quarta-feira, 5 de junho de 2013

Ach! Der douce und grosse Dekadence... Frankreich, bien sur - Der Spiegel


Presidentes, estadistas, existem para guiar um país no caminho da prosperidade, geralmente por meio de reformas constantes, se preciso for com algum sacrifício dos acomodados. Se esses líderes se revelam incapazes de fazê-lo, melhor aposentá-los e pensar em lideranças mais consequentes. Acho que é o caso do morno, aborrecido, sonolento François Hollande. Time to retire...

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Bonjour Tristesse: The Economic and Political Decline of France

By Mathieu von Rohr
Der Spiegel, June 05, 2013

France is in the grip of a crisis. As both its economy and European influence weaken, scandal has hobbled its political elite. The country needs drastic overhaul, but President Hollande does nothing but waver and hesitate.
Judging by the imperial magnificence of the Elysee Palace, France has never ceased to be a world power. Rooms with five-meter (16-foot) ceilings, gilded chandeliers, candelabras and elaborate stucco work are guarded by members of the Republican Guard, who parade in front of the palace gates with their plumes of feathers and bayonets.
The man in charge, on the other hand, seems lonely and small in his palace. He is surrounded by court ushers who make sure that glasses and writing sets are perfectly arranged, and when he enters a conference room, they call out grandly "Monsieur le Président de la République!", to give his attendants time to stand up for him.

