Antigamente a gente usava "true believers", os verdadeiros crentes, no caso daquelas pessoas verdadeiramente, piedosamente, sinceramente religiosas, entre as quais a gente também poderia incluir os leninistas de Outubro, os maoístas da Revolução Cultural, os stalinistas fieis ao maior gênio da humanidade, sem excluir os esquerdistas em geral (menos os trotsquistas, que eram monoteístas), mas agora começo a acreditar que os cientistas do Bulletin of Atomic Scientists também são true believers. Eles acreditam que dá para sair algum resultado da Conferência de Revisão do Tratado de Não Proliferação Nuclear. Não pretendo colocá-los no mesmo pé que os true believers descritos acima, mas eles ainda chegam lá...
How to salvage the NPT Review Conference
How can the NPT Review Conference be salvaged? A divided review conference is a likely outcome in New York, write Adam Scheinman and Mark Goodman. But there may be a narrow path to consensus if parties come ready to make difficult compromises on non-proliferation. Read more.
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How to salvage the NPT Review Conference
By Adam Scheinman, Mark Goodman | Analysis | April 27, 2026
The 11th NPT Review Conference will be held from April 27 to May 22, 2026, at the UN Headquarters in New York (Credit: Image Patrick Gruban, via Wikimedia Commons)
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The prospects for the 11th Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference that gets underway this week are bleak, even though the treaty arguably has done more than any other to prevent the catastrophe of nuclear war.
Pressure on the NPT review process is not a new problem. The prior review took place six months after Russia invaded Ukraine, and the treaty survived the swings of Cold War rivalry. But the present moment is more dangerous. Strategic competition among the United States, Russia, and China, ongoing conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, reversals on arms control, Iran’s uncertain nuclear future, and President Donald Trump’s abandonment of the rules-based international order together create a perfect storm that could spill over beyond the confines of multilateral diplomacy and undermine confidence in the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
NPT reviews, which occur every five years, have always been contentious events that bring more attention to what separates the parties than to what unites them. Support for the treaty’s core objectives—preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, reducing nuclear arms, and promoting civil nuclear cooperation—remains firm. But the parties divide sharply on priorities among these pillars. As a result, review conferences fail more often than they succeed in producing a final consensus document.
There are many ways the conference could end without agreement. Certain parties may prefer to have no agreed outcome document rather than one that lacks ambition or crosses national redlines. Regrettably, the United States, traditionally a diplomatic force in NPT politics, is likely to find itself isolated and unable to help shape a consensus outcome and might opt to stake out positions that have no chance of gaining general support.
Although a divided review conference is a likely outcome, there may be a narrow path to consensus if parties come ready to make difficult compromises. That will require assistance in the form of a small group of treaty supporters capable of working behind the scenes to prepare the ground for compromise. This group would play a brokering role, helping to navigate contentious political issues that the review conference will not resolve and to produce a short outcome document, which should be modeled on the “Principles and Objectives” decision adopted in connection with the treaty’s indefinite extension in 1995.
Building bridges. Several issues are most likely to complicate the negotiations. But there are ways to bridge them in a final document at the conference:
Nuclear disarmament and arms control. With the expiration of the US-Russian New START treaty earlier this year, the 2026 NPT review will be the first conference to open with no nuclear arms control agreement in place. Prospects for future agreements or entry into force of pending ones are dim, considering that China is rapidly building up its nuclear weapons forces for purposes Beijing will not explain, nuclear testing moratoria are at risk, and rising international tension makes completion of new nuclear arms control agreements unlikely in the next year. In 2015, the five NPT nuclear powers agreed that the era of nuclear arms racing was over and should never resume, but all five are now modernizing or considering increases to their nuclear stockpiles.
