A quase destruição da democracia americana por Trump - James Robinson (El Mundo)

Por qué fracasó el populismo trumpista

James A. Robinson

 El Mundo, Madri – 10.3.2021

 

 Aunque resulte difícil de creer para quienes vieron el espectáculo, el reciente segundo juicio político contra el expresidente estadounidense Donald Trump en el Senado sugiere que la democracia estadounidense sigue siendo sólida. Los cuatro años de desacato grandilocuente y flagrante de Trump a la tradición y los procedimientos habían socavado la confianza en la capacidad de recuperación del sistema político estadounidense, pero los procedimientos del juicio político parecieron afirmar la fortaleza de las instituciones democráticas del país.

El gobierno de Trump sacudió a EE. UU. con el rechazo activo de esas instituciones, que culminó con la invasión del Capitolio estadounidense el 6 de enero por una turba convocada por Trump. Parece que con el presidente Joe Biden se recuperó el equilibrio

De hecho, la democracia estadounidense aún es vulnerable, principalmente por la falta de compromiso de muchos de sus habitantes con las instituciones democráticas. Mientras Trump trabajaba para desinstitucionalizar al país y enriquecerse durante su mandato, el Partido Republicano se cruzó de brazos o, en algunos casos, lo aplaudió, allanando el camino a la sedición. Muchos estadounidenses y una porción considerable de la élite política estuvieron dispuestos a ver caer la democracia, una sensación que se intensificó cuando todos los senadores republicanos, excepto siete, votaron para absolver a Trump en febrero.

Por supuesto, aun cuando el juicio en el Senado no logró alcanzar la mayoría de dos tercios necesaria para declararlo culpable de incitar la insurrección del 6 de enero, sus esfuerzos para anular la elección presidencial de 2020 fracasaron. Las instituciones políticas estadounidenses prevalecieron y triunfó la democracia. Trump no pensó estratégicamente ni contó con un plan para traducir sus tendencias autocráticas en nuevas instituciones autoritarias.

De todas formas, asusta que un aspirante a autócrata más serio y hábil hubiera podido alcanzar el éxito donde Trump fracasó, no cuesta mucho entender cómo pudo haber ocurrido.

Los autócratas exitosos necesitan algo que se asemeje a un proyecto político integral. A fin de cuentas, el «América primero» de Trump fue principalmente una pose, porque no podía producir mejoras reales en las vidas de sus electores. Todos los autócratas exitosos —como el expresidente venezolano Hugo Chávez, el presidente argentino de posguerra Juan Perón y el actual presidente ugandés Yoweri Museveni— de alguna manera «cumplieron» frente a sus principales votantes.

Trump logró beneficios, pero solo para los ricos, eliminando impuestos y normativa legal. Sus gestos simbólicos no perdurarán y su eslogan «Que América vuelva a ser grande» está destinado a ser sepultado en el fondo de millones de armarios estadounidenses.

Los republicanos harían bien en tener esto en cuenta. En lugar de ello, gran parte del partido, tanto en el Congreso como a nivel local y estatal, aún se aferra a la falsa narrativa del fraude electoral y apoya a los insurgentes, o propone que la toma por asalto del Capitolio fue una puesta en escena para debilitar a Trump.

Esto es extremadamente preocupante. Perón pudo gobernar como lo hizo después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial porque la creciente intromisión presidencial en la Corte Suprema y las instituciones políticas argentinas había erosionado esos organismos durante los 15 años previos. La mayoría de los estadounidenses no desea seguir ese camino, aun cuando sí lo hagan muchos de sus líderes políticos electos.

Afortunadamente, el sistema político estadounidense cuenta con muchas fuentes de resiliencia, una de ellas es la integridad de los funcionarios locales y estatales, como la de quienes certificaron el resultado de las elecciones presidenciales de noviembre pasado en Michigan —a pesar de las amenazas de los partidarios de Trump— y la del gobernador republicano y los administradores de las elecciones de Georgia, que hicieron frente a las amenazas del propio Trump. Otra es el poder judicial: hasta los jueces nombrados por Trump se negaron a dar credibilidad a las afirmaciones infundadas de fraude electoral propagadas por el presidente y sus aliados. Eso funcionarios hicieron su trabajo y creyeron en el sistema.

Pero el talón de Aquiles del llamado populista de Trump fue su antiestatismo extremo. Odiaba al gobierno y no podía tolerar que se fortalecieran sus capacidades. Como prueba no hace falta más que ver la innumerable cantidad de vacantes en el gobierno federal para las que no hubo nombramientos durante los cuatro años de su período; ni qué hablar de la desastrosa respuesta de su gobierno ante la COVID-19, coronada por una chapucera implementación de las vacunas.

Los líderes populistas exitosos, por el contrario, aprovechan el poder del Estado de manera discrecional para crear puestos de trabajo para sus partidarios y proporcionarles bienes y servicios. Eso repugnaba a Trump... y pagó el precio electoral por ello. Muchos estadounidenses enfrentan problemas genuinos y Biden, afortunadamente, no sufre de una antipatía contra el poder del Estado que lo ate de pies y manos para mejorar sus vidas.

La supervivencia de la democracia requiere que tanto el Estado como la sociedad sean fuertes y se contrapesen. Para mantener este equilibrio es necesario un esfuerzo constante que, en última instancia, genera una mayor capacidad estatal para brindar a los ciudadanos lo que desean y fomenta una mayor movilización social para monitorear esa capacidad.

Este es el corredor en el cual Trump no podía funcionar; también es, esperemos, el punto donde todos quienes aspiran a destruir la democracia fracasarán en última instancia.

 

James A. Robinson, director del Instituto Pearson para el Estudio y la Resolución de Conflictos Globales, es profesor universitario en la Escuela de Políticas Públicas Harris de la Universidad de Chicago. Es coautor (con Daron Acemoglu) de The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty y Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty.

