Cultura e história alemã serão assuntos no Goethe-Institut São Paulo em agosto
Temas de relações internacionais, de política externa e de diplomacia brasileira, com ênfase em políticas econômicas, em viagens, livros e cultura em geral. Um quilombo de resistência intelectual em defesa da racionalidade, da inteligência e das liberdades democráticas.
O que é este blog?
Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.
sexta-feira, 30 de julho de 2021
Cultura e história alemã serão assuntos no Goethe-Institut São Paulo em agosto (Estadão)
quinta-feira, 29 de julho de 2021
The Geopolitical Olympics: Could China Win Gold? - Graham Allison (The National Interest)
Sumary:
I’m writing to share my article published today in The National Interest previewing some of the major findings of a forthcoming Harvard report, “The Great Rivalry: China vs. the US in the 21st Century.”
- As we watch the results of the Tokyo Olympics, it’s hard to remember when in the century-long history of the modern Olympics China won its first medal. Answer: the 1984 Games in Los Angeles. By 2008, it had displaced the US from an accustomed position—taking home 48 medals to the US’s 36. And while most betting sites have the US winning the most gold in Tokyo, as Yogi Berra taught us: “it ain’t over til it’s over.”
- In the geopolitical Olympics, China’s rise to rival the US has been even more dramatic. Who today is the manufacturing workshop of the world? Who is the number one trading partner of most nations in the world? Who has been the principal engine of economic growth in the decade and a half since the Great Recession of 2008?
- In the military arena, who has eroded America’s competitive edge in every domain of warfare to the point that “today, every domain is contested: air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace”—in the words of former Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis?
- Who is the largest producer and consumer of automobiles? Who does Elon Musk see as the largest market for Tesla and other EVs? In the technology likely to have the greatest impact on economics and security in the next generation—AI—who is the clear leader in facial recognition, voice recognition, integrated surveillance, and fintech?
- The Big Takeaway from the Report is that the time has come to recognize China for what it is: a “full-spectrum peer competitor.” But as the essay says unambiguously: for the authors of the report, this does not mean “game over” for the USA. To the contrary, it means “game on.”
Part of a set of Transition Memos for the new administration prepared by members of the Harvard China Working Group led by the late Ezra Vogel and me, and supported by a grant from the Harvard Global Institute, the five chapters of the report along with other memos have been provided to those leading the Biden administration’s strategic reviews (as well as those who had been heading up plans for a second Trump term). After the Biden team and leaders of Congress have had the opportunity to use the memos and chapters in whatever ways they find helpful, they will be published later this year as Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center discussion papers. But since there have recently been a number of public comments and inquiries about the report, it seemed appropriate to preview some of the key findings.
If you have reactions, we will look forward to reading them.
Graham Allison
Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School
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Complete Article:
The Geopolitical Olympics: Could China Win Gold?
In the past two decades, China has risen further and faster on more dimensions than any nation in history. As it has done so, it has become a serious rival of what had been the world’s sole superpower.
Graham Allison
The National Interest, July 29, 2021
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/geopolitical-olympics-could-china-win-gold-190761
The Tokyo Olympics offers an apt analogy for reflecting on the much more consequential geopolitical Olympics in which China is challenging the United States today. In the century-long history of the modern Olympics, when did China win its first medal? Not until the 1984 Games in Los Angeles. Just a quarter-century later, in the 2008 Beijing Olympics, China displaced the United States from its accustomed position as No. 1—taking home forty-eight gold medals to the United States’ thirty-six.
While the United States snapped back in 2012 and 2016, the outcome of this summer’s games looks to be tight. Most betting sites have the United States winning forty gold medals to China’s thirty-three. But curveballs and caveats abound: tight rules have banned spectators and excluded elite athletes who failed Covid-19 tests. Meanwhile, several favored U.S. Olympians have stumbled in early competition. Sportswriters can be forgiven for repeating Yogi Berry’s one-liner about baseball: “It ain’t over till it’s over.”
In the geopolitical Olympics, China’s rise to rival the United States has been even more dramatic. Only two decades ago at the dawn of the twenty-first century, China did not even appear on the league tables of any geopolitical competition. Economically, it was classified as a “poor, developing country” (and thus allowed to join the World Trade Organization on terms reserved for developing economies). Technologically, with a per capita income at roughly the same level as Guyana and the Philippines, its citizens did not have enough money to buy advanced computers or cellphones, much less the resources to produce them. Militarily, it was for the Defense Department inconsequential, covered as what it called a “lesser included threat.” Diplomatically, it sat quietly, following Deng Xiaoping’s guidance to “hide and bide.”
But that was then.
In the past two decades, China has risen further and faster on more dimensions than any nation in history. As it has done so, it has become a serious rival of what had been the world’s sole superpower. Moreover, to paraphrase former Czech president Vaclav Havel, all this has happened so quickly that we have not yet had time to be astonished.