It seems doubtful that any of the five nuclear powers will arrive at the review conference with new proposals for nuclear arms control. Russia has linked arms control talks to its war in Ukraine, and the United States and China have continued to spar over whether and when China and other nuclear powers should participate. Rather than try to untangle these positions, the United States and Russia could issue separate, parallel national statements indicating each will hold to New START quantitative caps and resume routine transparency notifications for 12 months. China could signal openness to strategic dialogue and mutual restraint among nuclear-weapon states. Recording these statements in the final document could generate useful pressure to advance future nuclear talks.
A second topic concerns nuclear weapons testing. The NPT’s nuclear powers have routinely reaffirmed a commitment to uphold their moratoria on nuclear testing, pending entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. But such voluntary commitments are at risk of being reversed. The United States has accused Russia and China of violating those moratoria, and the US and Russian presidents have called for preparations to resume nuclear testing. As a measure of assurance, the United States, China, and Russia could commit to discussions on increasing the transparency of activities at their respective nuclear test sites.
If there is an appetite for compromise, it should be possible to finesse differences in national positions over nuclear abolition or a general prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons. This could be best achieved by including a factual statement of the status and organizational developments for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons without attempting to resolve differences on the merits of the treaty.
Given that Russia’s nuclear rhetoric during its invasion of Ukraine was accompanied by potential conflict over Taiwan or the Korean Peninsula, another potential area of convergence is reducing the risk of nuclear war. Just four years ago, the nuclear-weapon states agreed that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” China is likely to press for a common no-first-use policy as the path forward on risk reduction, but this will not pass muster with those who regard endorsement of no-first-use as an invitation to, rather than a deterrent of, military aggression by Russia or China. Indeed, China’s commitment to no first use is hard to square with its rapid build-up of nuclear forces. Rather than attempt to conform nuclear deterrence policies, NPT parties could draw on language from the 2022 review conference to revive calls on the five powers to resume dialogue with a view to adopting specific measures to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons use and to affirm support for a treaty to end production of fissile material.
Extended deterrence. US nuclear alliance relationships in NATO and the Pacific were accepted as lawful under the NPT for decades. During the NPT negotiations, US and Soviet diplomats presented identical drafts of Articles I and II, reflecting the understanding that the NPT allows NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements but prohibits transfers of control over nuclear weapons. Russia tacitly accepted these arrangements until 2014, when it was criticized for seizing Crimea and parts of Donbas. Since 2022, China has amplified criticism of extended nuclear deterrence to guard against the adoption of NATO-like arrangements with US allies in the Pacific. Many developing countries have since piled on, questioning the legitimacy of nuclear umbrellas at the very moment that states in Europe and Asia have become more reliant on them.
We recommend cooling off: Opponents of extended nuclear deterrence could tamp down on criticism or misleading renderings of the history of treaty negotiations, while beneficiaries of extended deterrence could refrain from over-emphasizing the nuclear element of alliance security guarantees. Rather, a final document could endorse the general principle that, in keeping with NPT purposes, military strategies of all parties should aim to limit the role and salience of nuclear weapons. The document could also express the shared understanding that the treaty precludes any loophole allowing for nuclear proliferation through military alliances.
The Iran conundrum. No matter how the conflict with Iran unfolds during the conference, Tehran can be expected to seek recognition of its claimed right to uranium enrichment, which the United States and others do not accept. Iran will also likely seek to adopt language condemning Israeli and US military attacks on its nuclear infrastructure and leadership. As in 2022, following Russia’s forcible seizure of Ukraine’s nuclear power plant at Zaporizhzhia, there may be support to address the generic issue of the adequacy of legal and policy responses to attacks on civilian nuclear facilities.
The current conflict raises larger questions that the review conference should not try to resolve. Some states may draw the lesson that they must get nuclear weapons before being attacked by a stronger state. Or they can draw perhaps the opposite lesson: that seeking nuclear weapons is not worth the price of military reprisal or the risk that regional neighbors will respond with proliferation of their own. Either way, parties should expect difficult conversations on this issue, as well as on the 1995 NPT Middle East resolution that has spoiled more than one NPT review conference. At best, parties could agree to endorse generic language recalling this Middle East resolution and its continuing importance, provided Israel is not gratuitously singled out for criticism while Iran is given a free pass.