François Hollande never intended to become a king, but rather a "normal president," as he put it, and now he has to play one nonetheless. He occasionally seems like an actor who has somehow ended up in the wrong play.
Outside, throughout the country, unemployment reaches new highs each month, factories are shut down daily, hundreds of thousands take to the streets to protest gay marriage, and the French are increasingly outraged over a barrage of new political scandals as the country hovers on the cusp of waning global relevance. Yet this roar of dissatisfaction doesn't permeate the walls of Hollande's world. Here, it is quiet, very quiet.
Shortly after moving into his new official residence, Hollande warned his staff that in a palace it is easy to feel protected, and he insisted that he did not want to be "locked in." But that is precisely what is happening, as evidenced by the documentary film "Le Pouvoir" (The Power), which recently debuted in French theaters and whose creators accompanied Hollande during the brutal first eight months of his presidency.
Elite in a Bubble
They paint an image of a likeable man who seems to spend a lot of time rewriting speeches prepared by his staff. As you watch him in the movie, you start to wonder: Does he do all the important things when no one's watching or does he really spends most of his time on the unimportant? However, the main subject of the film is not the president, but rather the reality bubble in the country's top echelons. Not just Hollande, but also most of his cabinet ministers, still reside in Parisian city palaces that predate the French Revolution, and perhaps that's a problem.
A justice minister who spends her days in the Hôtel de Bourvallais on Place Vendôme, next door to the Hotel Ritz, a culture minister who goes to work at the magnificent Palais Royal, a prime minister whose offices are in the grand Hôtel Matignon and a president who resides at the Elysee Palace, they all need a great deal of inner strength to avoid losing their connection to reality. It's a difficult proposition, because Paris's settings of power convey the message that France is big, rich and beautiful.
But the mood hanging over the country is depressed. France is in the midst of the biggest crisis of the Fifth Republic. It feels as if the French model had reached an end stage, not just in terms of the economy, but also in politics and society. A country that long dismissed its problems is going through a painful process of adjustment to reality and, as was the case last week, can now expect to be issued warnings by the European Commission and prompted to implement reforms.
France's plight was initially apparent in the economy, which has been stagnating for five years, because French state capitalism no longer works. But the crisis reaches deeper than that. At issue is a political class that more than three quarters of the population considers corrupt, and a president who, this early in his term, is already more unpopular than any of his predecessors. At issue is a society that is more irreconcilably divided into left and right than in almost any other part of Europe. And, finally, at issue is the identity crisis of a historically dominant nation that struggles with the fact that its neighbor, Germany, now sets the tone on the continent.
The French economy has been in gradual decline for years, without any president or administration having done anything decisive about it. But now, ignoring the problems is no longer an option. The economy hasn't grown in five years and will even contract slightly this year. A record 3.26 million Frenchmen are unemployed, youth unemployment is at 26.5 percent, consumer purchasing power has declined, and consumption, which drives the French economy, is beginning to slow down, as well.
There is a more positive side of the story, which sometimes pales in the face of all the bad news. France is the world's fifth-largest economy, and interest rates for government bonds have been at historic lows for months. The country is far from being on the verge of bankruptcy and cannot be compared with Italy or Spain, and certainly not with Greece. Nevertheless, France is ailing. And looking weak is something the French themselves hate more than anything else.
