segunda-feira, 24 de abril de 2023

At U.S. behest, Ukraine held off anniversary attacks on Russia - Shane Harris and Isabelle Khurshudyan (The Washington Post)

THE DISCORD LEAKS

At U.S. behest, Ukraine held off anniversary attacks 

on Russia

Kyiv’s head of military intelligence, Kyrylo Budanov, planned bold strikes deep behind enemy lines that unnerved officials in Washington

In February, with the first anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine days away, officials in Kyiv were busy making plans to attack Moscow.

Maj. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov, the head of the country’s military intelligence directorate, the HUR, instructed one of his officers “to get ready for mass strikes on 24 February … with everything the HUR had,” according to a classified report from the U.S. National Security Agency. Officials even mused about a sea-based strike using TNT in the Black Sea port city of Novorossiysk, a largely symbolic operation that would nevertheless demonstrate Ukraine’s ability to hit deep inside enemy territory.

Back in Washington, officials were secretly monitoring the Ukrainians’ plans. The White House had long worried that attacks inside Russia could provoke an aggressive response from the Kremlin.


On Feb. 22, two days before the anniversary, the CIA circulated a new classified report: The HUR “had agreed, at Washington’s request, to postpone strikes” on Moscow. The documents, part of a trove of classified information allegedly leaked on a gaming server by a 21-year-old member of the National Guard, don’t explain precisely who interceded and why the Ukrainians agreed to stand down.

But they offer a specific example of a broader tension that has characterized much of the war: Ukraine, eager to bring the fight to Russia’s home turf, is sometimes restrained by the United States, which has consistently tried to avoid escalating the conflict into a direct fight between U.S. and Russian forces. Some U.S. officials see attacks on Russia, particularly if they involve U.S.-supplied weapons, as highly risky operations that Russian President Vladimir Putin could find so threatening that he resorts to using tactical nuclear weapons.

And yet mysterious explosions and drone strikes continue to happen in Russia. Ukrainian officials are often coy about the incidents, hinting that they’re responsible without directly taking credit.


“The Earth is round — discovery made by Galileo,” presidential adviser Mykhailo Podolyak wrote on Twitter in December after an attack on the Engels-2 air force base, deep inside Russia. “If something is launched into other countries’ airspace, sooner or later unknown flying objects will return to departure point.”

Operations on foreign soil fall under the HUR’s purview. Budanov, an ambitious 37-year-old general and rising star in the Ukrainian military, doesn’t acknowledge that his agency is behind the attacks. But he has warned they will continue.

“This shattered their illusions of safety,” Budanov told The Washington Post in January. “There are people who plant explosives. There are drones. Until the territorial integrity of Ukraine is restored, there will be problems inside Russia.”


Budanov did not comment for this article. U.S. officials did not comment on the leaked documents about anniversary strikes.


Privately, U.S. and European officials express their admiration for Budanov. But they also say his audacity sometimes makes them nervous.

On Feb. 13, the day that the NSA document said Budanov had instructed one of his officers to be ready for an operation presumably aimed at Novorossiysk, the United States repeated its public advisory for citizens in Russia to leave the country immediately. It’s not clear that the warning anticipated an aggressive Ukrainian strike, but it appears to reflect a level of concern in Washington about attacks around the anniversary.

Budanov is known for bold claims and pronouncements, which many Western officials regard skeptically. He has said that Putin is terminally ill, an assertion that U.S. intelligence officials have rejected, and that he uses multiple body doubles. Budanov exudes confidence that Ukraine will prevail over Russia — and soon. He has said that Crimea, the highly fortified peninsula Russia illegally annexed in 2014, must be returned to Kyiv this summer. The leaked documents show the U.S. intelligence community views that scenario as unlikely.

The documents also make clear that the U.S. intelligence community is monitoring Budanov’s communications, which seems not to be news to the general. In past interviews with The Post, Budanov, perhaps aware that he was being spied on, has played music or static noise in his office at HUR headquarters. 

Washington’s intercession ahead of the war’s anniversary appears to have been only partially successful. “There is no indication” that Ukraine’s security service, the SBU, “agreed to postpone its own plans to attack Moscow around the same date,” the CIA report said. The SBU, which is responsible for state security and reports directly to the president, also conducts special operations.

Ukraine appears not to have held its fire for long. A week after the anniversary, Moscow publicly accused Kyiv of attempting drone strikes on infrastructure in Russia, including near the capital.


Ukraine continues to have ambitions to expand the battlefield beyond its home territory, the classified documents show. Budanov’s agency made plans to attack members of the notorious Russian military contractor Wagner Group in Mali, where personnel provide security assistance to the Malian government and training for its military, the documents state. Wagner has played a pivotal role in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and provides essential front-line support to Russian military forces.

“It is unknown what stage the operations [in Mali] were currently in and whether the HUR has received approval to execute its plans,” the NSA document says.

The HUR also developed plans to conduct covert attacks on Russian forces in Syria using secret Kurdish help. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky halted the offensive, but one of the intelligence documents details how Budanov’s agency could still launch deniable attacks that would avoid implicating the Ukrainian government itself.


Officials in Washington and Europe have admonished Ukraine for attacks outside its territory that they felt went too far. After a car bomb near Moscow in August killed Daria Dugina, in an attack that appeared intended for her father — a Russian nationalist whose writing had helped to shape a Kremlin narrative about Ukraine — Western officials said they made clear to Zelensky that they held operatives in his government responsible. The attack was seen as provocative and risked a severe Russian response, officials said.