Itamaraty quer defender o direito à livre expressão de Trump, num foro inadequado: o G20 - Eliane Oliveira (Globo)

 Planalto elege redes sociais como novo alvo internacional e governo quer apresentar resoluções contra Big Techs

Em movimento desencadeado por banimento de Trump, Itamaraty começa a atuar em fóruns internacionais para reduzir o poder de grandes empresas de tecnologia
Eliane Oliveira

O Globo, 08/02/2021 - 03:30 / Atualizado em 08/02/2021 - 07:14

BRASÍLIA - Motivado pelo bloqueio de pessoas em plataformas da internet — como o então presidente dos EUA, Donald Trump, que no início de janeiro foi banido do Facebook e do Twitter por postagens classificadas como de incitação à violência — o governo Bolsonaro planeja começar a atuar em fóruns internacionais para reduzir a influência das grandes empresas de tecnologia sobre “o debate público, as eleições e a democracia de modo geral”, dizem fontes do Planalto.

Para isso, prepara-se para levar a fóruns internacionais, como o G-20 e a Assembleia Geral da ONU, propostas cujo fim é combater o que o chanceler Ernesto Araújo tem chamado de “tecnototalitarismo”.

O governo quer levar para o debate o argumento de que as redes sociais, embora privadas, se confundem com o espaço público. Por essa razão, devem estar sujeitas à legislação nacional e às garantias constitucionais, como a liberdade de expressão e a livre associação. O tema tem sido tratado com países como Canadá, Austrália, Coreia do Sul, Índia , Japão e México, onde o governo anunciou na semana passada que aprovará lei para regular as redes sociais.

A ideia é apresentar três propostas de resolução. Uma delas condena o banimento de Trump e de qualquer outro dirigente eleito. A segunda reconhece as redes sociais como “bens públicos” com impacto no processo político e propõe medidas para evitar que as empresas que controlam essas redes “distorçam o debate público com intervenções para calar vozes e censurar temas”.

Já a terceira proposta de resolução sugere que essas empresas se adequem a um dos dois regimes possíveis: como meio de comunicação e fórum de debates, com mínima interferência guiada pelas leis locais; ou como empresa de jornalismo, com responsabilidade por sua linha editorial e pela curadoria de conteúdo

Hungria e Terça Livre

Em debate no final de janeiro no Fórum Econômico Mundial, Araújo fez um apelo para que os países democráticos combatam o “tecnototalitarismo”. Mas não foi a primeira vez que o chanceler criticou as chamadas Big Techs. Em janeiro, no Twitter, ele disse que as redes sociais podem se tornar uma “polícia política” e sinalizou que pode haver mudanças na legislação brasileira.

Aliados do presidente Jair Bolsonaro na Europa também se movimentam, alegando, como fazia Trump, que as redes são enviesadas contra a direita. O governo do premier Viktor Orbán, na Hungria, anunciou que apresentará neste semestre um projeto para regular as Big Techs internamente. O da Polônia propôs legislação que multaria as redes por removerem postagens que não violem as leis locais. Países como Alemanha e França, por outro lado, querem combater o discurso de ódio na internet, mas cobram transparência das empresas e afirmam que esse tipo de regulação deve ser objeto de legislação pública, e não de decisão privada.

A preocupação do governo deve-se também a fatores internos. Na semana passada, o canal Terça Livre foi suspenso do YouTube, sob a acusação de violar as regras da plataforma ao veicular a falsa tese de que houve fraude na eleição americana. O secretário de Cultura, Mário Frias, determinou que a Secretaria de Direitos Autorais e Propriedade Intelectual notificasse a empresa e avisou que não admite “qualquer tipo de censura”. O responsável pelo canal, o bolsonarista Allan dos Santos, é investigado nos inquéritos que apuram a disseminação de fake news e a organização de atos contra a democracia.

Para Marco Sabino, especialista em assuntos da internet e sócio da Mannrich e Vasconcelos Advogados, o banimento nunca é a melhor saída mesmo para as redes, que vivem de usuários, tráfego de informações e anunciantes. A remoção das contas é uma medida extrema, disse.

— Estamos vivendo um momento de desinformação e notícias falsas para amealhar simpatizantes, pessoas que comungam daquele pensamento. As plataformas são parte da arena pública e possibilitam que muitas vozes sejam ouvidas. As empresas têm a prerrogativa de derrubar conteúdos falsos, racistas ou que incitem a violência — disse Sabino.

Na opinião do professor e especialista em tecnologia Ronaldo Lemos, a posição do governo brasileiro é triplamente equivocada: é, segundo ele, mais uma jogada de marketing do que uma ação diplomática; o G-20 não é o fórum adequado para tratar da questão; e a chance de haver qualquer medida nesse fórum sobre o tema o é zero.

— Um fórum internacional adequado seria o Conselho de Direitos Humanos da ONU, considerando que os direitos de liberdade de expressão que o chanceler brasileiro invoca nessa ação estão previstos precisamente nos tratados de direitos humanos. No entanto, o prestígio do Brasil perante o Conselho é atualmente muito baixo. O Brasil tem muito mais a explicar do que cacife para propor qualquer iniciativa para ele —disse Lemos.

Crimes e encruzilhada

Dawisson Belém Lopes, professor de Relações Internacionais da Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, lembra que o discurso de ódio e as fake news foram muito usados por Trump e seus apoiadores antes de serem bloqueados.

— Hoje nos encontramos nessa encruzilhada. As grandes empresas estão tentando pôr freios à sabotagem às instituições democráticas, como aconteceu nos EUA, ao cometimento de crimes no ambiente virtual. Mas o problema é que isso gera uma reação de um certo bloco da ultradireita. É uma reação feroz, raivosa, que traz consequências econômicas para as grandes empresas, faz as ações despencarem — afirmou.

Yasmin Curzi de Mendonça, pesquisadora do Centro de Tecnologia e Sociedade (CTS) da Fundação Getúlio Vargas no Rio, disse que a suspensão das contas de Trump das redes sociais foi uma resposta tardia, mas exagerada. Outras saídas poderiam ser a limitação do engajamento e a redução da visibilidade das publicações —o que a s redes já fazem também.