Consequences of French Decline
This mixture of factors could jeopardize the entire European structure. For one thing, if France continues to decline, more and more responsibility will be shifted to Germany. "Germany cannot carry the euro on its shoulders alone indefinitely," writes Harvard University economist Kenneth Rogoff. "France needs to become a second anchor of growth and stability."
Another problem is that the European Union is losing its standing in France at a more dramatic pace than in any other EU member state. According to a study by the Pew Research Center, the public approval of the EU in France has declined from 60 to 41 percent in only a year. This might be owed to the uncomfortable fact that Brussels is increasingly treating France as a problem and not as one of Europe's supporting columns, and many French citizens have started to see the terms 'Brussels' and (German Chancellor) 'Angela Merkel' as synonymous.
But is the EU to blame for the France's crisis? Can Europe truly be held responsible for the fact that the government is behind 57 percent of total economic output in France? That government debt has risen to more than 90 percent of the gross domestic product? Is it Germany's fault that, for decades, French administrations have failed to make the country's business environment more competitive? And has anyone in Brussels demanded that a fifth of all workers in France be employed by the government?
France may be ailing, but it still has a lot going for it. It is home to successful major corporations, such as the luxury brand group LVMH, tire manufacturer Michelin and many pharmaceutical companies. The country has an efficient healthcare system, the highest birthrate in Europe and healthier demographics than Germany, fostered by tax breaks for families, the acceptance of working mothers as a fact of life and a corresponding system of full-day childcare.
But the French welfare state costs money, a lot of money. The country has neglected to make decisions on how much its individual achievements are worth, and how certain luxurious aspects of life it has come to appreciate could be modified to conform to not-so-luxurious realities, including the 35-hour workweek, a retirement age of 60 for some workers and unemployment benefits of up to €6,200 ($8,122) a month. As a result, there is a sense of gridlock, and a sour public mood is following on the heels of bad economic news.
Stuck in Past Grandeur?
France has an illustrious past, of which it is justifiably proud, but its historic success also prevents it from clearly recognizing the need for reforms. The omnipotent, bloated central government, which also controls the economy, should have been reformed long ago. The privileges of the Paris political elite are so outdated that they have become intolerable, and many bribery and corruption scandals are undermining an already fragile political legitimacy.
It cannot be accidental that France's leading politicians increasingly refer to their country as the "grande nation." Since the election campaign, President Hollande has hardly missed an opportunity to invoke the nation's greatness. With some dialectical malice, one could see this as evidence that France's greatness is now becoming a relic, but it certainly reflects the self-hypnosis of a nation whose stature is in the process of shrinking.
"Our soldiers demonstrated our role," Hollande said recently in a major press conference at the Elysée Palace, as he praised one of his rare successes, the military operation in Mali. "Namely that of a great nation that can influence the balance of power in the world."
There is an increasingly stark contrast between the feigned grandiosity of the president's appearances and the faintheartedness of his daily actions. The obstructionism and inflexibility that prevail throughout the entire country can only be eliminated through deep-seated renewal. But so far Hollande, who promised "change" in his campaign, has been more conspicuous for his hesitation than his courage.