U.S. officials are also concerned that Beijing is likely to view attacks by Ukraine inside Russia as “an opportunity to cast NATO as the aggressor,” and that China could increase its support to Russia if it felt the attacks were “significant,” according to other classified documents contained in the trove.

So far, officials have said there is no indication that China has granted Russia’s request for lethal military aid. However, a Ukrainian attack on Moscow using weapons provided by the United States or NATO would probably indicate to Beijing that “Washington was directly responsible for escalating the conflict” and provide possible justification for China to arm Russia, the analysis concludes.


The United States prohibits Ukraine from using American weaponry to strike Russia. One Ukrainian official, who, like others, spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive matters, pointed to an attack in December on a Russian strategic bomber base using Ukrainian-made drones as evidence that Kyiv was adhering to the rules Washington has imposed.

Ukrainian officials have long privately said that the United States has de facto control over some military operations. For example, Kyiv typically won’t fire its advanced U.S.-provided rocket systems without coordinates confirmed or provided by U.S. military personnel from a base in Europe, to ensure the strikes’ accuracy and conserve artillery.

A senior Ukrainian official said that Kyiv’s willingness not to fire on certain targets and to coordinate with the Americans should encourage the United States to provide more modern and longer-range weapons, such as the Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS, a munition that can travel up to 185 miles. Biden administration officials have declined to provide the weapon, which is in limited supply and might be seen by Russia as an escalation by the United States, officials have said.


The strikes in Russia have been a morale booster for Ukrainian citizens, who have taken to calling the billowing smoke from the mysterious explosions “bavovna,” or “cotton.” Stores sell T-shirts with cotton flowers blooming on the Kremlin’s walls, and cotton bouquets are popular gifts.

The attacks may be getting to Putin, too. Citing security concerns, he recently opted to cancel some regional Victory Day parades celebrating the upcoming anniversary of the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany. May 9 is considered one of Russia’s most important holidays and an opportunity for the Kremlin to flex its military muscle with a display of tanks and other weaponry in central Moscow.


Khurshudyan reported from Kyiv.


China Embarrasses Macron on Europe - Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine (Editorial WSJ)

 Macron já tinha sido humilhado por Putin, ao tentar desesperadamente reter a invasão russa, anunciada diversas vezes por Biden. Agora está tentando convencer a China a parar com a guerra de agressão. Não conseguirá!

Mas, o embaixador chinês em Paris é um trapalhão: ignora os acordos feitos ao abrigo da Conferencia sobre Segurança e Cooperação na Europa (CSCE), com sede em Viena, e que cobriram inclusive as ex-repúblicas federadas da Ásia central. Ignora que os Estados bálticos foram perfeitamente independentes entre 1919 e 1940. Ignora a História e o Direito Internacional. Deveria ser chamado de volta a Beijing!

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 


China Embarrasses Macron on Europe

Beijing’s ambassador reveals China’s real views on sovereignty.

WSJ Opinio

By The Editorial Board

April 23, 2023 4:42 pm ET

Emmanuel Macron has been trying to triangulate between the U.S. and China, and it isn’t going well. China’s ambassador to Paris has now embarrassed the French President by declaring that the former nations of the Soviet Union aren’t really sovereign under international law.

China’s Ambassador Lu Shaye was asked on Friday on French TV whether he considered Crimea to be part of Ukraine under international law. In 2014 Russia occupied and annexed Crimea, which had been part of Ukraine since the dissolution of the Soviet empire.

Mr. Lu didn’t stop at Crimea. “Even these ex-Soviet Union countries do not have effective status, as we say, under international law because there’s no international accord to concretize their status as a sovereign country,” Mr. Lu said. The “as we say” is a nice diplomatic touch since the only international law that Beijing recognizes is what serves its increasingly imperial interests.

The diplomat is saying that the many countries that declared their independence when the Soviet Union dissolved aren’t independent at all. That would include Ukraine, but also the three Baltic states, Moldova, and the countries of central Asia like Georgia and Kazakhstan. The clear implication is that Russia is justified in its attempt to conquer Ukraine, and perhaps the other countries too.

The Baltic states are furious and said they’d summon the Chinese ambassadors to their countries on Monday. The French Foreign Ministry responded with what it called “consternation” at Mr. Lu’s remarks and said Beijing should “say if these comments reflect its position, which we hope not to be the case.”

What did the French expect? Mr. Macron kowtowed to China’s Xi Jinping on his recent trip to Beijing, saying that Europe shouldn’t take a side over Taiwan. He also beseeched Mr. Xi to use his influence to mediate a settlement to the Russia-Ukraine war. China spotted weakness, as it always does, and has now spat on the French President’s entreaties. Any diplomatic clarification will be a ruse.

China wants the right to snatch any territory it wants to take, including Taiwan, disputed islands off Japan and in the Western Pacific, and border lands with India and others. Maybe Mr. Macron will figure out he’s being played.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-embarrasses-macron-on-europe-sovereignty-soviet-union-baltics-ambassador-lu-de45b8ed


Lula perdido no vasto mundo - Rolf Kuntz (OESP)

ESPAÇO ABERTO

Lula perdido no vasto mundo

Rolf Kuntz

O Estado de S. Paulo, 23/04/2023

Com muito falatório e pouco governo, Lula se afunda em bobagens, iguala agressor e agredido e assusta os parceiros ocidentais 

O mundo, mundo, vasto mundo de Carlos Drummond de Andrade é certamente maior que o universo petista, insuficiente até para eleger o candidato Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva em 2022. Aparentemente esquecido da ampla diversidade política de seus eleitores, o presidente Lula insiste em agir como se o Brasil e o sistema internacional fossem extensões de Vila Euclides, berço sindical de sua carreira pública. Rebaixado à condição de pária pelo presidente Jair Bolsonaro, o País começou, com a mudança de governo, a retomar sua posição no sistema regional e na ordem global. Esse retorno seria mais fácil e mais seguro se o principal porta-voz brasileiro parasse de falar bobagens, levasse em conta o Direito Internacional, deixasse de afrontar sem razão Estados Unidos e Europa e considerasse mais seriamente os interesses nacionais.