Para ela, o ideal é que toda a sociedade civil e os atores envolvidos participem das discussões, tendo como base princípios éticos.

Yasmin Curzi de Mendonça, pesquisadora do Centro de Tecnologia e Sociedade (CTS) da Fundação Getúlio Vargas no Rio, disse que a suspensão das contas de Trump das redes sociais foi uma resposta tardia, mas exagerada. Outras saídas poderiam ser a limitação do engajamento e a redução da visibilidade das publicações —o que a s redes já fazem também.

Para ela, o ideal é que toda a sociedade civil e os atores envolvidos participem das discussões, tendo como base princípios éticos.

https://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/planalto-elege-redes-sociais-como-novo-alvo-internacional-governo-quer-apresentar-resolucoes-contra-big-techs-24873361

Ultimos dias, perigosos, de Trump: um projeto de destruir a democracia internamente e precipitar conflitos externamente - Nouriel Roubini

Tanto quanto Bolsonaro, Trump atua por diretivas presidenciais que podem ter consequências nefastas para o país e o mundo.  

America Is the New Center of Global Instability

Following the storming of the US Capitol, President Donald Trump is desperate for an exit ramp that will preserve both his fragile ego and his future political influence. Unfortunately, that conundrum leaves him with few options other than to foment even more chaos both at home and abroad.

Nouriel Roubini

Straits Times, Singapura – 13.1.2021

 

New York - Whether the storming of the US Capitol was an attempted coup, an insurrection, or an assault on democracy is merely a question of semantics. What matters is that the violence was aimed at derailing a legitimate transition of power for the benefit and at the behest of a dangerous madman. President Donald Trump, who has never hidden his dictatorial aspirations, should now be removed from power, barred from public office, and prosecuted for high crimes.

After all, the events of January 6 may have been shocking, but they were not surprising. I and many other commentators had long warned that the 2020 election would bring civil unrest, violence, and attempts by Trump to remain in power illegally. Beyond his election-related crimes, Trump is also guilty of a reckless disregard for public health. He and his administration bear much of the blame for the massive COVID-19 death toll in the United States, which accounts for only 4% of the global population but 20% of all coronavirus deaths.

Once a beacon of democracy, rule of law, and good governance, the US now looks like a banana republic that is incapable of controlling either a contagious disease – despite spending more on health care per capita than any other country – or mobs incited by a wannabe dictator. Authoritarian leaders around the world are now laughing at the US and scoffing at American critiques of others’ political misrule. As if the damage done to US soft power over the past four years was not immense enough, Trump’s failed insurrection has undermined America’s standing even more.

Worse, although President-elect Joe Biden will be inaugurated in about a week, that is plenty of time for Trump to create more mayhem. Right-wing militias and white supremacists are already planning more acts of protest, violence, and racial warfare in cities across the US. And strategic rivals such as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea will be looking to exploit the chaos by sowing disinformation or launching cyber-attacks, including potentially against critical US infrastructure.

At the same time, a desperate Trump may try to “wag the dog” by ordering a strike – perhaps with a tactical nuclear warhead – on Iran’s main nuclear facility in Natanz, on the grounds that it is being used to enrich uranium. Far from this being out of the question, the Trump administration has already held drills with stealth bombers and fighter jets – loaded, for the first time, with tactical nuclear weapons – to signal to Iran that its air defenses are no defense at all.

No wonder Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi felt the need to reach out to the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff to discuss steps to prevent a nuclear strike by the Dr. Strangelove in the White House. Whereas an unwarranted order to launch a nuclear attack on a target with a large civilian population would be rejected by the military as obviously “illegal,” an attack on a military target in a non-populated area might not be, even if it would have dire geopolitical consequences. Moreover, Trump knows that both Saudi Arabia and Israel would tacitly support an attack on Iran (indeed, the US may avail itself of Saudi logistical and ground support to carry one out, given the shorter range of nuclear-armed fighter jets).

The prospect of an attack on Iran may give Vice President Mike Pence the pretext he needs to invoke the 25th Amendment and remove Trump from power. But even if this were to happen, it would not necessarily be a win for democracy and the rule of law. Trump could – and likely would – be pardoned by Pence (as Richard Nixon was by Gerald Ford), allowing him to run for president again in 2024 or be a kingmaker in that election, given that he now controls the Republican party and its base. Removing Trump with the promise of a pardon may be a Faustian deal that Pence strikes with Trump.

Because the self-pardon that Trump has been considering might not pass constitutional muster, it is reasonable to assume that he will be groping around for other creative outs. He cannot simply resign and allow Pence to issue a pardon, because that would make him look like a “loser” who accepted defeat (the worst insult in Trump’s egomaniacal lexicon). But if the president were to order an attack on Iran and then become a (pardoned) martyr, he could both preserve his base and avoid accountability. By the same token, Trump cannot risk being impeached (again), because that would open up the possibility of his being disqualified from holding office in the future. By this reasoning, he has every incentive to go out with a bang and on his own terms.

If this all sounds like the final days of Nero “fiddling while Rome burned,” that’s because it is. The decay of the American empire appears to be hastening rapidly. Given how politically, socially, and economically divided the US is, four years of sound leadership under Biden will not be enough to reverse the damage that has been done. Most likely, the Republicans will do everything they can to sabotage the new administration, as they did with former President Barack Obama.

Even before the election, US national-security agencies were warning that domestic right-wing terrorism and violence would remain the primary home-grown threat to the US. With Biden in office, this risk will be higher still. For the last four years, heavily armed white-supremacist militias have been kept relatively at bay by dint of the fact that they had an ally in the White House. But once Trump is gone, the groups whom he has instructed to “stand back and stand by” will not simply accept Democratic control of the presidency and Congress. Trump, operating from Mar-a-Lago, will continue to incite the mob with more lies, conspiracy theories, and falsehoods about a stolen election.

