Paul Krugman’s new book should come with a disclaimer: there is no relation whatsoever between the ideological assertions of the New York Timescolumnist and bestselling author and the other Paul Krugman, who received a well-deserved Nobel Prize in 2002 for his scholarly research on international trade. Winning a Nobel Prize in economics doesn’t grant legitimacy to everything an economist writes, and Krugman’s book, like most of his newspaper columns, shows little connection with his past academic work.
To be fair, Krugman acknowledges that he has become a “pundit,” an implicit admission that his book is informed by his liberal views as much as by his economic knowledge. End This Depression Now! is essentially a pamphlet pretending to offer scientific answers to the U.S. economic slump. Its argument is easy to summarize: we have the knowledge and tools to revive the economy and provide jobs to millions of unemployed Americans. Consequently, those in positions of power who refuse to put Krugman’s advice into practice, themselves motivated by ideology, are the enemies of the unemployed. They want Americans to suffer for their past sins of excessive borrowing and spending. As if to emphasize that he sees the economic debate as a morality play, Krugman dedicates his book to the unemployed.
“Ending the depression should be incredibly easy,” Krugman asserts. The government must simply spend more, because the American consumer is spending less. Borrowing from Keynes, Krugman argues that the crisis, having been provoked by a decline in private demand, can only be solved by an increase in public demand. This is “a moral imperative” (the book constantly zigzags between ethics and economics). Public spending would be not only efficient, Krugman contends, but ethical.
This inflationary solution, which Krugman calls “a feel-good experience,” has been tried before. It worked, he claims, during World War II, when arms-building programs lifted the U.S. economy out of the Great Depression. Half-jokingly, Krugman says that the threat of an alien invasion should suffice to motivate more government spending. But he knows well—or should—that President Obama has already tried to rekindle growth this way. He admits that the results were not impressive, but only because public spending didn’t go far enough and wasn’t sustained.
The argument is dubious. All economies are built on confidence. An increase of the public debt now, as Krugman urges, would create a crisis of confidence, not a quicker recovery. Robert Lucas, the originator of rational-expectation theory, has shown how and why consumers and entrepreneurs reject Keynesian policies: in essence, the marketplace is wiser than the government. Entrepreneurs and consumers alike understand that an increase in public demand is artificial and short-term. Consequently, public demand leads not to increased consumption or investments but to price hikes. This unintended consequence of Keynesian demand has been repeatedly demonstrated in theory and practice. Milton Friedman and the late Anna Schwartz, in their Monetary History of the United States, showed that excessive money printing, which Krugman strongly recommends, always leads to inflation, not growth.
Krugman does not even mention these fellow economists, Nobel Prize winners all. He acts as if they did not exist, hardly a scientific attitude. Nor is it scientific to ignore that the only time Keynesian theory was truly applied—after the recession caused by the 1974 “oil shock,” when petroleum-producing countries formed the OPEC cartel and sent fuel prices soaring—it produced “stagflation,” a mix of inflation and economic stagnation. Krugman ignores this feel-bad experience, as well as the supply-side policies, based on monetary stability, that sparked the 1980s recovery. He hardly mentions the success of so-called austerity policies (which basically means balancing public accounts) in nations like Germany, which has seen strong economic growth. Krugman’s pithy dismissal: “It will not last.” His attitude calls to mind a quip from Paul Samuelson, a Keynesian himself, who observed that doomsday prophets could predict five crises for every three that actually happen.
Krugman also ignores the political consequences of the inflation he supports. Inflation may not create growth, but it does redistribute incomes. In an inflationary situation, one’s wealth depends less on what one does than on where one stands. Those able to cope with price hikes—a shopkeeper charging more, a banker raising interest rates—may become inflation’s beneficiaries. But wage earners and pensioners usually fall behind when prices rise, becoming poorer by the day. All those who lent their money at a fixed rate, usually by buying treasury bonds, are bankrupted in an inflationary era. This well-known pattern destroys all faith in government and leads to political upheaval. Throughout the twentieth century, inflation has been the death of democracy.
A modest knowledge of economics and of recent history, then, reveals that Krugman’s “feel-good experience” would not reduce America’s long-term unemployment: it would only cause more damage. With any luck, the cynical ideologues he vilifies will ensure that his solutions are not adopted. Common sense, which the author dismisses, rejects so simplistic a solution. An honest review of American history offers ample proof that economic growth does not obey government’s decrees, because the engine of growth has always been innovation and entrepreneurship. Stimulating the economy through the financing of “shovel-ready” projects and the like might sound attractive, but it has no record of success in the American experience. Paul Krugman lives in an unreal world: his book could even qualify him for another Nobel Prize—in literature.