O presidente brasileiro poderia, talvez, pensar no exemplo de seus gentis anfitriões na China, maior parceira comercial do Brasil. Sem descuidar de seus interesses, os chineses continuaram, nos últimos três anos, tomando espaço dos exportadores brasileiros nos maiores mercados sul-americanos. Em 2022, ocuparam o primeiro lugar nas vendas à Argentina.

O presidente Lula conseguiu impedir, por enquanto, acordos comerciais entre a China e outros países do Mercosul. Mas só impedirá a desorganização do bloco se coordenar uma negociação conjunta com os chineses. Isso dependerá muito mais de ação diplomática e de bons argumentos práticos do que de retórica. Paraguaios e uruguaios têm respeitáveis motivos, há muito tempo, para abandonar a fidelidade a um bloco estagnado e distante dos objetivos originais de cooperação produtiva e de inserção global.

Mas o presidente Lula tem mostrado mais inclinação para a retórica, para as picuinhas e para o falatório de palanque do que para a administração e para as políticas mais ambiciosas. Demorou cerca de três meses e meio para apresentar suas metas fiscais e formalizar o compromisso, ainda discutível, com o equilíbrio das contas públicas. Esse objetivo dependerá, como já indicaram analistas, de maior arrecadação, embora o ministro da Fazenda negue a intenção de impor maior peso aos contribuintes. Além disso, nenhum plano ou roteiro de governo foi apresentado até agora. Mas o presidente encontrou tempo para tolices administrativas, como a transferência da Companhia Nacional de Abastecimento (Conab), importante instrumento da política agrícola, para o insignificante Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrário – uma decisão tecnicamente injustificada e obviamente ideológica.

Na política externa, as manifestações mais ostensivas têm sido grotescas ou desastrosas. A viagem à China foi encerrada com uma declaração infantil sobre a predominância do dólar em negócios internacionais. Sem se envolver no episódio ridículo, o presidente Xi Jinping até pode ter gostado da canelada nos Estados Unidos, mas certamente conservará o enorme volume de reservas cambiais em moeda americana, cerca de US$ 3,1 trilhões.

Se a segunda maior economia do mundo conserva esse dinheiro, deve haver uma razão ponderável, assim como deve haver uma boa razão para o uso do euro no dia a dia da União Europeia. Ninguém está proibido de negociar com outras moedas, especialmente em blocos econômicos, mas quem quer acumular reservas em reais, liras turcas ou pesos argentinos? Lula terá, em algum momento, considerado essas questões?

Nem todas as falas de Lula têm sido, no entanto, inconsequentes e engraçadas. Ao tratar como equivalentes um Estado agressor, a Rússia, e um Estado agredido, a Ucrânia, o presidente brasileiro atropelou uma das noções mais importantes do Direito Internacional, enunciada no artigo 51 da Carta das Nações Unidas e amadurecida em séculos de negociações e de elaborações teóricas.

Pelas normas internacionais, a violência só é admissível como resposta a um ataque. Também é inaceitável a chamada agressão preventiva – quando se fala, por exemplo, no perigo potencial gerado pela expansão da Otan ou quando se denuncia, com ou sem razão, a existência de armas de destruição em massa num país qualquer. O ataque à Ucrânia é tão contrário à regra internacional quanto foi a invasão do Iraque no começo deste século.

Pode-se até desculpar, em Lula, a ignorância da lei internacional, mas, neste caso, ele ignorou também uma norma simples do Código Penal e, é claro, uma regra básica da ética e da civilidade. Ao cometer esse erro, alinhou o Brasil à política criminosa de um autocrata. Diante da reação internacional, e certamente aconselhado por auxiliares mais informados e mais sensatos, o presidente mudou suas palavras e condenou, na terça-feira, a violação territorial da Ucrânia. Mas a tentativa de correção soou fraca e foi insuficiente para anular o enorme equívoco das declarações anteriores. Com tantos desastres, Lula talvez entenda, finalmente, a conveniência de falar menos, de consultar mais os assessores mais prudentes e de – afinal – dar mais atenção ao trabalho e começar, de fato, a governar o País.


domingo, 23 de abril de 2023

Tunisia, a primeira nação árabe a iniciar a primavera democrática é a última a recair na ditadura, depois de todas as outras - David D. Kirkpatrick (The New Yorker)

 Triste evolução da democrácia islâmica, estrangulada pelas suas contradições internas.

Tunisia Arrests Its Most Prominent Opposition Leader

Rached Ghannouchi has been a voice for democracy in his nation and across the Muslim world.

Tunisia, the birthplace of the Arab Spring, was the last place where it failed. After a decade of freedom and democracy, in 2021 a new strongman, President Kais Saied, shut down the parliament and, soon after, began imposing an authoritarian constitution and arresting his critics. This week, the police finally came for Rached Ghannouchi, the leader of Tunisia’s largest political party and the Arab world’s most influential thinker about the potential synthesis of liberal democracy and Islamic governance.