The US will thus most likely be the world’s new epicenter of political and geopolitical instability in the months and years ahead. America’s allies will need to hedge their bets against a future return of Trumpism, and strategic rivals will continue to try to destabilize the US through (P.S,)

 

Nouriel Roubini, Professor of Economics at New York University's Stern School of Business and Chairman of Roubini Macro Associates, was Senior Economist for International Affairs in the White House’s Council of Economic Advisers during the Clinton Administration. He has worked for the International Monetary Fund, the US Federal Reserve, and the World Bank. His website is NourielRoubini.com, and he is the host of NourielToday.com.

 

A Grande Mentira na Alemanha de 1918 e nos EUA de 2020 - Jochen Bittner

Minhas considerações iniciais a um artigo importante. 

Trump — que é um idiota completo e não tem a menor ideia de que está construindo uma estratégia política, pois só quer manter seu eleitorado para tentar novamente em 2024 —, pode estar repetindo, sem ter consciência disso, o famoso mito dos alemães de direita e conservadores em 1918: a mentira da traição pelas costas, por parte de socialistas e do grande capital judeu. Isso alimentou o caminho da vitória dos nazistas em 1932. Trump quer manter o mito e a mentira de que as eleições foram fraudadas em seu desfavor em 2020: 88% dos seus eleitores acreditam que foram roubados. O Grande Mentecapto continua destruindo a democracia americana.

No Brasil, temos um outro Grande Mentecapto que continua repetindo que as eleições foram fraudadas em 2018, as mesmas urnas que deram vitória a FHC, a Lula, a Dilma e a ele. Idiota IRRESPONSÁVEL!

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

 

Opinion

1918 Germany Has a Warning for America

Donald Trump’s “Stop the Steal” campaign recalls one of the most disastrous political lies of the 20th century.

By Jochen Bittner

Contributing Opinion Writer

The New York Times, November 29 2020

 

HAMBURG, Germany — It may well be that Germans have a special inclination to panic at specters from the past, and I admit that this alarmism annoys me at times. Yet watching President Trump’s “Stop the Steal” campaign since Election Day, I can’t help but see a parallel to one of the most dreadful episodes from Germany’s history.

 

One hundred years ago, amid the implosions of Imperial Germany, powerful conservatives who led the country into war refused to accept that they had lost. Their denial gave birth to arguably the most potent and disastrous political lie of the 20th century — the Dolchstosslegende, or stab-in-the-back myth.

 

Its core claim was that Imperial Germany never lost World War I. Defeat, its proponents said, was declared but not warranted. It was a conspiracy, a con, a capitulation — a grave betrayal that forever stained the nation. That the claim was palpably false didn’t matter. Among a sizable number of Germans, it stirred resentment, humiliation and anger. And the one figure who knew best how to exploit their frustration was Adolf Hitler.

 

Don’t get me wrong: This is not about comparing Mr. Trump to Hitler, which would be absurd. But the Dolchstosslegende provides a warning. It’s tempting to dismiss Mr. Trump’s irrational claim that the election was “rigged” as a laughable last convulsion of his reign or a cynical bid to heighten the market value for the TV personality he might once again intend to become, especially as he appears to be giving up on his effort to overturn the election result.

  

  But that would be a grave error. Instead, the campaign should be seen as what it is: an attempt to elevate “They stole it” to the level of legend, perhaps seeding for the future social polarization and division on a scale America has never seen.

 

In 1918, Germany was staring at defeat. The entry of the United States into the war the year before, and a sequence of successful counterattacks by British and French forces, left German forces demoralized. Navy sailors went on strike. They had no appetite to be butchered in the hopeless yet supposedly holy mission of Kaiser Wilhelm II and the loyal aristocrats who made up the Supreme Army Command.

 

  A starving population joined the strikes and demands for a republic grew. On Nov. 9, 1918, Wilhelm abdicated, and two days later the army leaders signed the armistice. It was too much to bear for many: Military officers, monarchists and right-wingers spread the myth that if it had not been for political sabotage by Social Democrats and Jews back home, the army would never have had to give in.

 

The deceit found willing supporters. “Im Felde unbesiegt” — “undefeated on the battlefield” — was the slogan with which returning soldiers were greeted. Newspapers and postcards depicted German soldiers being stabbed in the back by either evil figures carrying the red flag of socialism or grossly caricatured Jews.

 

By the time of the Treaty of Versailles the following year, the myth was already well established. The harsh conditions imposed by the Allies, including painful reparation payments, burnished the sense of betrayal. It was especially incomprehensible that Germany, in just a couple of years, had gone from one of the world’s most respected nations to its biggest loser.

 

  The startling aspect about the Dolchstosslegende is this: It did not grow weaker after 1918 but stronger. In the face of humiliation and unable or unwilling to cope with the truth, many Germans embarked on a disastrous self-delusion: The nation had been betrayed, but its honor and greatness could never be lost. And those without a sense of national duty and righteousness — the left and even the elected government of the new republic — could never be legitimate custodians of the country.

 

In this way, the myth was not just the sharp wedge that drove the Weimar Republic apart. It was also at the heart of Nazi propaganda, and instrumental in justifying violence against opponents. The key to Hitler’s success was that, by 1933, a considerable part of the German electorate had put the ideas embodied in the myth — honor, greatness, national pride — above democracy.

 

The Germans were so worn down by the lost war, unemployment and international humiliation that they fell prey to the promises of a “Führer” who cracked down hard on anyone perceived as “traitors,” leftists and Jews above all. The stab-in-the-back myth was central to it all. When Hitler became chancellor on Jan. 30, 1933, the Nazi newspaper Völkischer Beobachter wrote that “irrepressible pride goes through the millions” who fought so long to “undo the shame of 9 November 1918.”

 

Germany’s first democracy fell. Without a basic consensus built on a shared reality, society split into groups of ardent, uncompromising partisans. And in an atmosphere of mistrust and paranoia, the notion that dissenters were threats to the nation steadily took hold.

