são, porém, economias avançadas, com patamar já elevado de renda per capita, em que a estabilidade do progresso em indicadores sociais, como o nível de pobreza, é menos sujeita às oscilações de diferentes ciclo econômico.

Muitas das nações em desenvolvimento, que dependem de taxas razoáveis de crescimento para melhorar o padrão de vida de suas populações, têm apresentado desempenho superior ao brasileiro.

Nos últimos oito anos, vizinhos latino-americanos como Colômbia, Peru, Chile, Uruguai e Paraguai conseguiram, pelo menos, manter suas fatias do PIB mundial (em PPC). Outros emergentes como Indonésia, Turquia, Filipinas, Vietnã e Malásia aumentaram suas participações no período.

“Eu não me preocuparia com a perda de participação do Brasil na economia global se estivéssemos crescendo”, diz o economista Alexandre Cunha, professor da UFRJ (Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro).

“O problema é que não estamos crescendo, e esse recuo relativo a outros países também se manifesta em outros indicadores”, diz o pesquisador.

Ele ressalta que a renda per capita brasileira como percentual da norte-americana —medida muito usada para analisar se um país está se desenvolvendo— nunca retornou ao nível de quatro décadas atrás.

Em 1980, o rendimento médio do brasileiro (em PPC) equivalia a 39% do americano. Em 2018, esse percentual era 25,8%.

Nações como Chile, Taiwan e Coreia seguiram a trajetória inversa no período —os dois últimos, aliás, passaram a ser considerados países desenvolvidos.

Segundo Cunha, embora nenhum economista detenha uma receita mágica para o crescimento econômico sustentado no longo prazo, há grande convergência entre acadêmicos das principais universidades do mundo sobre a importância da estabilidade fiscal nesse processo.

“Não existe na história registro de algum país que tenha conseguido crescer por 20, 30 anos estando quebrado”, diz o pesquisador.

Por isso, para ele, é crucial aprovar a reforma da Previdência e avançar em medidas para reequilibrar as contas públicas deficitárias do Brasil.

Outros passos, diz Cunha, são a estabilidade democrática e das leis.

“Acho que houve um retrocesso nesses aspectos no Brasil. Nosso Congresso, por exemplo, não tem iniciativa de apresentar propostas relevantes para o país nem fiscaliza o Executivo como deveria”, afirma o professor.

O economista Jorge Arbache, vice-presidente do Banco de Desenvolvimento da América Latina, diz que a região se tornou mais dependente da exportação de commodities nos últimos anos e que isso freia seu desenvolvimento em relação a outras partes do mundo, como a Ásia.

“Não é que as commodities não sejam importantes. Elas são muito. Mas estamos vivendo a era da economia do intangível, em que os serviços sofisticados ganham espaço até na produção de manufaturas como automóveis”, diz.

Segundo Arbache, há avanços tecnológicos recentes na economia digital que ainda nem são mensurados nas contas nacionais e, se fossem, revelariam, provavelmente, um retrocesso ainda maior do Brasil no contexto global.

“Precisamos avançar na economia digital para voltar a crescer e ganhar espaço”, diz o economista.
Para isso, ressalta Arbache, além do foco em agendas como a estabilidade fiscal e a de melhoria do ambiente de negócios para as empresas, é necessário avançar em inovação e aumentar a participação do Brasil nas cadeias globais de comércio.