Since this spring, Hollande has been viewed by most commentators as the nice "Grandpa" in the Elysee Palace, who lacks the gumption to address the country's serious structural problems. The French constitution grants the office of the president more power than is allotted any other leader of the Western world. Besides, his Socialist Party holds significant majorities in the National Assembly, the Senate and even in regional governments.In other words, Hollande could get down to business on any day he chooses. He could reform the country as he wished, if only that were his objective. But no one -- not citizens, not journalists and possibly not even his cabinet ministers -- knows what he wants and if indeed he wants anything at all.
Does he aim to be France's great reformer but lacks the courage to defy the left wing of his party, as a member of the German government believes? Or is it that he clings to his party's old formulas, wants to change as little as possible and is waiting for the day when the recovery happens on its own?

40 licoes simples de um economista que chegou aos 40 anos - Bryan Caplan

Puxa vida: eu esqueci de fazer as minhas lições quando cheguei aos 40 anos (embora tenha feito outras já tendo passado); agora vou ter de redigir muito mais lições, ensinamentos, experiências. Assim será.
Com vocês, algumas lições verdadeiras, outras lógicas, outras ainda elementares, e algumas poucas tão complexas que vai ser difícil segui-las...
Mas vale tentar (embora a maioria seja feita de deduções, e portanto não aplicáveis no plano individual).
Divirtam-se...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida


LIÇÕES DE VIDA

Quarenta coisas que aprendi nos meus primeiros 40 anos

Economista revela lições valiosas que aprendeu em suas primeiras quatro décadas de vida

por Bryan Caplan



1. A lei da oferta e demanda resolve incontáveis mistérios do mundo – tudo desde controle de aluguéis a congestionamentos em estradas.


2. Quase qualquer um pode entender a lei da oferta e demanda se ouvir calmamente. Infelizmente, o contrário também é verdadeiro.
3. A pobreza é terrível, e o crescimento econômico, não a redistribuição, é a cura.
4. As causas aproximadas do desemprego são a regulação do mercado de trabalho e a crença equivocada dos trabalhadores a respeito de justiça. Mas a causa fundamental do desemprego são os salários excesssivos.
5. A competição livre é muito superior à competição “perfeita”.
6. Governos com moeda fiduciária têm poder quase absoluto sobre o PIB nominal, mas muito menos sobre o PIB real ou sobre o emprego.
7. O risco moral (moral hazard) e a seleção adversa são em grande parte produtos de – e não a lógica para – regulação de seguros.
8. Restrições à imigração são crimes inúteis – e causam mais danos do que todas as outras regulações governamentais juntas.
9. O comunismo foi um desastre por causa de maus incentivos e não por falta de incentivos.
10. Os dois últimos séculos de crescimento populacional e prosperidade deveriam nos encher de admiração – e o melhor ainda está por vir.
Filosofia
1. O maior erro filosófico é exigir prova para o óbvio. Veja Hume.
2. O segundo maior erro filosófico é tentar provar o óbvio. Veja Descartes.
3. Se você não consegue explicar a sua posição claramente em uma linguagem simples, provavelmente você mesmo não a compreende.
4. Quando possível, decida debates sobre “o que é óbvio” apostando, não falando.
5. Ignorar os fatos de dualismo e livre vontade radical é antiempírico e anticientífico.
6. Falar sobre moralidade, se não existem fatos morais é como falar sobre unicórnios, se não existem unicórnios.
7. Não existem fatos morais.
8. Argumentos morais produtivos começam com casos claros e simples, não com teorias morais em cada frase ou problemas provocativos.
9. Violência e roubo são presuntivamente errados e, mesmo que você se chame “governo”, essas presunções ainda são válidas.
10. As melhores três páginas da filosofia ainda são “Carta a Meneceu”, de Epicuro.
Política
1. Eleitores são irracionais. E também o é pensar de outra maneira.
2. O governo não é uma solução para problemas de externalidade; ele é o melhor exemplo do problema.
3. O principal produto do governo não são os “bens públicos”, mas os bens privados que as pessoas fingem querer muito mais do que realmente querem. Veja o caso da previdência social.
4. As pessoas raramente usam o argumento mais internamente consistente para a ação do governo: paternalismo.
5. O caminho realista para um mercado mais livre não é uma “reforma do livre mercado”, mas austeridade.
6. Democratas e Republicanos são quase tão diferentes quanto católicos e protestantes – e 80% da união das suas recriminações mútuas são verdade.
7. Antes de estudar a opinião pública, você se pergunta por que a política não é muito melhor. Depois de estudar a opinião pública, você se pergunta por que a política não é muito pior.
8. Grandes motivos por que a democracia não é pior: participação desigual, negligência política e viés do status quo.
9. Os libertários são os dhimmis da democracia
10. Apesar de tudo, a vida nas democracias do primeiro mundo é incrivelmente boa para os padrões mundiais e históricos e continuarão se tornando melhores. Então, anime-se.
Vida
1. A vida é um presente e, quanto mais, melhor.
2. “Faça o que você ama e você nunca terá que trabalhar na sua vida”. Isso mesmo.
3. Seja amigável como uma questão de política. Vire a outra face diante de ataques pessoais. Pode parecer loucura, mas funciona.
4. A obsessão é uma solução poderosa para problemas físicos e sociais. Infelizmente, também é uma das principais causas de problemas emocionais.
5. Uma vez que você se torna adulto, pessoas religiosas te deixarão em paz se vocês as deixar em paz.
6. As pessoas mudam mais do que você pensa. Diga a você mesmo que isso não é culpa de ninguém.
7. A seleção é a chave para a harmonia social. Cerque-se de amigos verdadeiros que lhe amam do jeito que você é. Se você não vir ninguém por perto, procure por eles.
8. Crie os seus filhos com bondade e respeito. “Eu sou seu pai, não seu amigo” é uma razão para tratá-los melhor que os seus amigos, não pior.
9. Sua mente envelhece a uma velocidade menor do que você espera quando você é jovem e o seu corpo a uma velocidade maior.
10. A psicologia evolucionária é, de longe, a melhor teoria universal da motivação humana. Ignore-a ao seu próprio risco.