 

Alarmingly, that seems to be exactly what is happening in the United States today. According to the Pew Research Center, 89 percent of Trump supporters believe that a Joe Biden presidency would do “lasting harm to the U.S.,” while 90 percent of Biden supporters think the reverse. And while the question of which news media to trust has long split America, now even the largely unmoderated Twitter is regarded as partisan. Since the election, millions of Trump supporters have installed the alternative social media app Parler. Filter bubbles are turning into filter networks.

 

In such a landscape of social fragmentation, Mr. Trump’s baseless accusations about electoral fraud could do serious harm. A staggering 88 percent of Trump voters believe that the election result is illegitimate, according to a YouGov poll. A myth of betrayal and injustice is well underway.

 

It took another war and decades of reappraisal for the Dolchstosslegende to be exposed as a disastrous, fatal fallacy. If it has any worth today, it is in the lessons it can teach other nations. First among them: Beware the beginnings.

 

Jochen Bittner (@JochenBittner) is a co-head of the debate section for the weekly newspaper Die Zeit and a contributing opinion writer.

 

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.

 

Follow The New York Times Opinion section on Facebook, Twitter (@NYTopinion) and Instagram.

 

"I love you Trump" perde o seu objeto: Bolsonaro ainda insiste na resistência a Biden - Frederic Puglie (Washington Times)

 Newfound flexibility? Defiant Bolsonaro not rushing to embrace Biden

By Frederic Puglie - Special to The Washington Times 

Thursday, November 26, 2020

In the wee hours of election night Nov. 3, the president’s son tweeted a screenshot of Michigan vote totals purporting to show a sudden jump in favor of former Vice President Joseph R. Biden.

“Strange,” he noted ironically.

But what may sound like Donald Trump Jr. in truth came from Eduardo Bolsonaro, the congressman and third son of a man who has long and enthusiastically embraced his “Trump of the Tropics” moniker: Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro.

Several foreign leaders who forged strong personal bonds with President Trump — including Hungary’s Viktor Orban, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu — over the past four years face challenges adjusting to the prospect of a Biden administration. But nowhere may the whiplash be as severe as in Brasilia.

Having openly endorsed President Trump’s bid for reelection, the leader of South America’s largest and most populous nation now finds himself having to deal with a man he all but called a danger to his country as recently as two weeks ago — and one who has had some pointed criticisms of the populist Brazilian leader to boot.

“We heard a great candidate for head of state say that if I don’t put out the fire in the Amazon, he’ll put up trade barriers against Brazil. How can we react to all that?” Mr. Bolsonaro said on Nov. 10.

“Diplomacy alone won’t do,” he cautioned. “When you’re out of spit, you need gunpowder.”

The remark was but the latest sign the confrontational Mr. Bolsonaro sees no immediate intent to ingratiate himself with Mr. Biden, who had threatened the former army captain with “significant economic consequences” should he refuse to “stop tearing down the forest” in exchange for a $20 billion payment.

Not surprisingly, Mr. Bolsonaro is one of the last major holdouts who has yet to formally acknowledge Mr. Biden’s apparent electoral victory, so long as his friend Mr. Trump refuses to formally concede the race.

But also characteristically, Mr. Bolsonaro’s defiance is not so much about alienating Mr. Biden or placating Mr. Trump as it is about promoting none other than Mr. Bolsonaro, said Ambassador Paulo Roberto de Almeida, a former director of the IPRI think tank at Brazil’s foreign ministry.

“He must know that Trump lost and that Joe Biden will be the next president,” Mr. de Almeida said. “But since he embodied this ‘anti-multilateralist, anti-globalist, pro-American, anti-Chinese, anti-communist and so on’ position, he sticks to it.”

And while Mr. Bolsonaro’s refusal so far to congratulate — much less offer to work with — Mr. Bidenmay unnerve Brazil’s foreign policy establishment, his inner circle continues to egg him on, Mr. de Almeida added.

“Bolsonaro depends on his immediate advisers: [foreign policy adviser] Filipe Martins; son No. 3, Eduardo Bolsonaro; and Foreign Minister Ernesto Araujo,” he detailed. “Those three kept Bolsonaro from ending [his] silence about the [Biden] victory.”

And little suggests Mr. Bolsonaro is about to turn into a second Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, Mexico’s leftist president who — despite his political leanings — was able to forge an unexpectedly respectful and productive relationship with Mr. Trump, his ideological opposite.

Mr. Bolsonaro “doesn’t seem like he’s really ready to backtrack and find ways of working with Biden,” said Peter Hakim, president emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington think tank. “In part, it’s [because] Brazil is certainly less dependent on the United States than Mexico.”

Running in 2022

In the medium term, then, the fate of Washington-Brasilia relations may well depend on what Mr. Bolsonaro concludes is his best campaign strategy to win a second term two years from now.

“Whatever he does with regard to relations with the United States — what he looks for in the United States — will be in reference to his [reelection],” Mr. Hakim cautioned.

The Brazilian president, who has remained buoyant in the polls despite the country’s devastating fight with the coronavirus, has shown a tactical ability to be flexible on the policy front.

Having initially championed his Economy Minister Paulo Guedes’s pro-market fiscal conservatism, Mr. Bolsonaro this year switched course to allow for generous government handouts amid the coronavirus pandemic — one big reason, analysts say, for an unprecedented bump in his approval numbers.

“After a blustery, Trump-like start that he is going to make these huge changes in the way Brazilfunctions and he’s not going to follow the rules,” Mr. Hakim quipped, “he has [now] recognized the value of getting something done.”

And though the Nov. 15 first round of municipal elections saw Bolsonaro-backed candidates lose key mayoral races, the overall success of center-right forces, ironically, turned out to be good news.

“In truth, he gained strength,” Brasilia-based political consultant Vera Galante noted. “He ends up strengthened in Congress, and also in the states, even though his candidates were defeated.”