Who is today the manufacturing workshop of the world? Who is the No. 1 trading partner of most nations in the world? Who has been the principal engine of economic growth in the decade and a half since the Great Recession of 2008? By the yardstick that both the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Monetary Fund have concluded is the best single metric for comparing national economies, who has the largest economy in the world?
In the military arena, who has eroded America’s competitive edge in every domain of warfare to the point that “today, every domain is contested: air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace”—in the words of former Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis? While the United States remains the only global military superpower, in the Department of Defense’s most carefully constructed simulations of conflict over Taiwan, who has won eighteen of the past eighteen war games—according to former Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work?
Who is the largest producer and consumer of automobiles? Who does Elon Musk see as the largest market for Teslas and other electric vehicles? In the technology likely to have the greatest impact on economies and security in the next generation—artificial intelligence (AI)—who is the clear leader in facial recognition, voice recognition, supercomputers, and fintech—in the judgment of Eric Schmidt, the former CEO of Google (which is the leading AI company in America)?
Readers who hesitate before answering these questions will find bracing the forthcoming Report from Harvard’s China Working Group on the “Great Rivalry: China vs. the US in the 21st Century.” Prepared as part of a package of Transition Memos for the new administration after the November 2020 election, chapters of the report have been provided to those leading the Biden administration’s strategic reviews (as well as to those who had been heading up plans for a second Trump term). After the Biden team and leaders of Congress have had an opportunity to use them in whatever ways they find helpful, the chapters will be published later this year as Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center Discussion Papers. But since there have recently been a number of public comments and inquiries about the report, this essay previews some of our key findings.
The specific assignment to which our report on the “Great Rivalry” responds was “to document what has actually happened in the past two decades in the array of races between China and the US.” The goal was to provide an objective database that could serve as a foundation for policymakers who would undertake a fundamental strategic reassessment of the China challenge. Five chapters drill down on the rivalry in five core arenas of power: economic, technological, military, diplomatic, and ideological. Each chapter begins by identifying criteria, metrics for assessing various races, and the best-unclassified sources of data on each topic. Each then summarizes the evidence about what has happened over the past two decades and concludes with a candid assessment of where the competitors now stand.
In offering judgments, we have made our best effort to follow the lead of judges in the Olympics: scoring results impartially according to established criteria. For example, in assessing where the United States and China currently stand in AI applications for voice recognition, we report the results of Stanford’s international challenge for machine-reading, where Chinese teams won three of the top five spots, including first place. In most of these races, this means reporting that China’s performance has improved dramatically. But as the report explains, these advances should not be surprising, since China has essentially been playing catch up, closing gaps by copying technologies and practices pioneered by the United States and others.
Nonetheless, for Americans—including us!—news about China overtaking us and even surpassing us in some races is unsettling. Indeed, as students of international security, we recognize that the international order the United States has led for the seven decades since World War II provided a rare “long peace” without war between great powers, and larger increases in health and prosperity worldwide than in any equivalent period in history. The impact of China’s meteoric rise on that order is thus a matter of deep concern. But as John Adams repeatedly reminded his compatriots as they fought for freedom against the most powerful nation in the eighteenth-century world: “facts are stubborn things.”
In brief, the major findings of our report across the five arenas are these. First, China is not only rising. It has already risen to a point that it has upended the post-Cold War order: geopolitically, economically, technologically, militarily, diplomatically, and politically. Washington officials continue straining to see China in our rearview mirror. They insist that it is no more than what they call a “near-peer competitor.” Reality says otherwise. The time has come to recognize China as a full-spectrum peer competitor of the United States. As such, it poses a graver geopolitical challenge than any American living has ever seen.
The difference between the terms is not just semantic. If our assessment is correct, the Director of National Intelligence’s 2021 Global Threat Assessment describing China as “increasingly a near-peer competitor” is wrong. And the difference matters. Ask American athletes in Tokyo about peer competitors.
Second, China has not only overtaken the United States in a number of significant arenas, including the size of its economy, but has established leads the United States is unlikely to recover. While many readers may find this hard to believe, they should consider the arithmetic. Since China has four times as many people as the United States, if Chinese workers were only one-quarter as productive as Americans, their gross domestic product (GDP) would equal that of ours. GDP, of course, is not everything. But it forms the substructure of power in relations among nations.
Third, if both nations continue on their current trajectories, by 2030, China’s economy will be twice the size of America’s. Moreover, in many other sports that the United States has traditionally dominated, China is likely to have sustainable advantages. Painful as it will be, Americans will have to find some way to come to grips with a world in which, at least in some realms, “China is No. 1.”
Fourth, in contests like the Olympics, winning the largest number of medals is essentially a matter of national pride. In core geopolitical rivalries, however, including GDP, relative military capabilities for potential conflicts (for example, over Taiwan), or leadership in frontier technologies like AI, if China succeeds in winning gold medals that we should have, the consequences for the American economy, American security, and the American-led international order will be profoundly negative. Anyone who has doubts about what life under Chinese rules looks like should watch what is happening in Hong Kong.