Colombia na OTAN? Nao contem para os companheiros, nervosos e irritados...


Colombia: acercamiento a la OTAN irrita en América Latina

AFP
Bogotá, 5 de junio de 2013
Las claves
  • El presidente de Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega, lo calificó como "una puñalada", el de Bolivia, Evo Morales, como una provocación, y el de Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro como una aberración.
  • Ante la oleada de críticas, el gobierno colombiano aclaró este martes en un comunicado que "no pretende y no puede ser país miembro de la OTAN", y que lo que busca son "mecanismos de cooperación".
  • La aclaratoria fue celebrada poco después por Maduro, quien la consideró como "un paso positivo" que permite "mantener encarrilado, en buen carril seguro, las relaciones de paz y cooperación con el gobierno de Colombia y con toda Sudamérica".

Un vecindario sensible

El análisis
El Tiempo (Colombia)
“En un contexto así, es bueno medir cada palabra en asuntos de trascendencia regional. Lo que no significa, desde luego, ceder en el sagrado derecho a la autodeterminación. Colombia no puede, en ningún momento y bajo ninguna circunstancia, renunciar a iniciativas orientadas en la senda correcta por no molestar a los vecinos, así a veces cunda la paranoia”. (El Tiempo. Colombia)
El anuncio de Colombia de que buscará un acuerdo de cooperación con la Alianza del Atlántico Norte (OTAN) complica sus relaciones con los gobiernos de izquierda en la región, con los que había logrado un delicado equilibrio en los últimos años, destacaron analistas a la AFP.
Colombia, principal aliado de Estados Unidos en América Latina, tuvo difíciles relaciones en los años recientes con países como Venezuela y Ecuador, incluso con rupturas, hasta que con la llegada al poder del presidente Juan Manuel Santos en 2010 se normalizaron los vínculos.
Pero una declaración de Santos en la que dijo que este mes de junio la OTAN suscribiría un acuerdo con su país “para iniciar todo un proceso de acercamiento, de cooperación, con miras también a ingresar a esa organización” militar provocó el rechazo inmediato de Nicaragua, Venezuela y Bolivia, socios en la Alternativa Bolivariana para Nuestra América (ALBA).
El presidente de Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega, lo calificó como “una puñalada”, el de Bolivia, Evo Morales, como una provocación, y el de Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro como una aberración.
A la vez, Morales y Maduro coincidieron en la pertinencia de convocar una reunión de emergencia de la Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (Unasur), que cuenta con un Consejo Suramericano de Defensa, para tratar el tema.
Ante la oleada de críticas, el gobierno colombiano aclaró este martes en un comunicado que “no pretende y no puede ser país miembro de la OTAN”, y que lo que busca son “mecanismos de cooperación”.
La aclaratoria fue celebrada poco después por Maduro, quien la consideró como “un paso positivo” que permite “mantener encarrilado, en buen carril seguro, las relaciones de paz y cooperación con el gobierno de Colombia y con toda Sudamérica”.
Mientras tanto, la propia OTAN explicó que Colombia no cumple con sus criterios de adhesión, pues solo los países ubicados en el Atlántico Norte pueden ingresar.
Para Rubén Sánchez, politólogo especialista en seguridad y democracia por el Instituto de Ciencias Políticas de París, el anuncio “contribuye a ahondar la brecha” entre los países con gobiernos de izquierda integrados en el ALBA y Estados Unidos y sus aliados.
“Colombia busca estrechar las relaciones con Estados Unidos, ser uno de sus aliados preferenciales en América Latina, pero pierde lo que se había ganado con la diplomacia”, señaló.
Desde 2000, este país se beneficia del Plan Colombia para lucha contra el narcotráfico y el terrorismo, mediante el cual ha recibido más de 8.000 millones de dólares en asistencia y entrenamiento militar.
Pero la ayuda estadounidense en esa materia “se ha reducido y se va a reducir aún más”, recordó Sánchez, por lo que Colombia podría “buscar compensación en otra parte”.
Para Vicente Torrijos, profesor de estudios políticos en la Universidad del Rosario de Bogotá, la ventaja de un acuerdo con la OTAN sería la de darle “mayor legitimidad” a las acciones que se emprendan.
“Estados Unidos sabe que puede cooperar con Colombia en cualquier momento, pero tendría mayor legitimidad en el marco de una gran alianza y no unilateralmente”, dijo.
“Colombia no tiene recursos para embarcarse en una carrera armamentista, ni tampoco la quiere. La OTAN es un modelo social y económico afín al de la democracia liberal colombiana, y representa una manera de estar a salvo de las aventuras militaristas en la región”, opinó Torrijos.

Exposição “Pioneiros & Empreendedores: A Saga do Desenvolvimento no Brasil” - Manaus

Anunciando aos amazonesnes, amazônidas, amazônicos, amazonianos, amazoneiros e outros amazed people...