Which version of Mr. Bolsonaro — the 2019 ideologue or the 2020 pragmatist — will show up for the 2022 campaign, then, is, more than ever, anybody’s guess.

“He has a real dilemma facing him,” Mr. Hakim said. “Does he use his populist strongman approach? … Or is the best to try to get the economy going again? He would like to do both, but there are trade-offs there for him.”

The dilemma is real, political scientist Lucas de Abreu Maia agreed. But economic realities will ultimately force Mr. Bolsonaro’s hand, the former O Estado de S. Paulo reporter added.

“He is in a very tough position, actually, because he has to please his domestic audience — but the Brazilian economy cannot afford to have anything but [a] good relationship with the U.S.,” Mr. de Abreu Maia said. “Brazil needs the U.S. a lot more than the U.S. needs Brazil.”

And plenty of influential forces will be pushing Mr. Bolsonaro to at least try to mend fences with his new American counterpart, Mr. Hakim said.

“The agricultural lobby, the business community and the military — and even many of the evangelicals,” he said, “are going to press him to find a way to patch up relations with Biden.”

To do that, though, all roads lead back to the Amazon, whose deforestation pits Mr. Bolsonaro’s trademark talking points — sovereignty, national pride, development — against Mr. Biden’s assertion of an “existential threat” from climate change and his determination to make climate change a centerpiece of U.S. economic and foreign policy.

“Trade relations, trade negotiations, trade agreements,” Mr. Hakim enumerated, “are going to be very hard for Brazil to secure without a real reversal on Bolsonaro’s Amazon policy.”

In fact, Mr. Biden’s mention of the Amazon in the first presidential debate was the first time he had seen a purportedly domestic issue come up so prominently in a foreign campaign, economist Marcio Pochmann said.

“The Amazon issue, in truth, is an international debate,” said Mr. Pochmann, the former president of the Perseu Abramo Foundation linked to the opposition Workers’ Party.

About-face?

And given Mr. Bolsonaro’s newfound flexibility on a variety of issues, another about-face is certainly within the realm of the possible, he suggested.

“I wouldn’t rule out Bolsonaro changing positions” on the international scene, Mr. Pochmann said.

Getting along with Mr. Biden could certainly help Brasilia stay at the top of the South American pecking order, Ms. Galante suggested.

“President Bolsonaro will want to re-establish [Brazilian] hegemony in the region, and for that he needs the United States,” she said.

But any “flexibility” could easily cut both ways, Mr. Pochmann cautioned, pointing to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s conspicuous display of camaraderie toward Mr. Bolsonaro at last week’s virtual BRICS summit of major emerging economies.

And if anything, the former congressman — who during his 20-year career in politics has switched party allegiances no fewer than eight times — has a history of digging in, not dropping out.

Mr. Bolsonaro’s animosity toward Argentine President Alberto Fernandez — by all accounts mutual — seems to have survived countless attempts at reconciliation. And his jabs against China have already cost Brazil dearly, Mr. de Almeida said. At the BRICS summit — a loose grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — Beijing quietly withdrew its longstanding endorsement of an expanded role for Brasilia at the United Nations.

A telltale sign of what course Mr. Bolsonaro wants to take toward the Biden administration, analysts agreed, will likely be the fate of Mr. Araujo, his foreign minister.

A changing of the guard at the ministry’s famed Itamaraty Palace in Brasilia could come around Mr. Biden’s Jan. 20 inauguration and would signal Mr. Bolsonaro’s desire for a new beginning, Mr. de Almeida said.

“I would pay close attention to the Itamaraty,” Ms. Galante agreed, “because he could use this opportunity.”

But foreign policy and self-interest aside, embracing Mr. Biden will not come easy to Mr. Bolsonaro, who modeled much of his political success — his stunning 2018 electoral victory, his jabs at “fake-news” media, his Twitter tirades — on the Donald Trump model.

“He embodied this ‘Trumpist’ position not because he was Trump’s friend — he isn’t — [but because] he is Trump’s admirer,” Mr. de Almeida said.

“To the extent that either follows a playbook, Bolsonaro has been following Trump‘s,” Mr. de Abreu Maia said. “It’s going to be harder for [Mr. Bolsonaro] to win reelection without having really an inspiration — really a playbook to follow.”

A diplomacia bolsonarista servil a Trump continua impérvia - Jamil Chade (UOL)

 A maior parte dos países que seguem os EUA na submissão em votações na ONU é extremamente dependente da ajuda americana, em vários casos em questões cruciais de segurança militar ou ajuda humanitária. 

Não é certamente o caso do Brasil, o que torna ainda mais inaceitável a sabujice de Bolsonaro e de Ernesto Araujo em relação a Trump e ao Departamento de Estado. Inaceitável e vergonhoso para a diplomacia profissional brasileira.

Paulo Robeto de Almeida

Brasil se transforma em um dos últimos aliados dos EUA de Trump na ONU

Jamil Chade
Colunista do UOL
20/11/2020 04h00

Derrotado nas urnas nos Estados Unidos (EUA), Donald Trump vê seu apoio internacional também desaparecer e poucos países ainda votam ao lado do governo do republicano em decisões internacionais. Mas um deles não da sinal de trair o presidente derrotado: o Brasil.

Em votações na ONU (Organização das Nações Unidas) nesta semana, o Itamaraty optou por manter seu alinhamento automático com os EUA, o que passou a ser a marca da diplomacia do chanceler Ernesto Araújo, admirador declarado de Trump. Hoje, o Brasil é um dos raros países do mundo que não reconhece a vitória do democrata Joe Biden nas eleições americanas.

Numa resolução colocada em votação sobre o compromisso de todos os governos a eliminar qualquer tipo de violência contra a mulher, a Casa Branca exigiu que um parágrafo inteiro fosse abolido do texto. O Brasil apoiou.

