The view from Moscow: The future of nuclear arms control exists, but the path is hard - Dmitry Stefanovich (Bulletin of Atomic Scientists)

 

The view from Moscow: The future of nuclear arms control exists, but the path is hard When it comes to the future of arms control in a multipolar, post-New START world, are multilateral arms treaties even possible? International security expert Dmitry Stefanovich weighs in.    connect.thebulletin.org/lt.php?x=4lZy~GDKVaPLEH4q-Q~NV.WgAnRUiAAiwhkzjng7VXSiD5F60Uy7xOhs1X-l-RVfjDZo2nnLJGGi5pCKyOxGVOdv1k   The view from Moscow: The future of nuclear arms control exists, but the path is hard By Dmitry Stefanovich | May 13, 2026   It is impossible to argue with the fact that today’s arms control architecture is in very bad shape, especially if one focuses on strategic nuclear weapons. While Moscow seems open to at least some limitations, the current thinking in Washington is obsessed with Chinese nuclear buildup (real or alleged), and the only acknowledged solution to the ‘three-body’ problem seems to be purely arithmetical in its nature: In other words, the United States declares that the only way to sustain nuclear deterrence under current circumstances is to have its nuclear arsenal exceed both the Russian and Chinese capabilities. Clearly, neither Russia nor China can ignore such an attitude and would respond in kind.]\ But despite the current negative trends, arms control remains alive, although the formats that still exist are limited. And in the future, arms control instruments may take many forms: legally and politically binding agreements, unilateral initiatives, and bilateral and multilateral arrangements. Even enhanced notifications and transparency mechanisms could be helpful. Moreover, there is some room for synchronized limitations on certain activities—i.e. deployment of selected weapons only at selected regions—which might contribute to the stabilization of military-political relations between certain countries. It is also crucial to understand that it is hardly possible that any future arms control could only be bilateral. Furthermore, it is impossible to even imagine the complicated arrangements for inspection mechanisms for every state that possesses nuclear weapons, and the asymmetrical quantitative limitations for them. The arsenals of nuclear weapon states are significantly different, and even the Russian and US nuclear forces postures are not symmetrical. To have a dozen or more inspections per country per year is too much of a logistical challenge if we begin to consider more than two participants for such a regime. There are other factors as well, including but not limited to the increasing presence of dual-capable systems, growing cooperation between the United States and its allies and partners in the nuclear domain (with NATO declaring itself a “nuclear alliance”). The peculiar part is that while one side perceives such developments as explicitly destabilizing, the other believes them to be stabilizing and enhancing strategic (or integrated) deterrence. Most important, not only nuclear capabilities contribute to the overall “security equation.”  Military conflicts since the end of the 20th century clearly show that non-nuclear long-range precision weapons are indeed a strategic capability, while non-nuclear deterrence is a much more complicated concept. It is now becoming readily apparent that non-nuclear weapon states can inflict significant costs on their adversaries, no matter how many nuclear weapons those adversaries have in their arsenals. Such trends are augmented by rapid scientific and technological change. The role of hypersonic weapons, drone warfare, artificial intelligence, machine learning, and outer space infrastructure is continuously growing, and all these emerging and disruptive technologies are intertwined—jointly contributing to the very complicated landscape of multilateral strategic deterrence. Last but not least, the renewed possibility of overt nuclear testing is becoming a big challenge. Major countries have hardly forgotten what their nuclear weapon explosions revealed, but there seems to be a growing number of arguments supporting nuclear tests for both political and technological reasons. A deep dive into this issue deserves a separate paper, but what is clear is that should one country test, others will follow—and ultimately, a domino effect would likely follow, leading to the destruction of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as it is, not to mention the grim prospects it would make for the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty to ever enter into force.   A path forward Still, there are options to address the current polycentric nuclear era of major military-political confrontations. One way is to find a way to engage in behavioral arms control—which basically means looking for mechanisms that limit activities, and not capabilities. Unilateral and coordinated declarations of one’s capabilities and doctrines might be helpful as well. Joint notification regimes are also a possibility, even if those will be limited initially. For example, the only area where the “Nuclear Five” of the nuclear weapons states recognized by the NPT have some symmetry is the sea-based leg of their nuclear deterrence forces. Codifying existing patrol practices regarding nuclear-tipped ballistic missile-armed submarines (known as Ship Submersible Ballistic Nuclear, or SSBN), and a regime of submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launch notifications could be a relatively easy first step that would significantly enhance mutual understanding and revitalize the practices of military-to-military data exchanges. Moreover, increasing the number of SSBNs deployed on deterrent patrols above the agreed “normal’ can become a visible and clear signaling method. However, to make such arrangements possible, arms control itself should be “re-branded,” so it will be perceived first and foremost as a tool in a state’s national security arsenal rather than anything intended for the good of all humankind. And the term “re-branding” would be absolutely correct to use, because a top-to-bottom overhaul of arms control would indeed contribute to the optimization of military development projects—based on better understanding of the efforts and logic of similar developments in both adversarial and partner countries alike. Russia, for what it is worth, had already made several proposals regarding somewhat informal arms control mechanisms over the last decade alone. To name a few such proposals, there was the suggestion for a post-INF moratorium on intermediate-range ground-launched missiles deployment; limitations on the scale and geographic locations of military exercises during the COVID-19 pandemic; and an extension of treaty limitations post-New START. Unfortunately, none of those eventually succeeded, although the post-INF moratorium did contribute to a somewhat slowed and scaled-down development and deployment of such systems by both Russia and by the United States. Moreover, as of Spring 2026 neither Russia nor the United States seem to be actively engaged in deploying nuclear warheads beyond the now-defunct New START limits.   