Fifth, contrary to those for whom these findings lead to defeatism, the authors of the Harvard report decidedly do not believe that this means “game over” for the United States. Historically, American democracy has been slow to awake to great challenges. On the battlefield, had its greatest wars ended after the first innings, American colonists would have never become independent, Germany would have emerged the victor in World War I, Asia would now be a grand Japanese co-prosperity area, and Europeans would be speaking German in a Nazi empire. Had the United States not made the Soviet Union’s launch of the first satellite into space a “Sputnik moment” of awakening, the United States would not have been the first nation to send a man to the moon.
In the past two decades, China has risen further and faster on more dimensions than any nation in history. As it has done so, it has become a serious rival of what had been the world’s sole superpower.
Recognition of the magnitude of the challenge posed by what Singapore’s founding leader Lee Kuan Yew presciently predicted would be “the biggest player in the history of the world,” is the beginning of wisdom. We believe it should—and will—lead the United States to mobilize a response proportionate to the challenge.
As the United States and China compete neck-and-neck in the Tokyo Games, the head of China’s General Administration of Sports, Gou Zhongwen, has made no secret of China’s goal. As he put it recently: the Tokyo and Beijing Games are stepping stones on the path to China’s becoming a global “sports power by 2035.” In pursuit of this mission, China sent its biggest-ever team to Tokyo with 777 athletes to America’s 621. Nonetheless, as she arrived in Tokyo, the CEO of the U.S. Olympic Committee declared: “Team USA is ready” for everything. In sum, the game is on.
Americans have never shrunk from competition. Indeed, our market economy and democracy are founded on the proposition that fair competition will spur the rivals to run faster than they would do running alone. But for students of war and peace, the big question is: in the great geopolitical rivalry, can the United States and China can find a way to structure and manage constructive competition? Can the necessity for coexistence drive enlightened leaders to engage in peaceful competition in which each nation does its best to demonstrate which system—America’s democracy, or China’s Party-led autocracy—can deliver more of what human beings want? Since citizens’ lives in both countries depend on an affirmative answer, we must hope and pray that they can find their way to yes.
Graham T. Allison is the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at the Harvard Kennedy School. He is the former director of Harvard’s Belfer Center and the author of Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?
Um governo que mente, tão descaradamente, que até pensa que fala sinceramente, e que a gente acredita nele...
Bolsonaro deu 1.682 declarações falsas ou enganosas em 2020, aponta relatório de ONG internacional
Documento da Artigo 19 mostra ainda queda no nível de liberdade de expressão no mundo e no Brasil
André de Souza
O Globo, 29/07/2021
BRASÍLIA - Um relatório da organização não-governamental Artigo 19, com escritório em noves países, inclusive o Brasil, mostra que o presidente Jair Bolsonaro emitiu 1.682 declarações falsas ou enganosas em 2020, ou seja, mais de quatro por dia. O documento também aponta ataques de Bolsonaro à imprensa e mostra uma queda no nível de liberdade de expressão no mundo em geral e no Brasil: o país obteve apenas 52 pontos numa escala que vai de 0 a 100. O índice é o mais baixo registrado pelo Brasil desde 2010, quando começou a ser calculado pela ONG. As informações fazem parte do "Relatório Global de Expressão 2021", com dados de 161 países.
De acordo com o documento da ONG, que atua na defesa da liberdade de expressão e acesso a informação, as declarações falsas ou enganosas de Bolsonaro contribuíram para a aumentar o número de casos de Covid-19. A Artigo 19 também fez críticas à falta de transparência nos números da pandemia em alguns países, entre eles o Brasil.
"Em outros casos, a desinformação vem de indivíduos que ocupam posições relevantes — até mesmo chefes de governo, como Jair Bolsonaro — geralmente por meio de contas pessoais, em vez de oficiais, nas redes sociais. Esses indivíduos isolados podem ter um grande impacto na disseminação da desinformação. O presidente dos Estados Unidos [Donald Trump, que estava no cargo em 2020] foi provavelmente o maior impulsionador da 'infodemia' de informações errôneas sobre a COVID-19 em língua inglesa", diz trecho do relatório.
O documento destacou algumas falas de Bolsonaro, como chamar a Covid-19 de "gripezinha", enquanto "promove discursos antivacinas e anti-isolamento, piorando as taxas de infecção e causando uma crise de informação com discursos altamente polarizados". Desde janeiro de 2019, quando assumiu o cargo e ainda não havia pandemia, Bolsonaro fez 2.187 declarações falsas ou distorcidas.
O problema da desinformação não se limitou ao Brasil, tendo se espalhado rapidamente nas redes sociais e aplicativos de mensagens de vários cantos do planeta. O tipo mais perigoso, diz o relatório, "tem sido as teorias de conspiração sobre minorias étnicas que espalham a doença e o discurso de ódio, traduzidas em discriminação e violência no mundo real, remédios caseiros espúrios para a prevenção ou cura do vírus e propaganda — tanto por autoridades políticas nacionais quanto estrangeiras".