Born in 1941 to impoverished peasant farmers in remote southern Tunisia, Ghannouchi studied in Cairo, Damascus, and Paris; worked menial jobs in Europe; and returned to Tunis, in 1971. Muslim Brotherhood-style Islamist politics was on the rise across the region, as an alternative to the autocracies in power, and, in 1981, Ghannouchi co-founded a Tunisian Islamist movement. He was jailed and tortured for three years, and in 1987 he was arrested again, sentenced to death, and exiled to London. (Other Arab states would not take him.)

Ghannouchi’s examination of Britain’s liberal democracy through an Islamic lens set him apart from a generation of Arab intellectuals. Islamic scholars had long ago concluded that in the true “Abode of Islam” a Muslim must feel secure in his liberty, property, religion, and dignity, Ghannouchi wrote in his landmark treatise, “Public Freedoms in the Islamic State,” which he began writing in prison and published, in Arabic, in 1993. So why had he found that security only in the West? A true Islamic state, he concluded, must be founded on “freedom of conscience” for Muslim and non-Muslim alike. Quoting a revered twelfth-century scholar, Ghannouchi urged Islamists to learn from Western democracy—to benefit “from the best of human experiments regardless of their religious origins, since wisdom is Shari’a’s twin.”

He returned to Tunisia, in 2011, when a spontaneous wave of protests against police brutality drove its longtime ruler into exile and set the Arab Spring revolts in motion. Ghannouchi helped make the country’s political transition the most liberal in the region, and he did his best to salvage the prospects for democracy elsewhere. In the late spring of 2013—a decade ago—he flew to Egypt to offer advice to its first democratically elected President, Mohamed Morsi, of the Muslim Brotherhood. The hopefulness of those months is now difficult to remember. Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya had all held credible elections and had started drafting new charters. Western experts cited Yemen as a model for the peaceful handover of power. Even in Syria most rebels still marched under the banner of democracy, rather than of extremist Islam; the uprising had not yet devolved into a sectarian civil war. But a sandstorm was blowing toward Tahrir Square, where two and a half years earlier an eighteen-day sit-in, inspired by Tunisia, had toppled President Hosni Mubarak and opened the way for Morsi. Now Morsi’s opponents were calling for protests to demand his resignation, and the head of the armed forces was sending mixed signals about his allegiance.

Ghannouchi had spent more than two decades thinking and writing about the same promises that Egypt’s Muslim Brothers had campaigned on—combining Islamic governance with democratic elections and individual freedoms. During his trip to Cairo, he told me a few months later, at his party’s headquarters in Tunis, he had tried to convince Morsi that, in order to achieve those goals, he should voluntarily forfeit some power. (Morsi advisers later confirmed the broad outlines of Ghannouchi’s account, which he told me on the condition that I keep it private at the time.) After revolutions like those in Egypt and Tunisia, a majority party should understand the anxious vulnerability of political or religious minorities, such as Egypt’s secular-minded liberals and Coptic Christians. They had been afforded at least some protections under the old authoritarian order, and those were now gone, with little reason yet to trust promises about the rule of law, checks and balances, and individual rights. Precisely because of the Brotherhood’s electoral success—Morsi had already won ratification of the new constitution—in the interest of democracy and to reassure the Party’s weaker rivals, it should bring in a unity government ahead of another election. Why remain the lightning rod for his opponents’ fears or resentments? “The democracy of consensus succeeds—not the democracy of the majority,” Ghannouchi told me.

Morsi rejected that advice, convinced that yielding power under threat of protests would be a capitulation to political extortion and set a dangerous precedent.. Had Morsi followed Ghannouchi’s advice, perhaps he could have defused the protests that filled the streets on June 30th, demanding his ouster, or at least won over more Egyptian liberals. We’ll never know: on July 3, 2013, General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi—now President Sisi, possibly for life—ousted Morsi from power, ending Egypt’s thirty-month experiment with democracy and freedom.

More than a thousand Egyptian Islamists were killed in the streets for opposing the coup. Tens of thousands more were jailed. Those who were underground or in exile demanded retribution against the ostensibly liberal factions who initially supported Sisi’s takeover. But Ghannouchi still urged reconciliation. “The Egyptian ship needs to include all Egyptians and not throw some of them into the water,” he told me. “There should be no collective punishment. The cure for a failed democracy is more democracy.”

In the months after the Egyptian coup, one Arab Spring revolt after another foundered in despair and extremism—a reversal of 2011, when the Tahrir Square sit-in stirred democracy movements in capitals across the region. Tunisia was the exception to the dark turn after the coup, in part because Ghannouchi followed his own advice there the following year. The Islamist party that he co-founded and led, Ennahdha, meaning “the renaissance,” had won the dominant role in a transitional parliament. By late 2013, the assassinations of a pair of left-leaning, secular politicians had brought the political process and constitution-drafting to a halt; opponents suspected Islamist extremists of carrying out the killings, and blamed Ennahdha for failing to prevent them. Ghannouchi, who held no elected office at the time, defied many in his party to reach a power-sharing agreement with the main leader of the secular opposition. Ennahdha voluntarily handed power to a caretaker government to oversee new elections. Ghannouchi’s concession broke the logjam. Tunisia’s revolution celebrated a fourth anniversary—it was the only Arab Spring uprising that appeared to succeed—and the civil-society organizations that helped sponsor the talks between Ghannouchi and the opposition received a Nobel Peace Prize. “We are not angels. We would like to have power,” Ghannouchi said on a visit to Washington. “But we fervently believe that a democratic constitution is more important.”