O trecho que deveria ser eliminado indicava que governos deveriam "garantir" o direito das mulheres à saúde sexual e reprodutiva, além de assegurar que sistemas de saúde dessem acesso a tais serviços. Entre eles: métodos contraceptivos modernos.

O texto ainda pedia que governos garantissem que, onde a lei permita, serviços para abortos seguros sejam prestados.

Os americanos ainda pediram que fosse retirado do texto um trecho que indicava que mulheres têm o direito de ter "controle e decidir livremente e de forma responsável em assuntos relacionados com sua sexualidade, incluindo saúde sexual e reprodutiva, livre de coerção, discriminação e violência".

17 fiéis aliados
113 países votaram contra a proposta americana e 33 optaram pela abstenção. Mas 17 fieis aliados de Trump decidiram manter sua postura e votaram ao lado do americano. Além do governo Bolsonaro, apoiaram a proposta americana países como Líbia, Belarus, Paquistão, Iraque e Egito.

O Brasil ainda não votou contra uma emenda apresentada pelos americanos para modificar outro trecho da resolução, também sobre educação sexual. Nesse caso, o Itamaraty optou por uma abstenção.

Derrotado em seus votos, o Itamaraty ainda assim acabou se juntando aos demais países que aprovaram a resolução.

O Brasil ainda foi um dos raros países que se absteve em uma proposta americana para eliminar de uma outra resolução qualquer referência ao trabalho da OMS (Organização Mundial da Saúde). O texto original se referia a um compromisso de governos para garantir tratamento de obstetrícia adequado para mulheres.

153 votaram contra o projeto americano e a Casa Branca contou com apenas 11 países que optaram por se abster. Um deles foi o Brasil.

Antes da derrota de Trump nas urnas, o Brasil foi um dos cerca de 30 países que assinou uma declaração conjunta com o governo americano para montar uma aliança antiaborto nos organismos internacionais. Uma das metas do grupo era a de frear qualquer tipo de resolução que pudesse abrir brechas para o aborto como método contraceptivo.

Na primeira votação após a derrota do americano, porém, nem todos os países que se aliaram ao consenso seguiram o compromisso de votar ao lado dos EUA.

** Este texto não reflete, necessariamente, a opinião do UOL.

https://noticias.uol.com.br/colunas/jamil-chade/2020/11/20/bolsonaro-se-transforma-em-um-dos-ultimos-aliados-de-trump-na-onu.htm

Chinese Security Engagement in Latin America - R. Evan Ellis (CSIS)

 Meu "colega" do Department of State continua sua ofensiva do final do governo Trump contra a China na América Latina, provavelmente no mesmo estilo paranoico do documento que ele me mandou anteriormente e que divulguei ontem: "The Elements of the China Challenge", e que agora trata de um "perigo" iminente:  

Chinese Security Engagement in Latin America

(CSIS, November 19, 2020)

Dear Colleague:

Although you just heard from me yesterday, I am writing now to share with you a new report that I authored, on Chinese military activities in Latin America, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
This work looks at the range of strategic benefits to the PRC of that expanding security engagement in the hemisphere, from supporting near-term PRC goals of supporting its global commercial engagement, to utility in a possible (if undesired by all) future war.  The work further examines patterns across the region in that engagement, including arms sales, training and military education, exercises and other activities in the region.

The report is available here as a PDF document, and also at the website of  CSIS, which published it (please copy the whole link if it becomes split between lines):
https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinese-security-engagement-latin-america 

Thank you, as always, for the opportunity to continue in contact through this medium.

Respectfully, 
Evan Ellis
Dr. R. Evan Ellis
Research Professor of Latin American Studies 

U.S. Army War College Strategic
Studies Institute
47 Ashburn Drive
Carlisle, PA 17013
Tel: (717) 245-4085
Cell: (703) 328-7770
Twitter: #REvanEllis

Copiar o documento neste link: 

https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/201119_Chinese_Security_Engagement.pdf

Trump Drove Latin America Into China’s Arms - Oliver Stuenkel (Foreign Affairs)

Oliver Stuenkel mostra como a política de Trump para a AL backfired, por incompetente, ideológica e puramente aventureira, como se espera de bestas quadradas...

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

 

Foreign Affairs, November/December 2020

SIGN INSUBSCRIBE

Trump Drove Latin America Into China’s Arms

Biden Has a Chance to Wrest It Back

By Oliver Stuenkel

November 13, 2020

 

The administration of U.S. President Donald Trump took an aggressive approach to Latin America that has spectacularly backfired. Two years ago, John Bolton, who was then the U.S. national security adviser, dubbed the autocratic regimes of Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua the “Troika of Tyranny” and confronted the three countries with crippling sanctions and menacing rhetoric. “Today, we proudly proclaim for all to hear: the Monroe Doctrine is alive and well,” Bolton said in April 2019, referring to the principle behind the long and traumatic history of U.S. interventions in Latin America.

The result was to unite Latin American governments of all stripes against the United States. Regional leaders, concerned about the precedent that U.S. intervention in Venezuela could set, reluctantly sided with the country’s dictator, Nicolás Maduro. Even those strongly critical of Venezuela, such as Colombia, rejected all talk of military intervention, and Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, who had made radical alignment with the United States the centerpiece of his foreign policy, found himself overruled by the country’s armed forces, which categorically oppose the presence of foreign troops in neighboring countries. The autocratic leaders of Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba are still in power—in part because U.S. pressure created a rally-round-the-flag effect and helped them deflect blame onto Washington for internal woes.

Even as it failed to achieve its primary objective, the Trump administration’s policy undermined broader U.S. strategy in Latin America by strengthening China’s hand in the region. Indeed, the aggressive U.S. stance has left Latin American policymakers scrambling for partners who can balance Washington’s influence—a role that Beijing has been only too willing to play. In Venezuela, sanctions have sidelined U.S. firms, creating an ideal opening for Chinese companies to expand their influence. If the Maduro regime were to collapse, Beijing would be well positioned to assume a dominant role in the country’s reconstruction.