Ataques à imprensa
O levantamento aponta ainda 464 declarações públicas de Bolsonaro, seus ministros ou assessores próximos atacando ou deslegitimando jornalistas. "Essas atitudes influenciam as autoridades locais e se manifestam em atitudes, assédio e ações judiciais contra jornalistas. Esse nível de agressão pública não era visto desde o fim da ditadura militar. A crescente hostilidade social contra jornalistas e seus efeitos desencorajadores não devem ser subestimados", diz o relatório.
Além disso, houve 254 violações no Brasil contra jornalistas e comunicadores em 2020, das quais 123 perpetradas por agentes públicos e 20 constituindo casos graves, como homicídios, tentativas de homicídio e ameaças de morte.
Outro problema foi o aumento no uso da Lei de Segurança Nacional, da época da ditadura militar "como arma contra manifestantes e jornalistas que desafiaram o presidente por sua falta de ação, mesmo com o aumento das evidências do escopo da emergência da Covid-19".
No mundo todo, 62 jornalistas foram mortos e 274 presos. Os países com mais prisões foram China, Turquia e Egito. "As prisões quadruplicaram de março a maio de 2020, e o assédio e os ataques físicos aumentaram em todo o mundo — do Brasil à Itália, Quênia, Senegal e Nigéria", diz trecho do sumário executivo do relatório.
Apesar das críticas a Bolsonaro e outros governos mundo afora, o relatório apontou o papel de algumas instituições como freio ao autoritarismo: "Algumas instituições demonstraram resiliência — governos regionais e Congresso foram um contrapeso efetivo no Brasil, enquanto o Judiciário no México bloqueou algumas das iniciativas mais problemáticas de López Obrado [presidente do país]."
Queda global na liberdade de expressão
Na escala de liberdade de expressão, que vai de 0 a 100 e é calculada a partir de 25 indicadores, o Brasil teve 52 pontos. É a pior pontuação da série, que começou em 2010, e é a mesma da Colômbia e do Gabão, ficando logo abaixo do Haiti, que teve 53 pontos. As melhores pontuações foram da Dinamarca e Suíça, com 95, e a pior foi da Coreia do Norte, que zerou. Na América Latina, os melhores resultados foram de Uruguai (92), Costa Rica (89), Argentina (88) e República Dominicana (87).
Em 2010, o Brasil tinha uma pontuação bem melhor: 89. Em 2015, ficou em 86. A primeira grande queda foi em 2016, quando obteve 73 pontos. Em 2017 e 2018, ficou em 66 pontos. Em 2019, nova queda, para 54 pontos. Países que têm entre 40 e 59 pontos entram na categoria de expressão restrita. Já aqueles entre 80 e 100 estão na categoria de expressão aberta, a melhor possível.
"Nos últimos cinco anos, o Brasil deixou de ser um dos países com maior pontuação mundial para ser considerado uma crise de democracia e expressão – e agora também uma crise de saúde pública. O Brasil é a perfeita avalanche contemporânea de problemas de expressão: populismo autocrático, desinformação, desigualdade severa e controle tecnológico. A pandemia consolidou as tendências observadas no último ano", diz o relatório.
No mundo em geral, o relatório também mostra uma queda no grau da liberdade de expressão e imprensa. Ao todo, 61 países analisados têm pontuação inferior a 40, ou seja, são considerados em crise ou com altas restrições, o que dá 64% da população global. Em 2010, tais pontuações abrangiam 32% da população no mundo. E pelo menos 57 governos usaram a pandemia de Covid-19 como pretexto para limitar a liberdade e a democracia.
O aumento do autoritarismo é atestado por outros índices. Em 2010, 48% da população mundial viviam eu autocracias. Em 2020, passou para 68%. No ano passado, 96 países cometeram violações moderadas ou graves à democracia. Em 29, houve 155 desligamentos da internet. Também foi constatada a diminuição da privacidade e o aumento da vigilância, e um crescimento das demissões e cortes salariais de jornalistas no mundo todo.
Também foram registrados 331 mortes de defensores de direitos humanos, das quais 264 na América Latina. A Colômbia sozinha foi responsável por 53% dessas mortes no mundo todo.
https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/bolsonaro-deu-1682-declaracoes-falsas-ou-enganosas-em-2020-aponta-relatorio-de-ong-internacional-1-25131340
Um depoimento pessoal sobre tempos não convencionais no Itamaraty - Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Um depoimento pessoal sobre tempos não convencionais no Itamaraty
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Nunca pretendi colocar assuntos funcionais à frente de questões institucionais, mas alguns episódios recentes me induzem a fazê-lo agora.
Lá atrás, aproximadamente entre 2013 e 2018, quando eu aparecia como opositor da roubalheira do PT, e da sua diplomacia equivocada, essa direita destrambelhada me contatou algumas vezes para “entrevistas”.
Como sempre, nunca me neguei a falar com “jornalistas”, dizendo tudo o que penso sobre gregos e goianos, sem qualquer restrição mental.
Mas, depois que leram minhas críticas ao bolsolavismo alucinado (desde as eleições de 2018), passaram a me hostilizar, como esperado. Não foi surpresa para mim.