His leadership made Ennahdha a unique example of what some called liberal Islamism. In fact, Ghannouchi helped persuade Ennahdha leaders to jettison the label “Islamist” and to begin describing themselves as Muslim democrats. (He published an essay in Foreign Affairs explaining the change.) His party, which led the drafting of the constitution, pushed through a charter with explicit protections for the rights of women and of religious minorities. When we spoke in 2014, he also noted that Tunisia’s was one of the few Arab constitutions that made no reference to Islamic law. He assured me that Tunisia guaranteed freedoms for mosques, churches, synagogues—and even “pubs.” He stopped short of endorsing same-sex marriage but described sexuality as a strictly personal matter—a more liberal stance than that taken by almost any Arab government.

Tunisia’s tourism-heavy economy, however, never fully recovered from the images of turmoil in the aftermath of the Arab Spring uprising, and the pandemic shut down its resorts. Years of relative inaction by Tunisia’s caretaker government and its successors fuelled a backlash against the whole political class, and especially against Ennahdha. During the next elections, in 2019, Ghannouchi also made the questionable decision to seek a seat in parliament and was then chosen as its speaker. He had become a politician. Emad Shahin, a scholar of political Islam in exile from Egypt, who is now a visiting professor at Harvard, said, “That parliament was a circus—not a place for a leader of his intellectual calibre to preside over, and he was consumed by petty politics.”

In the 2019 elections, voters rejected every Presidential candidate who had held public office. Two populists—a prominent media mogul and an obscure law professor, who together received only a third of the vote—went to a runoff. The professor, Saied, won in a landslide. In many ways, Saied is an inverse of Ghannouchi. He has eschewed any known political philosophy or faction. He routinely rails against the West, directing particular vitriol toward the International Monetary Fund, whose support Tunisia now desperately needs. His constitution promises the state “will work to achieve the objectives of pure Islam” and gives the government control over Islamic interpretation and teaching. He has called gay people “deviants” and supported the criminalization of homosexuality. This year, in his own adaptation of “replacement theory,” he set off a wave of anti-Black violence by scapegoating dark-skinned African migrants for Tunisia’s economic travails.

Saied initially cited the crisis of the pandemic as a pretext to dissolve the parliament and to rule by decree. It was not long before he began detaining a long list of critics and opponents, culminating this week with Ghannouchi. His alleged crime involves a statement that he made last weekend: “Tunisia without Ennahdha, without political Islam, without the left or any of its components is a project for civil war.” Shortly before dusk and the breaking of the fast on Monday, the holiest night of Ramadan, more than a hundred plainclothes police officers raided his home, his party said in a statement. After two days in custody, Ghannouchi, now eighty-one, was interrogated for eight hours. On Thursday, a judge sentenced him to an extended pretrial detention. Initially accused of incitement, he now faces charges of conspiring against the security of the state—a crime that can carry the death penalty.

The blow to Tunisian democracy is clear. But the imprisonment of a leader as singular as Ghannouchi is also a setback to the wider world. For Islamists who espouse violence, his imprisonment is a vindication—new evidence of the futility of the ballot box. And the silencing of his voice is a loss to the West, too.

“Marrying Islam and liberalism and democratic governance,” Robert Kagan, a historian of U.S. foreign policy, told me, “is the solution to our problems in the Arab world, and it is the solution to their problem with us.” That was also the hope that Ghannouchi tried to salvage in Egypt ten years ago.

Ghannouchi, in a prerecorded video released on Thursday, urged patience. He told Tunisians, “Trust in the principles of your revolution, and that democracy is not a passing thing in Tunis.”

Foreign Policy especial sobre a contraofensiva ucraniana para retomar terrenos conquistados por forças invasoras russas

 FOREIGN POLICY, April 23, 2023

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For months, there has been speculation over Ukraine’s spring counteroffensive. Now, as the weather gets warmer, observers are wondering: What is Kyiv waiting for? The reporting and essays below explore this question and more, delving into the reasons for the holdup, the innerworkings of Ukrainian military training and decision-making, and what the highly anticipated offensive might look like.—Chloe Hadavas


Ukraine’s Spring Offensive Is Waiting on Weapons Every day Kyiv waits, the Russians dig deeper trenches.
By Jack Detsch


Ukraine’s Longest Day The first 24 hours of the expected counteroffensive will likely be decisive.
By Franz-Stefan Gady


Crimea Has Become a Frankenstein’s Monster The Ukrainian government is now trapped by its own uncompromising—and increasingly indefensible—policy.
By Anatol Lieven


How Ukraine Learned to Fight Russia’s full-scale war started a year ago. Ukraine’s military started slashing its Soviet roots long before.
By Jack Detsch


Ukraine’s Leopard Tank Crews Are Trained and Ready to Fight Advanced tanks will be critical to any summer offensive.
By Elisabeth Braw

Photo: Paula Bronstein for Foreign Policy

Seleção atualizada de trabalhos sobre a guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a nação ucraniana - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

 Seleção atualizada de trabalhos sobre a guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a nação ucraniana

  

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Diplomata, professor

(www.pralmeida.org; diplomatizzando.blogspot.com)

Lista seletiva de trabalhos sobre a guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia, atualizada em 23/04/2023; rev.: 25/05/2023.