                
A exposição itinerante “Pioneiros & Empreendedores: A Saga do Desenvolvimento no Brasil”, idealizada pelo professor Jacques Marcovitch, da Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade da Universidade de São Paulo, será inaugurada oficialmente dia 5 de junho, no Centro Cultural Palácio da Justiça, em Manaus (AM).
Em Manaus, a exposição apresentará a história do professor universitário e empresário Samuel Benchimol, fundador do grupo amazonense Bemol/Fogás, focalizado no livro Pioneiros & Empreendedores, e as trajetórias de outros 23 pioneiros de várias regiões do país, dentre eles, Barão de Mauá, Delmiro Gouveia, Roberto Marinho, Bernardo Mascarenhas, Edson Queiroz, entre outros. Além de criar empresas ou grupos empresariais bem-sucedidos, que impulsionaram o desenvolvimento do país, esses empreendedores envolveram-se em projetos sociais ou de natureza filantrópica com a mesma energia com que assumiram riscos e aproveitaram as oportunidades do seu tempo.
O professor Jacques Marcovitch acredita que no Brasil atual "uma visão de futuro inspirada nos pioneiros do empreendedorismo deve animar o esforço daqueles que buscam mudanças estruturais e soluções para os problemas mais dramáticos e ainda persistentes... O que aconteceu é tão importante quanto o que está acontecendo e o que vai acontecer", diz o professor. Ele explica que o livro que inspirou a exposição “se destina aos professores de cursos superiores de Administração, Economia, Engenharia de Produção e áreas afins, e aos educadores que atuam no campo da gestão. Foi pensado também para servir como fonte de inspiração para os jovens que, em número crescente, procuram esses cursos com o sonho de criar riquezas para o país."
A mostra permanecerá aberta ao público entre 6 de junho e 4 de agosto, de terça a sábado, das 10h às 17h, e aos domingos, das 17h às 21h.
No link abaixo assista ao vídeo da matéria sobre o evento:


Livro: “Sistema Internacional de Hegemonia Conservadora" - Eduardo Viola et alii


O Instituto de Relações Internacionais da Universidade de Brasília e a Annablume Editora convidam para o lançamento do livro "Sistema Internacional de Hegemonia Conservadora: Governança Global e Democracia na Era da Crise Climática", de Eduardo Viola, Matias Franchini e Thaís Lemos Ribeiro.
O lançamento se fará com uma Mesa Redonda, com os autores e José Flávio Sombra Saraiva, Antônio Jorge Ramalho da Rocha, Cristina Inoue e Ana Flávia Barros, professores do Instituto de Relações Internacionais.
O evento terá lugar no Auditório do iREL-UnB (ao lado do Pavilhão João Calmon do Campus Darcy Ribeiro da Universidade de Brasília), no dia 07/06/2013, a partir das 16h.
Não é necessário fazer inscrição para o evento. Informações adicionais podem ser obtidas pelo e-mail tlemosribeiro@gmail.com.

Argentina estatiza companhia de transporte ferroviario ALL - Portogente

A companhia pode até ser uma porcaria, feita de incompetentes e interessada apenas em ganhar dinheiro, sem atentar para os interesses do país. Mas o simples fato de que uma companhia negligencie suas operações num país com conexões ferroviárias tão importantes, historicamente, quanto a Argentina, e que acabe sendo "expropriada" pelo Estado, já é um sinal de que, ou a companhia é muito ruim, ou então que ela não encontrou condições para trabalhar nesse país.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Portogente, 05/06/2013 - 10:01
Argentina rescinde concessões da ALL e consequências preocupam acionistas
por Redação *
O governo da Argentina decidiu rescindir nesta terça-feira (4) os contratos de concessão detidos pela América Latina Logística Central S.A. e pela América Logística Mesopotâmica S.A. (em conjunto, "ALL Argentina"). Os acionistas da empresa no Brasil iniciam esta quarta-feira preocupados com as consequências financeiras da intervenção do governo Cristina Kirchner.
A Argentina alega que a ALL não cumpriu o acordo de modernizar a malha ferroviária concedida pelo governo local. Produtores argentinos,assim como acontece no Brasil, se queixam da administração da companhia. No Twitter do Ministério dos Transportes da Argentina foi publicado: "Temos que defender o interesse do Estado. As concessões foram realizadas na década de 90 e não atenderam a qualquer objetivo".
Foto: Divulgação ALL
Rescisão da concessão afeta companhia de capital aberto
O departamento de Relações com Investidores da ALL lançou nota pública afirmando que a empresa não recebeu qualquer informação oficial do governo Kirchner e tentou minimizar a importância das operações ferroviárias na Argentina. "Em vista do atual cenário político e econômico da Argentina, a companhia vinha buscando potenciais investidores interessados em adquirir participação nas concessões da ALL Argentina. A ALL Argentina ao longo dos anos se tornou pouco representativa nos resultados consolidados da companhia, demandando foco desproporcional por parte da sua administração. Em 2012, os resultados das referidas concessões corresponderam a 6,5% da receita líquida e 0% do EBITDA total da companhia".
O Conselho de Administração da ALL havia divulgado no sábado (1) ter aprovado a compra da totalidade de debêntures da quinta e da sexta emissões após resultados fracos apresentados pela unidade de operação na Argentina.