Other scenarios But with the expiration of the last of the nuclear arms control treaties, a renewed nuclear arms race is a real possibility, and one that is already occurring in some domains. The exact parameters are hard to determine, because there is only secondary or even tertiary data on the capacities of defense industries and nuclear enterprises for countries like China and Russia, especially given the ongoing “special military operation” that the latter is undertaking in Ukraine. More information is available on the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, while far less can be found on India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea (also known as the DPRK). Such races are occurring even though they are not the most effective way to spend increasingly limited resources. Russian nuclear weapons and delivery systems have been continuously upgraded and modernized throughout the post-Cold War period, for many reasons. The reasons include the degradation of Russia’s conventional forces, US superiority in strategic non-nuclear weapons, concerns about US missile defense, and the general security environment on the Eurasian continent—not to mention the practical need to preserve nuclear weapons’ expertise and to keep Russia’s relevant nuclear infrastructure running throughout periods of economic turmoil. So, there seems to be some capacity for arms racing. The same is more or less true for China and, probably, France, although the reasons for keeping one’s nuclear weapons enterprise in good shape can be different. The nuclear arms race itself, which could be said to have been ongoing for at least a decade or even more, only now shows signs of switching from the qualitative to the quantitative. Previously, most nuclear weapon states focused on enhancing the capabilities of their nuclear weapons—and especially their delivery systems—through increased precision, reliability, and survivability. Now it is clear that, although there is a different amount of open-ness and transparency about it, all nuclear weapon states are getting ready to increase their overall nuclear weapon stockpiles. What makes it much more different and much more dangerous compared to the previous Cold War is that this new arms race is essentially multi-domain and multipolar, with much bigger roles played by many more actors—including newly emerging powers. One should not ignore the link between the growing emphasis on nuclear weapons as an ultimate tool to ensure national security and sovereignty by nuclear weapons states (and to some extent their allies) and the pressure on nuclear non-proliferation, with more countries considering getting a nuclear capability for the very same purpose. This link, if understood correctly, might also contribute to the limitation of “nuclear optimism” by the existing nuclear weapon states and force them to search for collective security solutions.   Limits of negative effects Presumably, there is an understanding in Moscow and other nuclear capitals that arms-racing each other “into oblivion” (as a former US official once said) is not straightforward, and that there are serious limitations and bottlenecks. This gives some level of optimism that the arms race can be contained, if not through formal mechanisms, but based on mutual understanding that you can’t change the political, industrial, and demographic landscape back to what it once was. The biggest danger, as viewed from Moscow, is that it is crucial to see a mix of strategic nuclear, strategic non-nuclear, non-strategic nuclear, and missile defense capabilities as a joint system augmented by nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities of allied states and integrated through “space superiority” and AI-enabled unified mission planning. This is perceived as a possibility to combine a disarming and decapitating strike with nuclear and non-nuclear weapons with air and missile defense capabilities preventing a weakened retaliation. The latest military conflicts demonstrate that such “bogeymen scenarios” cannot be ignored, as there is a clear push to bank on selected areas of military superiority by the United States and some of its allies. Clearly, such threats are well understood; consequently there is a constant development of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, as well as Heavy Bombers and SSBNs, not to mention so-called novel strategic delivery systems, such as Avangard HGV-tipped ICBMs, Burevestnik unlimited range nuclear-powered cruise missiles, and the Poseidon nuclear-powered uncrewed underwater vehicle. Rapidly developing kinetic and non-kinetic counterspace capabilities also contribute to such efforts. There has been a clear focus on survivability and overwhelming second-strike capabilities, so that even a limited number of delivery vehicles intended for the targets on the adversary’s territory will reach their destination. However, actions by the United States and its allies do contribute to the ever-growing decapitation and disarming strike concerns. Ensuring the balance based solely on one’s military power without arms control framework is an extremely complicated task.   How to survive Finally, there are many reasons to have questions and make accusations against each other because of bad decisions made over the years, including but not limited to the destruction of the ABM Treaty by Washington, as the most dramatic example—it drove both Moscow and Beijing to pursue symmetrical and asymmetrical measures to hedge against possible future technological breakthroughs. The so-called rogue states that have been cited as a primary reason to develop the US missile defenses and forward deploy its assets also continuously enhanced their capabilities. The characterization of Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea by some politicians as an “axis of evil” (or “evil tetragon” in Russian) did not help to stabilize things either. But the problem is that things can get much worse, with countries facing less stable strategic balances and more escalatory force postures. And they surely will evolve in that way, unless joint efforts to find solutions are undertaken. Ultimately, there can and should be some new legally binding new arms-control regimes, including strict limitations on nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles, although it is possible that a “warhead” would be a virtual accounting unit akin to the New START rules, where one Heavy Bomber accounted for one Nuclear Warhead only. This demands a significant volume of political will, especially given the fact that it is impossible to cover all existing concerns within a single document. Before we reach this stage, some informal mechanisms to enhance arms control and risk reduction can be put in place. The path forward will be hard and will need mutual concessions. However, the alternative is significantly more costly and dangerous on an existential level. The more nuclear weapons (and nuclear weapons states) that exist, the greater the possibility that nuclear weapons use becomes. This is the ultimate threat to the human civilization, and efforts to limit this threat demand leadership from the great powers today, not tomorrow.  ============= Dmitry Stefanovich is a research fellow at the Center for International Security at the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO RAS), a member of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy and PIR Center Advisory Board, and an expert at the Russian International Affairs Council and the Valdai Discussion Club. Stefanovich graduated from the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute with a degree in International Science and Technology Cooperation.