 

 

4087. “Uma nota pessoal sobre mais uma postura vergonhosa de nossa diplomacia”, Brasília, 22 fevereiro 2022, 2 p. Comentários a nota do Itamaraty e a declaração feita no CSNU a propósito da invasão da Ucrânia pela Rússia, com referência à nacionalização dos hidrocarburos na Bolívia em 2006. Postado no blog Diplomatizzando(link:https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2022/02/uma-nota-pessoal-sobre-mais-uma-postura.html).

4098. “Renúncia infame: o abandono do Direito Internacional pelo Brasil”, Brasília, 7 março 2022, 5 p. Breve ensaio para o blog científico International Law Agendas, do ramo brasileiro da International Law Association (ILA; http://ila-brasil.org.br/blog/), para edição especial sobre “A política externa brasileira frente ao desafio da invasão russa na Ucrânia”, a convite de Lucas Carlos Lima, coeditor do blog, com base nas notas e declarações do Itamaraty com respeito aos debates no CSNU e na AGNU. Publicado, na condição de membro do Conselho Superior do ramo brasileiro da International Law Association, no blog eletrônico International Law Agendas (7/03/2022; link: http://ila-brasil.org.br/blog/uma-renuncia-infame/); blog Diplomatizzando (link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2022/03/uma-renuncia-infame-o-abandono-do.html). Relação de Publicados n. 1442. 

4099. “Quando o dever moral nascido do sentido de Justiça deve prevalecer sobre o “pragmatismo” que sustenta o crime”, Brasília, 9 março 2022, 1 p. Comentário sobre a postura objetivamente favorável do governo brasileiro ao agressor no caso da guerra na Ucrânia. Postado no blog Diplomatizzando (link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2022/03/quando-o-dever-moral-nascido-do-sentido.html).

4107. “O conflito Rússia-Ucrânia e o Direito Internacional”, Brasília, 16 março 2022, 12 p. Respostas a questões colocadas por interlocutor profissional sobre a natureza do conflito e suas consequências no plano mundial. Disponível Academia.edu (link: https://www.academia.edu/73969669/OconflitoRussiaUcraniaeoDireitoInternacional2022); divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2022/03/o-conflito-russia-ucrania-e-o-direito.html).

4109. “Avançamos moralmente desde os embates de nossos ancestrais na luta pela sobrevivência?”, Brasília, 19 março 2022, 1 p. Considerações sobre a imoralidade e barbaridade dos atos que estão sendo cometidos pelas tropas de Putin na Ucrânia. Postado no blog Diplomatizzando (link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2022/03/avancamos-moralmente-desde-os-embates.html).

 4131. “Consequências econômicas da guerra da Ucrânia”, Brasília, 19 abril 2022, 18 p. Notas para desenvolvimento oral em palestra-debate promovida no canal Instagram do Instituto Direito e Inovação (prof. Vladimir Aras), no dia 21/04/22. Nova versão reformatada e acrescida do trabalho 4132, sob o título “A guerra da Ucrânia e as sanções econômicas multilaterais”, com sumário, anexo e bibliografia. Divulgado preliminarmente na plataforma Academia.edu (link: https://www.academia.edu/77013457/AguerradaUcrâniaeassançõeseconômicasmultilaterais2022) e anunciado no blog Diplomatizzando (20/04/2022; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2022/04/a-guerra-da-ucrania-e-as-sancoes.html). Transmissão via Instagram (21/04/2022; 16:00-17:06; link: https://www.instagram.com/tv/CcoEemiljnq/?igshid=YmMyMTA2M2Y=); (Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/p/CcoEemiljnq/).

4143. “Quão crível é a ameaça de guerra nuclear da Rússia no caso da Ucrânia?”, Brasília, 2 maio 2022, 3 p. Rememorando o caso dos mísseis soviéticos em Cuba. Postado no blog Diplomatizzando (link:https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2022/05/quao-credivel-e-ameaca-de-guerra.html).

4152. “O Brasil e a guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia”, Brasília, 11 maio 2022, 16 p. Texto de apoio a palestra no encerramento da Semana de Ciências Sociais do Mackenzie, sobre o tema da “Guerra na Ucrânia e suas implicações para o Brasil” (13/05/2022). Disponibilizado na plataforma Academia.edu (link: https://www.academia.edu/78954459/OBrasileaguerradeagressãodaRússiacontraaUcrânia2022) e no blog Diplomatizzando (13/05/2022: xc>chttps://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2022/05/guerra-na-ucrania-e-suas-implicacoes.html). Divulgado igualmente na página do Centro de Liberdade Econômica das Faculdades Mackenzie (link: https://www.mackenzie.br/liberdade-economica/artigos-e-videos/artigos/arquivo/n/a/i/o-brasil-e-a-guerra-de-agressao-da-russia-contra-a-ucrania). vídeo da palestra no canal YouTube do Mackenzie (link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7jQtR277iDc). Relação de Publicados n. 1452.

4153. “Guerra na Ucrânia e suas implicações para o Brasil”, Brasília, 11 maio 2022, 5 p. Notas para exposição oral na palestra no encerramento da Semana de Ciências Sociais do Mackenzie, sobre o tema da “Guerra na Ucrânia e suas implicações para o Brasil” (13/05/2022). Divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (14/05/2022; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2022/05/guerra-na-ucrania-e-suas-implicacoes14.html); vídeo da palestra no canal YouTube do Mackenzie (link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7jQtR277iDc).