Addressing withdrawal and universality. North Korea’s announced withdrawal from the NPT in 2003 and Iranian threats to do the same raise the question of how to respond if states withdraw or threaten withdrawal in the future. The 2026 review conference would do well to endorse the standard from the 2022 review, which noted that a withdrawing state remains responsible for any prior NPT violations and for safeguards obligations that stem from its agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation. Withdrawal would also detract from the longstanding goal of bringing all states into the NPT, recognizing that universality will not be achieved soon and would require a transformation of security relationships in the relevant regions.
A bright spot. The peaceful uses of nuclear energy, science, and technology have spread to all corners of the globe and many sectors of the economy. This has been in part thanks to the NPT, which has helped to facilitate “the fullest possible exchange” of nuclear technology, particularly for developing countries. These peaceful applications, not just for energy but also for medicine, agriculture, and many other areas, are a genuine success story with significant growth potential.
Rather than get bogged down in ideological debates over the NPT right to peaceful uses, parties could instead focus on the positives by endorsing concrete steps to expand access to nuclear technology to meet the countries’ energy and other development needs.
On prior commitments. An enduring problem in the NPT review concerns the status of actions called for in prior consensus outcome documents, particularly those related to nuclear disarmament. The steady progress on arms limitations and nonproliferation controls that followed the Cold War has given way to fears of a renewed arms race and proliferation cascades. Many parties regard these recommendations as hard-fought commitments that remain valid today. But the world has changed so dramatically that many of the undertakings from a more hopeful period may no longer be relevant.
One option would be to reframe prior commitments in ways that address today’s problems. Calls for dialogue on nuclear test sites and risk reduction measures are examples of that approach. These relate to specific commitments from prior review conferences but would allow parties to focus on actions needed now. At the end of the day, any blanket reference to past commitments would need to be crafted to recognize that, while some remain relevant and achievable, others do not.
Strengthening the review process. One potential positive outcome would be a decision that helps future review conferences be more constructive. Formal debates tend to make consensus harder by focusing on points of disagreement and taking areas of broad agreement for granted. Dysfunctional practices accumulated over multiple review cycles are hard to change. The 2022 review conference established a working group to make recommendations on improving the review process itself. This working group met for one week in 2023 and came very close to a consensus. Unfortunately, Russia and Iran blocked efforts to give the group more time to finish its work. A follow-up effort at the 2025 preparatory committee meeting also narrowly failed to secure consensus when China withdrew its support.
In addition to modest proposals to improve coordination and reduce redundancy, the most promising idea is to allocate time during the review cycle for states to present and engage in interactive discussion of national reports. Many states backed this as a measure to improve transparency and accountability, enhance the quality of dialogue in NPT reviews, and help clarify why states make the nuclear policy choices they do. Many NPT parties submit reports on actions they have taken to strengthen the NPT, but these reports have never been a formal part of the review process.
A well-designed process for engagement on national reports should encourage practical and fact-based discussions. It should include all five nuclear-weapon states and a representative group of other leading states, recognizing that reporting and participation remain voluntary. The conference could decide to incorporate interactive discussion of national reports in the next review cycle, even if it is unable to adopt a substantive final document.
Have a ‘Plan B’. The international community is deeply fractured. A divisive outcome at this review conference could add to strains on the international nuclear order and to anxieties over its future. Despite anticipated affirmations of the importance of and commitments to the NPT, a consensus outcome will be hard to come by.
Agreement on a detailed list of recommendations like those adopted in 2000 and 2010 is particularly unlikely. A shorter statement of higher-level principles and objectives, akin to those adopted in 1995, is more realistic and more appropriate for this moment. A separate decision on reforming the review process could be adopted on its own or, ideally, the two could be adopted together. This outcome would help to shore up the rules-based nuclear order. Participants should begin working on such a ‘Plan B’ outcome now and not wait until the final days of the review conference, when time will be too short to assemble a workable compromise.