Turquia: entre a preeminencia islamica e a heranca laica - Stratfor


Turkey's Violent Protests in Context

Stratfor Analysis
 Print - Text Size +
Turkey's Violent Protests in Context
Turkish protesters gather in Taksim Square in Istanbul on June 1. (BULENT KILIC/AFP/Getty Images)

Summary

The rapid escalation of anti-government protests in Turkey in recent days has exposed a number of long-dormant fault lines in the country's complex political landscape. But even as the appeal of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's ruling Justice and Development Party (also known by its Turkish acronym, AKP) is beginning to erode, it will remain a powerful force in Turkish politics for some time to come, with its still-significant base of support throughout the country and the lack of a credible political alternative in the next elections.

Analysis

The foundation for the current unrest was laid May 28, when a small group of mostly young environmentalists gathered in Istanbul's Taksim Square for a sit-in to protest a planned demolition of walls, uprooting of trees and the perceived desecration of historical sites in the square's Gezi Park. The initially peaceful demonstration turned violent the night of May 30, when police tried to break up what had grown to more than 100 protesters.
The environmental protesters were joined the next day by high-level representatives of the Justice and Development Party's main opposition, the secular Republican People's Party (known as CHP). The message of the protests soon evolved from saving Gezi Park's trees to condemning Erdogan and his party for a litany of complaints. Anti-government chants included "Down with the dictator," "Tayyip, resign," and "Unite against fascism."
The protests grew rapidly when the weekend began, with more than 10,000 people gathering in Taksim Square on June 1. Many of these made their way to the square from the district of Kadikoy, a Republican People's Party stronghold on the Asian side of Istanbul, by walking across the Bosphorus Bridge banging pots and pans in defiance of laws against pedestrian use of the bridge. Some reportedly threw Molotov cocktails, fireworks and stones at police, prompting the use of tear gas and water cannons on the protesters. However, this quickly drew condemnation, leading the government to temporarily withdraw police at the cost of allowing more protesters to gather.
Spread of Protests in Turkey: May 31-June 2, 2013
Erdogan's response was defiant. While admitting excessive force by the police and ordering an investigation of the matter, he said that he would not give in to "wild extremists" who belong to an "ideological" as opposed to "environmental" movement and that he would bring out a million supporters from his party for every 100,000 protesters. The same night, riots broke out and some 5,000 protesters threw stones at the prime minister's office in the Besiktas neighborhood in Istanbul.
On the morning of June 2, heavy rains kept protesters away from Taksim Square save for a few dozen who huddled around bonfires. More protesters made their way back to the square in the afternoon while Erdogan made another defiant speech blaming the Republican People's Party for the unrest and vowing to proceed with the development plans. Clashes between police and protesters have resumed, and close to 1,000 people have been detained and dozens injured.