4165. “Os 100 primeiros dias da guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia: o Brasil afronta o Direito Internacional e a sua história diplomática”, Brasília, 3 junho 2022, 7 p. Texto de apoio a participação em seminário do Instituto Montese sobre os “100 dias de guerra na Ucrânia”, com gravação prévia antes da apresentação. Divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2022/06/100-dias-de-guerra-de-agressao-da.html); emissão divulgada em 10/06/2022, 14h05 (link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CEs-kG1hOjk; exposição PRA de 44:37 a 52:30 minutos da emissão). Relação de Publicados n. 1454.

 4168. “O Brics depois da guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia”, Brasília, 9 junho 2022, 6 p. Posfácio ao livro A grande ilusão do Brics e o universo paralelo da diplomacia brasileira, e revisão geral, eliminando todas as tabelas, agora com 187 p. Apresentação no blog Diplomatizzando (11/06/2022; link:https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2022/06/meu-proximo-kindle-sobre-miragem-dos.html). Publicado em 12/06/2022 Brasília: Diplomatizzando, 2022; ISBN: 978-65-00-46587-7; ASIN: B0B3WC59F4; Preço: R$ 25,00;

 4171. “O Brasil está perdendo o rumo em sua postura enquanto nação civilizada?”, Brasília, 12 junho 2022, 5 p. Nota sobre a postura diplomática do Brasil em relação à guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia, aproveitando para apresentar o livro sobre o Brics, incluindo os dois sumários e o índice não numerado. Postado no blog Diplomatizzando(link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2022/06/o-brasil-esta-perdendo-o-rumo-em-sua.html).

4189. “O futuro do grupo BRICS”, Brasília, 30 junho 2022, 9 p. Texto conceitual sobre os caminhos enviesados do BRICS pós-guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia, e reflexivo sobre as ordens alternativas no campo econômico e político. Elaborado a propósito de webinar promovido pelo IRICE (embaixador Rubens Barbosa) sobre “O futuro do grupo Brics” (30/06/2022), na companhia do presidente do NDB, Marcos Troyjo, e da representante da Secretaria de Comércio Exterior do Itamaraty, Ana Maria Bierrenbach. Postado no Diplomatizzando (link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2022/06/o-futuro-do-grupo-brics-ensaio-por.html). Vídeo do evento disponível no canal do IRICE no YouTube (link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9Q9l8i4gyX4 ). Relação de Publicados n. 1464.

4206. “Sobre a guerra na Ucrânia e nossa próxima política externa”, Brasília, 24 julho 2022, 2 p. Nota sobre a postura de Lula em relação à questão da guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia. Postado no blog Diplomatizzando (link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2022/07/a-proxima-politica-externa-do-brasil.html ). 

4217. “A guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia e a postura do Brasil”, Brasília, 14 agosto 2022, 10 p. Breve paper sobre a diplomacia brasileira no tocante à guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia, para participação em seminário híbrido sobre o posicionamento dos Estados latino-americanos frente ao conflito entre a Rússia e a Ucrânia, organizado pelo prof. Nitish Monebhurrun, no Ceub, no dia 17 de agosto, 9h30 (<nitish.monebhurrun@gmail.com>; link do seminário: meet.google.com/gkc-szgz-prt). Divulgado na plataforma Academia.edu (link: https://www.academia.edu/84817949/4127AguerradeagressaodaRussiacontraaUcraniaeaposturadoBrasil2022) e no blog Diplomatizzando (15/08/2022; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2022/08/os-estados-latino-americanos-frente-ao.html). 

4227. “Relação de materiais no Diplomatizzando sobre a guerra na Ucrânia”, Brasília, 2 setembro 2022, 3 p. Listagem dos materiais mais interessantes sobre a guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia e seu impacto geopolítico. Postado no blog Diplomatizzando (link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2022/09/materiais-sobre-guerra-de-agressao.html); disponível na plataforma Academia.edu (link: https://www.academia.edu/86055975/4227_Materiais_no_Diplomatizzando_sobre_a_guerra_de_agressao_a_Ucrania_2022_).

 4245. “O Brasil deixou de fazer parte da comunidade internacional? Desde quando?”, Brasília, 28 setembro 2022, 2 p. Nota sobre a postura do Brasil em face das violações da Rússia na sua guerra de agressão contra a Ucrânia. Postado no blog Diplomatizzando (link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2022/09/o-brasil-deixou-de-fazer-parte-da.html).

 4249. “Carta aberta ao Sr. Presidente da República”, Brasília, 7 outubro 2022, 1 p. Indagação a respeito de nossas obrigações constitucionais e internacionais, no tocante à guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia. Postado no blog Diplomatizzando (link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2022/10/carta-aberta-ao-sr-presidente-da.html).

 4293. “O Brasil e a guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia”, Brasília, 20 dezembro 2022, 1 p. Nota sobre a futura diplomacia do lulopetismo no tocante à guerra na Ucrânia. Postado no blog Diplomatizzando (link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2022/12/o-brasil-e-guerra-de-agressao-da-russia.html).

4301. “Seleção de trabalhos sobre a guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a nação ucraniana”, Brasília, 10 janeiro 2023, 4 p. Lista seletiva de trabalhos sobre a guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia. Postado no blog Diplomatizzando(link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2023/01/selecao-de-trabalhos-sobre-guerra-de.html).

4308. “O mundo aguarda o Brasil sobre a Ucrânia”, Brasília, 21 janeiro 2023, 2 p. Nota sobre a posição ambígua do Brasil em torno da questão da guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia. Postado no blog Diplomatizzando (link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2023/01/o-mundo-aguarda-o-brasil-sobre-ucrania.html). 