Guy Sorman, a City Journal contributing editor and French public intellectual, is the author of Economics Does Not Lie.
Olá Prof,
ResponderExcluirCorroborando a sua opinião, segue mais uma pérola do nosso amigo Krugman!
http://blogs.elpais.com/paul-krugman/2012/06/la-historia-de-exito-no-tan-exitosa-de-estonia.html
Abraços!
Fabricio de Souza
Dessa vez eu discordo, Paulo.
ResponderExcluirAcho que o Krugman está certo. O erro do Sorman é não diferenciar o curto prazo e uma economia em depressão de uma economia em condições normais. O Krugman entende perfeitamente que inflação não traz crescimento de longo prazo. Não há nenhuma contradição entre aceitar essa ideia e supor que no curto prazo uma política monetária ou fiscal expansionista pode ajudar na recuperação.
"An increase of the public debt now, as Krugman urges, would create a crisis of confidence, not a quicker recovery."
A crise de confiança depende do tamanho do déficit e dos juros cobrados para rolar a dívida (quase nada hoje). Se uma expansão fiscal ajudar a reequilibrar a economia, a arrecadação tb aumenta, e o déficit pode diminuir daqui a pouco, mesmo que aumente agora.
"An honest review of American history offers ample proof that economic growth does not obey government’s decrees, because the engine of growth has always been innovation and entrepreneurship"
Pois é, mas o que isso tem a ver com o gap entre o produto potencial e o real?
Eu entendo que o Krugman quer forçar gastos públicos porque acredita em um estado maior, mas os pontos que ele levanta são relevantes para a economia sob qualquer ponto de vista ideológico. Se os gastos forem a salvação para a crise, então gastar agora pode ser uma boa ideia.
O que se pode argumentar é que ainda é possível sair dessa com a política monetária, mas isso envolve algumas discussões mais recentes sobre como a política monetária pode funcionar na armadilha da liquidez.
abraços, Zamba
Zamba,
ResponderExcluirGrato pelos comentarios, sempre bem vindos.
Discordo de voce nem tanto quanto à forma das políticas econômicas (que podem ser usadas de diferentes maneiras em diferentes circunstâncias, mesmo com as mesmas ferramentas monetárias ou fiscais), mas quanto ao fundo, que, de toda maneira, nao parece se aplicar aos EUA, um país "mais igual", ou especial, e sim 'as economias de medio e pequeno porte atualmente em crise na Europa.
A crise de confianca ja estava instalada desde antes, em todos eles, com os aumentos do deficit e da dívida pública. Mas a crise é realmente cruel para economias que nao teem a facilidade de exportar sua crise, via emissões monetárias de moeda de reserva, como os EUA; esse pequenos países (mas aqui cabe a Itália e a Espanha também) passam a sofrer a pressao dos mercados, via juros altos e perda de confiança (o que não é exatamente o caso dos EUA, que atrai capitais mesmo com juros baixos, o que não é dado a muita gente).
Mas nao havia depressao ate esse momento da verdade nos países mais atingidos. A coisa desaba a partir de alguma inadimplência bancária.
Quanto ao gap de PIB potencial e real, não vejo problema em reconhecer: ele se da' justamente pela NAO utilização plena de todos os fatores de producao, o que indica, precisamente, ausencia de inovacao e de empreendedorismo, o que tampouco e' o caso dos EUA. Mas é o caso do Brasil, da Grécia, de Portugal...
Mas, você tem de me explicar como e' que se pode gastar mais, quando o Estado ja esgotou todas as suas possibilidades de gastanca?
Como se pode jogar ainda mais dinheiro nos mercados, depois de todos os trilhões gastos? Quem pagará a conta: os filhos e netos? Vai haver calote?
O Krugman nao esta' certo. Continua a ser um panfletario, apenas que com linguagem keynesiana. Mas quase tao de botequim quanto nossos UniCampistas.
Mas quero agradecer mais uma vez seu comentario.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Vendo essa pérola, não pude deixar de lembrar desse seu Post, professor. Olha só o que a brincadeira fez...
ResponderExcluirhttp://www.againstcronycapitalism.org/2012/07/krugman-says-he-was-only-joking-when-he-implied-in-his-column-that-greenspan-needed-to-spur-household-purchasing-in-2002-by-inflating-a-housing-bubble/
Abraço
Felipe Xavier