Tinha dado entrevistas para o Brasil Paralelo (primeiro em solo, em 2016, depois num “diálogo” com o Rasputin de Subúrbio, para minha surpresa, em 2017), e fui até contatado pelo Terça Livre, já em 2019, para “confirmar” que as manifestações no Chile e em outros países eram tudo obra do Foro de São Paulo (nunca publicaram as minhas respostas).
O guru presidencial, o subsofista então expatriado, nunca deixou de me atacar, até com palavrões grosseiros nos últimos dois anos e meio. Seguido, obviamente, pela tropa de aderentes alucinados, com ofensas ainda mais escabrosas.
Desde o início do desgoverno do degenerado, fui privado de cargos na Secretaria de Estado das Relações Exteriores, assim como ocorreu nos 13,5 anos de diplomacia lulopetista, de 2003 (quando fui vetado para dirigir o Mestrado do Instituto Rio Branco) a 2016, até o impeachment de Madame Pasadena. Passei meu tempo na Biblioteca, lendo e escrevendo, inclusive um livro dedicado ao lulopetismo diplomático chamado “Nunca Antes no Itamaraty” (2014).
Os bolsolavistas fizeram muito pior: me exoneraram do cargo de diretor do IPRI, no inicio de 2019, me lotaram na Divisão do Arquivo e passaram a controlar meus horários, sem que eu tivesse qualquer função nessa lotação puramente formal. Deduziram supostas “faltas injustificadas” (inclusive em dias em que eu estava com o patético chanceler acidental em eventos oficiais do MD) e me cobraram por “horas não trabalhadas”. Foram mesquinhos, prevaricadores e assediadores.
Resumo: Continuo onde sempre estive; larápios também!
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Brasília, 29/07/2021
Covid afasta servidores de divisão do Itamaraty em trabalho presencial e acende alerta no órgão - Metropoles
Covid afasta servidores de divisão do Itamaraty em trabalho presencial e acende alerta no órgão
Funcionários da Divisão de Comunicações e Arquivo do Itamaraty estão em trabalho presencial desde o início da pandemia
Três servidores públicos e dois funcionários terceirizados da Divisão de Comunicações e Arquivo do Ministério das Relações Exteriores estão afastados das atividades após terem testado positivo para a Covid-19 na semana passada. Eles trabalham presencialmente no prédio do Itamaraty, no setor que é responsável por serviços como a correspondência diplomática com embaixadas e consulados do Brasil pelo mundo.
Mesmo em órgãos públicos que adotaram majoritariamente o trabalho remoto ao longo da pandemia, como o próprio Itamaraty, setores considerados essenciais tiveram de se manter em expediente presencial dos servidores. É o caso da Divisão de Comunicações e Arquivo.
De acordo com o MRE, o setor tem 68 servidores lotados, dos quais 38 têm trabalhado presencialmente, mas em sistema de rodízio: metade numa semana, metade na outra. Os outros 30, segundo a pasta, estão em trabalho remoto.
Uma pessoa que trabalha no local relatou ao Metrópoles que uma servidora combinou de cobrir um colega na semana que não era a dela e compareceu ao trabalho presencial por 15 dias seguidos, os últimos com visíveis sintomas de Covid-19. Ao longo da semana passada, ela e em seguida mais quatro colegas desse mesmo setor acabaram testando positivo. Ainda de acordo com essa fonte, já há outros casos suspeitos - o que o Itamaraty não confirma ainda.
Outro ladoO MRE confirmou os cinco afastamentos de funcionários da Divisão de Comunicações e Arquivo após testes positivos de Covid-19 e alegou que segue protocolos para minimizar os riscos de contaminação.
"A área responsável pela limpeza e desinfecção do MRE foi comunicada dos resultados positivos e realizou limpeza cuidadosa das instalações", informou o órgão.
"Todos os servidores são orientados a usar máscara durante todo o expediente nos termos do Decreto 40.648 do GDF, de 23 de abril de 2020. Encontram-se disponíveis máscaras descartáveis e álcool em gel na unidade. O MRE adotou ainda rígido controle de segurança sanitária, com restrição de acesso, aferidor de temperatura nas portas de entrada, torres de álcool em gel, campanhas de conscientização, novo protocolo de tramitação digital de documentos e digitalização do atendimento sempre que possível", diz ainda a nota oficial.
A fonte que conversou com a reportagem reclamou, porém, que os protocolos não são seguidos por parte dos servidores e que não há cobrança para quem deixa, por exemplo, de usar máscara no ambiente de trabalho.
O globalismo dos tecnocratas que não é o globalismo dos imbecis: reflexões sobre matéria do FMI - Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Tecnocratas internacionais são acusados pelos malucos paranóicos das teorias conspiratórias do antiglobalismo de serem os principais agentes – "burocratas internacionais não eleitos pelo povo", dizia o Robespirralho, o aspone diminuído do inepto presidente que temos –, junto com milionários de esquerda como o George Soros, mais a "esquerdalha mundial", de um suposto projeto mundial para retirar soberania aos Estados nacionais. Esse é o globalismo dos imbecis, aqueles que pretendem matar as instituições multilaterais e deixar o poder com os Estados nacionais, ou seja, com as super potências.