4327. “Julgamento da História, pelo lado MORAL”, Brasília, 22 fevereiro 2023, 2 p. Nota sobre a postura da diplomacia brasileira em relação à guerra na Ucrânia. Postado no blog Diplomatizzando (link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2023/02/julgamento-da-historia-pelo-lado-moral.html).

4328. “Não ao inaceitável “Não Alinhamento Ativo”, que só significa um Desalinhamento Passivo e Inativo”, Brasília, 26 fevereiro 2023, 1 p. Nota sobre a postura proposta ao fantasmagórico Sul Global de Não Alinhamento Ativo em relação ao conflito da Ucrânia. Postado no blog Diplomatizzando (link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2023/02/nao-ao-inaceitavel-nao-alinhamento.html).

4329. “Os 12 pontos do ‘Plano de Paz” da China para a guerra na Ucrânia; comentários de Paulo Roberto de Almeida”, Brasília, 27 fevereiro 2023, 2 p. Comentários pessoais aos 12 pontos do Plano de Paz da China à guerra de agressão da China contra a Ucrânia. Postado no blog Diplomatizzando (link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2023/02/os-12-pontos-do-plano-de-paz-da-china.html).

4330. “Qual é o maior desafio à diplomacia brasileira, em décadas?”, Brasilia, 28 fevereiro 2023, 2 p. Nota sobre a questão do desafio russo e chinês à paz e à segurança internacionais, do ponto de vista do Brasil. Postado no blog Diplomatizzando (link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2023/02/qual-e-o-maior-desafio-diplomacia.html).

4344. “O que Putin quer de Lula? O que ele vai conseguir?”, Brasília, 25 março 2023, 6 p. Artigo para a revista Crusoé, sobre a próxima visita do chanceler Lavrov ao Brasil, tratando do Brics e da guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia. Publicado na Crusoé (31/03/2023; link: https://crusoe.uol.com.br/edicoes/257/o-que-putin-quer-de-lula-o-que-ele-vai-conseguir/?fbclid=IwAR0HUZLik-L-mAziepagvbW2FtPFh-mtymnqIQHUhNSGKuu2dxVGndG0dKk?utm_source=crs-site&utm_medium=crs-login&utm_campaign=redir); divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (18/04/2023; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2023/04/o-que-putin-quer-de-lula-o-que-ele-vai.html). Relação de Publicados n. 1499.

4347. “Faz sentido o Brasil se aproximar de China e Rússia?”, Programa Latitudes n. 19, 1 abril 2023, 1h de conversa com os jornalistas Rogério Ortega e Duda Teixeira sobre as posições adotadas pela diplomacia petista em relação aos grandes temas da política internacional, como a invasão da Ucrânia e a retórica belicista da China (link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3S2n8_pCtrw); divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2023/04/faz-sentido-o-brasil-se-aproximar-de.html). Relação de Publicados n. 1501.

4351. “Em face de uma nova bifurcação da estrada, à nossa frente”, Brasília, 6 abril 2023, 1 p. Nota sobre mais um momento decisivo na vida da nação: a opção entre sustentar um crime ou optar pela Justiça. Divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando(6/04/2023: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2023/04/em-face-de-uma-nova-bifurcacao-da.html).

4354. “‘A Guerra Perpétua’, segundo Putin, ou o projeto de uma ‘nova ordem mundial’, como vontade e como representação”, Brasília, 7 abril 2023, 3 p. Publicado na revista Crusoé (14/04/2023; link: https://oantagonista.uol.com.br/mundo/paulo-roberto-de-almeida-na-crusoe-guerra-perpetua-de-putin/); divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (23/04/2023; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2023/04/a-guerra-perpetua-segundo-putin-ou-o.html). Relação de Publicados n. 1504.

4358. “O retorno da diplomacia presidencial nos cem dias de Lula”, entrevista com o jornalista Duda Teixeira da revista Crusoé (emissão em 9/04/2023, 14:29; link: https://crusoe.uol.com.br/diario/o-retorno-da-diplomacia-presidencial-nos-100-dias-de-lula/); divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2023/04/o-retorno-da-diplomacia-presidencial.html). Relação de Publicados n. 1503.

4359. “O Brasil tem futuro? Um debate no programa Latitudes”, Brasília, 10 abril 2023, 6 p. Resposta a um comentarista no programa Latitudes 19, como registrado no trabalho 4347 (“Faz sentido o Brasil se aproximar de China e Rússia?”). Postado no site do YouTube (link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3S2n8_pCtrw), aguardando novos comentários. Divulgado inteiramente no blog Diplomatizzando (link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2023/04/um-debate-espontaneo-no-programa.html).

4365. “Potências revisionistas e rupturas da ordem global”, Brasília, 17 abril 2023, 4 p. Ensaio sobre os momentos de rupturas históricas em ordens políticas estabelecidas. Para aula no curso de mestrado em Relações Internacionais da UFABC, via online, em 18/04/2023. Primeira parte aproveitada para um pequeno texto sobre a guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia; postado, sob o título de “Lula tem certeza de que seria uma boa ideia colocar o Brasil do lado da Rússia e da China na construção de uma nova ordem mundial?”, no blog Diplomatizzando (26/04/2023; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2023/04/deve-o-brasil-aderir-ideia-de-uma-nova.html); segunda e terceira partes, aproveitadas para novo artigo para a revista Crusoé, sob o título “Por que a tal de 'nova ordem mundial' é uma má ideia?”, sob o número 4374. 


Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 4370, 23 abril 2023, 5 p.; rev. 25/05/2023.


 

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