During the Trump presidency, China has grown more influential and more powerful in Latin America in virtually every dimension. Brazil is perhaps the most remarkable example: despite Bolsonaro’s anti-China rhetoric and his efforts to strengthen ties to Washington, Brazil’s trade with the United States has fallen to its lowest level in 11 years, while trade with China is booming. Fully 34 percent of Brazilian exports go to China, and China’s relatively quick economic recovery from the coronavirus pandemic will likely lead that figure to grow.

Latin American heads of state watched closely as Trump repeatedly humiliated Bolsonaro—surprising him with tariffs on Brazilian products, for example. The lesson they drew was simple: a partnership with Washington entailed significant economic and political risk. They looked to Beijing instead: Chile’s president sought to make his country the region’s main interlocutor with China, and Argentina welcomed a Chinese military-run space station, which began operating in 2018. Of seven countries that shifted ties from Taipei to Beijing during the Trump presidency, three—the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Panama—are in Latin America. Paraguay faces growing pressure to join them. Many Latin American countries are likely to adopt Huawei’s 5G infrastructure, despite U.S. threats of unspecified “economic consequences” for those that do.

President-elect Joe Biden has an opportunity to take a more constructive approach to Beijing’s growing influence in Latin America. Doing so will require the new administration to avoid antagonizing the region’s leaders and to emphasize shared interests instead. Washington will have to counteract an ugly impression that the Trump administration has created—one that suggests the United States is driven largely by the desire to contain China rather than support the region’s economic development.

DAY ONE

The less threatening the United States appears from a Latin American perspective, the less of an urge the region’s leaders will feel to balance its influence with China’s. Trump administration officials, including former and current Secretaries of State Rex Tillerson and Mike Pompeo, have made frequent reference to the Monroe Doctrine. The incoming U.S. administration must explicitly distance itself from this language. Such talk was a gift to the Chinese, who defend the principle of nonintervention—a principle that Latin American governments strongly support.

Badmouthing China makes Washington look desperate to dominate and afraid to compete.

The Biden administration should make clear from day one that military intervention in Venezuela is off the table, and it should put an end to broad sanctions that immiserate the country’s citizens. Even Venezuelans who despise Maduro largely oppose the U.S. sanctions, which have caused vast human suffering in a region where millions of people are already sliding back into poverty because of the pandemic. The United States should calibrate sanctions to hurt only those who assure Maduro’s hold on power. It should do the same in Nicaragua and Cuba, because whatever Latin Americans may think about the regime in Havana, broad sanctions fuel anti-Americanism in the region and make China’s life easier.

A POSITIVE AGENDA

Latin American policymakers are far more likely to be influenced by constructive U.S. policies toward their countries than by negative U.S. rhetoric about China. Trade with China has had many positive economic consequences for Latin America over the past two decades, and the United States sounds patronizing and dishonest when it seeks to dissuade the region’s leaders from sustaining these relations. Such meddling is counterproductive—even when the United States has genuinely relevant concerns, such as those about the inequality of a trade relationship that has Latin America mainly selling commodities to China and buying value-added goods in return, or about the risks that Huawei telecommunications infrastructure may pose to privacy.

The Biden administration should instruct its ambassadors and officials not to speak about Chinese–Latin American relations in public at all. Badmouthing China, rather than promoting U.S. strengths, makes Washington look desperate to dominate and afraid to compete. A Central American diplomat once privately told me that when U.S. officials complain about China in Latin America, “they sound like a jealous ex-boyfriend.”

The United States should instead lay out a positive agenda on matters of common concern across the region. Some of these pertain to other regions as well: the United States under Biden should of course return to the World Health Organization and adopt more generous policies to help poor countries gain access to masks, ventilators, and vaccines against COVID-19. Such measures will go a long way in countering China’s growing influence in Latin America.

Biden will need particular diplomatic skill to deal with Bolsonaro.

In Latin America in particular, Washington should emphasize and deepen its work with local partners to promote human rights, protect the environment, and strengthen civil society. It should be an ally in the region’s fight against corruption and a source of economic aid at the current moment of profound crisis. A constructively engaged United States can convene regional discussions to help tackle drug trafficking and transnational crime, which victimizes hundreds of thousands of young Latin Americans every year.

PRESIDENTIAL DIPLOMACY

U.S. presidential diplomacy could go a long way toward overcoming the region’s polarities, and Biden may be particularly well suited for such an enterprise. He is unusually knowledgeable about Latin America for a U.S. president-elect, and his moderate, pragmatic style may allow him to establish a meaningful rapport with leaders from the left (Bolivia, Mexico, Argentina), through the center-right (Colombia, Chile, Uruguay), to the far right (Brazil). Dialogue in the region has all but broken down in recent years: President Bolsonaro has so far refused to speak to his Argentine counterpart, and Mexico’s president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, has yet to visit a single Latin American country. Only if and when these leaders resume a constructive dialogue will the region be able to address its most urgent problems, such as migration from Venezuela and Central America, environmental degradation in Brazil, transnational crime, and a poverty rate nearing 40 percent.

Biden will need particular diplomatic skill to deal with Bolsonaro. The self-styled “Trump of the Tropics” repeatedly attacked the Democratic candidate during the campaign because of his comments about deforestation in the Amazon. Biden’s task will be to get Brazil to adopt more stringent environmental rules—but to do so without pushing it into the arms of China, which is careful never to criticize Brazil’s controversial environmental policies, and without issuing public threats, which Bolsonaro uses to mobilize his radical followers.

No matter how much U.S. diplomacy improves under Biden, trade between China and Latin America is almost certain to continue growing, and China will therefore consolidate some influence on the continent. Economic ties to China may help to mitigate the worst of the coming recession in Latin America, even if it can’t be staved off altogether. Nonetheless, Washington has an opportunity to become a far more trusted and influential partner to Latin America than it has been under President Trump. The new administration should seize the moment as the region charts its geopolitical course.