Reproduzo abaixo um artigo no blog do FMI sobre moedas digitais, que vai justamente no sentido contrário ao pretendido pelos antiglobalistas, mas também ajuda a entender a distinção que eu sempre faço entre globalização micro (a verdadeira) e a globalização macro (que é, na verdade, uma antiglobalização).
A globalização micro é essa feita por indivíduos e empresas que trabalham de forma livre e quase desimpedida, criando produtos e serviços, e depois os lançam nos mercados mundiais, para uso e usufruto de quem queira se servir de inovações, entre elas as moedas digitais, por exemplo, que ESCAPAM do controle dos governos. Temendo a perda de senhoriagem, os Estados nacionais – EUA, China, etc. – querem criar os seus próprios bitcoins e continuar com o monopólio das moedas oficiais, as únicas com poder liberatório e de circulação.
A globalização macro é essa feita pelos Estados e organismos internacionais, que sempre tentam CONTROLAR a livre expressão de indivíduos e empresas que fazem concorrência ao monopólio estatal com produtos e serviços que não DEVEM NADA aos governos, e isso é insuportável aos olhos de burocratas nacionais e internacionais. A globalização macro tenta REGULAR as transações, de qualquer tipos, e cobrar impostos em cima desses fluxos livres que se estabelecem entre indivíduos e empresas, POR CIMA das fronteiras.
Os imbecis do antiglobalismo não percebem que os burocratas internacionais atuam justamente com o mesmo objetivo dos Estados nacionais: controlar atividades, fluxos, pagamentos, inovação, o que me parece impossível, mas eles atrapalham um pouco o que é feito na globalização micro, que é o mesmo que LIBERDADE!
Sou pela liberdade, e portanto sou pelo globalização, pelo globalismo, pela TOTAL ausência de controles estatais, que não sejam aqueles que se destinam a garantir, a segurança, a saúde, a vida, a propriedade e a LIBERDADE dos indivíduos, que para mim sempre passam ANTES dos Estados. Por isso, não sou patriota, não sou nacionalista, não sou estatizante; apenas reconheço que Estados existem e vão continuar existindo enquanto o mundo for desigual, assimétrico e violento. Vai demorar para que a realidade mude no mundo, afinal de contas só temos pouco mais de 10 mil anos de civilização, ou seja, vida organizada em comunidades pacíficas. Mas existem ainda violência dispersa no mundo, não apenas derivada das assimetrias econômicas, mas também de instintos primitivos e até nobres: poder, ódio, amor, desejos, interesses e paixões.
Sendo o mundo como é, os Estados estão aí para garantir um pouco de segurança entre os indivíduos e no interior das jurisdições estatais, que é a forma que temos, nos últimos 4 ou 5 mil anos, para a constituição e manutenção de comunidades estáveis, com todas as diferenças que ainda existem entre "tribos" humanas. Em alguns milhares de anos, quando toda a humanidade estiver totalmente mesclada, misturada e supostamente unida, tudo isso pode mudar, mas por enquanto é isso.
Por isso, sou globalófilo e universal: desejo a mistura mais ampla possível entre povos e nações, e isso só pode ser alcançado pela globalização micro, aquela que se desenvolve naturalmente, e mais rapidamente, saída do espírito empreendedor de indivíduos e empresas, não a macro, regulada por burocratas estatais e internacionais, que só atrasa a primeira.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Brasília, 29/07/2021
Making The Digital Money Revolution Work for All
By Tobias Adrian and Tommaso Mancini-Griffoli
IMF blog: July 29, 2021
History moves in uneven steps. Just as the telegraph erased time and distance in the 19th century, today’s innovations in digital money may bring significant changes in the way we lead our lives. The shift to electronic payments and social interactions brought on by the pandemic may cause similarly rapid and widespread transformations.
But we must look beyond the dazzle of technology and the alluring image of futuristic payment services. At the IMF, we must identify and help countries solve the deeper policy tradeoffs and challenges that are arising.
The rapid pace of change is a call to action—for countries to guide, and not be guided by, today’s transformations. It is also important for the IMF to engage early with countries, and usher in reforms that will contribute to the stability of the international monetary system, and foster solutions that work for all countries. There is a window of opportunity to maintain control over monetary and financial conditions, and to enhance market integration, financial inclusion, economic efficiency, productivity, and financial integrity. But there are also risks of stepping back on each of these fronts. We must enact the right policies today to reap the gains tomorrow.
We emphasize this in two papers published today, one on the new policy challenges, and one on an operational strategy for the Fund to engage with countries on the digital money revolution.