Erdogan's Limits

The size and scope of the protests must be kept in perspective. By the end of June 1, protests had reportedly spread to Izmir, Eskisehir, Mugla, Yalova, Antalya, Bolu, Adana, Ankara, Kayseri and Konya. Many of the areas where protests were reported are also areas where the Republican People's Party would be expected to bring out a large number of supporters. Konya, Kayseri and Ankara, strong sources of support for the Justice and Development Party, were notable exceptions. The largest protests, in Istanbul and Izmir, brought out predominantly young protesters in the tens of thousands. The protests would be highly significant if they grow to the hundreds of thousands, include a wider demographic and geographically extend to areas with traditionally strong support for the ruling party.
The protests so far do not indicate that Erdogan's party is at serious or imminent risk of losing its grip on power, but they do reveal limits to the prime minister's political ambitions. Erdogan is attempting to extract votes from a slow-moving and highly fragile peace process with the Kurdistan Workers' Party to help him get enough support for a constitutional referendum. The referendum would transform Turkey from a parliamentary system to a presidential system and thus enable Erdogan, whose term as prime minister expires in 2015, to continue leading Turkey as president beyond 2014, when presidential elections are scheduled. The sight of protesters from the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (known as the BDP) joining Republican People's Party supporters for the June 1 protests does not bode well for Erdogan's plan to rely on those votes in the constitutional referendum. Though the Justice and Development Party, which remains highly popular with Turkey's more conservative populace in the Anatolian interior, so far does not face a credible political contender for the October local elections or 2015 parliamentary elections, Erdogan's political maneuvering to become president will face more resistance.
The ruling party's main secular opposition is alarmed at Erdogan's policies that compromise the core founding principles of the state as defined by Kemal Ataturk. From social measures that ban the sale of alcohol after 10 p.m. to foreign policy measures that have Turkey trying to mold and influence Islamist rebel groups in Syria, these are policies that directly undermine the Ataturkian mandate that Turkey must remain secular and avoid overextending itself beyond the republic's borders. But the growing dissent against the party is not a simple Islamist-secular divide, either. A perception has developed among a growing number of Turks that the party is pursuing an aggressive form of capitalism that defies environmental considerations as well as Islamic values. Within business circles, frustration is building over the number of concessions handed out to Erdogan's closest allies.

Rising Dissent

The polarization of the state could be plainly seen in the reporting of the Gezi Park protests. The protests appear to have emboldened once critical newspapers such as Hurriyet to reassume an anti-ruling party stance unseen in the recent years of Erdogan's media taming. Hurriyet has broadcast Erdogan's "defeat" with headlines such as "Erdogan no longer almighty." On the other end of the political spectrum, the state-funded news agency Anatolia is reporting the protests as a "brawl" between police and firework-throwing youth extremists, while stressing a democratic message that the government permitted the Republican People's Party to demonstrate in Taksim.
Far more interesting is reporting from the Justice and Development Party's traditional sources of support. Yeni Safak, a newspaper close to the ruling party, has condemned the park project and sympathized with the protesters. The same was seen in Zaman newspaper, run by followers of the moderate Islamist Gulen movement. The Gulenists form a crucial component of the ruling party's broader support base but also keep their distance from the ruling party. The movement has been increasingly critical of Erdogan, strongly suggesting that he and his party have become too powerful. Editorials from the newspaper admonished Erdogan for his "excessive" behavior and sided with the protesters.
Though dissent is rising, Erdogan and the Justice and Development Party still have a substantial support base, and the opposition continues to lack a credible political alternative (local elections scheduled for October likely will indicate how much support for the party has waned). At the same time, Turkey is pursuing a highly ambitious agenda abroad, from negotiating peace with Kurdish militants and developing oil pipelines in Iraqi Kurdistan to trying to fend off Syrian-backed militant attacks. Turkey was already highly constrained in pursuing these foreign policy goals, but they will take second place to Turkey's growing political distractions at home as Erdogan prioritizes the growing domestic challenges and as foreign adversaries such as Syria try to take advantage of preoccupied Turkish security forces to try to sponsor more attacks inside Turkey.


Read more: Turkey's Violent Protests in Context | Stratfor 

Postagem em destaque

Livro Marxismo e Socialismo finalmente disponível - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Meu mais recente livro – que não tem nada a ver com o governo atual ou com sua diplomacia esquizofrênica, já vou logo avisando – ficou final...