Digital money developing rapidly
Digital forms of money are diverse and evolving swiftly. They include publicly issued central bank digital currencies (CBDC)—think of these as digital cash, though not necessarily offering the same anonymity to avoid illicit transfers. Private initiatives are also proliferating, such as eMoney (like Kenya’s mobile money transfer service MPesa) and stablecoins (digital tokens backed by external assets, like USD-coin and the proposed Diem). These are digital representations of value that can be transferred at the click of a button, in some cases across national borders, as simply as sending an email. The stability of these means of payment, when measured in national currencies, varies significantly. The least stable of the lot, which hardly qualify as money, are cryptoassets (such as Bitcoin) that are unbacked and subject to the whims of market forces.
These innovations are already a reality, and growing rapidly. According to IMF data, CBDCs are being closely analyzed, piloted, or likely to be issued in at least 110 countries. Examples range from the Bahamas’ Sand Dollar already in use, to the People’s Bank of China’s eCNY pilot project, to countries like the United States where the benefits and drawbacks of a digital dollar are still being studied. Stablecoins, still esoteric two years ago, tripled in value in the last six months (from $25 billion to $75 billion), while cryptoassets doubled (from $740 billion to $1.4 trillion). And adoption is global. eMoney accounts are not only growing much more rapidly in low- and middle-income countries than in the rich ones, but are now also more numerous. Africa, in particular, is leading the way.
Opportunities are immense. A local artisan can receive payments more cheaply, potentially from foreign customers, in an instant. A large financial conglomerate can settle asset purchases much more efficiently. Friends can split bills without carrying cash. People without bank accounts can save securely and build transaction histories to obtain micro-loans. Money can be programmed to serve only certain purposes, and be accessed seamlessly from financial and social media applications. Governments can tax and redistribute revenues more efficiently and transparently.
Policy implications—opportunities and challenges ahead
We may well reap these benefits, but we must be aware of risks, and—importantly—of the bigger policy implications and tradeoffs. The challenges to policymakers are stark, complex, and widespread.
The most far-reaching implications are to the stability of the international monetary system. Digital money must be designed, regulated, and provided so that governments maintain control over monetary policy to stabilize prices, and over capital flows to stabilize exchange rates. These policies require expert judgment and discretion and must be taken in the interest of the public. Payment systems must grow increasingly integrated among countries, not fragmented in regional blocs. And it is essential to avoid a digital divide between those who gain from digital money services and those left behind. Moreover, the stability and availability of cross-border payments can support international trade and investment.
There are also implications for domestic economic and financial stability. The public and private sectors should continue to work together to provide money to end-users, while ensuring stability and security without stifling innovation. Banks could come under pressure as specialized payment companies vie for customers and their deposits, but credit provision must be sustained even during the transition. And fair competition must be upheld—not an easy task given the large technology companies entering the world of payments. Moreover, governments should leverage digital money to facilitate the transfer of welfare benefits or the payment of taxes. Scope even exists to bolster financial inclusion by decreasing costs to access payment and savings services.
Finally, new forms of money must remain trustworthy. They must protect consumers’ wealth, be safe and anchored in sound legal frameworks, and avoid illicit transactions.
The challenges are significant, and so is the potential reward. But policy action must begin immediately. This is the time to establish a common vision for the future of the international monetary system, to strengthen international collaboration, and to enact policies and establish legal and regulatory frameworks that will drive innovation for the benefit of all countries while mitigating risks.
Choosing the right path now is critical. Regulation, market structure, product features, and the role of the public sector can quickly ossify around less desirable outcomes. Backtracking later can be very costly.
The IMF has a mandate to help ensure that widespread adoption of digital money fosters domestic economic and financial stability, and the stability of the international monetary system. We plan to engage regularly with country authorities to evaluate country-specific policies, provide capacity development to avoid a digital divide, and develop analytical foundations to identify policy options and tradeoffs.
To do so, the IMF must deepen its expertise, widen its skillset, ramp up resources, and leverage its near universal membership. Still, we cannot do this alone. The challenges are so complex and multifaceted, that collaborating closely with other stakeholders is necessary. The World Bank, the Bank for International Settlements along with its Innovation Hub, international working groups and standard-setting bodies, as well as national authorities, are all complementary partners, each with its specific mandate and skillset. By joining hands, we will help households and firms leverage the benefits and avoid the pitfalls of the digital money revolution.
Tobias Adrian is the Financial Counsellor and Director of the IMF’s Monetary and Capital Markets Department.
Tommaso Mancini-Griffoli is a Division Chief in the IMF's Monetary and Capital Markets Department.
Os EUA, a China e o Mar do Sul da China - CGTN
Uma opinião oficial chinesa a propósito de acusações feitas pelo Secretário da Defesa do governo Biden em Singapura, relativamente ao chamado Mar do Sul China. Não é irônico que os EUA queiram determinar o que é melhor para os países do Mar do Sul da China a respeito do Mar do Sul da China? Seria apenas por liberdade de navegação em conformidade ao Direito Internacional? Os EUA poderiam começar por aderir à convenção sobre o Direito do Mar; já seria uma boa coisa…
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Editor's note: CGTN's First Voice provides instant commentary on breaking stories. The daily column clarifies emerging issues and better defines the news agenda, offering a Chinese perspective on the latest global events.
During a speech at a Singapore think tank on Tuesday, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin made three claims about the South China Sea that don't hold much water – and are unlikely to plug the draining confidence in the U.S. commitment to the region.
Here is a reality check on claims Austin, the first high-ranking official from the Biden administration to visit the region, made during his speech in Singapore.
Beating the drums of war
In his speech, Austin painted China as a warmonger and a troublemaker, saying Beijing was not willing to negotiate the South China Seas issue peacefully.
"Unfortunately, Beijing's unwillingness to resolve disputes peacefully and respect the rule of law isn't just occurring on the water," Austin added, citing the Indian border, Taiwan and Xinjiang.
It is interesting that the U.S., which is still involved in two decades-long military conflicts, accuses China of refusing to resolve conflicts peacefully.
It is the U.S., not China, that is injecting itself into a maritime dispute half a continent away. It is the U.S. that is sending military warships deep into Chinese territory, and it is the U.S. that is trying to discourage negotiations and encourage conflict in the region.
A prime example of this is the Philippines. Washington is pushing Manila to make a defense pact and take a tough line on its maritime border with China.
However, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte has ignored this pressure and succeeded in fruitful negotiations with China about resolving the maritime conflict.
The two countries have moved beyond narrow sea border disputes into broader issues like strengthening trade and diplomatic ties.
Despite the unresolved maritime issue, Duterte refers to China as a friend and a benefactor.
China has been the biggest supplier of COVID-19 vaccines to the island nation. It is peacefully negotiating with all countries that have maritime disputes in the South China Sea. The only nation that wants military conflict over this issue is apparently the U.S.
A staff member unloads vaccines donated by China at a Philippine Air Force base in Manila, the Philippines, February 28, 2021. /Xinhua
South China Sea straw man
Austin again repeated the well-worn U.S. canard that China's South Sea claims are baseless and threaten international shipping routes.
Austin said, "We don't believe that any one country should be able to dictate the rules or worse yet, throw them over the transom, and in this regard, I'll emphasize our commitment to freedom of the seas."
China's sovereignty, rights and interests in the South China Sea have been formed in the course of a long history and have an abundant historical and legal basis. They have been upheld by successive Chinese governments all along and brook no challenge by anyone.
China has never threatened freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and promises it won't do so. In fact, one of China's primary priorities, the Belt and Road Initiative, revolves around building trade routes and increasing regional connectivity.
China has long cultivated closer trade and diplomatic ties with Southeast Asia, even as U.S. attention drifted elsewhere.
The U.S. claims that China's South China Sea claims have no basis in law. But this U.S. assertion relies on the UN Convention for the Law of the Sea, which the U.S. itself refuses to sign.
Choose your friends
During Austin's speech, he denied that Washington was asking Southeast Asian nations to pick sides. "As Prime Minister Lee (Hsien Loong) has counseled, we are not asking countries in the region to choose between the United States and China," Austin said.
However, this claim is undermined by the U.S.' words and actions. Although the U.S.' official position is to remain neutral in the South China Sea dispute, it regularly takes a side.
For example, Austin called China's maritime claims "unhelpful and unfounded."
Southeast Asian nations do not want to be caught up in the rivalry between the U.S. and China. They prefer strong ties with both nations.
But the U.S. continues its efforts to isolate China and put diplomatic pressure on Beijing from all sides. As Washington turns up the flame on South China Sea territory disputes in which it has no claim, it is hard for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries not to feel the heat.
The region still has not forgotten that the U.S. abandoned the Trans-Pacific Partnership deal that it initiated. Southeast Asian nations can't be blamed for wondering if U.S. promises for military support would be abandoned just as quickly.
The U.S. can playact that it is vitally concerned with Southeast Asia all it wants, but ASEAN nations know that in the end, China is a close neighbor with strong trade ties and will always be more focused on the region than the United States. Washington's provocations and lies like the three Austin repeated in Singapore won't change the fact that China will always care more about the South China Sea than the U.S.
(If you want to contribute and have specific expertise, please contact us at opinions@cgtn.com.)
quarta-feira, 28 de julho de 2021
Associação Internacional Adam Smith: convite a participar da próxima conferência
Uma boa oportunidade para historiadores do pensamento econômico:
2021 IASS Madison Conference Registrationby adamsmithsociety |
Registration for the upcoming 2021 IASS Madison Conference is now available online! Our full program will be forthcoming soon.
If you are interested in attending the conference, whether you plan on presenting a paper or not, please register for the conference at your earliest convenience.
To do so, submit the Google form available on the conference website: https://smithsociety.org/2021-international-adam-smith-society-madison-conference/ The registration fee for non-members is $25; registration is free for current IASS members. You can join the IASS here; if you indicate that you would prefer to pay the $25 fee on your registration form, you will be invoiced.
Discounted lodging arrangements for in-person participants have been made available at the Springhill Suites Madison. We are in the process of making travel arrangements to and from the conference hotel to campus.
We're looking forward to hosting our hybrid conference in Madison in October.